Selma Skov Høye Final Exam Political Science 2012 BSc IBP

Final Exam 2013

BSc International Business and Politics

Regional Integration and the EU

Explaining the increased power of the

European Parliament

Question 2: Compare the main features of two theories of European Integration

and discuss whether the increasing role of the European Parliament in the last

two decades lends more support to one theory rather than the other.

Written 13.05.2013 – 11.06.2013

Author: Selma Skov Høye

Word count: 3589

STU count: 22686

Table of contents1.0 Introduction 2

2.0 Integration theories 3

2.1 Introduction 3

2.2 Sociological institutionalism 4

2.3 Supranational governmentalism 4

2.4 Comparing the theories 5

3.0 The European Parliament 6

3.1 Historical development 6

3.2 Discussing the increased role of the European Parliament 9

4.0 Conclusion 11

Bibliography

1.0 IntroductionThis assignment aims to investigate two theories of integration, and compare them in the light

of the increased power of the European Parliament (EP). Due to the limited remit, this

assignment will be closely related to the EP, thus neither attempt to explain the general

integration of the European Union nor the history and processes of other institutions than the

EP. In addition, the analysis of the two chosen integration theories will be in light of how they

relate to the EP, which becomes clear in the final discussion. The major question addressed in

this assignment is: How would each of the integration theories supranational governmentalism

(SG) and sociological institutionalism (SI) explain the increased power of the EP the last two

decades, and which of the two is the most credible when applied to the historical development

of the EP?

The assignment will conclude that the two theories describe different parts of the development

– the delegation of power through Treaties, and the EP obtaining power through acting

autonomously towards other institutions in Europe, and the concept of path dependency. They

can therefore be seen as somewhat compatible. The competition of arguments is highly based

on the perception of the development itself, and it is therefore hard to make any definite

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judgment on this matter. However, the subjective opinion expressed in this assignment is that

by taking into account the informal development and autonomy of the EP, supranational

governmentalism provides the most credible explanation.

Firstly, there will be an elaboration upon the theories addressed, followed by a comparison of

the two. The assignment will then move on to investigating the historical background of the

increased power of the EP. Finally, there will be a discussion on how the chosen theories would

approach the increased power of the EP.

2.0 Integration theories

2.1 IntroductionTheorizing integration is a complex field of research, where not only separate theories and

scholars need to be taken into account, but also the historical context in which different

integration theories were developed and how they relate to reality, both the past and the present.

The focus area of this assignment will be the theoretical debate in the past two decades, but this

will include a short, historically theoretical introduction to each of the chosen integration

theories. The reason for choosing supranational governmentalism and sociological

institutionalism is that they can offer two different explanations for the increased power of the

EP, and therefore lay the foundation for an interesting discussion.

In the debate over European integration, there have always been two opposite sides in

supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (Leuffen et al 2013:62). In the early phase of this

dichotomy, the ruling theories were neofunctionalism and realist intergovernmentalism.

However, as the focus of research shifted from explaining a possible outcome of integration

towards the processes and outcomes of institutionalization, the emergence of a transnational

society and supranational rules, and the capacity of supranational actors, the main theoretical

distinction became between liberal intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. However, in

the late 90s a new ontology emerged, which can be closely related to SI – social constructivism

(Bache et al 2011:41). Without labelling it an integration theory, it offers an alternative to the

rationalist approach of both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Before comparing SG

and SI, it is however necessary to elaborate upon them.

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2.2 Sociological institutionalismSI is a “branch” of new institutionalism, a theory in EU integration that became increasingly

important in the 1990s. New institutionalism was a reaction to the behavioural approaches of

the 60s and 70s, and argued that the importance of institutions needed to be re-discovered

(Bache et al 2011:22). In addition, new institutionalists had a broader perception of what

constitutes an institution, including both formal institutions and informal institutions (such as

societal groups and their structured interaction). Instead of viewing institutions as neutral areas

for power struggles, new institutionalists also argued that firstly, the mentioned areas aren’t

neutral, and secondly, that institutions themselves could be autonomous actors (ibid). Within

the new institutionalist approach, one can distinguish three varieties: rational choice

institutionalism, historical institutionalism and SI. This is also relevant for the next section, as

SG can be related to historical institutionalism.

SI is, as mentioned, one of the varieties of new institutionalism. It puts an even larger emphasis

on broadening the definition of institutions than the other new institutionalist varieties. In

addition, SI has a more cultural approach to the relationship between individuals and

institutions, and claims that institutions don’t only influence the rational choice of actors in

given situations, but more profoundly the goals of these actions (Bache et al 2011:26). SI is also

seen to have a close relation to social constructivism, as they both emphasize how actors’

behavior is influenced by the “logic of behavior”, defined by Katzenstein (1996:5) as

“collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Bache et al

2011:42). This makes way for the possibility of actors acting rationally based on different

objectives than rationalist theories suggest, meaning that the broader social/cultural goals can

be seen as more important than the materialist goals of organizations. For sociological

institutionalists, institutions can be created because they contribute to not necessarily efficiency

or reduction of transaction costs, but to social legitimacy (Bache et al 2011:26). This will be

central in the comparative analysis later in the assignment.

2.3 Supranational governmentalismSG is a theory developed by a set of scholars in the 1990s, which is based on the

transactionalism of Karl Deutsch (1953; 1957) (acknowledging the shared interest and values

independent from boarders) and the earlier mentioned new institutionalism, though it originated

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in neofunctionalism (Bache et al 2011:14). The supranational governmentalist Caporaso

criticizes both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet,

1998). He argues that neofunctionalism is unable to explain the fluctuations of integration

processes, though it was a suitable theory for early European integration (Sandholtz and Stone

Sweet 1998:345). SG supports liberal intergovernmentalism in some areas, such as the

separation of the roles of state and society (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998:346 and Bache et

al 2011:16). However, SG relies much more on the importance of institutions, and is therefore

closer related to new institutionalism. The concept of path dependency, which will be brought

up in the next paragraph, is also central to historical institutionalism, a variety of new

institutionalism (ibid). In addition, it doesn’t see the EU as one regime, as did the founder of

liberal intergovernmentalism Moravcsik (1993), but several regimes (Bache et al 2011:14).

Caporaso “sums up” three main points of SG (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998:349). Firstly,

the authors emphasize the importance of microfoundations in macrobehavior, and how the

individual actors pursue goals in an environment of regulations and constraints. Secondly, they

re-think the relationship between transnational society and supranational institutions by

emphasizing the importance of supranational institutions not only as inter-governmental links,

but also as agents for the transnational society as a whole (ibid.). Finally, they present the

concept of path dependency as central to the development of the European Community, and this

last point brings up two new ways of understanding the temporal path of Europe (Sandholtz and

Stone Sweet 1998:350). The first way is the influence of exogenous shocks. More relevant to

this assignment is however the second way – path-dependence of power delegation and current

constraints made by previous actors (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998:350). As defined by Hall

and Taylor, “forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often

inherited from the past” (Bache et al:25). This approach states that forces work against the

reversal of a decision – “it is difficult to do and difficult to undo” (ibid).

2.4 Comparing the theoriesThe assignment will now turn to comparing SG and SI, before seeing them in the context of the

EP. Firstly, it is important to note that these two theories have a lot in common. They can both

be classified as supranational theories of integration, as they emphasize the transformative

potential of integration rather than seeing it as a continuous international organization (Leuffen

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et al 2013:62). The perception of institutions as autonomous actors is also central to the

supranational approach as a whole, though this is more characteristic for SG than for SI. They

both have a broad perception of institutions, though SI goes one step further, by including

“symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the “frames of meaning”

guiding human action” (Bache et al 2011:26). This leads to the one of the areas where they

differ the most – the inclusion of culture and sociological aspects in the view of the creation,

function and development of institutions. As previously elaborated upon, SG is clearly a

rationalist approach, whereas SI is closely connected to social constructivism (Bache et al

2011:41). This includes a different view of how institutions are created, and how they develop.

While rationalists focus on material interests, constructivists wish to put more emphasis on the

role of ideas and values in a society and how they contribute to shaping the outcome of

negotiations and both supranational and intergovernmental politics (Bache et al 2011:42).

This difference in their perception of the origin and motivation of institutions is what will be

central to this assignment in providing an approach to the increased power of the EP. After

investigating the characteristics of the two chosen theories, one can state how each of them

would explain this development. SI would focus on the democratic deficit of the EU (defined

by Lord 2001:165 as being insufficiently representative of, or accountable to, the nations and

people of Europe), and how the wish for reducing this, more power and influence would be

delegated to the EP as the only elected body of the EU (Bache et al 2011:312 and 69). SG on

the other hand, would rather claim that the increased power of the EP could be explained

through path dependency and the EP attempting to stretch its own powers to the fullest in order

to gain more, thereby acting autonomously and attempting to maximize its own situation with

the given constraints. Before beginning to discuss whether one theory is more credible in

explaining the increased power of the EP than the other, it is however necessary to elaborate

upon the actual development of the EP.

3.0 The European Parliament

3.1 Historical developmentThis section of the assignment aims to provide a general outline of how the EP has evolved

chronologically since its creation, with a focus on the last two decades. The EP is the only

institution of the EU that is directly elected, and thereby accountable to the citizens of the

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European Union (EP 08.06.2013). At present, the EP decides on a vast majority of EU

legislation, in addition to having the last say on the budget and performing a supervisory role

vis-à-vis the other central institutions, most notably the Commission (ibid). This, however,

hasn’t always been the case. There will now be an introduction to the formal delegation of

power to the EP, in addition to a presentation of a couple of cases where the EP exercised

power towards other institutions of the EU, in order to lay a foundation for the final discussion.

Jean Monnet, a founding father of European integration, didn’t include a parliament in his

initial idea of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However, the European

Parliamentary Assembly (changed to European Parliament in 1962) was added to the Treaty of

Paris (1951) and transferred to the Treaties of Rome (1957). The argumentation behind it was

that it would make the European Coal and Steel Community more democratic (Bache et al

2011:234). The first expansion of the budgetary powers of the EP was in 1970. With the Single

European Act, the co-operation procedure was introduced, which is seen by many as the first

step towards real power for the EP (Bache et al 2011:296). Direct elections became reality in

1979 through the Summit Conference (1974) and the Decision and Act on European Elections

by direct universal suffrage (1976) (Leuffen et al 2013:1). The EP tested its power towards the

other institutions of the EU in the coming decade, most notably through the disagreements with

the Commission in the isoglucose case (1980), where it gained the power to delay legislation by

taking the case to the European Court of Justice (Bache et al 2011:318), and in the quarrel over

the 1986 budget with the Council (ibid:298).

By taking a leap of approximately ten years forward in time from the introduction of direct

elections, we arrive at the era of integration concerned by this assignment. The Maastricht

Treaty (1992) marked the beginning of the role of the EP as a co-legislator through the

introduction of the co-decision procedure. In addition, the EP was granted the power of

approving the College of the Commission. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) extended the co-

decision procedure, leading to the equality of the EP and the Council in legislative matters (The

EP 2013:3, Bache et al 2011:161). It also introduced the approval of the President of the

Commission by the EP. Through the Treaty of Nice, the co-decision procedure was even further

expanded (The EP 2013:3).

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After being granted the right to approve the President of the Commission, the EP adopted

internal rules of procedure, which would make it easier to reach decisions and make use of its

current powers. In 1998, the EP lay down a motion of censure on the Commission, due to

incomplete answers by the Commission regarding the 1996 budget. Though the EP failed to

vote on this motion, it led to an increase in public awareness, and the resigning of the entire

Commission (Bache et al 2011:301).

Without going too much into detail, the beginning of the 3rd millennium was politically

turbulent in Europe. This led to a questioning of the nature of the EU, its legitimacy on behalf

of Europe and the political direction it wished to undertake. The internal issues of the EU

continued with the attempted Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed

by the heads of government and member states foreign ministers in 2004. The Treaty was rather

federalist by nature, including granting more power to the EP (Bache et al 2011:195, The EP

2004:7). It was rejected in France and the Netherlands, leading to even more disillusionment,

which seemed to also contribute to the low turnout at the elections for the EP in June 2004

(Bache et al 2011:202). In fact, the turnout at elections for the EP had declined steadily since

the procedure was introduced in 1979. 2004 was also the year of an event where the EP pushed

its power over the Commission to the edge, by voting down an incoming commissioner for the

first time in EU history (New York Times 2004). In the Barroso Commission, the Italian

nominee as commissioner for justice, freedom and security, Rocco Buttiglione, was regarded as

“inappropriate” (ibid). This ended with a reshuffling of the College, where Buttiglione

withdrew his nomination. According to the New York Times (2004), this flexing of muscles by

the EP was due to its very limited power. However, with the next Treaty, they were extended

once again.

The Lisbon Treaty, which was developed from the non-ratified Constitutional Treaty, suggested

a fundamental restructuring of the governing architecture of the EU. Regarding the EP, it aimed

to strengthen its powers through expanding the co-decision procedure to new policy areas, in

addition to the influence it had in the budgetary process (Bache et al 2011:213). The ratification

process of the Lisbon Treaty was, similar to that of the Constitutional Treaty, highly

controversial. The Treaty was finally ratified, and came into effect in 2009 (Bache et al

2011:215). At the elections for the EP in 2009, turnout was again down, once again leading to a

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questioning of the question of democratic legitimacy of the EP. Due to the delay in the

ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the new structure of the EP wasn’t applied before the

elections. The EP didn’t approve the new Commission as smoothly as some had hoped, though

it was passed in February 2010.

To sum up, the European Parliament has moved from being an un-elected body of the EU that

had the right to give advice on the Council, though the Council could choose whether to take

their advice into account or not, to having legislative, budgetary and supervisory control over

large parts of decisions made in the EU, as well as the other institutions (Bache et al 2011:295 –

296). This has happened both through the formal delegation of power to the EP and through the

informal development in the same direction for several reasons. This is the main focus area of

the following, and last, section of this assignment.

3.2 Discussing the increasing role of the European ParliamentThis assignment has now provided a brief overview of the two chosen integration theories, and

the development of the EP since it was created, with a focus on the two previous decades. This

last section will discuss whether the increasing role of the EP lends more support to one theory

rather than the other. This assignment argues that even though the raison d’être of the EP is to

ultimately fill the democratic deficit, the increase in power has been gained largely through the

EP adapting a minimalist approach and stretching its powers to the fullest.

As previously argued, one of the areas where SI and SG contrast, is in their perception of how

institutions are created. The creation of the EP, this assignment argues, is directly linked to how

the Treaties consciously delegated power to the EP, backed by arguments concerning the

democratic deficit of the European Union, and how a directly elected parliament would increase

the legitimacy and accountability of the EU. This argument is valid in many cases of the formal

delegation of power to the EP (see the previous section). However, the informal development of

the EP is just as, if not more, important to take into consideration when arguing for the

background if its increased power.

“Treaty amendments gave the EP limited powers that were then exploited fully under the

minimalist strategy” (Bache et al 2011:299). This sentence provides a very different

understanding of how the EP gained additional power from the starting point, together with the

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concept of path dependency in SG. As the historical study of the EP emphasizes through the

examples of the motion of censure against the Commission in 1998, and the Buttiglione affair

in 2004, the EP has at several occasions acted as an autonomous actor, adapting a minimalist

strategy to explore the extent of its powers, and attempting to push them further. This struggle

for power hasn’t arisen the past two decades (as exemplified in the previous section through the

isoglucose case and the budget quarrel in 1986), but is a strategy the EP has followed since it

was first delegated additional power. One of the most concrete examples of how the EP has

adapted a minimalist approach to exploit its own power to the fullest in the two previous

decades, was by adopting internal rules of procedure in the 1990s, leading to more influential

outcomes of their actions than both member states and other EU institutions had foreseen.

The low, and constantly declining, turnout at elections also contests the argument of increasing

the legitimacy of the EU through granting more power to the EP. Why is the EP then

continuously granted additional power through the Treaties? This question can be answered in

two very different ways. There might be expectations of more involvement of the public in the

elections for the EP if the MEPs actually have an influence on European politics. This argument

would support the sociological institutionalist approach. Supranational governmentalists, on the

other hand, might refer to the concept of path dependency and how it is easier to continue along

a chosen path than it is to undo decisions and explore a new one. If there has already been

shown a will to grant power to the EP to close the democratic deficit of the EU, it will be hard

to change the direction even though it might be proven that the initial decision in fact leads to

neither more efficiency, nor more democratic legitimacy. Though the main focus of this

assignment is not to evaluate whether the EP provides sufficient democratic legitimacy for

justifying its increased powers, the experience of voter turnout might suggest that the effect of

attempting to reduce the democratic deficit is questionable, though the motives might be clear.

The reasoning of SI is in this case therefore seen as inferior to that of SG.

It is challenging to state whether the development leans towards one theory rather than the

other, but the discussion has shown that the conclusion is closely related to what aspects of the

development one chooses to emphasize. As this assignment has chosen to focus on not only the

formal delegation of power to the EP, but also its informal development and autonomy, the

subjective opinion after investigation the essence of two integration theories, and the

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development of the EP, is that SG provides the most credible explanation of its increasing role

in the EU and Europe as a whole. However, this is while acknowledging the role of SI in

explaining the initial creation and formal delegation of power to the EP.

4.0 ConclusionThis assignment has provided an investigation and comparison of the two integration theories

supranational governmentalism and sociological institutionalism, in addition to an overview of

the increase in power of the European Parliament. This has been to finally discuss how each of

these two theories approaches the development of the EP in the last two decades, and provide

an analysis of whether the development leans towards one of the theories rather than the other.

Though the theories can be regarded as somewhat compatible, the assignment argues

subjectively that by taking into consideration several aspects of this development, the theory of

SG provides the most credible explanation of this development trough offering an explanation

of path dependency and autonomous acting of the EP. However, the SI theory provides a

central argument in the formal delegation of power to the EP – increasing the democratic

legitimacy of the EU. By approaching the development of the EP differently, a different

conclusion might have been reached.

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Bibliography

Ian Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer: Politics in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2011)

Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Ritterberger and Frank Schimmelfennig: Differentiated integration – Explaining Variation in the European Union (Palgrave MacMillan 2013)

James A. Caporaso in European Integration and Supranational Governance (Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, Oxford University Press 1998)

Paul Pierson in European Integration and Supranational Governance (Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, Oxford University Press 1998)

Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfenning: Liberal Intergovernentalism (05.06.2013)http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/intergovernmentalism.pdf

Amie Kreppel: The European Parliament and Supranational Party system (Cambridge University Press 2002):http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/2001025495.pdf

The European Parliament: Historical Background (Fact Sheets of the European Union, The European Parliament 2013):http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.1.pdf

European Parliament resolution on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004 (2004/2129(INI))

P6_TA(2005)0004:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2005-0004+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN

The European Parliament (08.06.2013):http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0042423726/Parliament-and-the-Lisbon-Treaty.html

New York Times: Buttiglione affair highlights evolving role of Parliament: Questions arise on the democracy at the EUhttp://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/18/news/18iht-brussels_ed3_.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (9.6.2013, published 19.10.2013)

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