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STAKEHOLDERS MEETING TO DEVELOP EARLY WARNING INDICATORS ON

VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN WEST AFRICA

Summary of Proceedings

OCTOBER 21-22, 2014 - LAGOS-NIGERIA

Supported by

Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) &

Austrian Development Corporation

WEST AFRICA NETWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING

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ACRONYMS

AQIM AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

AWA ARABIC MOVEMENT OF AZAWAD

CSO’s CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

CVE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

ECOWARN ECOWAS EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE NETWORK

ECOWAS ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

GSPC SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT

IED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

MEND MOVEMENT FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE NIGER-DELTA

MNLA NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR LIBERATION OF AZAWAD

MUJAO MOVEMENT OF UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST AFRICA

NEWS NATIONAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

WANEP WEST AFRICA NETWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING

WARN WEST AFRICA EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE

NETWORK

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1. BACKGROUND

Over decades, West Africa has been a hotbed to series of diverse human security threats,

ranging from military coups, civil wars, ethnic and communal conflicts, piracy, political

instability, agro-pastoral conflicts and most recently the emergence of violent extremism and

religious fundamentalism in the Sahel and Nigeria. Despite the overwhelming presence of

diverse natural resources in every member state of the Economic Community of West Africa

States (ECOWAS), the region is regarded as one of the world’s most impoverish regions with

seven of its countries occupying the bottom 10 places in the most recent UN Human

Development Index.

The activities perpetuated by violent extremist and terrorist in West Africa, alongside issues

of exclusion and marginalisation, political and social tension, organised crime, weak

governance and environmental degradation witnessed in the region weakens not only the

economic base of the region but also impacts negatively on the delivery of dividends of

natural resources and the development agenda of the region. This continues to heighten the

level of insecurity and instability in the region. However, the negative impact of extremism

faced in the Sahel and Nigeria resonate the need for a collaborative action from local, regional

and international actors to work together towards countering violent extremism West Africa.

2. INTRODUCTION

Violent extremism (VE) refers

to a process of taking radical

views and putting them into

violent action; a willingness to

use or support the use of

violence to further particular

beliefs including those of

political, social and ideological

nature. Extremists often

employ violent means, which

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will involve all sorts of violence. The term extremist is used to describe groups and individuals

who have become radicalized in some way. It is used in reference to those who use or

advocate violence to enforce the will of the social body such as government or majority

constituency.

In a bid to enhance human security, peace and development in the region, a multi-tiered,

multi-national and multi-sectoral platform has been recommended as an effective

mechanism to respond to violent and humanitarian crisis in West Africa. More so, the need

for an effective information-generating system depends on this platform for monitoring,

reporting and analysis for strategic planning and response. At the monitoring unit is the

quality of indicators generated and how these indicators reflect the realities of peace and

security challenges. Due to the changes in trends and dynamics in conflict, the need to review

and contextualize the indicators to respond to emerging challenges becomes important.

As the largest Peace building network in West Africa with over 500 members organisations

and with grassroots base across the ECOWAS member states, WANEP, as part of its

commitment to support the ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning System as its official

implementing partner has developed a the National Early Warning System (NEWS). The

system (NEWS) seeks to provide a platform for a broad-based participatory approach to

conflict prevention and mitigation in West Africa on issues of human security in the region.

The role of CSOs to conflict prevention, management and transformation has increasingly

become critical as governments in the region seek integrative approaches to address

insecurity and instability.

The worrisome resurgence of violent extremism and fundamentalism in Mali and Nigeria as a

major threat to peace and security in the West African region requires a collaborative

approach in identifying the drivers of violent extremism.

In view of the above, WANEP with the support of its partners (the governments of Austria,

Denmark and Sweden), organised a two day Stakeholders Consultative Meeting to develop

early warning indicators for monitoring violent extremism in the region. Participants were

drawn from the counties in the Sahel region including Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria

and representing a combination of CSO experts, academia and development partners (please

see annex for list of participants)

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3. THE IMPERATIVES OF INDICATORS IN CONFLICT EARLY WARNING

There is no such a thing as a ‘sudden crisis’; only a lack of information or analysis could make

the crisis look sudden. However, selecting indicators for an early warning system is a complex

process involving a number of trade-offs. A comprehensive early warning system with the

capacity to predict the occurrence of intra-state conflicts with a high degree of accuracy must

have a large number of indicators to monitor, a fact that significantly increases its operational

requirements. Frugality has to be maintained in deciding on the number of indicators for an

early warning system since ease of implementation and simplicity of operation are very

important factors in designing an early warning system.

The multilevel and multidimensional nature of conflict poses considerable challenges to the

selection of indicators that can accurately predict outbreak of conflicts. With the idea of

creating an effective early warning system based on a relatively few set of indicators, there is

need to aim at identifying a set of indicators that can be tested for their utility in predicting

violent extremism.

The causes of violent extremism have been extensively researched and have been classified

(just as many other issues in conflict and wars) as Structural and Proximate causes. Structural

factors, referred to as root causes, include poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment etc

while Proximate factors, referred to as accelerators and triggers, refer to the set of incidents

that lead to escalation of the risk of violent extremism. Structural factors provide the

background situation for the occurrence of conflicts and proximate factors constitute the

escalatory dynamics of conflicts.

An effective early warning system must be based on an analysis of generative connection

between the background structures and the observed consequences.

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Indicators are therefore changes we

observe in communities and in the

institutions/structures of the state

which when continued over time may

increase the risk of violent conflict.

For example the number of young

boys out of schools in a community or

the number of ex-combatants in the

community who are not disarmed,

demobilized and reintegrated, or the

number of returnees after a violent conflict without homes in a given society or community.

KEY OBSERVATIONS:

- The hopelessness of IDP’s and the failure to

reintegrate them to their former homes makes

them vulnerable for recruitment by extremist

groups.

- Porous Borders in West Africa aids the spread of

extremist groups.

- Research has shown that insurgent groups tends to

pay their “army” much more than the conventional

army received from the government. Thus the issue

of who finances their activities becomes key in

monitoring violent extremism.

- The Extremist groups seem to be ahead on

information than the State especially relating to

the types of weapons and other strategies of the

state.

- The need to empower the Justice System is key in

combating violent extremism.

- If early warning indicators on the emergence of

extremist groups were responded to, there would

have been less spread and complexity of

containment

- Issues of exclusion and non-participation in

decision making, is a recipe for violent extremism.

- The non-implementation of agreements is a driver

of violent extremism.

- Lack of justice for victims of violent extremism

leads to revenge killings.

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4. CAUSES, NATURE AND TYPOLOGIES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Root Causes

Poverty

Bad governance

Corruption

Marginalization/exclusion

Social inequality

Under development

Youth bulge/ unemployment

Illiteracy

Limited livelihood opportunities

Ideology/misinterpretation of religious principles

Impunity

Porous border

Bad national/electoral laws

Identity, Reputation/Power

Human Rights Abuses

Mental manipulation/Psychological Proximate Causes

Fear of victimization (e.g. for not joining Boko-Haram); Financial and Material incentives by Militia groups; political factors

Manipulation of constitution; tenure elongation/unconstitutional change of government; impunity; corruption; Human Rights violations; marginalisation and exclusion

Proliferation of small arms; uneven distribution of wealth

Availability of vulnerable recruitment communities- youth; lack of peace education and educational curriculum geared towards self employment (unemployable youths - without skills or potentials)

Peer influence; Inadequate provision or absence of basic infrastructures (schools, hospitals) to enhance living standards of people

Substance/drug abuse; Youth Bulge

Mirroring other radical/extremist groups, ISIS, AQIM etc., inflation and hike in prices of essential commodities

Advance/access to technology, Unrestricted cross border movement

Lack of support to victims of violent extremism; Appealing/compelling ideas and radical messages by Charismatic leaders (religious, political, etc.)

Weak justice system, Weak security sector, human Rights abuse and extra judicial killings

Distrust between security agents and communities, Presence of isolated/suspicious groups

Emergence of strangers and suspicious characters in a community

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Sudden affluence among the youth

Non implementation of peace agreements and reports

Proliferation of ethnic militias and rebel groups; arms trafficking; weak security infrastructures; porous borders (influx of refugees

Sense of Belonging; social status; respect from peer groups; strong bonds for brotherhoods; ‘self-esteem’; quest for fame and glory

Social Inequalities (demography, gender), parental abdication of responsibilities leading to intra and inter state movement and dumping of children and youths

Proliferation of Arms, Technology

S/N Typologies Ideologies Modus Operandi Location/territori

es of Tenacious

Concerns

Other facts

1. Jama’atuAhlis

SunnaLidda’A

watiwal-Jihad

(Boko Haram)

Maitasine

Religion

Political,

Criminal

Abduction/Kidnappings (as

human shield, conscription,

ransom, sex/domestic slaves);

massive killing; Suicide Bombing;

Rape; Forced marriages; Attack

on security agencies; Hostage

taking; Decapitation; Attack on

government/intergovernmental

structures and

Telecommunication facilities;

Attack on places of worship:

Attack on Christians and Muslims

preaching against them; Use of

technology, IED, Sophiscated

weapons and Guerilla

Techniques; Raiding of

community; Bank robbery;

Money laundering; Arms

BH activities is

most visible in

Borno, Yobe and

Adamawa, with

Kano, Kaduna,

Niger, Nassarawa,

Abuja FTC, Gombe,

Northern

Cameroun,

Northern Niger,

Northern Chad as

occasional targets

Northern Mali

Linkages with AQIM,

AQIP, AQIS, AL-

Shaabaab, Ansaru,

MUJAO and Ansar Dine.

Cross border operations

is evident in Cameroun,

Niger and Chad.

Boko Haram mirrors

activities of ISIS

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trafficking and smuggling; Illegal

levy on community; Production

of IEDs; Fear, Creation of Islamic

Caliphate human trafficking; car

jacking; Attacks on schools and

markets; jailbreaks

2. Movement

for the

Emancipation

of Niger Delta

(MEND)

Identity/

Resource

Control

Blowing up of oil pipelines,

Attacks on ships on high sea; Oil

Bunkering; drug trafficking,

Psychological Trauma, terror

Niger Delta Region

of Nigeria:

Bayelsa, Edo,

Rivers, Delta,

Cross-River

Linkage of MEND with

pirates in the Gulf of

Guinea

3. The

Movement

for Unity

/Oneness and

Jihad in West

Africa

(MUJAO)-;

Ansar Dine

MNLA and

Arabic

Movement of

Azawad

(AWA)

Religion

Identity

and

Political

Abduction of westerners

especially French; Hostage

taking; car bombing, killings;

Attacks on Military formations,

High government officials,

communities Humanitarian

workers and Journalist; Gender-

based Violence; Use of

landmines and Booby traps,

armed robbery, Ransacking of

communities, Human trafficking,

attack on foreign missions and

tourists

Northern

region of

Mali: Kidal,

Gao,

Timbuktu,

Mopti,

Northern

Niger

Senegal

Linkages with AQIM, Al-

Shaabab, Boko-Haram

MNLA AND ARABIC

MOVEMENT OF

AZAWAD activities

sometimes takes place

in Burkina Faso

4. Al- Qeada

Organization

in the Islamic

Maghreb

(AQIM)

SalafistJihadis

m, Islamic

fundamentali

sm and anti-

Westernism

Religion

Kidnapping of Western Tourist

in Mali and neighbouring

countries for ransom; carjacking;

drug and weapon smuggling

across the Sahara, Suicide

bombing, Jail break, Terror and

Fear, Destruction of Monuments

or Cultural symbols,

Introduction of sharia laws,

Land-Mines

Head

quarters in

Algeria but

operating

in Gao,

Kidal and

Timbuktu

in Northern

Mali,

AQIM has been

declared as a Foreign

Terrorist organization

by the International

Community

Salafist Jihadism origin

is traced to Mauritania

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5. Al Ansaru Religion Abduction of Westerners for

ransom, killing, money

laundering, arms

smuggling/trafficking, attacks on

foreign missions and

intergovernmental agencies

Northern Niger

and North-eastern

Nigeria

Splinter group of Boko

Haram

6. Tuareg Rebels

People’s

Movement

for Justice

(MNJ)

MUJAO

Resource

control

Political

Religion

Attacks on Agadez Airports,

attacks on Uranuim site,

jailbreaks

Niamey, Agadez,

Diffa

Linkage with AQIM,

MUJAO, Boko Haram

7. Livestock

Rustlers

Identity/R

esource

Killings, rape, stealing, Arsons,

Human Shield, Use of Fear and

Terror, reprisal killings

Cuts across all the

west African

countries except

Cape Verde

5. PROPOSED INDICATORS FOR MONITORING VIOLENT EXTREMISM ANDRELIGIOUS

FUNDAMENTALISM

S/N INDICATORS

1 Unusual movement of people out/into a community is evident or reported

2 Discovery of small arms, light weapons and I.E.D materials is evident or reported

3 Sudden increase of inciteful and radical preaching is evident or reported

4 Increase incidents of rape, abduction/ kidnapping of women and girls is evident or reported

5 Increase of human right abuses and extra-judicial killings by state agents and non state actors is evident or reported

6 Uncensored use of social media /ICT to propagate extreme ideologies is evident or reported

7 Complaints / protest by groups over marginalization or exclusion are evident or reported

8 Frequency and use of unconventional attires and symbols is evident or reported

9 Increase/presence of isolated / suspicious groups is evident or reported

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10 Increase number of thugs, militias, vigilante, private security groups are evident or reported

11 Destruction of social amenities, economic interests and communication technology equipment is evident or reported

12 Increase use of drugs and other illicit substances amongst the youth is evident or reported

POSITIVE INTERVENING FACTORS

13 Advocacy/ enforcement of regulations on purchase and use of chemical substances by government is evident or reported

14 Increase cooperation between government and civil society organization on security matters is evident or reported

15 Strict regulation on Inflow and outflow of funds and resource materials is evident or reported

16 Intra and inter-faith dialogue is evident or reported

17 Presence of Government policies on countering violent extremism and enforcement are evident or reported

6. KEY OUTCOMES OF THE CONSULTATIVE MEETING

Indicators for monitoring Violent Extremism developed (this will be tested and

adopted into WANEP’s NEWS and proposed to the ECOWARN

High level appreciation of the impact of Violent Extremism on the ECOWAS

development and integration agenda

Partnership and collaborative strategies for countering violent extremism initiated

Harmonized perspectives on causes, typologies and modus operandi of insurgent

groups in West Africa established

The need for Cross Border collaboration in countering violent extremism amongst the

Sahel states emphasized

High level appreciation of the need for information sharing and the role CSOs and

other non state actors can play in countering violent extremism identified

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7. CONCLUSIONS

As the West Africa region continues to experience trends and patterns of violent extremism

and radicalism, the development of preventive mechanism such early warning instruments

for monitoring and analysis becomes imperative. Across the Sahel-Sahelo corridor, countries

such as Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad remains burdened with high level of

insecurity emanating from extremist activities of groups such as Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), MUJAO etc. This has impacted negatively on the economy of these

countries and the integration agenda of the region. The developments of Early Warning

indicators by WANEP is part of its contribution to strengthening the National Early Warning

System (NEWS), as well as improve the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network

(ECOWARN) towards sustainable peace and security in the region.