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A2: Anthro (By: Nick G


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3.Anthropocentrism is inevitable and goodthe alternative links to thecritique and makes it impossible to protect the biosphere.

Grey 93 William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (Anthropocentrismand Deep Ecology,Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online athttp://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)The attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values, or preferences seems to be a hopelessquest. Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are confronted with just too manyalternatives, as we can see when we consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem with

the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been proposed is that they permit too manydifferent possibilities, not all of which are at all congenial to us. And that matters. We should be concerned topromote a rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere. Human flourishing may certainly be included as a legitimatepart of such a flourishing.The preoccupations of deep ecology arise as a result of human activities which impoverish and degrade thequality of the planet's living systems. But these judgements are possible only if we assume a set of values (that is,preference rankings),based on human preferences. We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly shortterm and narrow conception of human interests and concerns. What's wrong with shallow views is not theirconcern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that well-beingconsists. We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace thedominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception.Our sort of world, with our sort of fellow occupants is an interesting and engaging place. There is every reason

for us to try to keep it, and ourselves, going for a few more cosmic seconds [10].

4. Incremental changes add uppragmatism in the context of ecology isbetter than their alternative

Hirokawa 2 Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the University of Connecticut and LL.M. from the NorthwesternSchool of Law, 2002 (Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law,Stanford

Environmental Law Journal, Volume 21, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)Changes in each instance create entirely new contexts in which more (or less) progressivearguments find a hold. Every time a change occurs, even if it is incremental or ostensibly seems

benign, the change creates a new context within which an entirely new set of possibilities willarise. n230 The pragmatist therefore evaluates progress by the distance a new idea causes practices to moveaway from past practices and paradigms.The difference between the pragmatic version of progress and the Kuhnian version is one only of degree. In the end, the results of both versions of

progress are the same - we look back at the change and realize that earlier ideas do not make sense anymore. The effectiveness of thepragmatic approach lies in the simple realization that, in adopting an innovative approach to a legal question,courts will find comfort in adopting what appears to be an incremental change, rather than a radicalparadigmatic shift. In [*278] contrast to radical theorists that deny the existence of progress because of a failureto immediately reach the radical goals of alternative paradigms, the pragmatist recognizes that a series ofincremental changes eventually add up. Environmental pragmatism enables environmentalists toseek achievable gains by focusing on minor improvements in the law that incrementally closethe gap between the values that pre-existed current environmental law and the alternativeparadigms of environmental protection.

ON THE ALT -

1. Turn: Calls for harmony with nature are dangerousthe underlyingassumptions of their alternative are rooted in the logic of Nazism.

Zimmerman 91 Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1991 (DeepEcology, Ecoactivism, and Human Evolution,ReVision, Volume 13, Number 3, Reprinted in ReVision (2002,

Vol. 24, No. 4), Available Online via Information Access, p. 43 (in 2002 reprint))Fascism may be regarded, at least in part, as a phenomenon of recollectivization, a regressivemovement in which people willingly surrender the anxiety and guilt associated withresponsibility and freedom. The self-assertiveness involved in modern anthrocentrism (whethercollectivistic or individualistic) demands actions that cause great harm to natural systems, to the Mother from which


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we spring. Implication in such actions may precipitate a sense of guilt and defilement, as well as acorresponding need for reconciliation and purification. The fact that National Socialism remains secretlyfascinating to so many people is indicative of the widespread longing to relinquish thealienation of modernity, to be purified of the defilement caused by the self-assertivetransgressions involved in individuation, and to regain lost communal and natural ties. The danger ofHeideggers view of history as a course of decline and degeneration, then, is that it invites psychologicalregression and a destructive social recollectivization, a type that we have witnessed too often in this violentcentury. Deep ecology, then, cannot call for a return to the guilt-free, undefiled days when humankind andnature allegedly existed in harmony. Instead, deep ecology must urge that humankind continue the evolutionary developments that ledfirst from original unity toward increasing individuation and that may ultimately lead to Self-realization.

2. Their alternative still requires a concept of human agency. We are limited toour own spatial-temporal perspective.

William Grey '00 Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland,Australia ("A Critique of Deep Green Theory",Beneath the Surface, p. 48)

Values depend on the existence of choice-making preference-havers. However, while our species characteristicsare sufficient for having the capacity to choose, they are not necessary. Values are tied to the notion of agency, because without thecapacity to choose and to act, there can be no coherent preference-ordering. The domain of actionthat is, thedomain in which we have the causal power to effect changesimposes limits on the kind and the scale of states of affairs about which we can coherently

entertain preferences. That is, it imposes limits on the domain of praxis. These limits can be illustrated by considering alternative spatial

and temporal perspectives. From a remote temporal perspective or a remote spatial perspective, whathappens here and now is of little consequence.21 Such perspectives are, in general, not relevant to choice. Similarly, froma subatomic level much of the practically relevant structure of the world disappears . That is not to sayit is without interest. Moral questions are not the only interesting questions. But we do not inhabit cosmic or subatomic levels of organization, and thestructure and organization at those levels are not relevant to praxis; they lie beyond the boundaries of community. Sylvan's account of values nowhereacknowledges the existence of such limits. The realm of practical reason is the zone of middle dimensions. In our sort of lives, billions of years andnanoseconds are irrelevant for structuring our preferences and choices. Human scaleor rather, the scale appropriate for choicemaking preference-

havers who hereabouts happen to be humandoes, however, matter. Meaningful deliberation must conform to the range ofpowers and opportunities that creatures such as ourselves possess.

AND NEW FLOW, EXTINCTION DA TO THE ALT

A. Their alternative means we all dieit makes extinction inevitable.Grey 93 William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (Anthropocentrismand Deep Ecology,Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online athttp://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)Suppose that astronomers detect a modest asteroid or comet, say five or ten kilometres diameter, on collision course withplanet Earth [8]. The impending collision would be perfectly natural all right, and cataclysmic enough to do tous what another one rather like it probably did to the dinosaurs. Such periodic disruptive events are natural allright, though they probably destroy most of the then extant large life forms. These times of renewal provideopportunities for smaller, flexible organisms to radiate opportunistically into vacated niches, and life goes on.From a biocentric or ecocentric perspective there is little doubt that our demise would providecomparable opportunities for development which we currently prevent. Should we, in suchcircumstances, step aside so that evolution can continue on its majestic course? I think not, and I think

further that interference with the natural course of events, if it could be effected, would be nobad thingat least from our point of view and in terms of our interests, which it is quite legitimate to promoteand favour.Suppose again that we are entering one of the periodic epochs of reduced solar energy flux. An ice age isimminent, with massive disruptions to the agriculturally productive temperate zones. However supposefurther that by carefully controlled emissions of greenhouse gases it would be possible to maintain a stable andproductive agriculture. No doubt this would be to the detriment of various arctic plant and animal species, butI do not think that such interference, though "unnatural" would be therefore deplorable. Nature in and of itselfis not, I suggest, something to be valued independently of human interests. It could be argued moreover that inthus modifying our natural environment, we would be following the precedent of three billion

years of organic evolution, since according to the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock (1979), the atmosphere and oceansare not just biological products, but biological constructions.


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B. Life in some form is inevitable but human life is uniquely goodradical ecology makes extinction inevitable.

Grey 93 William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (Anthropocentrismand Deep Ecology,Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online athttp://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

A great deal of hyperbole has been deployed in articulating the claims of deep ecology. It is

common, for example, to encounter claims that destructive human activityand in particular human technologyis threatening life on the planet; that we are disrupting the delicate fabric of the ecosphere, and driving ittowards collapse. Such claims are exaggerated. There have been far more traumatic disruptions tothe planet than any we can initiate. From a long-term planetary perspective, this is alarmistnonsense. However from an anthropocentric point of view such fears may be well founded.If the concerns for humanity and nonhuman species raised by advocates of deep ecology areexpressed as concerns about the fate of the planet, then these concerns are misplaced. From aplanetary perspective, we may be entering a phase of mass extinction of the magnitude of the Cretaceous. Forplanet earth that is just another incident in a four and a half billion year saga. Life will go onin some guise orother. The arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least, will almost certainly be around for a few

billion years more. And with luck and good management, some of the more complex and interesting creatures,such as ourselves, may continue for a while longer as well. Of course our present disruptive and destructive

activities are, or should be, of great concern to us all. But that is a quite properly human concern, expressinganthropocentric values from an anthropocentric perspective. Life will continue; but we should take stepsto maintain and preserve our sort of living planet; one that suits us and, with a few exceptions, our biotic co-existents.

C. Anthropocentric values are the only wayto prevent extinction.

Grey 93 William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (Anthropocentrismand Deep Ecology,Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online athttp://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)This passage is revealing. Note the characterization of the Age of Mammals as "richer" than the Age of Reptiles. As mammal chauvinists we might agree

but it is not clear on what grounds Callicott can justify the claim. It is also easy to agree that our demise, and the demise of

the ecosystem which currently supports us, would be a matter of regret. But clearly it would beregrettable because of a decidedly anthropocentric set of values, interests and perceptionsifCallicott really eschews such concerns entirely, the grounds on which his regret is based are deprived of anyfoundation. There are various levels of description for any natural system, and the level which

we adopt is inevitably interest relative. From a perspective which ascribes special value toliving systems, Venus and Mars are pretty disappointing planets. However from a purely physical point of

view it may be that they are, like Earth, complex equilibrium systems with energy cycles operating through theenergy flux of our local star. The reason that the purely physical descriptions are unhelpful for characterizing

what makes this planet better than the others in some important respects is that it is the wrong level oforganization for explaining what conditions are conducive to the flourishing of creatures like us. It is,once again, interest relative. Conceivably a silicon-based life form would find the temperature and atmosphereof Venus congenial, and of Earth execrable. As carbon chauvinists we should feel free to dissent from that

judgement.

Next off- Counter Kritik

BioSphere 2A. The negative treats the natural world as an experiment to bemanaged, a sphere in which human life must be preserved eternally,which paradoxically removes the value of life itself. We need the


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accident and randomness of the natural world to smash their simplifiedconstruction in order to escape.Baudrillard in 94[Jean, The Illusion of the End p. 85-88]

The finest example of what the human species is capable of inflicting upon itself is Biosphere 2 -the first zoological gardens of the species, to which human beings come to watch themselvessurvive, as once they went to watch apes copulate. Outside Tucson, in Arizona, right in themiddle of the desert, a geodesic glass and metal structure accommodating all the planet'sclimates in miniature, where eight human beings (four men and four women, of course) are to

live self-sufficiently, in a closed circuit, for two years, in order - since we are not able to changeour lives - to explore the conditions for our survival. A minimal representation of the species inan experimental situation, in a kind of spaceship allegory. As a museum mock-up of the future,but of an unpredictable future - a century hence, a thousand years, millions. . . who knows? - itforms a pendant to the Desert Museum some sixty miles away, which retraces the geological andanimal history of two hundred million years. The point of convergence between the two being theidea of the conservation and optimal management of residues - of the relics of the past for theDesert Museum, the anticipated relics of the future for Biosphere 2 - not to mention the magicaldesert site which allows the problem of survival to be examined, both that of nature and that ofthe species with equal rigour.Such a very American hallucination this ocean, this savannah, this desert, this virgin forestreconstituted in miniature, vitrified beneath their experimental bubble. In the true spirit of

Disneyland's attractions, Biosphere 2 is not an experiment, but an experimentalattraction. The most amazing thing is that they have reconstituted a fragment of artificialdesert right in the middle of the natural desert (a bit like reconstituting Hollywood inDisneyworld). Only in this artificial desert there are neither scorpions nor Indians to beexterminated; there are only extraterrestrials trained to survive in the very place where theydestroyed another, far better adapted race, leaving it no chance. The whole humanist ideology -ecological, climatic, micro-cosmic and biogenetic - is summed up here, but this is of noimportance. Only the sidereal, transparent form of the edifice means anything - but what?Difficult to say. As ever, absolute space inspires engineers, gives meaning to a project which hasnone, except the mad desire for a miniaturization of the human species, with a view perhaps to afuture race and its emergence, of which we still dream. . .

The artificial promiscuity of climates has its counterpart in the artificial immunity of the space:

the elimination of all spontaneous generation (of germs, viruses, microbes), the automaticpurification of the water, the air, the physical atmosphere (and the mental atmosphere too,purified by science). The elimination of all sexual reproduction: it is forbidden to reproduce inBiosphere 2; even contamination from life [Ie vivant] is dangerous; sexuality may spoil theexperiment. Sexual difference functions only as a formal, statistical variable (the same numberof women as men; if anyone drops out, a person of the same sex is substituted). Everything hereis designed with a brain-like abstraction. Biosphere 2 is to Biosphere 1 (the whole of our planetand the cosmos) what the brain is to the human being in general: the synthesis in miniature ofall its possible functions and operations: the desert lobe, the virgin forest lobe, the nourishingagriculturelobe, the residential lobe, all carefully distinct and placed side by side, according tothe analytical imperative. All of this in reality entirely outdated with respect to what we nowknow about the brain - its plasticity, its elasticity, the reversible sequencing of all its operations.

There is, then, behind this archaic model, beneath its futuristic exterior, a gigantichypothetical error, a fierce idealization doomed to failure. In fact, the 'truth' of theoperation lies elsewhere, and you sense this when you return from Biosphere 2 to 'real' America, asyou do when you emerge from Disneyland into real life: the fact is that the imaginary, orexperimental, model is in no way different from the real functioning of this society. Just as the whole

of America is built in the image of Disneyland, so the whole of American society is carrying on - inreal time and out in the open - the same experiment as Biosphere 2 which is thereforeonly falsely experimental, just as Disneyland is only falsely imaginary. The recycling of allsubstances, the integration of flows and circuits, non-pollution, artificial immunity,ecological balancing, controlled abstinence, restrained jouissance but, also, the right of allspecies to survival and conservation - and not just plant and animal species, but also social


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ones. All categories formally brought under the one umbrella of the law - this latter setting itsseal on the ending of natural selection.It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence of lifeand the right to life. But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory. Life is nota question of rights, and what follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial, but death. Itis only by paying the price of a failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a failure to die thatman is assured of survival. At least in present conditions, which the Biosphereprinciple perpetuates.

This micro-universe seeks to exorcize catastrophe by making an artificial synthesis of all the elementsof catastrophe. From the perspective of survival, of recycling and feedback, of stabilization andmetastabilization, the elements of life are sacrificed to those of survival (elimination of germs, of evil,of sex). Real life, which surely, after all, has the right to disappear (or might there be a paradoxical

limit to human rights?), is sacrificed to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed condemned, issacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air-conditioned clone (have no fear, all the earth'sclimates are air-conditioned here) which is designed to vanquish death by total simulation. Indays gone by it was the dead who were embalmed for eternity; today, it is the living we embalmalive in a state of survival. Must this be our hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we haveto build this prophylactic one? What, then, is this species endowed with the insane pretension tosurvive - not to transcend itself by virtue of its natural intelligence, but to survive physically,biologically, by virtue of its artificial intelligence? Is there a species destined to escape naturalselection, natural disappearance - in a word, death? What cosmic cussedness might give rise to such

a turnabout? What vital reaction might produce the idea of survival at any cost? What metaphysicalanomaly might grant the right not to disappear - logical counterpart of the remarkable good fortuneof having appeared? There is a kind ofaberration in the attempt to eternalize the species - notto immortalize it in its actions, but to eternalize it in this face-lifted coma , in the glasscoffin of Biosphere 2.We may, nonetheless, take the view that this experiment, like any attempt to achieve artificialsurvival or artificial paradise, is illusory, not from any technical shortcomings, but in its veryprinciple. In spite of itself, it is threatened by the same accidents as real life. Fortunately. Letus hope that the random universe outside smashes this glass coffin. Any accident willdo if it rescues us from a scientific euphoria sustained by drip-feed.

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