Weberian patrimonialism and imperial Chinese history

ANDREW EISENBERGNortheastern Illinois University

Weberian patrimonialism

In this article, I discuss the applicability of the Weberian concept ofpatrimonialism and derivative hypotheses as they apply to imperialChinese history. The discussion is relevant insofar as we wish to inter-pret the available historical data in an appropriate and reasonablefashion. I contend here that the concept of patrimonialism provides abroad, £exible, and accurate framework, or ideal typical guideline, bywhich to arrange and interpret many of the data regarding imperialChinese history. During the course of the presentation, I outlineWeber'sbasic ideas regarding the application of the concept of patrimonialismto the China case, critique Gary G. Hamilton's 1984 revisionist rejectionof Weberian patrimonialism as it applies to China, and propose somederivative hypotheses drawn from the general Weberian approach. Inwriting this essay, I found that there is considerable confusion in the¢eld regarding what Weber meant and how to apply these meanings toresearch projects.

The term `̀ patrimonialism'' broadly typologizes a polity wherein thepolitical sphere is under the leadership of one royal house (organizedas a court) that has attained a degree of autonomy vis-a© -vis othersocial sectors. This moderately autonomous political sphere is inmany ways still beholden to traditional values as a source of legitimat-ing ideology. Weber viewed patrimonial domination as an extensionand development from an earlier system of political-kinship controlexercised by the extended patriarchal household (loosely characterizedby common residence and commensality). Weber also viewed the ex-tended patriarchal household as the organizational basis out of whichsubsequently developed such economic organizations as the classical

Theory and Society 27: 83^102, 1998.ß 1998Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

`̀ oikos'' of antiquity (in both East and West) and the early Westernbusiness ¢rm of the medieval period.1

Weber clearly de¢ned patrimonialism as the extension of the politicalpower of the extended household head (in this case the prince) overformerly non-patrimonial areas.2 What is being described here is thetruncation of formerly elaborate kinship social and political networks,the concentration of power in the hands of one elite extended house-hold leader and the extension of this power over populations andterritory formerly never so dominated by this household leader.Weberexplicitly notes ``The majority of all great continental empires had afairly strong patrimonial character until and even after the beginningof modern times.''3 In a negative fashion, Weber explicitly excludedfrom the category of modern bureaucratic regimes `̀ the large politicalstructures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic andMon-golian empires of conquest and of many feudal states.''4 I register theabove quotes to emphasize that Weber did not conceive of patrimonialregimes as pre-literate tribal polities, or very early, primitive empires,but in fact, their opposite, the literate pre-modern empires of theworld, which Weber felt displayed common ideological and organiza-tional characteristics.

Relatively speaking,Weber perceived the Chinese empire to be a highlyrationalized form of a patrimonial regime.5 The Chinese empire `̀ untilmodern times'' shared key common characteristics with all other patri-monial regimes, amongst these, `̀ features of a conglomerate of satra-pies.''6 Scholars of the Ch'ing period often object to such a character-ization as anachronistic, nevertheless, the ability of theYang-tse regiongovernor-generals to take a territorial `̀ leave of absence'' during theheight of the Sino-foreign con£ict that developed over the Boxer Rebel-lion of 1900 in North China, without incurring the immedite disinte-gration of the dynasty, indicates the continuing validity of the satrapyconcept.

The patrimonial regime was a loosely linked territorial entity, admin-istered by servants of the throne, whose concept of o¤ce tended to blurwith their private family status responsibilities (the merging of o¤cialand private duties and sources of income). This situation regardingimperial administrators resulted in full or partial appropriation ofo¤ce. In the Chinese case, appropriated o¤ces were formally tempo-rary and rotated among status quali¢ed personnel, though duringdi¡erent historical periods certain o¤ces were also sold by the throne

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for revenue. Complete appropriation of nominally imperially con-trolled administrative positions did occur on occasion. The Period ofDisunion (300's A.D.^500's A.D.), in general, seems to have witnesseda surge in this type of phenomenon.

It is not unusual for scholars to refer in passing to the various post-Ch'in uni¢cation regimes as bureaucratic, rationally organized politieswithout pausing to specify their understanding of the terms `̀ bureau-cratic'' or ``rational'' (used in the Weberian context). To an extent,Weber contributed to this confusion by juxtaposing such terms aspatrimonial bureaucracy or prebendal bureaucratic to refer to highlystructured patrimonial regimes. For the non-specialist reader, the termbureaucracy will usually trigger an association with contemporarygoverning structures. I prefer to use a more neutral, less suggestiveterm, such as ``administration'' or `̀ administrative structure.''

Despite some of the confusion over the use of the term `̀ bureaucracy,''Weber speci¢cally conceived of clear distinctions between what hetermed `̀ modern'' bureaucracy and `̀ patrimonial'' bureaucracy, a dis-tinction that many scholars in the China ¢eld do not emphasize orsimply gloss over completely. While patrimonial administrative struc-tures were capable of developing functional divisions, often of a stereo-typical nature, and rationalization, they were ultimately characterizedas being direct tools, subject to the discretionary political power of theprince and lacking in formal legal jurisdictions.7 Weber explicitly notedthat `̀ the position of the patrimonial o¤cial derives from his purelypersonal submission to the ruler'' and that `̀ Even when the politicalo¤cial is not a personal household dependent the ruler demands un-conditional administrative compliance.''8

Weber speci¢cally conceived of the Chinese imperial o¤cials as beinga patrimonial o¤cialdom of culturally indoctrinated generalists. Hestates that ``. . . Chinese o¤cialdom did not develop into a modernbureaucracy, for the functional di¡erentiation of spheres of jurisdic-tion was carried through only to a very limited extent in view of thecountry's huge size . . . .''9 In the Late Imperial Period, the stereotypedland tax revenues, systemic underfunding of the imperial administra-tion, and the blurred public-private functions of the mu-fu chancellerysystem speak to the accuracy of Weber's perceptions. From theWeber-ian perspective, the modern bureaucracy, as we commonly understandthe term, is typical `̀ only in the modern state and in the private economyonly in the most advanced institutions of capitalism.''10

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In the patrimonial order, beyond certain ritual requirements, ruler andsubjects related to each other by means of limited, stereotyped amountsof in-kind taxes and corvee supplied by the subject population (barringad hoc emergency drafts). In the case of China, by the Ch'ing dynasty(1644^1912) taxes were usually paid in units of silver (the `̀ tael''), withstandards of purity varying from region to region. However, the graintribute from the Lower and Middle Yang-tse Regions continued to bepaid in kind. Given the limited nature of administrative rationalizationand penetration into society, taxation and local control responsibilitieswere often placed upon semi-coerced groupings of subjects (villages,guilds, lineages). Weber referred to this phenomenon as `̀ liturgical''responsibilities, wherein ``private subjects'' were expected to assumepublic responsibililties at their own expense.11

Correlated with this mode of political domination was a market econ-omy that, during the earlier imperial period, was either completelyburied in a natural peasant economy or, in the case of major urbanmarkets, embedded in the patrimonial system of political control where-in urban markets were directly or indirectly manipulated by imperialadministrators. In the case of China, the commercialized peasantmarket economy of the late imperial period is a variation on the latterpattern of patrimonial political control of the market. In late imperialChina, a large aggregated marketing system with moderate inter-regional linkages was accommodated into the patrimonial structureby means of expanded liturgical responsibilities placed upon the par-ticipants, in addition to strategically placed imperial licensing andmonopoly agencies. On the other hand, remnants of a more directmode of patrimonial control over key commodities were manifested inthe production and sale licensing monopoly of salt and the extensiveemergency granary system of the high Ch'ing period. Indeed, granaryresponsibilities would become increasingly ``liturgicalized'' over time.12

Markets in all the major urban centers were kept under surveillance, toa greater or lesser extent, by patrimonial o¤cials.

In terms of legal orientation, patrimonial regimes commonly attemptedto establish and magnify the power of the prince by codifying penaland administrative laws and merging administrative and adjudicativeresponsibilities. The legal and administrative structures were stronglyoriented toward issues of social and economic equity that were con-gruent with the politically enforced status systems existing in theseregimes. This orientation was closely tied to the legitimating conceptthat the throne was the enforcer and upholder of a just and traditional

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social order with strong cosmic/ritual overtones. This sort of orienta-tion to status equity and justice, often codi¢ed into extensive codes, iswhat Weber referred to as the substantive rationality of the patrimoni-al regime.

When we use terms such as bureaucratic or rational in a Weberiansense, we must be sensitive to the clear distinctionsWeber drew betweendi¡erent types of bureaucracies, and in a parallel fashion, di¡erentforms of rationality. Weber tended to use the terms `̀ substantive'' and`̀ formal'' rationality most often in his discussion of modes of economicorganization and also in the discussion of historical legal orientations.The di¡erent types of rationality are correlated, in Weber's writings,with di¡erent modes of political domination, as well as with di¡erentmodes of subjective historical social action. Donald Levine formallyde¢nes substantive rationality as `̀ manifest to the extent that the oper-ative norms are subordinated to some overarching value; it re£ects thedesire to achieve motivational integrity.'' On the other hand, ``Formalrationality is manifest to the extent that the operative norms channelaction according to clearly stipulated procedures; it re£ects the wish toact within a calculable order of activities and relationships.''13 I wish toemphasize that Weber viewed his typologies of domination and theircorresponding rationalization trends as intellectual constructs repre-senting his understanding of complex, multi-dimensional historicaldevelopments. These ideal-typical constructions do not have a life oftheir own, nor are they conceived of as representing a unilineal unfold-ing of ``Reason'' in historical time.Weber was not a Hegelian.14

Weber correlated strong tendencies toward substantive rationalizationwith patrimonial regimes among others. The issue can become com-plex, in that types of rationalization trends can be crosscutting in anygiven historical period resulting in historically contingent outcomesdependent upon the existing constellation of socio-political and cul-tural structures and orientations. Regarding substantive rationality inthe legal realm, as it would generally apply to patrimonial authorities,Weber argued that

.. . their aim is not that of achieving the highest degree of formal juridicalprecision ... . The aim is rather to ¢nd a type of law which is most appropriateto the expediential and ethical goals of the authorities in question .. . , the selfcontained and specialized juridical treatment of legal questions is an alienidea and they are not at all interested in any separation of law from ethics.''15

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Formal rationality, in contrast, ideally eschews determination of themorally right or proper and enforces adherence to recognized procedureregardless of the status or personal identity of the parties involved. It isan irony of history that formally rational systems of law and theeconomy give much more play to economic and class inequities. How-ever, speaking of a dichotomy between rational versus irrational action,or rational versus pre-rational action, re£ects a misconstrual of thegeneral Weberian position.

In the context of patrimonial administrators as formal representativesof the throne rendering judicial decisions, Weber terms this ``kadijustice'' insofar as the magistrate is basing his decision on the concretesituation, existing customary law, and recognized precedent.16 Underthese circumstances,Weber's concept of kadi justice and his concept ofempirical justice (a common-law tradition) are very closely related. Inthe English common-law tradition, however, procedure and reasoningby precedent and analogy were established (that is, the practice of lawbecame a recognized ``technology''), and court personnel were mo-nopolized by an autonomous guild, in juxtaposition to the institutionsof the church and the throne. In the Chinese case, the magistrate alonewas formally responsible for establishing and implementing procedureand reaching a decision, although magistrates had to be aware of theindirect implications for civil law implied in the dynastic penal andadministrative codes. `̀ Pettifoggers'' were resented and sometimes sub-ject to prosecution by the magistrate. Kadi justice represents a distinctform of adjudication, which does not operate in terms of formal juridicallogic (as was typical on the modern European continent) but operatesin terms of situational social equity, precedent, and analogy.17 WhereWeber's concept of kadi justice veers o¡ signi¢cantly from the practiceof empirical justice is in its ability to `̀ advance to a prophetic breakwith all tradition.'' Weber expressed this in the form of the `̀ propheticdictum that follows the pattern: ``It is written . . . but I say unto you.''18

Such a prophetic tradition was not generally present in China, andWeber was aware of this.19 Nonetheless, the Chinese magistrate wasreligiously charged. As part of his formal duties, the magistrate wasauthorized to communicate with and also discipline local deities withinhis bailiwick who were o¤cially recognized by the imperial center (theCity God of the county seat, the spirits of canonized local heros, etc.).Such local deities and spirits could be o¤cially summoned to assist inpending legal cases. More startling, however, was that it appears thatmagistrates could become charismatic magi in their own right as ameans of expediting their o¤cial responsibilities in coping with super-

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stitious or recalcitrant local elites.20 Thus, Weber's use of the term`̀ kadi justice,'' if applied sensibly, is rather appropriate to the imperialChinese situation.

As regards the rule-governed nature of late imperial law, it would besubsumed under the concept of substantive rationalization. That is,exogenous social concerns entwined themselves around juridical logicand were fully incorporated into both the codes and the independentjudgement calls of the local magistrate. Thus, embodied in the Ch'ingpenal codes were a variety of full or partial exemptions for the degreedgentry, and variable punishments depending upon the generationaland kinship relationship between defendant and plainti¡. This is wellknown, but similar preoccupations also appeared in the conduct ofcivil cases, wherein degreed gentry were not permitted to appear in thecounty yamen for ordinary civil suits (considered a stain upon theirstatus honor) nor were they permitted to become litigating specialists.Civil cases in general were viewed as a¡airs of the household or thecommunity that should be mediated out of court, particularly inheri-tance disputes. The general practice of what Philip C. C. Huang termsthe `̀ third realm'' of civil justice, representing a type of synergisticrelationship between formal legal appeals to the county yamen andlocal-community mediation as a means of reaching a viable settlementis simply a form of legal liturgicalism.21 The magistrate sought torender a judgment on the basis of a loose and £exible harmonizationof relevant code, local custom, general sense of Confucian morality,and existing legal precedent.22

The expediential aspect of imperial legislation and law is illustrated ina 1743 edict by the Ch'ien-lung emperor. The emperor refused to imple-ment a policy proposal that would restrict the amount of acreage thatany household could own. The emperor premised his refusal on strictlypractical administrative grounds. The issues of contractual rights topurchased property (itself a controversial ¢eld a¡ected by local cus-tomary law), or the autonomy of market decision-making were noteven discussed.23

The substantive rationality of the patrimonial regimes was in part adirect re£ection of the extension of the power of the prince. This wasparticularly notable in the penal codi¢cations and development ofadministrative regulations. Indeed, adjudication often took on thecharacter of administration, since there was little di¡erentiation of theo¤cials involved in these activities. Ultimately, the prince had the right

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and responsibility to ensure that social equity was achieved, and ofcourse, imperial interests attained, regardless of laws or regulations.24

The qualitatively unique characteristics of the patrimonial bureaucracywere a function of the tendency of these regimes to rationalize them-selves in a substantive as opposed to a formally rational manner.

Over the centuries, speci¢c modes of operation and emphases shifted,other arenas of society became active and developed historicallyunique inter-relations, but the overall orientation and structure of thepolity remained patrimonial. William Rowe's work on Hankow (par-ticularly volume I) clearly discusses the continuing interest of the patri-monial center in indirectly controlling major wholesale markets vialicensed brokers (yahang) and imperial sponsorship and legitimationof guilds, which were held responsible for maintaining orderly andregulated market exchanges.25 The late imperial economic and market-ing structure seems to have had a strong corporatist orientation, encour-aged by the use the imperial center made of liturgical control techniques.The polity was not consciously altered until the early twentieth centuryafter China had experienced intense, violent pressure from simultaneousempire-wide rebellions and Western and Japanese military and politi-cal advances.

Critique of Gary Hamilton's position

Generally, when historians of Chinese history attempt to criticize theWeberian position, they approach the task in a piecemeal, fragmentaryfashion that proves to be intellectually unsatisfying. The revisionistattack by Gary Hamilton, however, is qualitatively di¡erent becauseHamilton is solidly grounded in both Weberian historical sociologyand Chinese history, particularly of the Late Imperial Period (c. 1000^1900).26 Thus, to move forward with the project of this essay, it becomesnecessary to critique Hamilton's position. The following critique focuseson Hamilton's excessively rigid use of Weber's concept of patriarch-alism and also upon the serious logical inconsistencies in his argu-ment.

We need ¢rst to review Hamilton's position. He observes that Weber'sconcept of traditional domination (a cover term referring to bothpatriarchal domination and patrimonialism) is premised on the histor-ical importance of the patriarchal household, which Weber encoun-tered in ancient Occidental history, and which he then used as the basis

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for a comparative general model to be applied to all pre-modern soci-eties. The concept of the Greco-Roman patriarchal household wasembodied in the Latin legal term of ``patria potestas.'' Hamilton thengoes on to argue that the patriarchal household as de¢ned by the con-cept of ``patria potestas'' did not exist in China during the imperialperiod, though a di¡erent form of male-dominated extended house-hold authority did exist, represented by the ritual-legal concept of`̀ xiao,'' or ¢lial duty. Since the Roman understanding of the signi¢-cance of patriarchal household relations did not correspond exactly tothat in China, the derivative Weberian concept of patrimonialismcannot be applicable to Chinese imperial history (see the rhetoricalclimax in the middle of page 417).

In Hamilton's analysis, the concept of patria potestas implies a directcausal link of superior command to inferior obedience. The relation-ship between superior and inferior is direct, personal, and charismatic.Further, he argues that the patria potestas concept encouraged theinstitutionalization of legal jurisdictions in the West. By asserting thatpatria potestas de¢nes jurisdictions and xiao de¢nes roles (p. 411)Hamilton is endeavoring to establish the base of a teleological trajec-tory for a subsequent Weberian-interpreted Western historical devel-opment. As such, particularly given the presence of this charismaticelement, the concept of patria potestas had unique implications for thesubsequent development of Western history that are not applicable toother areas of the world. Hamilton does not make strong distinctionsbetween patriarchalism and patrimonialism, and understands the for-mer term as `̀ the general principle of power and prerogative'' (p. 409)inWestern antiquity. Hamilton notes that in the great empires ``. . . thatrule was based upon patriarchalism and the modi¢cation of patri-archalism at the level of the state structure that Weber called patrimo-nialism'' (p. 401). Hamilton severely understates the historical andideal typical di¡erences between the two concepts. The developmentfrom patriarchalism to patrimonialism was not a mere modi¢cationbut a political-social transformation. The Warring States Period inChinese history (roughly 500 B.C. to 221 B.C.) represents just such atraumatic transition.27

From Hamilton's perspective, the Chinese concept of xiao, or ¢lialduty, as it developed during the early Han dynasty and thereafter,implied an extended household (and by extension, an empire) governedby duty to an impersonal role. Hamilton understands the term as anorganismic Confucian role concept, emphasizing the immanence of

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the cosmic order in the performance of one's speci¢c social duties. Thisunderstanding seems indebted to the work of Joseph Needham. Thus,the relationship is not personally charged, but an impersonal roleresponsibility, particularly incumbant upon the subordinate ¢gure (theson, or daughter) to create, or maintain, a cosmic order, of which thesocial realm is an organismic microcosm. Thus, while the extendedpatriarchal household did exist in China, its ritual/legal premises weredistinct from those of the Roman household. In Hamilton's view, thecharacteristics associated with xiao resulted in the institutionalizationof roles in China, as opposed to legal jurisdictions in the West. Inmaking this assertion Hamilton is attempting to provide an alterna-tive, non-Weberian, `̀ systems'' oriented, Needhamesque trajectory forinterpreting imperial Chinese history.

My understanding of Weber's position is as follows: Historically, thepatrimonial regime emerged from an earlier patriarchal mode of polit-ical domination and social organization and was a radical expansionand abstraction from the patriarchal structure. While the patrimonialruler used a legitimating ideology that appealed, in part, to earlierpatriarchal ideals, the patrimonial political regime could not toleratethe continued functioning of full-scale patriarchal structures. In thecases of both Rome and China, such organizational entities wereseverely modi¢ed over the course of time in order to accommodatethemselves to the patrimonial political order. Neither the Roman em-perors nor the Chinese emperors would tolerate autonomous clan orlineage leaders dictating imperial policy. In a quotation from Weberthat appears in the essay,Weber notes that ``The patria potestas atte-nuated under the [Roman] Empire, even toward the children'' (p. 406).Clearly, within the developmental context of Roman history proper,the ``true'' patriarchal household never existed.

In the case of China, philological and historical research in Chinesehistory indicates the existence of what appear to be archaic, patrilineallineages surviving into the early Warring States Period before beingdestroyed or severely altered.28 That is to say, the Chinese patrimonialempire developed out of earlier kinship structures (patriarchal organ-izations) that staked out turf, had lineage leaders, contracted a¤nalrelationships, and engaged in blood feuds. Presumably, this was nottoo di¡erent from what pre-imperial, early polis kinship groups weredoing in Italy. In China, some of these practices survived in extremelytruncated form well into the imperial period. The lineage was reducedto the ideal of the landed, extended patriarchal household living under

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one roof ^ a peaceful land tax-paying oikos. Blood feuding and re-venge, also in highly truncated, severely restricted form, survived intothe imperial period as part of the Confucian concept of xiao, and wasalso given limited recognition in the imperial codes dating back to theearly Han period. The reader should note that the lineages of lateimperial times, roughly 1000 A.D. and into the present, particularlythe large southern ones, were basically land-owning and investmentcorporations, which used kinship as a legitimating charter and as ameans of mustering local political leverage. They are historically andorganizationally distinct from the archaic remnants discussed above,although they certainly did reinforce the ideas of patriarchal authorityand patrilineality, which have been marked features of the Chinesecultural landscape since the Warring States Period, if not earlier.Throughout the entirety of imperial Chinese history the imperial cen-ter had striven successfully to delimit the authority of the householdhead (as well as the latter-day lineage leader of the late imperial period).

From a wider historical perspective, both Rome (as a polis and as anempire) and imperial China were strongly oriented to formally struc-tured social-status orders, embodied in law codes and institutionalstructures (the Roman Senate and the various congressional bodies oflower-order citizens of the Roman polis). These structures demandedhighly stereotyped forms of social-role ful¢llment in order to function.In a broadly comparative sense, the Chinese and Roman models ap-pear quite similar in orientation and purpose. Hamilton's narrowlyfocused approach obscures these similarities.

Hamilton is keenly aware that Weber's typologies of political domina-tion were conceived as being structured in accordance with and en-couraging social-action potentialities in congruence with fundamentallegitimating principles (the general congruency between the realm ofideals and that of political and social action). To establish organiza-tional routines `̀ leaders always drew upon shared understandings ofpower and obedience in organizing their subjects and sta¡s'' (p. 395).These shared principles do not have to be embodied in current andfully functioning social organizations, but rather represent a cultural-social locus, or selected elements thereof, derived from a hallowedpast. Hamilton's insistence upon identifying fully functioning, autono-mous patriarchal structures in the context of sophisticated territorialempires is ahistorical. In principle, it also violates his own understand-ing of ideal-type constructs (in this case the patriarchal household) aspurposely arti¢cial and one-sided. That is,Weber's insistence that ideal-

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type constructs represent a historical reality that constitutes `̀ combi-nations, mixtures, adaptations, or modi¢cations of these `pure' types''(p. 396).

It seems to me that Hamilton's argument is rigidly formalistic in termsof the evidential support for his position, which relies entirely upon acomparison of two formal ritual/legal concepts. Hamilton does notdispute the historical evidence of agnatically oriented, extended, jointhouseholds in Chinese history or Roman history, he is simply notingthat these structures were legitimated in a variant fashion that resultedin cultural peculiarities unique to each of these civilizations. A socio-logical model or interpretive framework can acknowledge culturalvariance and still identify valid structural or processual similaritiesbetween the societies being compared, as does Weber's concept ofpatrimonialism.

From a methodological perspective, Hamilton's argument is com-pletely self-contradictory. Hamilton notes and agrees with Weber'spremise that sociological interpretive constructs, or ideal types, have arelatively logical, though, not necessarily straight-forward relationshipwith empirical institutions and the changes these institutions are capa-ble of achieving given their historical context (see pp. 395^397). Thereis, if you will, a general logical coherence between the sociologicalconstruct (or ideal typical conceptualization) and empirical reality.Thus, from a strictly `̀ analytical'' perspective, Hamilton acknowledgesthat patria potestas and xiao are analytically complementary to eachother, or ``di¡erent sides of the same coin'' (p. 407). That being the case,then, by his own logic, the empirical realities of these two civilizationsshould also represent variations around a common sociological typol-ogy. Hamilton's methodological approach demands this, yet he pro-ceeds to violate his own sociological strictures by positing a completelack of sociological similarity. If one, however, proceeds as Hamiltondoes (see particularly pp. 409^410), to discuss the contingent fashionby which the legal concept of patria potestas interacted with subse-quent historical factors following the fall of the Western Roman em-pire, then these nuanced di¡erences do become very signi¢cant. Byentering these factors into the discussion, though, Hamilton is shiftingthe terms of comparison from Imperial Rome and Imperial China toMedieval and Absolutist Europe and Imperial China. This is notlegitimate in view of the original basis of Hamilton's argument. TheWestern medieval experience destroyed the foundations of the earlierRoman patrimonial polity, and the Europeans subsequently rearranged

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the remaining shards to suit their contingently developing historicalneeds. In China the patrimonial foundations remained in place.

ForWeber theWestern medieval experience resulted in the destructionof the patrimonial order and the ultimate development of the modernstate and the legal-rational bureaucratic order. Hamilton's discussionof the impact of patria potestas upon the development of laterWesternconcepts of legal jurisdiction is valid, but seems to give an overlyprivileged position to the power of a Roman legal concept (see pp.409^410). As noted in an earlier quotation from Weber in this essay,the rise of imperial Rome resulted in the signi¢cant diminishment ofpatria potestas. The reappearance of the intensely personal jurisdic-tion in the post-imperial period is likewise due to the complete collapseof the political and social structures associated with the empire, andthe emergence of the peculiar social and political structures associatedwith the Western medieval experience, itself intimately tied to thefragmented violence and warfare of the period. Weber's multi-causal,contextual historical sociology, emphasized so strongly by StephenKalberg, is given little play in Hamilton's rigidly focused discussion.29

In my opinion, as long as the terms of the comparison remain betweenthose of the two imperial orders, then the Roman and Chinese empiresremain, as Weber perceived them to be, nuanced variations of a com-mon sociological typology.

To conclude, I do not believe that Gary Hamilton's argument is success-ful; it is rife with conceptual rigidity, internal contradictions, suddenlyshifting terms of discussion,30 and ahistorical perspectives. Weber'stypologies and his grasp of broad historical trends continue to be in-formative and accurate. Hereto, I have sought to demonstrate that, interms of both broad generalization and in application to speci¢c his-torical issues, Weberian typologies and concepts, tempered by refer-ence to modern scholarship, are very useful tools in guiding research inthe ¢eld.

Derivative hypotheses

The above discussion argues for the utility and appropriateness ofapplyingWeberian concepts to much of Chinese imperial history, withappropriate nuances added where necessary. TheWeberian concept ofpatrimonialism is su¤ciently £exible to lend itself to relatively morespeci¢c hypotheses regarding key orientations and structural charac-

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teristics of pre-modern imperial regimes in general, and the Chinesecase in particular. Based on readings of China related material, I pro-pose what I consider to be three major characteristics of the Chinesepatrimonial regime:

First, the focus and the heart of political action in the Chinese patrimo-nial regime was consolidation of power by a small, militarized rulingelite. In this context, naked military power (necessary for power estab-lishment) subsequently fused with factional politics, which focusedmost intensely on the issue of imperial succession (crucial to powerconsolidation).

Second, external warfare was a means of economic and political ag-grandizement (Ray Huang characterized the Ming Yonglo emperor asessentially a warlord.31 TheYonglo emperor may have been overzealous,but his fundamentally militarist and ``foreign policy orientation'' aretypical of the rulers of patrimonial regimes). Simultaneously, warserves as a prime means by which the throne could attempt to garnerelite support for its autonomous authority vis-a© -vis politically en-trenched groupings or factions. This latter use of warfare for the con-solidation of an internal political base may have been particularlyprominent among North Asian conquest regimes in China, whichwere struggling to destroy the existing kinship/tribal bonds of theirconfederacy past.

Third, taxation (usually a stereotyped in-kind land tax supplementedby ad hoc drafts when necessary) developed as logistical support forthe above two activities.32

The guiding operative concept of the Chinese patrimonial regime was`̀ suzeraignty.'' In foreign a¡airs this involved a relationship calibratedon relative military power and using neo-familialistic status terminol-ogy. Suzereignty allowed for an interpenetrating political relationshipbetween empires, or more accurately, between two territorially basedruling elites. The superior partner demanded and received periodictribute gifts in-kind, which were reciprocated. Marriage between theruling elites often solidi¢ed the legitimate right of the superior partnerto interfere directly in the intimate succession politics of the inferiorpartner. This was particularly useful if the former was already militarilyprimed and prepared to enforce its ritualistic privileges. The modernconcept of sovereignty, indicating atomistic, sealed, political-territorialunits of nominal mutual equality, was alien to the system of interna-

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tional relations based on suzereignty.33 I view the current post-modern-ist critique of the `̀ nation'' concept, with its emphasis on the multi-vocalsubstantive reality undergirding the constructed concept, as simply apeculiar resurgence of the research approach characterized by methodo-logical individualism. The utility of the concept ``nation,'' however, isnot undermined, particularly when viewed as a power structure.

The concept of suzereignty also appears to pervade the realm of whatwe term `̀ domestic politics.'' The Chinese patrimonial political centerwas essentially a regionally based garrison regime with tentative ties toits provinces.34 This aspect appears most clearly at the beginning andtoward the end of the political life of these regimes. This idea alsocorresponds with Weber's conception of all patrimonial regimes asessentially conglomerates of satrapies. One standard means used bythe imperial center to combat the autonomy of potential satraps was tocreate an ine¤cient, fragamented military and administrative structurewith overlapping, duplicative functions that was also starved for fundsand su¤cient manpower. Administrative e¤ciency as a general oper-ative principle was simply irrelevant to the imperial power elite.35 Es-sentially, both foreign and internal politics were structured in terms ofa massive, multi-faceted patron-client relationship.

Generally, the Chinese empires (and most others as well) were struc-tured as disjunctive political and social entities, in contrast to the highlyintegrated societies dominant in the modern nation-state.36 Minimalsocietal and ideological linkage was attained by the varying e¡orts ofdi¡erent dynastic ruling elites to contact and co-opt regional and sub-regional elite landed households. The post-T'ang use of the examinationsystem was a `̀ scienti¢c'' application of a cooptation and surveillancepolicy focused on all levels of the Chinese elite.37 Indeed, the lateimperial examination system can also be considered as a highly ration-alized form of ``domestic'' human tribute. Imperial religious policyoften attempted to co-opt and subsidize major regional belief systemsas a means of encouraging ideological identi¢cation with the imperialcenter.38

Conclusion

In presenting the argument for the applicability of the concept ofpatrimonialism to a broad span of Chinese history, I do not wish tosuggest that Chinese history stood still or stagnated (a perspective that

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was most recently revived by Mark Elvin's stimulating but economisticoverview of Chinese history and society). From a sociological and ahistorical perspective such a statement is untenable. By de¢nition, asociety is a web of emergent, patterned relationships; as such, societyand its history are inherently dynamic. China has experienced signi¢-cant changes over time, some of them drastic. The advent of the manyNorth Asian conquest regimes throughout Chinese history cannot beconsidered trivial occurrences. The changes that did occur, however,occurred within the structural context of the patrimonial polity.39 Thepatrimonial model had been developed and consolidated during theWarring States Period through the Han period, and thereafter wasretained as a dependable, satisfactory means of organizing the polity.

Acknowledgment

I wish to thank the Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chica-go, for providing me access to the University research facilities.

Notes

1. MaxWeber, Economy and Society, trans. and ed. Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 375^384, 1006^1010.

2. Ibid., 1013.3. Ibid.4. Ibid., 956.5. Ibid., 1047^1051.6. Ibid., 1052.7. Ibid., 1028^1029. Brad Reed, in a discussion of Ch'ing period county yamen admin-

istrative jurisdictions with regard to the duties of clerks and runners, noted thatbecause most of them were not o¤cially salaried, or were simply grossly under-paid, their livelihoods depended on non-formal fees. (See Reed, `̀ Money andJustice: Clerks, Runners and the Magistrate's Court in Late Imperial Sichuan,''Modern China 21/3 (1995). In this regard, legal cases were particularly remuner-ative. Thus, the jurisdictions exercised by the various bureaus within the yamenover particular types of legal cases were often hotly disputed. Reed notes that`̀ Given the income producing potential of legal cases it is hardly surprising thatthe jurisdictional claims of clerks and runners frequently resulted in turf warswithin the yamen.. .'' (Reed, 350^351). Jurisdictions and fees were considered `̀ pro-prietary rights'' (Reed, 346) that had to be defended, and if possible, expanded.

8. Weber, Economy & Society, 1030.9. Ibid., 1049.

10. Ibid., 956.11. Susan Mann has published a monograph that adroitly utilizes the Weberian con-

cept of `̀ liturgy'' in discussing commercial tax policy from the Ch'ing period

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through the mid-twentieth century. See Susan Mann, Local Merchants and theChinese Bureaucracy, 1750^1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). Prasen-jit Duara's concept of `̀ brokerage'' to describe aspects of imperial-local relations inthe late imperial period is very similar toWeber's concept of liturgical services. SeeDuara, Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900^1942 (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1988), 51^53.

12. Pierre Etienne-Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth Century China (Stan-ford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 314^317.

13. Donald N. Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1985), 159.

14. Weber's methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of valuerelevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, ``FromWeber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory,''American Journal of Sociology 85/5 (1980): 1180^1201. Weber's complex under-standing of the past and his e¡orts to express the multivocality of historical mean-ing and action is discussed by Levine,The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160^162, andStephen Kalberg, `̀ MaxWeber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analy-sis of Rationalization Processes in History,''American Journal of Sociology 85/5(1980): 1150^1151. Kalberg (p.1151) speci¢cally denies that Weber's concept ofrationalization was related to a `̀ unilinear evolutionary process.'' Indeed,Weber'sneo-Kantian epistemological perspective enjoins a ``radical perspectivism'' (Kalberg`̀ Max Weber's Types of Rationality,'' 1155; also see Zaret for the methodologicalinsights, `̀ FromWeber to Parsons,'' 1181^1188). These points need to be emphasizedbecause of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber's methodologicalgrounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a recentmonograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: QuestioningNarratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duaraargues, in a somewhat halting, intellectually strained fashion, that Weber is aninheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24^25).

15. Weber, Economy & Society, 810.16. The edited volume by Philip C. C. Huang and Kathryn Bernhardt, Civil Law in

Qing and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), provides astimulating discussion of late imperial civil law. For a misconstrued attack byHuang onWeber's understanding of civil adjudication, see page 147 in this volume.

17. Weber, Economy & Society, 976^978. Also,Weber, Religion of China, 102, 148^149.In Weber's Religion of China, 102^103, he includes a speci¢c comparison with theEnglish common-law tradition.

18. Weber, Economy & Society, 976, 978, respectively.19. Ibid., 818.20. This tradition is discussed in the context of the late imperial period by Judith

M. Boltz, `̀ Not by the Seal of O¤ce Alone: New Weapons in the Battle withthe Supernatural,'' in Patricia B. Ebrey and Peter N. Gregory, editors, Religionand Society in T'ang and Sung China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993),241^305.

21. See Philip C. C. Huang's discussion in `̀ Between Imperial Mediation and FormalAdjudication: The Third Realm of Qing Justice,''Modern China 19/2 (1993): 251^298.

22. Mark A. Allee argues this point very clearly. See his, `̀ Code, Culture, and Custom:Foundations of Civil Case Verdicts in a Nineteenth Century County Court,'' inHuang and Bernhardt, editors,Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, 124^125.

23. Hsiao Kung-ch'uan,Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seat-tle: University of Washington Press, 1960), 387^388.

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24. Weber, Economy & Society, 844^845.25. See Rowe, Hankow ^ Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796^1889, vol. I

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). This is somewhat ironic since Rowe'sbook was speci¢cally designed to debunk the Weberian position. The detailed dis-cussion of nineteenth-century Hankow, however, actually lends support toWeber'shypotheses (particularly with regard to the issue of guild liturgies) illustrating theextraordinary £exibility and adaptability of the patrimonial polity (in particular,see Rowe,Hankow, 285^288).

26. Gary G. Hamilton, `̀ Patriarchalism in Imperial China and Western Europe ^ ARevision of Weber's Sociology of Domination,'' Theory and Society 13/3 (1984):393^425.

27. A clear distinction between patriarchalism and patrimonialism is also made byWolfgang Schluchter. Schluchter explicitly identi¢es the former with kinship polit-ies and the latter with imperium, or the creation of di¡erentiated political functionson a territory-wide basis. In terms of historical precedents, this process has neces-sitated the severe alteration or complete destruction of the pre-existing kinshippolity. See Schluchter,The Rise of Western Rationalism: MaxWeber's Developmen-tal History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 119. Stephen Kalbergnotes that despite overlapping values, as far as the ideal typical constructs areconcerned `̀ Weber's models hypothesize that patriarchal, feudal, and patrimonialtypes of rulership remain in relationships of strict opposition to one another.. . .''See Kalberg, MaxWeber's Comparative-Historical Sociology (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1994), 106.

28. For the Shang period, see K. C. Chang, Shang Civilization (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1980), 158^259. Also his, Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path toPolitical Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983),127. For theWestern Chou period see Tu cheng-sheng, Chou-tai ch'eng-pang (Taipei:Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1979). Mark Lewis has argued that suchkinship organizations dominated society and politics from the 700s through 500sB.C. (the onset of the Warring States Period). See his Sanctioned Violence inEarly China, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1^52. WhileLewis does not speci¢cally discuss the concept of patrimonialism, one can clearlyunderstand from his presentation that the emergence of the competitive WarringStates Period polities after the 500s B.C. represented the ¢rst experimental appear-ances of regionally centered patrimonial regimes (see particularly pages 9^10,53^96).

29. See Kalberg's discussion of Weber's contextual sociology and the multi-causalorientation in his,MaxWeber's Comparative-Historical Sociology, 39^78.

30. A striking example of shifting terms of discussion occurs on page 418 whereHamilton suddenly, and in a somewhat indirect fashion, noti¢es the reader that, infact, his entire argument applies only to the Late Imperial Period of Chinesehistory (c. 1000^1900).

31. Ray Huang, Taxation in Sixteenth Century Ming China, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1974), 45.

32. For a similar sort of discussion see John H. Kautsky, The Politics of AristocraticEmpires (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 80^81. G.W.Skinner's discussion of the inferred rationale behind the structure of the Ch'ingdynasty administrative system in China also lends credence to the overwhelmingly`̀ realpolitik'' perspective of the regime. Skinner argues that defense/internal secur-ity and revenue extraction concerns dictated the patterned arrangement of the

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various administrative units. See Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China (Stan-ford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 301^346.

33. See Owen Lattimore's discussion of broad territorial frontier zones and peopleswho were capable of autonomous political action that could tilt the balance ofpower between neighboring patrimonial regimes in his Studies in Frontier History(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 165^166, 469^491.

34. G.W. Skinner's address on patterns in Chinese history strongly correlated region-ally based economic surges over time to both the shifting location of the imperialcapital and to regionally tailored imperial political policies. See Skinner, `̀ Presi-dential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,'' Journal of Asian Studies 44/2(1985): 281^284.

35. Regardless of the varying size of the variety of formal administrative units that weredeveloped and experimented with over the course of time, a major goal of theChina-based patrimonial regime was fragmentation and duplication of authorityat all subordinate administrative levels. See Elizabeth Endicott-West's discussion ofthe Mongol `̀ darughaci'' in her Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration intheYuan Dynasty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Ray Huang's workon the sixteenth-century Ming ¢nancial system describes in great detail a purposelyfragmented revenue system. See Huang,Taxation in Sixteenth Century Ming China.In an interesting comment regarding the failure of the late Ch'ing New Armyexperiment, Edward McCord noted that the organizational fragmentation thatplagued the military system was a conscious policy designed to prevent militaryusurpations. See McCord,The Power of the Gun:The Emergence of Modern ChineseWarlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 18. Finally, PrasenjitDuara notes that, `̀ State involution does not occur where the state seeks a restrictedrole, as in traditional China, and where e¤ciency is not in itself an absolute value.''Duara,Culture, Power and the State, 75.

36. The concept of a disjunctive imperial polity has been articulated by Owen Lattimorein his Studies in Frontier History, 480^481; and Wolfram Eberhard,Conquerors andRulers: Social Forces in Medieval China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 3^12.

37. In this regard, see Benjamin Elman, `̀ Political, Social, and Cultural Reproductionvia Civil Service Examination in Late Imperial China,'' Journal of Asian Studies50/1 (1991): 7^28.

38. Prasenjit Duara discusses Ch'ing cooptation of the Kuan-ti cults and temples in hisCulture, Power and the State, 139^148. James L.Watson o¡ers a similar discussionof imperial actions toward a preexisting popular cult along the Southeast Coast ofChina in his `̀ Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T'ien Hou (Empress ofHeaven) Along the South China Coast,'' in D. Johnson, A. Nathan, and E. Rawski,editors, Popular Culture in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1985). In his most recent monograph Duara reiterates this understanding ofthe tendency for the Chinese imperial regime to use cultural brokerage techniquesas a means of stabilizing and legitimizing imperial rule compared to the moreabsolutizing, if not destructive policies of the modern state. See Duara, RescuingHistory from the Nation, 97.

39. How far and how fast Chinese society changed at any given time is highly variable.Patricia Ebrey noted with regard to the issue of patriarchy in Chinese society that,`̀Although all historians today reject the vision of a `̀ changeless'' China, we shouldnot over-compensate for past failings and deny that, in comparison to other majorcivilizations, Chinese history is marked by some rather remarkable continuities anda tendency to an equilibrium after some deviation.'' Ebrey goes on to apply this

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idea to continuities in basic cosmological principles and to the `̀ regular returns to amonarchical-bureaucratic form of government.'' See Ebrey, The Inner Quarters ^Marriage and the Lives of ChineseWomen in the Sung Period (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1993), 271. Ebrey's statement is a bit strong, particularly thehint at an inherent systems equilibrium with regard to patterns in Chinese history.A milder restatement of this position would simply acknowledge the relativelystable parameters for change in state and society provided by the patrimonialmode of domination.

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