Week 2 Durkheim Suicide and Fertility 20164619

8/2/2019 Week 2 Durkheim Suicide and Fertility 20164619

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Suicide and Fertility: A Study of Moral StatisticsAuthor(s): Emile Durkheim, H. L. Sutcliffe, John SimonsReviewed work(s):Source: European Journal of Population / Revue Europenne de Dmographie, Vol. 8, No. 3(1992), pp. 175-197Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20164619 .

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European Journal of Population 8 (1992) 175-197 175North-Holland

Suicide and fertility:a study of moral statisticsEmile Durkheim

Translated byHL. Sutcliffe

The paper that follows was originally published in 1888, and has been speciallytranslated from the French for this issue of the journal. The author, Emile Durkheim(1858-1917) is often described as one of the founding fathers of sociology, and hiscontribution to that discipline has certainly been immense. In this paper, which ischaracteristic of his work, he claims to demonstrate an inverse relationship betweenthe suicide rate and the birth rate for the D?partements of France, and to explain

why this relationship was to be expected. We had the paper translated because webelieve that Durkheim's work has much contemporary significance, and merits moreattention than it has yet received from population scientists.Like many scholars of his day, Durkheim was preoccupied with the issue of socialsolidarity. Concerned with what he and many others saw as the malaise of modernEuropean societies, he believed that its roots were in the way social solidarity hadbeen weakened in these societies in the process of their development. The interests ofindividual and society had diverged. Progress towards moral individualism had beenundermined by pressures towards egoism and anomie.

One index of the malaise was, argued Durkheim, the suicide rate, for suicideimplied a complete disintegration of the bond between individual and society. The1888 paper marked the start of a major empirical study of suicide, the result of whichwas his famous monograph Suicide, published in 1897. In this he assembled evidenceof social differentials in the suicide rate to support the proposition that it variedinversely with the degree of integration of the social group. The book (published in

English in 1952) had a profound effect on the development of sociology, andcontinues to have a dominant influence on the study of suicide.

Why should the suicide rate rise when the birth rate declines? Durkheim arguesthat the greater the vigour and unity of the family?as manifested in a "healthy" birthrate and a low rate of marital dissolution?the more it serves as a protection against

Correspondence to: J. Simons, Centre for Population Studies, London School of Hygiene andTropical Medicine, 99 Gower Street, London WC1E 6AZ, UK.

0168-6577/92/$05.00 ? 1992 - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved


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176 E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertilitysuicide. "If suicide increases when the birth rate declines, it is because these twophenomena are both due in part to a decline in family sentiment." For Durkheim,domestic solidarity?familism?was essential to solidarity in society at large. Inanother paper he writes: "... the family is a source [foyer] of morality, energy andkindness, a school of duty, love and work?in a word, a school of life which cannotlose its role" (quoted in Lukes, 1973, p. 186).Durkheim's other major books were The Division of Labour in Society (1893), TheRules of Sociological Method (1895), and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life(1912). His work is now the subject of a substantial literature, in which his ideas havebeen much analyzed and elaborated, and often cogently criticized. A critical biography by Lukes {Emile Durkheim?His Life and Work: a Historical and Critical Study.Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973) provides a comprehensive review and assessment.

John SimonsFormer joint-editor of the

European Journal of Population

Suicide and fertility: a study of moral statisticsOwing to advances in demography, the population question has atlast emerged from the logical discussions inwhich the economists hadconfined it for too long. Today, it is no longer enough to discuss theabstract principle of the struggle for life or the likelihood that produc

tion may fairly soon attain its upper limit. Such an approach would beincapable of advancing consideration of the problem at all for, although the law of competition is a general one, it is not the only law

which governs social facts, and to solve the highly complex problem ofpopulation by means of this axiom alone would be to condemn oneselfto a partial solution. Also, nothing could be more pointless thanpondering on the possible development of the population and the

objects of consumption in the distant future, since the answer dependson a thousand and one circumstances which the observer can neitherknow nor predict. Science studies what already exists before seekingto divine the future and can infer the future only on the basis of thefamiliar present. The only way of deciding whether population increase is beneficial or detrimental to a people is therefore to observethe societies in which this phenomenon occurs, the societies in whichthe reverse is found and to compare them.However, the social fact one elects to observe must be chosen withdiscernment. As a rule, it is assumed that the happiness of individualsand of societies grows hand in hand with the increase in the quantity


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E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertility 111of objects consumed. It is posited that a society which consumes moreis happier, and it is therefore believed that, to solve this problem, oneneed only ascertain whether or not the trends in consumption vary inaccordance with those in the birth rate [1]l. But this is to forget howrelative happiness is. It matters little that resources increase if needsincrease in like or greater measure. The degree to which they aresatisfied is no greater if at the same time they widen in scope; the gapremains the same. This is one of the truths of elementary psychologythat the economists have by and large forgotten. Social happiness is aresultant which depends on a multitude of causes. The increase incommon and private resources is only one of these causes and veryoften not even one of the most important of them. For a society tofeel healthy, it is neither adequate nor always necessary for it to use agreat deal of coal or consume a lot of meat; but the development of allits functions must be regular, harmonious and well-proportioned.In fact, we do not actually have any criterion for evaluating thedegree of happiness of a society with any accuracy. But it is possible tomake a comparative evaluation of its state of health or sickness, forwe have at our disposal a relatively well-known fact which expressessocial ills in figures, namely the relative number of suicides. Withoutdwelling at this juncture on the psychology of this phenomenon, it iscertain that the regular increase in the number of suicides alwaysbetokens a serious disturbance in the organic conditions of society.For these abnormal acts to increase in number, the reasons forsuffering must have increased in number too and, at the same time,the organism's power of resistance must also have declined. One cantherefore be sure that societies in which suicide is more frequent areless healthy than societies inwhich it is rarer. We thus have a methodwith which to tackle the much debated problem of population. If itcan be established that the development of the birth rate is accompanied by a rise in the number of suicides, one will be entitled to inferfrom this that too high a birth rate is a morbid phenomenon, a socialill. If, on the other hand, the reverse were found to be true, the

opposite conclusion would be implied.A number of facts to which demographers have already drawnattention would seem to confirm the former of these two hypotheses.In countries where the population is too dense, suicides are numerous1Numbers in square brackets refer to notes in the Notes section at the end of the paper.


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178 E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertility

and they are seen to decline in number whenever emigration, functioning in the manner of a safety valve, relieves society of this

menacing plethora [2]. On the basis of these observations alonetherefore, Malthusianism could be regarded as proven by statistics. Itis not my intention to dispute these facts, but Iwould like to comparethem with contrary facts, which are no less numerous and extensive,and which limit their scope. In other words, if an excessively high birthrate encourages suicide, an excessively low birth rate produces precisely the same result.

It is the purpose of this study to set out the facts which demonstratethis law, then to interpret it.

I. Suicide and the birth rate in the various countries of EuropeIf the European countries with most suicides are placed in one

group and those with the least in another, and if one then seeks toestablish the average birth rate in these two kinds of society, theresults are as follows:Countries with the most suicides

Suicidesper 1,000,000inhabitants

Births per 1,000inhabitants(1865-76)Denmark (1866-75)France (1871-75)Switzerland (1876)Prussia (1871-75)

Austria (Cisleithan) (1873-77)Bavaria (1871-76)Sweden (1871-75)Norway (1866-73)England and Wales (1871-76)

Mean

26715019613312290817470

131

30.925.730.438.538.739.230.430.335.533.3

Countries with the fewest suicidesHungary (1864-65)Belgium (1866-75)Netherlands (1869-72)Italy (1864-76)Finland (1869-76)Spain (1866-70)

Romania (?)Scotland (?)

5267353131172534

41.732.135.637.134.535.730.235.1

Mean 36 35.7


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E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertility 179

Hence, whereas in countries with the most suicides there are 33.3births for every 1,000 inhabitants, there are 35.7 in countries with thefewest suicides. This difference is admittedly not very substantial, andif this was all the proof we had in support of our thesis, we should beable to acknowledge only a remote and vague relation between suicideand the birth rate. Yet there is a preliminary point which must not beneglected. One is bound to attach greater importance to itwhen onereflects that the low birth rate is at most only one case among all theinnumerable conditions on which the development of suicide depends.It is thus highly remarkable, even at this stage, that, of all these manyinfluences, the birth rate should single itself out so clearly. To appreciate the true value of this first piece of evidence, it should be bornein mind that, in some of the countries in the first group, the large

number of suicides is certainly not due to, an excessively low birth rate,but to an excessively high birth rate. This is certainly the case whereGermany is concerned. The mere presence of this very prolific country

in the first of our two groups raises the average birth rate appreciably.Indeed, if Prussia and Bavaria are removed, the result is as follows:

Countries with most suicides. Mean birth rate: 31.7.Countries with fewest suicides. Mean birth rate: 35.7.

If, despite the presence of this disruptive element, the influence ofa low birth rate on suicide is still apparent, it is because it is asomewhat general one. And Morselli, from whom we have borrowedthe above table, is also forced to acknowledge this, though he declinesto explain it.He calls for it to be given closer scrutiny [3] and this iswhat we shall endeavour to do.

This first step is doubly instructive. While providing us with apreliminary though admittedly imperfect proof of our hypothesis, itshows us where to look for the elements of a more complete proof. Itis clearly neither in the countries with a very high birth rate nor inthose where it is simply healthy thatwe will find the facts we require.Indeed, in the former, the birth rate tends to encourage rather thanprevent suicide; in the others, our field of observation is not variedenough. We must therefore turn to a society in which the mean birthrate is low. France meets this condition only too well.


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180 E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertilityIL Suicide and vital growth in the French D?partements

The birth rate is often measured by dividing the annual number ofbirths, after subtracting the still-born (So), by the total populationfigure (N). This produces what is termed the crude birth rate.

However this procedure is extremely imperfect, since the generalpopulation includes a large number of citizens who are not, or not yet,capable of reproducing, the children and the aged; and since they areunequally distributed throughout the country, a comparison of theD?partements on the basis of the birth rate is thus distorted. In places

where they are most numerous, they would appear to reduce the birthrate figure because they increase the denominator N in the fractionSo/N. This is why it is preferable, where possible, to calculate thebirth rate by eliminating all those elements incapable of reproductionfrom the N factor, in other words, by dividing the annual number ofbirths by the population of childbearing age (from 15 to 50 years for

women).But what is obtained by this method is rather the mean fertilityfigure, and this is not what interests us for the moment. For what wewish to study is the birth rate in the context of its social function of

maintaining the life of society. Clearly, the manner in which thisfunction is performed cannot be assessed on the basis of the birthfigure alone; the gaps these births are intended to fill, in other words,the deaths, also have to be taken into account. A particular level ofreproductive activity may be either strong or weak depending on

whether the losses which have to be made good are more or lessnumerous. In other words, the socially useful effect of the birthrate?and this is the only one which matters to us?can only beexpressed in terms of mortality. A prolific society, but one in whichmortality is also very high, is not healthier than one inwhich the birthrate is lower but where the death rate is also lower. This iswhy we aregoing to compare the suicide figure in the different French D?partements not with the birth rate as such, whether crude or specific, butwith the ratio of mean natural increase, which results from the excessof births over deaths, to the deaths. This is what has so aptly beentermed vital growth. The increase thus calculated also has the greatadvantage of not taking account of migratory movements from one

D?partement to another, the obvious effect of which would merely beto disrupt our investigations.


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In the Compte g?n?ral pour Vadministration de la justice criminelle enFrance (1880), Mr Yvern?s divided the D?partements into six groupsaccording to the frequency of the annual suicides there between 1830and 1880 [4]. Let us therefore seek to ascertain what the average vitalgrowth was in each of these six groups over the same or a very similarperiod. I am taking this as calculated byMr Bertillon for the first 69years of this century (1801-1869) [5].

Also, since the first of these six groups includes only one D?partement, namely Seine, I have combined itwith the following one in thecalculations below.


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182E. Durkheim / Suicide andfertilityIst group (from 39 to 28 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants)

(Average) annual excess of birthsper thousand deaths (1801-1869)Seine 2.4Seine-et-Oise 0.7Seine-et-Marne 2.6

Marne 2.6Oise 1.5

Mean growth 1.9

Und group (from 21 to 17 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants)Seine-Inf?rieure 3.6

Aisne 4.3Aube 2Eure-et-Loir 2.1Var 0.3Mean growth 2.4

Illrd group (from 16 to 12 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants)Eure [6] -0.6Charente-Inf?rieure 1.7Vaucluse 4.5Basses-Alpes 2.9Bouches-du-Rh?ne 2Pas-de-Calais 5.6

Ardennes 6Meuse 3.7C?te-d'Or 2.8Indre-et-Loire 2.5

Dr?me 5.6Somme 3.5Rh?ne 5.8Yonne 2.2Loir-et-Cher 3.7Loiret 3.4

Mean growth 3.49

TVth group (from 11 to 5 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants)Doubs 5.1Jura 2.7

Haute-Sa?ne 4.7Dordogne 3.4Cher 7.8Indre 6.2

Ni?vre 5.9Deux-S?vres 4.8Tarn-et-Garonne 0.6


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?Vth group (from 11 to 5 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants) (cont.)(Average) annual excess of birthsper thousanddeaths (1801-1869)

Gironde 2.1Is?re 5.5

Maine-et-Loire 3.6Saone-et-Loire 5.6

Mayenne 3.9Haute-Marne 3.4Calvados [6] -0.1H?rault 4Lot-et-Garonne 0.3Orne 1.4Sarthe 3.4

Manche 2.1Charente 2.3Nord 7Corr?ze 6.1Haute-Vienne 4.7Loire 8.3Aude 5.1Pyr?n?es-Orientales 6.6Vosges 6.4Ard?che 7.2Landes 4.6Basses-Pyr?n?es 4.9Vend?e 6.2Vienne 5.6C?tes-du-Nord 3.7Finist?re 5Ille-et-Vilaine 2.8

Loire-Inf?rieure 5.7Morbihan 4.4Allier 5.7Ain 2.3Hautes-Alpes 3.5Gard 5.5

Mean growth 4.4

Vth group (from 4 to 2 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants)Corse 6.2Creuse 6.3Aveyron 5.6Loz?re 5.9Hautes-Pyr?n?es 5.9Cantal 3.8Haute-Loire 5.5Ari?ge 6.3Tarn 5.4Haute-Garonne 4.4Gers 1


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184E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertility

Vth group (from 4 to 2 annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants) (cont.)(Average) annual excess of birthsper thousand deaths (1801-1869)

Lot 3J?Puy-de-D?me 3.6

Mean growth 4.8

These tables show that mean natural growth displays a smooth andgradual increase as the suicide rate decreases. These two parallelmovements are found from the first group to the last with no interruptions or exceptions. We can therefore conclude that these two socialfacts vary in inverse proportion to one another.

Admittedly, we have thus compared nothing but averages. Yet thisprocedure had to be adopted in view of the multitude of random andlocal causes to which the phenomena compared are subject. Theireffects had to be neutralised by taking a sufficient number of D?parte

ments. Furthermore, if instead of confining ourselves to averages, weanalyse the contents of the above tables, the result merely confirmsour conclusion.

In fact, for France as a whole, or rather for the 82 D?partementswhich we have considered, the ratio of mean natural increase todeaths is 4 per thousand (4.03 to be precise). If we try to ascertainhow many D?partements lie above and how many below the averagein each of the five groups, we find that they are made up as follows:

Annual suicides Below mean Above meanper 100,000 growth (%) growth (%)inhabitants

1st group 39-28 100 0Und group 21-1780 20Illrd group 16-128 32iVth group 11-5 40 60Vth group 4- 2 13 7

Hence, the groups with the greatest number of suicides includealmost only those D?partements whose growth is below the mean.

Then the ratio is gradually reversed, as the number of suicidesincreases. The same might also be expressed in the following manner.Of the 26 D?partements with the greatest number of suicides (1st,Ilnd and Illrd groups), there are 20 where vital growth is below the


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average; and of the 41 D?partements whose growth corresponds to orexceeds the average, 25, or more than three-quarters, belong to theIVth and Vth groups, namely those inwhich the number of suicides isthe lowest.

III. Reverse procedure

To check the above result, let us try the reverse procedure. Let usclassify the D?partements according to the size of their vital growthand subsequently seek to ascertain the average suicide rate for each ofthe groups thus established; the suicide rate used is an average figuretaken over the five years from 1872 to 1876.Admittedly, this is a shortperiod and not sufficiently similar to the one used to determine vitalgrowth. Unfortunately, these are the only figures available to us. In hisCompte general, Mr Yvern?s gives us only the upper and lower limitsfor each of the groups he singles out; he does not indicate the averagenumber of suicides for each D?partement (over the same period). Ofcourse, we could have calculated it for ourselves; but since theevidence given above and below tallies, there seemed to be little needfor this mammoth and somewhat intimidating task. Moreover, in viewof the fact that, since the beginning of the century, suicide hasdeveloped much more regularly than growth, there is less need todetermine the annual rate over a very extensive period.We shall divide the D?partements into four groups on the basis ofthe relative value of their mean growth.


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Ist group (growth from - 0.6 to 2.5?20 D?partements)Suicides per millioninhabitants, per year,1872-1876

EureCalvadosVarLot-et-GaronneTarn-et-GaronneSeine-et-OiseGersOrneOiseCharente-Inf?rieureBouches-du-Rh?neAubeEure-et-LoirGirondeMancheYonneAinCharenteSeineIndre-et-Loire

Average suicides

255.1147.5221.2

84.574

388.861.896.9

407.2160.2202.9284.8273.5122.584.5

219.3128.2164.3400.3213.2199.5

Und group (growth from 2.5 to 4.5?26 D?partements)MarneSeine-et-MarneJura

Haute-MarneDordogneLoiretIlle-et-VilaineC?te-d'OrBasses-AlpesLotSarthe

Hautes-AlpesSommeSeine-Inf?rieure

Maine-et-LoirePuy-de-D?meLoir-et-CherMeuseC?tes-du-NordCantal

380.6383.5123141.7115.3206.769.2187.4195.258.9

141.7115.3

206.7155.399.2

219.3186212.8

52.761.2


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E. Durkheim / Suicide andfertility 187Und group (growth from 2.5 to 4.5?26 D?partements) (cont.)

Suicides per millioninhabitants, per year,1872-1876

Mayenne 82.7H?rault 78.1Haute-Garonne 65.9Aisne 297.9Morbihan 64.8Vaucluse 208.7A ver age suicides 157.6

Illrd group (growth from 4.5 to 6?24 D?partements)Landes 83.1Haute-Sa?ne 118.1Haute-Vienne 101.1Basses-Pyr?n?es 64.2Deux-S?vres 111.0Finist?re 108.2Doubs 113.9Aude 74.8Tarn 55.0Haute-Loire 45.9Is?re 97.9

Gard 114.7Aveyron 39.7Dr?me 162.2Vienne 93.5Pas-de-Calais 146.8Sa?ne-et-Loire 144.7

Allier 83.9Loire-Inf?rieure 76.0Rh?ne 166.8Hautes-Pyr?n?es 39.9Ni?vre 94.1Loz?re 54.6Ardennes 166.7A verage suicides 98.2

IVth group (growth from 6 to 8.3?12 D?partements)Corr?ze 69.3Corse 28.6Indre 66.2

Ari?ge 103.6Creuse 30.8Vosges 69.2


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Ist group (growth from 0.6 to 2.5?20 D?partements) (cont.)Suicides per millioninhabitants, per year,1872-1876

Pyr?n?es-Orientales 126.2Nord 76.0Ard?che 109.9Vend?e 84.6Cher 104.9Loire 70.8Average suicides 78.3

This procedure thus provides confirmation of the earlier one andreveals just as clearly the inverse relation between growth and suicide.The group with the lowest growth is the one with the highest suiciderate and, in each of the groups, we see that suicide declines as growthincreases.

If we cease to confine ourselves to averages, we obtain the following results.For the 82 D?partements observed, the annual average number ofsuicides for every 1,000,000 inhabitants is 138.9. To begin with, wenote that, of the 36 D?partements included in the Illrd and IVth

groups, i.e. those with the highest rate of growth, only five exceed theaverage for suicides. And even these five exceptions are all found inthe third group, not a single one being in the fourth.

But we can take this analysis a stage further.The maximum number of suicides is 407.2 (Oise) and the minimum28.6 (Corse). Let us divide the difference between these two extremefigures into four parts, and establish in each of the four groups, drawnup according to the level of growth, how many D?partements thereare in which the number of suicides exceeds 300, how many in whichthe number ranges between 300 and 201, between 200 and 101 andbetween 100 and 28.6. The result is shown in the following table:


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E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertility 189Growth How many D?partements are there where Total number

the number of suicides ranges between: of D?partements407-301 300-201 200-101 100-28.6

Ist group -0.3 to 2.5 3 7 50Und group 2.6 to 4.4 2a 6 80 26Illrd group 4.6 to 6.5 0 0 1134IVthgroup 6.5 to 8.3 0 0 42Total 13 28 362

aThe top two in the class.

One has only to glance at this table for confirmation of the linkconcerned [7].

IV. Suicide and vital growth according to the degree of urbanisation ofthe inhabitants

This relationship is also apparent in other ways.It is well known that in France, as also in many other European

countries, suicides are much more frequent in towns than in ruralareas. "From 1873 to 1878, there were 18,470 suicides in rural areasand 15,895 in towns. If the annual average derived from these figuresis compared with the respective population figures for 1876, we findthat there were 123.48 suicides in rural areas and 221.44 suicides inthe towns per million inhabitants." [8] Consequently, if our previoussupposition was correct, it may be anticipated that vital growth intowns is considerably lower than in rural areas. And this is indeed the

case.If one observes solely the county towns in each D?partement, it is

apparent that not only is the increase minimal, but mortality exceedsthe birth rate. In 1880, and this is a phenomenon which holds true forevery year, 71 out of 86 county towns had more deaths than births.The following are the 15 exceptions to the rule:

Nice, 183Privas, 102

M?zi?res, 5Tulle, 231Ch?teauroux, 43Saint-Etienne, 266


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Chaumont, 62Lille, 658Tarbes, 39Perpignan, 2La Rochesur-Yon, 2Limoges, 57Epinal, 4P?rigueux, 3The total gain in these 15 towns is 1,758, whereas the deficit in the71 others reaches the enormous figure of 13,641.

Where the total urban and rural populations are concerned, Frenchnational statistics provide us the following estimates for 1884:Urban population (including all settlements with over 2,000 inhabitants): 13,400,000 inhabitantsRural population: 24,500,000 inhabitantsThe first of these ismore than half the second, so that its growth

should be equal to over half the growth of the latter. In fact, it is onlyone ninth of it. Indeed in the same year, 1884, the increase is:Urban population: 8,363Rural population: 70,661In other words, if the first figure is given a value of 100, the secondwould equal not 200, but 875.

Lastly, if these two populations are compared from the standpointof the birth rate alone, rather than growth, the results would besimilar. Hence, in 1861 [9]:

The birth rate for Seine was 32.1For other towns, the birth rate was 34.5For rural areas, the birth rate was 38.7

Moreover, this unequal population growth of the towns and ruralareas has been known about for a long time. Maurice Block [10]believes he can explain it by the fact that people get married youngerin rural areas than in towns. Apart from the fact that it is hard tounderstand how an interval of a few years can produce such a

difference in the growth of these two populations, the comparison wehave just made between vital growth and suicide shows that the


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decline in growth is a phenomenon whose importance is of a differentorder and depends on more deep-seated moral causes.

V. Vital growth and suicide by professionsIt is well-known that the various professions sometimes have a very

marked influence on suicide. There is thus good reason to ascertaintheir influence on the growth of the population also.Although it is not known in sufficient detail how individual professions influence the tendency to commit suicide, it can nevertheless betaken as read that the profession with the least number of suicides isfarming and the ones with the highest suicide rate are the liberalprofessions. Commerce and industry lie somewhere in between, without it being possible to allot a precise place to them; commerce wouldnone the less appear to be slightly more at risk than industry. It is inItaly that the influence of the professions on suicide has been studied

most closely. Here, then, is the table drawn up byMorselli [11].Number of suicides in each occupationfor every 1,000,000 individuals

Property 113.5Production of raw materials 25.0Industry 56.7

Commerce 246.5Transport 154.7Public administration 324.3Religion 45.3

Law 217.8Medicine 163.3Education and Teaching 175.3Fine Arts 94.0Arts and sciences 618.3

Army 404.1

As we see, there are very few suicides among farmers, few amongindustrialists [12], more among people in commerce, with the liberal

professions providing an enormous contingent. We may assume thatthese relationships are approximately the same in France. Where vitalgrowth is concerned, we will find an inverse relationship.Similarly, according to official French statistics [13], and leavingaside domestic staff, it will be seen that, on average, a family of


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landowning farmers consists of 3.53 persons; among industrialists, thefigure is only 2.98; 2.73 among merchants and 1.74 in the liberalprofessions. Hence, the families of farmers are over one sixth largerthan those of industrialists, and over one fifth larger than those ofmen in the liberal professions. In a word, the professions wherepeople commit suicide the most are also those with the lowest birthrate, and vice versa.

VI. Conclusion

Now that we have established the law, it remains to interpret it.The first conclusion to emerge from the foregoing is that the birthrate is a pathological phenomenon when it is too low. However onechooses to explain suicide, it is, as we have seen, always a sign of asocial malaise and can only increase if this malaise itself increases.Since a low birth rate and an increased tendency to suicide consistently go hand in hand as we have just indicated, we are justified inregarding them as two phenomena of a similar kind and in ascribingto the former the universally acknowledged morbid character of thelatter. Through the parallelism of their development, the abnormal

nature of the one reveals the abnormal nature of the other.It has been alleged by many sociologists that too low a birth rate

spells harm and sickness for society. This study shows that it spellsharm and sickness for individuals as well. Not only is a society whichincreases regularly stronger and more capable of holding its ownagainst rival societies; its individual members also have more chanceof survival. Their organisms are more vigorous and resistant. Referring to countries with a poor birth rate, Mr Bertillon states that theyput into savings, into capital, what would have been part of the futuregeneration [14]. It is clear from what has already been said howdisastrous such an investment is for all and sundry.

But, as we pointed out initially, it is not our intention to maintainthat this relationship is identical in each step on the scale of the birthrate. On the contrary, it is probable that when the birth rate risesbeyond a level which is too high, it once again becomes a cause ofsuicides, though for another reason. In a society where the populationis increasing too fast, the fight for survival becomes more cut-throatand individuals find it easier to turn their backs on a life which has


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become too much of a struggle. Although apparently contradictory,these two hypotheses can easily be reconciled. Indeed, it should notbe forgotten that the birth rate is a social and therefore a living fact.There is no such thing as an organic property which is good indefinitely and absolutely. Every biological development is healthy withincertain limits: for all phenomena of life there is a normal area oneither side of which they become pathological. This is also true of thebirth rate.

So much for the meaning of the relationship we have established;but what of its cause? Having interpreted it, we must now explain it.How is it that, at least within certain limits, the birth rate curve falls as

the suicide rate rises and vice versa?Clearly, these two facts, the increase in the number of suicides and

the decline in the birth rate, must have one or more common causes.But what are they?

As Mr Bertillon points out somewhere, suicide is always a symptomof an organism in disequilibrium; but this disequilibrium may be dueto either organic or social causes. Sometimes it is the being itselfwhich is tainted, its functions being distorted and impaired while theenvironment is healthy, and sometimes it is the environment itself

which is not normal. In reality, it is highly probable that there is nosuicide where these two causes are not both present at once. Anorganism which was perfectly intact would resist the environment, andif the environment itself was not in any way pathological, the morbid

germs which the organism might contain would not be able to develop.But although these two causes are always present, it is sometimes oneand sometimes the other which has greater influence and which setsits stamp on suicide. Suicides have sometimes been regarded as fallinginto two major categories: those that are absurd and those that arereasonable and reasoned. The former are those which result almostexclusively from an organic defect and in which the social causes haveplayed only an incidental role; the latter, on the other hand, derivelogically from the nature of the environment and are intelligible forthis precise reason.

The first of these causes is not common to the two phenomenacompared and cannot therefore explain the relationship betweenthem. Moreover, it is an established truth of demography that thebirth rate is determined only to a very small extent by race. Aparticular race either is or is not prolific depending on the circum


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194 E. Durkheim / Suicide and fertilitystances and the social setting inwhich it is situated. The French inFrance have difficulty making good their annual losses; in Canada,they are multiplying rapidly. People of Norman stock are extremelyfertile on English territory, whereas this is not at all the case in

Normandy. These and other facts which might be quoted show thatthe birth rate is much less dependent on certain organic predispositions than on the morals and ideas which hold sway in a society.

Although individual sterility may be due to a physiological state, masssterility results from other causes. Moreover, we are fully aware that itis intentional, a sort of discipline, to which individuals deliberatelysubmit, rather than one imposed on them for organic necessities. It istrue that the D?partements with the largest number of suicides andthe fewest births are also those with the most mental cases. But this

merely proves that madness, like suicide and the birth rate, does notstem solely from individual, chance variations, but, in large measure,from social causes. The number of persons with defective nervoussystems within a group does not increase solely as a result of unfortunate matings and hereditary predispositions, but also as a result of thepoor sociological conditions inwhich such individuals find themselves.

Often, apparently organic causes are merely social causes appearing ina different form and fixed within the organism. Consequently, socialcauses alone are common to suicide and the birth rate and are able toaccount for the relationship between them.

To determine more precisely the exact nature of these causes, let usrelate the birth rate to a number of other facts which also conferimmunity from suicide. We know that husbands are much less at riskfrom suicide than bachelors and fathers much less than childlesshusbands; that, where the family is very strong, where domestictraditions are strong enough to withstand these internal conflicts

which elsewhere destroy marriages, in a word, that where divorces andseparations are rare, suicides are rare also, and that where the formerare frequent, so are the latter. All these facts show that where thefamily thrives, it serves as a protection against suicide and that thegreater the vigour and unity of the family, the more it possesses thisprotective virtue. A healthy birth rate naturally presupposes quiteclosely-knit families, but these, in turn, are only possible where menare fond of and used to domestic solidarity and prefer the pleasures ofa communal life to material well-being. In most cases, these preferences probably become fixed in an instinctive, unthinking fashion; but


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what does that matter? Whether deliberate or not, their natureremains the same. It has often been said that if families were becoming smaller, this was because the parents were unwilling to jeopardizeeither their own or their children's material well-being. This may wellbe so; but material well-being would not have assumed such importance in popular morality unless the joys of collective life had lostsome of their importance. Hence, any decline in the birth rate impliesa decline in the domestic spirit. We have just seen that this provokessuicides. So this must be the common cause we are looking for. Ifsuicide increases when the birth rate declines, it is because these twophenomena are both due in part to a decline in family sentiment.But what is the origin of this beneficent property of the family? Itcannot be a matter of the economic advantages that domestic life isable to offer. When one thinks of the worries, the extra work, theresponsibilities and sorrows of all kinds Which large families lead to,

who would venture to suggest that the balance of purely utilitarianadvantages and disadvantages adds up to a gain or a loss? From thisangle, it is no longer

evenpossible to see what the raison d'?tre of thefamily might be and, like Mr Renan, one has no alternative but to

regard paternal love as some kind of mechanism contrived by natureagainst individuals, to force them to serve its own ends. In the light ofthe foregoing, there is only one possible reply to the question, which isthat the family lies in the nature of the human organism, at least, suchas evolution has made it. In his present state, man is created for thepurpose of uniting with certain of his fellows in a community closerthan ordinary social relations or simple friendship might require; andit is easy to explain how this need could have arisen and becomeconsolidated. The effect is to make the individual part of a compactmass with which he identifies and sympathises and which multiplieshis strength: his powers of resistance are thereby increased. The lessisolated he is, the better he is equipped for the struggle. On the other

hand, where families are smaller, weaker, less fertile, individuals,being less close to each other, leave gaps between them through whichthere blows the icyblast of egoism, chilling the heart and breaking thespirit.

This brief study provides yet more evidence of the truth that, insocial questions, it is the social point of view which predominates. Asa rule, it is above all the economic consequences of the birth ratewhich are studied; people seek to establish its possible influence on


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196 E. Durkheim / Suicide andfertility

production or the distribution of goods, in other words, on theinterests of individuals, and think that itsmovements can be explainedby these considerations alone. We have just seen that it is essentially acondition of and a pointer to the health of societies. What determinesits variations is not so much utilitarian calculations?which, moreover,are too complex to have any effect on most people??s certain socialfeelings which, depending on whether they are present or not, pro

mote or discourage life in the group. The same is true of suicide. Ithas often been presented as a solution to the conflict of individualinterests, and its increase has been explained by the growing intensityof competition, of the fight for survival (Morselli). But it is also due toother strictly social or, if you will, moral causes, one of which we havejust indicated. It is perhaps one of the most important of them all.

Notes

[1] See Nadaille, marquis de, Affaiblissement de la natalit? en France. Paris, 1881, p. 121 et seq.[2] Legoyt, Suicide ancien et moderne, p. 257.[3] Morselli, // Suicidio, p. 199.[4] See Table II.[5] See Dictionnaire encyclop?dique des sciences m?dicales, articles entitled FRANCE and

DEMOGRAPHIE. I am including only 82 D?partements in my calculations. I have had toomit the Alpes-Maritimes and the Savoies, whose demography has been known for such ashort time, and also the D?partements annexed in 1870, which are not included in the mapof suicides drawn up by Mr. Yvern?s.

[6] Mr Bertillon's table attributes to Eure a growth of +0.6; in our view, this plus should havebeen a minus and we have therefore amended it. Likewise in the case of Calvados.[7] Our sole concern, in all the foregoing, has been growth. We thought itmight be interestingto make the same comparison for the marital fertility rate (number of annual births per

1,000 married women ranging between 15 and 50 years of age). This produces the followingresults:

Category of Annual suicides MaritalD?partement fertility rate

1st 38 1332nd 28 139.253rd 21 to 17 150.24th 16 to 12 1615th 11 to 5 1906th 4 to 2 185

Apart from the irregularity which suddenly appears in the sixth category, this resultcoincides with the preceding ones.


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[8] Legoyt, Suicide ancien et moderne, p. 195.[9] Legoyt, La France et VEtranger, II, 38.

[10] Statistique de France, I, 63.[11] Morselli, Il suicidio.[12] The immunity of industry in Italy is even quite exceptional. It probably stems from the fact

that Italian industry is also underdeveloped.[13] 2e s?rie, XVII, XLVII.[14] Bertillon, article entitled NATALITE in Dictionnaire encyclop?dique des sciences m?dicales,

2e s?rie, II, 490.

Week 2 Durkheim Suicide and Fertility 20164619

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