What is it like to have a higher-order hallucination? Or, Must we get higher, just to

be conscious?

Morgan Wallhagen

Introduction

What are conscious states? According to some they are simply states one is conscious of having.

According to others they are states that make one conscious of something else. The former is the

higher-order theory of consciousness, the latter is the first-order theory of consciousness. I favor

the first-order theory and in this paper I attempt to explain why. After some preliminary

conceptual points and further elaboration of the two theories, I will develop a version of a

particularly powerful argument against the higher-order theory—I call it the problem of higher-

order hallucination. At least, most first-order theorists find it powerful. Strangely, higher-order

theorists seem quite unmoved by the argument. By examining the higher-order theorist’s reply to

the argument, I believe we find that first-order theorists and higher-order theorists are deeply

divided on how we ought to conceive of conscious states. They differ, as it were, on our starting

point for thinking about consciousness. Deciding among proposed starting points is no easy

matter, often relying on a host of very general considerations rather than rigorous argument. I

conclude with some such considerations in favor of a first-order conception of conscious states.

Transitive consciousness and state consciousness

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Before discussing the first-order and higher-order theories in detail, it will be helpful to

distinguish transitive consciousness (also sometimes called ‘creature consciousness’) from state

consciousness. Both theories make use of both notions and needless confusion ensues when one

doesn’t keep clear on them.

Bill is a participant in a psychology study. He is watching a video screen across which a number

of colored shapes move at various speeds. After the video ends, the psychologist asks him, “How

many green squares were you conscious of?” Bill replies, “Three, I think”. Bill reports being

conscious of three. In fact, there were five. Bill was unaware of two of them. Note that here we

attribute consciousness to the whole person, the subject, Bill. But we don’t just say that Bill is

conscious, or unconscious, full stop. We say further that Bill was aware of this, unaware of that.

Bill’s consciousness has, or fails to have, one or more objects. This is known as transitive

creature consciousness—following Rosenthal 1997 (hereafter, just ‘transitive consciousness’).

The word “awareness” is often used to denote this kind of consciousness, and is usually the more

natural term, especially when we are denying that a person was conscious of something. In such

cases we say someone was unaware of this or that. “Unconscious of” sounds odd. This kind of

consciousness seems to be a kind of relation between a subject and an object. The objects of

consciousness often are just that: objects, though most philosophers are willing to admit

properties and facts among the “objects” of consciousness too. For example, Bill might become

conscious of the fact that there were five green squares on the screen (not three) when the

psychologist tells him there were. He becomes aware that he was incorrect in thinking there were

three.

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Transitive consciousness is distinct, at least conceptually, from state consciousness. Most

philosophers, psychologists, and laypeople now think that some mental states are unconscious.

Amy, for instance, might have an unconscious pain that is causing her to limp ever so slightly.

She might also be having some unconscious thoughts, perhaps about some problem she’s

working on. At the same time, she might be having conscious visual experiences, auditory

experiences and so on. The form of consciousness that distinguishes Amy’s conscious

experiences and thoughts from her unconscious experiences and thoughts—if such there be—is

called mental state consciousness (hereafter, just ‘state consciousness’). This form of

consciousness is not a property of whole creatures or subjects, but of some of their states. And,

as my example was supposed to illustrate, some of their states can have this property at the same

time others do not. State consciousness does not seem to be a relation, the way transitive

consciousness does. And one certainly does not imply that a state is ‘conscious of’ anything by

calling it conscious, as we do when we say of a subject that he is transitively conscious.

With this distinction in place, we can turn to theories of consciousness. When a philosopher

claims to have a theory of consciousness, you’ve got dollars to donuts that she’s offering a

theory of state consciousness. A theory, that is, of what makes a particular mental state a

conscious state (rather than an unconscious one).

Two theories of state consciousness

All theories of state consciousness fall into one of two camps: first-order theories and higher-

order theories. (This is, of course, just one way to divide up theories of consciousness. Others

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include: representationalist v. non-representationalist, physicalist v. dualist, cognitivist v.

neurophysiological, etc. But the first-order v. higher-order division is an important one.) Both

theories explain state consciousness in terms of transitive consciousness, though in different

ways. According to the first-order theory, a mental state of a subject is a conscious state if and

only if it makes the subject of that state (transitively) conscious of something or other. Your

present visual experiences, for instance, make you conscious of a variety of shapes and colors.

That, according to the first-order theory, is why those experiences are conscious. It is what

makes them conscious states. Unconscious thoughts or sensations, should you be having any, fail

to make you conscious of anything. That is why they are unconscious states.

According to the higher-order theory, a mental state of a subject is a conscious state if and only if

it is the object of one’s transitive consciousness—that is, if and only if the subject of that state is

(transitively) conscious of (having, being in) it. Consider again your current visual experiences.

According to the higher-order theory, these are conscious not because they make you conscious

of other things (colors, shapes), but because you are conscious of (having, being in) them. It is

your consciousness of them that makes them conscious. Were you unaware of (having) your

visual experiences, they wouldn’t be conscious. They would be unconscious states. Unconscious

thoughts or sensations, should you be having any, are those states one is unaware of (having,

being in) them. That is why they are unconscious states.

Each of these theories should have some intuitive plausibility to it. Certain aspects of each

probably sound right to you. But they are not equally plausible. And while the first-order theory

is certainly not without its difficulties, I believe the higher-order theory is replete with them. We

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should be first-order theorists about state consciousness. The rest of this paper is an attempt to

show why.

The problem of higher-order hallucination

The most serious objection to higher-order theories is one I call the problem of higher-order

hallucination. Several authors have raised this objection, in one form or another, over the past 17

years or so. Karen Neander (1998) appears to have been the first. It is widely discussed in the

literature today, largely due to a version of it put forward by Ned Block (2011). Many first-order

theorists find it convincing. Indeed, many, myself included, have thought it refutes the higher-

order theory. In what follows, I develop what I believe to be a particularly powerful version of

the objection. It rests on fairly weak assumptions about the mind and consciousness, yet allows

us to derive a contradiction from the higher-order theory. I believe it forces the higher-order

theorist’s hand and reveals a commitment to a very puzzling and implausible view about

conscious states. But we’ll get to that.

There are a few details of the higher-order theory I haven’t yet mentioned that are important to

the statement of the problem of higher-order hallucination. We therefore need a somewhat more

developed statement of the higher-order theory.

Again, the basic idea is that a mental state, M, in a subject, S, is a conscious state if and only if S

is conscious of (having, being in) M. Higher-order theorists disagree about the exact way in

which S must be conscious of M. Most now hold that it must be some kind of thought to the

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effect that “I am in M” or “I am having M”. This is called the higher-order thought, or HOT,

theory. Others hold that the consciousness is more akin to perception or experience. These views

are called the higher-order perception, higher-order experience, or inner sense theories. The

differences among the theories aren’t important here—the problem of higher-order hallucination

applies equally to all versions of the higher-order theory. What is important is that these

statements of the theory makes it clear that all higher-order theorists take S’s being conscious of

M to be a matter of S’s having or being in some kind of mental state (a thought, experience, etc.)

that has M as its object (is directed at M, or is about M, represents M, etc.). In fact, (and this is

important too) all parties in the present debate hold that transitive consciousness, S’s being

conscious of x, is a matter of S’s being in some mental state—be it a thought, sensation,

memory, etc.—that has x as its object (is directed at x, is about x, represents x, etc.).1

Let M* designate the state in virtue of which S is conscious of M. (Perhaps S’s being in M* is

S’s being conscious of M, or perhaps the latter is constituted by the former, or there is some

other relation among those states of affairs. I’m not sure.) M* is known as a higher-order mental

state because it has another mental state (M) as its object (because it is directed at, is about, or

represents M). Plugging this back into our earlier statement of the higher-order theory, we get: A

mental state, M, in subject S, is a conscious state if and only if S is in M* (a higher-order mental

state that has M as its object). Further, it is S’s being in M* that makes M a conscious state. It is

the occurrence of the higher-order state M* in S that explains why, or makes it the case that, M is

one of S’s conscious states, as opposed to one of S’s unconscious states. This is why the higher-

1 Higher-order theorists generally also add that S’s consciousness of M must be direct or non-inferential. This rules out various unwanted consequences, such as the theory’s implying that an unconscious desire becomes conscious when one infers, on the basis of one’s own behavior, that one have the desire in question, or the consequence that I make your (unconscious) mental state conscious by becoming aware that you have it, on the basis of inference from what you do or say. I omit this point from the discussion since it has no bearing on the objection I’m about to raise.

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order theory is called the ‘higher-order’ theory (perhaps you’ve been wondering). In the absence

of M*, M would be an unconscious state.

One more point will be important to keep in mind. Note that the higher-order state M* is not

itself a conscious state. It is one of S’s unconscious states. M* could become a conscious state,

were to become the object of another mental state—M**, as the case my be. (This, incidentally,

is the higher-order theorist’s account of introspection. When you think—consciously—I am

having a visual experience, that thought is a higher-order state (M*), since it is about another

mental state—a visual experience (M). But since that (higher-order) thought is conscious, it is

the target of a further state, M**). But it certainly need not be. Indeed, it is a requirement of the

higher-order theory that the higher-order state, M*, S’s being conscious of M, need not be a

conscious state. If it were required that it be a conscious state, then by the theory’ own lights, it

would be the object of a still higher-order state, M**, which, by parity of reasoning would itself

have to be conscious, and so on, ad infinitum. The higher-order theory would be immediately

committed to an infinite number of conscious states which no finite entity could possess. So,

higher-order states, insofar as they explain or account for the fact that other mental states are

conscious, are not themselves conscious. They are unconscious states. This fact plays a key role

in the problem of higher-order hallucination.

Our reflections on the details of higher-order theories highlight the point that mental states

display intentionality. To be in a mental state is to be in a state that has an object, is directed at, is

about, or represents something. To have a thought is to have a thought about this or that (the time

of one’s flight, the outcome of a hockey game). To have an experience—even a sensation—is to

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have an experience of something or other (a certain sound, or color). Some people, myself

included, think this is true of all mental states. But that is controversial. What is not controversial

is that a great many mental states display intentionality. At least partly because of this, mental

states can “get things right” or “get things wrong”. One might think one’s flight is at 8 pm, when

in fact it is at 7 pm. One might see a car as blue, when in fact it is red (perhaps it is parked under

a sodium-arc lamp at night). In most cases, mental states “get things wrong” by representing a

thing as having one property (8 pm departure, blueness) when in fact it has another (7 pm

departure, redness). But more radical mistakes are possible. Sometimes a mental state represents

the presence of an object when there is no corresponding object in one’s environment at all.

Strong visual afterimages and dreams are examples of this sort of misrepresentation, as are many

hallucinations. Thought it is perhaps somewhat artificial, I will call all misrepresentations of this

sort hallucinations.

It is a familiar point that we can have sensory hallucinations. One can have a sensation of blue in

the presence no colored object at all. This is possible, apparently, because our senses might be

affected in unusual ways: direct neural stimulation, top-down effects (as may happen in dreams),

or simple neural misfiring due to the presence of foreign chemicals in the brain. Just so, in

principle, with our higher-order faculties. Typically, one has a higher-order state, e.g., the

thought that one is having a sensation of blue, as a result of having the corresponding first-order

state, i.e., a sensation of blue. First-order states are the typical causes of the higher-order states

that are about them in the same way that environmental conditions are the typical causes of first-

order states targeted at them. But things can go awry. A sensation of red, for instance, might

cause the higher-order thought that one is having a sensation of something blue. One isn’t having

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the sensation one thinks one is. This is the higher-order correlate of perceptually mistaking a red

object for a blue one.

Moreover, it is possible, at least in principle, for a higher-order state to occur in the absence of

any first-order state. One might, for example, have the thought that one is having a sensation of

blue in the absence of any visual experiences at all. Perhaps such things never happen, or would

happen only as a result of direct stimulation of the brain. It doesn’t matter. All that matters is that

this is possible, in principle. Such a state would be what I am calling a higher-order

hallucination. It is difficult to see any basis for denying the possibility of higher-order illusions

and higher-order hallucinations. Few higher-order theorists (and none of the prominent ones)

deny this. Yet higher-order hallucinations are deeply problematic for the higher-order theory.

Hallucinations are interesting, and not just from a philosophical perspective, because they are

subjectively similar to their veridical counterparts. When one hallucinates a patch of blue before

one’s eyes, or a pink elephant, it seems that there is a patch of blue, or a pink elephant, present,

even though there isn’t. I suppose we wouldn’t have the concept of a hallucination if this weren’t

true. Certainly there wouldn’t be such interest in books, or drugs, that assist one in having

hallucinations! At any rate, the important point here is that veridical first-order (sensory) states

and first-order sensory hallucinations with the same objects are subjectively similar. Actually, I

maintain that they are subjectively indistinguishable, in principle.2 But since my argument does

not require indistinguishability—similarity suffices—I will stick with the weaker claim. Of

course, this reasoning about veridical states and hallucinations is completely general. There is

2 I realize that some philosophers deny this. I take “Matrix”/Evil Deceiver style scenarios, involving highly complex, direct neural stimulation, to be powerful arguments for subjective indistinguishability. But again, my argument only requires that veridical and hallucinatory states be subjectively similar, in principle.

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nothing special about the ‘order’ of the state. So, by parity of reasoning, higher-order

hallucinations will be subjectively similar to veridical higher-order states, in principle.

Consider, however, what the higher-order theory says about veridical higher-order states. They

are cases in which one has (or is in) a conscious state. A veridical case of a higher-order state,

such as one’s being conscious of having the sensation of blue, is a case in which one is having a

sensation of blue. And since you are conscious of having this state, the higher-order theory

entails that it (the sensation of blue) is a conscious state. You are having a conscious experience

of blue.

But now, by the subjective similarity of veridical and hallucinatory states, having a higher-order

hallucination will be subjectively similar to having a veridical higher-order state. The latter,

according to the higher-order theory, is a circumstance in which one is having a conscious state.

Therefore, having a higher-order hallucination is subjectively similar to having a conscious state.

One’s hallucinatory consciousness of the sensation of blue, for instance, will be subjectively

similar to one’s veridical consciousness of the sensation of blue. But that is case in which one is,

according to the higher-order theory, having a conscious experience of blue. So, the

hallucinatory consciousness of the sensation of blue will be subjectively similar to the

circumstances under which one is having a—conscious!—sensation of blue.

We can now begin to draw out the problematic consequence for higher-order theories.

Circumstances that are subjectively similar to circumstances in which one is having a conscious

state just are circumstances in which one is having a conscious state. Circumstances in which

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one is having no conscious states are not subjectively similar to anything. Only circumstances in

which there is some subjective character to speak of can be said to be similar, or alike, with

respect to subjective character. But subjective character comes and goes with the occurrence of

conscious states. Perhaps this seems obvious to you (it seems obvious to me). If it doesn’t, I need

only appeal to what I call “Nagel’s Slogan” to make the problem clear.

It is difficult to say much of substance about conscious states without generating controversy or

begging questions. However, one piece of common ground, something that serves to mark the

territory of interest, so to speak, is Thomas Nagel’s idea that an organism has conscious mental

states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism (1979, p. 166). I call this

Nagel’s Slogan. It is a remarkably useful tool for thinking about consciousness. If you think

there is something it is like to be some creature—say, a porpoise or a lion or a bat—then you are,

Nagel suggests, attributing conscious states to that creature. If you don’t think there’s anything it

is like to be something—a stone, a cup of water, a tree—then you don’t attribute conscious states

to that thing. All of this seems right. Furthermore, the areas of uncertainty seem to coincide.

Does a moth have conscious states? How about a worm? I’m inclined to say not, but I’m a little

unsure. Is there something it is like to be a moth? How about a worm? I’m inclined to say not,

but I’m a little unsure. There seems to be a tight connection—a tight conceptual connection—

between supposing that an organism is having at least one conscious state and thinking that there

is something it is like to be that thing. Judgments about one seem to go hand in hand with

judgments about the other.

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Now, there are substantive and interesting questions about what exactly Nagel meant to say

about conscious states when he offered his slogan. Some see him attributing a mysterious

property—“what-it-is-like-ness”—to conscious states. Some think he saying that there is

something it is like to have a conscious state, or that conscious states themselves are “like

something” for their subjects. Regardless of what Nagel intended to claim, I need only a very

weak reading of his slogan, according to which an organism is having at least one conscious state

(at t) if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism (at t). This minimal reading of

Nagel’s Slogan seems unobjectionable. It is all I need to drive home the problem of higher-order

hallucination.

For notice that a veridical occurrence of a higher-order state is one in which a subject has at least

one conscious state (the one that is the object of the higher-order states). By the minimal

interpretation of Nagel’s Slogan, there will be something it is like to be the subject at that time.

By the subjective similarity of veridical and hallucinatory states, it follows that when a subject is

having a higher-order hallucination, there will be something it is like to be the subject at that

time. If it is true of situation X that there is something it is like to be in that situation, then if

situation Y is subjectively similar to X, then there is something it is like to be in situation Y. To

put it the other way around, if there is not anything it is like to be in situation Y, then Y cannot

be subjectively similar to a situation, X, such that there is something it is like to be in that

situation. If you deny this, I simply don’t know what you could mean by “subjective similarity”.

What could subjective similarity be but similarity with respect to what it is like to be the subject

at a time? (Compare: what could objective similarity be but similarity in what things are like,

similarity of properties?)

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It follows, then, that there is something it is like to be a subject at the time that subject is having

a higher-order hallucination. And from Nagel’s Slogan it follows that the subject is having (at

least one) conscious state at that time. So the higher-order theorist is committed to saying that

there is at least one conscious state occurring when one has a higher-order hallucination. But we

may suppose that this higher-order hallucinatory state is the only mental state the subject is

having. It follows that it, the higher-order state, is a conscious state.

But recall that the higher-order theory is a theory about what makes first-order states conscious.

Drawing upon our more detailed formulation of the theory, it is the occurrence of the higher-

order state M* that makes the first-order state M a conscious state. M is the conscious state, not

M*. But, in the case of higher-order hallucination, M is not occurring (by definition). In such a

case, M* is (or may well be) the only mental state occurring in S. Then, according to the higher-

order theory, S has no conscious states at the time of the occurrence of the higher-order

hallucination. Only unconscious states.

And here we have derived a contradiction. The higher-order theory, along with a small set of

quite uncontroversial assumptions, entails that a subject is having a conscious state and is not

having any conscious states when that subject has a higher-order hallucination. Indeed, the

argument shows that the higher-order theory entails that a given mental state, the higher-order

hallucinatory state M*, both is and is not a conscious state. So the higher-order theory is false.

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The contradiction can be formulated another way, in terms of what it is like to be the subject at

the time the higher-order hallucination is occurring. The higher-order theory, along with Nagel’s

Slogan and the subjective similarity of veridical and hallucinatory states, entails that there is

something it is like to be the subject when a higher-order hallucination is occurring. But it also

entails that no conscious states are occurring. Then, by Nagel’s Slogan, there is not something it

is like to be the subject when a higher-order hallucination is occurring. So there both is and is not

something it is like to be the subject of a higher-order hallucination. Again, it follows that the

theory is false.

The higher-order theorist’s reply

The problem of higher-order hallucination seems like a powerful objection. First-order theorists

insist that it is a powerful objection. And yet, higher-order theorists, by and large, seem quite

unbothered by the objection. I find this puzzling. So let us see what higher-order theorists say

and see if we can figure out what is going on here.

The first point to make is that it is not the higher-order theory alone that entails contradiction. It

is the higher-order theory plus (i) the claim that higher-order hallucinations are possible, (ii) the

subjective similarity of veridical and hallucinatory mental states, and (iii) the minimal reading of

Nagel’s Slogan. A higher-order theorist may deny any of these and avoid the contradiction. But

which? Each seems highly plausible. As it turns out, most higher-order theorists deny (iii).

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In response to Ned Block’s version of the problem of higher-order hallucination, David

Rosenthal claims that, “A state’s being conscious is a matter of mental appearance—of how

one’s mental life appears to one” (2011, 431). And again, “All that matters for a state’s being

conscious is its seeming subjectively to one that one is in that state” (436). Now, these are just

different ways of stating the higher-order theory. They are dressed up versions of the claim that a

state is conscious if and only if one is conscious of (having, being in) it. So these statements, on

their own, are no reply to the problem of higher-order hallucination. However, by making use of

the notion of a mental appearance, these statements do serve to draw one’s attention to the

possibility that mental reality—the way one’s mind actually is—might differ from the mental

appearance—the way one’s mind appears to one. And Rosenthal is firm in maintaining the

appearance/reality distinction when it comes to one’s own mind: “subjective appearances may

mislead about what mental states one is actually in” (432). And again, “We must distinguish

one’s seeming to be in a mental state from one’s actually being in that state” (433). There is still

no reply to the problem of higher-order hallucination, here, since a higher-order hallucination is,

precisely, a case in which the mental appearances, so to speak, come apart from mental reality.

However, if it is true that it can appear to one that one is in a conscious state, even if one is not,

then one can deny that it follows from the fact that one subjectively seems to be in a conscious

state (as one does when one has a higher-order hallucination) that one is in a conscious state.

And this is exactly what Rosenthal denies.

Rosenthal grants that higher-order hallucinations are possible. He grants that a higher-order

hallucination of the occurrence of some state M is subjectively similar to a veridical higher-order

awareness of M. He even grants that there is something it is like to have the higher-order

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hallucination. As such, a subject undergoing a higher-order hallucination will seem to be aware

of a certain mental state. It will seem subjectively as though that state were occurring. There will

be something it is like to be the subject. But this will be pure seeming. The state that seems to be

occurring is not. And Rosenthal takes this to mean there really is no conscious state occurring.

There only seems to be.

So Rosenthal (and other higher-order theorists—this is the standard response they have to the

problem of higher-order hallucination) rejects the part of the argument from higher-order

hallucination that leads to the conclusion that some conscious state is occurring. So, higher-order

theorists in fact reject what I’ve called the “minimal reading” of Nagel’s Slogan. They claim one

that cannot infer from the fact that there is something it is like to be a subject at a time that there

is a conscious state occurring in that subject at that time. All that need be true is that it seem to

the subject that a conscious state is occurring! Similarly, higher-order theorists deny that one can

infer from the fact that a subject has no conscious states that there is not anything it is like to be

that subject! Both of my supposed contradictions are avoided, because Nagel’s Slogan is false.

What Nagel should have said, according to the higher-order theorist, is that a creature seems to

have conscious states (but need not) if and only if there is something it is like to be that creature.

I find this response difficult to assess. On the one hand, despite what the higher-order theorist

says, it seems as though Nagel’s Slogan has not been denied after all. Grant that one can fail to

be in the state one seems to be in. Still, if one so much as seems to be in a conscious state, one is

(actually) in some mental state. “Seemings” do carry some ontological import. One cannot seem

to be in a state while being in no state at all. The state one will be in will be a thought, or

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perception, or some kind of mental state that has as its content something to the effect that one is

in a mental state of a certain kind. Moreover, as the higher-order theorists grant, there will be

something it is like to be one when one has this (actually occurring) state. Furthermore, it seems

quite clear that it is the occurrence of this (actually occurring) state that explains the fact that

there is something it is like to be one. The content of that state (i.e., that some other state is

occurring) determines the precise character of what it is like. Now, to my ear, that is reason

enough to call that actually occurring state a conscious state. So Nagel’s Slogan stands after all.

And the problem of higher-order hallucination stands.

But higher-order theorists—obviously—don’t see it this way. They deny that we ought to call the

state, the occurrence of which is sufficient for there to be something it is like to be one, a

conscious state. They insist that the phrase “conscious state” be applied to the state one seems to

be in, even when one merely seems to be in it. And if we grant this usage, Nagel’s Slogan, even

the minimal reading I have offered, may well be false. If we grant this usage, the higher-order

theorist’s reply to the problem of higher-order hallucination works. Furthermore, once we see

that the higher-order theorist treats “conscious state” as, in effect, shorthand for “state one seems

to be in”, or “state one is conscious of being in”, one can begin to understand why they seem so

unmoved by the problem of higher-order hallucination. They simply don’t see the force of the

part of the argument that concludes with the claim that some conscious state is, after all,

occurring (or: the part that concludes that there is nothing it is like to undergo a higher-order

hallucination).

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Of course, something similar may be said about the first-order theorist. First-order theorists do

not feel the force of the higher-order theorist’s use of “conscious state”. The fact that they offer,

and find so compelling, the problem of higher-order hallucination shows that they think of what

it is to be a conscious state quite differently. This is also why they are inclined to find various of

the higher-order theorist’s claims, such as that one can seem to be in a conscious state without

being in any conscious state so odd. First-order theorists find it more natural to think of

conscious states as those that make one conscious of something, states one is conscious with, not

states one is conscious of (having).

I think we have here two genuinely different ways of thinking about what it is to be a conscious

state. As such, I think that some of what gets said in the debate over first- versus higher-order

theories of consciousness amounts to philosophers talking past one another. Furthermore, it

seems too simplistic to insist that one of these ways is simply the wrong way to think about state

consciousness. Each has something to be said for it, each is to a certain extent grounded in “our

ordinary talk” about consciousness and conscious states, and each of them has certain

drawbacks. Moreover, I think each conception of state consciousness captures a different aspect

of our mental lives. Perhaps the reasonable thing to do is admit that the ordinary term

“consciousness” just doesn’t discriminate finely enough among aspects of our mental life. First-

order and higher-order theories illuminate those different aspects. Understood this way, they are

not actually incompatible with one another.

That’s the ecumenical response to difference between the first-order and higher-order

conceptions of state consciousness. As reasonable and fair-minded as it sounds, I don’t actually

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accept it. Not fully. Let me conclude with some brief remarks about why I cannot accept the

higher-order conception of what it is to be a conscious state.

Why I am a first-order theorist

First, it seems likely that very few non-human animals have the capacity to be conscious of their

mental states. Particularly when one realizes that most higher-order theorists believe that one’s

being conscious of one’s mental states is a matter of one’s thinking that one is having a mental

state. It is (at least) mildly controversial that non-human animals have any thoughts at all. So it

must be quite controversial to suppose they can have thoughts about their own minds. Why

should they need to? It follows that it is extremely controversial that non-human animals have

conscious states, according to the higher-order theory. But that seems deeply wrong. When

Nagel wrote “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” he chose to write about bats because it isn’t very

controversial to suppose that bats have conscious mental lives. But it is very controversial indeed

to suppose that a bat’s mental life, its mind, appears some what to it.

A similar objection is that, according to most psychologists, human children do not acquire the

concept of mind, the notion of a mental state (thought, experience), until around the age of three.

Given that you need the concept of a mental state to have a thought about a mental state, it

follows that even human beings cannot be conscious of having mental states until around the age

of three. So even human children don’t have conscious states until around the age of three,

according to most higher-order theorists. I invite you to try to take this seriously the next time

you are around a two-year old.

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Now, a higher-order theorist could simply note that I’m not looking at these cases through their

eyes. A conscious state, they say, is a state one is conscious of having. I have just admitted that it

isn’t very plausible to suppose that many animals, other than humans over the age of three, are

conscious of their own mental states. So, given the higher-order conception of a conscious state,

these results aren’t counterintuitive after all!

But this is too fast. When I, and others, say that it is plausible to suppose that human infants and

many non-human animals have conscious states, we mean that it is plausible to suppose that

there is something it is like to be these creatures. Higher-order theorists still need to deny this.

For recall the modified version of Nagel’s Slogan the higher-order theorist accepts: there is

something it is like to be a creature if and only if that creature seems to be in a certain mental

state. For the reasons advanced two paragraphs back, human infants and most non-human

animals do not have the capacity to seem to be in a certain mental state. So the higher-order

theory denies that there is something it is like to be these creatures. That seems deeply wrong. It

is a reason to reject the higher-order conception of conscious states in favor of a first-order

conception.

My second reason for rejecting the higher-order conception of conscious states is that it seems

quite arbitrary in certain ways. Any creature capable of being conscious of its own mental states

is surely also capable of being conscious of its environment. Provided that the higher-order

theorist wants to maintain some connection between the occurrence of conscious states and the

fact that there is something it is like to be one, the higher-order theorist is forced to say that there

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is something it is like to be one only when one seems to be in a certain mental state. Why? Given

that seeming to be in a mental state is a matter of being transitively conscious of that state, why

shouldn’t there be something it is like to be transitively conscious of, say, a tree or the sky? What

is it about consciousness of one’s own mental states that should make it true that there is

something it is like to be a creature, whereas consciousness of one’s environment should not?

Higher-order theorists like to accuse first-order theorists of supposing that state consciousness is

a mysterious monadic property that attaches only to a select number of mental states. But it

seems that the higher-order theory must treat mental states as having a mysterious special

property of their own, such that, when transitive consciousness alights upon them (and only

them), there is something it is like to be the creature that is so conscious. In some sense, I think it

would be better—in the sense of being less mysterious—if higher-order theorists divorced their

use of “conscious state” entirely from the idea that there is something it is like to be a creature.

My present objection would fall away, as would my former. Of course, I think that were higher-

order theorists to do this, it would be clear to many philosophers that they were not really

interested in the property that most philosophers interested in consciousness are interested in,

namely, that picked out by Nagel’s Slogan. The higher-order theory needs to maintain some

connection to Nagel’s Slogan to keep people’s interest. But in so doing, it loses plausibility as a

conception of a conscious state.

The third reason is phenomenological. Rosenthal and other higher-order theorists speak of

mental appearances. They say that a state’s being conscious is a matter of its appearing a certain

way. Of how one’s mental life seems to one. They think that for a sensation of red to be a

conscious sensation, it, the sensation, must appear to one. This seems to me an inaccurate—or at

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least highly loaded—description of much of one’s conscious mental life. My current visual

experiences, my current conscious visual experiences, do not themselves appear to me. They do

not “seem” some way. My present environment—the objects in front of my eyes—are what seem

a certain way to me. Similarly for most of my conscious experience. It is important, here, to keep

clear on the distinction between between the mental state itself and the object of that mental

state. Ordinarily, it is the object of one’s mental state that “seems” a certain way, not the state

itsel. This is the sense in which conscious experiences are said to be transparent. We “see” right

through them to their objects. The states themselves make no appearance in our “stream of

consciousness”. This is why I find it odd that Rosenthal makes the following remark, when

characterizing consciousness: “What counts for someone’s being in a conscious state is just the

occurrence in one’s stream of consciousness of the relevant subjective appearance, the

appearance of being in the state in question” (432; italics mine). This strikes me as bad

phenomenology. Or to put it another way, if this is true, then I think even humans rarely, if ever,

have conscious states. Of course we know that we have conscious states. But it isn’t because they

appear to us. So I do not think it is plausible to understand the notion of a conscious state as a

state one is conscious of (having, being in).

None of this is to deny that we are sometimes conscious of having mental states, or that our

consciousness of them is a matter of having higher-order states that are targeted at them, or that

there is something it is like to be conscious of having them. Nothing I have said casts doubt on

any of these claims. The higher-order theory of being conscious of one’s own mental states is

unobjectionable. My objection is rather to the view that what it is to be a conscious state is to be

a state one is conscious of (having, being in).

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References

Block, N. 2011. “The higher-order approach to consciousness is defunct.” Analysis, Vol. 71. No.

3. Pp. 419-431.

Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Nagel, T. 1974. “What is it like to be a bat?” In The nature of consciousness: philosophical

debates. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press. Pp.

519-27.

Rosenthal, D. 1997. “A theory of consciousness”. In The nature of consciousness: philosophical

debates. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press. Pp.

729-53.

__________. 2011. “Exaggerated reports: reply to Block. ” Analysis, Vol. 71. No. 3. Pp. 431-

437.

Weisberg, J. 2011. “Abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness: A response to Block.” Analysis,

Vol. 71. No. 3. Pp. 438-443.

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