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What mix of brigade combat teams should the USArmy Field?

David Tier

To cite this article: David Tier (2016) What mix of brigade combat teams should the US ArmyField?, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:3, 538-549, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1151661

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1151661

Published online: 25 Apr 2016.

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Small WarS & InSurgencIeS, 2016VOl. 27, nO. 3, 538–549http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1151661

What mix of brigade combat teams should the US Army Field?

David Tier

uS army

ARTICLE HISTORY received 29 January 2015; accepted 13 november 2015

KEYWORDS national defense; uS army; force structure; brigade combat teams (BcTs)

In February 2011, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously stated, ‘When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engage-ments . . . our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right . . .’ This sentiment resonates as an explanation of why US forces have found themselves operating in ways in which they were not optimally designed to perform, such as conducting humanitarian assistance tasks in Somalia, peacekeeping operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, counterinsurgency missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a host of examples that Gates then mentioned. This phenomenon happens not by coincidence, and not because US strategists have performed poorly in forecasting potential future missions, but because it is the very nature of warfare. Only a foolish actor would engage enemy forces in a way for which they were well prepared, and adversaries have sought to avoid engaging US forces in manners they were most ready to handle. As Clausewitz described in his analogy of two wrestlers, combatants will eventually wind up in positions they had not previously considered, and so too US armed forces are doomed to fight

ABSTRACTDuring the past decade of war, the US Army has employed its forces in roles they were not intended to fulfill. The Army could have been better prepared if it had fielded a better mixture of forces. Instead of focusing on specific threats that narrowly specify which conflicts the Army will best be prepared for, the Army should maintain a broad range of capabilities that can meet a variety of circumstances. Accordingly, the Army should seek a force structure that exhibits a 3:1:1 ratio of Infantry, Armor, and Stryker brigade combat teams (BCTs) based on the possible range of conditions that US forces could face.

© 2016 Informa uK limited, trading as Taylor & Francis group

CONTACT David Tier davidtier@yahoo.com

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future wars in ways for which they are unprimed. This maxim should be accepted and embraced by the national defense community. In preparing for future wars, then, one reasonable course of action is to establish a force mixture designed to meet the worst-case scenario and thus reduce the chance that an adversary will pursue this most terrible case. However, the best course of action is to seek a force mix that the Army can apply to a broad spectrum of problem sets and weight its forces in favor of general capabilities that can be applied to as many environments as possible, while maintaining a smaller number of specialized forces ready to meet other particular threats. This would ensure that the Army would be prepared for a range of possible conflicts rather than subjectively focusing on a particular few scenarios judged to be most likely. In essence, the issue is not whether certain capabilities should be eliminated from the force as proponents of artillery and armor worry, but, instead, that all capabilities should be procured to some extent. The real question is which proportion of capabilities US forces should weight themselves toward. Based on a range of conditions US forces could find themselves fighting in, such as conventional versus irregular warfare, various terrains, and the Army’s ability to pre-position forces prior to conflict, the Army should seek a combat force structure that exhibits a 3:1:1 ratio of Infantry, Armor, and Stryker BCTs.

The range of conditions

To determine which proportion of BCTs to maintain, the Army must consider the range of possible conditions in which they could be employed. Although decision-makers may be tempted to assess the likelihood of combat in some con-ditions as more likely than others as done in the past, Gates’s incisive observation reinforces a maxim that adversaries will engage US forces in manners for which they are least prepared, and suggests that the Army should genuinely prepare for the entire spectrum of conflict rather than a narrower range judged to be more likely. This article first categorizes, then analyzes the range of conditions and assumes US forces would be equally likely to fight in any of them. Although other conditions such as the potential to fight in nuclear, biological, and chemical environments impact combat capability to some extent, they are not considered here because they do not disproportionately affect one type of BCT over another. This analysis also assumes that the United States will maintain the traditional air and maritime superiority it has enjoyed since World War II, which enables the joint force to bring greater firepower to bear and, naturally, reduces the requirement for ground forces to possess great quantities of firepower on their own.

The range of conditions in which forces could fight can be divided into three main categories: conventional warfare versus irregular, terrain type, and the opportunity to pre-position Army forces in troubled regions prior to conflict. each of these conditions provides certain advantages for which type of BCT is best to employ.

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Conventional versus irregular Warfare

The first condition that forces could fight in is the style of warfare. Clausewitz described war as the organized application of violence to achieve political objec-tives, and there are two broad subsets of warfare in which combatants employ different methods to achieve their goals. Conventional warfare is fought with forces operating in the field where each side attempts to defeat the other’s military forces through firepower and maneuver. Irregular warfare is fought with forces operating from areas of support where each side employs non-linear attacks in an attempt to indirectly defeat their opponents and force them into submission.

each BCT provides certain advantages in conventional and irregular warfare. Due to their superior firepower, mobility, and protection, Armor BCTs (ABCTs) are best equipped to defeat enemy forces in conventional warfare, with some exceptions depending on restrictiveness of terrain. Infantry BCTs (IBCTs) lend themselves well to conventional warfare to an extent, mostly when operating in terrain that restricts the operation of an ABCT. Designed as a middle compromise between heavy and light forces, Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) straddle the other two for advantages in conventional warfare and operate best in the transitional areas that separate restrictive from unrestrictive terrain.

Although ABCTs are most useful in conventional warfare, irregular warfare lends itself best to IBCTs. Since ‘human terrain’ is key to irregular warfare where a main point of contention is securing the support or acquiescence of local popu-lations, personnel-focused IBCTs place ‘boots on the ground’ in direct interaction with the population to compel, coerce, or persuade better than other BCT types. Although ABCTs and SBCTs provide more firepower, mobility, and protection, they also distance themselves from the local population in the same manner that airpower does, just to a lesser extent, by separating themselves from human interaction while mounted. Indeed, over the course of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, armored Army forces have had to dismount in order to conduct their critical missions and personally interact with the local population. Armored forces only operated as designed when battlefield conditions neared characteristics of con-ventional warfare, occasionally requiring the stronger firepower of main battle tanks, as was the case in the 2004 Battle of Fallujah as well as the Sadr City battle of 2009. ABCTs much more frequently operated like an IBCT or an SBCT. more often than not, ABCTs parked their heavily-armored tracked vehicles and used HmmWVs and mRAPs in the course of operating in assigned areas of responsi-bility. Personnel operating from the mounted safety of vehicles naturally lose some ability to persuade local populations through face-to-face engagement, and this forfeits a key aspect in irregular warfare.

In considering both of these subsets of warfare together, the different advan-tages of BCTs cancel one another out and discourage fielding more of one type over the other. However, the way the United States chooses to employ its forces

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makes a difference and breaks the deadlock. In irregular warfare, the United States typically rotates its forces at periodic intervals to allow units to recuperate and refit outside of the theater of war. In contrast, US forces in conventional warfare are typically not rotated, and remain engaged in the theater of war until the conflict’s conclusion. Therefore, there is an implied requirement to hold a number of forces in reserve that can replace fatigued units in theaters of irregular war. This necessitates a number of BCTs to be held as a rotational base force in reserve. Since IBCTs are best suited for irregular warfare, IBCTs should constitute the rotation base and exceed the number of other BCT types by an extent that reflects the desired rotation rate established in a military policy for refit and recuperation. The US Army’s active-duty rotation goal is 1:3,1 which is to say that for every day a unit is deployed, it should spend three days refitting outside of the theater of war. Consistent with this policy and combined with the IBCT’s advantage over others in irregular warfare, the US Army should field IBCTs at a ratio of 3:1 over other BCTs.

This also suggests that IBCTs and ABCTs should give somewhat greater prepa-ration toward the style of warfare they enjoy stronger advantages in. IBCTs should spend greater effort in preparing for irregular warfare. ABCTs should favor preparing for conventional warfare. Regardless, all BCTs should prepare for either style in order to ensure balance.

Terrain

The second condition which forces fight under is the nature of the terrain. There are seven different types of landscapes where ground combat could occur, with each BCT exhibiting different advantages in different terrain. The seven terrain types are arctic, coastal, desert, fluvial, jungle, mountain, and urban. most of these types are self-explanatory. However, the term ‘fluvial’ terrain is not com-monly used, though it is a very common terrain feature. Fluvial terrain is an area that is pocked with smaller bodies of water like rivers, lakes, and swamps, and is vegetated, but less densely than jungle terrain. The term derives from the geographic impact rivers have on soil, with their erosion carving swaths of land and making ground fertile for vegetation. Central europe and the eastern two-thirds of the United States would mostly be considered fluvial terrain. The

Table 1. BcT advantages by terrain.

Terrain BCT Infantry Armor Strykerarctic – – –coastal – – –Desert – X –Fluvial – – –Jungle X – –mountain X – –urban X – –Totals 3 1 0

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vehicles of ABCTs and SBCTs are better able to traverse fluvial terrain than they are jungle terrain. See Table 1.

Three types of terrain can be discarded in this analysis. First, arctic terrain can be discarded since no BCT enjoys a decisive advantage in it greater than the others. Arctic terrain can be mountainous or flat, soft-earth tundra or hard rock, vegetated or clear. Although extremely low temperatures might give an advantage for the personnel in mounted forces of ABCTs and SBCTs to survive its environmental conditions better, the tactical dangers and difficulty of oper-ating vehicles in snowy, icy environments offset their advantages. Thus, arctic terrain should not be a factor in considering BCT force mixture. For a similar reason, fluvial environments can be discarded from consideration. no type of BCT enjoys a distinct advantage in it. Fluvial terrain can be densely wooded or open, mucky swamp or firm grassland, it can allow easy vehicular mobility or it might be prohibitively difficult to traverse. When considering the whole fluvial set, the different types of BCTs yield no advantage in having a greater number of one over another, and the Army should maintain equal proportions of each type in this terrain. Third and lastly, mostly due to inter-service politics between the US armed forces, coastal terrain is generally the purview of the US marine Corps rather than the Army. Despite the fact that Army forces could still fight in this environment, the marine Corps bears primary responsibility for organizing and training their forces toward coastal terrain and the Army’s force mixture should focus on different environments.

military operations in desert, jungle, mountain, and urban terrain do lend favor to certain types of BCTs over others, however. ABCTs enjoy an advantage in desert terrain. Characterized by their relatively flat, open, and expansive landscapes, desert terrain favors the rapid mobility, superior firepower, and protection that ABCTs provide, rather than the softer-punching SBCTs and slow-er-moving IBCTs. For this same reason, SBCTs also enjoy a greater advantage in desert terrain over IBCTs. However, in jungle, mountain, and urban terrains, IBCTs enjoy an advantage over the others. Their mobility is less restricted, and IBCTs can utilize the crevasses of the terrain to protect and conceal themselves better.

Considering the various types of terrain in which US Army forces can fight, and presuming that no particular type of terrain is more likely to be fought on than others, IBCTs enjoy a 3:1 advantage in the variety of terrains in which they can fight. Consistent with concepts of game theory, Army forces would observe a nash equilibrium to field a 3:1 ratio of IBCTs over other types. Similar to the implication of advantages for which style of warfare BCTs should spend greater effort preparing, the different types of terrain also suggest that IBCTs and ABCTs should give somewhat greater preparation toward the three environments they enjoy stronger advantages in. IBCTs should spend slightly greater effort in pre-paring to operate in jungle, mountain, and urban terrains, and ABCTs should slightly favor preparing for desert conditions. Regardless, all BCTs should prepare to operate in any terrain to some extent. This analysis does not address the

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proportions of airborne or air assault capabilities that the Army should maintain but, at a minimum, the number of forcible entry-capable units in inventory should not fall below the number required by any single war plan.

As in any comparison of generalists to specialists, SBCTs do not enjoy a deci-sive advantage over either of the other BCT types in any terrain. SBCTs remain a compromise between the two others. An analysis of the third possible con-dition in which US forces might fight can better demonstrate the advantage of maintaining SBCTs as a deployable global reserve.

Pre-positioned forces

Despite the lack of success in predicting future conflicts as lamented by Gates, there is still value in forecasting the regions where US forces would most likely fight. The operational challenges associated with moving large forces to distant theaters necessitate seeking ways to reduce transit times of deploying forces. These challenges can be alleviated with pre-positioned forces. Granted, some resources will be wasted in positioning forces forward only to never use them for their intended purpose, as was the case with US Army europe (USAReUR) forces during the Cold War, but the investment still yields value in deterring potential conflict. Consistent with concepts understood in ancient times, the more preparation a force makes to fight in certain conditions, the less likely that type of conflict will occur. ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’ or ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. The forward-deployed forces of USAReUR helped deter Warsaw Pact aggression in the region for decades and, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, they could still contribute to a deployable global reserve of forces. Consequently, there remains value in forward-positioning forces in regions where armed con-flict is currently more likely, such as in the middle east or northeast Asia, whether or not these forces are eventually employed for the specific purpose of fighting in that region.

Forces can be forward-deployed and manned, as eighth Army forces pres-ently are in Korea, or they can be unmanned equipment sets located on land or afloat as they are with Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) sets. Prepositioning forces requires permission from a host nation to allow forces to either operate on their land or allow access to disembark, with associated legal arrangements diplomat-ically negotiated in Status of Forces Agreements, for example. Assuming agree-ment of host nations in strategic regions, prepositioning forces makes sense to eliminate the time it takes for units to deploy from other regions in order to respond more quickly to developing crises. However, there are diminishing mar-gins of returns for pre-positioned forces, as the more forces are pre- positioned the greater investment required, as well as the less likely that those forces will be needed where they are stationed. Since the practical alternative to prepositioning forces is to maintain a pool of globally deployable forces else-where, the Army should forward-position forces that are more difficult to deploy,

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while the globally deployable reserve should be easier to transport and nearer to transportation assets. Therefore, pre-positioned forces should predominantly consist of ABCTs, while IBCTs and SBCTs should disproportionately represent the global reserve. Sensibly enough, APS sets have tended to contain armor and mechanized infantry unit equipment sets rather than other BCT types.

While the Army should position ABCTs in forward regions where conventional conflict is more likely, it should hold a greater proportion of SBCTs in global reserve for rapid deployment of firepower, mobility, and protection capabili-ties. It makes a certain amount of sense to trade away the superior firepower and protection of a Continental United States (COnUS) based ABCT in favor of the added transportability of an SBCT for quicker deployment. The United States cannot expect future adversaries to allow sufficient time for US forces to mobilize and deploy as Iraq did in 1990 and 2003. SBCTs were designed to deploy anywhere in the world by air within 96 hours. Although a 2003 General Accounting Office study showed that it would take between 5 and 14 days and consume one-third of the US Air Force’s strategic lift capability in the process (i.e. C-5 and C-17 operating hours),2 an SBCT can realistically deploy by air while an ABCT cannot.

The global reserve should predominantly lie in the COnUS where concen-trated transportation assets can facilitate their rapid deployment. ensuring a balance of the more quickly deployable capability of SBCTs with the superior firepower and protection of ABCTs, the Army should maintain an equal number of ABCTs to SBCTs, but prioritize ABCTs for forward deployment and SBCTs for COnUS stationing.

National Guard and Army reserve force proportions

The active-duty force should favor a 3:1:1 ratio of Infantry, Armor, and Stryker BCTs, but should this proportion remain the same for reserve forces? The answer depends on whether the Army benefits most from an ‘operational reserve’ or a ‘strategic reserve’. An operational reserve would participate in the routine oper-ations and deployments that active-duty forces perform. It would be costlier yet quicker to mobilize and employ, and should more closely reflect the com-position of active-duty forces. Reserve component (RC) forces in an operational reserve should maintain a 3:1:1 ratio since the requirements would be similar to that of the active-duty force. The alternative to an operational reserve would be to maintain a strategic reserve, which would mobilize reserve forces only in the event of a major war as was done during the two World Wars. A strategic reserve would be cheaper for the nation to maintain but would take longer and greater effort to mobilize. A strategic reserve should possess a different set of capabilities than the active force since it would be employed under different conditions. A strategic reserve should consist of a greater proportion of ABCTs

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than the active force, since it would likely mean a major conventional war had broken out and the need for ABCTs would be greater.

The decision to choose between operational or strategic reserve depends upon whether the active-duty force is large enough to sustain its steady-state operations without calling on reserves to fill gaps. If active forces can act alone, RC forces should remain a strategic reserve. As General Odierno recently attested to Congress, an active-duty end strength of 490,000 would enable the Army to accomplish tasks assigned in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance with mod-erate risk, an end strength of 450,000 would be sufficient but would allow no flexibility in accomplishing the Army’s assigned tasks, and an end strength of less than 440,000 would be insufficient to meet the demands of the force.3 Since the present budget calls for an active-duty end strength greater than 440,000, RC forces should act as a strategic reserve, and there should be some greater proportion of ABCTs in RC forces than in the active force.

Evaluating the force

The active-duty Army consisted of 45 BCTs in 2012: 20 IBCTs, 17 ABCTs, and 8 SBCTs. According to Army announcements on force shaping, the Army will reduce the force to 33 active BCTs by the end of the 2017 financial year, which will include 14 IBCTs, 12 ABCTs, and 7 SBCTs.4 One more BCT may be cut to reduce the number to 32 at some point. If a 3:1:1 ratio is optimal, then the Army’s force has been too heavy and, thus, too expensive, and will continue to remain so. Instead, the 45-BCT force should have consisted of 27 IBCTs, 9 ABCTs, and 9 SBCTs, and a future 33-BCT force should consist of 20 IBCTs, 7 ABCTs, and 6 SBCTs. This force would be more dynamic in its ability to fight in a variety of conditions, more deployable, maintain the potential to position more ABCTs forward than presently forward-deployed, and cheaper to maintain. See Table 2.

In 2012, the RC contained 28 BCTs (all national Guard), with a force mixture of 20 IBCTs, 7ABCTs, and 1 SBCT. This mixture has been, and continues to be, too light for the needs of national service. If designed as a strategic reserve, the RC should contain a greater proportion of ABCTs. If designed as an operational reserve, the RC should exhibit a 3:1:1 ratio. The necessity of national Guard units to support their states may lead to different capability requirements, but Table 3 describes the proposed structure to meet national needs.

Table 2. evaluation of the active component/regular army.

2012 2017

Actual 3:1:1 Proposal Planned 3:1:1 ProposalIBcTs 20 27 14 20aBcTs 17 9 12 7SBcTs 8 9 7 6Total 45 45 33 33

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The present BCT mixture was based on a national defense strategy that has since been superseded and should not influence future requirements. The old US defense strategy of defeating two simultaneous regional aggressors has been replaced with defeating one while denying the objectives of another. This reduces the amount of combat power that was needed to defeat multiple nation-state actors, particularly decreasing the need for firepower-wielding ABCTs. The Army is reducing its size accordingly, but the force composition should be adjusted to accommodate this new strategy as well. The Army should maintain at least the minimum levels of particular capabilities required in exist-ing war plans, such as airborne, air assault, and armored forces, but it should also design its overall force with an eye toward the variety of conditions that forces could potentially face rather than for these specific plans. Some force management professionals argue that an ABCT can more easily replace the requirements of an IBCT rather than vice versa and, therefore, the Army would be well advised to hedge its bets by maintaining additional ABCTs, but the excess capacity in ABCTs is too great to justify continued levels.

A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) approached a similar topic from a different tack, identifying four different pos-sible futures, each with a corresponding BCT mixture strategy which the United States could use in force-shaping decisions.5 This article and the CSIS study make similar findings, particularly agreeing with the active-duty BCT mixture. Although each vision of the future in the CSIS study led to a different BCT bal-ance, the average ratio when considering all four futures together was very close to 3:1:1. A 3:1:1 ratio in active BCTs makes sense for decision-makers who would want to hedge bets between these four envisioned futures. However, the CSIS study incorrectly concluded that there was little reason to change the present mixture of national Guard BCTs. If ‘reversibility’ is the desired charac-teristic of the RC as the study claimed or, in other words, the ability of the RC to compensate for reduced active-duty force structure, then the RC should exhibit a similar BCT ratio to that maintained in the active-duty force. This would favor an operational reserve concept that sought to directly backfill the capabilities of the active force. nevertheless, the CSIS study essentially proposed no change to the present exceedingly light RC BCT mixture.

Table 3. evaluation of the reserve component/national guard.

2012–2017

Actual/ Planned Strategic Reserve (Illustrative Proposal)

Operational Reserve (3:1:1 Proposal)

IBcTs 20 10 16aBcTs 7 14 6SBcTs 1 4 6Total 28 28 28

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A 3:1:1 BCT ratio would nicely complement the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept. Since the RAF concept envisions sending few numbers of personnel to widely distributed areas of operation in predominantly high-rota-tion rate, small-unit training capacities, what better units to fulfill this role than infantry? Infantrymen would be best prepared to teach soldier-level and basic small-unit tasks that target nations would likely need; they would be better suited for the austere logistics support likely to be provided; they would not have heavy equipment left behind at home station to maintain; and there would still be sufficient armor units available to conduct any specific training needed for mounted forces.

The 3:1:1 ratio would fit well with a grand strategy of democratization, which would envision employing armed forces in counterinsurgency, stability and support, and nation-building missions, as have been pursued in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would also fit well with the ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific, where terrain dictates ground combat most suitable for infantry forces. A 3:1:1 ratio would not be best suited for a strategy that would limit the use of armed force to decisive, high-in-tensity conventional conflict in terrains where joint firepower effects could be maximized, such as held in the old conceptual framework of Airland Battle. A heavier force structure would better suit the conflicts this concept envisioned.

If the proportion of BCTs had been 3:1:1 for the past decade of conflict, Army forces would have been employed in a manner closer to their designed roles. Rather than forcing ABCT units to operate as infantry like they did in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the personnel-centric conditions of irregular warfare demanded forces be employed like IBCTs or SBCTs, the Army would have had more IBCTs to better match the demand to begin with. Army forces might have performed better or more efficiently as a result.

A potential criticism of the 3:1:1 proposal could be that the Army might short-change itself by maintaining only seven ABCTs in inventory if it were to face an adversary capable of large-scale conventional warfare. However, that charge should carry little weight considering the success Army forces enjoyed during major combat operations in 2003, when the equivalent of only three ABCTs from the 3rd Infantry Division (mechanized), as well as a total of five IBCTs from the 101st (Air Assault), 82nd Airborne Divisions, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade, were the only Army conventional forces required to topple the Iraqi regime. Since it proved possible to defeat a force that some experts considered to be the most effective in the Persian Gulf region with so few troops,6 maintaining more than twice that number of ABCTs in the active force should be sufficient to counter immediate threats. Furthermore, the additional ABCTs held in the national Guard could reinforce active-duty forces in major conventional war, and their number should be sufficient to address a greater number of other dire contingencies.

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In a similar vein, some might criticize a proposal to weight Army forces with more IBCTs that it might ‘lack the inherent protected mobility and firepower’ necessary for many combat operations.7 However, this risk can be mitigated by warehousing sets of up-armored HmmWVs and mRAPs left over from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as well as providing in-theater augmentation with transportation and assault aviation support units.

Conclusions

Army forces have not been as prepared as they could have been to operate under the conditions they have been called upon and engage the types of adver-saries they had previously prepared for. This has had less to do with a failure to accurately predict conflicts, than with the maxim that only foolish adversaries would choose to fight in a manner for which its opposition was best prepared. Instead of the Army focusing on particular threats only to never employ its forces as envisioned, the Army should maintain a broad range of capabilities that can meet a variety of circumstances. This makes further sense when considering that policymakers will forever seek to address the complex problems they face with the tools they have available to them at the time. ‘You go to war with the Army you have, not the one you might want or wish to have,’ former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commiserated.

Since IBCTs have an advantage over other BCT types in prosecuting irregular war, the Army should field IBCTs at a 3:1 ratio over the others in accordance with its rotation goals. Furthermore, when considering which types of terrain they hold employment advantages in, IBCTs again enjoy a 3:1 advantage over other types. The Army should weight its combat forces in the same proportion of operating environments it could face in observance of a game theory nash equilibrium. A 3:1:1 ratio best prepares the Army for the spectrum of potential conflict.

Army force structure exhibiting this 3:1:1 ratio would be better suited for the unpredictable nature of conflicts the future force will face. It will also yield cost savings, since a lighter force would be less expensive to equip and sustain. Although lightening the force could expose the Army to more risk in high-in-tensity conventional armored combat, this risk could be offset by transferring more armor capability to RC forces as a strategic reserve.

The Army could alternatively prepare for its worst-case scenario, such as a large conventional conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary, and focus its force structure to counter the deadliest threat it faces. This would deter potential adversaries from pursuing this most dangerous course. However, it would also require an awareness that, when conflict eventually starts, it will likely develop in a manner for which the Army had not prepared.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense, or any of their components.

Notes

1. US Army, 2010 Army Posture Statement, 13.2. General Accounting Office, ‘Realistic Deployment Timelines’, 2.3. Garamone, ‘missions Grow as money Declines’.4. lopez, ‘Brigade Combat Teams Cut’.5. murdock et al., Building the 2021 Affordable Military, 5–22.6. Otterman, ‘Iraq’s Prewar military Capabilities’.7. Freier and Guy, ‘What next for Army Force Structure?’.

Disclosure statement

David Tier is an active-duty major in the U.S. Army serving as a strategic plans and policy officer, and has a background in armored forces.

References

Freier, nathan and Jacquelyn Guy. ‘What next for Army Force Structure?’ Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9 July 2013. http://csis.org/publication/what-next-army-force-structure.

Garamone, Jim. ‘missions Grow as money Declines, Odierno Tells Congress’. American Forces Press Service, 25 march 2014. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121895

General Accounting Office. ‘Realistic Deployment Timelines needed for Stryker Brigades’. GAO-03-801, June 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03801.pdf.

lopez, C. Todd. ‘Brigade Combat Teams Cut at 10 Posts Will Help Other BCTs Grow’. www.army.mil, 25 June 2013. http://www.army.mil/article/106373/Brigade_combat_teams_cut_at_10_posts_will_help_other_BCTs_grow/.

murdock, Clark. Ryan Crotty, and Angela Weaver. Building the 2021 Affordable Military. Center for Strategic & International Studies. lanham, mD: Rowman & littlefield, June 2014.

Otterman, Sharon. ‘Iraq’s Prewar military Capabilities’. Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 2003. http://www.cfr.org/Iraq/Iraq-Iraqs-prewar-military-capabilities/p7695.

US Army. 2010 Army Posture Statement. 19 February 2010. http://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/aps/aps_2010.pdf.