EUM COUNTERPLANS

EUM REFORM

NEG

1ncThe United States federal government should substantially increase monitoring and oversight, including requisite funding, of ____, ensuring arms are not misused or diverted.

The CP solves diversion and civilian casualties --- avoids DIB backlash and fill-inMahanty and Stohl 18 - director of the U.S. program of the Center for Civilians in Conflict. Rachel Stohl is managing director at the Stimson Center. (Make U.S. arms sales great again, Axios, https://www.axios.com/made-in-the-usa-american-weapons-and-conflict-1516911330-fe0a6412-0e23-40d0-bd28-36491ca45f34.html)//BB

The Trump administration, according to recent reports, will soon be bringing "Buy America" to international arms sales by asking diplomats to drum up new business for American arms manufacturers. Here's what the administration and Congress should do to ensure that any new policies impacting the $60 billion per year in U.S. arms deals also minimizes the risks to civilians: The State and Defense departments need to better analyze whether countries receiving weapons will use them in accordance with international law. The U.S. government must demand oversight of weapons systems it sells to ensure they aren't being misused. Terms of sale for a limited number of major systems should be strengthened to ensure they're not misused or diverted. Why it matters: Manufacturers want to sell their wares, but do not want their weapons to indiscriminately harm civilians. A smarter, risk-based approach — focused on certain items, sold to certain partners, at certain times

— will save lives and sell more arms . That's a better outcome for U.S. national security, foreign policy and economic vitality .

S – FYI possible stepsReforming EUM solves the affUS GAO 2000 - Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (“FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: Changes Needed to Correct Weaknesses in End-Use Monitoring Program,” United States General Accounting Office, 08/24/2000, Accessed Online at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/229480.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/02/19, lasa-SI)

In response to the 1996 end-use monitoring amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, DOD issued standards for end-use checks and established training for overseas field personnel, but it did not issue implementing guidance or procedures. Without them, DOD’s end-use monitoring program cannot provide assurances that foreign governments are adhering to conditions placed on U.S. arms transfers. Because adherence to such conditions is one of the components in the decision-making process of approving arms transfers, information obtained from the end-use monitoring program could also be used in the approval process. Further, because DOD has not collected required information, Congress may be limited in its ability to evaluate the implementation of the end-use monitoring program or to determine if additional resources are needed.To improve the implementation of the end-use monitoring program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from the Secretary of State, • issue specific guidance to field personnel on what activities need to be performed for the routine observation of U.S. defense equipment and additional guidance for the monitoring of specific weapon systems ; • develop procedures to provide field personnel with the information necessary to apply the five end-use check standards, including the information contained in Arms Export Control Act violation reports, and provide guidance on when to apply the standards; • reconcile discrepancies in foreign governments’ Stinger missile inventories, where discrepancies exist; and

• comply with the 1996 end-use monitoring amendment by reporting required information to Congress.

S – genericThe US should explicitly tie sales to EUM complianceDaniel Mahanty and Annie Shiel 1-10-18 -- Daniel Mahanty is director of the U.S. Program for the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Through research and advocacy, he promotes the adoption of U.S. government policies and practices that serve to protect civilians and to minimize the harm they experience in armed conflict. Annie Shiel is a research consultant for the Center for Civilians in Conflict. She spent three years at the U.S. Department of State, where she worked as a policy advisor in the Office of Security and Human Rights. (“With Great Power: Modifying US Arms Sales to Reduce Civilian Harm” https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/With-Great-Power.pdf) mba-alb9. Require end-use monitoring programs to assess use, especially in conflict, and explicitly link end-use monitoring results to future sales. The US government should ensure that it has the access it needs to maintain visibility into the ways in which the major weapons systems it sells are used, especially during conflict. End-use monitoring and evaluation of USML items such as bombs, missiles, and

fighter aircraft should be required to include a review of use and expenditure. The criteria for evaluation should include the outcomes of use (for example, any reported cases civilian harm), rather than solely compliance with international law. Under the Blue Lantern program, the category for “unfavorable review” should be further delineated to include a category for credibly reported human rights abuses, violations of IHL, and harm to civilians or civilian infrastructure as a result of deliberate or inappropriate use. The US government should more consistently enforce sanctions for non-compliance, and link the results of end-use monitoring to future or prospective sales in the terms and conditions of sale.

S – generic – resources keyBudget constraints are the reason for nonenforcement - the CP solves Jessica K. Eddy 5-13-14 –JD candidate, George Mason University School of Law (“Re-focusing Export Control: A Review of the Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative and Suggestions for the Future” http://citba.org/documents/2013-JessicaEddy.pdf) mba-albe. End-Use and End-User Monitoring Requirements Are Insufficient Both ITAR and EARs attempt to curtail the transfer of sensitive technologies through end-use monitoring requirements. Technologies transferred under ITAR may not be used for unauthorized purposes and the receiving party must agree not to re-transfer title or possession of such defense articles or services.81 The ITAR end-use and end-user requirements for exported items controlled under the USML are monitored under the Blue Lantern Program, which reviews the end-use of defense articles, defense services, and brokering

activities exported through commercial channels. 82 While the Blue Lantern program does make strides to monitor the enduse of those technologies most vulnerable to exploitation, it is a resource constrained program.83 In 2012, the Blue Lantern Program on a budget of $2.1 million was only able to initiate 820 checks on end-use and was only able to close 706 cases out of the 86,000 license applications received for the same year.84 This means that less than 1% of the most sensitive technologies exported from the United States were verified to be compliant with end-use and end-user requirements.85

The EARs is similarly littered with prohibitions on end-use and end-users and restrictions on re-transfer to third parties.86 Despite these restrictions, enforcement of end-use monitoring is often non-existent. For example, Congressional hearings after the Gulf War revealed that of the 771 export licenses granted for Iraq, only one was ever checked for its end-use to ensure it was eing utilized for civilian purposes.87 A former Chairman of the House Oversight Committee complained the “Commerce Department issues licenses for commodities not knowing if the goods are what they purport to be; ever reach their intended destination; or are used for the stated legitimate purpose.”88 He further noted certificates not to re-export are “little more than paper salve to the conscience of the government and U.S. corporations” and do little to prevent the retransfer to sensitive technologies.89 The lack of monitoring under the ITAR and EARs undermines the objectives of each regulation. Exported sensitive technologies are easily being converted into destructive devices that threat U.S. nation security interests.90 Partner and allied nations that do not enforce U.S. end-use monitoring requirements are oftentimes found to be the suppliers of otherwise controlled U.S. technologies.91 Without a strong mechanism to ensure end-use and end-user monitoring, the United States effort to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies to global bad actors is compromised.

S – generic – enforcementStrong enforcement is keyJessica K. Eddy 5-13-14 –JD candidate, George Mason University School of Law (“Re-focusing Export Control: A Review of the Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative and Suggestions for the Future” http://citba.org/documents/2013-JessicaEddy.pdf) mba-albiii. Enhancing End-Use and End-User Monitoring and Enforcement New legislation must also ensure the SECA has strong oversight and enforcement authority. From an administrative standpoint, a SECA allows a streamlined opportunity to track exported items and technologies. The SECA would be responsible for tracking the life cycle of a technology export from licensing application through end-use and end-user monitoring. This would create records from a technology transfer to be housed in one place in one system. This consolidation will make end-use and end-user monitoring easier to track and enforce. To that end, Congress must ensure strong enforcement provisions for the SECA. The new SECA must have investigative authority to query end users about the whereabouts and use of controlled technologies. End-users who fail to comply with the SECA’s follow-up inquires must be subject to various levels of legislatively-approved sanctions, including but not limited to warning letters, watch lists, exclusions from end-use of certain technologies, ineligibility for military sale, and suspension or cancellation of contracts, and possibly sanctions. The SECA must have the responsibility for monitoring and reporting to Congress on multiple export control offenders . It should also make recommendations to Congress for further legislative sanctions if it is found that an allied or partner nation are not abiding by the terms of end-use and end-user restrictions against third-party transfers. The SECA recommendations should include country monitoring to identifying systemic issues, removing STA exemption eligibly, or sanctions for repeat end-use and end-user violations. Congressional action to overhaul the current export control regime by legislatively creating a SECA, SECL, and enhanced end-use and end-monitoring controls will ensure export control accomplishes the objectives of protecting national security and technological superiority. Moreover, these reforms taken at a Congressional level will ensure the overhaul to export control regulations has the longevity and authorization necessary to be effective in the long term. In addition to these legislative efforts, Congress should support enhancing export controls globally. This support can be accomplished by Congress supporting enactment of additional Defense Trade Treaties and ratifying the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (UN Arms Trade Treaty).

S – generic – moral hazardLack of enforcement creates a moral hazard – leads to abuse Andrew Miller and Richard Sokolsky 2-27-18 -- Andrew Miller is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program. Richard Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. (“What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much” https://car negieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much-pub-75657) mba-alb Congress rubber stamps these requests with little regard for whether this assistance achieves U.S. foreign policy objectives. It does the same when the executive branch requests congressional approval of arms sales for cold hard cash. Such docility might be good industrial policy—after all, it creates jobs in key congressional districts, provides corporate welfare for America’s defense companies, and helps maintain the defense industrial base. But it makes for lousy foreign policy. The United States will continue to pour money down a rat hole until Congress and the executive branch better understand why these problems keep recurring and muster the political will to fix them. Based on our experience in the State Department, here is our diagnosis of the problem and some remedies for what ails U.S. military assistance in the Middle East. In the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, security assistance and arms transfers have become the instruments of choice for American diplomats and soldiers. Grant assistance and weapons sales are treated as Swiss Army Knives, all-purpose tools appropriate for use in virtually any scenario. According to the prevailing view in the U.S. government, security assistance works wonders: it builds the capabilities of partner countries, provides influence over their policies, and guarantees access to influential institutions and personalities in capitals across the globe. If true, this would seem to more than justify the $48.7 billion the U.S. has spent on security assistance to the Middle East over the past decade. In reality, U.S. military assistance promises more than it delivers. There is scant evidence outside of a few isolated cases that U.S. material support to Middle Eastern countries has fulfilled any of these purposes. Recipients of U.S. funding and weapons have largely failed to make major strides in their capabilities and, in some instances, may have even regressed. Despite $47 billion in U.S. military assistance over 40 years, the Egyptian military has struggled mightily to contain an ISIS-affiliate numbering no more than 1,200 militants. The Saudis barely used their American-made advanced combat aircraft in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS operation in Syria, and $89 billion in arms sales to the kingdom over the last 10 years has not prevented Riyadh from getting bogged down in an increasingly costly quagmire in Yemen with U.S.-supplied weapons. The U.S. has sold hundreds of billions of dollars in military hardware to Persian Gulf countries and yet collectively

they are not capable of defending the free flow of oil from the Gulf against a militarily weaker Iran without U.S. assistance. Likewise, the track record of using security assistance to increase U.S. influence in the region is no more encouraging. While recipient countries are happy to utter platitudes about increased cooperation, they generally—and successfully—resist Washington’s requests to modify their policies in exchange for assistance. Ongoing U.S. assistance to Egypt did not leave Cairo open to American pleas to desist from forcibly dispersing two largely non-violent sit-ins in the capital, in which over

800 people were massacred. Likewise, U.S. attempts to explicitly link military assistance and arms sales to a recipient country’s domestic political behavior have not borne much fruit . For instance, the Obama administration’s suspension of some types of military assistance to Egypt in 2013 did not lead to “credible progress” toward democratic reforms. Nor did putting a $4

billion arms package for Bahrain on hold yield an improvement in that country’s human rights environment. Importantly, these failures have more to do with a lack of political will in Washington , in which the U.S. capitulated before its coercive measures could have the desired effect, than any inherent limitation in what withholding weapons shipments can accomplish. But the frequency with which the United States folds in these standoffs suggests a structural problem in U.S. assistance mechanisms that undermines its efficacy as a tool of influence. U.S. officials have excellent access in Middle Eastern capitals, but it is hard to attribute this to military assistance and arms sales. The United States remains a predominant international player and most countries do not have the luxury of ignoring Washington for long. Pentagon officials argue that the provision of material support

increases their contacts with foreign militaries, creating opportunities to learn more about partner armed forces. In practice, however, recipient countries take great precautions to limit and regulate U.S. access to their troops. As an example, most Egyptian military personnel are prohibited from interacting with U.S. officials, while a small core of vetted senior officers are entrusted with managing Egypt’s military relationship with the United States. Under existing conditions, U.S. interests and taxpayers are not the primary beneficiaries of military assistance and arms sales. Instead, it is U.S. defense contractors and regional militaries that often prioritize domestic political influence over operational capabilities. In recent years, the U.S. arms industry has registered record profits, a pattern likely to continue given President Trump’s initiative to expedite government approval of weapons sales. Indeed, the State Department cleared a record number of arms sales in

Fiscal Year 2017 ($75.9 billion). While champions of the U.S. arms industry defend it as an engine of job growth, economists have found that investments in other industries are more efficient job generators. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern militaries have exploited arms sales to buttress their prestige and to support local patronage networks, both of which help to sustain their dominant position in domestic politics. Egypt’s procurement of over 1,000 M1A1 Abrams tanks, for instance, has less to do with their military value than with the Egyptian jobs supported by a co-production plant in country. The Egyptian Armed Forces have so far opted not to deploy M1A1s in combat in the restive Sinai Peninsula. In his State of the Union address, President Trump endorsed “legislation to help ensure American foreign-assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to America’s friends.” But even when this assistance goes to America’s friends, it rarely serves

American interests. Decisions to sell weapons to allies, friends, and partners often involve hand-waving and intellectual laziness. It is unusual when clear objectives with measurable benchmarks of progress are identified for weapons sales and assistance levels. Instead, proponents of these sales invoke tired bromides about how assistance will provide access to the recipient’s military leadership or further cement the

bilateral relationship. But access should not be confused with influence—and “relationship maintenance” should not be treated as an end in itself. Washington has become so fixated on doling out billions of dollars for this

purpose that it often forgets what this assistance is for in the first place: securing U.S. interests. More often than not, our allies and client states take the money and use their weapons in pursuit of policies inimical to U.S. interests or kvetch about American unreliability. Saudi Arabia, which has used American-supplied weapons to visit ruin on Yemen and strengthen Jihadist groups there, is a poster child for this phenomenon. So, too, is the UAE, which is an accomplice in Riyadh’s immoral and strategically disastrous campaign in Yemen and used American-supplied weapons in Libya in support of a renegade general. A second and

related problem is that the U.S. government does a poor job of holding allies and clients to account for behavior that runs counter to American interests. There is no systematic review of what U.S. military assistance accomplishes. The key questions that rarely get asked, let alone answered, are what does the U.S. want and expect from the assistance we provide and how does this

aid help or hurt America’s ability to achieve these goals? If the U.S. cannot identify actions that the recipient would not have otherwise taken as a result of this assistance, then it is nothing more than a welfare program, and has two pernicious effects. First, it encourages “moral hazard”—recipients to do whatever they want with the assistance without having to fear the consequences of their actions . Second, it creates “reverse leverage”— Washington bends over backwards to keep relations smooth and the assistance flowing, rather than leverage the recipient’s dependence on U.S. military support and political commitments.

S – corruptionReforming EUM resolves misuse of arms and deconstructs corruption efforts.Bellows ‘18 (Abigail Bellows, works at the U.S. Department of State, where she leads the governance and anti-corruption portfolio for the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. Abigail previously served at the Department of Defense as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a Presidential Management Fellow in the Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Before government, Abigail worked on public accountability issues as a community organizer and consultant in New York City and India. Abigail holds a BA in Political and Social Thought from the University of Virginia and a Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School. "Ten Ways Washington Can Confront Global Corruption," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7-25-2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/25/ten-ways-washington-can-confront-global-corruption-pub-76919)(Shiv)Mechanisms exist to address the most egregious forms of fraud, waste, and abuse in U.S. assistance, yet more subtle forms of leakage can persist. The most gaping vulnerability—and the most dangerous one—is security sector assistance; associated funds or weapons that are diverted may directly imperil U.S. interests. In 2015, bribery and bid-rigging in an Afghan Ministry of Defense fuel contract increased costs to the Afghan government and U.S. taxpayers by more than $214 million. Have the gaps

that produced that problem been corrected? Not entirely. Embassies and intelligence agencies are not regularly tasked with assessing security sector corruption in advance of new assistance agreements. Department of Defense officers at post have little training in identifying which units have been criminally captured or are using coercive mechanisms to extract rents. When corruption is discovered, officers do not always report it back to headquarters, out of fear that programs will be cut off automatically. Risk mitigation measures are also applied unevenly.

Sometimes officers prioritize assistance that cannot be easily pilfered (such as training instead of equipment) or require additional end-use monitoring. Yet

at other times, some loss of U.S. assistance may be seen as inevitable and acceptable. Frequently, these decisions are made at the country level, on a case-by-case basis,

without full information. For instance, U.S. security assistance flowed into Nigeria in 2014 without adequate awareness that, simultaneously, Nigeria’s national security adviser was allegedly stealing $2.1 billion in public funds —leaving soldiers underfed, underpaid, and unable to defend citizens against Boko Haram. In such contexts, U.S. security assistance must meet its first obligation: do no harm. U.S. interventions sometimes fall short of this standard, as the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has documented in devastating detail. There are several steps that the Departments of Defense and State can take to avoid inadvertently fueling corruption via security assistance:

Instituting mandatory corruption risk assessments and mitigation plans, approved by senior leadership, for assistance above a particular threshold. A useful pilot would be robust implementation of the new strategy on preventing corruption in U.S. reconstruction efforts, tasked in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018. Congress has considered requiring broader risk assessments, as reflected in the draft State Department Authorities Act for fiscal year 2018.

Applying principles advanced by the   Open Contracting Partnership   to security assistance agreements, including beneficial ownership declarations, with limited national security waivers.

Focusing assistance in high-risk places on defense institution building, which could be an emphasis of the newly created   Security Force Assistance Brigades .

Conditioning bilateral security assistance on domestic transparency and procurement reforms, as has been suggested   in Ukraine .

The good news is that momentum for reform exists. The United States demonstrated early progress by including corruption questions in the 2016 Framework for Policy Review and Risk Analysis of Proposed Security Sector Assistance Activities (documented by OGP) and the new performance management approach . Lessons could be learned from the Partner Vetting System pilot (instituted to minimize the risk of U.S. funds benefiting terrorist organizations) and USAID’s Public Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework(which guides government-to-government development assistance).

CP solves corruption by reversing current trend of nonenforcement and lack of transparency.Hartung ’16 (William Hartung is director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, "Corruption in Military Aid Undermines Global Security," LobeLog, 05-12-2016, https://lobelog.com/corruption-in-military-aid-undermines-global-security/)(Shiv)

Widespread corruption poses other serious challenges to providers of military assistance. There is a danger that tilting aid too heavily toward the defense sector can strengthen it at the expensive of civilian institutions, undermining civilian control of the military. There is a significant risk that this may be occurring among key recipients of U.S. security assistance. The Security Assistance Monitor’s assessment of dependence on U.S. military

aid demonstrates that, for 2014, U.S. military aid accounted anywhere from 15% to 20% of defense expenditures of recipient countries like Egypt, Pakistan, and Burundi; over 50% in Liberia; and over 90% in Afghanistan. A major impediment to combatting corruption in military aid is the lack of transparency regarding aid programs in the supplying countries. In the United States, for

example, military aid programs rapidly proliferated in the 2000s. Of particular concern are the well over two dozen such programs funded and implemented by the Pentagon. There is no systematic reporting to Congress on these programs, so it is difficult to determine how many countries are recipients, what type of aid they receive, what the aid is intended to accomplish, and whether the programs have been effective. The Security Assistance Monitor maintains the most comprehensive tracking of U.S. military and police aid, but this invaluable data is no

substitute for detailed reporting on the part of the U.S. government. Absent greater transparency, it is extremely difficult to assess the extent and role of corruption in U.S. security assistance programs. Corruption in military aid programs is not inevitable. A greater focus on governance and anti-corruption practices in the provision of military training can be one useful tool in stemming corruption. In fact, it appears that the Department of Defense is slowly increasing some anti-corruption

training to foreign militaries. However, in more critical cases, a temporary suspension of security aid may be necessary to force recipient militaries to clean up their acts. Corruption in defense assistance programs is about more than just a diversion of funds. It is also a threat to local, regional, and global security. Any effort to reduce global corruption must make cleaning up corruption in military aid programs a top priority.

Arms trade is uniquely suspect to multiple forms of corruption – bribery runs rampant in all arms transfers.Feinstein, Holden, and Pace ’11 (Andrew Josef Feinstein is a former South African politician who currently resides in the United Kingdom; Paul Eugene Holden was an American mechanical engineer, and Professor of Industrial Management at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, who was awarded the 1941 Henry Laurence Gantt Medal for his contributions to management; Barnaby co-ordinated the Weapons Out Of Warwick campaign from 2007 to 2009. He worked as a researcher on Andrew Feinstein's book The Shadow World - Inside the Global Arms Trade, and is currently working for Scientists for Global Responsibility, researching militarism. Barnaby believes in the urgent need to end the arms trade and stop the suffering and death that the industry feeds upon: "By re-imagining our definitions of security, using peace and direct action we can create a safer, fairer world, “Corruption and the arms trade: sins of commission,” https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB1101.pdf)(Shiv)1. Introduction The arms trade is uniquely and disproportionately infected with corruption. While the trade in weapons constitutes a mere fraction of total world trade, according to one estimate it accounts for a remarkable 40 per cent of corruption.1 In 2010 a number of long-running investigations relating to bribery in the arms trade were concluded, including cases involving the French arms company DCNS in Taiwan and the British company BAE Systems in the United Kingdom and the United States.2 However, the length of time it took to conclude these cases and the often unsatisfactory outcomes and low punitive costs for the companies—not to mention the countless cases that are never investigated—illustrate the difficulties of tackling corruption in the arms trade and the reluctance of authorities to do so. This chapter attempts to unravel why the arms trade has become synonymous with corruption. It argues that this corruption takes a heavy toll on buyer and seller countries, undermining democratic practice , the rule of law and global security . Section II defines corruption and briefly discusses the features of the arms trade that make it so susceptible to this plague. Section III looks at the case of a highly controversial weapon deal in South Africa that exemplifies many aspects of corruption in the trade. Section IV reveals the impact of this corruption in a broader context using the South African and other examples. Section V concludes with suggestions for multilateral, international and national initiatives that could limit the extent of corruption in the arms trade and considers the rights of those who suffer the consequences of corrupt deals. II. Understanding corruption in the arms trade What is corruption? Corruption is a term with great emotive force that is often used without being precisely defined . Even in key international agreements it is often left vague . For example, the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) fails to define the term because ‘consensus on the definition of corruption had not been reached during the negotiating process’.3 Instead, UNCAC attempts to address ‘specific kinds of corruption’ without providing a prescriptive overarching definitional framework. Nonetheless, UNCAC is legally binding and obliges member states to introduce legal mechanisms to limit corruption. Like UNCAC, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) refrains from providing a definition of corruption, despite operating an anti-bribery and corruption programme and monitoring both bribery and corruption. The OECD’s 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions focuses on the specific issue of bribery that is directed at foreign public officials.4 However, the convention is not legally binding and instead requests that OECD member countries each enact supporting legislation. Transparency International (TI) provides a rigorous definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gains’.5 It further differentiates between corruption ‘according to rule’ and corruption ‘against the rule’. ‘Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something the bribe receiver is required to do by law’, constitute corruption according to rule, whereas corruption against the rule is ‘a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing’. This chapter uses TI’s definition but expands it to include the act of corrupting, defined as offering or giving any inducement that may or does result in undue advantage. This highlights both the need for successful conspiracies of corruption to involve two or more willing participants and that all parties, whether purveyors or recipients of such inducements, should thus be considered corrupt. Methods and means of corruption in the arms trade Within the arms trade a wide range of methods and means are used to purchase or acquire undue influence. This chapter focuses on four of the most frequently used: (a) bribery, (b) the failure to declare a conflict of interest, (c) the promise of post-employment and (d) the offer of preferential business access. Bribery is the first and most widely known method that is common to all types of weapon transaction . In these instances, payments are made or solicited in cash or kind (e.g. diamonds or other movable commodities) to influence a procurement decision. Modern arms dealers most frequently use a network of international banks to facilitate and obscure payments and relationships. In addition, it is extremely rare to find an instance of a supplier paying a bribe or inducement directly to an official or institution. Instead, this is frequently the job of a third party who ‘greases the wheels’ of arms deals. This provides a legal remove between the supplier and the corrupting act. In the case of the al-Yamamah arms deal between the UK and Saudi Arabia—the world’s largest—as well as the example of South Africa below, it was alleged that BAE Systems established a complex web of international banking arrangements and third parties that was designed to provide the greatest secrecy and obscurity for payments made to decision makers.6 The second method, common to formal arms deals involving governments, is failure to declare a conflict of interest, whether it be a conflict preceding a potential deal or one actively pursued in anticipation of a deal. In a conflict of interest case, public officials or institutions have a financial stake—be it direct or via a third party, often a relative or confidant—in a particular arms supplier’s success in securing a deal. Public officials may direct contracts to the supplier in anticipation of personal financial reward, sometimes through a financial interest in a company that anticipates a substantial flow of income following the selection of a particular arms supplier. A third method, occupying more of a legal grey area than those above, is post-employment. Also known as the ‘revolving door’, it occurs when public officials are employed by an arms company shortly or directly after leaving office. In many instances the offer of employment is made while the individual is still a public official adjudicating on decisions to award business to a future employer.7 Certain countries, such as the USA, legally require that public officials observe a ‘cooling off’ period before entering into private employment with a company connected to previous work as a public servant. However, this period is frequently short, sometimes ignored altogether or can be mitigated by means of, for example, bonus payments made to the official by the employing company.

Corruption feeds terror activities – only reforming security assistance checks burgeoning threats.Goodman and Hartung ’18 (Colby Goodman is the director of the Security Assistance Monitor where he leads research and analysis on U.S. foreign security assistance around the world. William D. Hartung is director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, "Improve US counterterrorism efforts by curbing corruption," TheHill, 10-22-2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/412394-improve-us-counterterrorism-efforts-by-curbing-corruption)(Shiv)In the years since the Sept. 11th attacks, the United States has spent huge sums to help foreign military and police forces develop the capacity to fight terrorism, with decidedly mixed results. Some of the biggest challenges to the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism aid can be explained by one word: corruption. The failures of U.S.-trained Afghan security forces are well known, but the role of corruption in fueling those failures is often not fully appreciated. In April 2014, Gen. John Allen (retired), the former commander of U.S. forces there, told a U.S. Senate subcommittee that “for too long we have focused our attention solely on the Taliban as the existential threat to Afghanistan,” but “they are an annoyance compared to the scope and magnitude of corruption.” In Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and Yemen, corruption was at the root of why U.S. supported military and security forces were unable to effectively respond to terrorist threats. Transparency International has rightly attributed the collapse of Iraqi Security Forces in the face of ISIS attacks in 2014 in part to the appointment of sectarian leaders who were more interested in “amassing personal fortunes through corrupt practices . . . than on maintaining an effective fighting force.” Many of the corrupt activities that fueled past U.S. counterterrorism problems are present in other U.S. partners. A recent report by the Security Assistance Monitor program at the Center for International Policy has found that two-thirds of the recipients of U.S. counterterrorism aid pose serious corruption risks. The risks are linked to the prevalence of practices such as favoritism, bribery, theft of defense resources, drug trafficking, state capture, and government fragmentation. These activities can undermine U.S. counterterrorism efforts by fueling terrorist group recruitment and financing, demoralizing front-line soldiers, and limiting the use and sustainability of U.S. provided equipment. For the last few years, the United States has supported Egyptian efforts to secure the Libyan-Egyptian border. However, there have been reports that low-ranking Egyptian soldiers are accepting bribes on the Libyan border to allow fighters “to smuggle money, people, and commodities across the border.” In Chad, President Idriss Déby has systematically supported some military units and individuals and marginalized others to help maintain his power. This rampant favoritism has created factional divisions within the military and increased the risk that the neglected Chadian military units involved in U.S.-supported counterterrorism efforts in Chad or Mali will continue to protest or even mutiny because of a lack of needed equipment, salaries, or benefits. U.S. support to favored military units may also fuel these divisions within the military. For several U.S. counterterrorism partners, widespread bribery and other forms of corruption could lead to serious deficits in skilled soldiers and needed equipment. It is reportedly common that individuals will pay bribes to serve in a particular unit or location or to avoid front-line duty in Azerbaijan. In Saudi Arabia, arms purchases have often been used more to line the pockets of certain princes or strengthen military factions than to obtain needed equipment for the country’s defense. It also appears that terrorist groups are benefiting from popular grievances against government corruption in Bangladesh and Burkina Faso in their efforts to gain new recruits or support for their causes. In Bangladesh, terrorist groups are reportedly seeking to “exploit resentment among some Bangladesh soldiers” that feel marginalized by the ruling party. In response to these serious risks, the United States is increasing some efforts to address corruption in U.S. security cooperation. This includes a relatively new congressionally-mandated directive for the Pentagon to elevate assessments, monitoring, and evaluation of U.S. security cooperation. In July 2018, the Defense Department also sent to Congress a new strategy to prevent corruption in stabilization operations. However, these initiatives are not yet addressing the full range of corruption risks. In order to curb corruption risks in U.S. counterterrorism aid programs, the Pentagon and the State Department would benefit from strengthened assessments of corruption risks before providing assistance. These assessments should map the structure of corrupt networks in the countries, including main revenue streams, external enablers and facilitators, and connections with the military. They should also provide a deeper analysis of the severity and nature of the corruption risks, including possible connections with organized crime. Another key tool in fighting corruption is to increase the use of restrictions and conditions on U.S. counterterrorism aid. As part of this effort, it would be important to identify triggers that could spark a possible revision or termination of certain types of counterterrorism aid. These triggers could include the diversion of U.S. weapons, cooperation with criminal organizations, increased factional divisions, or elevated repression of opposition parties, journalists, or marginalized groups. The United States could also increase U.S. support for and training on anti-corruption efforts in certain countries. Even in U.S. partner countries where corruption is widespread, U.S. support for transparency and oversight measures can help build support for effectively reducing the serious risks of corruption. Safety, security, and the wise use of tax dollars all demand that the United States invest more into reducing corruption going forward.

Corrupt regulations of arms enable authoritarian regimes to thrive – Congo proves.Powers ‘8 (Elizabeth Powers is an Associate Professor in the Economics Department and a faculty member of the Institute of Government & Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Prior to her position with the University of Illinois, Dr. Powers worked in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland as an Economist, for the President's Council of Economic Advisers in the George H.W. Bush Administration as a Junior Staff Economist during her Ph.D. program, and for the Economic Research Service of the USDA during college. Dr. Powers received her Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania and is a cum laude graduate of Vassar College with departmental distinction in Economics, “GREED, GUNS AND GRIST: U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,” https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf)(Shiv)Commercial sales of conventional weapons,1 military services , and small arms and light weapons (SA/LW)2 net billions of dollars for U.S. businesses each year.3 Military assistance (i.e., government-to-government military aid) pours additional billions into the arms and military services industry .4 In 2008 military assistance ranked third on the U.S. foreign aid budget.5 Weapons sales and military assistance are the lifeblood of many corrupt leaders. These leaders line their coffers with government money meant to be used for military assistance purposes , and use the acquired weaponry to engage in international antagonism and the repression

of their citizens.6 A glaring example of the negative effects of developing world arms spending sprees is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo),7 where military assistance and United States-supplied weapons enabled Mobutu Sese Seko (Mobutu) to retain power for over thirty years.8 Mobutu’s downfall precipitated the Congo Conflict, which has lasted for over seven years and cost more than 3.8 million lives.9 The reverberations of the Congo Conflict are still felt throughout Central Africa.10 Over $9 billion has been poured by the international community into the DR Congo to pick up the pieces left in the wake of the Congo Conflict.11

Corruption has profound implications on the economy and national security level.Feinstein, Holden, and Pace ’11 (Andrew Josef Feinstein is a former South African politician who currently resides in the United Kingdom; Paul Eugene Holden was an American mechanical engineer, and Professor of Industrial Management at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, who was awarded the 1941 Henry Laurence Gantt Medal for his contributions to management; Barnaby co-ordinated the Weapons Out Of Warwick campaign from 2007 to 2009. He worked as a researcher on Andrew Feinstein's book The Shadow World - Inside the Global Arms Trade, and is currently working for Scientists for Global Responsibility, researching militarism. Barnaby believes in the urgent need to end the arms trade and stop the suffering and death that the industry feeds upon: "By re-imagining our definitions of security, using peace and direct action we can create a safer, fairer world, “Corruption and the arms trade: sins of commission,” https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB1101.pdf)(Shiv)The costs of corruption are not just financial: the money lost to corruption is money that cannot be spent on health or education or returned to taxpayers; the weakness of attempts to investigate and prosecute corruption undermines a country’s justice and oversight institutions; and the poor procurement decisions that corruption in the arms trade leads to in turn lead to the weakening of a country’s ability to defend itself. The full implications of corruption in the arms trade are best illustrated with examples from recent years that affect rich and poor countries, both arms producers and arms purchasers, in all parts of the world. The South African arms deal—through its social and economic costs and impacts on South Africa’s actual security needs, democracy and the rule of law—has had, and continues to have, a debilitating impact on the country. It has also damaged the rule of law in the UK as an exporter state. The exorbitant costs have led to the sacrifice of much needed socio-economic development. Despite the deal being estimated at just under 30 billion rand ($5 billion) in 1999, the amount is more likely to be in the region of 70 billion rand ($11 billion) or more by the contracts’ conclusion, due to exchange rate fluctuations and the cost of financing.58 This figure dwarfs what has been spent on far more pressing priorities.

S – modelingOther countries model the US EUM programWilliam D. Hartung 3-7-01 -- director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute. (“Report: The Role Of U.S. Arms Transfers In Human Rights Violations- World Policy Institute – Research Project” https://worldpolicy.org/report-the-role-of-u-s-arms-transfers-in-human-rights-violations-world-policy-institute-research-project/) mba-albAs the leading arms supplier – and as the world’s oldest, most widely respected democracy – the United States has a special obligation to set strict standards about the kinds of governments that receive U.S. weaponry. If we don’t do it, no other nation will. As Jimmy Carter put it in 1976, “we cannot have it both ways. We can’t be both the world’s leading champion of peace and the world’s leading supplier of arms.”[3] I have been working on the issue of U.S. arms transfers since the late 1970s, when the Carter administration’s policies of promoting human rights and arms transfer restraint were beginning to give way to allegedly more “realistic,” hardline policies. Under the guise of strengthening longstanding allies like the Shah of Iran and winning over former adversaries like the People’s Republic of China, the Carter administration walked away from its commitment to reduce the United States role as the world’s leading arms merchant.[4] More than twenty years later, I believe more strongly than ever that when it comes to arming human rights abusers, the self-appointed “realists” are the ones who are living in a dream world, while the advocates of restricting arms exports to repressive regimes are the ones who are grounded in reality. From Iran to Indonesia, and from Central America to the Congo, our nation’s role as the world’s leading arms merchant has done far more harm than good. Using arms sales as a way to win friends and intimidate adversaries has not only fostered serious human rights abuses in the recipient nations; it has also undermined U.S. interests by spreading instability and fueling conflict.[5] It’s time to make human rights the primary consideration in U.S. arms sales decision-making, not just one factor among many. We need to move beyond the point where, on issues of national security concern, human rights considerations are routinely cast aside in favor of more pressing, “pragmatic” concerns. At the dawn of a new millennium, in the first few months of a new administration and a new Congress, it is time to take a serious look at the impact of U.S. arms sales on human rights with an eye towards changing our arms sales policies for the better. It is my hope that today’s hearings will be an important step in that process. U.S. Policy: Rhetoric Meets Reality On paper, the United States probably has the best laws anywhere on the issue of arms exports. On arms and human rights, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act mandates that “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” On arms and aggression, Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act authorizes provision of U.S. military equipment and training only for purposes of internal security, “legitimate self-defense,” or participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations or other operations consistent with the U.N. charter.[6] In practice, U.S. arms transfer policy diverges sharply from these sound principles of human rights and non-aggression. Nearly six years ago, in one of the first major research reports produced by my project, U.S. Weapons at War, we took a look at just how large the gap between rhetoric and reality is in U.S. arms transfer policy. I won’t bore you with all the details, but I will cite some of the relevant findings:

Reforming EUM spills over to other countries Daniel R. Mahanty and Eric Eikenberry 12-5-18 -- Daniel R. Mahanty is the director of the U.S. program at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Prior to joining CIVIC, Dan spent 16 years at the U.S. Department of State. In 2012, he created and led the Office of Security and Human Rights in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Eric Eikenberry is the director of policy & advocacy at the Yemen Peace Project(“How the “Arms Sales Oversight Act” Could Prevent American Arms from Contributing to the Next Overseas Crisis” https://www.justsecurity.org/61719/arms-sales-oversight-act-prevent-american-arms-contributing-overseas-crisis/) mba-albBy correcting this imbalance, H.R. 7080 will open another avenue to ending U.S. enabling of other governments’ gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Nowhere is this avenue more needed than for Yemen’s internationalized civil war. There, parties to the conflict routinely conduct indiscriminate attacks on civilians and have created a humanitarian crisis that has pushed millions to the brink of starvation. Yet, it is Saudi Arabia and the UAE, using U.S.-manufactured weapons and logistical support, that have caused the majority of the conflict’s recorded civilian casualties. Causing further concern, a new documentary aired by Deutsche Welle, presents credible evidence that the coalition states have diverted U.S.-manufactured armored vehicles to unaccountable non-state militias. Admittedly, the Senate has rarely made a serious

attempt to block an arms sale by resolution of disapproval, but support for exercising greater Congressional oversight over arms sales seems to be on the rise. And even when a resolution of disapproval fails to pass, mere consideration of the legislation can send clear signals to the executive branch and recipient countries alike, and can stimulate valuable policy debate. While S.J. Res. 39, a 2016 effort to block tank sales to Saudi Arabia, mustered 27 votes, S.J. Res. 42, a June 2017 measure to freeze a sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia, garnered 47. The administration has not moved forward with a further sale of as many as 120,000 precision munitions to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE due to Senate opposition; the weapons’ traceable serial numbers, as damning as “made in the USA” stickers, could embroil the United States in further strikes on buses, hospitals, and homes. While the threat of unicameral opposition has worked for now, the reforms advanced by H.R. 7080 would further increase the chances for debate on arms sales in the Congress, and create a more efficient path for the House and Senate to indefinitely arrest a sale. Had the procedures outlined in H.R. 7080 been in place in June 2017, H.J. Res. 102 (the House companion to S.J. Res. 42), could have forced a vote on a motion to discharge instead of dying quietly in committee, creating a debate that, as it did on the Senate side, swayed

moderate offices against the sale and focused a news cycle on U.S. complicity in Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians. While the most recent and egregious example, Yemen is not the only case where enhanced Congressional oversight is necessary to add reasonable constraints to the arms sales process. By some credible estimates, the United States sells arms, including bombs and missiles, to at least 62 countries that are an active party to a conflict. Some countries to whom the United States sells arms, such as Bahrain and Egypt, have

demonstrated a consistent pattern of human rights violations; others present a very clear risk of misuse or diversion, or even the potential for mass atrocities. And some countries with lower levels of capacity simply require a greater degree of due diligence to ensure equipment can be used appropriately. If H.R. 7080 makes it more likely that Congress could exercise more meaningful oversight in even a handful of these cases, the risk of U.S. complicity in human rights abuses or the next humanitarian disaster, wherever it is, could be meaningfully diminished – and at minimal opportunity cost. H.R. 7080 does not have to become law this Congress to have an impact – advocates should view it as an organizing tool around which to rally, and that could ease the way to reforms small and large which can check the executive’s nearly unfettered prerogative to sell weapons to any regime, regardless of their crimes. To begin, H.R. 7080 does not have to pass for next year’s House to respect its provisions as an intra-chamber rule:

regardless of eventual passage, Democratic leadership should open this procedural path to the floor for joint resolutions of disapproval as a matter of course. Furthermore, if H.R. 7080 is reintroduced in the 116thCongress, it should be resurfaced alongside a host of measures to strengthen Congress’s hand in overall arms export policy. These can include requiring detailed and unclassified answers from the departments of State and Defense concerning the likelihood that a sale of certain items will exacerbate armed conflict or spur an arms race (theoretically a judgment the executive already makes under AECA) and outlining robust processes for monitoring the way weapons’ are used among recipients with a history of rights violations or violations of the laws of armed conflict, and those for which the indicators suggest a high risk of future violations. Congress should also consider lowering notification thresholds, so that members can vet arms sales valued at less than $50 million. The time is also long past for Congress to unequivocally clarify that the Leahy Law applies to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), thereby prohibiting State and Defense from permitting the transfer or maintenance of defense articles to security forces that have committed unconscionable human rights violations with impunity. There is no simple trick to ending the devastation yielded by the war and intervention in Yemen, which has directly killed at least 57,000, contributed to the further deaths of tens of thousands of children per year from preventable causes, and threatened 14 million with famine. Yet without a congressional freeze on weapons to the coalition states, there will never be enough political space for peace negotiations to take root. So long as short-term profit motive driving executive branch arms sales policy supersedes a reasonable modicum of self-restraint, the Congress, and H.R. 7080 present the best opportunity to limit the risk that American weapons will be involved in – or aggravate – both Yemen’s catastrophe and the next humanitarian crisis.

Successful EUM reform is imperative to fulfill the U.S. obligation as the global security leader.FAS ’01 (The Federation of American Scientists is a 501 organization with the stated intent of using science and scientific analysis to attempt to make the world more secure. FAS was founded in 1945 by scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bombs., "DISAM," June of 2001, https://fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/DSCA_EndUse.htm)(Shiv)End-Use Monitoring has come under increasing scrutiny in the past year as a mission of great importance but also one that receives very little attention. In an August, 2000 report to the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, the General Accounting Office (GAO) a number of weaknesses in existing program (GAO/NSIAD-00-208). The report focuses specifically on weaknesses in DoD s program for end-use monitoring noting a lack of � specific observation and reporting requirements , ineffective implementation of end-use checks, and lack of guidance or procedures for end-use check standards. Therefore, as of the time of this writing, DoD s End-Use Monitoring program is being thoroughly reviewed for revision. DoD expects to issue revised �policy guidance by the end of FY01 but in the meantime, interim adjustments will be made. Among those adjustments, DSCA will likely require Unified Commands and SAOs to identify a single point of contact for end-use monitoring issues. Until DSCA issues further policy, the information provided in this chapter, particularly that concerning post-delivery checks, remains valid. As a major arms exporter and as a leader in worldwide arms control initiatives , the U.S. has special responsibilities related to control of U.S.- origin defense items. Of all responsibilities associated with management of military articles and services, none is more important than ensuring items are used to further the security of the United States, its friends, and its allies. The continual challenge of meeting this responsibility grows as the variety and sensitivity of items increases. Precautions, developed carefully and refined through decades of experience, are taken to provide items only to countries and international organizations with the capability and the will to assure their full protection and use as prescribed in pre-transfer agreements. As with other aspects of national security, both for the U.S. and countries receiving sensitive U.S. defense articles or information, end-use monitoring permeates aspects of most actions. Unlike actions which have a beginning and a conclusion, security is persistent and continuous. An effective security process may become so familiar and routine as to operate almost automatically, in virtual obscurity. Those responsible for one part often do not see other parts which, together, provide controls throughout an item s life. This may be optimal for those intimately familiar with the workings of �security assistance programs. It is proving inadequate for those only marginally familiar with U.S. processes, who seek to know that controls provide reasonable assurance items will be used only for the intended purposes, misuse will be detected, and any weakness of control will be found and corrected.

S – SaudiIncreased EUM solves coalition diversion without ending salesVittori ‘19 (Jodi Vittori, "American Weapons in the Wrong Hands," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02-19-2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/19/american-weapons-in-wrong-hands-pub-78408)(Shiv)

There are clear rules against arms transfers to third parties. There are also end-use monitoring requirements for U.S. arms exports, but these checks are hardly universal. Given that at least some of the equipment found in militia hands can be tied to U.S. arms sales, the Department of Defense, State Department, and Commerce Department are clearly not adequately monitoring sales. (Which U.S. agency is responsible for end-use checks depends on the type of sale conducted.) The United States is the largest arms supplier to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two lucrative customers of the U.S. defense industry. Saudi Arabia was the largest importer of U.S. arms, having purchased $112 billion in weapons from 2013 through 2017. The UAE was the second-largest importer of U.S. arms in the same time span. Since 2009, over $27 billion in weapons have been offered to the UAE in thirty-two separate deals under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program. These arms sales continue, despite both countries’ history of diverting arms to favored militias. Saudi Arabia has been purchasing weapons from third parties to pass on to allied governments and groups at least since the 1970s, sometimes on behalf of the U.S. government. Transparency International’s Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index ranks Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its high-risk category for corruption, with Saudi Arabia receiving a score of zero out of four (zero being the worst) and the UAE receiving a score of one for lacking a well-scrutinized process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols. The CNN investigation comes as Congress ramps up its opposition to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition. Former U.S. president Barack Obama’s administration only reluctantly agreed to support the Saudi-led coalition as it went on the offense in 2015, seeing it as an unwinnable proxy war against Iran. Obama had put restrictions on arms sales and intelligence cooperation with the coalition in 2016, but President Donald Trump’s administration lifted those restrictions in March 2017, just prior to Trump’s overseas visit to Saudi Arabia. Saudi human rights abuses in Yemen using U.S. weapons , such as the airstrike on a school bus in August 2018 that killed forty children, and the murder of Khashoggi have shocked the U.S. public and Congress. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Congress required the departments of Defense and State to certify that the Saudi-led coalition was doing all it could to prevent civilian casualties; the State Department failed to provide that justification when it was due earlier this month. In December, the Senate approved a measure to end arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, despite the Trump administration’s strong opposition to the bill. The measure did not have enough votes to override a presidential veto, but senators have promised to introduce an even tougher bill in to override an expected presidential veto. The Trump administration continues to approve arms shipments to the Saudi coalition. In 2018 alone2019. Last week, the House also passed a measure to end U.S. assistance to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, but again without enough votes, the United States directly sold $4.4 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia, and the administration approved the latest sale of Patriot missile upgrades in December. Tens of billions of dollars in deals with Saudi Arabia remain in the pipeline as well, awaiting approvals as part of the controversial, alleged May 2017 $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration has shown little inclination to loosen its close ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE despite the death of Khashoggi or the conduct of the war in Yemen. The monarchs of Saudi Arabia and the UAE can conduct these proxy operations and divert equipment with no oversight and almost no input from their own citizens. Both countries are absolute monarchies, and their legislative bodies are advisory and contain only regime-approved members. Both countries also stamp out any free press and most independent civil society. Information on defense policies, including the war in Yemen, is kept secret by the monarchs and their inner circles. Most available information on Saudi and Emirati coalition operations and weapons transfers comes from external parties, such as U.S. government weapons sales notifications, news organizations, and human rights organizations. Given the lack of effective Saudi and Emirati citizen or parliamentary oversight on the conduct of the war in Yemen and associated weapons transfers, it is crucial that the United States and other arms-exporting nations conduct additional due diligence and put controls on any exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The CNN investigation demonstrates that the stringent due diligence and accountability that should be required for such sales has not been conducted. As the Trump administration continues to approve arms sales, an emboldened Congress inches ever closer—often across partisan lines—to cutting off those very same sales.

S – Small ArmsReforming EUM is key to stop illicit trafficking of small armsSchroeder 16 – global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence (Matt, “Dribs and Drabs: The Mechanics of Small Arms Trafficking from the United States,” Small Arms Survey, March 2016, Accessed Online at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-IB17-Mechanics-of-trafficking.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/10/19, lasa-SI)

Data on traces of US-sourced firearms recovered in Canada and several Latin American countries provides additional evidence of the continued need for robust controls on authorized exports. In 2014 alone, the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) traced 2,162 firearms to ‘foreign countries’, meaning that the last known authorized recipients were foreign military, law enforcement, or private entities (see Table 5). The data does not indicate when, where, or how the firearms entered the black market. In contrast to the cases of trafficking highlighted above, however, the majority of these 2,162 weapons were probably authorized exports, meaning that they were licensed or otherwise approved for export by the US government.These and other recent examples of diversion of legally exported small arms 45 confirm the continued need for robust export licensing systems and post-shipment end-use monitoring programmes.Further complicating this already daunting policy challenge is the need to prevent trafficking not only in small arms and their ammunition, but also in their parts and accessories. As demonstrated above, there is a massive global black market in these items that extends to nearly every region of the world. Illicit firearms parts and accessories that circulate in this market are often assembled into fully functional weapons, many of which are acquired by drug traffickers and other criminals.These cases underscore the importance of controlling international transfers of parts and accessories for small arms, and controlling transfers of some of these items (such as receivers) as rigorously as the weapons themselves. Yet controls on parts and accessories are often significantly less extensive or robust than controls on weapons and ammunition. At the international level, this disparity is evident in the Arms Trade Treaty and, to a lesser extent, in the UN Firearms Protocol.

Enhanced end-use monitoring establishes stringent requirements that force accountability and compliance.Lumpe ’19 (Lora Lumpe is a consultant working for the Open Society Foundations on issues relating to the intersection of military aid and human rights. Her books include Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights Dimensions of US Training of Foreign Military and Police Forces (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2002), Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed Books, 2000), Small Arms Control (London: Ashgate, 1999), and The Arms Trade Revealed: A Guide for Investigators and Activists (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1998). “U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia, 1999–2009: Security Priorities Trump Human Rights and Diplomacy” "A 'New' Approach to the Small Arms Trade," No Publication, 4-15-2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_01-02/lumpejanfeb01)(Shiv)

Surplus production of assault rifles and other military small arms— exacerbated by the establishment of ever more new factories around the world through license arrangements— undermines international support for arms embargoes and other human rights and export controls. At a minimum, in order to protect against diversion of arms and undermining of their own national laws and policies, as well as the undermining of supranational arms embargoes, national governments should be pressed to discuss controls on the practice of licensed small arms manufacture, especially for the new generation of infantry weapons coming on line. Arms corporations oppose any such restrictions, and so states have been unwilling to negotiate limits on the practice. However, several common-sense rules would seem to serve the licensing corporations' interests , especially if they were more or less universally agreed upon. All states should ensure that all licensed production agreements for small arms and light weapons manufacture, ammunition, and components are subject to authorization within national export control legislation. Authorization criteria should be at least as stringent as those for direct arms exports. And in all cases, licensed production agreements should not be permitted where the recipient state cannot demonstrate sufficient accountability in terms of end-use control; nor should they be permitted to states that have a record of violating UN and other international arms embargoes.

EUM is key to stop illicit transfer or small arms and light weaponsCrowley, Isbister, & Meek 01 – * an American journalist who is a White House correspondent for the New York Times AND ** Saferworld's Small Arms and Transfer Controls Team Leader and *** Director of Legislative Affairs for the

American Network of Community Options and Resources (ANCOR) (Michael, Roy, and Sarah, “Building Comprehensive Controls on Small Arms Manufacturing, Transfer and End-Use,” BASIC – INTERNATIONAL ALERT – SAFERWORLD, 2001, Accessed Online at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2002/2002%20BtB%20Comprehensive%20controls.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/10/19, lasa-SI)Small arms and light weapons can enter the illicit market at many stages in their lifecycle. From manufacture, to sale/export, to import, and then to final end use, States must establish and enforce stringent and comprehensive licensing and monitoring systems to ensure that small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain under legal control. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and ensuing follow-up process provide States with important opportunities to analyse and compare how existing systems governing the manufacture and trade in SALW are working. They further provide the context in which best practice can be agreed and implemented internationally, and for the discussion of how future trends and developments in SALW manufacture and transfer can be more effectively brought within State control.

S – EgyptReforming end-use solves Egyptian mis-use. GAO ’16 (Government Accountability Office is a legislative branch government agency that provides auditing, evaluation, and investigative services for the United States Congress. It is the supreme audit institution of the federal government of the United States. “U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt,” Government Accountability Office, April of 2016, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676503.pdf)(Shiv)To strengthen assurances that military equipment sold through direct commercial sales is used as intended , we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following action: • Utilize available Blue Lantern outreach programs to help improve the completeness and timeliness of responses from the Egyptian government. To strengthen compliance with the Leahy laws and implementation of State’s h uman r ights vetting process and to help ensure that U.S. funded assistance is not provided to Egyptian security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights , we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following two actions: • Determine, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the factors that resulted in some Egyptian security forces not being vetted before receiving U.S. training, and take steps to address these factors, to ensure full compliance with human rights vetting requirements for future training. • As State works to implement a revised version of the INVEST system that is expected to help facilitate equipment vetting , develop time frames for establishing corresponding policies and procedures to implement a vetting process to help enable the U.S. government to provide a more reasonable level of assurance that equipment is not transferred to foreign security forces, including those in Egypt, when there is credible information that a unit has committed a gross violation of human rights .

S – HRReforming EUM solves human rights violations – especially in Middle EastCRS 17 – Informing the legislative debate since 1914 (“Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, 11/11/17, Accessed Online at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20171011_R44984_9c5999ba29006bc29d0363590f5e21d9c3183668.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/03/19, lasa-SI)

End-use monitoring is considered an important part of ensuring that recipient governments in the Middle East adhere to human rights standards . In April 2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that recommended "strengthening" end-use monitoring of military equipment sold to Egypt, citing the Egyptian government's failure to admit U.S. officials to storage sites and other issues.146 Similar GAO reports have been published on aid to Lebanon

(February 2014)147 and GCC countries (November 2011).148 Common recommendations across these reports include greater coordination between the Departments of State and Defense (which operate two different EUM programs), more comprehensive vetting of recipients of security assistance, and the development of guidance (by both departments) establishing procedures for documenting end-use monitoring efforts and violations thereof.

Individual enforcement solves GAO 2011 (“Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for U.S. Military Equipment” https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a552761.pdf) mba-albWhat GAO Recommends DOD and State should harmonize their end-use monitoring for NVDs and strengthen procedures to verify compliance with security and accountability requirements, among other things. Also, State should implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of equipment. DOD agreed with all of the recommendations. State agreed with two of the recommendations, but disagreed that it should develop guidance on the use and timing of site visits and closure of Blue Lantern cases. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid on the need for policies, procedures, and guidance.

S – UkraineResolving ineffective EUM solves the Aff and reforms Ukrainian corruption.IDAC ’17 (The Independent Defense Anti-Corruption Committee is a joint initiative established by Ukrainian activists and international experts to fight corruption in Ukraine’s defence sector. NAKO is independent from the Ukrainian government. “Making The System Work,” 2017, http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Making-the-system-work-1.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=347)(Shiv)After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukrainian armed forces received significant assistance from European and North American partners. By the summer of 2016, 18 countries provided non-lethal aid to Ukrainian armed forces.2 Top donors – the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada – have transferred non-lethal equipment, deployed advisers to assist with reform of the Ukrainian defence forces and provided training to selected Ukrainian units; the Lithuanians have also delivered security assistance, including bullets. Assisting the armed forces of aligned nations can be beneficial to both donor and recipient. What is known as “security assistance” in the US, “defence engagement” in the UK, and “military aid” in Canada, can help allies address shared threats; foster cooperation and interoperability ; share resources ; and build up the capacity of partner armed forces . The components of security assistance usually include donations and sales of equipment , training of partner militaries , and provision of advisers ; less often, assistance can also entail direct cash transfers. Security assistance, if not accompanied by robust analysis of the requirements of the recipient forces, which takes into account the local context, and monitoring programmes by both the donors and the recipient, can be wasted or diverted . In Mali, for example, failure to carry out a comprehensive needs analysis and understand not only the armed forces, but also their environment, meant that US assistance played into existing divisions within the Malian Army and did not stave off its collapse in 2012.3 Corruption and impunity within defence and security sectors create some of the most significant risks for diversion and waste of security assistance. Widespread petty corruption exacerbates the risk of diversion or waste at the tactical and operational levels, while systemic corruption and state capture make the provision of security assistance and enterprise fraught with large-scale strategic and political risks . Evidence suggests that assistance provided to Ukrainian armed forces between 2014- 2015 was at a significant risk of diversion, in large part due to low-level corruption and criminal activity. In 2014-2015, Ukrainian courts handed down 38 sentences related to theft committed by military personnel within the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO). Thirty five of these refer to irregularities in the supply of weapons and ammunition, with the remaining three concerning the theft of a mobile radio station (with a view to selling it for scrap), petrol, and diesel fuel.4 Other charges include theft of helmets, clothing, footwear and food rations, with officers detained as they attempted to sell a consignment worth 200,000 Hryvnia (approximately 7,500 USD).5 Rumours of a Canadian shipment of security assistance being diverted from the frontline by corrupt military officials prompted the Canadian government to involve Ukraine’s volunteer organizations (VOs), renowned for procuring and passing supplies to frontline troops, in the distribution of their next installment of military aid.6 Of course, while using VOs might have solved the immediate issue of diversion in the short- term, in the long run, using alternative or parallel structures to bypass formal institutions only weakens them further. Corruption can also undermine the Ukrainian Armed Forces in other ways as well, making the assessments of the overall strength, capability and effectiveness of the fighting force unreliable. For example, issues which affect morale, the integrity of personnel systems, or popular support for the military – such as theft of military housing budgets or the ability to avoid conscription through bribery. And as the RAND Corporation noted, the perception of corruption risks affecting international military assistance – whether justified or not – can pose a problem for donors, wary that sensitive technologies might be at risk of diversion. 7 This report aims to trace the processes and practices governing the provision of security assistance to Ukraine, including laws and procedures on the donor and recipient sides, as well as oversight institutions in Ukraine. And to diagnose weaknesses in the systems, which can and do create the risks of corruption , diversion and waste , undermining military readiness and popular support for the war effort; to assess any progress since 2014; and to offer recommendations on creating long-term, sustainable improvement for the Ukrainian defence and security institutions.

CP solves Ukraine.IDAC ’17 (The Independent Defense Anti-Corruption Committee is a joint initiative established by Ukrainian activists and international experts to fight corruption in Ukraine’s defence sector. NAKO is independent from the Ukrainian government. “Making The System Work,” 2017, http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Making-the-system-work-1.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=347)(Shiv)While tracking and monitoring procedures for security assistance have improved markedly, corruption risks are still present on all levels, from strategic to tactical. On the strategic level, the biggest risk is the failure to formulate capability requirements clearly and effectively, and to implement a robust requirements formulation process that includes the appropriate political and oversight institutions. In addition, the research found a number of areas of potential mismanagement and inefficiency , which result in lower effectiveness of security assistance and can increase corruption risks related to misappropriation of materiel. Formulating strategic requirements Perhaps the most significant issue which can contribute to corruption risks is the continuing lack of transparency , accountability , and oversight , particularly in the process of formulating requirements and filling capability gaps based on those requirements.42 Elements of the process are in place, but they do not yet add up into a robust, overarching process of planning and oversight, with civilian oversight and involvement from the wider defence and security sector – including relevant parliamentary committees. Ideally, security assistance should complement state procurement, by identifying requirements and shortfalls, providing assistance and thereby alleviating pressures on the defence budget. Though security assistance and procurement are different areas of concern, and this research only touches on problems with the procurement system, they are related – the failure to provide a clear and transparent plan for what the Ukrainian defence establishment needs, and how the State intends to fulfill those needs, leads to poor coordination , opens the door to influence by powerful individuals and the largest state-owned defence company Ukroboronprom, and ultimately reduces donor trust. 43 And when donor states are helping to fund the Ukrainian defence force, while elements of the Ukrainian defence budget are wasted due to corruption , it represents a waste of taxpayer’s money in donor states.

S – AT EUM nowNo guaranteed cancellation – congressional reports check and most end in administrative settlements.Kaidanow ’17 (Tina S. Kaidanow is a U.S. diplomat and the current Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs., "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," United States Department of State, 6-15-2017, https://www.state.gov/foreign-military-sales-process-and-policy/)(Shiv)

There are two aspects of compliance I would like to touch on today. The first relates to foreign partner nations, and the second to foreign and U.S. commercial entities. If our EUM checks determine that an unauthorized third party transfer has occurred, or that previously-transferred sensitive U.S. technology has been exploited, we may be required under section 3 of the AECA to make a report to Congress regarding the violation of our agreement with the foreign entity. There are a number of steps we may take to address such situations, up to and including the suspension of defense sales or exports to the country in question. Corporations involved in the defense trade are responsible for ensuring their compliance with the ITAR. Most U.S. defense manufacturers have personnel dedicated to ensuring such compliance, and we work with hundreds of companies each year to ensure they are aware of the requirements and to address any compliance issues that may arise. When significant lapses in compliance occur in the context of DCS transactions, the AECA authorizes a number of options for the U.S. government. These include pursuit of civil cases against companies or individuals who have violated the ITAR, potentially resulting in fines or export restrictions, as well as criminal penalties implemented by our law enforcement partners and the Department of Justice, if warranted. Our civil cases most frequently result in administrative settlements, which often include Department oversight of the steps the company takes to address the cause of their lapse in compliance. The Department may waive or reduce a civil monetary penalty when companies agree to implement compliance- improvement measures . In cases where criminal conduct has occurred, we assist our law enforcement partners, including the HSI and FBI, to support criminal proceedings by the Department of Justice.

EUM enforcement doesn’t result in cutting off armsVranckx 16 – Associate Research Fellow at UNU-CRIS. She holds a Ph.D. from the Free University of Brussels and is currently affiliated with the Conflict Research Group and the Department of Third World Studies at the University of Ghent, Belgium (An, “CONTAINING DIVERSION: Arms end-use and post-delivery controls,” GRIP REPORTS, April 2016, Accessed Online at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/10/19, lasa-SI)

And yet, there are limits to what can be achieved with the means to help ensure that a recipient of U.S. made equipment “is complying with the requirements imposed by the U.S. government with respect to use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense services; and [that] such articles and services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided”.36A recent case where those limits are exceeded concerns deployment of U.S. supplied goods by Saudi Arabia’s armed forces. U.S. arms export control authorities must have had reasonable assurance as to the Saudi client’s capacity and willingness to comply with the end-use documentation of solely legitimate defensive use of the goods. If the Watch List led any red flags to be raised when the deal to supply such goods was in the making, and even if such flags would have led to visits in site, the final decision was to approve the arms transfer. However as of mid-2015, some such equipment has been used for offensive goals in operations, as a Saudi-led coalition began deploying against Houthi strongholds in Yemen. The deployments were found to be in violation of international humanitarian law. By 2016, the international Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) reliably documented Saudi deployment of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons (weapons that disperse canisters that release sub-munitions) in densely populated areas.37 CMC also revealed that “in recent years”, a Massachusetts-based company had obtained the licence from the U.S. government to supply these weapons to Saudi Arabia (and other recipient states that dispose of airborne means to deliver such weapons) under the strict condition not to use these weapons in civilian areas.Non-compliance with these end-use conditions was established by CMC, not by Blue Lantern envoys. The U.S. export control agencies are nevertheless presumed eager to sanction non-compliant end-users, in line with their mission, as well as within the legal framework that mandates their activities. No information is available that the U.S. export control system (be that the Blue Lantern, or “Golden Sentry” programme that concerns Foreign Military Sales of defence articles and services via government-to-government channels) is currently taking action to recall licences for further supplies to the Saudi armed forces, nor to recover the equipment that was transferred in the past, nor even to prevent further unauthorised deployments of the equipment.

AFF

High nowEUM strong nowRowe 13 - Judge Advocate, United States Air Force. Presently assigned as General Counsel for the Exchange in Europe/SWA, located in Wiesbaden, Germany. J.D. 2004, J Reuben Clark Law School (Brigham Young University), Provo, Utah; B.A., 2001, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. Previous assignments include Chief of Operational Contracts, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, Utah, 2010-2011; Joint Investigative Committee Team, Law and Order Task Force, Baghdad, Iraq, 2009-2010; Chief of Military Justice, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, Utah 2008-2009; Chief of Military Justice, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea, 2007-2008; Military Justice Trial Counsel, Sheppard AFB, Wichita Falls, Texas, 2005-2007. Member of the bars of Washington State, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Supreme Court of the United States. This article was submitted in partial completion of the Master of Laws requirements of the 60th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. (FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS), PSEUDO-FMS, AND A RESPONSE TO THE GAO--IS PSEUDO-FMS THE WAY FORWARD?, 69 A.F. L. Rev. 199, Lexis)A. Effectiveness of FMS End-Use Monitoring

The AECA requires U.S. government agencies involved in arms transfers to monitor the use of those arms by the recipient country, i.e., end-use monitoring (EUM). 115Link to the text of the note The DOS shares EUM responsibilities with the DoD: DOS administers EUM for Direct Commercial Sales under a program called Blue Lantern, while DoD administers EUM for all FMS under a program called Golden Sentry. 116Link to the text of the noteThe EUM statutory requirements are to "improve accountability" for defense articles, to provide "reasonable assurance" that the articles are used consistent with the "purposes for which they are provided," and to prevent diversion, i.e., theft or illegal re-transfer. 117Link to the text of the note Under Golden Sentry, there are two types of EUM: routine and enhanced. 118Link to the text of the note Generally, EUM under Golden Sentry focuses on accountability, security, use and transfer or disposal of FMS articles. 119Link to the text of the note Enhanced EUM measures--such as greater physical security/accountability requirements and possibly a compliance assessment visit by DSCA--are required for sensitive articles and technologies such as NVDs, MANPADs, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), cruise missiles (Tomahawk), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 120Link to the text of the note Routine EUM often consists of a post-shipment check to ensure delivery of the articles by the SCO, in conjunction with other duties. 121Link to the text of the noteThe recent GAO report discussing EUM highlights the difference between DoD and DOS EUM procedures and database capabilities. 122Link to the text of the note The report found [*215] that the DoD EUM database, the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), was capable of confirming whether past inventories were conducted, but could not confirm whether the inventories were conducted on schedule. The report concluded, "DoD does not currently have assurance that its personnel in the Gulf countries completed past inventories on time, which may have resulted in gaps in accounting for sensitive equipment shipped through FMS." 123Link to the text of the note While the conclusion may be accurate, the report may also mislead readers regarding DoD EUM compliance. Specifically, Golden Sentry's inventory schedule is self-imposed; AECA only requires "improved accountability," "reasonable assurance" of end-use and diversion prevention. 124Link to the text of the note Measured against statutory requirements, DoD is certainly compliant.The same section of this report shows that the six Gulf countries surveyed purchased a total of 14,367 defense articles requiring enhanced EUM as of August 2011, but 63 articles were lost or could not be observed. 125Link to the text of the note The report does not put the facts in context--specifically, 63 lost articles represent less than one-half of one percent over three decades of FMS with six different countries . 126Link to the text of the note Moreover, the majority of articles (73%) transferred are small, personal-sized NVDs which were sold beginning in the 1990s. 127Link to the text of the note This feat of moveable property accountability is remarkable by any standard, but particularly for a military endeavor. 128Link to the text of the note Such positive results frequently escape U.S. military units conducting inventories of U.S. equipment in garrison.

As these two examples show, FMS EUM in the Gulf countries meets or exceeds statutory requirements and has an effective accountability record. These positive aspects of FMS EUM are not mentioned in the report, and tend to undermine the conclusion of the report captured in the title, "Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of End-Use Monitoring." 129Link to the text of the note

EUM failsIt’s impossible to reform EUM effectively---diversion scehemesVranckx 16 – Associate Research Fellow at UNU-CRIS. She holds a Ph.D. from the Free University of Brussels and is currently affiliated with the Conflict Research Group and the Department of Third World Studies at the University of Ghent, Belgium (An, “CONTAINING DIVERSION: Arms end-use and post-delivery controls,” GRIP REPORTS, April 2016, Accessed Online at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/10/19, lasa-SI)

Post-delivery verification, end-use monitoring and exchange of relevant information cannot guarantee that no more arms will be diverted from legal exports. It will remain inherently difficult to evaluate to what extent the instruments discourage diversion schemes and effectively prevent authorised arms transfers from becoming available to unauthorised users. Violations of non-re-export clauses and other modes of illegal arms transfers are not usually advertised. Such re-exports are

unlikely to be reported – especially in open sources – and evidence that they happened is rarely ever collated in statistics. The end-use monitoring instruments that have recently been put in place could create the illusion of control and forge some sort of assurance that leads arms export licensing authorities to OK end-users they would have had good reason to be concerned about in earlier days.

Things inevitably go wrong Helen Close and Roy Isbister 2008 – Helen Close is a former staffer of the NGO Saferworld, which deals with arms proliferation. Roy Isbister is Saferworld's Senior Adviser on Arms Control. (“Good conduct? Ten years of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/57366) mba-albThese cases highlight the fact that things can and do go wrong after arms are transferred, regardless of the assessment process that takes place before licences are issued. They also point to the types of measures that Member States should consider to either prevent misuse or diversion occurring, or to be quick to learn of it when it does

happen and take remedial steps to recover the situation or prevent its repeat. Of course, almost by definition it is impossible to know how frequently diversion takes place, and finding out is a large part of the battle (by definition, any examples we have are already in the public domain, however there is no way of knowing how

representative these are). In any event, Member States should be building provision for comprehensive end-use checking, delivery verification, follow-up monitoring and information-sharing as the means by which the risks and consequences of diversion can be minimised. Member States must stop regarding post-transfer controls as a nonessential extra in the arms transfer control regime. Instead, they should be seen as part of a virtuous transfer-control circle – measures taken after items are transferred can be used to better inform assessment of subsequent licence applications.120

No Cred NBGeopolitics means arm sales remain GRIP 2016 -- Group for Research and Information on Peace and security - independent research center created in 1979 and based in Brussels (Belgium) (“CONTAINING DIVERSION: GRIP REPORTS 2016/4 An Vranckx Arms end-use and post-delivery controls” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf) mba-alb A recent case where those limits are exceeded concerns deployment of U.S. supplied goods by Saudi Arabia’s armed forces. U.S. arms export control authorities must have had reasonable assurance as to the Saudi client’s capacity and willingness to comply with the end-use documentation of solely legitimate defensive use of the goods. If the Watch List led any red flags to be raised when the deal to supply such goods was in the making, and even if such flags would have led to visits in site, the final decision was to approve the arms transfer. However as of mid-2015, some such equipment has been used for offensive goals in operations, as a Saudi-led coalition began deploying against Houthi strongholds in Yemen. The deployments were found to be in violation of international humanitarian law. By 2016, the international Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) reliably documented Saudi deployment of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons (weapons that disperse canisters that release sub-munitions) in densely populated areas.37 CMC also revealed that “in recent years”, a Massachusetts-based company had obtained the licence from the U.S. government to supply these weapons to Saudi Arabia (and other recipient states that dispose of airborne means to deliver such weapons) under the strict condition not to use these weapons in

civilian areas. Non-compliance with these end-use conditions was established by CMC, not by Blue Lantern envoys. The U.S. export control agencies are nevertheless

presumed eager to sanction non-compliant end-users, in line with their mission, as well as within the legal framework that mandates their activities. No information is available that the U.S. export control system (be that the Blue Lantern, or “Golden Sentry” programme that concerns Foreign Military Sales of defence articles and services via government-to-government channels) is currently taking action to recall licences for further supplies to the Saudi armed forces, nor to recover the equipment that was transferred in the past, nor even to prevent further unauthorised deployments of the equipment. Proof of this unintended use would be expected to feed into the Blue Lantern monitoring cycle, and as such provide the U.S. export licensing authority with means to sanction this

particular violation of end-use conditions. These sanctions could become part of a broader and longer-term endeavour to limit the use of any transferred equipment to the specific importer and exporter agreed on at the time of licensing. Proven non-compliance with end-use documentation in one case is sure to be noted and recorded in the Blue Lantern monitoring cycle. Such records generate “flags” on its Watch List, and can impact decisions to authorise new export licences that identify the once-non-compliant party as the end-user. In this particular case, it is of note that Saudi armed forces hold a wide range of U.S.- supplied goods. This context makes the Saudi armed forces dependent on maintenance services and spare parts that the

relevant U.S. suppliers can continue to supply only if the U.S. export control authority approves licence requests to that end. This gives the U.S. arms export licensing system leverage to deny future licence requests. However, it would not seem certain that the leverage is effectively used. Geopolitical considerations and foreign policy choices may demand that the U.S. licensing authority refrains from refusing further licence applications. Unintended end-use of the cluster munition, as last documented

in February 2016, would appear likely to be downplayed by the fact that these same Saudi forces are a major ally in the U.S.-led airstrikes on Syria. The discussed case can serve here as a reminder that the situation in a recipient state may change. In Saudi Arabia, the context of possession and use of the goods evolved significantly over the past few years. In 2016 it no longer resembles the context that U.S. (and many other Western) arms transfer control authorities appraised in prior years, when they approved major export licences to Saudi Arabia. These same export control authorities may not come to the same decision about authorising transfer of the same goods and same end-user, if the latter were subject of a new export licence request. Transfer licences that were given at one time may be revoked, to prevent more transfers taking place under the same licence. But actual transfers authorised in the past when circumstances were different are difficult to undo. In all likelihood, the recipient at that time had intentions to use the goods in another way than a “defensive mode” recorded in the end-use documentation that the exporting country’s authorities had judged bona fide. The type of diversion in the documented case is one that takes transferred military goods “away from intended end-use” at an appreciable time after transfer. The diversion scheme, if there was one, could not possibly be anticipated nor detected at the time the decision was made to authorise that transfer.

Grey MarketStricter enforcement mechanism still can’t account for grey-market items which creates unidentifiable loopholes.Lumpe ’19 (Lora Lumpe is a consultant working for the Open Society Foundations on issues relating to the intersection of military aid and human rights. Her books include Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights Dimensions of US Training of Foreign Military and Police Forces (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2002), Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed Books, 2000), Small Arms Control (London: Ashgate, 1999), and The Arms Trade Revealed: A Guide for Investigators and Activists (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1998). “U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia, 1999–2009: Security Priorities Trump Human Rights and Diplomacy” "A 'New' Approach to the Small Arms Trade," No Publication, 4-15-2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_01-02/lumpejanfeb01)(Shiv)By contrast, in the black market, private dealers knowingly violate the arms sales laws or policies of source, transit, and/or recipient states for commercial gain. Also clearly within the black market are arms sales to governments or guerrillas that have been placed under UN or other legally binding arms embargoes. Gray-market sales are more difficult to classify. They include legally questionable transfers , such as arms supplies authorized covertly by an exporting government against the wishes of the importing government. Further complicating the matter, many states have either non-existent or very weak national laws and regulations in place to govern arms production and trade, rendering distinctions about what is legal and illegal largely moot . Moreover, the interactions between legal and illegal markets are manifold. Arms that are originally exported legally but that are not properly tracked or secured often fall into illegal circulation—diversion, theft, and capture of state security forces' arms are a major source of black-market supply around the world.

No ModelingReforming EUM is useless – US already has the best program and no one models itCrowley, Isbister, & Meek 01 – * an American journalist who is a White House correspondent for the New York Times AND ** Saferworld's Small Arms and Transfer Controls Team Leader and *** Director of Legislative Affairs for the American Network of Community Options and Resources (ANCOR) (Michael, Roy, and Sarah, “Building Comprehensive Controls on Small Arms Manufacturing, Transfer and End-Use,” BASIC – INTERNATIONAL ALERT – SAFERWORLD, 2001, Accessed Online at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2002/2002%20BtB%20Comprehensive%20controls.pdf, Accessed Online on 07/10/19, lasa-SI)From this brief survey it is clear that even among States recognised as having relatively extensive end-use controls, no one country can be seen to have a fully effective system. The system in place in the US is the most comprehensive, but nevertheless suffers from a lack of resources and the fact that SALW issues are not prioritised, despite the significant risks of diversion and misuse that accompany exports of these weapons. This underlines the importance of establishing effective cooperation, including information sharing on risks of diversion and misuse, amongst relevant actors. If the US, the world’s largest military exporter, has difficulties resourcing this area, other, less affluent States will find operating alone even more problematic.

No modelling – US already has the best EUM policy but no one caresKerstin Vignard 2010 -- deputy director at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Since 2013, she has led UNIDIR’s work on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies. (“Arms Control Verification” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123093/2010-3_full.pdf) mba-albNot all governments require end users to certify that weapons will only be re-exported with the permission of the initial exporting authority. In many cases, once weapons are in a particular state, it is up to that state’s government to decide upon re-exports. Again, the United States has the strictest rules here, always insists on licensing re-exports even for the export of components of weapon systems.19 This policy has brought the United States in collision with other governments and the European Union , which objects to US control over components that are used in the assembly of weapons in Europe. This is part of a larger, controversial debate about the appropriateness of extraterritoriality provisions.20 There have been many cases of falsified end-user certificates. Arms dealers and brokers have supplied licensing authorities with documents bearing signatures of non-authorized persons and stating destinations that they know to be incorrect. At least in the past, there existed a black market for end-user certificates.21 State officials were willing to sign false end-user certificates against the payment of certain sums. A number of such false end-user certificates have been documented by experts monitoring arms embargoes. It is likely that most falsifications of end-user certificates go by unnoticed, since the widespread lack of end-user checks —except in the case of the United States—makes the detection of false end-use declarations largely dependent on chance. For example, authorities may perhaps obtain reports by NGOs, monitoring groups or journalists. End-user checks are difficult but not impossible to carry out, as the US example shows. They require a good legal basis, and staff with sufficient knowledge to inspect end use. Many states are unwilling to follow the United States’ lead to base end-use inspection in domestic law. An alternative would be to require exporters to make the right of on-site inspection by representatives from the exporting state a part of the arms transfer contract. This also requires that governments reserve the right to licence re-exports of arms

tracking impossible - terroristsTracking impossible – terrorists will get weaponsCRS 17 – Informing the legislative debate since 1914 (“Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, 11/11/17, Accessed Online at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44984/5, Accessed Online on 07/10/19, lasa-SI)Congress has long taken an interest in ensuring that arms sold to foreign countries are used responsibly and for the purposes agreed upon as part of their sale (a legal requirement for certification that goes back to the 1960s). In 1996, Congress amended the AECA to include Section 40A (P.L. 104-164), which directs the President to “establish a program that provides for end-use monitoring in order to improve accountability with respect to defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or FAA.” 139 The goals of end-use monitoring include preserving U.S. technological superiority by impeding adversaries’ access to sensitive items and ensuring that arms are used solely by the intended recipients based on the terms under which the sale is made. In addition, as part of the standard terms and conditions of a letter of agreement (LOA), the recipient country agrees to “permit observation and review by ... representatives of the U.S. Government with regards to the use of such articles.” 140End-use monitoring has been an important consideration in evaluating arms sales to Iraq, as Members of Congress try to balance the Iraqi government’s need for weapons to use against the Islamic State and other threats with the potential for those arms to fall into the wrong hands, including the very groups their use is intended to combat. Since 2015, there have been widespread reports of the use of U.S. weaponry by Popular Mobilization Forces or Units (PMFs or PMUs), some of whom are supported by Iran. U.S. officials have reportedly denied the existence of any confirmed instances of Iraqi forces transferring U.S. arms to PMFs, and their Iraqi

counterparts have stated that all U.S.-provided weapons remain under Iraqi army control.141 However, the challenges of tracking the whereabouts of U.S. arms are considerable in a country that has received tens of billions of dollars of weapons in the past decade alone . 142 The challenges of accounting for the whereabouts of U.S. arms have perhaps grown as the United States has transferred more weapons into Iraq to help Iraqi forces confront the Islamic State. In May 2017, Amnesty International obtained (via a Freedom of Information Act request) and released a September 2016 DOD audit that determined that the Army “did not have effective controls” to track equipment transfers provided to Iraqi forces through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF). The audit characterized the Army’s recordkeeping as inconsistent, out of date, and prone to human

error.143 A DOD spokeswoman stated, “The bottom line is that the US military does not have a means to track equipment that has been taken from the Government of Iraq by ISIL. ” 144 The implications for these sales under the AECA are unclear. The DOD spokeswoman cited above explained the situation by saying that “the current conflict in Iraq limits some aspects of ... monitoring activities, including travel to many areas of Iraq and access to Iraqi units in combat areas, as well as combat use, damage and losses of war material.” 145

EUM CUT-OFF CP

NEG

1ncText: The United States federal government should reform the end-use monitoring of [the arms sales that the plan reduces] by:

- Increasing coordination and harmonization between the Department of State and Department of Defense, funding and personnel for enforcement, the stringency of vetting by at least implementing individual and unit-level vetting, and oversight of the end use monitoring process

- Requiring purchasers not divert arms for use beyond their intended purpose

- Linking end use monitoring to future sales, including an affirmative burden on the purchaser to prove that arms will never be diverted.

The counterplan solvesDaniel Mahanty and Annie Shiel 1-10-18 -- Daniel Mahanty is director of the U.S. Program for the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Through research and advocacy, he promotes the adoption of U.S. government policies and practices that serve to protect civilians and to minimize the harm they experience in armed conflict. Annie Shiel is a research consultant for the Center for Civilians in Conflict. She spent three years at the U.S. Department of State, where she worked as a policy advisor in the Office of Security and Human Rights. (“With Great Power: Modifying US Arms Sales to Reduce Civilian Harm” https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/With-Great-Power.pdf) mba-alb

9. Require end-use monitoring programs to assess use, especially in conflict, and explicitly link end-use monitoring results to future sales. The US government should ensure that it has the access it needs to maintain visibility into the ways in which the major weapons systems it sells are used, especially during conflict. End-use monitoring and evaluation of USML items such as bombs, missiles, and fighter aircraft should be required to include a review of use and expenditure. The criteria for evaluation should include the outcomes of use (for example, any reported cases civilian harm), rather than solely compliance with international law. Under the Blue Lantern program, the category for “unfavorable review” should be further delineated to include a category for credibly reported human rights abuses, violations of IHL, and harm to civilians or civilian infrastructure as a result of deliberate or inappropriate use. The US government should more consistently enforce sanctions for non-compliance, and link the results of end-use monitoring to future or prospective sales in the terms and conditions of sale.

BUT, ___ won’t meet the counterplan’s requirements --- this heightened standard results in a future reduction in salesGRIP 2016 -- Group for Research and Information on Peace and security - independent research center created in 1979 and based in Brussels (Belgium) (“CONTAINING DIVERSION: GRIP REPORTS 2016/4 An Vranckx Arms end-use and post-delivery controls” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf) mba-alb

The export control authority must also take at face value the importer’s signed declaration not to re-export the goods to another destination before permission for re-export is requested and obtained from the original

exporting country. Whilst past behaviour is often the only predictor of future behaviour, it is impossible to be certain that a party, that has never re-exported goods in the past, will never do so in the future, with or without obtaining written consent from the exporter. But more problematic still, is the unlikelihood that the export licensing authority has evidence of a

re-export that it was never requested to authorise. Not all is guaranteed to go sufficiently well even if the goods physically remain in the territory of the intended recipient country. The army’s assault rifles may turn up in the hands of police forces that use them on civilians in an unforeseen way. The truly

intended user of a defensive weapon may come to put it to offensive use. These are eventualities that the export control licensing authority has few means to anticipate , at the time it needs to decide about an export licence application, and even after that decision is made.

Explicit conditions cause other countries to internally reform to prevent arms diversionMelissa G. Dalton et al 2018 -- Melissa G. Dalton is a senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program (ISP). Her research focuses on security cooperation with allies and partners, U.S. defense policy in the Middle East, and global U.S. defense strategy and policy. As deputy director, she advises the director of ISP on a broad range of strategic and management issues. She manages the daily operations of ISP, including a team of 50 resident staff and an extensive network of nonresident affiliates. Prior to joining CSIS in 2014, she served in several policy and intelligence positions at the U.S. Department of Defense for 10 years. Ms. Dalton holds a B.A. in foreign affairs from the Univer-sity of Virginia and an M.A. in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Hijab Shah is a research associate with the International Security Program at CSIS. She graduated from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service with a master's degree in security studies in 2016 and a bachelor's degree in culture and politics in 2011. She was a postgraduate exchange student at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews. Shannon N. Green is director and senior fellow of the Human Rights Initiative at CSIS. Prior to join-ing CSIS, Ms. Green was senior director for global engagement on the National Security Council staff. From 2008 to 2013, Ms. Green worked at the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), where she coordinated the 2009 international election observation effort in Afghanistan. From 2004 to 2008, she served in USAID's Asia and Near East Bureau. Prior to joining the government, she worked at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the Environmental Change and Security Project and for nongovernmental organizations combating HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Ms. Green received her B.A. in political science and history from the University of Georgia and her M.A. in international peace and conflict resolution from American University. Rebecca Hughes is an intern with the CSIS International Security Program. She holds an M.S. in foreign service from Georgetown University and a B.A. in women and gender studies from Brandeis University. (“Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance” https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf) mba-alb***SSA = Security Sector Assistance

Strengths, Weaknesses, and Gaps When strategically applied, conditionality has the potential to mitigate risks, strengthen security partnerships, and incentivize good behavior. Policymakers can employ punitive conditionality to mitigate the risk that a partner country will abuse U.S. SSA. Transparent, positive conditionality, in which U.S. policymakers collaborate with recipient countries to develop a road map for SSA, would help incentivize reform and likely result in stronger partnerships and a better alignment of policy objectives between donor and recipient countries.47 Conditioning SSA to promote international norms and human rights demonstrates U.S. commitment to these values, mandates better behavior among current partner countries, and may also signal and influence the behavior of those seeking SSA in the future."

Arms diversion lead to global violence and warSchroeder 7 – Matt, “The Illicit Arms Trade,” FAS, https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/IssueBrief3ArmsTrafficking.html

Illicit arms trafficking fuels civil wars , contributes to sky-rocketing crime rates and feeds the arsenals of the world's worst terrorists. Particularly troubling is the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). SA/LW account for an estimated 60-90% of the 100,000+ conflict deaths each year (Small Arms Survey 2005) and tens of thousands of additional deaths outside of war zones. They are also the weapons of choice for many terrorists. Of the roughly 175 terrorist attacks identified in last year's State Department report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, approximately half were committed with small arms or light weapons. Stemming the flow of these weapons is incredibly difficult. Unlike weapons of mass destuction, small arms and many light weapons have legitimate military, law enforcement, and/or sporting and recreational uses. These uses preclude the types of outright bans on manufacture, stockpiling and sales imposed - with some success - on landmines and chemical and biological weapons. Instead, governments try to prevent the diversion and misuse of SA/LW without unduly infringing upon legitimate use and trade. This is no small feat. Plentiful, easy to

conceal, and lethal, SA/LW are a smuggler's dream and a law enforcement nightmare. Hundreds of thousands of small arms in leaky government arsenals are vulnerable to theft, loss and diversion. Once acquired by traffickers, these weapons are smuggled across national borders in every conceivable way. They are hidden under sacks of vegetables in the back of pick up trucks, packed into household appliances that are then loaded onto cargo ships, even air-dropped out of old Soviet military transport planes. In the hands of terrorists and other criminals, these weapons have the capacity to kill dozens, even hundreds, of innocent civilians . A shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile - available on the black market for as little as a few thousand dollars - can bring down a commercial airliner. Even a couple of $100 assault rifles can inflict horrendous casualties, as evidenced by the November 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt, during which 6 terrorists armed only with assault rifles, pistols and knives systematically slaughtered 58 tourists.

OVThe counterplan leads to a future arms cut-off based on ____ violating the counterplan’s EUM standard. That solves the case by ending sales, but sends a strong signal that the US will take diversion prevention seriously --- that’s Mahanty and Dalton.

Impact is illicit diversion by every non-aff purchaser – fuels civilian deaths and violence --- that’s Schroeder.

SDiversion is inevitable with every sale --- it’s absolutely impossible to preventAl Jazeera 18 - America's Guns: Secret Pipeline to Syria, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2018/03/america-guns-secret-pipeline-syria-180314121047479.html

It's well known that the United States exports billions of dollars' worth of arms and ammunition to its allies. What isn't as widely understood is that many of the guns it supplies to "partner forces" fighting wars in the Middle East - particularly to rebels in Syria - are Soviet-style munitions such as RPGs and Kalashnikovs which are obtained from manufacturers in Bulgaria, Serbia and other Eastern European countries. There are many reasons for this, of which the most obvious are that fighters in the region have long been familiar with these types of weapons and would rather use them than anything else, and they are relatively easy to obtain. Another reason is that providing guns which can't easily be traced back to the US puts a politically convenient degree of separation between the US and those to whom the arms go - even when the supplies have been sanctioned at the highest level. Nevertheless, the process still necessarily involves complicated procurement and supply routes, and a less than diligent application of the "rules" that are theoretically supposed to constrain the international sale and movement of guns into such a volatile environment - embargos, sanctions, "end-user" certification and so on. It often requires officials to turn a blind eye to less than satisfactory paperwork, the use of private contractors to act as cut-outs and trainers, and middlemen and dead-of-night cargo flights to and from strange, out-of-the-way places. Meanwhile, a host of other players, from Russia, to Turkey, to Saudi Arabia and Iran are all doing variants of the same thing: providing deadly weapons to their own proxies, which in the Syrian conflict alone has contributed to a death toll of around 500,000, the vast majority of whom are

civilians. It's also inevitable , in this murky world of shifting alliances and often hidden deals with irregular militias on an

ever-fluctuating battleground, that some of these arms do not always end up where they were meant to .

Zero diversion would require complete government cohesion – that’s not feasiblePablo Policzer and Valerie Yankey-Wayne 2009 -- Pablo Policzer is an Assistant Professor and holder of the Canada Research Chair in Latin American Politics at the University of Calgary, where he also directs the Armed Groups Project (http://www.armedgroups.org). Valerie Yankey-Wayne is a doctoral student at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and a Research Associate with the Armed Groups Project. She was formerly a Policy Analyst/ Researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, Switzerland. (“Armed Groups and the Arms Trade Treaty: Challenges and Opportunities” https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/591A692A47C527B2C12576CC003EBB13-AGP_Apr2009.pdf) mba-alb

To reduce unintentional diversion to armed groups, it is essential for states to have responsibility over both their exports and imports. This requires monitoring over international transfers as well as state agents and weapon stockpiles: in other words, to increase both internal and external

monitoring. We argue there are five aspects to this monitoring: (1) Coordination and Oversight: Coordination on arms procurement by relevant government agencies reduces duplication and improves transparency and oversight on not just on the arms procurement but also on the activities of government and private agents

involved. In most countries, several agencies are involved in arms procurement. This has long been recognised as a source of potential unintentional diversion, simply because it is almost impossible to coordinate government agencies/departments, particularly between the defence department, the executive branch and law enforcement agencies.

Even without actual transfer, ____ can’t meet the affirmative burden part of the counterplanGRIP 2016 -- Group for Research and Information on Peace and security - independent research center created in 1979 and based in Brussels (Belgium) (“CONTAINING DIVERSION: GRIP REPORTS 2016/4 An Vranckx Arms end-use and post-delivery controls” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf) mba-alb

Post-delivery verification, end-use monitoring and exchange of relevant information cannot guarantee that no more arms will be diverted from legal exports. It will remain inherently difficult to evaluate to what extent the instruments discourage diversion schemes and effectively prevent authorised arms transfers from becoming available to unauthorised users. Violations of non-re-export clauses and other modes of illegal arms transfers are not usually advertised. Such re-exports are unlikely to be reported – especially in open sources – and evidence that they happened is rarely ever collated in statistics. The end-use monitoring instruments that have recently been put in place could create the illusion of control and forge some sort of assurance that leads arms export licensing authorities to OK end-users they would have had good reason to be concerned about in earlier days. Finally, even if transferred arms remain under the control of the designated users and in the country that the end-use documentation described as their destination, the use of the arms is not guaranteed to be restricted to the purposes described in that documentation. Deployment for other purposes is a more visible type of diversion than are hidden re-exports. Under current

conditions, however, such visible unintended use has not given sufficient ground to try and recuperate the arms, or ensure that further deployment is restricted to intended end-use.

‘Affirmative burden’ isn’t possibleHelen Close and Roy Isbister 2008 – Helen Close is a former staffer of the NGO Saferworld, which deals with arms proliferation. Roy Isbister is Saferworld's Senior Adviser on Arms Control. (“Good conduct? Ten years of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/57366) mba-alb

These cases highlight the fact that things can and do go wrong after arms are transferred, regardless of the assessment process that takes place before licences are issued. They also point to the types of measures that Member States should consider to either prevent misuse or diversion occurring, or to be quick to learn of it when it does

happen and take remedial steps to recover the situation or prevent its repeat. Of course, almost by definition it is impossible to know how frequently diversion takes place, and finding out is a large part of the battle (by definition, any examples we have are already in the public domain, however there is no way of knowing how

representative these are). In any event, Member States should be building provision for comprehensive end-use checking, delivery verification, follow-up monitoring and information-sharing as the means by which the risks and consequences of diversion can be minimised. Member States must stop regarding post-transfer controls as a nonessential extra in the arms transfer control regime. Instead, they should be seen as part of a virtuous transfer-control circle – measures taken after items are transferred can be used to better inform assessment of subsequent licence applications.120

S – harmonizationHarmonization makes enforcement successful GAO 2011 (“Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for U.S. Military Equipment” https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a552761.pdf) mba-alb

To close gaps in the implementation of end-use monitoring programs in the Gulf countries that may limit the ability of DOD and State to adequately safeguard defense articles upon their arrival, storage, and eventual use in those countries, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State take steps to harmonize their approaches to end-use monitoring for NVDs to ensure that they receive equal levels of protection regardless of how they are obtained by foreign recipients. Such steps might include developing a plan or schedule for how and when each department’s end-use monitoring approaches would be harmonized. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: • develop guidance requiring DOD officials to document their efforts to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive equipment and their activities to monitor less sensitive equipment, and • obtain from the UAE government an NVD compliance plan, as required under the conditions of sale through FMS, or develop an appropriate response. We further recommend that the Secretary of State take two actions to issue policies and procedures that: • provide guidance to Compliance Specialists regarding when to request embassy personnel to conduct postshipment checks, and when to close checks, and • stipulate that when postshipment checks are requested, U.S. embassy personnel should conduct site visits to end-users to physically verify compliance with conditions associated with an export license. To reduce the risk that U.S.-funded equipment may be used by violators of human rights in the Gulf countries, we recommend that the Secretary of State implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of U.S.-funded equipment.

S – fundingBudget constraints are the reason for unenforcement - the cp solves Jessica K. Eddy 5-13-14 –JD candidate, George Mason University School of Law (“Re-focusing Export Control: A Review of the Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative and Suggestions for the Future” http://citba.org/documents/2013-JessicaEddy.pdf) mba-alb

e. End-Use and End-User Monitoring Requirements Are Insufficient Both ITAR and EARs attempt to curtail the transfer of sensitive technologies through end-use monitoring requirements. Technologies transferred under ITAR may not be used for unauthorized purposes and the receiving party must agree not to re-transfer title or possession of such defense articles or services.81 The ITAR end-use and end-user requirements for exported items controlled under the USML are monitored under the Blue Lantern Program, which reviews the end-use of defense articles, defense services, and brokering

activities exported through commercial channels. 82 While the Blue Lantern program does make strides to monitor the enduse of those technologies most vulnerable to exploitation, it is a resource constrained program.83 In 2012, the Blue Lantern Program on a budget of $2.1 million was only able to initiate 820 checks on end-use and was only able to close 706 cases out of the 86,000 license applications received for the same year.84 This means that less than 1% of the most sensitive technologies exported from the United States were verified to be compliant with end-use and end-user requirements.85

The EARs is similarly littered with prohibitions on end-use and end-users and restrictions on re-transfer to third parties.86 Despite these restrictions, enforcement of end-use monitoring is often non-existent. For example, Congressional hearings after the Gulf War revealed that of the 771 export licenses granted for Iraq, only one was ever checked for its end-use to ensure it was eing utilized for civilian purposes.87 A former Chairman of the House Oversight Committee complained the “Commerce Department issues licenses for commodities not knowing if the goods are what they purport to be; ever reach their intended destination; or are used for the stated legitimate purpose.”88 He further noted certificates not to re-export are “little more than paper salve to the conscience of the government and U.S. corporations” and do little to prevent the retransfer to sensitive technologies.89 The lack of monitoring under the ITAR and EARs undermines the objectives of each regulation. Exported sensitive technologies are easily being converted into destructive devices that threat U.S. nation security interests.90 Partner and allied nations that do not enforce U.S. end-use monitoring requirements are oftentimes found to be the suppliers of otherwise controlled U.S. technologies.91 Without a strong mechanism to ensure end-use and end-user monitoring, the United States effort to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies to global bad actors is compromised.

S - enforcementMore enforcement solvesJessica K. Eddy 5-13-14 –JD candidate, George Mason University School of Law (“Re-focusing Export Control: A Review of the Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative and Suggestions for the Future” http://citba.org/documents/2013-JessicaEddy.pdf) mba-alb

iii. Enhancing End-Use and End-User Monitoring and Enforcement New legislation must also ensure the SECA has strong oversight and enforcement authority. From an administrative standpoint, a SECA allows a streamlined opportunity to track exported items and technologies. The SECA would be responsible for tracking the life cycle of a technology export from licensing application through end-use and end-user monitoring. This would create records from a technology transfer to be housed in one place in one system. This consolidation will make end-use and end-user monitoring easier to track and enforce. To that end, Congress must ensure strong enforcement provisions for the SECA. The new SECA must have investigative authority to query end users about the whereabouts and use of controlled technologies. End-users who fail to comply with the SECA’s follow-up inquires must be subject to various levels of legislatively-approved sanctions, including but not limited to warning letters, watch lists, exclusions from end-use of certain technologies, ineligibility for military sale, and suspension or cancellation of contracts, and possibly sanctions. The SECA must have the responsibility for monitoring and reporting to Congress on multiple export control offenders . It should also make recommendations to Congress for further legislative sanctions if it is found that an allied or partner nation are not abiding by the terms of end-use and end-user restrictions against third-party transfers. The SECA recommendations should include country monitoring to identifying systemic issues, removing STA exemption eligibly, or sanctions for repeat end-use and end-user violations. Congressional action to overhaul the current export control regime by legislatively creating a SECA, SECL, and enhanced end-use and end-monitoring controls will ensure export control accomplishes the objectives of protecting national security and technological superiority. Moreover, these reforms taken at a Congressional level will ensure the overhaul to export control regulations has the longevity and authorization necessary to be effective in the long term. In addition to these legislative efforts, Congress should support enhancing export controls globally. This support can be accomplished by Congress supporting enactment of additional Defense Trade Treaties and ratifying the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (UN Arms Trade Treaty).

S - US keyUS is keyWilliam D. Hartung 3-7-01 -- director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute. (“Report: The Role Of U.S. Arms Transfers In Human Rights Violations- World Policy Institute – Research Project” https://worldpolicy.org/report-the-role-of-u-s-arms-transfers-in-human-rights-violations-world-policy-institute-research-project/) mba-alb

As the leading arms supplier – and as the world’s oldest, most widely respected democracy – the United States has a special obligation to set strict standards about the kinds of governments that receive U.S. weaponry. If we don’t do it, no other nation will. As Jimmy Carter put it in 1976, “we cannot have it

both ways. We can’t be both the world’s leading champion of peace and the world’s leading supplier of arms.”[3] I have been working on the issue of U.S. arms transfers since the late 1970s, when the Carter administration’s policies of promoting human rights and arms transfer restraint were beginning to give way to allegedly more “realistic,” hardline policies. Under the guise of strengthening longstanding allies like the Shah of Iran and winning over former adversaries like the People’s Republic of China, the Carter administration walked away from its commitment to reduce the United States role as the world’s leading arms merchant.[4] More than twenty years later, I believe more strongly than ever that when it comes to arming human rights abusers, the self-appointed “realists” are the ones who are living in a dream world, while the advocates of restricting arms exports to repressive regimes are the ones who are grounded in reality. From Iran to Indonesia, and from

Central America to the Congo, our nation’s role as the world’s leading arms merchant has done far more harm than good. Using arms sales as a way to win friends and intimidate adversaries has not only fostered serious human rights abuses in the recipient nations; it has also undermined U.S. interests by spreading instability and fueling conflict.[5] It’s time to make human rights the primary consideration in U.S. arms sales decision-making, not just one factor among many. We need to move beyond the point where, on issues of national security concern, human rights considerations are routinely cast aside in favor of more pressing, “pragmatic” concerns. At the dawn of a new millennium, in the first few months of a new administration and a new Congress, it is time to take a serious look at the impact of U.S. arms sales on human rights with an eye

towards changing our arms sales policies for the better. It is my hope that today’s hearings will be an important step in that process. U.S. Policy: Rhetoric Meets Reality On paper, the United States probably has the best laws anywhere on the issue of arms exports. On arms and human rights, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act mandates that “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” On arms and aggression, Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act authorizes provision of U.S. military equipment and training only for purposes of internal security, “legitimate self-defense,” or participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations or other operations consistent

with the U.N. charter.[6] In practice, U.S. arms transfer policy diverges sharply from these sound principles of human rights and non-aggression. Nearly six years ago, in one of the first major research reports produced by my project, U.S. Weapons at War, we took a look at just how large the gap between rhetoric and reality is in U.S. arms transfer policy. I won’t bore you with all the details, but I will cite some of the relevant findings: In the ten years from 1986 to 1995, the United States had delivered $42 billion worth of armaments to parties to 45 ongoing conflicts. Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts under way during 1993/94 90 percent of them – 45 out of 50 – involved forces that had received U.S. weaponry or military technology in the period leading up to the conflict. In a painful demonstration of the “boomerang effect,” U.S. arms or U.S. military technology found its way into the hands of U.S. adversaries in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. In addition, a significant portion of the $6 billion in covert U.S. arms and training that went to Afghan rebel groups in the 1980s was funneled to right-wing Islamic fundamentalist forces that have utilized these resources to attack U.S. allies and U.S. citizens.[7]

S - one countryModeling is true even though the CP only applies to one countryDaniel R. Mahanty and Eric Eikenberry 12-5-18 -- Daniel R. Mahanty is the director of the U.S. program at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Prior to joining CIVIC, Dan spent 16 years at the U.S. Department of State. In 2012, he created and led the Office of Security and Human Rights in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Eric Eikenberry is the director of policy & advocacy at the Yemen Peace Project(“How the “Arms Sales Oversight Act” Could Prevent American Arms from Contributing to the Next Overseas Crisis” https://www.justsecurity.org/61719/arms-sales-oversight-act-prevent-american-arms-contributing-overseas-crisis/) mba-alb

By correcting this imbalance, H.R. 7080 will open another avenue to ending U.S. enabling of other governments’ gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Nowhere is this avenue more needed than for Yemen’s internationalized civil war. There, parties to the conflict routinely conduct indiscriminate attacks on civilians and have created a humanitarian crisis that has pushed millions to the brink of starvation. Yet, it is Saudi Arabia and the UAE, using U.S.-manufactured weapons and logistical support, that have caused the majority of the conflict’s recorded civilian casualties. Causing further concern, a new documentary aired by Deutsche Welle, presents credible evidence that the coalition states have diverted U.S.-manufactured armored vehicles to unaccountable non-state militias. Admittedly, the Senate has rarely made a serious

attempt to block an arms sale by resolution of disapproval, but support for exercising greater Congressional oversight over arms sales seems to be on the rise. And even when a resolution of disapproval fails to pass, mere consideration of the legislation can send clear signals to the executive branch and recipient countries alike, and can stimulate valuable policy debate. While S.J. Res. 39, a 2016 effort to block tank sales to Saudi Arabia, mustered 27 votes, S.J. Res. 42, a June 2017 measure to freeze a sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia, garnered 47. The administration has not moved forward with a further sale of as many as 120,000 precision munitions to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE due to Senate opposition; the weapons’ traceable serial numbers, as damning as “made in the USA” stickers, could embroil the United States in further strikes on buses, hospitals, and homes. While the threat of unicameral opposition has worked for now, the reforms advanced by H.R. 7080 would further increase the chances for debate on arms sales in the Congress, and create a more efficient path for the House and Senate to indefinitely arrest a sale. Had the procedures outlined in H.R. 7080 been in place in June 2017, H.J. Res. 102 (the House companion to S.J. Res. 42), could have forced a vote on a motion to discharge instead of dying quietly in committee, creating a debate that, as it did on the Senate side, swayed

moderate offices against the sale and focused a news cycle on U.S. complicity in Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians. While the most recent and egregious example, Yemen is not the only case where enhanced Congressional oversight is necessary to add reasonable constraints to the arms sales process. By some credible estimates, the United States sells arms, including bombs and missiles, to at least 62 countries that are an active party to a conflict. Some countries to whom the United States sells arms, such as Bahrain and Egypt, have

demonstrated a consistent pattern of human rights violations; others present a very clear risk of misuse or diversion, or even the potential for mass atrocities. And some countries with lower levels of capacity simply require a greater degree of due diligence to ensure equipment can be used appropriately. If H.R. 7080 makes it more likely that Congress could exercise more meaningful oversight in even a handful of these cases, the risk of U.S. complicity in human rights abuses or the next humanitarian disaster, wherever it is, could be meaningfully diminished – and at minimal opportunity cost. H.R. 7080 does not have to become law this Congress to have an impact – advocates should view it as an organizing tool around which to rally, and that could ease the way to reforms small and large which can check the executive’s nearly unfettered prerogative to sell weapons to any regime, regardless of their crimes. To begin, H.R. 7080 does not have to pass for next year’s House to respect its provisions as an intra-chamber rule:

regardless of eventual passage, Democratic leadership should open this procedural path to the floor for joint resolutions of disapproval as a matter of course. Furthermore, if H.R. 7080 is reintroduced in the 116thCongress, it should be resurfaced alongside a host of measures to strengthen Congress’s hand in overall arms export policy. These can include requiring detailed and unclassified answers from the departments of State and Defense concerning the likelihood that a sale of certain items will exacerbate armed conflict or spur an arms race (theoretically a judgment the executive already makes under AECA) and outlining robust processes for monitoring the way weapons’ are used among recipients with a history of rights violations or violations of the laws of armed conflict, and those for which the indicators suggest a high risk of future violations. Congress should also consider lowering notification thresholds, so that members can vet arms sales valued at less than $50 million. The time is also long past for Congress to unequivocally clarify that the Leahy Law applies to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), thereby prohibiting State and Defense from permitting the transfer or maintenance of defense articles to security forces that have committed unconscionable human rights violations with impunity. There is no simple trick to ending the devastation yielded by the war and intervention in Yemen, which has directly killed at least 57,000, contributed to the further deaths of tens of thousands of children per year from preventable causes, and threatened 14 million with famine. Yet without a congressional freeze on weapons to the coalition states, there will never be enough political space for peace negotiations to take root. So long as short-term profit motive driving executive branch arms sales policy supersedes a reasonable modicum of self-restraint, the Congress, and H.R. 7080 present the best opportunity to limit the risk that American weapons will be involved in – or aggravate – both Yemen’s catastrophe and the next humanitarian crisis.

AT pdbThe counterplan is mutually exclusive --- it’s impossible to reduce and monitor arms that are never sold in the first place.

If they get the perm, it doesn’t solve.

FIRST --- visible enforcement --- arms have to be sold in order for them to be diverted. Only the process of sale, diversion and high-profile enforcement cause other purchasers to internally reform against diversionWaltz 7 – PhD, professor of public policy @ UM (Susan, “US Policy on Small Arms Transfers: A Human Rights Perspective,” Working Paper 43, https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2007/43-waltz-2007_rev.pdf)//BB

The question of who should receive US weapons has been viewed primarily as a foreign policy matter , and the State Department has been assigned principal responsibility for overseeing the approval of authorized arms deals. Full responsibility for the broad policy on small arms transfers, however, is shared by several cabinet level offices, including the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury as well as Department of State. Congressional authority and oversight for implementing programs is exercised through the House and Senate Appropriations committees, the Armed Forces committees, and the International Relations committees—and various subcommittees. More than a dozen quasi-independent agencies are involved in the oversight and enforcement of the policy and its implementing framework, with nearly as many distinct programs. It is only in reviewing the array of these programs that the principled policy can be fully appreciated. To facilitate that task, I have drawn on the descriptive framework employed by Richard Grimmett in a 2006 background paper on US small arms policy prepared for members of the US Congress. As a publication of the bi-partisan Congressional Research Service, this presentation can be viewed as a quasi-official view of current policy. Grimmett describes US policy as a multi-pronged approach with four principal objectives: • Efforts to curb black market or unauthorized transfers of small arms to zones of conflict, to terrorists, to international criminal organizations, and to drug traffickers • Attempt to raise the arms export standards of other nations to US standards • Streamline and strengthen US export procedures to improve accountability without interfering with the legal trade in and transfer of arm0073 • Support the destruction of excess stockpiles of small arms, particularly in regions where conflicts have ended.18 In the numbered sections below, programs that relate to each of these four objectives are discussed

in turn. 1. Curbing Black Market Transfers The first element in the multi-pronged policy as outlined in Grimmett’s CRS

report involves efforts to curb black market or unauthorized transfers of small arms to zones of conflict, to terrorists, to international criminal organizations, and to drug traffickers. Programs to implement this prong of

the policy range from criminal prosecutions and law enforcement actions to end-use monitoring and training programs for industry compliance. This is the most complex aspect of the policy and as shown in Table 1, responsibility for implementation is shared by five key agencies. Most of the illegal traffic in weapons across US borders is in the outbound direction. Although US Customs and Border Patrol have occasionally intercepted small arms at or near import checkpoints,19 the most serious concern extends from military weapons and defense articles procured in the US or US territories and intended for illegal export abroad. Agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the new Immigration Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) housed in the Department of Homeland Security regularly intercept and prosecute arms deals involving light weapons. In 2006, for example, ICE agents foiled a plot to export scores of state-of-the-art firearms, machine guns, sniper rifles and surface-to-air missiles to Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.20 Illicit commodities are often trafficked together, and it is not unusual for enforcement actions to draw in agencies that are not usually responsible for arms trafficking cases, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).21 In some cases, the ATF’s National Tracing Center may also be asked to assist with international criminal investigations through crime gun analysis and its ability to track the movement of US-origin firearms.22 Over a two-year period in the late 1990’s, more than 150 cases investigated by ATF involved international small arms trafficking.23 The law enforcement powers of these various agencies are supplemented by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which has authority under the Emergency Economic Powers Act to freeze foreign assets under US jurisdiction. In April 2005, for example, OFAC froze the assets of four individuals and 30 companies linked to Russian arms trafficker Victor Bout.24 In addition to enforcement mechanisms designed to stop criminal activity, the US has developed programs to survey and track legitimate end-use of

defense items sold under commercial contract or supplied directly through government-to-government deals. Statutes impose constraints on both the immediate end-user and eventual re-transfer of items on the Munitions List, and if sufficient warning signs are triggered, transactions may be subject to close scrutiny and sanction. Since 1990 the DDTC has run an inspection program for commercial sales known as Blue Lantern,25 and in 2001, after a highly critical report from the US General Accounting Office prompted Congressional intervention,26 the

Department of Defense launched a similar program, dubbed Golden Sentry. Although neither program focuses primarily on small arms, the Blue Lantern program is required by statute to include among its priorities weapons that can be easily diverted, and Golden Sentry includes surveillance of shoulder-fired Stingers. 27 From 2002-2004, Blue Lantern checks resulted in 52 unfavorable “determinations” involving small arms. A full 80% of these incidents concerned arms destined for Latin American countries--with Bolivia heading the list--but clients in Switzerland, UK, Canada and Israel were also found suspect.28 The Blue Lantern

program rarely investigates more than 1% of all commercial transactions, 29 but well publicized and specific results have earned it considerable respect abroad.30 In some cases, DDTC inquiries have led importing countries to impose their own sanctions or restrictions .31 Enforcement efforts and dramatic arrests naturally draw the most attention , but to curb black market activity, the US actually places greatest emphasis on preventive actions and voluntary compliance. As both a punitive measure and a preventive tool to discourage illicit deals, agencies within the State Department and Commerce Department collaborate to maintain and publicize lists of parties who are debarred or otherwise restricted from trade in defense or dual-use commodities. The DDTC screens export license applications against a watchlist that in 2006

included more than 130,000 foreign and domestic individuals and companies, and it also maintains a publicly accessible list of embargoed countries.32 The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) gathers in one site a set of six lists for exporters to check to ensure that their transactions do not include parties debarred under ITAR provisions or are otherwise restricted from the trade in defense or dual-use commodities.

Visible enforcement in this case is key to global deterrence of diversion Eric L. Hirschhorn 2015 -- former Under Secretary for Industry and Security United States Department of Commerce (“Bureau of Industry and Security Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2015 “ https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/policy-guidance/1389-bis-annual-report-2015/file) mba-alb

Enforcement is an essential aspect of the BIS mission. Enforcement efforts encourage compliance, prevent and deter violations, disrupt illicit activities, and bring violators to justice. BIS achieves these important objectives through a law enforcement program focused on parties engaged in the export of sensitive commodities, software, and technology to end uses, end users, and destinations of concern.

SECOND --- predictable enforcement --- the perm means that the USFG cuts off arms before ____ is found non-compliant --- that shreds any perception of fairness and credibility of the EUM process. No other country will internally reform because they don’t think they’ll be given a fair trial.Eric L. Hirschhorn 5-19-14 – former Under Secretary for Industry and Security United States Department of Commerce (“Remarks of Under Secretary Eric L. Hirschhorn at the Export Control Reform Workshop, Colorado Springs, CO” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/89-about-bis/newsroom/speeches) mba-alb

Today, four years later, we have converted many of our objectives into concrete regulations. With a few exceptions, the U.S. Munitions List (USML) is being made into a positive list that controls only items that provide the United States with a significant military or intelligence advantage. Militarily less sensitive items such as parts and components have been and continue to be transferred from the licensing jurisdiction of State to that of Commerce. License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) provides flexible and refined licensing

arrangements for trade with and among close allies. Enhanced compliance and enforcement measures create effective safeguards to deter diversion and misuse of controlled items . Although the government must make the final call on what is in our

foreign policy and national security interests, our rules need to be transparent and predictable so that you—the manufacturing and

exporting community—can be reliable, predictable, and successful exporters . II. Efficiency As I stated at the 2010 Update Conference,

the success of ECR rests on two fundamental principles: (1) the rules should be transparent and predictable ; and (2) we must have streamlined processes and higher fences to control sensitive items appropriately while facilitating exports of less sensitive items to destinations and end users that do not pose substantial national security, proliferation, foreign policy, human rights, or similar concerns. To review briefly, we began the United States Munitions List (USML) review process in 2010, and that process has resulted in the removal, as far as we could, of the basket categories that until now have accounted for about half of the 85,000 licenses issued annually by the Department of State. Military items that do not warrant continued control on the USML are becoming subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the new "600 series" controls on the Commerce Control List (CCL). At the risk of repeating myself, transferring items to the licensing jurisdiction of the CCL is not a decontrol. We made these changes because Commerce's regulations allow for country-based license exceptions as well as distinctions based on the technical parameters of an item. This is important because the EAR enable the government to "right-size" controls on less sensitive military items, such as parts and components for a military vehicle, that are destined for our country's allies and other multilateral control partners. Commerce and State have published final rules covering controls on 15 categories of the CCL and USML. Commerce also published in April 2013 a transition rule describing how items previously controlled by the ITAR are dealt with under the EAR. In January 2013, President Obama signed legislation restoring his authority to determine the appropriate export controls for satellites and related items. The May 2014 Commerce and State final satellite rules will transfer many items to the CCL, including commercial communications and lower performing remote sensing satellites, ground control systems, and radiation-hardened microelectronics formerly controlled in Category XV of the ITAR. The radiation-hardened microelectronics portions of the rules took effect June 27. The rest of the rules will take effect November 10. Turning to military electronics, the July 1, 2014 Commerce and State rules add to the CCL certain military electronics equipment and related articles formerly controlled by USML Category XI, plus certain cryogenic and superconductive equipment that have been controlled by "catch-all" provisions of the ITAR. The addition of software and technology for certain wing folding systems to Commerce ECCNs took effect on the date of publication. The other provisions of Commerce rule will be effective on December 30, 2014. Commerce also published on July 1st a notice requesting information about civil end uses of microwave monolithic integrated circuit, or MMIC, power amplifiers, as well as certain microwave transistors that will be controlled as "600-series" items. The results of the massive list review exercise, including the satellite and electronics rules, provide exporters with a number of benefits, including: • vastly improved interoperability with our closest friends and allies; • availability of 25% de minimis treatment to non-embargoed destinations, which should go far toward accomplishing Defense Secretary Gates's instruction to reduce incentives for non-U.S. companies to design out or avoid U.S.-origin content and services; • eligibility for various license exceptions, notably License Exceptions STA, GOV (for certain government end users), and RPL (for replacement parts); • elimination, in many cases, of the requirement for Manufacturing License Arrangements and Technical Assistance Agreements—though we continue to control releases of technology through simpler BIS authorizations; • ability to apply for a license before a purchase order has been received; • elimination of registration requirements; • elimination of defense service controls, though again, we continue to control releases of technology in other, simpler ways; • elimination of brokering constraints for less sensitive military items, though we still control the transfer of the items themselves; and • no registration or licensing fees. Many satellite and electronics items that have been transferred to Commerce will be eligible for License Exception STA, which permits the export of certain items to 36 allied and friendly countries. STA in effect established a license-free zone to cover the first transaction while creating new

safeguards to ensure that items are not diverted outside the designated country group and the designated end users within that group. III. Education and compliance A core principle for our export control system is ensuring an informed regulated commun ity. Neither you nor we can reap the benefits of ECR without ensuring that the regulated community understands and complies with the rules. The list review rules strengthen our national security. They also assist you—our manufacturing and exporting community—by making it easier to market to our closest friends and allies. There is no free lunch, however, and ECR increases your compliance responsibilities. A more nuanced export control system means a more complex system. We could have a simpler system that maintains controls on virtually everything. But the price for removing some license requirements is greater nuance and greater reliance upon exporters to see to compliance. We in BIS are few in number. We rely on industry as the front line in educating not only internally, but also externally—the supplier base, and where practicable, the customer base as well. The keys to successful compliance include internal coordination—How has your company developed and coordinated its internal ECR planning, ranging from the training of staff, to reclassifying products, to revamping your IT compliance tools? A second key is communication—How have you engaged and trained your supplier base and your customers? If you are a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign owned company, what compliance training and processes are you providing to your foreign parent? Finally, have you engaged in early collaboration with the U.S. Government to address complex cases or instances where you may have violated our rules? Since 2010, we have been working hard to get the word out. BIS provides comprehensive outreach services to exporters, ranging from seminars, to online interactive tools, to weekly teleconferences, to one-on-one exporter counselling. Notwithstanding fiscal austerity, the Bureau conducted more than 200 ECR-related outreach activities during FY 2013, including weekly interactive teleconferences, open to all, that are conducted by Assistant Secretary Kevin Wolf. As we continue to implement ECR, we will offer training materials, conduct webinars, and undertake related actions, including the possibility of conducting joint outreach to your foreign partners. It is imperative, though, that you play an important role in educating your employees, suppliers, and customer base. We are continuing to expand our public education effort, including developing partnerships with non-profit educational groups representing defense exporters, many of which are small and medium-sized enterprises. Many of the items transferring from the USML to the CCL are manufactured by small businesses. The Bureau is committed to helping our nation's business, particularly small businesses, reach their commercial potential while respecting U.S. national security. On Thursday, representatives from the Small Business

Administration and the Minority Business Development Agency will participate in the Roundtable sessions on exporting and small business. IV. Enforcement The enhancement of our export compliance and enforcement capabilities is essential to the success of ECR . We

are coordinating interagency efforts to conserve finite resources, increase our visibility into foreign parties of concern, provide more clarity to exporters on how to address red flags, and continue a layered approach to verifying compliance. In response to current events and to concerns that you have voiced to us, we will present a cyber threat panel this morning comprising government leaders from various cyber disciplines. They are here to explain the evolving threat posed to the United States, as well as to discuss resources that are available to help defend against those threats. Tomorrow afternoon Assistant Secretary David Mills will discuss in depth the evolution of the Office of Export Enforcement and the Office of Enforcement Analysis into a sophisticated law enforcement agency, with criminal investigators and enforcement analysts collaborating with our licensing officers to identify and act upon violations. We have created the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2) and the Information Triage Unit (ITU). The E2C2 ensures that export enforcement agencies talk to one another and share relevant information, while the ITU facilitates the review of license applications by compiling, coordinating, and reporting intelligence about foreign parties. Last December, BIS published a final rule that strengthens the Unverified List (UVL) by increasing U.S. Government visibility into transactions involving foreign parties whose bona fides BIS has been unable to verify. We amended the regulations to (1) require exporters to file an Automated Export System record for exports involving a party listed on the UVL, and (2) suspend the availability of license exceptions for parties listed on the UVL. In June, BIS added 29 persons to the UVL; BIS could not verify their bona fides because an end-use check could not be completed satisfactorily. BIS is continuing the layered approach to verifying compliance with License Exception STA. The review of AES data, exporter, and consignee records, plus some

on-site document reviews, has resulted in a high degree of compliance with the provisions of STA. We will continue to review STA transactions to guard against misuse. Finally, it is important to repeat that in our enforcement, we are trying to focus on truly bad actors , not those who have a decent compliance program, make a mistake, and work with us to remedy the situation. V. The Export Control Reform Box Score What have been the results of the ECR national security investment to date? Between October 15, 2013 and July 27th of this year, the number of Commerce-specific ECR exports related to "600 series" items has reached 29,000, with a value of $1 billion. BIS's Munitions Control Division has processed more than 5000 licenses with an average processing time of 15.3 days. Exporters now can use STA and other license exceptions to facilitate exports to key allies. STA has been used for more than 3700 transactions. Exporters also have used other license exceptions such as RPL, GOV, and Temporary Exports for an additional 7800 transactions. The benefits include: • timely exports to key defense allies; • no unexpected license provisos or conditions; • lower Defense Department acquisition and research costs; • enhanced U.S. and partner affordability throughout the product life cycle; and • reduction of the licensing burden for exporters. The statistics I've cited will continue to grow as additional CCL categories become eligible for "600 series" licensing treatment and/or license exceptions, and as existing State Department licenses for these items are used up or expire. VI. Other ECR Activities We have made significant progress but more work remains to be done. In the past year, working closely with the Department of Defense, BIS has made significant progress in converting the interagency aspects of its export licensing from our thirty year-old ECASS I.T. system to the Department of Defense's USXPORTS system. As you may recall, the President directed that as part of the ECR initiative, all U.S. Government agencies involved in export licensing join USXPORTS. We have started the important late stage of this effort known as end-to-end testing, and I'm hopeful that all work will be completed within the next few months. VII. Conclusion The success of paradigm-changing initiatives such as ECR does not occur overnight. Rather, it takes place in stages, much as a large building is constructed starting with the foundation. Together, we have built the foundation for a 21st Century export control system, establishing a ground floor of efficient regulations that allow you—the

exporters—to make use of Commerce Department licenses and license exceptions with appropriate compliance safeguards. Now we must complete the higher floors by focusing on education and compliance to facilitate implementation of our rules. We look forward to your

insights and questions. Thank you for your continuing partnership and your participation in this conference.

That mixed signal fails to produce meaningful reforms in other purchasersSwedlund 17 (Haley Swedlund is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM) at the Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. Her research is situated at the intersection of international political economy, development and conflict studies, "Analysis," Washington Post, 7-19-2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/19/theres-another-big-reason-u-s-foreign-aid-is-important-it-helps-us-get-what-we-want/)(Shiv)

Predictable foreign aid is important

My research on foreign aid diplomacy suggests that there is yet another reason we should care about the proposed cuts. Here’s why: Unpredictability and volatility in foreign aid undermines the ability of donor officials to lobby for changes in recipient countries. In a new book, “The Development Dance: How Donors and Recipients

Negotiate the Delivery of Foreign Aid,” I argue that aid is about bargaining and diplomacy. Contrary to popular conception, aid is not a unilateral gift. Foreign aid requires, in President Trump’s words, the “art of the deal.” But diplomacy is not like the real estate business. To get the best deal, you need to be predictable . For this study, I interviewed more than 150 donor and recipient-government officials working in four countries: Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. I also carried out a survey of high-ranking donor officials working in 20 countries across sub-Saharan Africa. What development practitioners told me is that donors get leverage with recipient governments by being able to make promises to deliver aid. The more credible donor promises are perceived to be, the more leverage donors get. Recipient governments do not just passively receive aid but rather actively attempt to manage their foreign aid donors. They pay attention to how predictable and consistent donors are with their aid dollars , preferring to work with donor agencies that keep their word and deliver what they promised. In all four countries, there are aid units within the ministry of finance whose sole job is to dialogue with donors, manage aid funds and represent the government’s interests with donors. In Rwanda, this government unit produces annual reports on the performance of individual donors — an attempt to shame agencies into upholding

their commitments. Aid recipients and donor agencies actively negotiate aid contracts Politicians in donor countries determine how much foreign aid a particular country gets. But donor agencies like USAID are responsible for delivering that aid. In exchange for aid dollars, donor officials ask recipients to make changes like implementing anti-corruption programs, establishing an independent electoral commission or overhauling the country’s primary education system. This requires donor officials to negotiate with recipient governments over how and under what conditions aid will be delivered. In Ghana, for example, the United States promised up to $498.2 million to support the country’s power sector over a five-year period. In return, the government of Ghana committed to

invest at least $37.4 million of its own money. The government also promised to implement a series of changes seen as necessary to improve the country’s power sector and encourage private sector investment. Aid dollars stimulated these promises. My research tells us that credible promises give donor officials a stronger bargaining position with recipient governments. If a donor agency is not able to keep its side of the bargain, why should the recipient? U.S. credibility is at stake That’s why drastic cuts in aid will hurt the U.S.’s ability to keep its promises to countries like Ghana. Retracting aid promises will discourage recipients from upholding their side of the bargain. It will also undermine the U.S.’s credibility in future negotiations. African governments like Ghana increasingly have access to financing from “nontraditional” donors like China. Just last month, Ghana signed a $10 billion memorandum of understanding with the Chinese to develop the country’s bauxite industry. Chinese financial assistance should not yet be seen as a replacement to traditional aid. Chinese aid is concentrated in the productive sectors (infrastructure, agriculture and mining) and mainly goes to Chinese companies. In contrast, traditional aid is more likely to go directly to recipient governments and supports social sectors like health and education. My conversations with government officials, however, suggest that some African governments see Chinese aid as more credible than

assistance from traditional Western donors. This puts even more pressure on traditional donors to offer credible promises of aid to recipient governments. My research tells us that uncertainty in foreign aid negotiations undermines the ability of USAID to lobby for things including democratic overhauls, increased transparency and economic policy that are in the U.S. national interest. This should matter to a president interested in making deals that benefit the American people . To get the best possible deal for our aid dollars, the assistance needs to be given in a predictable way.

AT pdcpThe perm severs --- that’s a voting issue.

1---Reduce --- the counterplan doesn’t reduce, it a reform that includes a punishment that could not be imposed. That’s a ‘change of terms’ not a reduction.Supreme Court of Missouri 73 – (State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, Lexis)//BB

"* * * The fact that this section relates solely to appropriation bills, in conjunction with the word 'reduce,' indicates clearly that the expression 'items or parts of items' refers to separable fiscal units. They are appropriations of sums of money. Power is conferred upon the Governor to reduce a sum of money appropriated, or to disapprove the appropriation entirely.

No power is conferred to change the terms of an appropriation except by reducing the amount thereof. Words or phrases are not 'items or parts of items.' This principle applies to the condition [**14]

attached to the appropriation now in question. That condition is not an item or a part of an item. The veto power conferred upon the Governor was designed to enable him to recommend the striking out or reduction of any item or part of an item. In the present instance His Excellency the Governor did not undertake to veto the appropriation of $100,000 made by item 101, or any part of it, nor to reduce that amount or any part of it apportioned to a specific purpose. He sought, rather, as shown by his message, to enlarge the appropriation made by the General Court by throwing the $100,000 into a common fund to be used for any one of several different purposes. We are of opinion that the power conferred upon him by said article 63 does not extend to the removal of restrictions imposed upon the use of the items appropriated."

2---Should --- it requires a mandatory reductionNieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"S hould" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation , propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word

in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an

imperative, obligatory sense . HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the

Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have

squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be

misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)

(finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or

obligation and not discretion . In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the

word " should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that

the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word " should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two

words have the same meaning . State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation . McNutt v.

McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

If anything, it’s a future reduction, which also violates ‘should’Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti .14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the

term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ( "should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or

immediately effective , as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

3---Substantial --- if it’s a future reduction then it’s insubstantialWords and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially

the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in

full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential , apparent, constructive,

and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain : absolute: real at present time , as a matter of fact, not merely nominal;

opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

4---Resolved --- it requires a firm decision AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about . 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.

And must be immediateRandom House 6 (Unabridged Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)

re·solve  Audio Help   /rɪˈzɒlv/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ri-zolv] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation verb, -solved, -solv·ing, noun –verb (used with object)

1. to come to a definite or earnest decision about ; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full.

If they are right about all of this, then kick the ‘explicit linkage’ plank of the CP --- the rest of the CP generates the will and momentum for criminal investigation and deters salesGRIP 2016 -- Group for Research and Information on Peace and security - independent research center created in 1979 and based in Brussels (Belgium) (“CONTAINING DIVERSION: GRIP REPORTS 2016/4 An Vranckx Arms end-use and post-delivery controls” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf) mba-alb For the purposes of this analysis, it appears instructive to consider this particular case of non-compliance with end-use documentation as an “unenvisaged” case of diversion. Such case needs to be distinguished from diversion operations that are designed with the

purpose to mislead licensing authorities, and that enable authorised arms exports to be transferred to unauthorised – often illicit - end-use and end-uses. However large the difficulty the U.S. State Department’s Blue Lantern would face to predict changes in the importer’s military policy, the programme is proving rather effective in detecting, and preventing, attempts to mislead the U.S. arms export control authority. Year after year it reports “unfavourable” findings of Blue Lantern checks that lead the requested licences to be denied, revoked or even passed on to criminal investigation . In the course of the years examined in Table 3, the “unfavourable rate” was also seen to diminish. Diligent scrutiny of end-use documentation is a key line of defence against the latter, more deceptive type of diversion scheme, where “such documents are effective only in the context of

a broader system that includes a thorough consideration of diversion risks at the licensing stage, the verification of end-user documentation, and complementary post-shipment controls”.38 In the Blue Lantern programme, information gleaned from each of these controls and verifications is additionally ensured to feed into a monitoring cycle, which revolves around an agile and well-maintained information system. The importance of that information cycle in effectively detecting and preventing diversion is something that export licensing authorities elsewhere might care to bear in mind.

AFF

ProblemsIf the US sets an unreasonably high standard, then why would any county ever assume they could meet it? They would think of the CP as just the same as the plan and not choose to internally reform.

If diversion is an inevitable component of every single sale ever, then that takes out the net-benefit because arms diversion is inevitable in every sale after the CP too.

The thesis of the net-benefit is that someone needs to be entrapped and imprisoned in a ‘high profile’ law enforcement case in order to justify doing the plan. That’s a problem.

If this CP is legitimate, then so is the CP that says ‘do the plan if the sun rises on the Monday after USMCA passes’ – it’s just a delay CP in disguise.

This CP always reduces, it makes that clear in the 1nc. So don’t buy any of the definitions on competition in the block.

Aff answers from the CP above apply (grey market, high now) --- but, go for perm/theory.

PermsPerm --- do the plan with the justification of diverted weapons. They’ve already diverted (based on the neg’s arg), so there’s no future diversion key arg.Perm --- do the plan and apply heightened EUM to other arms sales.Perm do the counterplan

Def’n – shouldShould expresses desirabilityCambridge Dictionary of American English 7(http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should*1+0&dict=A)

should (DUTY)auxiliary verb used to express that it is necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action of the following verb

Should describes what is probableOED 9Compact Oxford English Dictionary “should”, http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/should?view=ukshouldmodal verb (3rd sing. should) 1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness. 2 used to indicate what is probable . 3 formal expressing the conditional mood. 4 used in a clause with ‘that’ after a main clause describing feelings. 5 used in a clause with ‘that’ expressing purpose. 6 (in the first person) expressing a polite request or acceptance. 7 (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope.

Should isn’t mandatory Taylor and Howard 5 - Resources for the Future, Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa (Michael and Julie, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9/12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. The difference between shall and should may have legal significance—one is clearly mandatory while the other is a strong admonition—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

Should is permissive - it’s a persuasive recommendationWords and Phrases 2 (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 370)Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term “should,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

Should means desirable or recommended, not mandatoryWords and Phrases 2 (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 372-373)Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word “shall” instead of “should” was used, and word “should” did not appear to be result of inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word “should” was intended to convey idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended, but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq.----Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857

Should doesn’t mean immediate Dictionary.com 10Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/shouldshould    /ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement less direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of should Search should on the Web Origin: ME sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall —Can be confused:  could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). —Synonyms 3. See must1 . —Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions, would is the auxiliary

chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use for other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should (American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall . Shall –auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present plural shall; past singular 1st person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est, 3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive,

and participles lacking. 1. plan to, intend to, or expect to: I shall go later .

Def’n – substantialSubstantial has to be materiallyWords and Phrases 2 (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “Substantially,” Volume 40B, p. 448 October 2002, Thomson West)

Ala. 1909. “Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real ; * * * not seeming or imaginatary; not illusive; real; solid; true; veritable.” – Elder v. State, 50 So. 370, 162 Ala. 41.

Def’n – resolvedResolved means to express by formal vote--prefer it, it’s in the context of the resolution

Webster’s 98(Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, dictionary.com)

Resolved:¶ 5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no money).

No modelingNo modelling – US already has the best EUM policy but no one caresKerstin Vignard 2010 -- deputy director at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Since 2013, she has led UNIDIR’s work on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies. (“Arms Control Verification” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123093/2010-3_full.pdf) mba-albNot all governments require end users to certify that weapons will only be re-exported with the permission of the initial exporting authority. In many cases, once weapons are in a particular state, it is up to that state’s government to decide upon re-exports. Again, the United States has the strictest rules here, always insists on licensing re-exports even for the export of components of weapon systems.19 This policy has brought the United States in collision with other governments and the European Union , which objects to US control over components that are used in the assembly of weapons in Europe. This is part of a larger, controversial debate about the appropriateness of extraterritoriality provisions.20 There have been many cases of falsified end-user certificates. Arms dealers and brokers have supplied licensing authorities with documents bearing signatures of non-authorized persons and stating destinations that they know to be incorrect. At least in the past, there existed a black market for end-user certificates.21 State officials were willing to sign false end-user certificates against the payment of certain sums. A number of such false end-user certificates have been documented by experts monitoring arms embargoes. It is likely that most falsifications of end-user certificates go by unnoticed, since the widespread lack of end-user checks —except in the case of the United States—makes the detection of false end-use declarations largely dependent on chance. For example, authorities may perhaps obtain reports by NGOs, monitoring groups or journalists. End-user checks are difficult but not impossible to carry out, as the US example shows. They require a good legal basis, and staff with sufficient knowledge to inspect end use. Many states are unwilling to follow the United States’ lead to base end-use inspection in domestic law. An alternative would be to require exporters to make the right of on-site inspection by representatives from the exporting state a part of the arms transfer contract. This also requires that governments reserve the right to licence re-exports of arms

Diversion inevitableGeopolitics means arm sales remain GRIP 2016 -- Group for Research and Information on Peace and security - independent research center created in 1979 and based in Brussels (Belgium) (“CONTAINING DIVERSION: GRIP REPORTS 2016/4 An Vranckx Arms end-use and post-delivery controls” http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/L-External-publications/2016/GRIP-2016-Containing-diversion.pdf) mba-alb A recent case where those limits are exceeded concerns deployment of U.S. supplied goods by Saudi Arabia’s armed forces. U.S. arms export control authorities must have had reasonable assurance as to the Saudi client’s capacity and willingness to comply with the end-use documentation of solely legitimate defensive use of the goods. If the Watch List led any red flags to be raised when the deal to supply such goods was in the making, and even if such flags would have led to visits in site, the final decision was to approve the arms transfer. However as of mid-2015, some such equipment has been used for offensive goals in operations, as a Saudi-led coalition began deploying against Houthi strongholds in Yemen. The deployments were found to be in violation of international humanitarian law. By 2016, the international Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) reliably documented Saudi deployment of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons (weapons that disperse canisters that release sub-munitions) in densely populated areas.37 CMC also revealed that “in recent years”, a Massachusetts-based company had obtained the licence from the U.S. government to supply these weapons to Saudi Arabia (and other recipient states that dispose of airborne means to deliver such weapons) under the strict condition not to use these weapons in

civilian areas. Non-compliance with these end-use conditions was established by CMC, not by Blue Lantern envoys. The U.S. export control agencies are nevertheless

presumed eager to sanction non-compliant end-users, in line with their mission, as well as within the legal framework that mandates their activities. No information is available that the U.S. export control system (be that the Blue Lantern, or “Golden Sentry” programme that concerns Foreign Military Sales of defence articles and services via government-to-government channels) is currently taking action to recall licences for further supplies to the Saudi armed forces, nor to recover the equipment that was transferred in the past, nor even to prevent further unauthorised deployments of the equipment. Proof of this unintended use would be expected to feed into the Blue Lantern monitoring cycle, and as such provide the U.S. export licensing authority with means to sanction this

particular violation of end-use conditions. These sanctions could become part of a broader and longer-term endeavour to limit the use of any transferred equipment to the specific importer and exporter agreed on at the time of licensing. Proven non-compliance with end-use documentation in one case is sure to be noted and recorded in the Blue Lantern monitoring cycle. Such records generate “flags” on its Watch List, and can impact decisions to authorise new export licences that identify the once-non-compliant party as the end-user. In this particular case, it is of note that Saudi armed forces hold a wide range of U.S.- supplied goods. This context makes the Saudi armed forces dependent on maintenance services and spare parts that the

relevant U.S. suppliers can continue to supply only if the U.S. export control authority approves licence requests to that end. This gives the U.S. arms export licensing system leverage to deny future licence requests. However, it would not seem certain that the leverage is effectively used. Geopolitical considerations and foreign policy choices may demand that the U.S. licensing authority refrains from refusing further licence applications. Unintended end-use of the cluster munition, as last documented

in February 2016, would appear likely to be downplayed by the fact that these same Saudi forces are a major ally in the U.S.-led airstrikes on Syria. The discussed case can serve here as a reminder that the situation in a recipient state may change. In Saudi Arabia, the context of possession and use of the goods evolved significantly over the past few years. In 2016 it no longer resembles the context that U.S. (and many other Western) arms transfer control authorities appraised in prior years, when they approved major export licences to Saudi Arabia. These same export control authorities may not come to the same decision about authorising transfer of the same goods and same end-user, if the latter were subject of a new export licence request. Transfer licences that were given at one time may be revoked, to prevent more transfers taking place under the same licence. But actual transfers authorised in the past when circumstances were different are difficult to undo. In all likelihood, the recipient at that time had intentions to use the goods in another way than a “defensive mode” recorded in the end-use documentation that the exporting country’s authorities had judged bona fide. The type of diversion in the documented case is one that takes transferred military goods “away from intended end-use” at an appreciable time after transfer. The diversion scheme, if there was one, could not possibly be anticipated nor detected at the time the decision was made to authorise that transfer.