WEEK 9 Skjærseth and Wettestad (2002)

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Understanding the Effectiveness of EU EnvironmentalPolicy: How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?J. B. Skjrseth; J. Wettestad

Online Publication Date: 23 January 2002To cite this Article: Skjrseth, J. B. and Wettestad, J. (2002) 'Understanding theEffectiveness of EU Environmental Policy: How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?',Environmental Politics, 11:3, 99 - 120To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/714000635URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714000635

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Understanding the Effectiveness of EUEnvironmental Policy:

How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?

JON BIRGER SKJRSETH and JRGEN

WETTESTAD

The study of EU environmental policy consequences tends to focus on how EUlegislation output is formally implemented in the Member States and its impact in termsof the state of the European environment. The crucial outcome dimension linking outputto impact has, however, received scant attention. Outcome points to changes in thebehaviour of relevant target groups causing the problems in the first place. Accordingly,we know little about the causal relationships between EU environmental policy and thestate of the European environment. This article examines whether the study of regime-effectiveness has something to contribute in order to bridge this gap. Since EUlegislation comes close to the notion of international regimes in the implementationphase, this article argues that analysis and analyses of regime effectiveness cancontribute important insights about how to evaluate and explain the effectiveness of EUenvironmental policy. In particular, the regime analysis perspective is important forunderstanding how interaction between EU directives and international environmentalregimes affects the performance of EU environmental policy and vice versa. However,the study of regime effectiveness has clear limitations in the domestic context. Moreover,regime analysis has much to learn from EU studies particularly related to environmentalpolicy integration.

Introduction

In 1998, EU environmental policy celebrated its twentieth anniversary,and the study of this policy development has also matured considerably

over time.1 Recent research indicates a gap in the EU between what isdelivered in terms of policies or outputs and what is achieved on theground in terms of environmental improvement or impact. On the onehand, the impact assessments of the European Environmental Agency

Environmental Politics, Vol.11, No.3, Autumn 2002, pp.99120PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Jon Birger Skjrseth and Jrgen Wettestad are Senior Researchers based at the Fridtjof NansenInstitute in Norway. This article builds upon the FNI working paper The Study of EUEnvironmental Policy: Can Regime Theory Further Our Understanding [Skjrseth andWettestad, 2000]. Some sections have also benefited greatly from the Concerted Action agenda-setting paper written by Clare Coffey, Andy Jordan and Jrgen Wettestad [Coffey, Jordan andWettestad, 2000]. In addition, the authors would like to thank Neil Carter, Jonas Tallberg, OlavSchram Stokke and Steinar Andresen for very useful comments.

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(EEA) indicate that the quality of the European environment isdeteriorating [ EEA, 1999, 2000, 2001]. On the other hand, the EUinstitutional machinery has produced a comprehensive environmentalpolicy in depth and scope: about 300 environmental regulations, directivesand decisions have been adopted to date. What is then the causal

relationship between these apparently contradictory developments? Thisquestion is extremely hard to answer conclusively since the crucialoutcome dimension linking outputs and impact has received scantattention so far. Outcome points to change in behaviour among relevanttarget groups causing the problems in the first place, such as industry,agriculture and transport. Accordingly, we know little about the causalrelationships between EU environmental policy and the state of theEuropean environment.

If we are to improve the functioning of EU institutions in the field of theenvironment, we will have to learn from previous experience and practice.In particular, we need some idea of well functioning in contrast tomalfunctioning that is, we need to know what constitutes effectiveness inthis field. As will be further elaborated later, one core element of

effectiveness is change in the behaviour of target groups at national and sub-national levels causedby the institution in question. Hence, effectiveness isa wider concept than implementation and compliance, which are confinedto the follow-up of a specific policy. For instance, as compliance with EUclimate policy targets can be achieved by energy switching or economicfluctuations having absolutely nothing to do with EU climate policy, thistype of information may not tell us anything about the effectiveness of EUclimate policy. On the other hand, substantial knowledge about theimplementation of EU directives is an important building block ineffectiveness studies.

Although greater attention has been given to the consequences of EUenvironmental policy over time, there are very few studies explicitlyfocusing on how to evaluate the effectiveness of EU environmental policy.Moreover, there are also few systematic empirical case studies of EUenvironmental policy specifically aimed at explaining effectiveness orrelated outcomes.2 Understanding more about the causes linking policy toimpact is a precondition for improving the policy itself. Against thisbackdrop, the second section of this article provides a brief review of thestudy of EU environmental policy in practice.

The extent to which analysis of regime effectiveness [for example,Andresen and Wettestad, 1995; Young and Levy, 1999; Miles et al., 2001]has something to contribute in the study of EU environmental policydepends on whether it makes sense to compare EU environmental policywith environmental regimes. Since opinions vary on this matter, the third

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section deals with the question of whether it is helpful to treat the EU as aninternational regime or a set of interconnected regimes.3

In the fourth section, we ask to what extent and how we can define andmeasure the effectiveness of EU environmental policy in the same way aswe define and measure the effectiveness of international regimes. Insights

from regime effectiveness analysis can inspire EU scholars to focus moreexplicitly on the effectiveness of EU environmental policy.

Fifthly, to what extent and how can we explain the effectiveness of EUpolicies using the same explanatory perspectives as applied to regimestudies? Due to the supranational qualities of the EU there has been anunderstandable tendency in the study of EU environmental policy to focusmore upon institutional aspects than problem-types and related actorinterests and norms. However, a common challenge exists in combining thestudy of international and domestic institutions since most transnationalenvironmental problems arise as consequences of domestic activities.

Moreover, in most areas of transnational environmental problems thereis a core environmental regime interacting with EU environmental policy.In fact, the EU participates in 31 major international environmental

agreements spanning from the 1979 Convention of Migratory Species ofWild Animals to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change [Vogler, 1999]. The performance of EU environmentalpolicy is difficult to understand without focusing on the interaction betweenthe EU and international regimes in issue areas where a core regime exists.

While the focus of this article mainly lies on how regime analysis andanalyses can further our understanding of EU environmental policy, thestudy of EU environmental policy also has much to contribute to the studyof international regimes. Coming primarily from the field of regime theory,we shall leave most of the lessons which can be drawn from the study of EUenvironmental policy to others with more experience in this field.Nevertheless, we shall indicate some possible lessons to be learned from EUstudies; particularly related to institutional capacity and environmentalpolicy integration.

Empirical examples are primarily drawn from the issue areas of marinepollution, acid rain, ozone depletion and climate change. As this articleshould be seen as a think-piece, rather than a paper based on extensiveempirical research on EU environmental policy, these cases primarily serveillustrative purposes.

The Study of EU Environmental Policy in Practice

New volumes on EU environmental policy are published at a faster rate thanour ability to read, digest and review them.4 However, empirical case studies

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aimed at evaluating and explaining effectiveness are still short in supply.The study of compliance and implementation, however, has a longer historywithin the EU than within regime studies, and central concepts have beendefined in response to the somewhat special EU decision-making context.Compliance within the EU context refers to the incorporation/

transposition of EU legislation into national law and the subsequentnotification of the Commission of this act. Determining whether the endsspecified in the legislation/directive are achieved is referred to asApplication.5 Initially, much more attention within the EU system wasgiven to compliance issues than to implementation/application issues, butthis balance has been changing.6 Over time, interesting overview articles onthese issues from the first part of the 1990s have been increasinglysupplemented by more specific compliance and application case studies andinformation. For example, the Manuals of Environmental Policy producedby the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) focus onimplementation of EU directives in Spain, France, UK and, in the nearfuture, the Netherlands.

Our impression is, however, that most studies so far tend to give most

attention to the more easily studied and measured compliance/transpositionstage, but address the degree and background of actual behavioural impactin less detail. [e.g., Evans, 1979; Gormley, 1986; Dashwood and White,1989; Burrows et al., 1993]. From a political science point of view, many ofthe implementation studies are descriptive rather than theoreticallyinformed and focus on single, non-cumulative case studies.

This general picture is strengthened if we turn to the role of the EUinstitutions in implementing EU environmental policy. The Commission hasa central policy-initiating function, but it also plays a crucial role in theexecution and follow-up of environmental legislation. There are severalinteresting contributions to knowledge on the role of the Commission inenvironmental policy-making, offering bits and pieces to this issue [e.g.,

Edwards and Spence, 1997; Wurzel, 1999]. However, we seem to know farmore about the role of the Commission in policy-making than in the processof implementation and ultimately policy effectiveness.

In the EU, complex decision-making procedures have evolved, underwhich the European Parliament has been given more power and there isgreater use of majority-voting within the Council of Ministers. The 1997Amsterdam Treaty broadened the application of the co-decision procedureto cover Directives adopted on the basis of the environmental paragraph130s; hence increasing the decision-making role of the Parliament further.The study of procedural development and the role of the EuropeanParliament in the environmental context seems mainly to consist of anumber of helpful, but quite general contributions, with case studies of the


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practical impact (not least of the important Maastricht Treaty changes) inrelatively short supply [e.g., Weale, 1996; Jordan, 1998; Golub, 1999].

A large body of literature also exists focusing on general and specificpolitical principles underlying EU environmental policy, such as theEnvironmental Action Programmes [e.g., Hildebrand, 1993; Johnson and

Corcelle, 1995; Collier, 1997]. Other work concentrates more on specificprinciples, particularly related to subsidiarity [e.g., Wils, 1994; Golub,1996; Collier, 1997]. The analysis of the core principles underlying EUenvironmental policy is extremely valuable to anyone who wants tounderstand the development of EU environmental policy, but we still knowlittle about their impact on target groups and the state of the environment.

Regimes versus the EU: Similar Implementation Challenges?

As pointed out in the introduction, opinions vary as to the extent to which theEU can be treated as an international regime. Clarifying this question isimportant to judge the relevance of core regime variables for the study of EUpolicy and particularly for assessing the impact of international institutions

on member-states [ Breckinridge, 1997]. In addition, complementaryapproaches will enhance our ability to study interaction between the EU andinternational regimes. Let us start by taking the standard definition of aregime: social institutions consisting of agreed-upon principles, norms,rules, procedures and programs that govern the interaction of actors inspecific issue areas [Levy et al., 1995: 274].

The first difference to note is that the EU covers many issue areas whileinternational regimes are defined according to specific issue areas. In thestudy of international environmental regimes, we talk about the ozone regimeand the climate regime defined in terms of norms, rules and principles thatconsistently apply in a given issue area. By contrast, EU procedures, normsand rules apply to a number of issue areas. Still, the EU is clearly a socialinstitution consisting of the same core elements as international regimes principles, norms, rules, procedures and programmes.

In spite of conceptual complementarity, the EU is clearly much more thanan international regime: EU members have actually transferred nationalsovereignty to a supranational institution. Accordingly, when adopted, EUlaws are directly binding on the member states rather than requiring memberstates to ratify joint commitments, as is the case within international regimes.The EU is also a historically well-developed institution, with bodies thatenjoy significant autonomy. The Commission is a very different animalcompared to, for instance, the Ozone Secretariat, and the Council ofMinisters is something quite different from the annual co-operative meetingof the parties within the framework of the United Nations Framework


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Convention on Climate Change. In addition, there is nothing which is evensimilar to the directly elected EU Parliament within international regimes. Inother words, the EU is clearly something more in terms of institutionalcompetence and capacity than an international regime.

In a broader perspective, the EU is not only something more than

environmental regimes, but also substantially different in nature. It startedout as an European Economic Community back in 1957, and theenvironment was not added to the agenda until the 1970s. Moreover, asindicated, the Community/Union has acquired several supra-national traitsalong the way. However, the tension between what Hoffman [1966: 881]refers to as the logic of integration (Europeanism) and the logic ofdiversity (nationalism) is inscribed in the sharing of competence betweenthe nationalism of member states in the Council and the Europeanism ofthe Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Parliament.Some member states are pushing for faster and closer integration whileothers are fighting for their autonomy. Thus, the EU displays elements ofboth inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, being neither afederation nor an international organisation [Wallace, 1983]. This is also

reflected in the study of the dynamics of EU integration based on twoprincipal strands of International Relations theory: neofunctionalism andintergovernmentalism.

The balance between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism differsover time and according to specific issue-areas. The EU behaves more likean international regime in energy and environmental policy than inagricultural policy. In addition, the balance may vary between differentphases or stages of the policy cycle within individual sectors. While agendasetting and particularly decision making differ, the implementation of EUenvironmental policy still remains largely in the hands of the member stateseven though EU laws are directly binding on the member states. In essence,the similarities between international environmental regimes and EUenvironmental policy are actually quite striking concerning policyimplementation, here understood as the process leading towardsbehavioural change required at the domestic level (outcome). This isbecause the EU has strong policymaking powers but comparatively weakpowers of implementation and enforcement. Thus EU environmentallegislation or clusters of legislation applying to specific issue-areas come

close to the notion of environmental regimes. For example, there is a highdegree of congruence between the regime for controlling marine pollutionin the North-East Atlantic with a particular focus on the North Sea and EUDirectives relevant for marine pollution [Skjrseth, 2000a].

The mainformal difference between regime and EU implementation liesin the fact that EU Directives, once adopted, impose legal obligations


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directly upon the member states. Even if a member state fails to implementthe legislation properly, it is still binding on the member state and can berelied upon in national courts. In certain cases, failure to comply with EUlaw can even result in successful awards for damages to individuals whohave suffered a loss as a consequence. National courts are required to

interpret national laws in line with the EU obligations that the lawsimplement (sympathetic interpretation). The existence and role of the ECJis also unique, although its regime counterpart is in the international courtin the Hague. Since 1993, the ECJ may impose fines on states who havefailed to observe previous rulings of the court. This provision is currentlybeing applied for the first time against Greece for its failure to observe acourt ruling concerning waste management in Crete. The Commission isalso able to exert pressure on the member states to observe provisions of EUenvironmental law. Despite these formal differences the implementation ofenvironmental policy lies largely in the hands of member states in the EUas well as in international regimes.

To conclude, the EU is clearly different from international regimes as toits scope, depth, nature and competence. However, EU environmental

legislation in specific issue areas faces many of the same implementationchallenges as international environmental regimes. Implementationrepresents the sharp end of the EU policy process where supranationalinstitutions meet a decentralised policy delivery system in which themember states play the dominant role [Jordan, 1999].

Evaluating Effectiveness : The Crucial and Challenging Phase of

Outcome

Since the EU can be approached as an environmental regime in the phase ofimplementation, the next question is: to what extent and how can we applyevaluation insights from the field of regime effectiveness to EUenvironmental policies? First, against the backdrop of the neglect ofeffectiveness in EU environmental policy studies, regime analysis cancontribute with a rich and diversified academic discussion as well asempirical case studies of effectiveness extending over the past ten years[e.g., Underdal, 1992; Young and von Moltke, 1994; Young, 1994; Levy etal., 1995; Miles et al., 2001]. Secondly, scholars working within the fieldsof the effectiveness of international environmental regimes have appliedand developed quite sophisticated approaches to the concept and substanceof effectiveness that may also be useful for EU scholars as well. Althoughmuch research has focused on effectiveness, there are, of course, otherrelevant standards that can be used such as fairness, legitimacy orrobustness.7


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Studies of international regimes have evolved rapidly during the lastten years, from focusing predominantly on regime formation to recentconcern with regime consequences and effectiveness. A somewhat similardevelopment appears to have taken place in the study of the EU, fromexplaining the causes of integration to exploring the consequences of EU

governance. Studies of international regimes have also increasingly driftedtowards the study of international environmental regimes in various issue-areas, such as climate change, ozone depletion, acid rain and marine pollution.

Regime effectiveness is defined and operationalised in different ways,but all analysts have to deal with at least two fundamental questions: howcan we measure what has been achieved and how can we relate actualachievements to some standard, or criterion for what can be achieved?Concerning the former question, international environmental regimes aswell as EU environmental policy produce a chain of consequences andeffectiveness can be measured at different points in this chain. Three coredimensions can be discerned: output, outcome and impact.

Output is conceived as relevant policy, outcome connotes changes in thebehaviour of those subject to the provisions of regimes, while impact

represents the tangible consequences affecting the physical problem athand. These dimensions can in turn be further specified: Output can bedivided into the extent to which international obligations are incorporated innational policy (output1) and whether adequate policy instruments andmeasures have been adopted and implemented in accordance with relevantpolicy (output2). Note that the scores produced by our evaluations dependheavily on which phase in the causal chain we are focusing on. In the NorthSea/North-East Atlantic co-operation, for example, the Netherlands hadadopted a more ambitious policy (output1) than Norway, but achieved lessin terms of behavioural change [Skjrseth, 2000a].

In relation to this chain of consequences, two main perspectives in themeasuring of effectiveness have evolved, focusing upon behaviouralchange and environmental problem solving. In order to solve resourceand environmental problems, regimes must first produce outputs and inducegreener outcomes. Hence, behavioural change may be seen as a necessary,but not sufficient, condition for achieving regime effectiveness. It is notsufficient, as even considerable behavioural change may fall far short ofsolving the problem at hand. Recording behavioural change caused by theregime or institution in question is full of spurious fallacies since suchchange can be caused by factors unrelated to the policy in question, likeeconomic fluctuations and technological innovation. However, interpretingimpacts upon the natural environment is even more complicated: naturalvariability makes it difficult to identify human-induced changes over time,and attributing causes to observed effects is an even more uncertain process.


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Hence, political scientists and lawyers tend to focus upon some notionof behavioural change. Note that any assessment of regime effectivenessrequires causal inference between output and outcome in order to avoid thespurious fallacies pointed to above. This is extremely important in order tounderstand whether it is the policy in question, or other unrelated factors

that have caused observed changes in behaviour. In turn, establishing suchcausal links is a precondition for improving the effectiveness ofenvironmental policy. As pinpointed by Oran Young [2000: 545], carryingout such an analysis is a logical consequence of a behavioural effectivenessapproach, but at the same time a daunting challenge. This is not least so dueto the simple fact that international regimes often contain a high number ofparties. For instance, the Montreal Protocol has over 130 parties.Aggregating information and national assessments into overall scores andoverriding explanations is a very tall order. In order to cope with thischallenge, we often have to select countries which are representative forgroups of countries according to differences in dependent (effectiveness) orindependent (explanatory) variables. The aggregation problem appears lessserious in the EU than in many global environmental regimes. Still, the

logic of selecting typical or representative cases will clearly be relevant alsoin the case of the EU.

Let us take one example from a study on the North Sea/North-EastAtlantic regime on marine pollution [Skjrseth, 2000a]. The jointobligations considered are the targets of a 50 per cent reduction between1985 and 1995 of nutrients (to sensitive areas) and 36 specified hazardoussubstances. These obligations partly overlap with a number of relevant EUDirectives.8 The studys main conclusions were that the internationalobligations had significantly affected achievements in most North Sea states,but some countries and sectors had achieved significantly more than others.This study overcame the aggregation problem by selecting three countries Norway, the Netherlands and the UK representative in terms of marinepollution exchange of the importers, balanced actors, and exporters. Thenext step was to check the extent to which these obligations had beenincluded in national legislation or relevant policy in the selected membercountries (output1). The third step was to check whether domestic follow-upprogrammes to achieve these goals had been adopted (output2). The fourth,and more challenging step, was to analyse the extent to which relevant targetgroups (industry, agriculture and municipal waste-water treatment) hadchanged their behaviour (in this case measured in terms of emissions ofrelevant substances) as a result of the identified change in policy. This wasachieved by a combination of process-tracing and analysis of rivalexplanations. The rival explanations considered were: (a) economicfluctuations affecting activity in the sectors concerned; (b) action taken


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anyway due to purely domestic concerns; (c) unrelated (to the regime)introduction of new technology; (d) alternative ways of disposal; (e) otherrelevant international commitments. These factors could only to a limitedextent explain the achievements witnessed. Hence, most of the reductionswitnessed in this case could be traced back to deliberate control and

regulation at national level causally linked to the international commitments.The most important analytical requirement in any evaluation of what can

be achieved is to make evaluation criteria explicit. As Underdal (1995)reminds us, we have basically two main alternatives when approaching thequestion of what can be achieved. These alternatives may provide us withsignificantly different scores. The first alternative is related to the distancebetween the actual regime/policy and some notion of the ideal solution;either in economic or, most commonly, environmental terms. Expert adviceis sometimes available concerning resource regimes like fishery regimes, butmany rely on the official purpose of the regime/policy. The second is relatedto what would have happened in a hypothetical situation without the regimeor policy. Counterfactual questions are extremely hard to answerconclusively, but they can be approached by careful analysis of the situation

before the regime or policy was established, or before significant changes inthe regime/policy. The point is that a country or sector can sometimes makesubstantial progress without reaching its goals, or conversely; reach its goalswithout much effort. For example, the UK has reduced its CO2 emissionsmainly due to the closure of coal mines and shift to natural gas for economicreasons, while emissions continue to rise in the Netherlands in spite of arelatively active climate policy throughout the 1990s [VROM, 1999].

As far as we can see, the distinction between output, outcome andimpact as well as the criteria and methodologies used in the study of regimeeffectiveness are also applicable to the EU. Consider the case of EU ozone(Nss, forthcoming). The EU has since 1978 adopted nine resolutions,decisions and regulations aimed at phasing out ozone depleting substances(ODS). The member states have included relevant obligations in nationalpolicy (output1) and developed policies and measures to reach the targets(output2). In turn, target groups have generally followed up and the EUstates are only 10 per cent away from phasing out all ODS within the Unionincluding production, consumption and trade across borders (outcome).This will in the long run have positive consequences for the environmentand human health (impact).

Judged against the official purpose of EU ozone policy, achievementsappear highly effective. However, this high score is at least questionable

judged against a hypothetical situation without an EU ozone policy sincemost developed countries are in compliance with the Montreal Protocol.The Montreal Protocol has influenced achievements within the EU to the


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extent that the difference between a status quo situation and the currentsituation would probably not be dramatically different. The effectivenesslessons to be drawn will only be of limited value to the extent reductions ofODS are only weakly causally related to EU ozone policy. The importanceof acknowledging this crucial interaction between international regime

activity and EU policies will be further elaborated in the following section.To conclude, insights from regime effectiveness analysis can inspire EU

scholars to focus more explicitly on the effectiveness of EU environmentalpolicy. Insights from such studies can also contribute in bridging the gap inknowledge concerning causal relationships between EU environmentalpolicy and impact.

Explaining Effectiveness: Problem-Types, Problem-Solving Capacity

and Interaction Effects

How can we apply explanations of regime effectiveness to EUenvironmental policies? First, the study of regime effectiveness maycomplement the study of EU environmental policy by a more systematic

focus on differences in problem-types. In particular, the combination ofassumptions treating actors as both rational and consequence oriented andnorm-guided appears as an interesting avenue for explaining effectiveness.Secondly, the interaction between EU policy and core environmentalregimes operating in the same issue areas appears important for explainingeffectiveness. However, the approaches to the study of EU and regimeinstitutional attributes share more similarities than differences.

In regime studies, important explanatory perspectives have been builtaround the central concepts of interests, power, knowledge/learning andinstitutional factors [e.g., Underdal, 1995; Young and Levy, 1999]. Therecently completed effectiveness project led by Ed Miles and ArildUnderdal has benefited from the formulation and application of two centralexplanatory perspectives: characteristics of the problem versus problem-solving capacity.

Problem-types

With regard to the first perspective, the general proposition is that someproblems are solved more effectively than others simply because they arepolitically and/or intellectually easier to cope with. This variable highlightsthe links between problem-structure, the interests and preferences ofrelevant actors, knowledge and effectiveness. For example, it is hard tounderstand the differences between the effective ozone regime and theineffective climate regime without analysing differences in problem-structure [Skjrseth, 1992; Wettestad, 1999]. Evolving knowledge about


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ecological, technological and economic aspects of the ozone problemrevealed that actors faced a quite benign political problem. The sameargument is valid for EU ozone and climate policy. As a minimum, analyststend to distinguish between benign` co-ordination or cost-efficiencyproblems, and more malign collaboration problems caused by externalities

and competition [e.g., Underdal, 1987; Rittberger, 1993; Andresen andWettestad, 1995]. The essence of a `malign` problem is incentive distortion,while cost-efficiency problems are related to imperfect information andcommunication failure. The point is that the integrative potential is moreeasily tapped when actors are faced with problems of cost efficiency.

Careful problem diagnosis is important for explaining change andvariance in effectiveness, as well as for developing adequate collectivesolutions and policy instruments. The EU Commission has, for example,placed more emphasis on voluntary agreements as a new policy instrument inclimate policy in line with the fifth action programme. In 1998, an agreementbetween the Commission and European, Japanese and Korean car makers oncurbing CO2 emissions from new passenger cars was adopted. According tothe Commission, the reduction will contribute about 15 per cent of the total

reductions required from the EU under the Kyoto Protocol. However, seriousdoubts have recently been voiced as to the shape and content of theagreement itself and whether intended results will be achieved. 9

In addition to the qualities of voluntary agreements, the environmentaleffectiveness of such agreements depends heavily on the type of problem tobe solved and they are most likely to work when the problem ischaracterised by cost-efficiency [Skjrseth, 2000b]. If target groups such ascar manufacturers maximise expected profits, a company or branch willenter into an agreement voluntarily only if the expected profit fromparticipation is greater than the expected profit from notparticipating. In thecar-makers agreement case, however, an incentive problem probably existssince entering into and complying with the agreement will involve net costsfor target groups, at least in the short run. If participation is voluntary andthere are no sanctions or subsidies, we would either expect target groups torefrain from participation or to violate agreements whenever it is in theirinterest to do so. In short, such situations call for other types of policyinstruments (regulatory, or economic) which have the capacity to providesufficient incentive correction through the logic of sticks and carrots.

The problem-type dimension can be further specified according to theextent to which costs and benefits are concentrated or distributed to society

at large. Since regulatory policy tends to impose costs upon target groups,we may assume that when such costs are concentrated on specific subgroupsof society while the benefits are widely distributed, there is a high incentiveto oppose relevant policies. Commitments are most difficult to implement


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under such circumstances, owing to the risk of vertical disintegration inenvironmental policies meaning that the aggregate of micro decisionsamong target groups may deviate more or less systematically, orsubstantially, from higher-order policy goals [Underdal, 1979]. Conversely,if benefits are concentrated and costs widely distributed, there will be strong

incentives to support relevant policies and implementation is assumed to berelatively easy under such conditions. This situation may be rare, but it isperfectly possible that an industrial sector can improve its competitive edgeor achieve profit from environmental regulation. For example, thoseproducing sewage treatment facilities may profit directly from a stringentmarine policy on nutrient emissions.

When costs and benefits are highly asymmetrically distributed and theproblem or activity in question stems from point sources that are easy toidentify and highly visible, conflict tends to increase. Such situations arelikely to trigger mobilisation of environmental non-governmentalorganisations (ENGOs). Such groups tend to represent a counterbalancingforce to reluctant target groups. According to this perspective, we may saythat environmental policy is formed and implemented in the area of tension

between ENGO mobilisation and distribution of costs and benefits amongtarget groups. Accordingly, the key to explaining implementation andeffectiveness may lie in the relative support and strength among ENGOsand target groups.

This explanatory perspective helps us to understand why Europeanindustry has delivered significantly more behavioural change in order toimprove the environment than the agriculture sector [Conrad, 1993]. Forexample, industry has performed significantly better than agriculture inreducing marine pollution [Skjrseth, 2000a]. While both sectorsfrequently have incentives to oppose stringent regulation, industry has beenexposed to significantly more pressure from ENGOs as compared toagriculture [ibid.]. In addition, agriculture represents diffuse sources whichare more difficult to control than industrial point sources.

Even though much regime analysis has been based on the assumptionthat actors are rational utility maximisers, various combinations of actorassumptions have recently been explored in theory and applied in practice[Levy et al., 1995; Young, 1998: 7; Skjrseth, 2000a]. If we assume thatactors have different behavioural mechanisms consisting of cost/benefitrationality based on the logic of consequence and norms based on the logicof appropriateness [March and Olsen, 1996] we open the way for a widerrange of explanations than relying on one behavioural mechanism alone.The logic of appropriateness means that actors under certain conditions maybe more preoccupied with doing the right thing than with calculating costsand benefits. This behaviour mechanisms is, for example, important for


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understanding why the UK has ceased dumping of industrial waste in theNorth Sea [Skjrseth, 2000a].

In the late 1980s, the UK changed its policy on sea dumping partly dueto internal and external political pressure which increased the political costsof dumping. However, the principle of dumping at sea as the last option

was actually included in British legislation in 1985 before internal andexternal pressure intensified in the latter part of the 1980s. At the same time,the UK government, supported by virtually all important domestic actors,consistently and vehemently argued that dumping at sea had no negativeenvironmental consequences. The question then becomes: why shoulddumping at sea be considered as the last option when such activities werecommercially profitable for companies and economic beneficial for thestate, and at the same time were claimed not to harm the environment?There are strong indications that the British government had internalisednew norms since signing the Oslo and London Conventions on dumping inthe early 1970s. Those responsible for licensing dumping within theMinistry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food changed their attitude overtime, gradually evolving around the idea that using the sea as a trash can is

wrong in itself.

Problem-Solving Capacity

The other main proposition examined in the Miles et al. project is thateffectiveness may vary due to the problem-solving capacity invested in theproblem. The core of capacity within an institutional perspective are theregime attributes, that is, agreed upon norms, rules, principles andprocedures such as decision-making rules, funding mechanisms, flexibility,transparency, implementation review systems, non-compliance proceduresand so forth [Wettestad, 1999]. Regime analysis also puts emphasis oninformal features often referred to as social practices [Young, 1998: 20].Levy et. al. [1995] have proposed various behavioural models throughwhich international institutions may have an impact. For example, iterativecollective decision-making may lead to various norms of reciprocity.

According to the institutional problem-solving perspective, the ozoneregime may have achieved more than the climate regime owing to a higherproblem-solving capacity. Likewise, the effectiveness of EU climate policyhas been curtailed by limited problem solving capacity. For example, therequirement of unanimity in the Council of Ministers concerning provisionsof a fiscal nature and energy sources has severely restricted EU efforts toadopt a common carbon/energy tax.

As far as we can see, the analysis of regime institutional factors does notadd significantly to the study of EU environmental policy. For regimetheorists, EU institutional attributes in fact represent deviant cases in terms


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of institutional competence. Accordingly, to some extent, the EU represents

a social laboratory for regime analysts interested in the consequences of

strengthening institutional competence and capacity at the expense of

national sovereignty. For example, the systematic application of qualified

majority voting, funding mechanisms and the peculiar enforcement system

of the European Court of Justice may provide important inputs to the studyof regime attributes. In consequence this may be an important area where

regime studies could benefit from EU-focused research.

Take the case of air pollution policy. When comparing the parallel

processes of developing an EU National Emission Ceilings Directive and

negotiating the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol within the context of the

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), the

more broad-spanning and advanced EU institutional structure must be taken

into consideration in order to understand the somewhat greater policy

strength achieved within the EU context. In particular, issue-linking seems

to have been a much more prominent feature of the decision-making process

within the EU than within CLRTAP [Wettestad, 2002].

The same argument is valid for the study of the role of domestic politicaland administrative institutions concerning implementation and effectiveness

of environmental policy. Some regime effectiveness studies have focused on

domestic variations over how political institutions channel social demands

for environmental protection as well as how administrative institutions differ

in terms of distribution of competence and policy instruments. Nevertheless,

students of regime effectiveness take international relations theory as a point

of departure and regime theory has been repeatedly criticised for being state-

centric [Levy et al., 1995; Newell, 2000].

In contrast, evaluation of EU legislation is frequently researched from

the perspective of domestic policy. There has traditionally been an academic

divide between those working within international relations and those who

study domestic policy and processes. Scholars of public policy evaluations

working within individual states have developed their own approaches toevaluation focusing on top down, bottom up and a balanced approach

[Sabatier, 1986]. In our view, however, linking the study of international

institutions to the study of domestic political and administrative institutions

represents a common challenge. Since most transnational environmental

problems arise as by-products of otherwise legitimate domestic activities,

like production of energy, food and goods, we have to focus on domestic

and international institutions in order to explain differences in

implementation and effectiveness. Hence, we have to transcend these two

traditional institutional strands of political science in order to integrate

international and domestic politics.


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Regime analysis has recently developed towards the study of interplay

and interaction between environmental regimes and between such regimes

and other types of regimes, like those governing international trade. Regime

interplay can be understood as a situation where one regime influences the

effectiveness of another regime [Young, 1996]. This line of thought may

also be applied to the interaction between EU policy and internationalregimes [Oberthr and Gehring, 2001]. As noted in the introduction, in

most areas of transnational environmental problems there is a core

environmental regime interacting with EU environmental policy.

In the study of EU water policy, for example, the interaction between the

North Sea/North East-Atlantic regime (NEA-regime) on marine pollution

and relevant EU directives has been largely ignored [e.g., Richardson,

1994; Grant et al.. 2000]. However, since the 1987 International North Sea

Conference (INSC), the NEA regime has actually triggered the adoption of

and partly shaped the content of important EU directives regulating nutrient

emissions as well as discharges of hazardous substances.10 For example, the

NEA regime has directly caused the EU obligation to phase out sewage

sludge dumping in the North Sea included in the Urban Waste WaterDirective. Recently, Para. 17 of the soft law Esbjerg Declaration on the

phasing out of hazardous substances within one generation emanating from

the 1995 INSC has served as model for relevant sections in the Water

Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). Conversely, the EU directives on

nutrients and hazardous substances have subsequently strengthened the

implementation of the NEA regime commitments since they carry more

political weight owing to their authoritative force. This synergetic

interaction has been caused by a combination of a high degree of overlap in

membership and institutional differences owing to different functions

fulfilled by soft law, international law and EU law [Skjrseth, 2001]. Soft

law commitments can, for example, take instant effect, but are vulnerable to

changes in political leadership when they are to be implemented.

Conversely, developing EU law is time-consuming, but such law imposesdirect legal obligations on the member states once adopted.

Another example is the interaction between knowledge-building and

policymaking within the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air

Pollution (CLRTAP) and EU air pollution policy-making. In order to

understand the recent years process of developing an EU Acidification

Strategy and a National Emission Ceilings Directive, it is essential to

acknowledge the influence of concepts and policy-making approaches that

were developed within the CLRTAP context. Specific examples are the

concept of critical loads and the multi-pollutants and multi-effects

approach [Wettestad, 2002].


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The interaction perspective applied to the cross-sectoral nature of the EUitself is also crucial for understanding the current gap in the EU betweenwhat is delivered and what is achieved, as pinpointed by the EEA. Oneimportant reason for this mismatch between policy and achievementsappears to be that the EU is producing environmental problems caused by

other sectors faster than it is finding environmental solutions. In theory,one solution is sector-integration, meaning that environmentalconsiderations are baked into the decision-making process in theproblem-creating sectors themselves, such as transport, energy, industry,agriculture and so on. As a response to this challenge, a major debate hascommenced along with increasing research into environmental policyintegration (EPI) within the EU [Baldock et al., 1992; Wilkinson, 1997;

Haigh, 1999; Jordan and Lenschow, 2000].However, the extent to which more integrated policies also mean better

implemented policies is contestable. Perhaps it makes most sense to see theissues of policy integration and implementation as separate challengescalling for separate cures. In principle, the cross-sectoral andcomprehensive nature of the EU should put it in a far stronger institutional

position than traditional international environmental regimes; with thepotential for sectoral integration and the agreement of integrative packagedeals across issue areas. However, evidence from climate politics so farindicate that the EU has been unable to take full advantage of such potentialinstitutional strengths [Wettestad, 2000].

Concluding Comments

The impact assessments conducted by the EEA indicate a need to improvethe effectiveness of EU environmental policy. Research on EUenvironmental policy has, however, paid scant attention to the evaluationand explanation of effectiveness. We think that the study of regimeeffectiveness has something to offer as a means of bridging this gap. Eventhough the EU is clearly something different in nature and degree from aninternational regime, EU environmental legislation or clusters of legislationcome close to the notion of environmental regimes in the implementationphase. This is because the EU has strong policy-making powers butcomparatively weak powers of implementation. Still, transferringapproaches and methodologies from international regime analysis to the EUrequires particular sensitivity to their respective institutional, political andhistorical characteristics.

Approaches to the study of the effectiveness of internationalenvironmental regimes cannot offer one coherent approach that can beapplied automatically to the study of EU environmental policy. Regime


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theory has clear limitations in the domestic context and such theory and EUstudies face common challenges in developing analytical frameworkscombining the importance of domestic and international institutions.However, regime approaches can perhaps contribute with: (a) an explicitfocus on effectiveness that extends the existing more narrow focus on

implementation and compliance; (b) a more systematic approach to thecombined influence of problem-types and related actor interests and norms,and institutional problem solving capacity for explaining effectiveness; and(c) a growing awareness of the importance of interaction betweeninternational regimes and EU environmental policy.

Ten years of regime effectiveness studies can also contribute to arefinement of existing approaches to the EU by offering a framework foranalysis that emphasises issues of theory, methodology, research design andcase study testing a framework that includes the importance of discussingand classifying success and failure. Current research on EUenvironmental policy tends to be marked by an output, and to some extent,an impact focus, while we know less about the causal links between thesedimensions and outcome in terms of behavioural change. If this dimension

is systematically included in the study of EU environmental implementationit will by itself necessitate a more systematic focus on the role of relevantactors in implementing policy, such as industry and green groups;frequently operating as counterbalancing forces to target groups.

Our main focus has been on what the study of EU environmental policycan learn from the study of environmental regimes. It is nevertheless clearthat regime analysis has much to learn from EU studies. First, the mostcommon prescription for improving the effectiveness of internationalenvironmental regimes is in one way or another to make them more state-like by consolidating centralised compliance and verification capacities,improving the collection and dissemination of information, and introducingmechanisms to strengthen enforcement. Although even institutionally solidinternational actors such as the European Union are plagued by seriousimplementation problems, at least interesting monitoring and reportingsystems are in place which are being further developed to support theevaluation of EU (and international) policy effectiveness on a country-by-country level. Secondly, as signalled by the recent EPI initiative, increasingthe horizontal coordination between different policy areas is extremelydifficult. The EU has greater experience here, and has a sobering tale to tellof the obstacles that need to be overcome in the effort to achieve bettercoordination and linkages within and between international institutions.


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NOTES

1. See, for instance, Jordan [1998] for a brief overview of the development of EUenvironmental policy-making.

2. For one exception, see Grant et al. [2000]. However, their effectiveness concept spans no lessthan eight indicators, and several of them are quite loosely defined.

3. Hildebrand [1993] argues that the EU has developed like an international environmental

regime, while Weale et al. [2000] argue that is difficult to understand EU environmentalpolicy from a regime perspective. See also Breckinridge [1997] who is arguing for theappropriateness of using regime analysis when studying the EU.

4. For some recent contributions, see, for instance, Golub [(ed.), 1998a; 1998b]; Jordan [1998];Weale et al. [2000].

5. Nigel Haigh, in the Manual of Environmental Policy, uses the terms formal andpractical compliance [Haigh, 1999].

6. See Collins and Earnshaw [1993: 222]. In terms of infringement proceedings in the 1980s,75 per cent of the cases had to do with various forms of non-compliance [ ibid.: 216].

7. For a critical perspective, see, for example, Hovden [1999].8. Some of the most relevant EU Directives are: Directive 76/769/EEC on dangerous

substances discharged into the aquatic environment; Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urbanwaste water treatment and Directive 91/676/EEC on the protection of waters againstpollution caused by nitrates from agriculture.

9. Interview with Marianne Wenning, Deputy Head of Climate Change Unit, EU CommissionDG Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection, 30 Nov. 2000. See also a study of theEuropean Environment Bureau (EEB): http://ens.lycos.com/ens/jan2001/2001L-01-12-11.

html, 4 July 2001.10. The Urban Waste-Water Directive, the Nitrates Directive, as well as the Dangerous

Substance Directive.

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WEEK 9 Skjærseth and Wettestad (2002)

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