Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, Summer, 1990

CRITICAL ESSAYS AND RESEARCH NOTES

WEBER'S ACTION THEORY ANDLOWI'S POLICY TYPES IN FORMULATION,

ENACTMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION

Hugh MiiierUniversity of Wisconsin-Green Bay

Adding Max Weber's (1968) motivational sociai action construct to Theo-dore Lowi's (1964) functional poiicy taxonomy expands the utiiity of Lowi'smodei. The newiy synthesized criteria enabie more anaiytbaiiy precise cate-gories, resoiving much of the disagreement about where in Lowi's framework apoiicy bebngs.^

The method of this paper is to identify ideai types based on the integrationof the two modeis. The first task wiii be to outiine Weber's categories in a waythat wiii be usefui in a pubiic poiicy action context, and secondiy. to appiy theWeberian nx^dei to the categories of distributive, redistributive. reguiatory. andconstituent poiicy (Lowi 1964; 1975). A particuiar orientation toward sociai actionin the formuiatbn stage wiii evoive toward a partbuiar poiby arena in theenactment or legitimation stage, setting the stage for impiementatbn.

ORIENTATIONS TOWARD SOCIAL ACTION

Lowi's poiicy types-distributive, redistributive, reguiatory. and constituent-continue to arouse interest. Citing some "persistent ambiguities concerning thescheme." (especiaiiy with regard to the reguiatory arena) Spitzer (1987) pro-posed a revision to the categories by introducing an ordinai dimensbn whichKeiiow (1988) subsequently dismissed as confusing and ineiegant. in the pres-ent articie we reconstruct the categories aiong the iines of Weber's (1968)sociai action taxonomy and in doing so. connect the poiicy arenas to their moti-vationai antecedents of the formuiation stage.

individuais orient themseives to their sociai surroundings through theiractbns. The determination of whether an actbn is adequateiy grounded or"makes sense" is a subjective determination. Weber (1968) used categorieswhbh signify a variety of possibie orientations toward one's sociai surroundings:actbn may be traditbnai. affective.^ or vaiue-rationai. as weii as instrumentaiiy

b i . ^ The patterns in the way individuais orient themseives to sociai actbn

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are reievant in understanding poiicy actbn. in predbting types of poibiesenacted and structures of poiby impiementatbn.

For Weber, sociai actbn may be:

1. Traditionai; This is an orientation toward actbn that is determined byingrained habituation. The way things were done yesterday is thecentrai reference point in considering how things are to be donetoday. Much of everyday iife is iike this. Traditionai behavior wasregarded by Weber (1968:25) as a "reactive type of imitatbn." thatis marginaiiy meaningfui since it is often a matter of automatic reac-tbn to habituai stimuii. However, habituai forms of behavbr can bereinforced conscbusiy.

2. Affective; This is the emotionai orientation, determined by one'sspecifb affects and feeiing states. Affective actbn can be responsesto feeiings of fear. joy. hurt, anger, wanting, guiit. and so on. Theindividuai experiencing and acting on the basis of affect may not beconsciousiy aware of the reiation. However, when conscious reieaseof emotionai tension occurs, the primitive form of the feeiing is on itsway to becoming subiimated and ratbnaiized in the vaiue-ratbnai orinstrumentaiiy rationai senses. Affective action satisfies the need forsensuai gratifbation. for working off emotionai tensbn. for revenge,for devotbn. biiss. or any other affective conditbn.

3. Vaiue-ratbnai; Actbn may be determined by a vaiue whbh manifestsits worthiness in and of itseif. determined by a conscbus beiief in thevaiue for its own sake, witiiout regard for the iikeiihood of the even-tuai success in furthering the vaiue or in aitering conditions accordingto the vaiue. Ethbai. aesthetb. or reiigious vaiues orient vaiue-ratbnaibehavior. The vaiue-ratbnai orientatbn. as compared with the affec-tive and traditbnai orientations, is unambiguousiy conscbus. Yet.success in achieving some resuit is not what gives meaning toactbns of this orientation; rather, the actbn is reward in itseif. asbng as its meaning is consistent with the actor's sociai orientation.Without regard for personai costs, persons who practbe their convb-tbns as required by duty, honor, pursuit of beauty, byaity. or righ-teousness are oriented toward vaiue-rationai action.

4. instrumentaiiy rationai; This is very much a utiiitarian orientationtoward one's sociai surroundings, a means-ends orientation whereinactbn is determined by expectatbns as to the behavior of others,who are seen as means for pursuing one's own ratbnaiiy caicuiatedends. Objects, too. are viewed in this means-ends denotation, instru-mentaiiy ratbnai action is more pragmatic than vaiue-ratbnai actionin that resuits matter, but is iess ciear on desired ends in that thereis no unconditbnai or absoiute standard of behavbr. ironicaiiy. it is

Weber and Lowi 889

preciseiy because of the concern for consequences that the instru-mentaiiy rationai actor wiii not profess unconditbnai devotbn to anyvaiue. Thus, instrumentaiiy rationai actbn is that actbn whbh takesinto account means, end vaiues. and resuits.

USEFULNESS OF WEBER'S CATEGORIES

Weber's sociai action typobgy. uniike his ideai type bureaucracy, hasreceived scant foibw-up attention. With siight reference to Weber's categories.Parsons rrwved sociai action theory from the positivist naturai science modei toone that directiy confronts the fact that humans are motivated in compiexsociaiiy determined ways (Parsons. 1937). Motivatbn adds a teieobgbai dynam-b whbh naturai science modeis do not aibw; yet motivatbns were instrumen-taiiy reiated to action, in effect. Parsons (1959) repudiated aii of Weber's actionorientatbns other than instrumentai ratbnaiism stating that actbn theory con-ceives of behavior "as oriented to the attainment of ends" aibeit constrainedby norms. Thus vaiue-rationai. traditionai. and affective actbns were exciudedby definitbn from the reaim of actbn theory, indeed, even Weber has beencriticized for faiiing to make use of his own categories.

Weber's four-foid typobgy of sociai action . . . [is] not necessary to.nor even very heipfui towards, the formuiatbn of his substantivehypotheses about the causes of the deciine of the ancient worid. theinfiuence of reiigion on economic activity or the prerequisites forparliamentary denx)cracy (Runciman. 1978:5).

Schutz (1967:240) hekl a contrary view: "[Weber's] works on the socbiogyof reiigbn. for instance, make exempiary use of categories of irratbnai. emo-tbnai. and traditbnai action." Schutz (1967) does charge that the categoriesWeber proposes are vagueiy defined and contain ambiguities, but the behavbraiview of Parsons is Schutz's primary target.

Weber's definition of action, in fact, inciudes aiso a person's innerbehavior or activity to the extent that these can property be regardedas meaningfui. . . . Obviousiy. what he means is that action, asopposed to behavior in generai. has a specific kind of meaning(Schutz. 1967:40).

in other words, action inciudes unobservabie phenomena (for exampie.inner behavior) contrary to a behaviorai conception. The iiterature abounds withacademic argumentation regarding Weber's epistenrxjiogy. For exampie:

But aithough this conciusion [that Weber's categories are not incon-sistent with his own epistemoiogy] permits dismissai of rrost of thecriticism of this aspect of Weber's work, one aspect of these criti-cisms is undeniabiy accurate: the iimited usefuiness of pure typesof action in concrete sociai-scientifb research (Hekman. 1983:48).

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Given that there was no attempt to actuaiiy empioy the categories in sociaiscience research. Hekman's assertion is untimeiy. As it happens, concrete sociaiscience research is baded with metaphors, abstract symbois. arKi sociaiiy con-structed categories. More importantiy. usefui categories are those which accountfor events and actbns. and using Weber's categories wiii evidence greaterproductivity than wiii phibsophizing about them.

Harmon and Mayer (1986) found the typobgy usefui in expanding thedefinitbn of rationaiity to inciude vaiue-ratbnai actbn as weii as utiiitarianactbn. Aiso. they appreciated the fact that the interpretive nfiethod which Weberempbyed emphasized the necessity of comprehending sociai meanings in orderto understand actbn. Purposive rationai actbn is not the oniy type of actionbrought to bear on poiby formuiatbn; non-ratbnai actbn is aiso meaningfui.Non-ratbnai aspects of pubib poiicy are riot particuiariy attractive to poibyanaiysts who, iike academicians in generai. are oriented normativeiy towardexpanding the domain of ratbnaiity. Though pubib poiby is not "by definitbn"instrumentaiiy rationai. actors normaiiy intend it to be ratbnai. However,exampies abound which indicate that Amerbans do orient poiicy actbn towardabsoiute end vaiues. e.g.. anti-abortion, schooi prayer, freedom of expression,anti-pornography or civii rights (See Tataiovbh and Daynes. 1988). Aiso.symbois such as the fiag. country, states' rights, and iiberty are readiiy avaiiabieto ieaders who seek to stir the passions of their foiiowers.

Many of the speciai interest groups of the past two decades are orientedtoward one end-vaiue or another. Wiiderness, for exampie, need not serve ahuman purpose (e.g.. providing timber, minerais. or even recreatbn oppor-tunities) in order to be vaiued. Simiiariy. those who vaiue an object of art for itsinherent quaiities ("art for art's sake") orient themseives in a vaiue-ratbnai way;those who prize an object of art because of its resaie vaiue orient themseivesin an instrumentaiiy rationai way.

The reievance of Weber's sociai actbn categories for pubib poiby anaiysisis depicted in Figure 1. The terms mainstream and radbai are taken from Lowi(1988b). Mainstream poiicy tends to be conservative in that change is not advo-cated uniess it is graduai. incrementai change. Radbai poiby is primariiychange-oriented-ir>ciuding right-wing change-and migiit aiso be iabeied thepoiitics of transformation. Advocates of radbai change take aim at underiyingstructures and root causes.

Purposefui sociai action indbates that individuai and group action isconscbus and goai-oriented. Actors know what they are doing and why they aredoing it. Admittediy. much of sociai action that emanates from a traditbnai oraffective orientatbn is refiexive or tends to be automatic. Nonetheiess. to theextent that traditbnai or affective action is intentbnai and wiiifui. it constitutesmeaningfui sociai action.

Coaiitions form from a variety of agendas, and any action is not iikeiy tcreside exciusiveiy in one category or another. Wet>er's ideai type of vaiue-rationai actbn. for exampie. was phrased in absoiute terms but his ideai typemethod did not annui category overlap that is found when any anaiytbai modeis appiied to reai iife. Pure cases of bureaucracy, types of action, or any other

Weber and Lowi 891

ideai type can oniy be imagined. There is no attempt here, and there was noattempt by Weber (1968:26) to "formuiate in any sense an exhaustive ciassifi-cation of types of actbn." The attempt here is to arrange expianatory categorieswhbh are anaiytbaiiy usefui.

Figure 1

Sociai Action Model

Basis for Action

Poiitbai Ambitbn

Mainstream

Radicai

Purpose Refiex

instrumentaiiyRationai

Vaiue-Rationai

Traditionai

Affective

THE SOCIAL ACTION PERSPECTiVE

in the next four sectbns Lowi's poiicy types are presented aiongside thevarious categories of the Weberian modei. The first poiby type presented is onewhich Lowi (1964) iabeied distributive. With Weber's modei. Lowi's distributivepubiic poiby is dominated by actors who possess an instrumentaiiy rationaioutiook toward the worid and are oriented toward vaiues such as seif-interestand materiai accumuiatbn. Reguiatory poiicy is occasioned when poiicy actorspursue their interests but are confronted by other actors wiiose interests confiict.Poiby makers must then deveiop generai standards based on arguments whichtranscend patronage, in the reguiatory arena, arguments which biend bothvaiue-ratbnai and instrumentaiiy rationai orientatbns are expressed and heardin a poiicy arena broader than the narrow arena enjoyed by actors in the dis-tributive arena. Redistributive poiicy. the third of Lowi's categories, is a debateover vaiues (equaiity. sociai justice, or some other vaiue which emphasizesbroad-based sociai change in opposition to the priviieged ciass). and is of suchgenerai interest that neither narrowiy focused subgovemments nor interest groupconfiicts dominate the arena. Weber's vaiue-rationai, change-seeking orientationsare iikeiy to be enacted in the redistributive poiicy arena.

The "Method of Controi" heading in Figure 2 grazes a point of controversy.Keiiow (1988) woukl use a different iabei. perhaps 'Type of Response" to indi-cate that reguiatbn is a response to poiiticai pressure. Lowi (1988a) takes issuewith Keiiow on this point, beiieving that govemment coercion causes pressuregroups to form.* in the present anaiysis. the rrwtivators for poiicy actbn are

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Figure 2

Method of Controi

Stick

Carrot

Methods of Controi, Types of Policyand Types of Motivation

Sociai Action Orientation

instrumentaiiy Rationai Vaiue-Ratbnai

EconombReguiatbn

Distributive

SociaiReguiatbn

Redistributive

derived from Weber's sociai action categories and may have originated in anon-poiitbai sociai miiieu with no expectations of government intervention. ThusKeibw's answer to the "Who is using whom?" question is consistent with thepresent anaiysis. but the fact of positive and negative government sanctions isemphasized by using the Method of Controi heading. Carrots meted out bygovernment inciude direct expenditures to individuais and other entities, inexchange government purchases goods, services, and iegitimacy. Governmentboth procures and co-opts when it distributes its largesse. Stbks appiied bygovernment range from capitai punishment or imprisonment to fining, withdrawaiof ibense. withdrawai of benefits previousiy dispensed, or harassment, to namebut a few.

The kind of government apparatus brought to bear and the nature of thesanction empbyed is determined in part by the constitutbnai structure ofgovernment whbh is Lowi's (1974) constituent poiicy arena (represented inFigure 3. but not Figure 2). Constituent poiicy refers to the institutions ofgovernment whbh are estabiished, and wiii be discussed in the context ofWeber's traditionai orientation.

Weber's affective orientation is not consonant with any of Lowi's cate-gories, and the reasons for this wiii be discussed in turn. Constituent poiicy andsymboiic poiicy motivated by an affective orientation are charted in Figure 3beiow. First, the components of Figure 2 wiii be described.

instrumental Rationaiity and Distributive PoiicyA means-ends orientation, often derived from ratbnai seif-interest. is the

characteristic disposition of actors seeking favor and subsidy whbh is avaiiabiein the distributive arena. Economic actions in partbuiar are determined on thebasis that actors seiect behavbrs that are consistent with normai seif-interestsas the actors themseives are aware of them. An historicaiiy important aspect of

Weber and Lowi 893

this mode of rationalization of action is the substitution of unthinking habitualbehavior with conscious self-interested behavior (Weber, 1968).

Hence private interests and tobbyists petition the govemment in pursuit oftheir proffers, be they price support payments, procurement contracts, construc-tion contracts, payment for services rendered, and other means of dispensation(Ripley and Franklin, 1987:90).

The exceptton proves the rule: A distributive policy matter is "sprung" fromits nourishing subgovemment when its effects begin to spill over arxj affect abroader constituency. The classic pork barrel water projects have occasionallybeen flushed from the subgovemment routine for several possible reasons, in-cluding the specter of the growing budget deficit, the emergence of water asa contentious scarce resource issue, confiicts with environmentai groups, andpresidential involvement (Ripley and Franklin, 1987:111). The water project isnot extinct, but its predominance has waned. The process of broad discoursecan be nrwst damaging to "pork barrel" projects. Once discourse begins, moregeneral lines of argument can be put forth and given a hearing. The opportunityfor expression of a wider range of values improves. The moment the discussionshifts to the broader arena, the seif-interested instrumentally rational orientationbecomes insufficient to win subsidies and favors; broader arguments must bemade.

A rationale which justifies a distributive policy in terms of some broaderpublic interest is put forth during policy formulation and enactment, oftenconvincingly. For example, the federal food stamp program, located in the Foodand Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, subsidizes agri-business. One can imagine being a businessman and convincing the govern-ment to issue money that can only be used to purchase one's own product.Despite the fact that this program is not located in the Department of Healthand Human Services, it is nonetheless justified on the basis of values such ascompassion and helping the needy. Most subsidy programs have accompanyingrationales which appeal to a variety of values, earning them legitimacy, but theimpetus and force behind the enactment of distributive polices are instrumentallyrational economic interests, redistributive impact notwithstanding.

Impiementation. Distributive policies involve government payment orsubsidy to encourage one activity or another. The policies will be viewed assuccessful by the narrowly focused groups seeking patronage when the moneyis spent. Whether the government is purchasing public goods or socializing thecosts of private enterprise is uncertain in distributive policies. If private interestsdid not provide political support for government programs such as the foodstamp program, the program would not exist.

The uncertainty has implications for policy design. Is the purpose ofimplementation to disperse the money as efficiently as possible? If yes, spend-ing $600 on a single toilet seat as the Department of Defense was found tohave done in the 1980s is more efficient than having to conduct sixty trans-actions to purchase toilet seats at $10 apiece in order to spend $600. Addittonaltransactions waste staff time. Or, is the purpose of implementation to purchasepublic goods at low prices and high quality? If yes, implementers of public

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policy must view their mission to be one that is, in some degree, at odds withthe private sector supporters of the policy. Inspectors general, of all classi-fications of public empbyees, focus on this particuiar enigma arKi its incon-gruities. Private interests supported the program and provided political clout inorder to make more money, but if taxpayers perceive that they are being bilked,the system bses legitimacy and legislators lose elective office.

In either event, the central theme for the implementer is the quid pro quo.This business-like transaction often appears as skewed in favor of spendingmoney rather than purchasing public goods, a famiiiar finding in GeneraiAccounting Office reports. At other times in implementing distributive policy, thepublic administrator appears to be managing government "like a business,"attempting to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in purchasing and deliveringpublic goods and services.

Rationality and Values in Reguiatory PolicyMuch of what is nominally referred to as regulatory policy-tariffs, rate-

setting, licensing-benefits identifiable interests, and the dynamics are verysimilar if not identical to the dynamics of distributive policy.'* Lowi (1964)described how tariff policy could no longer be contained in the disaggregatedsubgovemment arena because diverse groups began to develop interests in thespecial favors afforded textile and other industries. Favorable market arrange-ments enforced by government have effects which seem distributive, but officialenforcement of bias, favoritism and market restriction is also a negative sanctionlevied against those who are excluded. When railroad regulation was first insti-tuted, small businesses were being gouged while large shippers were grantedconcessions by the railroads (Fellmeth, 1970). In that case, those who were notenjoying privileged rates sought government regulation. In the process of gettingthe matter placed on the government's policy agenda, values such as fairnesswere argued. The policy debate was motivated in part by instmmentally rationalself-interest, and in part by values such as fair competition.

Olson (1971) demonstrates the logic of the social processes that accom-pany social action toward such a social good. Small groups are more likely totake action since the incentive for each group member to contribute toward thegroup interest declines as membership expands. The social action probiemwhich interested Olson was the iarge group paradox that rational self-interestedindividuais do not act to achieve common interests unless they are coerced oroffered positive inducements. Olson willingly expanded the definition of incentivei3eyond economic self-interest to include social status, prestige, self-esteem andfellowship, but did not include in his analysis a social action concept whichwould approximate Weber's value-rational category in which ethical, aesthetic,or religious vaiues orient sociai action. Value-rational social action is dismissedas altnjism, an exceptional case (Olson, 1964:1).

At some point, individual incentives-whether economic, social, or psycho-iogical-do not account for events which take place in the regulatory arena.Environmental policy, anti-abortion protest, and consumer protection policy donot require the rational self-interest assumption to account for the behavior of

Weber and Lowi 895

the protagonists. One need not coerce or induce individuals if it is allowed thatsocial action may be oriented according to value-rational criteria and not neces-sarily by individual incentives. Tatatovich and Daynes (1988) conclude thatsingle-issue groups impact the regulatory arena by taking absolutist, moralisticpositions. Regulatory policies initiated by a value oriented group do achievesuccess in making the value salient in the general political arena. These indi-viduals and groups have denrionstrated the political efficacy of a value-ratbnalorientatbn.

Within the regulatory arena, the underlying continuum rartging from aninstrumentally ratbnal bias to a vaiue ratbnal bias has been contrasted as oldregulation v. new regulatbn, economic v. social regulation, mainstream v. radbalphilosophy, competitive v. protective regulatbn, and private interest regulatoryV. public interest regulatory (Spitzer, 1988; Lowi, 1988b; Ripley and Franklin,1987; Kellow, 1988). In instrumentally rational economic regulatbn, polbyprovides industry with a means of iimiting the supply of specific goods, ofrestricting market entry, of outlawing substitute goods and services, of enforcingprofitable rate structures, in value-rationa) social regulatbn, poiicy is "aiming atthe moral base of conduct" (Lowi, 1988b) and is concerned about protectingthe larger pubiic from harm, eliminating substandard goods, unfair competitbn,or fraudulent advertising.

In the regulatory poiicy arena poiicy actors make chobes as to who winsand who bses. Whether collective interests are based on utilitarian incentiveswhich nriotivate individual actbn, or on value-rational aesthetbs, multifariouswants and values manifest by a variety of collective interests provide the basisfor group conflict.

Impiementation. Reguiatory policy-making involves indulging or deprivingone specific interest or another, and implementation results in "directly raisingcosts and/or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals" (Lowi,1964). When regulatory policy is mostly economic and most nearly like instru-mentally rational distributive policy it appears to be free of controversy andappears protective of established interests-until other values and/or otherinterests make an impact (Ripley and Franklin, 1986). Some problems will staysolved bnger than others, but there is a latent volatility in the political arenaeven when hostility is not manifest. Various interests wrangle for advantage andjockey for positbn even after a decision has been made, that is, during imple-mentation. For example, those not licensed to operate recreatbnal rafts on theWhitewater rivers may sue the state, or may enter the kayaking business,exacerbating overcrowding on the river. With latent and manifest group conflictas background, the implementers' job is to prevent certain behaviors and torequire others (Olark, 1989).

The primary necessity in implementing regulatory policy is legitimacy in useof coercive powers. When the inevitable conflict point occurs, a regulatoryagency benefits from a clear authority-granting mandate from Congress and aclear endorsement from the courts in regard to its authority on the presumptionthat frequently the losers will not be happy with the decision.

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The Value-Rationai Domain of Redistributive PoiicyThe bcatbn of an issue in the redistributive arena is not a matter of

random selection but occurs when the debate takes on an ideological tenor re-garding class privileges. As an argument about the rbh and the poor, the bour-geoisie and the proletariat, the haves and the have-nots, the redistributive arenais, at its core, about values and contending workJ views. Enactment of redis-tritxjtive polby follows sociai actbn that is motivated by what Weber referred tcas a value-ratbnal orientatbn. The War on Poverty, Upward BourKJ, Job Oorp,Head Start, and the Equal Opportunity Act of 1964 are examples of redistribu-tive programs characterized by a high degree of ideological confiict during theirformulation and legitimation (Ripley and Franklin, 1986). The debate does notresembie irrterest group conflict so much as an ideobgbal bgjam.

impiementation. Policy enacted in the redistributive arena is inspired bya value-rational orientatbn to social actbn, an orientation favorably disposectoward the idea of social change. Implementing sociai change has been theprey of sharp-witted analysts since Pressman and Wiidavsky (1973) sniggerecat the diffbulties encountered in creating jobs for the hard-core unenrployed irOakland. Attempting standard bureaucratic methods of implementing redistribu-tive polby, implementers were confronted with a vexing variety of policy actors.Yet when snags are overcome, achieving effective redistributive social change-as had been occurring in the Oommunity Services Agency-contributes to thedemise of the agency (Ripley and Franklin, 1987). Ironically, the proof of theredistributive effbacy of these programs is that they threatened the entrenchecinterests, as did earlier War on Poverty programs.

Programs avowedly redistributive along ciass and/or racial iines (infavor of the poorer classes and minorities) once established were thecenter of constant debate and controversy and were gradually sur-rounded with restraints, both organizational and programmatb (Ripleyand Franklin, 1987:149).

If redistributive programs are to be successfully implemented as redis-tributive programs and not transnx>grified into distributive programs as frequentlyhappens, implementers wili need to become more clever at designirrg appropri-ate schemes. The underlying theme in implementing redistributive programs issocial change, which invariably attracts more enemies than friends. Inconspic-uous organizatbnal forms are to be preferred. Highly visible redistributive effortswill be resisted by those who are threatened by them.

Conversely, an invisible effort wiii also fail to attract the political support ':'needs for increased funding. Clearly, impiennenting redistributive programs ismost difficult. Ripley and Franklin (1986:193) made the folbwing comnrtent abocthe success or failure of a job program for disadvantaged veterans whbh wasimplemented locally:

Either the bcal CETA [Comprehensive Employment and Training Act]staff or the bcal employment service office needed to take the lead

Weber and Lowi 897

in building the appropriate network tailored to the needs of eachbcality. The few areas that did this had reasonably successful pro-grams; the majority who did not achieved little.

Other reports of the importance of establishing networks of sympathetbcontacts can be found. PSIP (Private Sector Initiatives Program) programs weremore likely to be successful when the Private Industry Councii and the profes-sbnal CETA staff established cooperative working reiationships (Ripley andFrankiin, 1986). Agencies which couid create a supportive network with keyactors and institutbns were abie to neutralize potential oppositbn. Lemov (1988)reports on the importance of non-profit corporatbns in gaining neighborhoodsupport and becoming partners in bw-income housing projects. Propitiating theinevitable suspbbn of redistributbn is an important activity for those who wouidimplement redistributive programs. Often the clients are outcasts and the pro-cedures of redistributive poiicy will stun those accustomed to bureaucratbnorms. The political and managerial problems are extraordinanly diffbult, andthe need for politbal alliance-building is acute.

Where [redistributive] programs seem iikeiy to have a chance ofsuccess, almost inevitably someone-probably at the bcal level-hastaken the lead in building a network of supporting actors and institu-tbns and simultaneously in neutralizing much of the potential opposi-tbn. The presence of such a network or its absence goes far in ex-plaining relative progress or lack of it in most of our examples (Ripleyand Franklin, 1986:217).

Achieving redistribution, then, means building support networks to forgeahead in a potentially hostile political atmosphere in which vested interestsoppose social change.

The Traditionai Orientation and the Constituent FunctionThe policy process itself is determined by traditbns whbh are enforced by

customary usage or legal sanctbn. In Amerba and other Western natbns, thelegitimation of a policy proposal is achieved when it is deliberated upon byelected legislators and approved by a majority proportbn of them. In othercultures legitimacy is derived from the workings of other authoritative institutionssuch as the monarch, religious authorities, the chief, or the deliberatbns of theelders.

Tradition defines the patterns of politics and polby making; of course,when first instituted, traditions were conscious determinatbns. For example,actual events such as presidential use of military powers create contemporarydiscourse and action aimed at restructuring the balance of power between con-gress and the president. The extent to whbh the War Powers Resolutbn of1973 is regarded as a meaningful shifting of authority from the president to thecongress indbates the extent to whbh a change has taken place in constituentpolby. Proposals that were once controversial matters, such as how many

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members should comprise the House of Representatives, have rww t>ecomeinstitutionalized traditbns and habits. Indeed, one of the differentiating traits ofthe traditbnal orientation is that it operates in contemporary times at the levelof habit. Lowi (1972) was interested in constituent policy because of its impacton the general environment of political conduct; new institutbns were sometimescreated, altering the rules of the game.

The term "constituent" may reasonably be defined as "necessary inthe formatbn of the whole; forming; composing; making as an essen-tial part." . . . Constitution is the setting up, the way in whbh apolitical regime is organized and the laws which govern its organi-zatbn . . . [T]he signifbance of democratic party systems is to befound first in the regime and in the type of regime rather than directlyand specifically in the substantive outputs of the regime (Lowi,1972:239).

Thus processes and structures, rather than substantive outputs, make upconstituent policy. The traditions that have devebped are reflected in thepractices and institutions of pubiic policy: the legislative bodies, the councils, theexecutive agencies, the courts, the lobby groups. More important than the staticinstitutions themselves are the relations and interactions of the actors whoreinforce the institutions by so orienting their everyday habits. Institutionallegitimacy is recreated in this way. It is one of the characteristics of traditionsthat they are followed without question because they are simply taken forgranted.

In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legallyestablished impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising theauthority of office under it by virtue of the formal legality of theircommands and only within the scope of authority of the office(Weber, 1968:215).

Weber's concept of legitimacy of legal-rational authority is in some waysmore precisely akin to Lowi's constituent category than is the Weberian tradi-tional social action, related as it was to the pre-modem societies which con-tinued to influence late nineteenth century European culture. American culturehas traditbnally been undergirded by institutions of govemment based on legal-rational authority. In the modern era one is inclined to want more rationality inconstituent functbns. Our sensibilities are offended when institutions do notappear rational enough. The traditions of our times reflect the legal-rationalethb that Weber astutely perceived at the turn of the century. The ethic pertainsto politbal institutions moreso than other social institutions (e.g., churches) ofpre-modern origin.

impiementation. Constituent poiicy is implemented every day by the poli-tical actors who, by their deference to particular customs, processes, behaviorsand courtesies, reinforce partbular ways of political discourse. Constituent policy

Weber arid Lowi 899

determines the balance of power between and among the executive, legislative,and judbial branches as well as federal, state, and bcal levels of government,though constituent policy need not be this formalized (Lowi, 1972). On anygiven policy matter, government may distribute rewards, impose sanctbns. Pos-sibly government will not be utilized at all either because of unwillingness todistribute rewards or impose sanctbns. implementing constituent polby is amatter of respecting the legitimate traditbns of politbal discourse and decisionmaking. Changes to traditions occur when past practbes are altered. With moresocial turmoil and revolutbnary fervor, change to traditions occurs nx>re rapidly.

Regimes adapt. States have been rDore willing to rewrite their constitutionsthan has the natbnal government. Incremental nuances such as the creation ofthe Congressbnal Budget Off be, the establishment of the Central IntelligenceAgency and the Nationai Security Council, and passage of the War PowersResolution in 1973 affect the way government conducts daily affairs. Laws canbe passed which alter constituent policy. The National Environmental ProtectionAct of 1970 mandated opportunities for public hearings and citizen partbipatbn.To the extent that this feature of the law is actually adhered to, constituentpolicy has been altered. Changes to traditbns can occur more rapidly (radicalchange) or less rapidly (incremental change), and are implemented when polbyactors alter their previous rituals to accommodate the change.

The Affective Orientation: Symboiic PoiicyGiven that humans often act on the basis of emotbns without awareness

of the affective content of their behaviors, the policy arena for enacting affectivematters is not self-evident. Affectively oriented action is enacted in the policyarena when the sentiment is expressed by political actors.

The affective orientation does not have an evident counterpart in Lowi'smodel, but Smith's (1975) analysis which is based on Lowi's model includes thecategory emotive symbolization. This policy arena performs an expressive func-tion that enables one to meet emotional needs. Smith (1975:90) maintains thatpersons establish self-identify and confirm notions of personhood throughsymbolic expression. For Edelman (1964:191) political acts and gestures "insupport of groups with particular goals come to symbolize the backing of thestate for the groups concerned. Such acts become symbols of status." Symbolsare thus far from meaningless; rather they are the substance of meaning."Placebo response," the term used by Kellow (1988) to characterize Edelman'stheory, ascribes too little importance to the reassurance that synUwlicgovernment actions provide to individuals and groups seeking legitimacy andinvolvement.

The Canadian flag debate of 1964 as reported by Smith (1975) is a quin-tessential symbolb issue made more interesting when one considers that thecleavages around this issue coincided with general Canadian political schisms.Ideobgbal arguments quickly appropriated symbolb expressions.

In the United States, the president and other politbians have reactedvivaciously to a Supreme Court ruling whbh permitted flag burning as a fonnof free speech. Efforts were begun to prohibit such heresy by constitutionally

900 Poiicy Studies Journal

investing the flag as a sacred icon. It remains to be seen whether the negativeimagery being attached to flag burning (also an attempt to assign a negativeimage) will impact the constituent policy arena, in this case quite directly.

At the outset of World War II, the J. Walter Thompson advertising agencywas enlisted by the govemment in a deliberate attempt to manipulate the mean-ing attached to important cultural symbols (Hewlett, 1986). In particular, marriedwomen were needed in the workforce. The image of women as portrayed in aNomian Rockwell painting reproduced on the cover of the Saturday EveningPost was a blue-collar image of physical strength, confidence, and mastery ofthe machine. Fashion, movies, radio serials and war-time propaganda filmsendorsed the strong and competent image, and the number of women workingin heavy manufacturiiig jobs increased by five million (Hewlett, 1986:236).

After the war with soldiers returning, govemment economists feared theretum of widespread unemptoyment and the propaganda effort was reversed.Docile, acquiescent actresses such as Doris Day and Donna Reed replacedresolute overall-clad actresses such as Katherine Hepburn. Four million fewerwomen were emptoyed by late 1946 than during peak wartime production (Hew-lett. 1986).

The marrying age of women dropped to its lowest age in history. Thebirthrate rose so steadily that by the end of the 1950s populationgrowth in the U.S. was twice that of Europe and close on the heelsof Africa and India. The happy homemaker-appearing in every ad,every television serial, every film, every magazine article-also gaveup on her education. In the 1930s women constituted 40 percent ofcollege graduates. In the fifties it dropped to 35 percent (Felder,1989).

Clearly, the social effect of symbol manipulation can be profound. Thethoughts and actions of women, employers, and co-workers were influenced bythe meanings they attached to women in the workforce; positive, then negative.The "Rosy the Riveter example originated from the instrumentaiiy rational needto increase wartime production, and is presented here to emphasize the impor-tance of symbol manipulation in public policy. The affirmative and negativemeanings which were altemately attached to women wori<ers clearly influencedthinking and decision-makirig on a nationwide scale.

Conflict in redistributive policy making is more structured and morepredictable than is conflict in the emotive-symbolic arena (Smith, 1975:129).The emotive content of old and enduring class-based issues is rrwre likely tohave been sublimated into a cognitive value premise. Emotive symbolizationsuggests a more spontaneous, nrwre reflexive orientation (see Figure 1). Value-rational redistribution represents sublimated emotion which is more purposiveand consciously willful.

Implementation. Affectively oriented social action is enacted in a politicalsense when it is expressed in a political rmdium such as televiston, news-papers, movies, luncheon meetings or public hearings. The "policy directive" is

Weber and Lowi 901

implemented when a symbol becomes possessed of poiiticai currency arKienters the lexicon of meaningful social discourse.

Language forms and terms reinforce the reassuring perspectivesestablished through other political symbols, subtly interweaving withaction to help shape values, norms and assumptions about futurepossibilities (Edelman, 1964:192).

The process of policy enactment and implementation is more spontan-eously achieved here than is the case for other policy arenas. Expressing thesymbol is the enacting activity. Once in currency, a created symbol takes oncognitive as well as affective meaning, implying the possibility of future value-rational and/or instrumentaiiy rational social action. Once attributed, a symbolwith cognitive meaning serves as a vehicie for communicating ideas as weii asfeelings, and more importantly, for expressing a positive or negative attitude. Asymbol which has been legitimated through some political media carries with ita potentially potent meaning, one which has (or can) become policy relevant.Symbols are readily appropriated into ideological themes and political propa-ganda (Lasswell, 1958) and are available for use in synchronizing collectiveaction (Elder and Cobb, 1983). Thus the affective orientation to social actionbecomes policy activity when the sentiment is acknowledged and expressed ina political medium, creating the symbols which undergird discourse in ail policyarenas.

Figure 3

What is Good? Who Decides?

Attitude Toward Object or Individual/Group

Policy Arena Negation Affirmation

Symbolic

Constituent

Threat

Exclusionary

Reassurance

Participatory

Figure 3 exhibits the utility of symbolic and constituent enactments. Inmanipulating cultural symbols, policy actors attempt to attach positive ornegative evaluations to certain ideas, groups, or individuals. Thus symbolicimages may confer negative or positive sanction. The symbolic languageattached to the policy object may seek to affirm the object or may seek tonegate the object (Figure 3). Likewise, constituent policy may exclude or include

902 Policy Studies Joumal

people or objects in the policy process. In constituent policy the point is tostructure institutbns so as to include certain ideas, groups, or individuais in thediscursive process and to exclude other. The questton "Who gets to decide?"is answered in the constituent poticy arena. For example, voting was at onetime a privilege extended only to propertied white males.

CONCLUSION

Social action which is initiated from an instrumental^ ratbnat orientationwiil be enacted in the distributive poiicy arena. Actors in this arena areconcemed about gaining govemmerrt subsidies and favorabie market corKlitions.The instrumentaiiy rationai orientation dominates the disaggregated distributivepoiicy subgovemment configuratbn. and in its impiementatbn, the transactionis the dominant organizationai theme (Figure 4).

Figure 4

Formuiation[Action Orientation]

Enactment[Poiicy Arenas]

impiementatbn[Design Theme]

instrumentaiiyRatbnai

Vaiue-Ratbnai

Traditionai

> Distributive

Reguiatory (Economic)

Regulatory (Sociai)

Redistributive

Constituent

Transactbns

Coercbn

> Coercbn

Sociai Change

Rituai

Affective > Symboiic Expression

The reguiatory arena, though it shares with the distributive arena anorientatbn toward instrumentaiiy rationai actbn. invoives end-vaiues other thanor in additbn to seif-interest and materiai accumuiatbn. "Wiiderness preserva-tbn," "ciean air," "fair piay," or "anti-abortbn" coukl aii be taken as the end-vaiue, toward whbh instrumentaiiy ratbnai regulatory means are empbyed.Coercbn whbh reiies on legitimate use of government authority undergirdsimpiementatbn.

Weber and Lowi 903

Vaiue-ratbnai actbns whbh ampiify tiie confiict between the haves and thehave-nots threaten the status quo with the prospect of sociai change. Thosewho benefit in the current regime are not receptive to pubib poiicy whbh fosterssuch change. In partbuiar, equality and social justice are normative bases whbharouse ideological debate. Efforts to implement redistribution can become con-troversial poiiticai events, and the necessity of supportive poiiticai networksindicates the voiatile environment of these poiicies.

Deliberative bodies, bureaucracies, and other govemment institutions aresymbolb manifestatbns of the traditbns and customs which were enacted in theconstituent poiicy arena. Most traditbns and institutbns are artifacts of sociaidynamics of prbr times which have nonetheiess continued to shape currentsocial conduct by their continued unquestbned. unconsciously accepted legiti-macy. Carrying on the traditbns through habitual or ritualistic behavbr reinforcesthe institutions formed in the constituent poiicy arena.

Feelings. erTX)tions, and other affective phenomena are subjectively expe-rienced but nonetheless have the potential to mobilize social action in the mostunpredictable of ways. Saving whales in Prudhoe Bay, invading Grenada, oroutlawing import of semiautomatic weapons were policies driven by affect tosome extent. Legitimation of feelings and the meanings attached to them occursthrough institutions of communication. Their expression as meaningful symbolsin such media is the culmination of the process.

Weber's social action categories provide texture and background to Lowi'spolicy arenas. They lend structure to the motivating antecedents of policymaking. Knowing what is intended by a policy actbn suggests the parametersfor policy design and impiementatbn. The categories presented in this articieand summarized in Figures 1. 2, 3 and 4 represent a theoretical model of pub-lic policy as social action, which is patterned according to the proclivities ofsocially active individuals who interact with government.

NOTES

1. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestbns of an anony-mous reviewer in strengthening the first paragraph, and for many othervery useful comments which improved the manuscript.

2. in the Roth and Wittich translatbn the term affectual is used rather thanaffective (Weber. 1968). Runciman (1978) used the term affective, whichis also the term that appears in Webster's New Collegiate Dictbnary.

3. Note that these categories differ from the more familiar categories oflegitimate authority.

4. Lowi (1988b) asserts that ail policy is coercive. However, it is useful inFigure 2 to distinguish between coercion (the stick) and other forms ofpersuasbn (the canrot).

904 Policy Studies Joumal

5. Lowi assigned tariffs to the distributive poiicy arena. However, originaiiy(Lowi. 1964) tariffs were exampies of regulatory poiicy: "But despite thepersistence of certain distributive features, the true nature of tariff in the1960s emerges as reguiatory poiby with a deveioping reguiatory arena."The probiem whbh Spitzer (1987) addressed apparentiy pestered Lowi asweii.

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