A W a l k o v e r t h e P o s t -S o c i a l i s t R u b b l e

Whats the Big Idea?As Europeans confront the spectacular failure of socialism,

they are frantically searching for a new ideology that can save them from capitalism.

A n t h o n y d e J a s a y

W H E R E the dream palaces o f socialist id eo lo gy used to stand, with their halls o f m irrors, banqueting room s, and w orkers dorm itories, there are now great big sad-looking holes. They are partly filled with the twisted beam s, rubble, and debris o f the old edifices, left by the wreckers ball. This pitiful clutter will almost certainly prove quire hard to break down any finer. T he rem aining void, from the interstices o f the debris upward, is now being filled up.

The filler is a gooey, viscous co n glom erate o f disparate elem ents. One day it may harden into a homogeneous- looking cem cnt and earn a name o f its own. Early attempts to hasten this process, and to give the filler intellectual respectability by calling it, variously, the Third Way, the post-socialist, postm odern, o r post-industrial m odel, the caring, com m unitarian order, or the forum over the m arket seem prem ature. For the tim e being no synthesis has taken place. The bits and pieces are still clearly distinguishable and som etimes even mutually contradictory. This makes them fascinating, though not necessarily enjoyable, to watch.

( I f all places, the filler conglom erate is richest in Europe, and nowhere so much as in France.There the breaking up o f socialist doctrine wreaked muchgreater devastation than in the social-science departments o f A m ericas colleges, i f only because its past role had been so much more vital. America basically accepts capitalism , not least because it considers it quintessentially A m erican. It is not the principle that it questions, only the practice. Francc basically rejects capitalism, especially in principle, the more so as it considers it quintessential!)- A nglo-Saxon. But how exactly do you do the rejecting when you can no longer get reasoned support and spiritual nourishment from socialism?

Mr. de Jasay is a political theorist living in France, and the author o f The State (Blackwells, 1985) and Social Contract, Free Ride (Oxford, 1989).

T he French alternative insists that it has no hangups about ow nership o f the means o f p rod u ction , chicfiy because it seeks to reduce its relevance to the vanishing point. In sharp contrast to personal patrim ony the house, the savings account, the share in uncles farm and aunts com er shop or sidewalk cafe, which both Left and R ight hold sacrosanct capital is despised on all sides. It is tolerated, however, because more than anywhere else,

capital in France is repentant, tam e, subservient to the bureaucracy o f the state, con ciliatory tow ard labor. A h igher profile would not fit what the French like to regard as their specific system, a model o f socictv no one else possesses, o r at least not to the same extent. T he model has three principal features: it is tech nocratic , medieval, and authoritarian.

Tech nocracy , o f course, goes with the grain o f the French tradition o f the suprem acy o f the engineer over the m erchant, the accredited expert over the practical man o f affairs. Replacing such socialist criteria as class interest or historical necessity, the French technocrat believes that he is guided by the rules o f reason; he manages

affairs, deploys resources, and pursues the public interest where in o ther countries business leaders pursue profit. He believes in efficiency in an engineering but not in the econom ic sense, approves w'hen m ore and b etter is achieved with the same outlay but protests sharply against achieving the same with less. Much o f the French opposition to privatization is technocratic, inspired by the fear that mere considerations o f cost will be allowed to thwart technical prow ess, and that service will be reduced to m atch expense to revenue. France has probably the best railway system in the world, which runs up what may be the highest operating deficit and this com bination is more acceptable in France than it would be anywhere else. Everybody can see the nice trains, but nobody really sees the deficit, which is in any case only an accounting fiction, immaterial as long as it is public, owed to ourselves.

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Salvaged from the ruins o f socialist thought, the idea that man and society must assert their mastery over the blind forces o f the market remains central to this new m od el. T h at the bulk o f the educated classes is at one w ith the L eft in h o ld ing th is is n o t su rp ris in g ; w hat is m ore striking is the strength o f this type o f discourse on the R igh t. Far-right intellectuals around the Club dH orloge, politicians o f the stamp o f Philippe de Villiers, but also those in the m ainstream cen ter-R ig h t such as Philippe Seguin and, when he lets him self go , President C hirac, really think that capital should thank its lucky stars that it is allowed to cam a profit.

JU ST as the disdain for profit as the purpose o f enterprise is a cross-party phenomenon in France, so is the medieval notion o f the just pricc, the just reward, and the right o f everyone to make the same living from doing the same thing tom orrow that he did yesterday and the day before that. Change imposed by m arket forces is a violation o f this right, which would be condoned by the savage liberalism o f Anglo-American laissez-faire, but is resisted and reversed by French post-socialism . That the attempted remedies against change are worse than the disease, and result in a vicious circle o f self-aggravating unemploym ent, is alm ost beside the point, and is widely ignored. T he im portant thing is to recognize the right once it has been acquired by whatever means, and to go on with the attem pt to protect it.

Since the introduction by de Gaulle o f the present system o f compulsory health insurance, the administration o f the systems money flows has been entrusted to one o f the Big T hree labor unions, which m odestly calls itself W orkers Force. This is a perk o f great value in cash and patronage. Last years short-lived attem pt by the Juppe governm ent to reform the health-insurance system and give the state some control over its runaway deficit would have allowed the Legislative Assembly to wrest the key to the till from the union bureaucracy. Helped by the C G T, the other big radical union, W orkers Force stopped all public transport much more vital in France than in the United States making the French trudge to work for an exceptionally cold w inter m onth. R u bbin g it in, W F's boss, M arc Rlondel, kept the strike going well after the governm ent abjectly capitulated. W ith uncontrolled and often vicious picketing, and with the governm ent in the absurd role o f em ployer elected by its employees and rcvokable by them, this is probably what one should have expected. W hat was unexpected and striking was the clear m ajority support Rlondel and his cohorts got from their victim s, the French public, held hostage by the tw o unions and som e public-service employees in their fight to protect their perks and privileges. The latters acquired rights were at stake, and true to the medieval spirit in which all have their place and all must keep it, the loss o f these rights could not be condoned.

Acquired rights that is, advantages o f one sort or another obtained at the expense o f the general public are a new cornerstone o f the ramparts o f the French m odel, Frances defense against speculative bond and currency markets, Asian child labor, American trade hegem onism ,

and the ruthless d ictatorsh ip o f supply and demand. During the 14 years o f M itterrands presidency, while he sacrificed one socialist principle and one socialist leader after another to his personal aggrandizem ent, his single yet sufficient excuse was that he was the guardian o f the peoples acquired rights. For that, lie was forgiven everything, including scandals and corruption o f a sordid- ness and Ryzantine com plexity com pared to w hich W hitew ater is not even in kindergarten. T he primacy o f acquired rights fits every post-socialist attem pt at rebuilding an ideology, but it fits the French version better than most: it favors producers over consum ers, insiders over outsiders, and surprising as this may be at first blush the haves over the have-nots.

This great reservoir o f rights is to post-socialism as surplus value used to be to socialism, for it tacitly implies a sort o f cornucopia, a widows cruse from which everyone can take what he thinks is his due, w ithout anybody else having to go without as a result.

That the have-nots nevertheless get the short end o f the stick is the great unm entionable o f the new ideology. A fter more than two hundred separate job-creating schem es involving tax incentives and subsidies o f all kinds, Frances unem ploym ent rate is over 13 per cent and rising steadily in good times and bad. This is a direct result o f payroll taxes to cover sickness, old age, and unemploym ent insurance that may exceed 6 0 per cent o f gross pay and that drive a thick wedge between the supply o f labor and the demand for it. This the defenders o f the French model will not admit. They blame chronic unem ploym ent basically on Frances and for that m atter the rest o f Continental Europes being an island o f fairness

France recognizes the right of everyone to make the same living

from doing the same thing tomorrow that he did yesterday

in the cruel sea o f Anglo-American and Asian capitalism. Any reference to vigorous job creation in these mercenary' and ruthless countries, and to the stagnation o f em ployment within Fortress Europe, is met with truculence: We have fewer jobs but our jobs are fit for human beings, whereas everyone knows that American blacks and Thai children work for next to nothing because their societies leave them without any protection. In France, all have an acquired right to a minimum income o f $ 4 3 0 a m onth; this token o f social solidarity proves the strength o f the m odel. Unem ploym ent is the fault o f others following a less humane one and com peting unfairly.

W hy, then, not pull up the drawbridge and make Fortress France, o r a Frcnch-led Fortress Europe, a fit place for operating the m odel w ithout being undermined by American and ultra-liberal influences? Elsewhere in Europe, this idea appeals mostly to the political and intellectual L eft. France is perhaps the only country where there is strong, albeit discreet, support for it across

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the political spectrum . N evertheless, it docs not prevail. So far, except for a brief interval in 1 9 8 1 -8 3 , it lias con sistently been trumped by an even stronger idea: plain gut nationalism. This sounds paradoxical, and it is deeply so; it must briefly be explained.

The anti-cap italist alternative, the idea o f a new m odel," in the minds o f the French political class is inseparable from the obsession with greatness; but France has long ceased to have the resources to be great with. Hence the support, in some o f the most unexpected quarters, for a united Europe where overbright French adm inistrators sail circles around their bum bling counterparts in Brussels, preventing any Atlantic tilt. Underlying it all is the core notion o f the brave and brawny Germ an draft horse, gently steered rather than driven by superior French w it and purpose tow ard a com m on goal that is reminiscent o f Charlemagnes empire if not o f N apoleons continental system . F o r this dream French political thought is ready to accept sacrifices, giving up the com fort o f a loose currency and trade protection , as well as tempering the dirigisme that would be congenial both to French traditions and to the gropings to replace socialist doctrine with som ething equally unfree. How ever, tem porarily at least, low external barriers and an open economy m ust prevail, for Germ any will not accept anything else, and Germany must be jollied along, not browbeaten.

T H E chemistry o f German political thought today, despite a few affinities, is quite different from the French. In France, any sectional advantage or privilege acquired since the war is held by ail sides to be a right; 55 per cent o f national product is spent collectively, and nobody believes seriously that anything could or indeed should be done about this. Statism reigns supreme and resources com e from the w idow s cruse. Germany, too , has a statist and welfarist tradition, but it also has a very Teutonic sense o f duty, work, and thrift that forbids belief in widows cruses, and compels a bitter realization that in its onward march the welfare state can go over the brink. For the last year or so, there has been fairly wide agreem ent that it has reached the brink. Only the loony L eft o f Berlin intellectuals denies this altogether. The respectable L eft and the unions are putting up a fight against any specific economy that is proposed, but this is largely a matter o f routine politicking. In effect, both Left and Right know full well that the democratic welfare state has its own dynam ics which, i f left alone, must push it into a zone o f hazard and possible self-destruction. At the same tim e, the R igh t is no keener than the Left to roll back the state. There is virtual consensus that even if it could be done it would not be desirable; anything so radical would be socially too disturbing.

W hile there is no Germ an ideology today, there is a search for som e ideological com pound that would help reconcile the acknowledged realities o f scarcity and co n flicting interests with the sweet reasonableness o f social peace and com munitarian spirit. W hat is wanted is a successor to the concept o f the social m arket econom y which, for all its being an oxymoron, has served the G ermans so well but which has now reached the term o f its

useful life. Som e other intellectual oxymoron is needed to provide the unifying form ula in which people o f good will can profess belief.

W ith the zeal o f converts, Germ ans are now perhaps m ore firm ly wedded to political dem ocracy than som e other nations that have had longer practice at it. D em ocracy, however, works through coalitions maintaining their cohesion and striving to recruit allies bv honoring old entitlem ents and awarding new ones in com petition with rival coalitions. This is the built-in engine that pulls the welfare state tow ard the brink, and this is what a magic new formula must somehow both stop and not stop.

I t is o f course not an impossible feat to stop your bicycle, keep it upright, and not fall o ff if you lean a little and put one foot on the ground; and it is this feat that political thought in Germ any seeks to accom plish. The side it leans to is the left, but the tilt is sligh t, and the foot it seeks to keep on the ground o f econom ic reality must not be made to carry too heavy a weight.

Unlike the French, Germans o f all classes and most persuasions do believe that capital has legitim ate rights o f ow nership and is entitled to earn whatever profit it lawfully can. In this respect socialist doctrine has never penetrated very deeply into Germ an op inion . At the same tim e, Germ ans o f m ost persuasions are egalitarian at heart, disapprove o f excessive d ifferences, and would not undo what is bv international standards a highly progressive tax structure. They think "society" should lift up the underprivileged, and the rich should be made to provide society' with the wherewithal to do so. The inconsistency betw een the rich being entitled to make what their property rights permit, and society being entitled to take it away from them , is o f course not noticed at the level o f broad popular opinion. It is, however, felt at the level where guiding ideological form ulae must evolve to reconcile irreconcilables and make social democracy intellectually respectable.

One o f the charms o f John Rawlss Theory o f Justice that explains its popular success on both sides o f the A tlantic was the idea o f chain-linkedness. The idea affirms that a distribution that maximizes the lot o f the least privileged docs not in fact do so at the expense o f the m ore privileged. A just d istribution admits no inequalities that do not work to the advantage o f the least w ell-off. But as a

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m atter o f fact (wc are expected to take this on trust) the ju st d istribution generates greater social w illingness to coo p erate . H ence the maximum advantage to the least w ell-o ff is chain-linked to advantages that accrue to the better-off, who thus need make no absolute sacrifice, only a relative one, at the altar o f social justice.

M uch the same idea is making the rounds in Germany today, and indeed in o ther European countries with a social-dem ocratic trad ition, including B ritain . Socialism was going to expropriate the expropriators, recapture surplus value, and vanquish scarcity. T hat this was rubbish is now acknowledged, but this makes the promise o f a new formula by which we can have our cake and cat it all the more alluring.

T he germ o f the corresponding new ideology, if it really deserves the nam e, is that as the com m unity tilts its policies in favor o f labor, o f the salaried middle classes and all those unable to carry lifes m ajor risks, coop eration becom es more willing, management gets easier, and productivity increases. W hat the tilt costs business and the wealthy in terms o f taxes, wages, benefits, and power- sharing with the unions, it repays them in greater social stability, safer property rights, and a sm oother functioning o f the administrative machinery. Both sides gain from the bargain. Capital, however, could never reap its gain if it were not for the redistributive measures, the taxes and regulations seem ingly directed against it. N o single capitalist can, by fair and caring treatm ent o f his employees, gain as much from their better cooperation as the caring treatm ent would cost him , for som e o f the gain would accrue to rival firms and to the com munity at large, which would get a free ride out o f his efforts and sacrifices. Only m andatory fiscal and regulatory measures that all en terprises have to com ply with can allow capital as a whole, and hence each firm and each owner individually, to reap the net gains o f greater social peace and a more productive econom y. This justifies interventionist governm ent and resolves any seem ing con trad iction for p ostsocialist thought must insist through thick and thin that the contradiction is only apparent between the respect for property rights demanded by a bourgeois order and the egalitarian legacy o f socialism that dem ocratic politics must preserve.

M U C H o f this effort at ideological reconciliation, although it suits the German yearning for consensus, is not specifically Germ an. The same ideas are swirling about wherever social democrats feel the need to update themselves. Except for the cou ntries, such as France, Italy, and Spain, where socialism was always deeper than social democracy and where there is now genuine ideological disarray, the whole o f Europe is speculating about som e such painless reconciliation o f evident contrad ictions. B rita in s N ew Labour has brought it closest to everyday reality by basing on it a strategy o f return from a quarter-century in the political wilderness. Tony Blair, the Labour leader, and his pack o f advertising men and T V producers seek above all to wipe out L abou rs old image as the class party, living o ff the conflict between us and them . New Labour is for labor

but also for capital; it will not assert one interest over another bur will bring all interests into harmonv and do it by less but better governm ent. Though no dem ocratic party w orth its salt can say anything else, New Labour appears to think that such a synthesis is in fact attainable.

While Thatcherite, dry Conservatives used to say that com panies belong to their shareholders, and Old L abour held that the com manding heights o f the economy should be in social ow nership, the new political language speaks about enterprises serving their stakeholders. In the capitalist view o f society, the natural conflicts between capital and labor, consumer and producer, young and old, blue- and w hite-collar, are resolved im personally by a myriad o f individual choices in free markets. In the social-

Socialism was going to expropriate the expropriatorsrecapture surplus value, } and vanquish scarcity. That

this was rubbish is now acknowledgedist view, they are resolved by the w orkers state. In the new view w hich senses the unpopularity o f the two old ones, they are not genuine conflicts and need not be resolved. Som ehow , all interests are com mon interests. As in chain-linkedness, all gain when one gains; all hold stakes in the same endeavor. While one part o f this creed is true but trite, and the other part is mushy and cannot stand up to cold analysis, the whole is nonetheless interesting, for it reveals what will sell.

People clearly do not like to let markets decide. N or do they like it when the government does, even if it is a government o f their own choosing. The idea o f a stakeholder dem ocracy insinuates that both m arket and governm ent can somehow be short-circuited and things will get sorted out among ourselves, giving more scope than hitherto to the apple-pie-and-motherhood values o f today, consultation and dialogue. Responsibility for who gets what seems, then, to shift to the enterprise as a kind o f stakeholders forum . M anagem ent must cease to be the agent o f the shareholders. It must become an umpire or, i f that word conjures up the idea o f a contest, rather a Solom onic cuttcr-up o f the com m on cake, seeing to it that wages are fair, prices are neither too high nor too low, jobs arc secure, consumers are protected, the local community gets its share, and the environment is not forgotten.

D espite the new science o f business eth ics, management is o f course not qualified to play this role, nor can it play it without betraying the owners mandate. Above all, the role would concentrate awesome power in its hands. Rut it would spoil the sport to spell this out. Stakehold- ing, like acquired rights, the widow s cruse, the caring European m odel, and equality w ithout leveling dow n, may be disparate, shapeless, and even dow nright phony, yet these seem to be the only elements currently on offer to fill Europes ideological void.

Fo r it is surely too much to hope that it will not be filled at all.

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