WAYNE STATE UNIV. HISTOBY DEPT.

Copyright by BERTHOLD P. RIESTERER 1966

KARL LOWITH«S VIEW OF HISTORY: A HUMANIST ALTERNATIVE

TO HISTORICISM

by

B erth o ld P . R ie s te re r

A DISSERTATION

Subm itted to the Office fo r G raduate S tud ies,G raduate D ivision of Wayne S tate U niversity* D etro it, M ichigan

in p a r t ia l fu lfillm en t of the re q u ire m e n ts fo r the d eg re e of

DOCTOR O F PHILOSOPHY

1966

MAJOR: HISTORY }ROVED BY:

vi a e r

A d v ise r Date

Date

Date

DateA d v iser

DateA d v iser

ACKNOW LEDGMENTS

I w ish to e x p re ss my g ra titu d e to a ll the m em b ers of the Wayne

S ta te U n iv e rs ity H is to ry D epartm en t fo r th e ir help in the p re p a ra tio n of

th is d is se r ta tio n . I am a lso g rea tly indeb ted to P ro fe s s o r G. H. J a m e s ,

C h airm an of the H is to ry D epartm en t of A lbion C ollege, fo r a ssum ing

som e of m y teach in g du ties so th a t th is d is se r ta tio n could be com pleted

w ithout undue delay* But sp ec ia l thanks m ust be a cc o rd e d the following

Wayne S ta te U n iv ers ity P ro fe s s o rs : R. H o ek stra fo r m uch valuab le

in fo rm atio n on the p ro b lem s of ontology and e x is te n tia lism , M. Coven sky

fo r a id in com piling the b ib liog raphy , H. J . W eics and W. J . B ossenbrook

fo r the in itia l s tim u lu s and fo r guidance and u n d erstand ing during the

ac tu a l w ritin g its e lf .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

C hapter Page

I n t r o d u c t io n ..................................... 1

I

II

R eac tion to He i d e g g e r . . . .

H is to r ic ism a s H um anism # *

13

. . 32

III H egel and Goethe . . . . . 5?

I V M eaning in H is to ry « . . . . . . * . . 89

V H isto ry a s a N a tu ra l Happening . . , . . 133

VI C onclusion . .........................

B ib liography . . . . . . . . . . 178

A utob iograph ical S ta tem en t . * » . . 191

INTRODUCTION

The developm ent of our m odern h is to r ic a l con sc io u sn ess or h is -

to r ic is m has long been the su b jec t of ca re fu l an a ly s is and study. M ost

s c h o la rs a g re e th a t i t a ro se in G erm any in the f i r s t half of the n ineteenth

cen tu ry and th a t i t co n stitu ted a defin ite re a c tio n to the E n ligh tenm en t'si

em p h asis upon u n iv e rsa l, im m utab le , and a l l “so v ere ig n n a tu ra l law.

F o r K ant and L essin g no le s s than, fo r V o lta ire and T urgo t, the g en era l

r a th e r than the p a r tic u la r w as the ch ief concern of h is to r ic a l in v e s tig a ­

tion . 51 'T h e co re is alw ays the sa m e '" a s V o lta ire s ta ted . In c o n tra s t,

m en lik e H e rd e r , H egel, and R anke p laced a g re a t s t r e s s upon the con­

c re te n e s s and p a r tic u la r ity of indiv idual h is to r ic a l phenom ena. M o re ­

o v e r in d ire c t opposition to V o lta ire 's in te re s t in " 'th a t g re a t socie ty of

a ll-w ise m en w hich e x is ts ev ery w h ere and w hich is everyw here independ-

e n t , '" they em p h asised the im p o rtan ce of the v a rio u s national un its and

th e ir unique and p e cu lia r h is to r ic a l developm ent.

But th is new h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n did not enjoy a com plete t r i ­

um ph in the n ine teen th cen tu ry . A lready a f te r the m iddle of the cen tu ry ,

* Among the b e tte r s tu d ies a re th o se of F r ie d r ic h M eiaecke, Die E n tstehung des H is fo rism u s , 2 Vols. (M unich and B erlin : R. O ldenbourg V erlag , 1936). F r ie d r ic h E n g e l-Ja n o s i, The G row th of G erm an H is to r i- c ism , ("T he John Hopkins U n iv ers ity S tudies in H is to r ic a l and P o litic a l S c ie n c e s ," Vol. DC It; B a ltim o re : The John Hopkins P r e s s , 1944). R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of H is to ry (New York: G alaxy Books, 1936). The Philosophy of H is to ry in Our T im e , ed. by H ans M eyerhoff (G arden C ity , New York: D oubleday A nchor Book, 1959).

2Quoted in E n g e l-Ja n o s i, op. c i t . , pp. 15-16.

1

2

a se r io u s question ing of i ts g e n e ra l v a lid ity and u ltim a te value began to

a p p ea r. One of the e a r l ie s t m an ifesta tio n s of what we m ight te rm a n ti-

h is to r ic is m can be d isc e rn e d in N ietzche^s a v e rs io n to the enervating and

cu ltu ra lly s e rv ile acad em ic " h is to r is m " of h is day e sp ec ia lly the Ran-*

k ian v a rie ty . N ie tzsche a rg u e d th a t the R ankians had em ascu la ted h is ­

to ry a s a v ita l so u rce of ac tio n by reducing i t to a m e re p a ss iv e ca ta lo g u ­

ing of the m inute happenings w hich taken to g e th e r constitu te a h is to r ic a l

event. T hereby they not only frag m en ted the g re a t event i ts e lf but a lso

p layed down the ro le of the indiv idual in effecting m a jo r o r decisive

changes, In s tead , N ietache w anted a h is to rio g rap h y which would s tim u ­

la te m a n 's v ita l and e sse n tia lly i r r a t io n a l w ill im p u lses fo r th e se a lone,

he fe lt, gave r is e to new and fru itfu l a ttem p ts to m a s te r re a lity . ^

Jacob B u rck h ard t, N ie tz sc h e 1 s o ld e r co n tem p o rary , w as a lso

% om e sc h o la rs have re c e n tly taken pains to d is tin g u ish the te rm s " h is to r ism " and " h is to r ic ism , " H is to r ism is u su a lly applied to the e a r ly p h ase of the developm ent, the H e rd e r , H egel, Ranke p e rio d , w here in the E n lig h ten m en t1 a em p h asis upon the n o rm a tiv e c h a ra c te r of re a so n and the ob jec tive n iean iag fu ln ess of the u n iv e rse w e re s t i l l recogn ized . H is ­to r ic is m , in con trast* is und ers to o d as re fe r r in g p r im a r i ly to the la te n ine teen th and e a r ly tw en tie th cen tu ry re la tiv iz a tio n of a ll ab so lu te n o rm s and s tan d a rd s . Since the following study is focused p r im a r i ly upon the p o s t W orld W ar I re v o lt a g a in s t h is to r ic a l thought, h is to r ic is m ra th e r than h is to r is m w ill fee the ch ief concern . F o r sp ec ific exam ples of th is d is tin c tio n se e G eorge G, Ig g e rs , "T he Idea of P ro g re s s : a C ritic a l R e ­a s s e s s m e n t, " The A m erican H is to r ic a l R eview , JLXXI (1965), pp. 1-17 and E r ic h K ah le r , The M eaning of H is to ry (New Y ork: G eorge B ra z il le r , 1964), p. 20Off.

^ F r ie d r ic h N ie tz sch e , "V om N utzen und N ach te il d e r H is to rie fiir das JLeben" in U nzeitgem asee B etrach tu n g en (S tu ttgart: A lfred K ro n e r, 1955), pp. 95-195.

d isp le a sed w ith the g en e ra l h is to r ic a l sch o la rsh ip of h is day but m o re

sp ec ific a lly w ith the fa c ile o p tim ism and ex trem e p re ten sio n s em bodied

in the m e tap h y sica l M sto r ism of Hegel. H egel’s h is to r ic a l stud ies co n sis t

a lm o s t exclu siv e ly in the p u rposefu l in v estig a tio n and judgm ent of p a r t ic u ­

l a r ,!w orld h is to r ic a l" ind iv iduals such a s C ae sa r and N apoleon and the

c o n c re te m an ife s ta tio n s of the "w orld sp ir i t" in the G reco-R om an and

G e rm a n ic -C h ris tia n w o rld s . In c o n tra s t, B u rck h ard t p re fe r re d the a e s ­

th e tic con tem plation of g en e ra l and e te rn a l types; the "m an of the R e n a is ­

s a n c e ," " the G reek of the h e ro ic a g e ," the " c re a tiv e individual" w ithin

the u n iv e rsa l h is to r ic a l continuum . 3

N ineteen th cen tu ry a n ti-h is to r ic is m w as a lso ev ident in the a ttem p t

of the p o s itiv is t th in k e rs to tra n s fo rm h is to ry in to a p re d ic tab le scien ce

analogous to the n a tu ra l sc ie n c es . In sh a rp opposition to the h is to r ic is t

em p h as is upon the u n iqueness and p e cu lia rity of hum an life , the p o s itiv is ts

a rg u e d th a t hum an life w as in no way fundam entally d iffe ren t fro m o th er

fo rm s of life . H ence, h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s e s w ere co n sid e red id en tica l in

kind w ith n a tu ra l p ro c e s s e s , and the m ethods of n a tu ra l sc ien ce w ere

judged ap p licab le to the in te rp re ta tio n of h is to ry . C om te h im se lf p roposed

th a t th e re should be a new sc ien ce ca lled "so c io logy" w hose in itia l w ork,

^Jacob B u rck h ard t, F o rc e and F reed o m ; an in te rp re ta tio n of H is ­to ry , ed. by Jam e s H. N icholas {New Y ork: M erid ian Books, 1955). See a lso B enedetto C ro c e ’s C om m ents on B u rck h ard t in h is H is to ry a s the S to ry of L ib e rty , T r . by Sylvia Sprigge (New York: M erid ian B ooks, 1955), pp. 93-103.

4

the gathering of fa c ts about hum an life , w as to be done by the h is to r ia n

but w hose u ltim a te goal w as the d isco v e ry of the causa l connections b e ­

tw een th e se fa c ts . "T he so c io lo g ist would thus be a kind of s u p e r-

h is to r ia n ra is in g h is to ry to the rank of a sc ien ce by thinking sc ien tif ica lly

about the sam e fa c ts about w hich the h is to r ia n thought only em p irica lly . u ^

M o reover, a s the cen tu ry d rew to a c lo se , m any th in k e rs grew

in c re a s in g ly sc e p tic a l of the u ltim a te value of the h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n

th rough its fa ilu re to p rov ide a f irm b a s is fo r an ob jective e th ica l sy stem .

In the face of the p o s ltiv is tic onslaught, B ilthey, W indelband, R ic k e rt,

and S im m el had a ttem p ted to m ain ta in the autonom y of the h is to r ic a l s c i ­

en ces by b ifu rca tin g re a li ty into two unique and spec ific re a lm s each p o s ­

se s s in g i ts own p a r t ic u la r m ethodology and view of tru th : n a tu ra l sc ie n c es

and c u ltu ra l o r h is to r ic a l s c ie n c e s , N a tu rw issen sch a ften und Ge i s t e s wi s s en -

sch a ften . B ut, a s one a s tu te s ch o la r has po in ted out, th is b ifu rca tio n a lso

im p lied th a t a ll v a lu es w e re p u re ly c u ltu ra l phenom ena w ith no re fe re n c e

to an u ltim a te unconditioned so u rc e of value p e r se. "A ll va lues w ere

ro o ted in W el tan s chauungen and W e ltan s chauungen w ere in the final a n a ly ­

s is i r r a t io n a l . M an w as thus faced by the e th ica l ir r a t io n a li ty of the w orld

and the inso lub le conflic t of the sy s te m s of v a lu es . n ' In o th e r w o rd s , h i s ­

to ry in s te ad of being view ed a s the so le key to value and rea so n , a s in the

^Gollingwood, qg. c it. , p. 128.

7Ig g e rs , op. c i t . , p. 8.

5

opening decades of the n in e teen th cen tu ry , was now identified w ith the r e la ­

tiv e ; and the p ro sp e c ts fo r a tta in in g to ob jective e th ica l knowledge v ia h is ­

to ry seem ed v ir tu a lly h o p e less .

However in sp ite of the ex isten ce of th ese a n t i-h is to r ic is t ten d en ­

c ie s , p r im a r i ly in G erm any, in the m iddle and la t te r decades of the n in e ­

teen th cen tu ry , they did not p lay a m a jo r ro le in the c u ltu ra l life of the

nation. The tra d itio n e s ta b lish e d by H e rd e r , H egel, and Ranke and c a r ­

r ie d on by m en such a s D roysen , Sybel, and M einecke continued to p r e ­

dom inate . One of the ch ief re a so n s fo r the fa ilu re of th e se n ascen t a n ti-

h is to r ic is t ten d en c ies to com e to the fo re in the p re -W o rld W ar I p e rio d

was the ab sen ce of a m a jo r so c io -p o litic a l and socio -econom ic upheaval

a round w hich th e se ten d en c ie s could c ry s ta ll iz e and a ssu m e defin ite fo rm s.

Ju s t as it re q u ire d the F re n c h R evolution and i ts N apoleonic sequal to

p rov ide the s tim u lu s fo r the w orks of the fo unders of h is to r ic is m , so the

"G re a t I ’a r " w as needed to p re c ip ita te th a t '’c r i s i s of h is to r ic is m ” ® w hich

has s in ce functioned a s a k ind of underly ing m o tif in a ll of the subsequent

d iscu ss io n s on the n a tu re and m ethodology of the h is to r ia n ’s c ra ft. U nder

the em otional im p ac t of W orld W ar I and its a fte rm a th , h is to r ic is m w as

® Ernst T ro e lts c h , "D ie K r is is des H is to r ism u s , ” Die Neue .Rund­sch au , XXXIII (1922), pp. 572-590* A lso h is P e r H is to rism u s und se ine F ro b lem e (Tubingen; J . G. B. M ohr [P au l S ie b e c k ] , 1922). F u r th e r w o rk s in d ica tiv e of the " c r i s i s ” c h a ra c te r of h is to r ic is m in the post W orld W ar I p e rio d a re : T heodore L essin g , G eachlchte a ls Sinngebung des S inn- lo sen (M unich: C. H. Beck, 1921); B enedetto C roce , "A n tih is to rism u s , ” H is to r isc h e Z e its c h r if t , GXLIII (1931), pp. 457-466; and K a rl H e u ss is ,Die K r is is des H is to r ism u s (Tubingen: J . C. B. M ohr (Paul Siebeck] , 1932).

6

se v e re ly d isc re d ite d . Now a ll v a lues w ere openly acknow ledged as his**

to r ic a l , i. e. , a s re la tiv e , and h is to ry i ts e lf w as view ed a s a m ean in g less

web spun by w hat m en did, p roduced , and thought, a v e rita b le " ta le to ld

by an id io t" signifying nothing. F u r th e rm o re , since G erm any had su f­

fe re d ou trig h t defeat on the b a ttle fie ld and a p a r tic u la r ly hum ilia ting

p eace , a defin ite o p p ro b riu m w as a ttach ed not only to uniquely G erm anic

custom s and p ra c tic e s but a lso to the tra d itio n of H is to rism u s w hich had

co n tribu ted stro n g ly to the c re a tio n of the G erm an na tiona l ideal. A cco rd ­

ingly , in the tw en ties and th ir t ie s , G erm any becam e the hom e of a num ber

of d is tin c t and pow erfu l a n t i -h is to r ic is t tendenc ies.

One of the m o re exclu sive but n o n e th e less in fluen tia l of th e se te n ­

den cies ap p ea red in the c irc le co n stitu ted by the fo llow ers of the poet

S tefan G eorge. T h e ir ch ief h is to r ic a l spokesm an w as F r ie d r ic h Gundolf.

H is to ry ’s so le va lu e , acco rd in g to Gundolf* w as to convey im ag es, a ro u se

the im ag ina tion , and develop c h a ra c te r th rough the p re sen ta tio n of g re a t

deeds and g re a t m en. And he w as d e te rm in ed to re a liz e th ese goals in

sp ite of the new evidence and in fo rm atio n b rought to ligh t by the e n tire

n ine teen th cen tu ry tra d itio n of h is to r ic a l and ph ilo log ica l c r i t ic is m . In

fac t, G undolf's w orks on such lead ing f ig u re s a s Goethe, H e in rich von

K le is t, and C a e sa r a re only co n cern ed w ith tra n s fo rm in g the e x tra o rd in ­

a ry m an in to a life giving h e ro ic m yth o r legend and often w illfu lly su b o r-

gJheo S tra u s s , N a tu ra l R ight and H is to ry (C hicago: U n iv ers ity of

C hicago P r e s s , 1953), p. 18.

7

clinate ac tu a l events to th is end. Thus N ie tz sc h e 's ag ita tions fo r a v ita l -

is t ic o r life -p ro m o tin g h is to rio g rap h y had fina lly borne fru it, although

N ie tzsch e h im se lf w ith h is p ass io n a te concern for e m p iric a l, i. e. , s c ie n ­

tif ic a cc u ra cy would h a rd ly have condoned Guldolf' s w ork.

A nother s tra n g e f ru it of the N ie tzsch ean seed w as the r is e of w hat

has been te rm e d h is to r ic a l and p o litic a l "d ec is lo n ism . Given the r e la -

tiv iza tio n of a ll fo rm e r ly ob jective n o rm s and s tan d a rd s , a num ber of

th in k e rs such as E rn s t Ju n g er, C arl Schm itt, and Hans F re y e r a rgued

th a t the only way the re su ltin g sp ir i tu a l and m o ra l apathy could be o v e r­

com e w as th rough a com plete b re a k w ith the past* In lieu of the t r a d i ­

tio n a l h is to r ic is t thought fo rm s , th e se th in k e rs p laced an exclusive em p h a­

s is upon the w ill and i ts unique capacity fo r d ecis ion and action . As

F r e y e r put it

A lready fo r quite som e tim e , a lre a d y befo re and during the w a r, one could d is c e rn a new g en era tio n of concepts in the c u ltu ra l sc ie n c es . C oncepts such a s : the " p re s e n t ," the " m o ­m e n t," " d e c is io n ," " e x is te n c e ," " re s p o n s ib i l i ty ," " en c o u n te r ," " re a li ty " began to dom inate the fie ld . Through th ese new con­cep ts the em ancipa tion of h is to ry fro m such thought fo rm s as " p r o g r e s s ," "deve lopm en t, " "d ia lec tic " [i. e . , tra d itio n a l h is to r - ic ls t thought forms]} w as com plete. Through them the idea w as rev iv ed th a t h is to ry is the re a lm of action .

^ C h r i s t i a n G raf von K rockow , Die E ntscheidung , eine U n te rsu ch - ung iib e r E rn s t Ju n g e r , C a rl S ch m itt, M artin H eidegger ("G ottinger Ab- handlungen z u r Soziologie u n te r E in sch lu ss ih r e r G renzgeb ie te , " Vol. XIII; S tu ttg a rt: F e rd in an d E nke, 1958).

**Hans F r e y e r , Das ge3ch ich tliche S e lb s tb ew u ss tse in des 20. J a h r - h u n d e rts ("K a ise r W ilhelm In s titu t fiir K unst-und K u ltu rw issen sch a ft, B ib- lio th eca H e rtz ian a in Rom , V erbffen tlichungen d e r A bteilung fu r K u ltu r- w is s e n s c h a f t ," Vol. I; Leipzig: H e in rich K e lle r , 1938), p. 19.

A fu r th e r v e ry im p o rtan t and w id esp read a n ti-h is to r ic is t tendency

found e x p re ss io n in O sw ald S pong ier1 s two volum e m orphology of w orld

12h is to ry . S pengler not only sought to re c o rd the r i s e and fa ll of the m a ­

jo r c iv iliz a tio n s of the w orld and to p re d ic t the fa te of our own W estern

c iv iliz a tio n but, even m o re im p o rtan t, he a ttem p ted to o b lite ra te , as

fa lse and a rb i t r a ry , the h is to r ic is t d is tin c tio n betw een n a tu re and h is to ry .

He sought to overcom e the re la t iv is m in the c u ltu ra l sc ien ces a s ju x ta ­

p o sed to the n e c e s s ity in the n a tu ra l sc ie n c es by view ing h is to ry a s a m an ­

ife s ta tio n of a p re d e te rm in e d co sm ic n e ce ss ity . S p e n g le r 's s e v e ra l c iv -

i liz a tio n a l cy c les ex p erien ce the sam e re g u la r sea so n a l rhy thm s a s those

w hich c h a ra c te r iz e n a tu re . M oreo v er the ind iv iduals of each c iv iliza tio n a l

cy cle a r e see n to be as lim ited in th e ir c ap a b ilitie s and m odes of e x p re s ­

sion a s the p lan ts of a p a r t ic u la r so il and g eo g raph ica l a re a . T hus, w ith

S p en g le r, p re -w a r h is to r ic is t o p tim ism a s w ell a s p o s t-w a r h is to r ic is t

p e s s im is m a re c le a r ly re je c te d in fav o r of an a ll-e n co m p ass in g cosm ic

fa ta lism , in fac t

In i ts dogm atic tone , in i ts d e te rm in is t a ssu m p tio n , in i ts tho rough ly u n so p h is tica ted ap p lica tio n of n a tu ra l sc ience te rm in ­ology to the c o u rse of hum an h is to ry , The D ecline of the West r e p ­re s e n te d a re la p s e in to a na ive p o s itiv ism , a t the sam e tim e , in i ts im ag in a tiv e ran g e in i ts b re a th -ta k in g jux tap o sitio n s of exam ples d raw n fro m the m o st v a r ie d a sp e c ts of hum an c u ltu re , it su rp a sse d the b o ld est flig h ts of id e a l is t [ i .e . , R om antic] thinking. ^

^ O s w a ld S p en g le r, P e r U ntergang des A bendlandes, 2 Vols (Mun ieh: C. H. B ecksche V e rla g s B uchhandlung, 1922).

S tu a rt H ughes, C o n sc io u sn ess and Society (New Y ork: V in ­tag e B ooks, 1961), p. 377.

But S pong ier’s am algam ation, of p o s itiv ism and R om an tic ism w as

not the only way to overcom e the re la tiv is m in h e ren t in the h is to r ic is t

o rien ta tio n . H is to r ic is t r e la tiv is m can a lso be overcom e through the

w h o lesca le abandonm ent of the m etap h y sica l a ssu m p tio n s tha t m ake i ts

conclusions so u n b earab le . And, in the la te tw en ties and e a r ly th ir t ie s ,

th is was p re c is e ly the suggestion of the e x is ten tia l on to log ist M artin Hei*

1 Ad ag g er, who, o s ten s ib ly , only in tended to ‘’fu r th e r the w ork of D ilthey. ”

F o r H eidegger m an Is h u rled into an e th ica lly a b su rd u n iv e rse in which

he is d riv en by “ c a re " g o rg e , and ’’angu ish” A ngst and only c e r ta in of

death . In o th e r w o rd s , hum an ex is ten ce as an in tr in s ic "being tow ards

death" a D asein gum Tode im p lie s th a t te m p o ra lity r a th e r than e te rn ity

is the tru e c h a ra c te r of ex is ten ce . In fac t given the fundam ental te m p o r­

a lity of ex is ten c e , th e e n tire post-S oc ra tio developm ent o r tra d itio n a l

su b s ta n tiv a l thought re v e a ls i ts e lf to be a g re a t a b e r ra t io n , one tre m e n ­

dous su b jec tiv e delusion . T h ereb y , H eidegger rem o v es the b a s is of a ll

com plain ts a g a in s t h is to r ic is m ; fo r if th e re n ev er w as an abso lu te o r an

e te rn a l su b stan ce , th en a ll o u r fe a rs of i ts re la tiv ia a tio n th rough h is to r -1 CL

ic is m a re , of c o u rse , g ro u n d less .

H ow ever p o s t Y^orld W ar I G erm any a lso w itn essed the r i s e of a

^ M a r t in H e idegger, Sein und Z e it (10th Ed. > Tubingen Max N ie - m e y e r , 1963), p. 404, T h e re a r e no m a jo r changes in th is ed ition and the o rig in a l w hich a p p ea re d in 1927 in the Jah rb u ch fu r P h ilosoph ie und phanom enolog ische F o rsc h u n g , VIII, (1927), pp. 1-438.

* % bid. , pp. 372-392. A lso see below, C h ap ter I.

10

le s s e x trem e a n t i -h is to r ic is t tre n d , a tre n d w hose o rig in s m ight even be

t ra c e d to Jacob B u rck h ard t. Unlike the ra d ic a l d e c is io n is ts , h e ro ic m yth -

o lo g is ts , co sm ic fa ta l is ts , and e x is ten tia l on to lo g is ts , th ese p a r tic u la r

a n t i -h is to r ic is ts fu lly a ff irm and acknow ledge the im p o rtan ce of the t r a ­

d itiona l h is to r ic a l developm ent. Y et, a t the sam e tim e , like B u rck h ard t,

they p lace a renew ed em p h asis upon the n e c e ss ity of acq u irin g a s u p ra -

h is to r ic a l o r e x tra - te m p o ra l point of re fe re n c e a s the only way of avoiding

the do g m atism of a r b i t r a r y p o stu la tio n on the one hand and of overcom ing

the p e rn ic io u s re ia tiv ia a tio n of a ll v a lu es on the o th e r. Some sought to

avo id the e x tre m e s of th e ir c o n tem p o ra r ie s by re a s s e r t in g the e sse n tia l

c o r re c tn e s s of the G reco -R o m an und ers tan d in g of m an and h is to ry . O thers

ad voca ted a r e tu rn to a sp ec ific a lly C h ris tia n view of h is to ry , and a few

even sought to r e s u r r e c t the E n ligh tenm ent d o c trin e of an im m utab le and

a ll- s o v e re ig n n a tu ra l law . ^

H ow ever the a rg u m en ts advanced in sup p o rt of th e se contentions

have no t a lw ays m et w ith s u c c e ss , and f ro m a s tr ic t ly log ica l point of

view the e n tire a tte m p t could be d ism is se d a s a fancifu l and neo -R om an tic

^ G e r h a r d t K ru g e r, P ie G eseh ich te im Denken d e r G egenw art (F ra n k - fu r th /M a in : V itto rio K lo s te rm an n , 1947), a lso G rundfragen d e r P h ilo so p h ie : G eseh ich te , W ah rh eit, W is-senschaft (F ran k fu rth /M ain : V itto rio K lo s te r ­m ann, 195S)i O sca r C ullm ann, C h ris tu s und die Z e it, d ie u rc h r is t l ic h e Z e it-u n d G esch ich t gauffassung (Z urich : E v an g e lisch e r V erlag , 1946); W il­h e lm K am lah , C h ris ten tu m und G esch ich tlich k eit (S tu ttgart: W. K oh iham m er, 1951); Non G erm an re p re se n ta tiv e s of th is tra n sce n d e n ta l o rien ta tio n would be R einhold N iebuhr, F a ith and H is to ry (New Y ork: C. S c r ib n e r 's Sons,1949); H e rb e r t B u tte rfie ld , H is to ry and C h ris tia n ity (London: B ell, 1949); and JLeo S trauss* op. c j t .

nfligh t fro m re a lity . But d esp ite i ts lo g ica l w eak n esses, the s u p ra -

h is to r ic a l position a s such has p roven i ts e lf m o re v iab le than m o st of

the o th e r fo rm s of a n ti-h is to r ic is m . In fac t of a ll the a fo rem entioned

a n t i -h is to r ic is t tre n d s only the s u p ra -h is to r ic a l and e x is ten tia l m anaged to

su rv iv e the c a ta c ly sm ic and "d ec is iv e 15 N ational S o c ia lis t solution of the

G erm an " c r i s i s of h is to r ic is m . M The o th e rs w ere soon ab so rb ed by the

new reg im e although not b e fo re ex ertin g a defin ite influence upon the

grow th of re la te d m ovem ents elsew here, e sp e c ia lly in England. F o r e x ­

am p le , co n tem p o rary E ng lish an a ly tica l philosophy and T oynbee’s th eo ­

lo g ica l cy c lica l e m p ir ic is m s t i l l b e a r w itn ess to the influence of som e of

17th e se p o s t W orld War I G erm an developm ents.

In a ll ev en ts , the su rv iv a l and in c re a s in g academ ic im p o rtan ce of

the s u p ra -h is to r ic a l p o sitio n , p a r t ic u la r ly as an a lte rn a tiv e to ex is ten tia l

1 ftontology and E n g lish a n a ly tic a l philosophy, ind ica te th a t a c a re fu l study

of th is p a r t ic u la r tre n d is in o rd e r . The following a n a ly s is of the in te l­

le c tu a l developm ent of K a rl Eowith, a th in k e r who in the c o u rse of his

i yIg g e rs , op. c it. , pp. 9 -10 , has d isce rn e d a s tro n g d ec is io n is t

s t r a in in an a ly tic philosophy. M oreover Toynbee h as h im se lf acknow ­ledged h is debt to S peng ler. See "My View of H is to ry ," in C iv iliza tion on T r ia l and T he W orld and the W est (New Y ork: M erid ian B ooks, 1958), pp. 20-21. A lso fo r an ex ce llen t co m p ariso n and c o n tra s t of an a ly tica l philosophy and e x is te n tia l ontology consu lt W alter K aufm ann, C ritiq u e of R elig ion and Philosophy (New Y ork: D oubleday Anchor B ooks, 1961),pp. 20-60.

18 O e rh a rd t B au er, G esch ich tlich k e it, Wege und Irrw eg e e in es B eg riffs (B erlin : W alter de G ru y te r and C o . , 1963); Rudolf B ultm ann, H is to ry and E sch a to lo g y , the P re s e n c e of E te rn ity (New Y ork: H arp er

12

c a r e e r m oved fro m phenom enology and ontology to h is to r ic is m and then

finally to the s u p ra -h is to r ic a l p o sitio n , it is hoped, w ill snake a c o n tr i­

bution tow ard such a study.

T orch b o o k s, 1962b E m il JL. F ackenheim , M etaphysics and H is to ric ity (M ilw aukee: M arquette U n iv ers ity P r e s s , 1961); H ans G eorg G adam er, "H erm en eu tik und H is to r ism u s , M P h ilo so p h ise he R undschau, IX (1962), pp. 241-276; E r ic h K ah le r , op. c i t . ; Hans M eyerhoff, op. c it. ; R ich ard W ittram , Das In te r e s s e an d e r G esch ich te (G ottingen: Vandenhoek und R u p rech t, 1963).

CHAPTER I

R eaction to H eidegger

K a rl Low ith, the son of a G erm an c ra f tsm a n , w as born in M unich,

G erm any in 1897, and lik e so m any young m en of th is gen era tio n he was

ca lled upon to defend the V a terlan d befo re he had any re a l opportunity to

p u rsu e a chosen c a re e r . H ow ever im m ed ia te ly a f te r the conclusion of

the f i r s t W orld W ar, Lowith began h is s tu d ies a t the U n iversity of F r e i ­

burg . In itia lly he s tu d ied both biology and philosophy but the la t te r soon

b ecam e h is ch ief in te re s t . A lso a t th is tim e , two fig u res in p a r tic u la r

e x e r te d an im p o rtan t in fluence upon him , Edm und H u sse rl and M artin

H eidegger. F ro m H u sse rl, Low ith a cq u ired an u n d erstand ing and a p p re ­

c ia tio n of the phenom enological m ode of in v estig a tio n and in te rp re ta tio n ,

and a v ita l im p re s s io n of an e x tra - te m p o ra l o r s u p ra -h is to r ic a l sch o la r ,

i, e , , a th in k e r who is ap p aren tly unm oved by the upheavals and develop­

m en ts w ith in the so c io -p o litic a l re a lm . In 1939 in the p re face to h is book

Von H egel b is N ie tzsch e d ed ica ted to H u sse rl, Lowith observ ed

In those days when one fe a re d F r e ib u r g 's occupation by F re n c h tro o p s and the le c tu re h a lls becam e em pty, I sh a ll n ev er fo rg e t how th is g re a t sch o la r H u sse rl continued h is expositions w ith an in c re a s e d ca lm and su re ty a s if nothing in the w orld could d is tu rb the s e r io u sn e s s of sc ien tif ic in v estig a tio n . And when I v is ite d h im fo r the la s t tim e a t h is hom e, to w hich he w as now re s t r ic te d , sh o rtly a f te r the upheaval [1933J , i t w as again the im p re s s io n of a f re e s p ir i t a tta in ed to w isdom .

^ K a r l Low ith, Von H egel b is N ie tzsch e (1 st E dit. ; New Y o rk /Z u r ­ich : E u ro p a V erlag , 1941), p. 5. A second ed ition of th is w ork w ith a

13

14

Bat th is H u sse r l im p re s s io n w as soon overshadow ed by L ow ith 's

en coun ter w ith M artin H eidegger who quickly re p laced H u sse rl a s his

te a c h e r and in a v e ry sh o r t tim e a lso becam e a c lo se p e rso n a l friend .

H e id eg g er’s in fluence on JLdwith is re a d ily d isce rn ab le in h is d o c to ra l

d is s e r ta tio n , a phenom enological and on to logical “ E x eg esis of N ie tz sc h e 's

S e lf - In te rp re ta tio n and of N ie tz sc h e 's In te rp re ta tio n s . " Y et in sp ite of

th is fa sc in a tio n w ith H e id eg g e r 's ontologizing, Jhowith n ev er re a lly b e ­

cam e an ac tiv e d isc ip le . In fac t a y e a r a f te r the pub lica tion of H eideg­

g e r 's B eing and T im e , Eow ith pub lished Ms f i r s t m a jo r s c h o la r ly w ork ,

The Indiv idual in h is R ole a s F e llo w - Man, which is a c r i t ic a l re e x am in -

7 1a tio n of H e id eg g e r 's e n tire u n d e rs tan d in g of m an, n a tu re , and being.

slig h tly m odified and expanded tit le , Von H egel zu N ie tz sc h e , d e r re v o lu - tio n a re B ruch im D enken des neunzehnten Jafarh u n d erts : M arx and K ie rk e ­g a a rd and som e m ino r tex tu a l re v is io n s ap p ea red in 1949 w ith the sam e p u b lish e r. A th ird and fo u rth ed ition , ex ac t cop ies of the second, ap p eared in 1953 and 1958 re sp e c tiv e ly but now pub lished by the W. K ohlham m er V e rlag in S tuttgart* An E ng lish tra n s la tio n fro m the th ird ed ition ap p ea red in 1964 pub lished fey H olt, R in eh ard t and W inston of New Y ork. F o r fu r th e r in fo rm a tio n on B ow lth 's im p re s s io n of H u sse r l see “E ine E rin n eru n g an H u s s e r l ," ed. by H. C. Van B red a in P haenom enolog ica C o llection P ubliee sous le P a tro n a g e des C en tre s d* A rc h iv e s -H u s s e r l , Edm und H u sse rl 1859- 1959 (The H ague: M artin as N ijhoff, 1959), IV, pp. 48-55.

20K. Edw ith, "A uelegung von N ie tzsch es Selbst In te rp re ta tio n und von N ie tz sc h es In te rp re ta tio n e n 1' (U npublished Ph. D. T h e s is , P h ilo so p h i­c a l F acu lty , U n iv e rs ity of M unich, 1923). M icro film copy a t Wayne S ta te U n iv e rs ity l i b r a r y .

? IK. libw ith . Das Individuum in d e r R olle des M itm enschen , e in B e itra g z u r a n th r opoloM ischen G rundlegung d e r e th isch en P ro b le m e , (M u­n ich: D re i M asken, 1928). The M ohr V e rlag of Tubingen a lso pub lished th is w ork in 1928, and in 1962 the D arm stad t W issen sch aftlich e B u ch g ese ll- sch a ft p ro c u re d a sp ec ia l photocopy ed ition but only fo r th e ir m e m b e rs .

15

At f i r s t g lance, the an a ly s is of H eidegger and L/owith b e a r a c e r ­

ta in s im ila r i ty in so fa r a s both consciously seek to overcom e the C a r ­

te s ia n u n d e rs tan d in g of re a lity . Both a g re e th a t given the rig id s e p a ra ­

tio n betw een a re a lm of m e re m en ta l co n sc io u sn ess , r e s cog itans, and

a re a lm of sh e e r p h y sica l ex tension , r e s e x ten sa , the u ltim a te re s u lts

of th is se p a ra tio n a re a fundam ental d isp lacem en t of m an and w orld.

Man a s a s e lf conscious “ su b jec t” m ay have the pow er to “ re p re s e n t '1 to

h im se lf m a th em atica lly the sp ec ific ’'o b je c ts” of the non-conscious w orld .

But th is m a th e m a tica l-p h y s ic a l a c c e s s to the w orld does not re a lly co m ­

p en sa te fo r the lo ss of his fo rm e r in tu itiv e g ra sp n o r of the robbing of

TeB ex ten sa of a ll i ts qua lita tiv e r ic h e s and shades.

H eidegger con tends th a t the u ltim a te ro o ts of the C a r te s ia n con­

cep tion a re to be found in the an cien t A ris to te lia n and C h ris tia n s c h o la s ­

tic em p h asis upon being and e sse n c e as e te rn a l, in fin ite , and p e rfe c t in

c o n tra s t to the t r a n s i to r in e s s and fin iten ess of hum an ex is ten ce . In o th e r

w o rd s , he a rg u e s th a t D e sc a r te s has m e re ly s e c u la r iz e d the tra d itio n a l

view of m an and being, H ence, fo r H eidegger, the only way the C a r te s ia n

dichotom y can be ov erco m e is th rough a c r i t ic a l d e s tru c tio n of the e n tire

W este rn m e tap h y sica l trad itio n . In s tead of focusing upon the e te rn a l and

im m u tab le , he p ro p o ses to u n d e rs tan d m a n 's being in p a r t ic u la r and Being

in g e n e ra l f ro m the s tandpoin t of m a n 's e s s e n tia l f in iten e ss o r “ te m p o r­

a lity , "

Low ith’s re je c tio n of D e sc a r te s a lso s tem s fro m a re c o n s id e ra tio n

16

of the W este rn tra d itio n although by no m eans as ra d ic a l a s th a t of H ei-(

dagger. Bowith d is c e rn s the an teced en ts of the m odern su b jec t-o b jec t

o r ie n ta tio n in the R en a issan ce and R efo rm ation . Both, he a rg u e s , con­

tr ib u te d to w ard s the developm ent of the autonom y and se lf con sc io u sn ess

of the ind iv idual. By encourag ing a reex am in a tio n of the p u re c la s s ic a l

and C h ris tia n so u rc e s of W este rn c u ltu re , the R en a issan ce gave r is e to

a new u n d ers tan d in g and ap p re c ia tio n of n a tu re and of indiv idual p o te n tia l­

i t ie s . The R efo rm ation , th rough i ts rem o v a l of a l l in te rm e d ia r ie s b e ­

tw een God and m an, la id the foundations fo r a highly p e rso n a l and in d i­

v id u a lis tic ap p ro ach to questio n s concern ing the u ltim a te n a tu re of th ings.

T hus both, a cco rd in g to Bow ith, “ m otivated the p h ilo so p h ic a l-h is to ric a l

22p rim ac y of the 'I am* and *1 th ink1. “

In any case* when confron ted w ith the C a r te s ia n p re su p p o sitio n

of a s e lf su ffic ien t ego o r a se lf co n sc io u sn ess w hich is jux taposed to an

“o b jec tive" o r n o n -co asc io u s w o rld , Bowith a s w e ll as H eidegger re a c ts

s tro n g ly . H eidegger u n d e rs c o re s the sh e e r fac tu a lity of hum an ex isten ce

and Bowith the p r im o rd ia l p re - in te lle c tu a l bond betw een m an , n a tu re ,

and so c ie ty . H ence th e u n d ers tan d in g of re a li ty fo r both H eidegger and

Bowith h inges on m a n 's d ire c t e x p e r ie n tia l encoun ter w ith the w orld ra th e r

than on an a p p a ren t so v e re ig n se lf co n sc io u sn ess . H ow ever if Bowith and

H eidegger a r e in a g re e m e n t on the n e c e ss ity of beginning fro m such a fu n ­

dam en ta l en co u n te r, th e ir u n d ers tan d in g and e lu c id a tio n of th is encoun ter

^ Tbid. , p. Z,

17

i t s e l f d iv e rg e s sh arp ly .

H eidegger a rg u e s th a t d esp ite the s h e e r fac tu a lity of our ex isten ce

w e a re not s im p ly "ex tan t” vorhanden like a stone, n o r a r e we m e re ly

"fu n c tio n a l” zuhanden like a tool, L e . , d e te rm in ed by an a lien p u rpose .

In d is tin c tio n to the m e re ly ex tan t and the functional being, m an owns his

own being, fo r he i s , in e ffec t, th ru s t upon h im se lf a s a self. Thus,

w hile m an is not re sp o n sib le fo r h is "being th e r e ,” o r fo r ex is ten ce i t ­

se lf , he alone of the o th er two m odes of being has the unique p riv ileg e of

accep tin g o r re je c tin g the fa c t of h is own being. M o reover, hum an e x is t ­

ence is not a fixed quality like the p h y sica l being ta ll o r sh o rt; r a th e r it

is a constan t p o ss ib ility . We can e x is t in th is o r th a t m an n er, au th en ti­

ca lly o r in au th en tica lly , in an ind iv idual o r in an av erag e way.

An "av e ra g e " o r inau th en tic m ode of ex is ten ce , acco rd in g to H e i­

d eg g er, is e x is ten ce in the fo rm of the im p e rso n a l m a ss -m a n o r the " m an . ”

E x is ten ce a s such is a p r io r i an ex is ten ce w ith o th e rs . But only r a re ly

is one genuinely to g e th e r w ith o th e rs a s , fo r exam ple, w ith c lo se f r ie n d s ,

o r w ith " th o u s” w ith w hom the " I” has a m eaningful re la tio n sh ip . In stead

one is g e n e ra lly to g e th e r w ith anonym ous o th e rs w ith " m an . ” " M an” is

nobody in p a r t ic u la r ; " m an” is ev ery m an o r m a ss -m a n . .Life is e asy fo r

the anonym ous " m an” fo r h e re one can re ly on th e g en e ra l anonym ity

of the m a ss and. avoid a ll re sp o n s ib ility . Thus th e indiv idual by escap ing

in to the " m an” rem o v es fro m ex is ten ce th e b u rd en of being a se lf o r of

au th en tic ity . ^

^ H e id e g g e r , og, c i t . , pp. 114-130.

18

F u rth erm o re* H eidegger a rg u e s th a t one of the key e lem en ts in

d iffe ren tia tin g au then tic fro m inau then tic ex is ten ce is the acknow ledgm ent

of death a s the only tru e c e r ta in ty of ex is ten ce . As a sh ee r fac tu a lity the

ind iv idual has no know ledge of h is w hence and w h ither. H eidegger e x ­

p la in s th is ig n o ran ce a s a p roduct of our "feeing throw n in to ex is ten ce* "

o u r G ew orfenheit. No one has e v e r fre e ly decided w h e th er he w ants to

com e in to ex is ten ce o r not. Hence* i t is u tte r ly u n in te llig ib le why we

have to be. Out of th is ex p e rien ce , one not only a ttem p ts to escape in to

th e "m an" but a lso u n d e rtak es v a rio u s p ro jects* both indiv idual and c o l­

le c tiv e , to help b lo t out the uneasy co n sc io u sn ess of feeing u ltim ate ly no th ­

ing m o re than a sh ee r fac tu a l self. H ow ever the u ltim a te " p ro je c t ,"

E n tw u rf, w hich the ind iv idual can and ought to u n d e rtak e is the a n tic ip a ­

tio n and a p p ro p ria tio n of Ms death . F o r only by an tic ip a tin g and facing

re so lu te ly the p o ss ib ility of an im m inen t end can one becom e an au then tic

o r a "w hole and to ta l ex istence* " gang se in koanen. Thus by re so lu te ly

an tic ip a tin g d ea th , the individual, em an c ip a te s h im se lf f ro m the "m an"

and acknow ledges the u ltim a te f in iten e ss and nothingness* o r v e ry simply*

th e " tru th " of e x is ten c e a s such. I

T h is u ltim a te no th ingness of o u r ex isten ce is a lso re v e a le d in an

in defin ite "anx ie ty" A ngst. F o r H eidegger anx iety is d is tin c t f ro m a s p e ­

c ific f e a r of th is o r th a t. It is not concern ed w ith p a r t ic u la r o b jec ts in

the w o rld but r a th e r w ith the to ta lity of ex is ten ce its e lf . In such an anx iety ,

^ Ib id . , pp. 235*267*

19

w hich m ay em erg e on quite t r iv ia l o ccas io n s , m an suddenly lo se s h is hold

on the world* The whole of being seem s to d r if t away into no th ingness.

But th is e x p e rien ce of s tre tch in g out into no th ingness is in its e lf a f r u i t ­

fu l one* fo r it g ives u s the n e c e s sa ry background ag a in s t w hich we becom e

a w are of B eing a s such , of the am azing fac t tha t th e re is som eth ing and

no t nothing. H eidegger r e f e r s to i t a s the ’’w onder of a ll wonders* " And

ju s t b ecau se m an can ex p erien ce th is "w onder of a ll w o n d e rs ," he is an

ex cep tio n a l fa ta lly p riv ileg e d being, o r in H e id eg g e r 's on to logical te rm ,

a D a -se in , a "being there* " M oreover a s such an on to log ical being, m an

is a lso capab le of tra n sce n d in g h is own and ev ery o th e r co n cre te being

tow ard B eing as such* He can re la te h im se lf to o th e r be ings, to e v e ry ­

thing in the w orld , and to h is own being in i t , and th e re b y he s u rp a s s e s

a l l th e se v a rio u s kinds of c o n c re te be ings. In sum then , w ith th e e m e r ­

gence of m an o r D a -se in a m id s t a ll o th e r b e in g s, th e re o c cu rs an " in ro ad "

w hich opens the view on B eing a s such.

In opposition to th is ex c lu s iv e ly e x is te n tia l and on to logical view

of m an, Lowith p ro p o se s an und ers tan d in g of hum an ex is ten ce w hich is

b a se d upon the conviction th a t "au th en tic e x is ten ce" can only be a tta in ed

by re e m p h as iz in g the p r im o rd ia l bonds w hich e x is t betw een the indiv idual

and so c ie ty o r w hat JLowith te rm s the M itw elt. "T he w orld is a lre a d y eo

ip so M itw elt" ju s t a s " life in g e n e ra l is a lre a d y eo ip so a life to g e th e r

2^w ith o th e rs . " F o r Low ith» the M itw elt is m uch m o re than a m e re

z %K, JLowith, Individuum , p. 16. Lowith h e re a lso seem s to im ply

zo

anonym ous im p e rso n a l m a ss ; it is the w orld of our fe llow -m en w ith whom

genuine and m eaningful re la tio n sh ip s a re possible* When we encounter

an " o th e r , " Lowith a rg u e s , we enco u n te r h im a p r io r i as a p e rso n a e ,

i. e. , a s a being e sse n tia lly d e te rm in ed by a p a r t ic u la r ro le such a s h u s-

26band, fa th e r , so ld ie r , e t c . , "w ithin and fo r the M itw elt. " Thus m an

in so c ie ty , a s a p e rso n a e , p re c e d e s m an as a sh e e r fac tu a lity o r a s an

im p e rso n a l, anonym ous " m an . "

F u r th e rm o re , since Lsdwith sp ec ific a lly an ch o rs the m eaning of

e x is ten ce in m an a s a p e rso n a e , he m u s t a lso co n ce rn h im se lf w ith the

p ro b lem of e th ic s . "O ne can only be ’ego tis tica l' o r 'k ind ' b ecau se of the

e x is ten ce of o th e rs to whom one can be 'ego tistica l* o r 'k ind. ' E g o tism

as w ell a s k in d n ess a r e not in n e r q u a litie s w hich can e x is t by th em se lv es

but a r e w hat they a r e a s e x p re ss io n s of hum an l i f e ," i. e . , of the p e rs o n a e -

27M itw elt re la tio n sh ip . In c o n tra s t, H e id eg g e r 's iso la te d indiv idual is a

co m ple te ly a m o ra l, nonefh ical being. In fac t, by im p lica tio n , H eidegger

seem s to be say ing th a t tra d itio n a l e th ic s have l i t t le o r nothing a t a ll to

do w ith the s tru g g le to com e to an a w a re n e ss of ex is ten ce and Being p e r

se . Thus E ow lth 's em p h asis upon the e th ic a l d im ension of ex is ten ce , w hile

th a t H e id e g g e r 's ju x tap o s itio n of the iso la te d indiv idual se lf to the im p e r ­sonal " m an" does not re a lly co n stitu te a n overcom ing of C a r te s ia n d u a l­is m but is m e re ly a c o n tem p o ra ry re s ta te m e n t of the old su b jec t-o b jec t d is tin c tio n .

26I b id . , p. 16.

27I b id . , p. 51.

Z1

not ex ac tly tra d itio n a l in the sen se of re s tin g upon su p e rn a tu ra l sanc tions,

n o n e th e less in d ica te s a conscious a ttem p t to re ta in a p ra isew o rth y fe a tu re

of the old tra d itio n . T his tendency to re ta in c e r ta in e lem en ts of the t r a ­

d ition , in opposition to H e id eg g e r 's tru ly ra d ic a l b re a k w ith the p a s t, is

a lso c le a r ly m an ife s t in L ow ith 's view of n a tu re and in h is conception of

tim e and h is to ry .

Hum an ex is ten ce , of c o u rse , im p lie s the ex istence of a w orld.

B ut, fo r H eidegger, the w orld is not m e re ly an e x te rn a l sum to ta l of a ll

ex tan t being, n o r is i t a sh e e r sy s te m of functional be ings. It is a u n i­

v e r s a l and yet, a t the sam e tim e , an e x is ten tia l s tru c tu re . As ind ica ted ,

m an is not in the w orld like a stone o r a too l but is e sse n tia lly re la tin g

h im se lf to th e se and o th e r be ings in the w orld . Thus he is fro m the v e ry

o u tse t of h is hum an e x is ten ce a w orld ly ex is ten ce . F u r th e rm o re , the

w orld i ts e lf is not s im p ly a m e re b lind m a ss of being; it , too, is a sp e ­

cific way oi* s ta te of being. If the w orld w ere nothing but a b lind m a ss of

being then i t would be a sh e e r chaos. But g ran ted th a t the w orld is not a

chaos, th is does no t m ean th a t, a s a s ta te of being , i t is in tr in s ic a lly

m eaningfu l. A ll it in d ica tes is th a t it is in tim a te ly re la te d to the e x is t ­

ence of m an. F o r i t is only to m an a s th e so le being capab le of t r a n s ­

cending h im se lf and the w o rld th a t the w orld ac tu a lly re v e a ls i ts e lf a s i t

r e a lly i s , i. e . , a s an o rd e re d to ta lity o r a cosm os. T h e re fo re H eidegger

re g a rd s the ex is ten ce of the w orld and m an a s a " s in g le undivided phenom ­

enon, " and th e w orld is , in e ffec t, red u ced to the s ta tu s of a m e re e x is ten tia l

22

s tru c tu re . Its v e ry ex is ten ce and d isco v e ry is in ex tric ab ly bound up with

the ex is ten ce of m an h im se lf.

But th is und ers tan d in g of the w o rld com pletely und erm in es the

tra d itio n a l view of w o rld and m an as e ith e r an in te g ra l p a r t of an a l l -

enco m p assin g n a tu re o r a s a sp ec ia l c re a tio n of a tra n sce n d e n ta l c re a to r -

god. In fac t, n a tu re its e lf , acco rd ing to H eidegger, cannot e lucidate the

on to log ica l c h a ra c te r of the w orld and of our ex is ten ce becau se it is only

an o th er kind of being w ith in our w orld ; we only encoun ter i t in the co u rse

of the a n a ly s is of m an’s ex isten ce . It is a m e re b o rd e rlin e case of the

"th ings in the w orld . " H ow ever, in w hat re s p e c t it is such a b o rd e r ­

lin e c a se is not su b jec t to c lo se r exam ination . A pparen tly n a tu re does

not enjoy an autonom ous ex is ten ce a t a ll in H e id eg g e r 's on to logical a n a ly ­

s is , van ish ing in the vague notion of th a t w hich is m e re ly "ex tan t" - - in

c o n tra s t to the m e re ly "functional. "

JLowith, on the o th e r hand, does reco g n ise an autonom ous life on

the p a r t of n a tu re a s w ell a s a s tr ic t ly n a tu ra l, L e. , autonom ous d im en ­

sion of hum an ex is ten ce . F o r Low ith, the w orld , w hile i t is p redom ina te ly

the w orld of our fellow m en, th e M itw elt, i s a lso the w o rld of n a tu re , the

U m w elt; and a lthough the Um welt i s su b jec t to a c e r ta in d eg ree to the in ­

flu en ces of the M itw elt, i t n o n e th e le ss re ta in s a s e lf -su ff ic ie n t o r au tono­

m ous co re w hich is p e rm an en tly im p en e trab le to the M itw elt. "T h is p r i ­

m o rd ia l independence of n a tu re a t f i r s t r e v e a ls i ts e lf to m an a s th a t w hich

^ H e id e g g e r , op. c i t . , p. 65.

23

can be cu ltiv a ted no fu r th e r , tra in e d no fu r th e r , b red no fu r th e r , e tc .

Thus n a tu re , w hile c le a r ly su b jec t to hum an in fluence, is not, how ever,

to ta lly co n stitu ted by m an ’s ex is ten ce ; hence m an and the w orld a re not

a "s in g le undivided phenom enon. M

But in Lbw ith’s view , i t is not only e s se n tia l th a t one reco g n ize

the fundam ental autonom y of n a tu re , a tru e understand ing of re a lity a lso

en ta ils a reco g n itio n of the "on to log ical dual n a tu re of m an. " Lowith

u n d e rs tan d s m an a s a "p r im o rd ia l d isun ity , " i. e, , a being n e ith e r ex ­

c lu siv e ly n a tu ra l n o r s p ir itu a l but ra th e r "am biguous" and " u n n a tu ra l ."

By am biguous and u n n a tu ra l he m eans th a t in c o n tra s t to the r e s t of o r ­

ganic being, m an is the only c re a tu re which can com m it su ic ide . "An

unam biguous n a tu ra l c re a tu re cannot negate i ts e lf b ecau se along w ith

lack ing the d isun ity in i ts be ing , it a lso lack s the freed o m to i ts e lf and

th e re fo re a lso fro m its e lf . By ex istin g i t a lre ad y has to be. But m an,

30ju s t b ecau se he is a liv e , does not e o - ipso have to b e ." Yet once m an

dec id es to be, i. e. , once he w illing ly accep ts th a t w hich a lre ad y is ,

nam ely h is ex is ten ce to g e th e r w ith o th e rs in the M itw elt and U m w elt, he

o v e rco m es h is p r im o rd ia l d isun ity and e x is ts au then tica lly . Thus L ow ith 's

d is tin c tio n betw een m an and n a tu re and h is u n d erstand ing of m an a s a b e ­

ing p o s se ss in g a n "on to log ical dual n a tu re " i s , in e ffec t, a co n tem p o rary

re fo rm u la tio n of the tra d itio n a l view . F o r in both the c la s s ic a l and

29 Low ith, Individuum , p. 33.

3Qlb id , , pp. 18-19*

24

C h ris tia n tra d itio n s m an is a lso fundam entally a two d im ensional o r dual

being , a s tra n g e unity of n a tu re and s p ir i t , a '’ra tio n a l’1 an im al o r an im ­

m o rta l soul te m p o ra r ily im p riso n ed in a m a te r ia l body.

But if, a s H eidegger a rg u e s , m an is n e ith e r exclusively n a tu re ,

n o r s p ir i t , n o r a unique com bination of the two, and m o re o v e r a being

fo r w hom n a tu re i ts e lf is a sh e e r e x is te n tia l s tru c tu re constitu ted by m an’s

own unique being in the w orld , w hat then is the u ltim a te m eaning of e x is t ­

ence a s such? G iven th e se p re su p p o s itio n s , the only p o ss ib le an sw er is

in te rm s of the phenom enon of tim e o r te m p o ra lity und ers to o d a s the tru e

c h a ra c te r o r e sse n ce of ex is ten ce . A ccording to H eidegger, the funda­

m en ta l lim ita tio n of tra d itio n a l m etap h y sics is th a t i t u n d e rs tan d s m an

and being a s e ith e r a m e re m an ife s ta tio n of a u n iv e rsa l cosm os o r as a

p ro d u c t of a tra n sc e n d e n ta l c re a to r -g o d . In e ith e r c a se , the point of d e ­

p a r tu re of tra d itio n a l m e tap h y sic s is th a t w hich i s now p re s e n t and alw ays

% 1p re s e n t o r the e te rn a l. ^ It h as l i t t le em pathy fo r m a n 's excep tional on to­

lo g ica l ex is ten ce a s a P ag e in and fo r the fu tu re a s the p r im a ry h o rizo n

of a l l hum an p ro je c ts . Thus w hat H eidegger c a lls m e tap h y sic s is ac tu a lly

m e tap h y sic s in an e n tire ly u n trad itio n a l sen se . In stead of ind ica ting

som eth ing e ternal* in fin ite , and p e rfe c t, it is a "fin ite m etap h y sics of

f in ite n e ss , " w hich see k s to u n d e rs tan d B eing in g e n e ra l and m a n 's being

"^^See the ex ce llen t a n a ly s is by H elene W eiss of "T h e G reek Con­cep tions of T im e and B eing in the L ight of H e id eg g e r 's P h ilo sp p h y ," Ph ilosophy and P henom enolog ical R e se a rc h , I (1941), 173ff.

25

in p a r t ic u la r w ithin the s ing le a ll-e n co m p ass in g horizon of tim e . A s a

re s u lt , m an e m e rg e s a s a one d im ensional being ra th e r than a s an "o n ­

to lo g ica l dual n a tu re ," a sh ee r fac tu a lity , a t b e s t ex isting "au th en tica lly ”

w ith in a to ta l te m p o ra lity o r " h is to r ic ity " of a ll th ings; o r a s H eidegger

pu ts it , "T he h is to r ic ity of ex is ten ce is e s se n tia lly the h is to r ic ity of the

w orld . " 32

F o r I/ow ith, ex is ten ce in the fo rm of the p e rs o n a e - M itw elt r e l a ­

tio nsh ip is a lso im p lic itly te m p o ra l and h is to r ic a l but not, of course# in

the ra d ic a l sen se of H e id eg g e r 's to ta l h is to r ic ity of a ll th ings. While fu l­

ly acknow ledging the innate te m p o ra l d im ension of ex is ten ce , he a lso

ta k es pains to c irc u m sc r ib e th is d im ension , and th e reb y he re v e a ls a

fu r th e r tie to the tra d itio n and in p a r t ic u la r to D ilthey. D ilthey w as con­

v inced th a t a l l ph ilo soph ical and re lig io u s id eas sp rin g fro m the to ta lity

of m a n 's liv ing e x p e rien ce and th a t they can only be understood in te rm s

of th e ir o r ig in s in th is liv ing ex p erien ce . In o th e r w o rd s , JLowith u n d e r­

stan d s D ilthey a s acknow ledging th a t m an is a h is to r ic a l being " 'to the

unfathom able depths of the self. *" But th is does not m ean th a t m an is

a lso a sh e e r te m p o ra l d e te rm in a tio n in the abso lu te sen se of H eidegger.

F o r D ilthey, m an a s a h is to r ic a l being m eans th a t ev ery ind iv idual is

d e te rm in e d by h is c o n te m p o ra r ie s , i. e. , by h is h is to r ic a l context.

"H ence the no tion of g e n e r a t i o n £ slc j i s D ilth ey 's fundam ental

■^H eidegger, op. c it. , p. 388.

33 JLbwith, Individuum , p. 26.

26

h is to r ic a l concept. It en co m p asses both the com m unal life a s w ell a s

the te m p o ra lity of e x is te n c e .1134 A lso , fo r Low ith, tim e is not " tem p o ­

ra lity " an a ll-e n co m p ass in g horizon , but a continuum which m an ife s ts

i ts e lf in the su cc e ss io n of the g en era tio n s , and h is to ry is not ’’h is to r ic ity , "

an abso lu te contingency of a ll th ings, but the u n d erstand ing of the ” sp e ­

c ific g en era tio n s of th inking raan "3^ w ith in the tim e continuum .

Yet along w ith th is D iltheyan h is ta r ic is t re je c tio n of H e id eg g er’s

no tions of te m p o ra lity and h is to r ic ity , Lowith w as a lso in te re s te d in o th e r

a l te rn a t iv e s to H eidegger. In fac t sh o rtly a f te r the ap p earan ce of The In ­

d iv idual in h is R ole as F e llo w - M an, lie undertook a c a re fu l a n a ly s is of

w hat m ight be te rm e d a "co sm ic " ap p ro ach to h is to r ic a l phenom ena.

Lowith*s a n a ly s is of h is to ry a s a n a tu ra l o r co sm ic happening b e ­

gins w ith a g en e ra l ju x tap o s itio n of B u rck h ard t and H egel. B u rck h ard t

is v iew ed a s an "an th ro p o lo g ica l" th in k e r g rea tly concerned w ith e x t r i ­

ca tin g the ind iv idual f ro m the v a rio u s en tang lem en ts and p re s s u re s of

h is age. H egel, in c o n tra s t, is seen as the "ph ilo soph ica l" o r " m e ta ­

p h y s ica l" th in k e r s tr e s s in g the t ie s betw een ind iv idual, fellow m an, and the

v a rio u s so c io -p o litic a l em bodim ents of the u n iv e rsa l w orld s p ir i t . But

34Ib id . , p. 26,

35 ••K. Low ith, " F e u e rb a c h und d e r A usgang d e r k la ss isc h e n deu t- sch en P h ilo so p h ie , " L ogos, XVII (1928), pp. 328,

3^K. Low ith, "B urckhard t*s S tellung su H egel’s G esch ich tsp h ilo - s o p h ie ," D eutsche V ie r te l ja h re s s c h r if t fu r L ite ra iu rw isse n sc h a f t und G e is te sg e sc h ic h te , VI (1928), pp. 702-741.

27

Ldwith w ants a poin t of view which com bines the b e st of both B u rck h ard t

and H egel. la k e B u rck h a rd t, he fav o rs an ap p ro ach to h is to ry which

re c o g n ize s m an as a fre e agent not m e re ly p ass iv e ly responding to the

v ic is s itu d e s of h is age. Y et, like H egel, JLbwith w ants th is f re e agent to

be a p e rso n ae co n sc io u s ly in te g ra te d w ith h is M itw elt r a th e r than an i s o ­

la te d ind iv idual ex is ten ce . F u r th e rm o re he a lso w ants an approach to

h is to ry w hich ta k es cognizance of the sp ec ifica lly n a tu ra l d im ension of

e x is ten ce a s e x p re s se d in the 11 on to logical dual n a tu re of m an. "

Ldwith seek s to o v ercom e th is d ilem m a by tu rn in g to an in v e s t i­

gation of the p ro b le m of h is to r ic a l cau sa tio n , since i t alone en ta ils the

antinom y betw een free d o m and n e c e ss ity o r the an tinom y betw een the

37consc ious and unconsc ious w e llsp r in g s of a ll action , JLowith begins

h is in v estig a tio n by su rv ey in g the view s of Kant, Sehelling , and T o lstoy ;

and he com es to the conclusion th a t of a l l the a fo rem en tio n ed th in k e rs ,

33T o lsto y b e s t an sw e re d the question ‘''what re a lly happens when m an a c ts ? "

A ccord ing to Jhowith, T o lstoy view ing hum an life a s a whole o r en

m a sse c o n s id e re d i t im p e n e tra b le to a b s tr a c t ra tio n a l ap p reh en sio n . A ll

“p h ilo soph ical" a tte m p ts to u n d e rs tan d re a l i ty w ere fo redoom ed to fa ilu re .

" 'T h e r e a r e two s id es to m a n 's life ; a p e r s o n a l life w hose d eg ree of

f reed o m is dependent upon the a b s tra c tn e s s of Ms in te re s ts and an

37Ib id . , pp. 733-734.

3^Ibid. * p. 733. An ex ce llen t a n a ly s is of the T olstoyan view of h is to ry can be found in Isa ia h B e r lin , The H edgehog and the F o x , an E ssa y on T o ls to y 's View of H is to ry (New Y ork: M entor B ooks, 1957).

Z3

e l e m e n t a r y life , a h e rd life , in w hich m an w ithout fa il fu lfills tha t

w hich is p re d e te rm in ed . ,u Thus "counsc iously m an liv es for h im se lf

but, unconsc iously , he s e rv e s a s a tool for the a tta in m en t of the h is to r i-

39c a l goals of a ll m an k in d .!1

Viewing man. in th is fash ion , the only explanation fo r h is to r ic a l

ac tio n w hich T o lsto y can o ffer is im p e rso n a l in te rm s of the "even t i t ­

se lf , " o r in te rm s of " the n a tu ra l co u rse of the anonym ous happenings. ”

H is to ry , he say s , is m oved by "an *X, f an unknown im p e rso n a l factor*

F o r T o lstoy - - and h e re too fo r liiw ith h is to r ic a l happenings a re con ­

s id e re d to be a s in sc ru tab le yet a s inev itab le and autonom ous as the h ap ­

pen ings in n a tu re . H is to ry is , in e ffect, analogous to n a tu re . J u s t a s a

v a s t n u m ber of s ing le and m inute o c c u rre n c e s in n a tu re u ltim a te ly is su e

in a m a jo r n a tu ra l happening such a s a h u rr ic a n e , to rnado , e tc . , so a

v a s t num ber of sing le and m inute hum an happenings u ltim a te ly is su e in

a m a jo r h is to r ic a l even t such a s a c iv il u p ris in g , a w a r, e tc . M oreover

ju s t as a n a tu ra l happening, once u n der way, m u st be allow ed to ru n its

c o u rse , so too a h is to r ic a l even t, once u n d e r way, is not su b jec t to r e ­

v e r s a l o r m a jo r m odification .

In add ition , T o ls to y 1® ju x tap o sitio n of the p a ss iv e a lm o s t ap a th e tic

G en era l Kutuzov to the a c tiv e dynam ic N apoleon i s a sym bo lica l r e p r e ­

sen ta tio n of h is own "n a tu ra l" ap p ro ach to h is to ry in co m p ariso n to the

^^Quoted in Low ith, "B u rc k h a rd t’s S te llu n g ," p. 737.

40I b id . , pp. 738-739.

29

" ra tio n a l" o r "ph ilosoph ical" view of a H egel. Kutuzov ad ju sts and adap ts

h im se lf to the in ev itab le , w hile Napoleon w illfu lly seek s to reg u la te and

govern the c o u rse of even ts , "U nlike Kutuzov N apoleon lacks a genuine

in s ig h t into the fa te fu ln ess of what m u st happen and w hat he m u st th e r e ­

fo re do. " A lso , in sh arp c o n tra s t to Kutuzov, N apoleon " is not v en erab le

and tra g ic , in s te ad he is com ical b ecau se h is ex ag g era ted se lf-c o n sc io u sn ess

b linds h im to the subconscious pow ers w hich he has to obey w hether he

.41w ants to o r not. "

T h is T o lstoyan dual view of m an; a s a ra tio n a l se lf-co n sc io u s in ­

d iv idual enjoying a f re e p e rso n a l life , but a s a p a r t of so c ie ty , "uncon­

sc io u s ly se rv in g a s a tool fo r the a tta in m en t of th e h is to r ic a l goals of a ll

m ankind, " Ixiw ith judges to be a " re m a rk a b ly o rig in a l com bination" of

the "an th ro p o lo g ica l" view of B u rek h a rd t and the "ph ilosoph ical" view of

H egel. In fac t he even goes so fa r as to d e c la re th a t " i t is , to p a ra p h ra se

D iithey, a s i f 'l i fe itself* is re f le c te d in i t - - 'hum an ly ' and yet not 'too

hum anly. ,n4^

H ow ever d esp ite th is re c o u rse to D iithey to sanc tify the T olstoyan

" re co n c ilia tio n " of the H egelian and B u rck h a rd tian ap p ro ach es to h is to ry ,

i t is obvious th a t the t ie s betw een T o lstoy and D iithey a re a t b e s t, highly

tenuous, e s se n tia lly negative r a th e r than positive* One can, of c o u rse ,

po in t to the fac t th a t both T o lstoy and D iithey w e re s tro n g ly opposed to

41 I b id . , p. 740.

30

a ll fo rm s of m e tap h y sica l concep tua lization th a t seek to c irc u m sc r ib e

dynam ic and c re a tiv e life fo rc e s . But beyond th is com m on opposition to

m e ta p h y sic s , th e re is l i t t le e lse to un ite the two m en. D ilthey’s ca re fu l

d e m arca tio n of the re a lm s of n a tu re and h is to ry and h is w ho lescale a f ­

f irm a tio n of h is to r ic is m a s a g re a t lib e ra tin g fo rce b reak ing " 'th e la s t

ch ain s w hich philosophy and n a tu ra l sc ien ce could not te a r a p a r t , " f^ is

c e r ta in ly a fa r c ry fro m T o ls to y 's em p h as is upon the e s s e n tia l s im ila r ity

betw een n a tu re and h is to ry , i. e . , " the n a tu ra l co u rse of the anonym ous

happenings, " In any c a se , B ow ith 's p reo ccu p a tio n with both the D iltheyan

and T o lstoyan view s of h is to ry is a fu r th e r in d ica tio n th a t his acknow ledg­

m ent of the in n a te te m p o ra l d im ension of hum an ex is ten ce in no sen se

e n ta ils the a b so rp tio n of e x is ten ce a s such into a H eideggerian a l l -

en co m p assin g te m p o ra lity and h is to r ic ity .

To sum up: in th e se e a r ly w orks, JLdwith re v e a ls h im se lf to be a

s tra n g e blend of tra d it io n a lis m and a n ti- tra d itio n a lism . In itia lly , like

H eidegger, he sought to m ake a c le a r b re a k w ith the p a s t and overcom e

the su b je c t-o b je c t b ifu rc a tio n of re a li ty w ith i ts re su ltin g a lien a tio n of

m an and w orld . H ow ever h is em p h asis upon the autonom y of n a tu re and

the o n to log ica l dual n a tu re of m an, to g e th e r w ith h is D iltheyan and T o l­

s toyan re je c t io n of H e id eg g e r 's ab so lu te te m p o ra lity - - a l l point to h is

b a s ic in d eb ted n ess to th e m e tap h y sica l tra d itio n . Y et on the o th e r hand.

^ Q u o te d in Hajo H olborn , "W ilhelm D iithey and the C ritiq u e of H is to r ic a l R e a so n ," Jo u rn a l of the H is to ry of Id e a s , XI (1950), p* 118,

4

31

h is s e a rc h fo r the sp ec ific m eaning of ex isten ce so le ly in te rm s of the

p e rso n ae -M itw e lt re la tio n sh ip is not, in i ts e lf , a s tr ic t ly tra d itio n a l con-*

c e rn . F o r both the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n th in k e rs the question of the

sp ec ific m eaning of hum an ex is ten ce w as f a r outw eighed by o th e r m o re

‘’fundam ental51 m a tte rs such as the con tem plation of the in n e r w orkings

of the cosm os o r the in te rp re ta tio n and re a lis a tio n of the W ill of God.

Thus w hile Liowith m ay re ta in the tra d itio n a l notion of a b a s ic duality of

m an, h is em p h asis upon m an in h is ro le a s a p e rso n ae is a m an ifesta tio n

of h is s in c e re search , fo r an un d ers tan d in g of hum an ex is ten ce w hich is

n e ith e r tra d itio n a l in the s t r ic t ly c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n sen se n o r to ta lly

new and ra d ic a l in the sen se of H e id eg g e r 's o n e -s id ed e x is te n tia l and on­

to lo g ica l p e rsp e c tiv e .

H ow ever a f te r th is e s tran g e m e n t fro m H eidegger, JLowith's in te r ­

e s t a lso began to sh ift f ro m the s t r ic t ly phenom enological and p h ilo so ­

p h ica l a n a ly se s of the g e n e ra l p ro b le m s of hum an ex is ten ce to an in v e s t i­

ga tion of the o rig in s and developm ent of co n tem p o rary thought and, s p e ­

c if ic a lly , to the ro le of h is to r ic is m in th is developm ent. And it is to

th is new in te r e s t and p reo ccu p a tio n th a t we now should tu rn .

CHAPTER II

K is to r ic ism as H um anism

jLowith1 s view of the o rig in s and developm ent of contem porary-

thought is d e te rm in ed by the conviction tha t H egel’s philosophy c o n s ti­

tu ted a genuine cu lm ina tion of th e W estern m etap h y sica l trad itio n ; w ith

H egel ’’the d estin y of p u re philosophy i t s e l f w as decided. A fter

H egel, he a rg u e s , philosophy could no longer e x is t a s p u re sp ir itu a lA K

concep tua liz ing but only a s ’’ph ilo soph ical h is to r ic a l an thropology, ” ' “

i, e. , a s an in v estig a tio n of the ’’h e re and now of ac tu a l hum an life .

Thus H eg e l's death in au g u ra ted "o u r own tru e 'in te lle c tu a l ' h is to ry "

s in ce the com m on poin t of d e p a r tu re of m o st of the p o s t-H eg e lian th in k ­

e r s and the "young o r " le ft" H egelians in p a r t ic u la r w as "no longer a

p u re 'c o n sc io u sn e s s ' o r a p u re 'r e a s o n ' o r an abso lu te ' s p i r i t , ' but

47ra th e r m an a s such in h is sh e e r naked ex is ten ce . "

^ K . JLowith, "H egel und H e g e lia n ism u s ," Z e its c h r if t fu r deu tsche B lldung, VII (1931), p. 565.

^ K . JLowith, "F e u e rb a c h und d e r A u sg an g ," p. 323.

46K« .Ldwith, "K ie rk eg a a rd und N ie tz s c h e ," D eutsche V ie r te l ja h r - e s s c h r if t fh r L ite ra tu rw isse n sc h a f t und G e is te sg esc h ich te , XI (1933), pp. 47-43 .

^ K . JLowith, "H egel und H eg elian ism u s, " p. 565. To avoid con­fusion , in the follow ing p ag es the te rm "young" o r " le ft" H egelians w ill be ap p lied ex c lu siv e ly to the ra d ic a l a n ti-m e ta p h y s ic ia n s am ong the fo l­lo w ers of H egel; " neo" H egelians to those who a ttem p ted to rev iv e and re ju v en a te H egel in the n in e teen tw en ties and th ir t ie s ; and "old" H egel­ia n s to those who p re s e rv e d the o rig in a l H egel as b e s t they could th ro u g h ­out the la t te r decad es of the n in e teen th cen tu ry .

32

33

S ta rtin g w ith F e u e rb a ch , Lowith finds th a t he w as one of the f i r s t

to reco g n ize the g re a t d isc rep an cy betw een the p re ten tio n s of H egelian

id e a lism and the a c tu a l s o c io -h is to r ic a l re a lity . Given ’’the thorough

co m m e rc ia liz a tio n of life in h is d a y ,” F eu e rb ach re a liz e d th a t "m ind” o r

’’s p i r i t” in i ts p rev a ilin g , i. e. , its H egelian fo rm , had becom e '‘g round-

43le s s . ” A ccord ing ly , F eu e rb ach sought to re sc u e m an fro m the '’id e a l­

is t ic m o ra s s" into w hich he had sunk - - a p a r tic u la r ly d ifficu lt ta sk since

"m an a s such does not p lay a p r in c ip a l ro le in H egel’s abso lu te p h ilo so ­

phy. B ecause of h is o b sess io n w ith the a ll encom passing "u n iv e rsa l

s p i r i t , " H egel only knows m an in the a b s tr a c t , as a m e re "su b jec t of

e a r th ly n eeds" and an "o b jec t of c iv il leg is la tio n . " In e ffec t then, Hegel

only knows m an as a " p a r tic u la r ity " r a th e r than a s a " to ta l i ty ." And

F e u e rb a c h ’s b a s ic co n ce rn w as to tra n s fo rm th is H egelian " p a r tic u la r ity "

back in to a " to ta lity " again , by re a ffirm in g the n o n -m e tap h y sica l, L e . ,

the " s e n s u a l-c o rp o re a l" o r " m a te r ia l" bonds ex is tin g betw een the in d i-

v idual and h is fellow m en. In fac t, in Lbw ith’s opinion, F eu e rb ach

w as one of the e a r l ie s t co n tem p o rary th in k e rs to reco g n ize the im p o rtan ce

Low ith, "K ie rk eg a a rd und N ie tz s c h e ," pp. 44-45.

^ K . Low ith, "M ax W eber und K a rl M a rx ," A rch ly fu r S o z ia l* w isse n sc h a ft und Sog ia lpo litik , LXVII (1932), p. 177. T his sam e a r t ic le , w ith m en tion of the c u r re n t l i te r a tu r e and a few m in o r s ty lis tic re v is io n s , a lso a p p e a rs in L ow ith 's G esam m elte A bhandlungen zu r K ritik d e r g esch ic tt- lich en F x is te n z (S tu ttg a rt: W. K oh lham m er, I960). A ll follow ing c ita tions of th is a r t ic le r e f e r to the o rig in a l r a th e r than the I960 v e rs io n .

5QI b id . , p. 180.

34

of a genuine I-T hou re la tio n sh ip . And Ldwith a lso fre e ly acknow ledges

h is indeb ted n ess to F eu e rb ach in h is own a ttem p t to tra n s fo rm the H eideg-

g e rian iso la te d indiv idual in to a p e rso n ae p o sse ss in g m eaningful tie s to

h is M itw elt.

Yet F e u e rb a ch w as not the only th in k er who found H egelian ism in ­

com patib le w ith re a lity . A n u m ber of o th e r th in k e rs w ere equally d is ­

p le a se d w ith H egel’s in te rp re ta tio n of m an and the w orld , not the le a s t

of whom w as K arl M arx. M arx and F e u e rb a ch , Ldwith a rg u e s , sh a re

"the judgm ent th a t H egel’s philosophy of s p ir i t only inc ludes m an as a

52p a r t ic u la r i ty but no t a s a b a s ic hum an and ph ilo soph ical to ta lity . "

H ow ever in the a tte m p t to re e s ta b lis h m an as such a "b a s ic to ta l i ty ,"

Low ith finds th a t M arx goes fa r beyond F e u e rb a c h ’s re la tiv e ly sim ple

sug g estio n of re em p h as iz in g the e s s e n tia l t ie s betw een the indiv idual and

h is fellow m en.

M arx seeks to e s ta b lish m an as a " to ta lity " o r m an’s tru e hum an­

ity by com plete ly re c o n stitu tin g the e n tire so c io -eco n o m ic b ase of m odern

socie ty . F o r M arx , m an is e s se n tia lly a " sp e c ie s of so c ia l b e in g ," a

g e se lls c h a fti ic h e s G attungsw esen , and a s such he " ’develops his tru e

Ldw ith, Individuum , pp. 5-13 , and "F e u e rb a c h und d e r A u s - g an g ," p a ss im . F o r som e in te re s t in g su g g estio n s concern ing the " fo rm a l" s im ila r i t ie s betw een the thought of H egel and H eidegger im p lied by th is tie betw een F e u e rb a ch and Lidwith, consu lt Ldwith* s , "G rundzuge d er F n tw ick- lung d e r P lihnom enologie z u r P h ilo soph ic und ih r V e rh a ltn is zu r p ro te s ta n - tisc h en T h e o lo g ie ," Tfaeologische R undschau , H (1930), p. 357, footnote 1.

^ L o w ith , "M ax W eber und K a rl M a r x ,11 p. 183.

nature only w ithin so c ie ty and the power of bis nature cannot be m easu red

k 3by the pow er of the sing le indiv idual but only by the s tan d a rd of socie ty . If,v^

But in the m o dern b o u rg e o is -c a p ita lis tic o rd e r , m an is a lien a ted fro m

h im se lf as w ell a s so cie ty by v ir tu e of c a p ita lism 's tendency to understand

every th in g so lely in te rm s of i ts com m odity value. M arx even co m p ares

the m an of bo u rg eo is so c ie ty w ith a com m odity. Ju s t a s in its com m odity

“value fo rm ” a th ing is w orth a c e r ta in sum of money and i ts “n a tu ra l fo rm "

re m a in s co m p le te ly i r r e le v a n t to th is com m odity value, so in h is b o u r­

geois "value fo rm " the ind iv idual m ay play an im p o rtan t ro le a s a b an k er,

g e n e ra l, e tc . , in co m p ariso n to h is " ra th e r shabby" ro le as a p la in n a t­

u r a l "m an a s such, " And as h is b o u rg eo is "value fo rm " in c re as in g ly

ta k es p reced en ce o v e r h is “n a tu ra l fo rm " and g radually b ecom es the s ta n ­

d a rd fo r the v e ry being and b eh av io r of m an, m an w ill n e c e s sa r ily be

re if ie d and a lie n a te d fro m h im se lf and his fellow m en. Hence only w ith

the d e s tru c tio n of the com m odity "value fo rm s" of m o dern c a p ita lism and

i ts equally a r t i f ic ia l bo u rg eo is so c ia l o rd e r w ill tru e hum anity be re e s ta b -

.. , , 54lish ed .

A nother th in k e r deeply co n cern ed w ith the d an g ers th rea ten in g

m an in m o d ern c a p ita lis tic and in d u s tr ia l socie ty w as Max W eber. Both

M arx and W eber could be c o n s id e red ad voca tes of a "ph ilosoph ica l

^ Q u o te d in K. Ldwith, "M an 's S e lf-A liena tion in the E a r ly W rit­ings of M arx, " S ocia l R e se a rc h XXI (1954), p. 210.

^ K . Low ith, “ Max W eber und K a rl M a rx ," pp. 185-207.

36

sociology of co n tem p o rary m an. But w here M arx confined h is an a ly s is

to m an ’s " s e lf a lienation" as a r e s u lt of c ap ita lism , Lowith finds th a t

W eber sought to u n d e rs tan d a ll of the v a rio u s phenom ena of m odern e x is t­

en ce , c a p ita lism included , under the m o re com prehensive c a te g o rie s of

" ra tio n a liz a tio n " and "d em y stif ica tio n . "

A ccord ing to W eber, s ince the c lo se of the m iddle ages W estern

c iv iliz a tio n has b een su b jec t to a g rad u a l but steady en erv a tio n of i ts

sp ir i tu a l v igou r th rough the w id esp read and e v e r in c re a s in g u se of ra tio n a l

p r in c ip le s and tech n iq u es . The e a r l ie s t defin ite m an ifesta tio n s of th is

p ro c e s s of ra tio n a liz a tio n he d isc e rn e d in the ap p earan ce of la rg e sca le

c a p ita lis tic e n te r p r is e s in the fifteen th cen tu ry (the M edici bank and the

F u g g e r c o m m e rc ia l com plex) and in the sc ien tif ic d isc o v e rie s of the s ix ­

te en th and seven teen th c e n tu r ie s . In addition , W eber w as e sp e c ia lly co n ­

c e rn ed w ith the g rad u a l u n d erm in ing and d isso lu tio n of a il of the tra d itio n a l

sp ir i tu a l s tan d a rd s of va lue which accom pan ied th is p ro c e s s of ra t io n a l­

iza tio n and d em y stifica tio n . In fac t, fo r W eber, one of th e g re a te s t d an ­

g e rs th re a ten in g tw en tie th cen tu ry m an w as h is to ta l ab so rp tio n in to im ­

p e rso n a l, ob jec tiv e , ra tio n a lly o rg an ized but in h e ren tly " v a lu e le s s ,"

w e r tf r e ie , in s titu tio n s - - b e they g o v ernm en ta l, econom ic, in d u s tr ia l, o r

sc ie n tif ic in c h a ra c te r . An e x tre m e e x p re ss io n of th is a ll-e n c ro ac h in g

ra tio n a liz a tio n w as, of c o u rse , the " to ta l m ob iliza tion , " the to ta le M obil -

m achung of W orld W ar I. ^

^ Ib id . , pp. 60-62*

56I b id . , pp. 91-99 .

37

Lowith a lso contends th a t W eber1 s only so lu tion to the p re d ic a ­

m ent of e v e r in c re a s in g ra tio n a liz a tio n and dem y stifica tio n w as a con'*

sc io n s re je c tio n of the tra d itio n a l hum anist id ea l of the w ell rounded p e r ­

so n ality and a com m itm en t to the sc ien tif ic techno log ica l ideal, of the

im p e r s o n a l ex p ert" o r F ach m en sch . The e x p e rt "co m m its h im se lf to

ev ery th ing and nothing, invo lves h im se lf in any given s itua tion , and, a t

the sam e tim e , e x is ts e n tire ly for h im se lf, “ * Tim s Lowith finds th a t

W eber o ffe red h is c o n tem p o ra r ie s an “open sy s te m of p o s s ib il it ie s" inC j J

w hich m en a re f re e to c re a te th e ir own s tan d a rd s of m eaning.

K ie rk e g aa rd and N ie tzsch e a r e a lso p ro d u c ts of the young-

H egelian ’s “an th ro p o lo g ica l11 re o rie n ta tio n of thought; and they a r e e s ­

p ec ia lly in te re s t in g to Lowith b ecau se they “o rig in a lly d isco v e red and

coined the two fundam ental conceptions of co n tem p o rary philosophy:

’life* and ’ex istence;*" and b ecau se they “ exposed w ith excep tional k een -

59n e ss and th o ro u g h n ess" the p ro b le m of n ih ilism and i ts overcom ing .

Lowith in te rp re ts K ie rk e g a a rd ’s p reo ccu p a tio n w ith n ih ilism a s

the p ro d u c t of h is u rg e n t d e s ire to e ffec t a rev iv a l of the C h ris tia n fa ith

a s it had ex is ted in the e a r ly c e n tu r ie s , in the days when indiv idual m a r ­

ty rd o m w as the su p rem e te s t fo r the b e lie v e r. G iven th is d e s ire ,

57Ib id . , p. 98.ca t

Ib id . , p. El 2, A lso see Lowith* s com m em o ra tiv e a r t ic le on W eber, “Die Entzauberum g d e r W elt du rch W issen sch aft, zu Max W eber's 100, G eb u rts tag , " M e rk u r, XVTII (1964), pp. 501-319.

^ K . Low ith, "K ie rk e g a a rd und N ie tz sch e , “ pp. 50-51.

K ie rk eg aa rd w as, of c o u rse , re le n tle s s ly opposed to the so c ia l m ove­

m en ts of the 1840's and the ob jective in s titu tio n s of salvation of his day,

p a r tic u la r ly the D anish s ta te church . Both, in h is judgm ent, em bodied

a pseudo ra th e r th an a tru e re lig io s ity and a "m ass'* ra th e r than an " in ­

dividual" ex is ten ce , "a leveling of the . . . ind iv idual w ith in the anony-

60m ous undertak ing . " C onsequently , K ie rk eg aa rd sought to detach the

ind iv idual fro m h is t ie s to the co llec tiv e and m ake him aw are tha t he was

" iso la te d and im p o te n t," a m e re "sin g le e x is te n c e ," an E im selner who,

com ple tely devoid of a ll su pport, s tands on the edge of the n ih ilis tic

ab y ss .

By a rgu ing in th is fash ion , K ie rk e g aa rd a lso c le a r ly fo reshadow s

H e id eg g e r 's la te r ju x tap o sitio n of the iso la ted indiv idual D asein and the

im p e rso n a l m a ss -m a n o r " m an . " But in sh a rp c o n tra s t to H eidegger,

K ie rk e g aa rd doe® not leave the indiv idual suspended on the edge of the

ab y ss w ith the m eag e r conso la tion th a t he now e x is ts "au then tica lly"

ra th e r than " in au th en tica lly . " In stead , for h im , once the individual has

becom e conscious of the p re c a r io u sn e s s of h is p o sition , i. e. , once he

is com ple te ly em an c ip a ted fro m the co llec tiv e , the foundation is la id fo r

h is leap back to tru e re lig io u s fa ith since K ie rk eg aa rd is convinced tha t

th is s ta te of e x tre m e n ih ilis tic ind iv iduation cannot endure . It m u st is su e

^ K . luowith, K ie rk e g aa rd und N ietgsche o d er ph ilosoph ische und theo log ische ffberw indung des N ih iliem us (F ra n k fu rt/M a in : V itto rio K lo s te rraan n V erlag , 1933), pp. 10-11.

61

39

e ith e r In com plete negation (su ic ide) or in com plete a ffirm atio n (the faith

of the fa th e rs and m arty rs)*

In c o n tra s t , N ieto a ch e 's p reo ccu p a tio n w ith n ih ilism w as not a t a ll

m o tiv a ted by a sp ec ific d e s ire to rev iv e the old faith* In fac t, fo r N ie tz ­

sch e , C h ris tia n ity co n stitu ted a g re a t s p ir i tu a l " s ic k n e ss" of W este rn

m an , a w eakening and s tiflin g sub lim atio n of h is h e ro ic , if occasio n ally

b ru ta l, v ita l is t ic w ill im p u lse s . Thus one of N ie tz sc h e 's fundam ental

c o n ce rn s w as to p ro m o te and fu r th e r the n ih ilis tic p ro c e ss by uproo ting

and exposing the unconsc ious and p e rv e r te d rem n an ts of C h ris tian ity

w hich he d isc e rn e d in the "decaden t" m usic d ra m a s of R ichard W agner

and in the g e n e ra l c u ltu ra l P h il is t in ism of the Second R eich.

H ow ever N ie tzsch e w as not unaw are o f the dan g ers a ttend ing an

u n b rid led n ih ilism . And in o rd e r to help m an avoid the blandishm ent©

and p an aceas of th o se who know how to m an ipu la te and explo it the fe a r of

th e nothing, he a lso sought to te ach m an how to live w ith th is n ih ilism ,

to m a s te r it , and even tually to overcom e it. In s tead of seeking d irec tio n

fro m som e fo rm of the su p e rn a tu ra l and yearn in g fo r im p o ssib le s p ir itu a l

cu lm in a tio n s , N ie tzsch e co unse led m an to focus upon the joys and b u rd en s

of o u r p u re ly n a tu ra l e x is ten c e , i. e. , to a c t h e ro ic a lly and v ita lly w ithin

62the g re a t co sm ic cycle of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e .

But if Lowiih thus c le a r ly in d ica te s the undeniable "con tem porunity"

o f th e se young-H egelian th in k e rs - - a t le a s t in te rm s of th e ir "an th ro p o -

62I b id . . pp. 16*31.

40

lo g ica l” and, ” e s s e n t i a l ” r a th e r than m e tap h y eica l o rie n ta tio n - * i t is

a lso im p o rta n t to note tha t only re la tiv e ly few of th em escap e h is c r i t ic a l

sea rc h lig h t, ^

F eu e rb ach , fo r ex am p le , one of the t r a i lb la e e r s of the new o r ie n t

ia t ia a and, a s in d ica ted , a th in k er who in sp ire d som e of Lb w ith’ s own con**

ception®, i s n o n e th e less judged on the whole to be vague and inadequate*

Indeed, in M s evalua tion of F eu e rb ach , Lowlth, su rp r is in g ly , finds him*1

s e lf in com plete a g re em e n t w ith the o b se rv a tio n of F r ie d r ic h E ngels tha t

Feuerbach* s "h u m a n ita r ian communism** of the I-T hou re la tio n sh ip is

nothing but a sen tim en ta l c liche ,

"L ove is a lw ays and ev ery w h e re the m ag ica l fo rce th a t h e lp s F e u e rb ach o v ercom e a ll of the d iff icu ltie s of p ra c tic a l l ife ” . . . » H ow ever in .rea lity , th is ‘'love1* which is to unite a ll th ings finds e x p re ss io n ” i» w a rs , q u a rre ls* ju d ic ia l p ro c e s s e s , d iv o rc e s , and m an ’s exp lo ita tion of Ms fellows* * . * F o rm a lly F eu e rb ach is a r e a l is t , he u se s m an a s M s point of d e p a r tu re bu t he has no re a l co m p reh en sio n o f the w orld in w hich th is m an liv es , Hence hi# m an re m a in s the sam e -abstract Individual of the old H egelian p h ilo so p h y .f*

43'O th e r im p o rtan t young "'Hegelian th in k e rs such as I), F . S tra u s s , B. B au e r, and M. S ii rn e r who a lso m ade im p o rtan t co n tribu tions to the developm ent of co n tem p o ra ry thought a r e , how ever, not sing led out by Low ith, fo r sp ec ific a n a ly s is . In stead th e ir id eas a r e su rveyed in con* ju n c tio n w ith th e ir p a rtic ip a tio n in the g e n e ra l c ritiq u e of re lig io n in the ■nineteenth cen tu ry ; and, sp ec if ic a lly , in so fa r a s they a ttem p ted to r©~ p lace the m e tap h y sica l H egelian t! s p i r i t ”' w ith such an th ro p o lo g ica lly m o ­tiv a ted concep ts a s an a il enco m p assin g “hum anity” (S tra u ss ) , o r-a fully "em an c ip a ted man'* (B auer), o r even a ra d ic a lly iso la ted ’’E lnzelnen*1 (S tlrn e r) . K*. Lowifh, 11 .Die philosophised© K ritik d e r c h r is tlic h e n R elig ­ion im 19* Jahrhundert* ” TkeaJMgiafcha, Rnada.e.haa,, V (1933), pp. 131*172 and pp. 201*226,

^ Q u o te d in EC* Low ith, *’F e u e rb a ch und d e r Ausgang, ” pp. 340*341*

41

C om paring Marx, and W eber, Ldwith. finds the W eberian an a ly s is

of c a p ita lism and m o d ern in d u s tr ia l socie ty su p e r io r to M arx 's o n e-s id ed

econom ic p e rsp e c tiv e since W eber '"broadened1* and " re la tiv ise d " M arx 's

th eo ry by fittin g i t in to the w id er and m o re profound "hypo thesis of r a -

tio n a liz a tio n and d e m y stif ic a tio n .1* But Edw ith1 s ch ief ob jection to

M arx c e n te rs upon Ms defin ition of m an a s p r im a r i ly a " sp e c ie s of so c ia l

being. " As we have seen , fo r JLdwith, the so c ia l d im ension of existence*

the p e rs o n a e - Mitwe.lt re la tio n sh ip , is e x trem e ly im p o rtan t, bu t Lowith

is a lso f irm ly convinced th a t " in p rin c ip le th e re e x is ts m o re than one

66tru th about m a n ." And an im p o rtan t a sp e c t of th is m an ifo ldness of the

hum an condition is the "o n to log ica l dual n a tu re of m an. "

In c o n tra s t, M arx has l i t t le if any un d ers tan d in g fo r m a n 's duality

and e sp e c ia lly not fo r the b a s ic re c ip ro c ity i t im p lie s betw een m an and

n a tu re . In fac t, fo r M arx , n a tu re " is only a sub o rd in a te p reco n d itio n of

hum an ac tiv ity . The only sc ien ce th a t M arx reco g n ized w as the " s c i ­

ence" of M sto ry and n a tu ra l o b jec ts lik e plants* a n im a ls , and m in e ra ls

only in te re s te d h im in so fa r a s they p layed a spec ific ro le in m a n 's

^ K . Eow ith, "M ax W eber und K a rl M a rx ," pp. 60-62.

66lb id . , p. 214.

67K. Low lth, " Vom Sinn der G eschichte," ed. by L. R einlsoh inP e r Sinn d e r G esch ich te (M unich: G, H. B eck, 1961), p. 44. An E n g lish tra n s la t io n of th is e s s a y can be found in K, Eow ith, N a tu re , H is to ry , and E x is te n tia lis m and O ther E s sa y s in the P h ilosophy of H is to ry , ed. by A. E ev ison ('*N o rth w este rn U n iv ers ity S tudies in Phenom enology and E x is t­e n tia l P h ilo so p h y ,11 E vanston : N o rth w este rn U n iv ers ity P ress* 1966), pp. 131-144.

42

" h is to r ic a l , " i . e . , c o m m erc ia l and in d u s tr ia l a c tiv itie s . As th ings in

th e m se lv e s , he found th em as in te re s tin g and sign ifican t a s " 'so m e of the

re c e n tly e m erg ed A u s tra lian c o ra l is la n d s , *"6^

T urn ing to K ie rk e g aa rd and N ie tzsch e , DSwith ag a in r e i te r a te s

th e ir im p o rtan ce a s the d ire c t fo re ru n n e rs of co n tem p o rary e x is te n tia l­

is m and life ph ilosophy, but he a lso po in ts out th a t th e ir thought en ta ils

s e v e ra l im p o rtan t d e fic ien c ie s a ll tra c e a b le to th e ir inab ility to b e a r

the b u rd en of th e ir s e lf im posed iso la tio n and n ih ilism . To a la rg e e x ­

ten t,

th e ir n ih ilism w as the . . . r e s u lt of th e ir ra d ic a l i s o l a ­t i o n of an a lie n a te d unw orld ly "ex is ten ce . " H ow ever the u ltim a te consequence of th is kind of n ih ilis tic iso la tio n w as . . . its an ti - pode; an e r u p t i o n info the o p e n sh o rtly b e fo re the end . * . K ie rk e g aa rd fina lly e ru p ted in to the w orld of his tim e w ith an a b ­su rd a tta c k upon the D anish s ta te church . In the m id s t of th is a t ­ta ck , he co llap sed and died. . , , N ie tzsch e , n e a r the end and a lre a d y qu ite de ran g ed , now c o n sid e red the time rip e to invite the E u ro p ean r u le r s to a con ference in Rom e fo r the pu rpose of r e a l ­iz ing h is philosophy p o litic a lly . . . , With th e se p o litic a l e ru p tio n s out of th e ir iso la tio n , both d e m o n stra ted th e in n er im p o ssib ility of a ra d ic a lly iso la te d ex is ten ce e ith e r b e fo re "God" o r the "n o th ­in g ." 69

68Quoted in K. Dowith, "Y om Sinn d e r G e se h ic h te ," p. 44; a lso quoted in Die B egelsehe D inke, ed. by K. Ddwith (S tu ttg a rt/ Bad C annstatt: F r ie d r ic h F ro m m an n [p u n th e r Holzboog] , 1962), pp. 36-37.

69JLowith, "K ie rk eg a a rd und N ie tz sc h e ," pp. 65-66. With th is r e ­je c tio n of the iso la te d ind iv id u a lism of K ie rk e g aa rd and N ie tzsch e , we ag a in com e to the c o re of Do w ith ’s ob jections to the e x is te n tia l m ode of thought i ts e lf , n am ely , i ts labk of a genuine con tac t w ith a fellow m an o r a M itw elt. S im ila r o b se rv a tio n s on the inadequac ies of the e x is ten tia l view point can be found in L dw ith 's *1 E x is ten zp h ilo so p h ie , " Z e its c h r if t fu r d eu tsch e B ildung, VIII (1932), pp. 602-613, and in h is "Ph& nom enologische O ntologie und p r ot e s tan iisc h e T heologie , " Z e its c h r if t fu r Theologie und K irc h e , XI (1930), pp. 365-399.

43

Yet Lowith* s unw illingness to accep t the ©pacific view points of

K ie rk e g a a rd and N ie tzsch e o r F eu e rb ach and M arx in no sen se en ta ils

an im p lic it re je c tio n of the g e n e ra l e ffo rt of th e se th in k e rs to u n d e rs tan d

m an so c io -h is to r ic a lly o r "ex is ten tia lly " ra th e r than m etaphysica lly . In

fac t Lowith is f irm ly convinced th a t the '’u n iv e rsa lly hum an" is "alw ays

u n iv e rs a l in a h i s t o r i c a l m an n er, " and th a t "ev en the n a tu ra ln e ss of

m an . . . has i ts h is to r ic a ln e s s . What was ’n a tu ra l ' fo r the G reeks o r

70fo r E o u sseau is no longer equally n a tu ra l fo r u s . " Thus, fo r Lowith,

a l l of the v a r ie d a sp e c ts of the phenom enon w hich is m an can only com e

to lig h t in the re a lm of h is to ry . M an 's " e s s e n tia l hum anity" se ine M en-

sch lich k e it and h is to ry a r e seen a s in tim a te ly re la te d ; th e re fo re the h is ­

to r ic a l ap p ro ach o r the h is to r ic is m of the young-H egelians could be con ­

s id e re d a co n tem p o ra ry hum an ist point of view . M oreover once having

accep ted th e se fundam ental p r e - suppositions of the young-H egelians, if

not th e ir sp ec ific co n clu sio n s , lo w ith a lso soon d isc o v e rs one of th e ir

n u m ber w ith w hom he is in com plete ag reem en t. W ilhelm D ilthey.

We have a lre ad y d isce rn e d D ilth ey 's influence upon lo w ith in h is

71c ritiq u e of H eidegger*s conception of h is to r ic ity . H ere Lowith view s

D ilthey a s a th in k e r who s tro v e fo r a " se lf-u n d e rs ta n d in g of the 'm odern*

m an of E u ro p ean s o c ie ty ," by focusing p r im a r i ly upon "m an as s u c h in

^K » Low ith, "K ie rk eg a a rd und N ie tz sc h e ," p. 64.

71See above, C hap ter I.

44

72h is d iffe ren t s o c io -h is to r ic a l s itu a tio n s. " D ilthey w as in te re s te d

l!n e ith e r in th e ren ew al of an old n o r in the c re a tio n of a new m e tap h y sic s ,

73but r a th e r in an in tu itiv e an a ly s is of a c tu a l hum an life. " And th is a n ­

a ly s is , in s te a d of re v e a lin g a sing le a ll encom passing re a lm of tim e le ss

lo g ica l p re d ic a te s , b rought to lig h t a m u ltip lic ity of W eltanschauungen

w hich D ilthey u n d ers to o d as the tra n s ie n t " e x p re ss io n s” of v a rio u s

m e tap h y sica l '’needs* " But if th is point of view co n stitu ted a defin ite

s tep fo rw a rd in the g rad u a l em ancipation of m an fro m m etap h y sica l dog­

m a tism , it a lso en ta iled a num ber of w eak n esses . And to the charge tha t

i t could only is su e in a p a ra ly z in g re la tiv is m and sce p tic ism , JLowith r e ­

p lie s th a t D ilthey n ev e r in tended the e s ta b lish m e n t of an ob jective p h ilo ­

so p h ica l sy stem . In fac t, fo r D ilthey, philosophy is "n e ith e r m o re n o r

le s s th an a d is c re te ask in g and answ ering" since "w ithin hum an cu ltu re

74and s o c ie ty ," i t is a m e re function of life its e lf . In o th e r w o rd s , what

D ilthey sought to su b stitu te fo r tra d itio n a l m e tap h y sic s w as u ltim ate ly

only a ph ilo soph ical "a ttitu d e . H He w as not concerned w ith the ob jective

" tru th " of the w orld bu t only w ith the re la tiv e "consequence" of the v a r ­

ious in te lle c tu a l m an ife s ta tio n s of the s o c io -h is to r ic a l re a lity . A cco rd ­

ing ly , he a lso a rg u ed th a t we should not, a s the m e tap h y sic ian s , a ttem p t

to im p o r t m eaning fro m the w orld in to life . B ather* quite the co n tra ry ,

7^K. Jhowith, "H egel und H e g e lia n ism u s ," p. 560.

^ I b i d * , p. 561.

74I b id . , p. 561.

45

we should co n sid e r " ’the p o ss ib ility th a t m eaning and sign ificance only

75com e in to being in m an and h is h is to ry .

But if th is an ti* m e tap h y sica l and avowedly h u m an istic o rien ta tio n

is c h a ra c te r is t ic of D ilthey, then i t would ap p ea r tha t th e re a lso e x is ts

a b a s ic bond betw een D ilthey and N ie tzsche . N ie tzsch e , too, consciously

s tro v e to overcom e the "m e tap h y s ica l h in te rlan d " and to re e s ta b lis h the

p rim ac y of " life " a s jux taposed to " s p i r i t . " Y et h e re Lowith a rg u e s th a t

N ie tzsche and D ilthey a re not re a lly com patib le . The "N ie tssc liean path

fo r the 'd isc o v e ry of the phenom enon m an '" u ltim a te ly is su e s in the iso*

la ted ind iv idual who by dint of e x tre m e s e lf d isc ip lin e finally tra n sce n d s

h im se lf, so c ie ty , and h is to ry to an accep tan ce of the g re a t co sm ic cycle

of e te rn a l re c u rre n c e . In c o n tra s t, fo r D ilthey, "w hat m an re a lly is only

b eco m es m an ife s t in the c o u rse of h i s t o r y , i. e . , th rough h is ex istence

76in the m id s t of s o c i e t y . " Thus D ilth ey 's "ph ilo soph ica l h is to r ic a l

re la tiv is m " o r h is to r ic is m as h um an ism w as, fo r Lowith, the only tru ly

v iab le p o s itio n in the post W orld W ar I e ra . In fac t, a s la te as 1933,

Law ith w as s t i l l so com pletely enveloped in th is p o sitio n that he w as

quite c e r ta in th a t any u ltim a te so lu tion to the n ih ilism of h is day would

co n stitu te a defin ite tu rn in g away fro m a sp ec ifica lly hum an ist o r ie n ta ­

tion . " If n ih ilism w ere e v e r re a lly abo lish ed , m an could bury h im se lf

a s m a n , b ecau se the m oving fo rce in a ll hum an o c c u rre n c e s is alw ays

^ Q u o te d by .Lbwith in Ib id . , p. 503.

^ Ib id . , p. 561,

46

77'th e pow er of negation. u*

How ever by 1935, a f te r the a ssu m p tio n of p o litic a l pow er by the

N azi p a rty and a f te r th e ir callous inhum anity had begun to m an ife st its e lf ,

Lbw ith w as no lo nger a s c e r ta in of the benefits to be d e riv ed fro m the

"pow er of n e g a tio n ," n o r as su re of the u ltim a te value of the h is to r ic is t -

re la t iv is t po in t of view . T h is re c o n s id e ra tio n of h is e a r l ie r convictions

is c le a r ly re v e a le d in h is a n a ly s is of the thought of a leading "o cc a s io n -

a l is t" and "d ec is io n is t" p o litic a l ph ilo so p h er who w as a lso a N azi apo lo -

78g is t, C a r l S chm itt. Jhowith not only condem ns S chm itt fo r his N az ism

and a n ti-S e m itism , bu t he now a lso in d ic ts the e sse n tia lly n ih ilis tic co re

77 Lidwith w as a lso f irm ly convinced tha t the a ttem p ts of his con­te m p o ra r ie s to ov erco m e th is n ih ilism , rang ing fro m the n e o -c la s s ic a l sp ecu la tio n s of S tefan G eorge to the d ia le c tic a l theology of K arl B arth , w e re fo redoom ed to fa ilu re . "H undreds of y e a rs w e re re q u ire d fo r it

n ih ilism to a r i s e and hundreds w ill be re q u ire d fo r i t to p a ss away.The p re s e n t s itu a tio n is no d iffe ren t fro m th a t w hich N ie tzsche delineated som e fifty y e a rs ago. " He o b serv ed , " 'W e have su ffe red youth as if i t w ere a s e r io u s i l ln e s s . T h is is the r e s u lt of the tim e in to which we have b een h u rle d -*• a tim e of a g re a t in n e r decay and d isso lu tion . U n c e r­ta in ty is the ch ief c h a r a c te r is t ic of our age* " 'N oth ing r e s ts on a so lid foundation. . . , One only liv e s fo r the nex t day, b ecau se the day a f te r to m o rro w is a lre a d y doubtful. JLowith, 'K ie rk e g a a rd und N ie tzsch e . " p. 29.

78H. F ia la (pseudonym ), " P o lit is c h e r D e z is io n ism u s ," In te rn a ­tio n a le Z e its c h r if t fu r T h eo rie des R ec h ts , DC (1935). A slig h tly expanded v e rs io n of th is sam e a r t ic le can be found in G eaam m elte A bhandlungen, pp. 93-123. The follow ing c ita tio n s r e f e r to the o rig in a l. F o r an in te r ­e s tin g accoun t of H e id eg g e r 's b r ie f f lir ta tio n w ith N az ism see B ow ith 's, "l#es im p lica tio n s p o litiq u es de la ph ilosophic de I 'e x is te n c e chez H eideg­g e r , " ibes T em ps M odernea , II (1947/48), pp. 343-360.

of S c h m itt 's fundam ental o rie n ta tio n a s the u ltim a te ground, of h is N azism ,

In c o n tra s t to the tra d itio n a l re lig io u s , p h ilo soph ical, o r m o ra l d ecision

fo r a p a r t ic u la r c o u rse of ac tio n , a d ec is io n which g en era lly en ta iled a

c le a r reco gn ition of the p o ss ib le consequences, Ldwith finds th a t Schmitt*

d ec is io n fo r p o litic a l ac tiv ity " is nothing but a d e c i s i o n fo r the sake of

7Qd e c i s i o n ” y re g a rd le s s of any consequences, T hus, as fa r a s Schm itt

i s co n cern ed , the sh e e r a c t of decid ing i ts e lf co n s titu te s ” the sp ec ific

e sse n c e of the p o litic a l* "

M oreover s in ce S chm itt cam e to th is conclusion on the b a s is of

the h is to r ic !s t p rin c ip le s e s ta b lish e d by the young‘•H egelians, Lowith was

a lso p ro m p ted to re c o n s id e r h is e a r l ie r b lanket condem nation of Hegel

and tra d itio n a l m e tap h y sic s . Now he finds th a t the young‘•H egelians a re

not only re sp o n s ib le fo r the em ancipa tion of m an fro m the " id e a lis tic m o ­

r a s s ” of H eg elian ism but a lso fo r " th e decay of the good conscience in

re s p e c t to w isdom , sc ien ce , and know ledge” w hich had s t i l l ex is ted ingi

H e g e l's day. In o th e r w o rd s , Ldwith reco g n ize s th a t once philosophy

is red u ced to the s ta tu s of a m e re handm aiden to the so c io -p o litic a l con­

te x t, once i t ab d ica te s to the "dem ands of p o litic s fo r a fundam ental r e -

82o rie n ta tio n . . . on the b a s is of the 's p i r i t of the t i m e , i t , in effect,

^ K . Ldw ith, " P o li t ls c h e r D ez is io n ism u s, ” p. 110.

8^Ib id . , p, 110.

81 I b id . , pp. 121-122.

Ib id . , p. 122, footnote 1*

48

• co m m its a kind of su ic ide. T rad itio n a lly , philosophy se rv e d “to d isc lo se

and enlighten'* but w ith the young-H egelians i t se rv e d m e re ly "*to s tr ik e ,

fight* neg a te , and contradict*" w ithin the a ll-p o w erfu l so c io -p o litic a l

fram ew o rk .

H ow ever in sp ite of th is re c o n s id e ra tio n of the young-H egelians*

d e s tru c tio n of m etaphysics* i t would be p re m a tu re to co n sid e r Lowith a

defin ite a n t i -h is to r ic is t a t th is point. F o r although he now ad m its tha t

th e m ovem ent in itia te d by th e se th in k e rs could is s u e in the n ih ilis tic de~

c is io n ism of a S chm itt, he a lso e m p h as ise s th a t i t was c e r ta in ly not the

in ten tio n of the young “H egelians to e ffec t a to ta l d e s tru c tio n of the e x is t­

ing value sy stem . In fac t Lowith re p e a te d ly s t r e s s e s th e ir " sp ir i tu a l

v ig o r" in co m p ariso n to the a r id and s te r i le o ld -H eg e lian ism of th e ir day;

and he tak es g re a t p a in s to po in t out th a t th e ir sp ec ific p ro p o sa ls fo r a

re o rg a n is a tio n of so c ie ty and fo r a re h a b ilita tio n of m an w ere not based

on "a d ec is io n fo r th e sake of d ec is io n " but w e re d e te rm in ed by th e ir

fa ith " in the ex is ten ce of a su p rem e p rin c ip le ["h u m a n ity ," o r " m a n ,"

o r the " c la s s le s s so c ie ty ’] w hich a lw ays functioned a s the c r i te r io n fo r

th e ir d ec is io n s .

N o n e th eless Ldwith*s in c re a s e d cau tion concern ing the h is to r ic is t

o rie n ta tio n is p e rh a p s b e s t in d ica ted in h is o b se rv a tio n th a t no in te llig en t

m an "w ill deny th a t m ind o r s p ir i t is ‘contem porary* o r *present*, i . e . ,

83Ibid ,, p. 122.

in tim a te ly re la te d to- a co n c re te situation.. But fro m th is fac t, one cannot

s im p ly deduce th a t the hum an in te lle c t ex h au sts i ts e lf a s being nothing

m o re than a m e re e x p re ss io n of th is co n cre te situa tion . In s tead Bo-

w ith a rg u e s th a t the hum an in te lle c t p o s s e s s e s i t s own p e cu lia r ’’s p ir itu a l

being’1 w hich en ab les i t to p e n e tra te " to the p e rm an en t e ssen ce of hum an

a f fa irs and to tra n sc e n d ev e ry hie and nunc*1' -*** although ju s t w hat is

m ean t by the in te llect*s ’’ s p ir itu a l being" and the "p erm an en t e sse n se of

hum an a f fa ir s " i s not su b jec t to fu r th e r e lucidation .

JLowith’s doubts a s to the v a lid ity of the h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n ar©

a lso ap p a ren t in a num ber of o th e r s tu d ies th a t ap p ea red in the m iddle

and la te th irties* ^ In 1935, fo r exam ple , Low ith pub lished a thorough

a n a ly s is of N ie tzsch e , e lab o ra tin g and syn thesiz ing m any of h is e a r l ie r

o b se rv a tio n s and judgm ents. Yet in sp ite of h is defin ite sym pathy for

N ie tz s c h e 's a tte m p t to r e a s s e r t the an c ien t p re -S o c ra tic d o c trin e of e t e r ­

n a l re c u r re n c e , he po in ts out th a t th is a tte m p t w as fo redoom ed to fa ilu re

b ecau se of N ie tz sc h e ’s to ta l ab so rp tio n in the spec ific p ro b lem s of h is

p a r t ic u la r tim e . In Lowith* s opinion, N ie tzsche did not a r r iv e a t e te rn a l

re c u r re n c e in the c o u rse of a d is in te re s te d , i. e. , S u p ra -h is to r ic a l

85I b id . . p. 123.

86lb id . . p. 12.3.

®^K. Low ith, "M ax S c h e le r und das P ro b lem e ln e r ph ilosoph ischenA n th ro p o lo g ie ," Theolo&lgche R undschau, VII (1935), pp. 349-372. H ere Low ith view s S ch e le r a s a th in k e r who had a tta in ed a genuine in s ig h t "in to the fundam ental 'p e rv e rted n e ss* of th e m o d ern w orld , and fo r i ts r e s to r a ­tion , he again sought fo r 'e te r n a l ' and 'natural* o r d e r s . " p. 352.

50

con tem plation of the n a tu re of re a li ty p e r s e > a s ap p aren tly the pre~

S o e ra tic s did; ra th e r i t w as the p ro d u c t of a d e sp e ra te s ea rc h fo r m o ra l

and e th ic a l im p e ra tiv e s to re p la c e the defunct C h ris tian ones of h is day;

and* a s such , It w as a m e re su rro g a te fo r n ine teen th cen tu ry n ih ilism ,

an ex p lic it “ re lig io u s su b stitu te . “ Thus a s fa r a s Ldwith is concerned ,

the d o c trin e of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e its e lf , a s an ob jec tive ly ex isting tru th ,

is accep tab le . It is Only the way in w hich N ie tzsch e a r r iv e d a t th is tru th

and h is sp ec ific u se of i t w ithin the con tex t of h is age th a t c au ses Lowith

to r e je c t it .

But the v e ry fac t th a t Ldwith can r a is e th e se kinds of ob jections

to N ie tzsch e tak ing a no tion like c la s s ic a l e te rn a l re c u rre n c e se r io u s ly

and m e re ly ob jecting to the "m e c h a n ic s '1 of i ts u se and d e riv a tio n is again

a c le a r in d ica tio n of h is e s tra n g e m e n t fro m a s tr ic t ly h isfcoricist o r ie n ia -

tion . A tru e h is to r ic is t would deny the a s s e r t io n s of both Ldwith and

N ie tzsch e by a rg u in g th a t no one can ev e r re a lly escap e M s age o r “t r a n ­

scend" h is tim e to a re a lm of e te rn a l and ob jective tru th . He would point

Lowith, N ie tz s c h e s P h ilosoph ic d e r ew igen W iederkeh r des G le ichen (B erlin ; D ie R unde, 1935), pp. 101 -113. An im proved v e rs io n of th is w ork ap p ea red in 1956 pub lished by W. K ohlham m er in S tu ttg a rt. O ther a n a ly se s of N ie tzsch e by Lowith a re : "Z u r n eu es ten N ie tzsche F o r - schuag, “ Theologisch® R undschau, X (1938), pp. 187-199* " F r ie d r ic h N ie tzsch e 1844-1900 ," ed. by H. H eim pel, J . H eu ss , and B. R eifenberg

g ro sse n D eu tsch ea , deu tache B iog raph ic (B erlin : P ro p y laen V e r - lag , 1956), HI, pp. 58Z-59S; N ie tz sc h e , Z e itg e m a sse s and D n ze itg em asse s , ed. by K. Lowith (F ra n k fu r t/ M ain : F is c h e r B iichere i, 1956); "Zu S ch lech- ta*s n e u e r N ie tzsch e L e g e n d e ," M erk u r, XH (1958), pp. 781-784. F r i e d ­r ic h N ie tz sc h e , V o rsp ie l e ln e r P h ilosoph ic d e r Zukunft, aus dem N ach* l a s s , B rie fe , ed. by K. Lowith (F ra n k fu rt/M a in : F is c h e r B u ch ere i, 1959).

out th a t the d o c trin e of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e i ts e lf fa r fro m ind ica ting an

' ’o b jec tiv e '' o r ‘’n a tu ra l" in s ig h t in to the t ru e c h a ra c te r of the cosm os

w as nothing m o re nor le s s than an e x p re ss io n of the m etap h y sica l ’’needs"

of p re -S o e ra tic G reece , A lso he would a rg u e th a t N ie tzsch e ’s a ttem p t

to o v erco m e the n ih ilism of h is tim e through the rev iv a l of th is d o c trin e

w as only a s im ila r e x p re ss io n of the sp ir itu a l needs of h is p a r t ic u la r age.

In c o n tra s t , Lbwith s tro n g ly im p lie s th a t given a d iffe ren t app roach ,

N ie tz s c h e 's e te rn a l re c u r re n c e would have co n stitu ted a genuine o r

’’t im e le s s " in s ig h t in to the n a tu re of re a l i ty a s such.

Lowith* s g rad u a l d r if t away fro m the M sfo r ie is t o r ie n ta tio n a lso

co m es to lig h t in the c o u rse of an an a ly s is of th e young “Hegelians* u n d e r­

stand ing of m an ’s unique "h u m an ity ," of th a t w hich alone d iffe ren tia te s

h im fro m a ll of the o th e r sp ec ie s of an im a te being. A ccord ing to Lbwith.,

the la s t e x p re ss io n of a genuine e x tra - te m p o ra l o r n o n -h is to r ic is t d e te r ­

m in a tio n of m an w as H egel’s conviction th a t " s p ir i t" as the "ab so lu te ” is

a lso " th e tru e u n iv e rsa l e s se n c e of m an. " In fac t, fo r H egel, i t is only

the p re -su p p o s itio n of the " in n e r u n iv e rsa li ty ” of the s p ir i t w hich enab les

one to reco g n ize the e x te rn a l p e c u lia r i t ie s of p a r t ic u la r m en. H egel

a lso c la im ed ab so lu te c e r ta in ty fo r th is know ledge and defin ition of m an

s in ce the C h ris tia n God is inc luded sp ecu la tive ly in h is notion of cosm ic

o r abso lu te s p ir i t .

Low ith, " Z u r P ro b lem a tik d e r H um anita t in d e r P h ilosoph ic naeh H e g e l,” ed. by E . Ju rk a t in H eine und angew andte S ozio logie, Fesfc- gabe fu r F e rd in a n d T o au ies (L eipzig : H ans B uske, 1936), p. 53.

H ow ever the young-H egelians, end F eu e rb ach m p a r t ic u la r , con*

s id e re d th is e x tra “te m p o ra l sp ec ifica tio n of hum anity superfluous and

p r e fe r r e d to lo ca te It in m a n 's fin ite and conditioned h is to r ic a l existence*

B ut th e re b y , as Bowith now em p h asizes , they in d ire c tly c re a te d the con*

9 0te m p o ra ry "p ro b le m a tica l s itu a tio n of m an. " F o r w ithout an e x tra -

te m p o ra l sanc tion , m a n 's hum anity soon b ecom es a s g round less and t r a n ­

s ie n t a s h is v a rio u s so c io -p o litic a l v e n tu re s , and he in c re a s in g ly w ith ­

d raw s fro m h is fellow m an into a ra d ic a l and n ih ilis tic s e lf iso la tio n , a s

th e tra n s it io n f ro m F eu e rb ach and M arx to K ie rk eg aa rd and N ie tzsche

has i l lu s tra te d . ^ F u r th e rm o re w ith the d e s tru c tio n of the m etap h y sica l

C rite rio n of hum anity the question a r i s e s w hether m a n 's "h u m anness" in

th e tra d it io n a l s e n se can e v e r be rev iv ed o r a r e we hencefo rth condem ned

to r e g a rd m an as a m e re co sm ic anom aly fo rtu ito u s ly h u rled into the

w orld , a being w hose e sse n c e - - i f any - - i s In com prehensib le a p a r t

92fro m th e s h e e r fac t of i ts ex is ten ce a s such? O bviously Fow ith is

unw illing to acc e p t th is ra d ic a l " e x is te n tia l" an a ly s is of the p ro b lem w ith

i ts im p lic it den ial of the e n tire notion of hum anity. "H um anity , " he say s ,

" i s no t a m e re 'p re jud ice* w hich one can se t a s id e a t w illj r a th e r , i t is93

, * • an in te g ra l p a r t of the n a tu re of . , . m an. "

53

But in sp ite of Bo with* s acknow ledgm ent of the w eak n esses of the

h is to r ic is t p o sitio n and o u trig h t re je c tio n of the e x is te n tia l den ial of h u ­

m an ity , he s t i l l p e r s i s t s in re g a rd in g hum anity a s e sse n tia lly a "phenom ­

enon of m an’s h is to ry , " e in Mena c hen &e s ch ich tlich es F hanom en. 94 H ence

Bdwith* s d ilem m a is th a t w hile he re c o g n ise s the need fo r a c r i te r io n which

is no t su b jec t to the v ic is s itu d e s of the so c io -p o litic a l c lim a te , he is , as

y e t, n e ith e r read y n o r w illing to fo rego com pletely the p o ssib ility tha t

h is to ry i ts e lf m ight ©till som ehow p rov ide such a c r ite r io n . And it is th is

s e a rc h fo r a h is to r ic a l and y e t non re la tiv e d e te rm in a tio n of hum anity tha t

even tually lead s h im to an exam ination of the thought of Jacob B u rck h ard i.

At f i r s t g lance B u rck h ard t seem s to p rov ide the so lu tion to Bow ith 's

d ilem m a, s in ce he d isco v e red a s tan d a rd th a t w as e x tra - te m p o ra l but n e i ­

th e r a h is to r ic a l n o r p u re ly tra n sce n d e n ta l. A ccord ing to Bbwith* B urck*

h a rd t’s e x tra - te m p o ra l poin t of re fe re n c e o r u A rch im ed ian po in t” is the

constancy of hum an n a tu re , i. e , , "m an su ffe ring and ac ting , a s he is , and

alw ays w as, and a lw ays w ill be, Thus m an h im se lf is the constan t

th a t u n d e r l ie s , en d u re s , and p re v a ils th roughout a ll h is to r ic a l change and

th a t alone m akes th is change in tellig ible* F o r w ithout th is im m utab le

hum an n a tu re , we tru ly would be im p riso n e d in our re sp e c tiv e e ra s and

would be in cap ab le of g rasp in g the ach iev em en ts as w ell a s the in fam ies

94 I b id . , p. 52.9 5

K. Bowith, Jaco b B u rc k h a rd t, d e r M ensch Inm itten d e r Ges chi elite (B ucern : V ita Nova* 1936), p. 9*

54

of ou r p re d e c e s s o rs . B u rck h ard t a lso em p h asised tha t the sp ec ia l

!lob ligation of the educated is to develop w ithin h im se lf, as com pletely

as p o ss ib le , a sen se of the p a s t and an ap p rec ia tio n of the continuity of

the w o rld 's developm ent. " T h is a lone, as he put it, " 'd if fe re n tia te s h im

as a conscious m an fro m the unconscious m an o r the b a rb a r ia n , ju s t a s

the view of a p a s t and fu tu re p e r se d iffe ren tia te s m an fro m the an im als . ,u^

In e ffec t then, the co n sc ious and unco erced p re se rv a tio n and contem plation

of th e p a s t is one of the n ob lest a c tiv itie s of m an b ecau se it re v e a ls the

e sse n c e of ou r unique hum anity , o r in B u rc k h a rd t ' s w ords, " 'th e e n d u r­

ing m e tem p sy ch o sis of m an acting and su ffe rin g th rough innum erab le

s h e a th s . ,!' 9^

But since B u rck h ard t w as p r im a r i ly in te re s te d in m an as a ra tio n a l-

h is to r ic a l ind iv idual ra th e r than as a p e cu lia r unity of both n a tu re and

s p ir i t , an "on to log ica l dual n a tu re ," his und ers tan d in g of the constancy

of hum an n a tu re does not p rov ide a wholly s a tis fa c to ry an sw er to L ow ith 's

quest. In fac t, a b a sic co n ce rn of B u rc k h a rd t’s w as to d e lim it sh a rp ly

the h is to r ic a l and n a tu ra l re a lm s . "H is to ry is the 'b re a k ' w ith n a tu re ,

98h is to r ic a l being a r i s e s and p a sse s away d iffe ren tly fro m n a tu ra l being. "

In c o n tra s t, Bowith, a s in d ica ted , seek s to g ra sp the sp ec ific a lly n a tu ra l

a s w ell a s the p u re ly h is to r ic a l d im ension of ex is ten ce .

9 oQuote-d in Ibid. , p. 208.

^ Q u o te d in Ib id . , p. 208.

98 Ibid. , p. 347.

55

In sum then , although Lowifch has not yet a tta in ed to a defin ite

a n t i -h is to r ic is t p o sition , the y e a r 1935 m a rk s h is unm istakab le e s tr a n g e ­

m ent fro m the s t r ic t h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n of h is e a r l ie r w ritin g s. How­

e v e r 1935 w as a lso d ecis iv e in se v e ra l o th e r w ays fo r Lowith. Unable

to co m p ro m ise w ith the N asi re g im e , he le ft G erm any journey ing f i r s t

99to R om e, and then to the Tohohu U n iversity in Sendai, Japan w here he

gave c o u rse s on both H egel and H eidegger. T his so jo u rn in the F a r F a s t ,

w hich la s te d u n til 1941, a lso p rov ided Lowith with an opportunity to sum

up, sy n th es ize , and c la r ify h is e a r l ie r specu la tio n s on the o rig in s of

c o n tem p o rary thought as w ell a s to re c o n s id e r the u ltim a te value and

1 Of)v a lid ity of the h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n . Thus in 1941, a f te r leaving

Jap an fo r the United S ta te s , Low ith published w hat som e re v ie w e rs and

co m m en ta to rs have judged to be one of the few tru ly im p o rtan t w orks on

99As the re c ip ie n t of a R o ck e fe lle r F e llow sh ip to study the in flu ­ence of H egel upon Ita lian thought.

* ^ T h e m o st im p o rtan t s tu d ie s of th is p e rio d a r e the following:" L*achevem eat de la ph ilosophic c lass iq u e p a r H egel e t sa d isso lu tio n chez M arx e t K ie rk eg aa rd , “ R ech erch e ph ilosoph ique, V (1934/35), pp. 332-267; “ La co n cilia tio n H egelienne, “ R gcherche philosophique,VI (1935/36), pp. 393-404; ’’D e sc a r te s v e rn u n ftig e r Fw eifel und K ie rk e ­g a a rd s Leiden sc haft d e r V erzw eiflung , “ ed. by R. B ayer in T ravaux du 3Xe C ongres in te rn a tio n a l du ph iloaoph ie , C ongres D e sc a r te s (P a r is : H erm ann e t C ie. , 1937), pp. 74-79. In Jap an ese Low ith published: “N innen no T oitu to S a isa i, “ T e tugaku- Z a s s l , N IP /L III (1938), pp. 36-72; and “R o u sseau Y ori N ie tzsch e ni i ta ru S im in-S yakai no M ondai, “ S iso , N IP (1939), pp. 1 -32 and pp. 20-47. The fo rm e r w as a lso published in G erm an a s “ Die E inhelt und die V ersch ied en h e it d e r M enschen, “ P h i- lo so p h ia , Y /III (1939), pp. 444-459.

56

th e e n tire post H egelian developm ent: Vorn H egel b is N ie tz sch e .

5 ' Of the n u m erous rev iew s of Vom H egel, the m ost p e rcep tiv e fro m the sy m pathetic a s w ell a s the c r i t ic a l point of view a re those of H anna H afkesh rink in P h ilosophy and Phenom enolog ical R e s e a rc h , II (1941-42), pp. 259-283; Leo S tra u ss in h is book What is P o li tic a l P h i­losophy and Oth e r S tudies (G lencoe, Illin o is: F r e e P r e s s , 1959), pp. 268-270; and G eorge L ich th e im in The New S ta te sm an , A p ril 23, 1965, pp, 648-650. An o u trig h t M a rx is t-S ta lin is t in te rp re ta tio n can be found in G* L uckas, Die Z e rs td ru n g d e r Y ernunft (B erlin : Aufbau V erlag , 1954), pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER HI

He gel and Goethe

In the fo rew o rd to Vom H egel, Edwith s ta te s th a t he has no in ten **

tion of w ritin g a 11 G eiste .sgeechichte in the u su a l (i. e. , H egelian) sen se

of the w o rd ” since i ts p rin c ip le s have becom e ” so a tten u ated th a t they

a re now tr iv ia l . ” R a th e r he ’’seek s to b rin g a cc u ra te ly to life the epoch

w hich s ta r t s w ith H egel and ends w ith N ie tzsch e , ’'tra n sc r ib in g 1 the p h i­

lo so p h ica l h is to ry of the n ineteen th cen tu ry w ithin the horizon of the 1

p re se n t* ” ■ But in 's h a rp c o n tra s t to the ” t ra n s c r ib in g ” a c tiv itie s of

m any of h is c o n tem p o ra r ie s (F . Gundolf, H« F re y o r , and A* B aum ier),

Ebwlth e m p h as ise s th a t ” feo t r a n s c r ib e h is to ry does not m ean to c o u n te r­

fe it the ir re v o c a b le pow er of w hat has taken p lace once and fo r a ll, o r

to in c re a s e v ita lity a t the expense of tru th , but to do ju s tic e to the v ita l

fac t of h is to ry th a t the tr e e m ay be known . . . by i ts f ru i ts , the fa th e r

103by h is son. ” T hus Edwifch’s d e s ire to ’’t r a n s c r ib e ” the in te lle c tu a l

developm ents of the n ine teen th cen tu ry is u ltim a te ly b ased on the view

th a t p a s t and. p re s e n t a r e in tim a te ly re la te d and m an ife st fundam ental

s im ila r i t ie s .

H egel s e e m s to stand v e ry fa r rem o v ed fro m us and N ie t­zsch e v e ry n e a r , if we co n sid e r only the l a t t e r ’s. influence and the f o r m e r ’s works* In fac t, though, H egel’s w ork m ed ia ted

* ^ T r a n s la t io n of V o m H egel, pp. v -v i.

, pp. v -v i.

5?

58

th rough h is pup ils had an e ffec t upon in te lle c tu a l and p o litic a l life which it would be d ifficu lt to o v e re s tim a te w hile the num erous in ­flu en ces e x e r te d by N ie tzsche since 1890 have given b ir th to a G erm an ideology only in ou r own time* The N ie tzsch ean s of y e s ­te rd a y c o rre sp o n d to the H egelians of th e 1840*s.

In o th e r w o rd s , the " p re se n t G erm an happenings a re the key to what h ap ­

pened a hundred y e a rs ago, ju s t a s th e se in tu rn unlock the understand ing

of the p re se n t. "

T h is em p h asis upon a " co rre sp o n d e n c e" o r even a ’'re c ip ro c ity "

betw een v a rio u s h is to r ic a l ag es is a lso a fu r th e r v e ry s tro n g ind ica tion

of Ldw ith’s in c re a se d a lien a tio n fro m th e h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n . F o r in

o rd e r to d is c e rn such a " c o r re sp o n d e n c e ," Lb w ith m u st n e c e s sa r i ly adopt

a po in t of view w hich is no lo nger p recond itioned by the h is to r ic is t " s p i r i t

of th e age" but w hich, in e ffect, " tra n sc e n d s" any and a ll ages. T his new

in te re s t in a " tra n sc e n d en t" o r e x tra - te m p o ra l r a th e r than a sp ec ifica lly

h is to r ic is t o r ie n ta tio n can a lso be i l lu s tra te d by com paring and c o n tra s t­

ing Lb w ith ’s in te rp re ta tio n s of m en and m ovem ents in h is w ritin g s befo re

1935 w ith th o se in th is p a r t ic u la r w ork.

In itia lly , a s in d ica ted , Lbwith w elcom ed the young-H egelians*

d isso lu tio n of Hegel* s m e tap h y sica l sy n th es is a s a defin ite em ancipation

of m an fro m a web of a b s tr a c t m e tap h y sica l concep tua lization , and a s a

re e s ta b lish m e n t of philosophy on the b a s is of "p h ilo soph ica l h is to r ic a l

an thropology. " Now, how ever, he re g a rd s th is ph ilosophizing on the

*°^Ibid . , p. v.

^ ^ F i r s t ed ition of Vom H egel, p. 530.

39

b a s is of m an and h is to ry a s defin ite ly in fe r io r to the fo rm e r m etaphysica l,

i. e . , e x tra - te m p o ra l p e rsp ec tiv e .

H egel acco rd ed to the hum an s p ir i t the s tren g th to open the sea led n a tu re of the u n iv e rse , rev ea lin g i ts r ic h e s and i ts depth; but fro m B aym to P ilth ey i t w as the m o re o r le s s avowed conv ic­tion th a t the hum an s p ir i t is e sse n tia lly p o w erle ss v is -a -v is the p o litic a l and n a tu ra l w orld , b ecau se i t is i ts e lf only a fin ite " e x - p re s s io n " of " so c io .-h is to r ica l" reality* F o r them , the s p ir i t is no longer the "pow er of an a g e ," in i ts e lf tim e le s s b ecause i t i s e te rn a lly p re se n t: i t i s m e re ly an exponent and m ir r o r of the age. Thus philosophy b ecom es a "w orld view " and " in te rp re ta tio n of l i f e , " the u ltim a te consequence of w hich is the se lf a s s e r t io n of " p a r t ic u la r , ind iv idual" h is to r ic ity in H e id eg g e r 's Sein und Zeit.

In line w ith th is new c r i t ic a l o rien ta tio n , Lowith judges the w r i t ­

ings of the young-H egelians to be "m a n ife s to s , p ro g ra m s , and th e se s ,

but n e v e r anything w hole, im p o rtan t in th e m se lv e s . In th e ir hands, th e ir

sc ie n tif ic d em o n stra tio n s becam e sen sa tio n a l p ro c lam atio n s w ith which

th ey tu rn e d to the m a ss e s o r the indiv idual. " In co m p ariso n to Hegel,

"they m ake im m o d e ra te dem ands w ith in su ffic ien t m eans and d ila te H eg el's

a b s tr a c t d ia le c tic s to a p iece of rh e to r ic . . . . T h e ir c r i t ic a l a c tiv ism

knows no bounds, w hat they seek to b rin g about is in e v e r y case and a t

any p r ic e ' c h a n g e . V e r y sim ply then , " they a r e 'c u ltu re d m en ru n

107w ild , ' f ru s tr a te d ex is ten c es . "

1 a /

T ra n s la tio n of Vom H egel, p. 64. See a lso L ow ith 's jux tapo ­s itio n of "M. H eidegger and F . R osenzw eig o r T em p o ra lity and E te rn i ty ," P h ilosophy and P henom enolog ical R e s e a rc h , III (1942/43), pp. 53-77. AG erm an tra n s la t io n of th is a r t ic le ap p ea red in Z e lts c h r if t fur P h ilo so p h is che F o rsc h u n g , XII (1938), pp. 161 -187. Also in G esam m elte Abhandlungen,pp. 6 8 - 9 2 .

^ ^ T r a n s la t io n of Vom H egel, p. 67. T h is is c e r ta in ly a f a r c ry

60

This reev a lu a tio n of the young-H egelians is a lso c le a rly m an ifest

in Lowith*s new highly c r i t ic a l account of the thought of i ts key fig u res ;

F e u e rb a ch , M arx, K ie rk eg aa rd , and N ie tzsche . In c o n tra s t to his e a r l ie r

c r i t ic is m s , w hich w ere often nothing m o re than, m ild c o rre c t iv e s tem p e red

by a b a s ic sym pathy fo r th e ir g en era l hi s to r i c is t-h u m a n is t o rien ta tio n , he

now finds th e ir thought m a r re d by deep and fundam ental inadequac ies .

F o r exam ple, Lowith s t i l l acknow ledges F e u e rb a c h 's d isco v ery

1 OSof " se n su o u s -n a tu ra l c o rp o re a lity , " and he is s t i l l c r i t ic a l of H egelian

id e a lism becau se i t "no m o re reco g n izes the independent re a lity of o th e r1 QQ

m en than i t re co g n ize s the re a li ty of se n su o u s-n a tu ra l c o rp o rea lity . **

B ut th is c r i t ic is m of id e a lism and ap p aren t p ra is e of F eu e rb ach is fa r

outw eighed by the deep a v e rs io n Lowith now fe e ls fo r m any of the conclu ­

sions w hich F e u e rb a ch drew fro m his fundam ental p rh ie ip le s . He is e s ­

p ec ia lly unhappy w ith the p o litic a l view s of F eu e rb ach and p a r tic u la r ly

w ith h is suggestion th a t "philosophy is i ts e lf to becom e re lig io n , and a lso

p o litic s , a k ind of p o litic a l w orld view which re p la c e s the re lig io n of the

fro m Lowith* s e a r l ie r view of the young-H egelians a s w r i te r s "w hose re a l am b itio n s w ere not to s u rp a s s the e x p e rien c e s of life p e r se. They re tu rn again to the ’hum an a ll too human* d im ension of the understand ing ; they la ck the b e lie f in som ething like 'p u re thought* o r 'ab so lu te co n sc io u sn ess ,1. e. # any r e a l p o ss ib ility fo r the ex trav ag an ce of conceptual thought. " F e u ­e rb a ch und d e r A u sg an g ," p. 327.

1 03 T ra n s la tio n of Vom H egel, p. 80.

I09Ibid. , p. 80.

61

110of the p a s t. " As lidw ith see s it, the m otive behind F e u e rb a c h 's p ro -

po sed leveling of philosophy to a "p o litic a l w orld view" w as not sim ply

th e e s ta b lish m e n t of ju s t and equ itab le fo rm s of governm ent. Instead ,

" F e u e rb a c h 's a c tu a l in te r e s t w as the co n cen tra tio n and ex tension of the

pow er of the s ta te a s such , m uch m o re than the ou tw ard fo rm of a re*

p u b lic ." T his is d em o n strab le by the c irc u m stan c e tha t he "view ed B is*

m a rc k not as an enem y but a s a p acem ak er along the ro a d to h is re v o -

111lu tio n a ry goals. " F u r th e rm o re , in c o m p ariso n to H egel's conceptually

o rg an ised " a b s o lu te ," Lowith finds th a t " F e u e rb a c h 's m ass iv e sensual*

is m m u st s e e m a s a s tep backw ard . . . a s a barbarizsation of thought

w hich re p la c e s content by bom bast and sen tim en t. " Thus "H eg e l's final

doubt w h e th er the tu m u lt of in s c o n tem p o ra rie s and the 'deafen ing lo ­

q uacity ' of van ity le ft any ro o m a t a ll fo r p a ss io n le ss knowledge is drow ned

out by the v e rb o se rh e to r ic of h is p u p ils , who re p la ce d philosophy with

112,the in te re s ts of the clay. "

A nother th in k e r who, in Im w ith 's view , p layed a m a jo r ro le in

u n d erm in ing the H egelian co n ce rn fo r "p a ss io n le ss know ledge" and in

confounding "the in te re s ts of the day" w ith philosophy w as K a rl M arx,}

A s in d ica ted , JLowith fu lly acknow ledges M a rx 's co n tribu tion to the gen­

e r a l "an th ro p o lo g ica l" and s o c io -h is to r ic a l re o rie n ta tio n of thought

1 IQIbid. , p. 81.

l U I b id . , p. 82.

62

effec ted by the young - H eg elian s . But th is acknow ledgm ent is now te m ­

p e re d and, a s in the case of F eu e rb ach , fa r outw eighed by a sh a rp c r i ­

tique of the b a s ic ten e ts of M arx ian thought» p a r tic u la r ly the assum ption

of the conditioned c h a ra c te r of a ll understand ing . As M arx put it, "*A

po in t of view is n ev e r unconditional. It p ro ceed s fro m re a l conditions,

i t n e v e r le av e s th em fo r a m om ent. Its p reco n d itio n s a r e hum an beings,

not in som e fa n ta s tic a b s tra c tio n and sec lu sio n , but in th e ir r e a l . , .

113p ro c e s s of developm ent u n d er sp ec ific co n d itio n s ."

A gainst th is em p h asis upon the conditioned c h a ra c te r of a ll hu­

m an und ers tan d in g and of hum an ex isten ce in g en e ra l, Lowith r a i s e s

two o b jec tio n s. F i r s t , "H eg e l’s m etap h y sic s of the h is to ry of the s p ir i t

is developed th e re b y to the m o st e x tre m e position p o ss ib le , m ade fcem-

v 114p o ra l, and p laced in the s e rv ic e of h is to ry ." And secondly , a s s u m ­

ing the om nipotence of the so c io -p o litic a l and socio -econom ic context,

then on w hat grounds can the M arx ians c la im su p e r io r ity fo r th e ir p a r ­

tic u la r a n a ly s is and so lu tion in lieu of o th e r po in ts of v iew ? "In re s p e c t

to H eg e l's s p ir itu a l w orld , It m akes no b a s ic d iffe ren ce w hether G e is te s -

gegchich te a f te r H egel is given a m a te r ia l in te rp re ta tio n b ased on the

econom ic fa c to rs of p roduction" o r w hether i t is based on D ilthey’s

" s o c io -h is to r ic a l re a lity " Or even w hether it is based on the ra c ia l d is ­

tin c tio n s of the N ational Socialists* F o r they a ll, like M arx, can lay

113Quoted in Ibid. , p. 102.

114Ibid. , p. 102.

equal c la im to com prehending a p re -co n d itio n ed " r e a l life p ro c e ss" and

11 5a " p a r t ic u la r way of liv ing . "

A lso in c o n tra s t to h is e a r l ie r sym pathy fo r the young-H egelians*

d isso lu tio n of Hegel*s re c o n c ilia tio n of the id ea l and the re a l , of God and

116th e w o rld , JLbwith now finds M arx ’s c r itiq u e of th is re co n c ilia tio n

d ecided ly one s ided , in fac t, a s one s id ed a s th a t of K ie rk eg aa rd . M arx,

he a rg u e s , undertook a ra d ic a l c ritiq u e of the H egelian re co n c ilia tio n

fro m th e standpoin t of a "p u re hum anity" (the p ro le ta r ia te a s the to ta lly

a lie n a te d c la s s ) ju s t a s K ie rk e g aa rd undertook h is c ritiq u e of Hegel fro m

the poin t of view of a "p u re sp ir itu a lity " (the com pletely iso la ted in d iv id ­

u a l b e fo re God), But JLowith is highly sc e p tic a l of the ap p aren t f ru its of

th is c ritiq u e , "B oth no lo n g er look upon ex is ten ce a s H egel did: a s p u re

'e x - i s te r e , ’ a s the ap p ea ran ce of an in te rn a l e s se n c e in the ap p ro p ria te

fo rm of ex is ten ce . " F o r K ie rk eg aa rd , " i t is a r e t r e a t to indiv idual

ex is ten ce w hich m akes d ec is io n s acco rd in g to conscience . " F o r M arx,

" i t is an advance to a p o litic a l d ec is io n of c irc u m sta n c e s co n sid e red en

m a s s e ." T hus

they com prehend "w hat is " (rea lity ] a s a w orld d e te rm in ­ed by m erch an d ise and m oney, and a s an ex isten ce shot th rough w ith iro n y and the "d ru d g e ry " of bo redom . The " re a lm of s p ir i ts "

115Ibid.. p. 102.116

Ibid , , pp. 162-173. A lso h is a r t ic le "H eg e l's Aufhebung d e r c h r is t l ic h e n R e lig io n ," ed. by K. O ehler und R. S ch aeffle r in E in s ic h te n , Q e rh a rd t K ru g e r zum 60, G eb u rts tag (F ran k fu rt/M a in : V itto rio K lo s te r - m ann, 1962), pp. 156-203.

64

of H e g e l's philosophy becom es a phantom in a w orld of lab o r and d e s p a ir . F o r M arx , a "G erm an ideology” p e rv e r ts H eg el's s e l l - ex is ten t " id e a , H and fo r K ie rk eg aa rd , a " s ick n ess unto death" p e rv e r ts the s e lf -s a tis fa c tio n of the abso lu te s p ir it . F o r both, H e g e l's consum m ation of h is to ry becom es the te rm in u s of a p r e ­h is to ry leading up to an ex ten siv e revo lu tion and an in tensive re fo rm a tio n . H is co n cre te m ed ia tions a r e converted to a b s tra c t d ec is io n s fo r the an c ien t C h ris tia n God and a new e a rth ly w orld , hi p lace of H e g e l's ac tiv e s p ir i t , M arx su b stitu ted a th eo ry of so c ia l p ra c tic e and K ie rk eg aa rd a re fle c tio n of in n e r ac tiv ity ; thus both consciously and d e lib e ra te ly deny the o r la a s the t i t le of h ig h est hum an ac tiv ity . *

C oncern ing N ie tzsch e , a s ind ica ted , Lb w ith has thus fa r in sp ite

of som e m ild re s e rv a tio n s , m an ifested , c o n sid e rab le sym pathy fo r Ms

a ttem p t to r e a s s e r t the p re -S o c ra tic d o c trin e of e te rn a l re c u rre n c e . Now,

how ever, he ju x tap o ses N ie tz sc h e 's dynam ic and "D ionysian" u n d e rs tan d ­

ing of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e to the "A pollonian" sp ecu la tions of a w ell known

co n tem p o rary of H egel, G oethe. And he finds th a t N ie tz sc h e 's view is a s

d iffe ren t f ro m G o eth e 's " a s the e x trem e fro m the m o d e ra te , seeth ing

pow er fro m o rd e re d co sm o s, d e s ire fro m ab ility and the d e s tru c tiv e v io -

118len ce of a tta c k fro m w ell m eaning irony. " But th is re a p p ra is a l of

N ie tzsch e is p e rh a p s b e s t m a n ife s t in Lb w ith ' b judgm ent of the respec tive

v iew s of C h ris tia n ity of N ie tzsch e and Goethe, "N ie tzsch e is re p o rte d

to have re m a rk e d th a t the 'c ro ss* should be seen a s Goethe saw it. But

he h im se lf saw i t quite d iffe ren tly ; he w anted to te ach m en lau g h te r in ­

s tead of su ffe rin g , and c a lled h is lau g h te r holy; Z a ra th u s tra m ocks

^ ^ T ra n s la t io n of Vom H egel, p. 161,

U 8Ib id ., p. 179,

65

C h r is t’s crow n of th o rn s by crow ning h im se lf w ith a crow n of r o s e s *’1

Yet th is crow n has no hum an o r ra tio n a l re la tio n sh ip to the cross* !!Z a -

r a th u s t r a ’s 'ro s e -w re a th crown* is p u re ly a po lem ic c o n tra s t to th a t of

the c ru c ified . " Goethe* on the o th er hand, nwas not an a n ti-C h ris tia n ,

and w as th e re fo re th e m o re genuine pagan} Ms 'god* had no need to op ­

p o se any o th e r, b ecau se by h is v e ry p o sitiv e n a tu re he w as d is inc lined

1 1 oto any such den ial. " * 7

H ow ever the ou tstand ing exam ple of Lowith* s new highly c r i t ic a l

o rie n ta tio n tow ard the young-H egelians is h is changed view of D ilthey.

He s t i l l r e g a rd s D ilthey a s the m ost profound and le a s t a r b i t r a r y of the

e n tire group; but the p ra is e which he once heaped upon D ilthey, as a m a ­

jo r opponent of a l l m e tap h y sica l co n cep tu a lisa tio n and a s a ch ief advocate

of a h is to r i c is t-h u m a n is t o rien ta tio n , now g ives way to a v e ry ca re fu l

and c r i t ic a l re a n a ly s is of the u ltim a te value of th e D iltheyan acco m p lish ­

m ent i ts e lf . M D ilthey red u ces H eg e l's sp ecu la tiv e ' co m p reh en sio n ' of

the notion of r e a l i ty to an an a ly tic 'u n d ers tan d in g of its m o st u n iv e rsa l

s t ru c tu re s . Thus the 'lo g o s ' of w hat has being is tra n s fo rm e d into a

re la tiv e 'm eaning* and H eg e l's ontology into an e m p ir ic a l an a ly s is of

120 u r e a l i ty . 11 A lso w h e re lo w ith had once w elcom ed D ilthey 's co n v ersio n

of H eg e l's a b s tr a c t Ms p ir i t" to the " so c io -h is to r ic a l r e a l i ty '’ as an

119Ib id . , p. 179.

66

in d ica tio n of "an em ancipation fro m m etap h y sica l d o g m a tism ," he now

finds th is co n v ersio n to be n e ith e r p a r tic u la r ly em ancipating nor in d ica -

tiv e of a new co n cre te ra tio n a lity but only "in an indefin ite way ’ s ig n ifi-

121cant. And finally w h ere JLowith had p rev io u s ly accep ted D ilth ey 's

re le g a tio n of philosophy to the ro le of a m e re handm aiden of " l i f e ," since

"w ith in hum an c u ltu re and socie ty" it is " ’W ith e r m o re nor le s s than a

122d is c re te ask ing and an sw erin g , he now fee ls " tha t th is an sw er to

the p ro b lem of h is to ry is not re a l ly a ph ilosoph ical an sw er. " In fac t

"D ilth ey ’s lifelong e ffo rts to c o n s tru c t a philosophy on the b a s is of hisfcor-

123ic a l c o n sc io u sn ess p e r se w ere b rough t to n o u g h t."

In sum then in th is w ork , in sh a rp c o n tra s t to the stud ies and a n a l­

y se s of th ese sam e th in k e rs which ap p ea red b efo re 1935, the chief accen t

is now d efin ite ly no lo n g e r on the a tte m p t of the young-H egelians to re c o v ­

e r and p re s e rv e m an u n der the given so c io -p o litic a l and socio -econom ic

conditions of th e i r re sp e c tiv e ag es ; it is r a th e r on th e ir " tem p o ra liza tio n "

o r "h is to r ie iz a tio n " of the e x tra - te m p o ra l H egelian " s p ir i t . " M oreover

w h ere Lowith had once d isc e rn e d a p o sitiv e o r c o n stru c tiv e developm ent,

f ro m F e u e rb a ch to D iithey - - a developm ent th a t only b ecam e q u estio n ­

ab le w ith the ap p ea ran ce of such co n tem p o rary e x is te n tia lis t th in k e rs as

H eidegger and J a s p e r s - - h e now im p lie s a com plete ly negative o r

121 Ibid. , p. 124.

122 See above C hap ter I.

123T ran sla tion of V om H egel, p. 124.

67

d e s tru c tiv e developm ent which, w ith " deadly co n sis ten cy ” has d e te rm in ed

124the c o u rse of philosophy s in ce Hegel. ' C lea rly Ldwith has exp erien ced

a profound re o rie n ta tio n in h is thinking. In c o n tra s t to his fo rm e r com m it*

m ea t to h is to r ic !a m a s the bu lw ark of co n tem p o rary hum anism , he is now

f irm ly convinced th a t h is to ric !a m , in s tead of p ro tec tin g and p re se rv in g

m an, is ac tu a lly Ms cM ef enem y. Hence the only way m an can be r e s ­

cued fro m the p e rn ic io u s re la tiv is m and n ih ilism en ta iled in the h is to r i ­

es, s t d e s tru c tio n of tra d itio n a l m etap h y sics 1$ to re c o v e r and r e a s s e r t a

va lid e x tra - te m p o ra l o r tra n sce n d e n ta l view of m an and h is to ry .

T his new co n cern fo r an e x tra - te m p o ra l d im ension of hum an e x ­

is te n ce is re v e a le d in Low ith’s a n a ly s is and c ritiq u e of our co n tem p o rary

notions of tim e and h is to ry . F o r Bdwith the c ru x of the p ro b lem lie s in

" th e tra n s fo rm a tio n of the t im e le s s s p ir i t of the ag es" G eist d e r Z e iten

125in to the te m p o ra l " s p i r i t of the age" Z e itg e is t.

P r io r to the F re n c h R evolu tion , he a rg u e s , the p h ra se " s p i r i t of

the age" had a v e ry n a rro w and lim ited m eaning, 1. e . , i t was understood

quite d iffe ren tly than in the p o s t rev o lu tio n a ry e ra . F o r exam ple, both

Goethe and H e rd e r u sed the te rm freq u en tly and fo r both it se rv ed to e x ­

p re s s the unique p e c u lia r i t ie s of the v a rio u s ag es of m ankind. Yet n e ith e r

lZ * M d . , p. VI. F o r a re m a rk a b ly s im ila r view of the d evelop ­m ent s in ce H egel see G, L ich theim , "On the R im of the V olcano, H eideg ­ger# B loch, A d o rn o ," E n co u n te r, XXII (1964), pp. 98-105.

^ ® T ra n s la tio n of Vom H egel, p. 201.

68

G oethe nor H e rd e r conceived of the " s p i r i t of the age" as a tem p o ra l

s p ir i t . "It is r a th e r - - analogously to the s p ir i t of the people o r of the

language - - alw ays one and the sam e s p ir i t of the whole ’sp h e re of m an ­

kind, ’ which a ssu m e s a p a r t ic u la r mode of ap p ea ran ce in d iffe ren t ages

and am ong d iffe ren t peop les. " However "the F ren c h R evolution w ith i ts

d e s tru c tio n of tra d itio n , had an h is to r ic ia in g e ffec t upon the co n sc io u s­

n e ss of i ts c o n tem p o ra r ie s . T h en cefo rth the tim e of the p re se n t, in

c o n tra s t to the e n tire ’p a s t, ’ view s i ts e lf e x p re ss ly a s belonging to the

126c o u rse of h is to ry , looking tow ard the fu tu re . " Thus fro m th is ra d ic a l

b re a k w ith the p a s t o ccasioned by the Revolution,

the p h ra se " s p i r i t of the age" e n te rs the ro m a n tic 's c r i t i ­c ism of th e ir p e rio d ; fin a lly , am ong the w r i te r s of the th ir t ie s and fo r tie s , i t becom es a u n iv e rsa l slogan. In the m id s t of the ra d ic a l changes tak ing p lace betw een a g es , a ll even ts a r e r e f e r ­re d m o re and m o re co nsc iously to the s p ir i t of the "ep o ch ," and the fee ling of an epoch-m ak ing tu rn ing point betw een two ages g row s; thus the fina l age a s such becom es the destiny of the s p ir i t . T his is w hat lends a ll ta lk of the s p ir i t of the age th a t co n tem p o r­a ry note which a d h e re s to i t s t i l l today,

Even H egel, who con sc io u sly s tro v e to p re s e rv e the innate t im e ­

le s s n e s s of the s p ir i t , is c re d ite d by Lb with a s unw ittingly playing a m a ­

jo r ro le in effecting th is tra n s fo rm a tio n . F o r H egel, in harm ony w ith

the tra d itio n , the s p ir i t w as e te rn a l and i ts re la tio n sh ip to tim e co n sis ted

" s im p ly in the fa c t th a t i t m u st ’expound’ i ts e lf in tim e a s w ell a s space ,

69

mot in any innate te m p o ra l quality of the s p ir i t , a r is in g fro m tim e and

IPSfa llin g in to i ts pow er. " " N o netheless, in sp ite of th is acknow ledgm ent

of the innate tim e le s s n e s s of the s p ir i t i ts e lf , Hegel a lso conceived of an

e s s e n tia l un ity betw een s p ir i t and tim e. The s p ir i t not only unfolds i t ­

s e lf in the c o u rse of tim e ; but i t is a lso id en tica l w ith tim e in the sen se

th a t i t i s a lw ays the fu lle s t e x p re ss io n of a p a r t ic u la r tim e . In the p ro -

face to Ms R ech tsp h ilo so p h le , H egel o b serv ed "*as co n cern s the in d iv id ­

u a l, each is a son of h is tim e ; and philosophy is th e ir tim e com prehended

in thought, It is ju s t a s foo lish to im agine tha t som e philosophy tran scen d s

129i ts p re s e n t w orld a s to im agine tha t an indiv idual can tra n sce n d h is tim e .

But H egel d rew a co n se rv a tiv e , one m ight a lm o s t say re a c tio n a ry , con ­

c lu sio n fro m th is c irc u m sta n c e th a t no th eo ry can tra n sc e n d its own tim e

b ecau se of h is conv iction tha t h is own age and his own philosophy, which

inc ludes the C h ris tia n logos* co n stitu ted a final s ta te in the unfolding of

the s p ir i t . 130

U 8 Ibid. , p. 209.

* Q u o te d in Ib id . , p. 84,

130"If H egel c au se s the e te rn a l to be m an ife st in the te m p o ra l, th is is not the r e s u l t of any fo rm a l d ia le c tic s , but an in tr in s ic m etaphy­s ic s of the C h ris tia n lo g o s . 11 In fac t "h is philosophy inc ludes w ith in i t ­s e lf the C h ris tia n co n sc io u sn ess of the ’end of a ll th ings, * b ecause Hegel does a ll of h is th inking consc ious of the abso lu te sign ificance of the h is ­to r ic a l ap p ea ran ce of C h ris t. ” T h e re fo re "no t any p re se n t m om ent a t a l l w as fo r h im ’the highest* bu t only th a t w hich like h is own, is a ’final link* in the ’s a c re d chain* of the p a s t, now a p p ro p ria te d by thought in i ts fu ll ex ten t. " H ence i t is only the tim e w hich ex tends fro m T h a le s to P r o - c lu s and fro m thence to h is own age w hich m akes it p o ssib le fo r Hegel to w rite a p e r iod a f te r the "now" of "up to n o w ." In h is un ifica tion of a ll

70

His p u p ils , on the o th er hand, on the b a s is of the sam e coincidence

betw een s p ir i t and tim e* but le s s in te re s te d in the p re se n t a s a p e riod of

s p ir i tu a l fu lfillm en t and m o re concerned w ith the so c ia l and m a te r ia l p o s ­

s ib il i t ie s of the fu tu re , focused upon what should be ra th e r than upon what

is* ’’’They sought to p lace philosophy a t the s e rv ic e of the revo lu tion fo l­

low ing the p ro g re s s of time* " A ccordingly , 11 in the fo rw ard m ovem ent

of th e age, h is to ry a s p ro g re s s is e leva ted to the s ta tu s of u ltim a te a rb i te r

even of the s p ir i t ; the s p ir i t of H egelian m etap h y sics is co n sis ten tly m ade

te m p o ra l. "

Thus fa r in our a n a ly s is of Lowith’s sh ift in in te re s t fro m the

h u m a n is t-h is to r ic is m of the young-H egelians to th e ir tem p o ra liz a tio n of

H egel’s e x tra - te m p o ra l s p ir i t , we have freq u en tly jux taposed h is c r i t ic a l

view of the fo rm e r to h is fav o rab le view of the la t te r . Yet th is jux tapo­

s itio n , w hile u sefu l a s an i l lu s tra tio n of the changing accen t in h is th in k ­

ing, is not, in its e lf , in tended a s an in d ica tio n of a b a s ic en d o rsem en t of

H egel. F o r exam ple , Lb w ith a p p ea rs to favo r H egel’s und ers tan d in g of

the re la tio n sh ip betw een s p ir i t and tim e when d iscu ss in g the modification©

in tro d u ced by the young - H egelians ♦ B ut, taken by its e lf , he finds the

p rev io u s h is to ry the accen t " is on the e n tire ’thus fa r now, * th a t is , ’f i ­n a lly ' the w orld s p ir i t has com e; and th is e n tire ty is a d e lib e ra te g o a l ." H egel le ft the question open as to w hat m ight p ro ceed fro m th is goal in the fu tu re , bu t becau se th re e epochs have now been concluded (one f re e , som e f r e e , a l l f re e ) , "H egel c o n sid e re d h is to ry , taken a b s tra c tly , to be en d ed ." Ibid. , pp. 127-12*9*

131 Ibid. , p. 34 and p. 205.

71

H egelian view com pletely unaccep tab le .

The tru e [s tu m b lin g block} in H eg e l's an a ly s is of tim e is not th a t he thought of e te rn ity , but th a t - - i n sp ite of h is study of A r is to t le 's P h y s ic s - - h e no longer saw i t as i t was p r im i­tiv e ly seen by the G reek s , in the c irc lin g co n ste lla tio n s of the heavens and the r e a l " e t h e r , " but r a th e r a sc r ib e d it to a spirit* in the notion of w hich the G reek and C h ris tia n tra d itio n s a re in ­ex tric ab ly en tangled . As ph ilosopher of the C h ris tia n - G erm anic w orld , H egel un d ers to o d the s p ir i t a s w ill and freedom . F o r th is reason* the re la tio n sh ip of the s p ir i t to tim e , which he view s in the G reek fash ion as an e v e r la s tin g p re se n t and r e c u r re n t cy ­c le , re m a in s in fac t a co n trad ic tio n and a rid d le . * ^

H ow ever Lowith*s ch ief ob jections to both the H egelian a s w ell a s

young-H egelian po in ts of view a re b e s t re v e a le d in the co u rse of h is a n a l­

y s is of H eg e l's and G oethe 's conceptions of h is to ry . Lb w ith begins h is

in v estig a tio n of H egel w ith a sh arp ind ic tm en t of H eg e l's em p h asis upon

the g re a t even ts and the g rand scope and sway of h is to ry , understood a l ­

m o s t exc lu siv e ly a s u n iv e rs a l o r w orld h is to ry . Lowith a rg u e s tha t the

te rm h is to ry should be u n d e rs to o d a s r e fe r r in g to any s im p le "happen­

ing" o r G eschehen; and the function of the h is to r ia n should be to in v e s t i­

gate th is happening "and by re p o r t and d e sc rip tio n give in fo rm atio n about

w hat has been in q u ired a f te r and in v estig a ted . " A ccording to Lowith,

the an c ien t G reek h is to r ia n s H erodo tus, T hucydides, and Polybius s ti l l

s tu d ied and w ro te w ith th is m o d est goal in mind* "T hey w ere e x p lo re rs ,

1 32 Ib id . * p. 210. In the o rig in a l G erm an the f i r s t sen tence of th is p a ssa g e re a d s "D as w irk lich e K reuz in H eg el's A nalyse d e r Z e it . . . e tc . " The t r a n s la to r has re n d e re d th is a s "T he c ru x in H eg el's a n a ly s is of tim e" w hich is l i te ra l ly c o r re c t but does not re a lly convey L bw ith 's m eaning , hence my in te rp o la tio n of "stu m b lin g block. "

72

w ith th e ir eyes and e a r s open, and told us in ex em p lary fash ion what they

had seen th e m se lv e s and le a rn ed through others* " But ev er since Hegel*

h is to ry and p a r tic u la r ly w orld history* in c o n tra s t to the goals of c la s s ic

ca l in q u iry " se e m s to be p re c ise ly w hat one has not seen and ex p erienced ,

in q u ired a f te r and in v estig a ted fo r h im se lf;" and in o u r co n tem p o rary w orld ,

"h is to ry has tra v e le d so fa r fro m its o rig in a l m eaning tha t am ong m odern

h is to r ia n s re f le c tio n upon the h is to ry of 'h is to r ic ie m , 1 has a lm o s t r e -

133p laced the in v estig a tio n of .events, " Y et, Lowiih contends

th e even ts of each sing le day, everyday h is to ry , show us on a sm a ll sca le som eth ing of w orld h is to ry on a la rg e sca le . B e ­fo re any u n iv e rs a l h istory* the daily p a p e rs tra n s m it ev ery day the even ts of the w orld ; our own tim e in p a r t ic u la r can f la t te r i t ­se lf th a t it is daily ex p erien c in g w orld h is to ry on a g rand scale*But to g e th e r w ith w o rld h is to ry a s a w hole, which p a sse s us a ll by w ithout re g a rd , th e re is a lso an o th er kind of even t, w hich a t ­t r a c ts le s s a tten tio n , but fo r a l l tha t, is n o n e th e less re a l; the u n p re ten tio u s ev en ts in the c o u rse of m a n 's daily l j ^ , and the u n ifo rm ev en ts of the c o u rse of the n a tu ra l w orld .

Thus in sh a rp opposition to the H egelian em p h asis upon the im p e r ­

sonal, " a b s t r a c t ,” g re a t h is to r ic a l even t, Bowith s t r e s s e s the sp ec ifica lly

hum an and n a tu ra l d im ension of a ll h is to r ic a l o c c u rre n c e s . In fac t he

fla tly s ta te s , "the s im p le fac t th a t m an m u st live in the m id s t of n a tu re"

and w ith h is fellow m en ab so lu te ly "d e te rm in e s the w ay philosophy m ust| ac

ap p ro ach the even ts of the w orld . " And given th is s tro n g accen t upon

133Ibid. , P- 213.

134Ibid. , P* 213.

135Ib id , , p. 214.

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m an and n a tu re , lidw itb w ill, of c o u rse , d is c e rn a num ber of inadequacies

in the H egelian view of h is to ry beyond the g en e ra l o v e rem p h asis upon

"w o rM -h ls to ry on a g rand s c a le .” His sp ec ific ob jections c en te r on H e-

g e l’s under standing of the re la tio n sh ip betw een n a tu re and s p ir i t , on h is

in te rp re ta tio n of the in d iv id u a l’s ro le in h is to ry , on h is se c u la r isa tio n of

th e H e b rew -C h ris tian sa lv a tio n ep ic , and on h is tendency to ju s tify usu c ­

c e s s " above any and a ll c r i t ic a l co n s id e ra tio n s .

Ifowith r e je c ts H egel’s u n d ers tan d in g of the re la tio n sh ip betw een

n a tu re and s p ir i t on the grounds tha t Hegel v iew s n a tu re "negative ly , ”

m e re ly a s som ething to b© overcom e. It is t ru e tha t H egel reco g n ised

the in fluence of the v a rio u s types of c lim a te on th e h is to r ic a l life of m a n ­

kind b ecau se the s p ir i t conceived a s w orld s p ir i t m an ife s ts i ts e lf in space

a s w ell a s tim e . B ut, fo r h im , th is in fluence is n ev e r d e te rm in a tiv e .

P r o g re s s in the unfolding of the s p i r i t tow ard freed o m is e s se n tia lly p ro ­

g re s s in the lib e ra tio n of the s p ir i t fro m sub jec tion to n a tu re . "In H egel’s

philosophy , th e re fo re , n a tu re a s such has no independent po sitiv e s ig n i­

ficance . It is no t the ground of the h is to ry of the w orld , but only i t s geo­

g rap h ica l te r r a in , . , m e re ly the n a tu ra l ’arena* of the s p ir itu a l even ts

of th e w orld . " *

H egel’s view of th e ro le of the ind iv idual in h is to ry is a lso re je c te d

by Lowith, not only b ecau se "the everyday life of m ankind is w ithout su b ­

s ta n tia l s ign ificance fo r H egel’s idea of w orld h is to r y ," but p r im a r i ly

i3 6 Ifoid. , p. 214.

74

b ecau se of h is notion tha t !,the abso lu te r ig h t of the w orld s p ir i t t r a n ­

scen d s a ll p a r t ic u la r r ig h ts . W ithin the m ovem ent which involves the

'w o rld a s a whole* ind iv iduals a r e only m eans to the end of th is whole. n * 37

In o th e r w o rd s , fo r H egel, the only ind iv iduals of consequence a r e the

"w o rld h is to r ic a l ind iv idua ls , " ind iv iduals like a Napoleon, who re a l is e

o r b rin g about the g re a t goals of h is to ry by em bodying te m p o ra rily the

p a r t ic u la r "n a tio n a l s p ir i t" the V o ik sg eis t d estin ed to dom inate.

In c o n tra s t to th is " s p i r i tu a l” view of the g rea t m an, Lowith p r e ­

fe r s the m o re m undane but so b er evaluation of Goethe. Goethe too re c o g ­

n ised N apoleon as a tru e re p re se n ta tiv e of his age, Ubut because he did

not sy s te m a tiz e on the b a s is of an id ea , but r a th e r lived by in tu ition , he

saw in N apoleon not only a m e re ’agen t of the w orld s p ir i t , ’ but an incon­

ceivab le ’phenom enon’ a dem igod, ' ” a com pletely e x tra o rd in a ry m an who

e m erg ed 'f ro m the a b y ss ’” - - i n e ffec t, a phenom enon of n a tu re in ­

s tead of an in c a rn a tio n of the w o rld sp ir i t .

Yet if , as H egel c la im ed , the governing fo rce behind the even ts

of th is w o rld is s p i r i t r a th e r than n a tu re , then i t m u st be asked w hat r e ­

la tio n sh ip th is " id e a lis t ic ” view of h is to ry has to a d ire c t p e rcep tio n and

in tu itio n of re a l life? H egel conceded th a t an im m ed ia te o r unp re ju d iced

view of the w orld y ie ld s " n e ith e r a b a s ic id ea n o r a ra tio n a l goal, " but

only a " ’confused heap of rubble* and a 'sham bles* upon w hich the fo rtune

137Ib id ., pp. 214-215.

75

of peo p les , s ta te s , and ind iv iduals is s a c r i f ic e d ." 7 H ow ever i t is ju s t

th is d ire c t p e rcep tio n of re a li ty w hich p ro m p ted him to a sk why o r fo r

w hat p u rp o se it a l l tak es p lace . And a s a th in k e r thoroughly steeped in

th e C h ris tia n tra d itio n , H egel an sw ered his own question by s e c u la r is in g

the C h ris tia n d o c trin e of p rov idence into the ucunning of reaso n " and by

converting the C h ris tia n b e lie f in sa lv a tio n in to a se c u la r theodicy "fo r

which the d ivine s p ir i t is im m anen t in the w orld , the s ta te is an ea rth ly

god, and a ll h is to ry is d i v i n e . T h e r e b y he not only overcam e the

in itia l d u a lism betw een s p i r i t and ex p erien ce , but he w as a lso ab le to

e lic it an in h e re n t ra tio n a lity in the w orld h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss which m an i­

fe s ts , a s he o b serv ed , a " 'p e rp e tu a l p ro g re s s in the co n sc io u sn ess of

141fre e d o m . 1,1 H egel tra c e d the c o u rse of th is p ro g re s s fro m the a n ­

c ien t N e ar E a s t (one f re e ) , to the G reco -R om an w o rld (som e free ) , and

th en fina lly to the G e rm an ic~ G h ris tian w orld w hose cu lm ination w as the

F ren ch -R ev o lu tio n (a ll f re e ) . But Low ith finds th is co n v ersio n of the

old C h ris tia n fa ith in to a s e c u la r theodicy o r a "m e tap h y sica l hi s to r i ­

e ls m " fa r fro m p ra isew o rth y . In fac t as a sp ec ific fa ith in the m ean ing ­

fu ln ess of the h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s p e r s e , he judges i t to be a m e re su b ­

s titu te re lig io n and the "c h e a p e s t s o r t of su b stitu te" to boot. " F o r what

is ch eap e r than the fa ith th a t o v er the long co u rse of h is to ry every th ing

139 Ib id . . p. 2 1 6 .

140Ibi<i., p. 216.141

Quoted in Ib id . , p. 217.

76

th a t has e v e r happened, w ith a i l i ts co nsequences, m u st have a m eaning

and a p u rp o s e !”

As a sp ec ific fa ith in the m eaning of h is to ry , H egel’s h is to r ie is m

h as becom e the re lig io n of th o se ’’whose sk ep tic ism is not v igorous

enough to live e n tire ly w ithout fa ith ;” and ’’even th o se who know nothing

of H egel continue to th ink today in the H egelian s p ir i t , to the ex ten t th a t

they sh a re h is a d m ira tio n fo r the pow er of h is to ry , using 'w orld h is to ry ’

to d is re g a rd the dem ands and m is e r ie s of the day.

But along w ith th is re je c tio n of H egel’s m e tap h y sica l h is to r ie ism ,

-Lowifch a lso re p u d ia te s an o th er im p o rtan t fe a tu re of the H egelian view

of h is to ry ; i ts o s ten s ib le v ind ica tion of the com m on sen se in s ig h t, ’’su c ­

c e s s crow ns the m a s te r” E rfo lg k rd n t den M e is te r . A ccord ing to Lowith,

in the fin a l a n a ly s is H egel’s e n tire h is to r ic a l c o n s tru c t r e s ts on sh ee r

h indsigh t. H egel a rg u e s backw ards fro m the fin a l s tag e to the p reced in g

ones th e reb y a rb i t r a r i ly tra n s fo rm in g th em into n e c e s sa ry s tep s of an

in ev itab le developm ent. The su cc e ss fu l p a r ty , a s the c u rre n t em bodim ent

142 Ibid . , p. 217. But if Lowith is h e re highly c r i t ic a l of the con­sequences of H eg el's ’’m e tap h y sica l h is to r ie is m ,” h is judgm ent of the y oung-H egelians is even m o re s e v e re . ’’The ac tu a l pupils of H egel con ­v e r te d M s m e tap h y sic s of h is to ry into an abso lu te h is to r ie is m ; th a t i s , they re ta in e d m e re ly the h is to r ic a l a sp e c t of the ab so lu ten ess of the s p ir i t w hich unfolds h is to r ic a lly , and m ade the even ts of the age into the su p rem e pow er o v er even philosophy and the s p ir i t . ” Thus ’’the young-H egelians tra n s fo rm H eg e l's re tro s p e c tiv e and re m in isc e n t h is to r ie is m into an h i s ­to r ic a l fu tu rism ; they d e s ire to be m o re than th e consequence of h is to ry , they w ant th em se lv es to be epoch -m ak ing and thus 'h i s t o r i c . ' ” Ib id . , p. 217.

77

of the w o rld -sp ir it# is alw ays the u ltim ate c r i te r io n of the H egelian judg­

m ent. H ow ever, in LSwith*B view , su cc e ss is a v e ry dubious c r ite r io n ;

and in sh a rp c o n tra s t to Hegel# he c ite s N ie tasch e1® o b serv a tio n tha t

143"•su c c e ss has a lw ays been the g re a te s t of l i a r s . *" He a lso poin ts out

tha t

su cc e ss is in fac t an indispensable c r i te r io n of hum an life# but it p ro v es ev ery th ing and nothing: everything# b ecau se in w orld h is to ry a s in everyday life only th a t which is su ccess fu l r e ­m a in s , and nothing# b ecau se even the g re a te s t popu lar su ccess p ro v es nothing of the in n e r w orth and tru e " h is to r ic a l g re a tn e ss" of w hat has ac tu a lly been su ccess fu l. Things w re tch ed and stupid# b a se n e ss and m ad n ess , have often had the g re a te s t su c c e ss . It is qu ite re m a rk a b le w hen a v ic to rio u s pow er p ro c la im s the fam e and honor of th o se i t lias conquered and not m e re ly the o s ten s ib le r ig h t of i t s own su cc e ss fu l pow er. N ever has an h is to r ic a l pow er com e to be w ithout v io len ce , in justices# and offenses# but fo r good o r i l l offended m ankind accu s to m s i ts e lf to ev ery change, w hile w orld h is to ry " g a th e rs g re a t t r e a s u r e s a t our e x p e n se ."

Thus Lowith concludes h is a n a ly s is of the H egelian view of h is to ry

w ith a defin ite ind ic tm en t of m etap h y sica l h is to r ic is m and a s tro n g p lea

fo r a r e tu rn to a point of view w hich acknow ledges the indom inab ility of

m an ra th e r than the so v ere ig n ity of a su p ra -hum an " s p i r i t . "

W hoever has re a lly ex p erien ced a s lic e of w orld h is to ry ra th e r than m e re ly knowing i t th rough h e a rsa y , sp eech es , books# and n ew sp ap ers w ill have to com e to the conclusion tha t Hegel* s philosophy of h is to ry is a pseudo theo log ica l sch em atiza tio n of h is ­to ry a rra n g e d acco rd in g to the idea of p ro g re s s tow ard an e sc h a to - lo g ica l fu lfillm en t a t the end of tim e ; i t does not c o rre sp o n d a t a ll to v is ib le re a li ty . The tru e "p a th o s" of w orld h is to ry does not re s id e only in the sonorous and im posing " g re a t even ts" w ith which it d e a ls , but a lso in the s ile n t su ffe ring it b rin g s upon men. If

* "^Q uoted in Ibid, # p. 219.

144tbid. , p. 219.

78

th e re is anything in w orld h is to ry to be a d m ired , i t is the pow er, the p a tien ce and s tu b b o rn n ess w ith w hich m ankind re c re a te s i t ­s e lf again a f te r a l l lo s s e s , d e s tru c tio n s , and in ju r ie s .

3h c o n tra s t to H eg e l's "p seudo theo log iea l sch em atiza tio n of w orld

h is to ry , " Lb w ith finds th a t G oethe 's view of h is to ry w as m uch c lo se r to

"v is ib le r e a l i ty . 11 Goethe w as p r im a r i ly con cern ed w ith the d ire c t "o b ­

se rv a tio n , " the A nsehen uad A nschauen of h is to r ic a l phenom ena ra th e r

th an w ith the co n stru c tio n of u n iv e rsa l a ll-e n co m p ass in g sy s te m s . But

Iidw ith contends th a t th is G oethean em p h asis upon the im m ed iacy of the

p e rc ep tu a l ex p erien ce w as not "b ecau se Goethe w as a 'p o e t ' and Hegel

a 'th in k e r ' but r a th e r b ecau se G o e th e 's p u re hum an d isp o sitio n w as as

open to n a tu re and the everyday life of m en a s to the g re a t ev en ts of the■I A £

w o rld . 51 Through h is p o sitio n as p r im e m in is te r of the p r in c ip a lity

of W eim ar, Goethe had the opportun ity to ex p erien ce a t c lo se range such

g re a t even ts a s the co ro n a tio n of E m p ero r Joseph II, the Seven Y ears

W ar, th e F re n c h R evolution, and the N apoleonic W ars. Yet a lm o s t a ll

of the n o n -g o v ern m en ta l c o rre sp o n d en ce s tem m in g fro m th is p e rio d of

h is life m an ife s ts a p e c u lia r lack of in te re s t in the p o litic a l sign ificance

of th e se g re a t events* F o r exam ple, G oethe 's im p re ss io n s of the b a ttle

5 Ib id . , p. 219. In the o rig in a l G erm an , the la s t sen tence of th is p a ra g ra p h re a d s , "Und w enn m an etw as an d e r W eltgesch ich te bew undern kaan dann 1st es d ie Kraft* die A usdauer und Z ahigkeit, m it d e r s ich die M enschheit aus a lie n E in b u ssen , Z e rs to ru n g e n und V erw undungen im m e r neu w ied er h e r s t e l l t . " The t r a n s la to r has re n d e re d i t as follow s: "If th e re is anyth ing in w orld h is to ry to be a d m ire d i t is the pow er, the p a tien ce , and s tu b b o rn n ess with, w hich i t con tinues to r e c re a te m ankind a f te r a ll lo s s e s , d e s tru c tio n s , and in ju r ie s ( ita lic s m in e ) ."

146Ibid., pp. 219-220.

79

of V alm y, in which, he took p a r t , a r e m o re concerned w ith the effects of

the ac tu a l fighting upon the hum an p a rtic ip a n ts than w ith the u ltim a te h is ­

to r ic a l consequences of the 'battle itse lf . Goethe "d e sc r ib e s the en tire

c o u rse of the re a l life of m en in the m id st of w a r ’s confusion in the p ro ­

p e r m ix tu re ; he n e ith e r g lo rif ie s the s to ry in m onum ental te rm s nor

1 4-7t r iv ia l iz e s i t c r i t ic a lly ; he view s it w ithout p re ju d ice as a phenom enon."

And JLowith goes on to o b serv e

The p re ju d ice to which w orld h is to ry as a whole can seduce u s c o n s is ts in view ing th is h is to ry in the a b s tra c t , w ithout the r e a l ­it ie s of hum an life and re a l s itu a tio n s , as though it w ere a w orld in i ts e lf w ithout re lev an ce to people th a t a c t and a re ac ted upon w ithin it. Goethe w as not guilty of such philosophic ab s trac tio n . He does not c o n s tru c t "n a tio n a l s p ir i ts " a s in ca rn a tio n s of abso lu te " p r in ­c ip le s ," but r a th e r te l ls quite g rap h ica lly how he fe lt the d e s ire to ea t in tha t h is to r ic m om en t of the bom bardm ent of Valm y. A fter G oethe 's re tu rn from B ohem ia, when the "Holy Rom an E m p ire of the G erm an N ation" cam e to an end, he co n fesses tha t a t tha t m o ­m ent he w as m o re d is tu rb ed by a q u a rre l betw een his a tten d an t and n h is coachm an than by th a t im p o rtan t, but vague and d is tan t event.

In o th e r w o rd s , i t is L ow ith 's co n sid e red opinion " th a t w orld h i s ­

to ry lo se s a ll tru e m eaning when we do not com e back fro m it to o u rse lv e s

I 4 7 Ibid. , p. 2 2 1 .

148 Ibid . , pp. 221-222. T h is tendency to allow the m om ent to take p reced en ce over o th e r co n sid e ra tio n s w as an underly ing m o tif in a ll of G o e th e 's w ritin g s . In h is d ra m a K&mont, Goethe has the hero re m a rk ,"Do I but liv e to think about l i f e ," i. e. , to specu la te h is to r ic a lly , "ShouldI r a th e r not enjoy the p re s e n t m o m en t?" And in his F a u s t , Goethe c re a te d a c h a ra c te r fo r w hom com plete b lis s can only be a tta in ed when he finds the p e rfe c t m om ent, th a t m om ent of w hich he dem ands, " P le a se lin g e r; you a r e so beau tifu l. " E gm ont, III, i i , and F a u s t, I, i i i , in G oethe 's s a m m t- lich e W erke (S tu ttg a rt and Tubingen: J* G. C o tta ’sc h e r V erlag , 1854), I, p. 69 and IX, p. 175.

80

149and w hat is n e a r e s t to a s . " But w hile th is concern fo r the sp ec ifica lly

hum an d im ension of a l l h is to r ic a l happenings is c e r ta in ly p ra isew o rth y

e sp e c ia lly in the ligh t of the m any d is to rtio n s brought about by H egel and

h is fo llo w ers - - it in no sen se p ro v id es us w ith a p ro p e r view- of h is to ry

p e r se . F o r example* JLowith a rg u e s tha t one of the v ir tu e s of the Goe~

thean view of h is to ry is th a t it a c ts a s an effec tive check upon the “ c r i t i ­

c a l tr iv ia l!n a tio n ” of the event. But does not th is G oethean view its e lf

is su e in a co m parab le tr iv ia lia a tio n ? By reducing the g re a t event to the

lev e l of a p e rso n a l re a c tio n (anger a t the q u a rre l of h is s e rv an ts o r hun­

g e r during the bom bardm en t of V alm y), G oethe has* in e ffec t, tr iv ia liz e d

i t o r , a t least* frag m en tized i t into a s m any indiv idual re a c tio n s a s th e re

w e re ind iv idua ls p a rtic ip a tin g in the event its e lf . It i s c e r ta in ly n e c e s sa ry

to ev a lu a te h is to r ic a l happenings in te rm s of th e ir " re lev a n c e to p eo p le ,"

but th is focus upon the ind iv idual and p e rso n a l d im ension of the event m ust

not ga in the u p per hand le s t the event i ts e lf d isso lv e in to a chaos of su b ­

je c tiv e fee lings and sen tim en ts . Thus n e ith e r Hegel n o r Goethe seem p a r ­

t ic u la r ly con cern ed w ith the ac tu a l p ro b lem of the h istorian .; a sc e rta in in g

and evalua ting the even t i ts e lf . F o r the fo rm e r i t Is red u ced to a m e re

In s tru m e n ta lity se rv in g the goals of the so v ere ig n , a ll-p o w erfu l w orld

s p ir i t ; and fo r the la t te r i t b ecom es a vague com posite of innum erab le

hum an p lan s , a c tio n s , and re a c tio n s .

In fac t, fo r G oethe, h is to ry i ts e lf a s the p ro d u c t of such a m anifo ld

149 Translation of Vom H egel, p. 222,

81

d iv e rs ity w as m o re ak in to a "n a tu ra l happening** a N a tu re re ig n is than

to anything else* In c o n tra s t to H egel, who saw h is to ry a s a " p ro g re s s

in the c o n sc io u sn ess of f re e d o m ," Goethe o b serv ed " ’in a ll th is m o n stro u s

ex p erien ce th e re is nothing to see but n a tu re ; nothing of what we philo so -

150p h e re would be so happy to c a ll f r e e d o m ,111' A lso in opposition to H e­

gel, who view ed n a tu re a lm o s t exclusively a s the ' ‘o th e rn e ss" of the id ea ,

G oethe d isce rn e d both re a so n and fo rm in nature* and fro m th is e x p e r­

ien ce of the e s s e n tia l un ity betw een n a tu re and. s p ir i t , he g rad u a lly d e ­

veloped h is un d ers tan d in g of m an and h is to ry . A s he put i t , " ’w ithout

m y s tu d ie s in the n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s , I should n ev er . . . have com e to

151know m en as they a re , But Lbwith a lso em p h asizes th a t G o e th e 's

study of n a tu re i s not co m p arab le to the n a tu ra l sc ien ce of h is day*

Goethe did not app ro ach n a tu re a s a m e re re a lm of m a ss and fo rce sub ­

je c t to m a th em atica l quan tifica tion , m ic ro sco p ic and te le sc o p ic ex ag ­

g e ra tio n , o r even a r t i s t ic and ph ilosoph ical sublim ation* In stead he

view ed it a s a to ta l a ll-e n co m p ass in g "phenom enon" which could only be

g ra sp ed in tu itiv e ly . Goethe cu ltiv a ted a fa m ilia r ity with, p lan ts , bones,

s to n es , and c o lo rs in o rd e r to develop " th e p a tien ce and a tten tiv en ess

^^O uoted . in Ib id* , p. 223*

* ^ Q u o te d in Ib id , , p. 225. L»bwith a lso i l lu s tr a te s the p rim ac y of n a tu re in G o e th e 's thought by pointing out th a t "in the m id s t of theF re n c h R evolution, he occupied h im se lf w ith the m e tam o rp h o sis of p lan ts , d u ring the cam paign in F ra n c e , w ith the phenom ena of co lo r, and during the duly R evolu tion , w ith m orphology, " Ibid* , p. 225,

82

w hich does not gain knowledge by fo rce , but r a th e r allow s phenom ena to1 S')

re v e a l th e ir own s e c re ts , le ttin g them speak fo r th e m s e lv e s .” Through

h is study o£ n a tu re , Goethe a lso becam e aw are th a t in a ll living th ings

’’th e re tak es p lace a co n stan t re g u la r a lte ra t io n of fo rm s , a m e tam o rp h o ­

s is of w hat re m a in s the sam e , ” i. e . , a m etam o rp h o sis of the one " p r im -

153o rd ia l fo rm , ” the U r fo rm . And p u rsu in g th is path fro m n a tu re to h is ­

to ry G oethe found th a t !,,The c irc le of m an’s c o u rse is defin ite enough;

no tw ithstanding the s ta n d s till b rought about by b a rb a r is m , it has gone

th rough i ts cycle m o re th a n once. Even if a s p ira l m ovem ent is a sc r ib e d

to it, i t still, r e tu rn s ag a in and again to the reg ion through which it has

154a lre a d y p assed . In th is w ay, a ll tru e view s and e r r o r s a r e rep ea ted . *”

But if Goethe w as convinced tha t h is to ry view ed as a m an ifesta tio n

of n a tu re re p e a ts c e r ta in b a s ic fo rm s of hum an destiny , he w as a lso a d a ­

m an t in h is b e lie f th a t w ithout such a ’’n a tu ra l” p e rsp e c tiv e , h is to r ic a l

s tu d ie s w ere of l i t t le value, In sh a rp c o n tra s t to h is co n tem p o ra rie s who,

enco u rag ed by H egel’s ’’s p ir i tu a l” view of the w orld , em phasized the d is ­

con tinu ity betw een n a tu re and h is to ry , Goethe p ro c la im ed th a t h is to ry

v iew ed ’’p u re ly h is to r ic a lly , ” a s an autonom ous re a lm of a c tiv ity se p a ra te

and d is tin c t fro m n a tu re , is the m o st ’’a b su rd ” th ing under the sun, ”a

t is s u e of nonsense fo r the h ig h e r th in k e r .” The w ork of the ’’p u re ”

152Ibid. , p. 225.

153Ibld„ p. 226.

* “ Quoted in Ibid. , pp. 226-227,

h is to r ia n is not only u n ce rta in , th an k less , and even dangerous, it is

ac tu a lly a m ish m ash of e r r o r and v io len ce’*’ a ’’’re fu se can and junk

p ile ; a t b e s t a governm ent p ro je c t. And Lowifch, pu rsu in g th is line of

thought, p a ra p h ra s e s Goethe as follows*, the f ru its of "p u re h is to ry ” a re

like those of a new spaper s to ry , ”a d is to rtio n of the tru th , com posed of

w ishful th inking and ten d en tio u sn ess , sp ec ia l p leading and stup id ity ,

cow ard ice and l ie s . How much, does even the b e st h is to r ic a l study give

us of the r e a l life of a people, and how m uch of th is l i t t le b it is tru e , and

155how m uch of w hat is tru e is c e r ta in ? "

H owever lijw ith a lso acknow ledges th a t the sam e Goethe who, on.

the one hand, could so s a rc a s t ic a l ly condem n the ’’p u re" h is to r ic a l con­

tem p la tio n of his c o n tem p o ra rie s could, on the o th e r , con tribu te g rea tly

to the re fin em en t of the h is to r ic a l c ra f t itse lf .

In the h is to r ic a l p o rtio n of h is th eo ry of co lo r, he p rov ided a s tan d a rd fo r the tre a tm e n t of " sp ir i tu a l h is to ry " by d iscu ss in g a s e r ie s of s c ie n tif ic d isc o v e rie s and concea lm en ts with re fe re n c e to the c h a ra c te r and way of thought of hum an b e ings, but not a b ­s tra c tly a s a h is to ry of m e re id eas and opinions. F o r he u n d e r­stood the a c tu a l h is to ry of re a lm s of knowledge as the conflic t of the indiv idual w ith im m ed ia te ex p erien ce and m ed ia ted tra d itio n , b ecau se in the la s t a n a ly s is it is the "indiv idual" who can "open h im se lf to a m o re in c lu s iv e n a tu re and a m o re in c lu siv e trad itio n . " In add ition , h is sk e tch of W inckelm ann shows m arv e lo u sly how even a r t can be tre a te d h is to r ic a lly fro m the standpoin t of m an; and p a r t ic u la r ly in D ichtung and W ahrheit, he showed how an in d i­v idual m an caught in the ac tio n and co u n te r-a c tio n of h is h is to r ic a l env ironm en t develops into a m an w hose life is of s ign ificance fo r the e n tire w orld .

84

T hus in Lid w ith 's opinion, G oethe, alone of a ll the th in k e rs of the n in e ­

teen th cen tu ry a tta in ed to a p ro p e r view of m an, n a tu re , and h is to ry .

In fa c t h is em phasis upon the e s se n tia l un ity of n a tu re and s p ir i t and

upon the d ire c t u n fe tte red and unm edia ted p e rcep tio n of a ll phenom ena

is , fo r Low ith, a su re sign th a t ” Goethe can n ev er becom e tim ely o r u n ­

tim e ly , b ecau se he is fo re v e r a p u re sp rin g of tru th in the re la tio n sh ip

157of m an to h im se lf and to the w orld . ’*

But Goethe is not only a "p u re sp rin g of t r u th ,” he a lso c o n sti-

138tu te s a '" tr iu m p h of the p u re ly h u m a n ,IM i. e. , he is an em bodim ent

of th a t 11 hum anity0 which Lowith has thus fa r in a ll of h is w ritin g s sought

to re c o v e r and p re s e rv e fro m the an ti-h u m an is tic re la tiv is t , d ec is io n is t,

and e x is te n tia lis t o r ie n ta tio n s of h is day. Yet Lowith nev er re a lly s u c ­

ceeds in te llin g us ju s t w hat th is "hum an ity 0 c o n s is ts of. Quoting Goethe

he r e f e r s to it as a " ‘high, benevolen t irony . . . fa irn e s s of judgm ent

. . . even tem p e r in the face of o ffen siv en ess . . . equanim ity in a ll

159v ic is s itu d e s . . . *“ And som ew hat fu r th e r on, quoting H e rd e r , L a -

w ith r e f e r s to hum anity a s " ‘the t r e a s u r e and p r iz e of a ll hum an e ffo rt,

1 60 * the a r t of ou r race* *H But th e se d esigna tions and defin itions a r e m uch

too vague and g e n e ra l when co m p ared to the c o n c re te c la s s ic a l defin ition

157Ibid ., p. ZOO,

158Ibid. , p. 324.

159Ib id ., p. 324.

85

of m an as a ra tio n a l and so c ia l an im al, soon logon echon and zoon p o li-

tik o n , o r to the C h ris tia n conception of m an as a being sp ec ia lly c re a te d

in. the im age of God, occupying-an in te rm e d ia te position betw een the D i­

v ine and the b ru te s . W hat Dbwith is re a lly saying , through Goethe and

H e rd e r , is th a t m an’s hum anity is a p roduct of education and developm ent,

of the slow and ca re fu l cu ltiva tion of an in h e ren t but unspec ified po ten tia l.

In the end then , it bo ils down to the old e igh teen th cen tu ry E nligh tenm ent

“id ea l of education” B ild ungsidea l. N on e th e less , fo r Lbwith, th is G oe-

thean and H e rd e r ia n “hum anity” is alone the tru e , the p ro p e r , v e ry s im ­

p ly , a lone the n a tu ra l as w ell a s n o rm a tiv e point of view.

It is easy to m is s see ing tha t what is tru e , to the ex ten t th a t i t h as m ade I ts e lf h e a rd in G erm any during the p a s t cen tu ry , can be seen in Goethe and not in m o re re c e n t f ig u res . It is u sually not u n d ers to o d th a t the excep tion to the o rd in a ry is not what is can - sp icuous by e x ce ss and defic iency , but w hat is com plete ly n o rm al.

H ow ever d esp ite th is su p e r io rity of G oethe’s “n o rm a lity , ” in co m ­

p a r is o n to the d is to r tio n s and ex ag g era tio n s of H egel and of m o st of the

young-H egelians, Low it h is w ell aw are of the fac t th a t a s im p le r e a s s e r ­

tion of the v a lid ity of the Goethe an point of view in our con tem p o rary

“ tech n o lo g ica l c iv iliz a tio n . . , w ithout w hich we can no lo nger even p ic -

tu re our daily l iv e s ” would i ts e lf co n stitu te an a n ach ro n is tic denial of

a m a jo r rev o lu tio n in hum an life . In addition , JLowith is h im se lf too

thoroughgoing and co n sc ien tio u s a th in k e r, s e r io u s ly , to c h e r ish illu s io n s

161 Ibid. , p. 231.

86

of a d ire c t re tu rn to a Goethea.ii view of m an, n a tu re , and h is to ry . "T h e re

163i» no going back in tim e n e ith e r to Goethe n o r anybody e l s e ,11' p r im a r i ly

b ecau se the " M s to ric ism , w hich developed out of H egel's m etap h y sics of

th e h is to ry of the s p ir i t , becam e m o re fu tu r is t ic than the u n h is to ric a l

1 £ Aw orld view of G o e t h e . ° It "becam e the standpoint of the age. Now

165consc io u sly o r unconsciously - - i t belongs to a ll of u s . "

But since th is h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n has becom e the dam inenl

standpoin t of. our tim e , then "a study of the age fro m Hegel to N ie tzsche

u ltim a te ly w ill have to y ield the question: Is the e ssen ce and ’meaning*

of h is to ry d e te rm in ed abso lu te ly fro m w ithin h is to ry i ts e lf and, if not,

then ho w ?" *^ Lowith s ta te s th a t the re s u lt of an a ffirm ativ e an sw er to

th is question , i. e. , the r e s u l t of an an sw er " fro m w ithin h is to ry " by the

m e m b e rs of h is g en era tio n , "b o rn b e fo re 1900 and com e to m a tu rity d u r-

167ing the F i r s t W orld W ar, would be a re so lu te re s ig n a tio n . " Yet he

i s a lso f irm ly convinced th a t "even if only to be ab le to u n d e rs tan d the

age a s an age, a point of view is n e c e s sa ry which w ill tra n sc e n d the b a re

ev en ts of the a g e . ,?*k8 F u r th e rm o re , only a f te r the adoption of such a

^ ^ F irs fc ed ition of Vom H egel, p. 530.

1 64T ra n s la tio n of Vom Hegel^, p. 181,

165Ibid. , p. 82.

* ^ Ib id . , p. v i.

^ ^ I b id . , p. v ii.

* ^ Ibid. , p. v i. Lowith a lso o b se rv es " tim e and h is to ry p e r se

87

tra n sce n d e n t point of view o r "only in those m om ents in which e te rn ity

a p p ea rs a s the tru th of being does the te m p o ra l schem e of p ro g re s s as

w ell as decay p ro v e i ts e lf to be a h is to r ic a l c h im a e ra , 11 P resu m ab ly

G oethe, a s a ' ’p u re sp rin g of tru th " n e ith e r " tim e ly nor u n tim e ly ," con*

s titu ted one of those m om ents. In any ca se , Lbwith is c e r ta in tha t "m an

is not so le ly dependent upon a ll-p o w erfu l tim e . He su rv iv es the v ic is ­

s itu d es of ex is ten ce thanks to a single ra y o r sp a rk fro m the being of

170e te rn ity . " But, c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly , JLSwith is incapable of p rovid ing

us w ith a fu r th e r sp ec ifica tio n of th is "being of e te rn ity " e ith e r as C h r is ­

tian s p ir i t o r pagan n a tu re a s Hegel and Goethe could; hence it is not

re a lly anything su b s ta n tia l in i ts own rig h t but m e re ly s e rv e s as an a n ti-

pode o r a co u n terp o ise to the " re so lu te re s ig n a tio n " of his co n tem p o raries

who have succum bed to the " s p i r i t of the a g e ." Thus in sp ite of Low ith 's

conviction th a t an e x tra -te m p o ra l poin t of re fe re n c e is n e c e s sa ry , his

own "being of e te rn ity " is s t i l l m ore a p roduct of a negative re a c tio n to

h is age, and th e reb y unconsciously conditioned by it , than the re s u lt of a

genuine em ancipation fro m the h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n .

H ow ever th is ob jection no tw ithstand ing , Lowith has now, a t least*

do not o ffe r us a spot w h ere one can stand s tead fas tly . C ontinuity, d u ra ­tio n , and e te rn ity a r e independent of the faith in p ro g re s s , re a so n , and free d o m [ e x tra -te m p o ra l} p re su p p o sitio n s of each and ev ery p h ilo so ­phy of h is to ry . " F i r s t ed ition of Vom H egel, p. 8 .

* ^ Ib id , , p. 530.

17QIbid. , p. 9.

com e to the defin ite conclusion, tha t h is to r ic ism , fa r fro m provid ing an

adequate so lu tion to the p ro b lem of the d isco v e ry and p re se rv a tio n of

m an, is , in fac t, a m a jo r th re a t to th is v e ry undertak ing . M oreover,

M s se r io u s co n sid e ra tio n of the p o ssib ility of an e x tra - te m p o ra l point

of re fe re n c e a lre a d y c le a r ly fo reshadow s the d ire c tio n of his subsequent

a tte m p ts to effect an overcom ing of h is to r ic ! sm . Indeed, d ire c tly a f te r

Vom H egel, Lowith u n d e rtak es a v e ry c r i t ic a l and thorough in v e s tig a ­

tio n of the h is to r ic is f d is to rtio n s of the o rig in a l e x tra - te m p o ra l so u rces

of the h is to r ic a l point of view per se, o r , in his w ords, an inv estig a tio n

of the p ro b lem of "m ean ing in h is to ry . M

CHAPTER IV

M eaning in H is to ry

. i 7 1M eaning in H is to ry ' is ac tu a lly a m any faceted w ork concerned

not only with, the g en era l p ro b lem of the m eaning and sign ificance of p a s t

ev en ts but a lso w ith the p ro b lem of the th eo lo g ica l background of the p h i­

losophy of h is to ry , 1. e« , w ith the re la tio n sh ip betw een s a c re d and sec u la r

h is to ry , w ith W eltgeechichte und B eilsg esch eh en . H ow ever, the u n d e r­

ly ing m o tif uniting a ll of th e se co n ce rn s is the a ttem p t to d em o n stra te the

in n a te inadequacy of the h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n . To d em o n stra te the in ­

adequacy of a poin t of view , Eowith a rg u e s , one m ust f i r s t go to i ts ac tua l

b a se o r so u rc e and then show that it does not do ju s tic e to e m p ir ic a l r e ­

a lity . But in the c ase of h is to r ic ism , the ac tu a l base is not sim ply a con ­

g e r ie s of iso la te d h is to r ic a l fa c ts nor even the e n tire young-H egelian

m ovem ent; i t is the to ta l e n te rp r is e of h is to ry its e lf . Thus in o rd e r to

o v erco m e h is to r ic is m , ui t does not suffice m e re ly to re a so n c o rre c tly ,

172in s te ad a h is to r ic a l re fle c tio n upon h is to r ic a l thought i ts e lf is re q u ire d . 11

171 K. Eow ith, M eaning in H is to ry , the T heolog ical Im p lica tions of the Ph ilosophy of H is to ry (Chicago: U n iv e rs ity of Chicago P r e s s , 1949)*In 1953 th is w ork ap p ea red in G erm an as W eltgesch ich te und H eilsgesehe - hen, die theo log ischen V o rau sse tzu n g en d e r G esch ichfsph ilosopbie (S tu tt­g a rt: W. K oh lham m er, 1953).

K. Lbwith, ’’Die D ynam ik d e r G esch ich te und d er H is to r is m u s ," in E ran o s J a h r b u c h (Z urich : R e in v e rlag , 1952), XXI, pp. 134-135. An Ita lian tra n s la t io n of th is e ssa y ap p ea red in R iv is ta di F ilo so fia , XEV (1954), pp. 131-148.

90

M oreover th is re fle c tio n o r , b e tte r s t i l l , c r i t ic a l reex am in a tio n of the

s o u rc e s of o u r co n tem p o rary understand ing of the ro le and function of

h is to ry is a ll the m o re n e c e s sa ry since , acco rd in g to Lowiib, "we find

o u rse lv e s m o re or le s s a t the end of the m o d ern rope. It has w orn too

th in to give hopeful support. We have le a rn e d to ■wait w ithout hope ‘for

hope would be hope fo r the w rong thing. "* Hence "the w ho lesom eness

of re m e m b erin g in th e se tim es of su sp en se What has been fo rgo tten and

173of re c o v e rin g the genuine so u rc e s of our so p h istica ted r e s u l t s . "

Lowith finds that the v a s t m a jo rity of our co n tem p o rary " so p h is ­

tic a te d re s u lts " a re tra c e a b le back to the H eb rew -C h ris tian sa lva tion

epic. F o r exam ple , o u r co n cern with the m eaning of h is to ry , i. e. , w ith

a "philosophy of h is to ry ," he d is c e rn s a s a p roduct of re lig io n , " it is

H ebrew and C h ris tia n thinking tha t brought th is co lo ssa l question into

e x is ten ce . To a sk e a rn e s tly the question of the u ltim a te m eaning of h is ­

to ry ta k es one’s b re a th away; it t ra n s p o r ts us into a vacuum w hich only

hope and fa ith can fill. " * And in o rd e r to em p h asize th is o rig in a l d e ­

pendence of the philosophy of h is to ry upon H eb rew -C h ris tian thinking,

Lowith po in ts out th a t the f i r s t g re a t a ttem p t to e lic it an u ltim a te m ean ­

ing in h is to ry , A ugustine’s C ity of God, is not to be co n sid e red a genuine

"ph ilosophy of h is to ry " a t a ll; r a th e r it is a d o g m a tic -h is to r ic a l in te r p r e ­

ta tio n of C h ris tia n ity .

173K, Lowith, M eaning, p. 3.

17 4_, , j.Ibid. , p. 4.

91

Though he is dem o n stra tin g the tru th of the C h ris tia n d o c trin e in the m a te r ia l of s a c re d and pro fane h is to ry , the h is ­to ry of the w orld has fo r h im no in tr in s ic in te re s t and m eaning.The C ity of God is not an id ea l which could becom e r e a l in h is ­to ry , like the th ird age of Joach im , and the church in i ts e a r th ly ex isten ce is only a re p re se n ta tiv e s ign ifica tion of the tru e , t r a n s - h is to r ic a l city- F o r A ugustine the h is to r ic a l ta sk of the ch u rch is not to develop the C h ris tian tru th th rough su cce ss iv e s tag es but sim ply to sp re ad it, fo r the tru th a s such is e stab lish ed .

In o th e r w o rd s , A ugustine1® tru e them e is not the hum an h is to ry of the

w orld p e r se; it is the esch a to lo g ica l h is to ry of the fa ith , the Hells g e -

sc he hen , w hich is a kind of e so te r ic h is to ry w ith in s e c u la r h is to ry v is ib le

only to th o se who p o s se ss the eyes of faith . F o r A ugustine, the en tire

c o u rse of h is to ry becom es p ro g re s s iv e , m eaningful, and in te llig ib le

so le ly by an tic ip a tin g a fina l trium ph , beyond h is to r ic a l tim e , of the city

of God o v e r the sin fu l city of m an.

But if A ugustine view ed h is to ry a s defin ite ly d is tin c t fro m God* fo r

the la te r C h ris tia n th in k e rs , and H egel in p a r t ic u la r , God tended to b e ­

com e one w ith h is to ry , m an ifestin g h im se lf p r im a r i ly in and th rough the

h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss its e lf , Thu® h is to ry , a s the re a lm fo r the spec ific

re a lis a tio n of the s p i r i t of C h ris tian ity , in c re as in g ly b ecam e a theodicy ,

the ju s tif ic a tio n of God in h is to ry , hence H egel’s conviction th a t “ the h i s ­

to ry of the w o rld is the w o rld ’s cou rt of ju s tic e , M Die Welfg esch ich te is t

177 »das W eltg e rlch i. H ow ever, in Xjowith* s view , the p rin c ip le d ifferen ce

m IM#- * P*

176M £* > PP* ib8~17£.177 »A ccord ing to Lbwith, Ha sen tence which is a s re lig io u s in i ts

92

betw een A ugustine and H egel lie s in the fac t th a t Hegel in te rp re ts the en-

t i r e C h ris tia n re lig io n in te rm s of specu la tive rea so n . Hegel sa id , " 'th e

p ro c e s s d isp layed in h is to ry is only the m an ifesta tio n of re lig io n as hum an

re a so n , the p roduction of the re lig io u s p rin c ip le under the fo rm of se c u la r

173f re e d o m .,n M oreover w ith th is se c u la r isa tio n of the C h ris tia n faith

o r , in H egelian te r m s , " re a lisa tio n " of the C h ris tia n s p ir i t , Hegel b e ­

liev ed h im se lf loyal to the genius of C h ris tian ity . But in L dw lth 's judg ­

m ent

F ifteen hundred y e a rs of W estern thought w ere re q u ire d befo re H egel could ven tu re to tra n s la te the eyes of fa ith into the eyes of re a so n and the theology of h is to ry a s e s tab lish ed by A ugus­tine in to a philosophy of h is to ry which is n e ith e r s a c re d no r p ro ­fane. It is a cu rio u s m ix tu re of both, degrading s a c re d h is to ry to the lev e l of s e c u la r h is to ry and exalting the la t te r to the level of the f i r s t ~~ C h ris tian ity in te rm s of a s e lf-su ffic ie n t Logos a b ­so rb ing the w ill of God into the s p ir i t of the w orld and the s p ir i t of the na tio n s , the W eltgeist and the Volks gels t e r .

A nother im p o rtan t d e riv a tio n fro m the H eb rew -C h ris tian r e l ig ­

ious o rien ta tio n , acco rd in g to Ldwith, is o u r co n ce rn w ith the fu tu re a s

the tru e focus of h is to ry . G iven our u n d erstand ing of h is to ry a s "a m o v e­

m ent in tim e" i ts "m ean ing , " g en era lly , w ill be conceived in te rm s of a

fina l goal. But " the te m p o ra l h o riso n fo r a fin a l goal is . . . an

o rig in a l m otivation w here i t m eans tha t the w o rld 's h is to ry is p roceed ing to w ard i ts judgm ent a t the end of a ll h is to ry , a s i t is ir r e lig io u s in its s ec u la r ap p lica tio n , w h ere i t meatus th a t the judgm ent i s contained in the h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss a s s u c h ." Ibid. , p. 58.

178Q uoted In Ibid. , p. 57,

93

esch a to lo g ica l fu tu re and the fu tu re e x is ts fo r us only by ex p ec ta tion and

hope. " F u r th e rm o re , "su ch an expecta tion w as m o st in ten se ly a live

am ong the H ebrew p ro p h e ts ; it did not ex is t am ong the G reek p h ilo so -

180p lie rs , “ Thus in the H eb rew -C h ris tian view of h is to ry , the p a s t b e ­

com es a p ro m ise to the fu tu re and a s a re s u l t " the in te rp re ta tio n of the

p a s t becom es a p rophecy in r e v e r s e , d em o n stra tin g the p a s t a s a m ean ­

ingful ‘p reparation* fo r the fu tu re .

Yet, on the o th er hand, fro m a s tr ic t ly orthodox point of view ,

th is fu tu r is t ic m otif does not ex tend indefin ite ly ; w ith the ap p ea ran ce of

C h ris t, tim e has been fu lfilled . T h e re fo re the tim e betw een the r e s u r ­

re c tio n and the second com ing is not com parab le to tha t w hich p reced ed

| jjrtw 1' When we re m e m b e r that II Isa iah and H erodotus w e re a lm o s t

c o n te m p o ra r ie s , we r e a l is e the unb ridgeab le gulf th a t s e p a ra te s G reek w isdom fro m Jew ish fa ith . " Ibid. , p. 6 .

181 Ibid. , p. 6 , Lowith a lso a rg u e s tha t not only o u r in te re s t in the fu tu re but the g en e ra l tendency to d is tingu ish v a rio u s zones o r p h ases w ithin tim e i ts e lf re f le c ts our H eb rew -C h ris tian h e rita g e . “ The th e o re ­t ic a l o b se rv a tio n of n a tu ra l sp a c e -tim e and the d is tin c tio n of an in d if fe r ­en t ‘now* poin t fro m i ts 'before* and 'after* do not exp lain the ex p erien ce of a qua lita tiv e h is to r ic a l tim e . A h is to r ic a l now is not an in d iffe ren t in s ta n t but a k a i ro s , w hich opens the ho rizo n fo r p a s t a s w ell a s fu tu re . " A ccord ing ly , ‘"the s ign ifican t now of the k a iro s q u a lifie s the r e tro s p e c t on the p a s t and the p ro sp e c t upon the fu tu re , un iting the p a s t as p r e p a r ­a tio n w ith the fu tu re a s consum m ation . ’* H is to ric a lly , " it was the a p p e a r­an ce of J e su s C h ris t a t the appoin ted tim e w hich opened fo r the C h ris tian fa ith th is p e rsp e c tiv e onto the p a s t and onto the fu tu re a s te m p o ra l p h ases in the h is to ry of sa lva tion , . . . A m e re b e fo re and a f te r of a n e u tra l now could n e v e r have co n stitu ted h is to r ic a l p a s t and h is to r ic a l fu tu re . " Ib id . * pp. IBS-186.

th e in carn a tio n . It is no longer a tim e of an tic ipation and expectation of

a g lo rio u s fu tu re fu lfillm en t but ra th e r the " la s t t im e ," an in te r im , f,a

tim e of p roba tion and fin a l d isc r im in a tio n betw een the w heat and the tares#

Its co nstan t content a r e v a ria tio n s of one sing le them e; God’s ca ll and

» . 182 m an’s re sp o n se to i t , ” Thus fo r the tru e b e lie v e r, the in carn a tio n

and c ru c ifix io n in d ica te th a t tim e is fulfilled* it only rem a in s to be con*

sum m ated ; in Other w o rd s , "the Kingdom of God is a lre a d y a t hand, and1 Q O

yet a s an e sc h a t on s t i l l to com e. " But th e esc baton as the end is not

an an tic ip a ted fu tu re in the c o u rse of tim e ; i t is a penu ltim ate co n su m m a­

tion beyond tim e .

H ow ever in sh arp c o n tra s t to th is orthodox understand ing of fu tu re

fu lfillm en t, Jo ach im of F lo ris., in the tw elfth cen tu ry , on the b a s is of a

re v e la tio n , p ro c la im ed a new and la s t d isp en sa tio n a f te r those of the Old

and Hew T e s tam en ts . The g e n e ra l schem e of Jo ac h im 's in sp ira tio n is

b a sed on the d o c trin e of the T rin ity . T h ree d iffe ren t d isp en sa tio n s com e

to p a ss in th re e d iffe ren t epochs in w hich the th re e p e rso n s of the T rin ity

a r e m an ife s t in an o rd e r ly su ccess io n . The f i r s t d isp en sa tio n is th a t of

the F a th e r (the age of the law o r the Old T es tam en t) , the second th a t of

the Son (the age of G race o r the Hew T es tam en t) , and the th ird tha t of

the Holy G host (the age of p u re sp ir it) w hich he a lso conceived a s ju s t

beginning, i. e. , beginning in h is own day* Jo ach im ’s expecta tion of

I 82 Ibid. , p. 184.

95

a la s t p ro v id en tia l p ro g re s s tow ard a fu tu re "age of the sp ir it" w as r a d ­

ic a lly new in co m p ariso n to the orthodox p a tte rn , e sp ec ia lly since J o a ­

ch im conceived of th is p ro g re s s o r consum m ation w ith in r a th e r than b e ­

yond the fram ew o rk of h is to ry .

T h is consum m ation does not o ccu r beyond h is to r ic a l tim e , a t the end of the w orld , but in a la s t h is to r ic a l epoch, Jo ach im 's esch a to lo g ica l schem e c o n s is ts n e ith e r in a s im p le m illenn ium no r in the m e re expecta tion of the end of the w orld but in a tw o- fold e sch a to n : an u ltim ate h is to r ic a l phase of the h is to ry of s a l ­vation , p reced in g the tra n sce n d e n t es chat on of the new aeon, ushered, in by the second com ing of C h ris t. The K ingdom of the S p ir it is the la s t re v e la tio n of G od's p u rpose on e a r th and in tim e . C onsequently , the in s titu tio n of the papacy and c le r ic a l h ie ra rc h y is lim ited to the second epoch. T h is im p lie s a ra d ic a l rev is io n of the C atholic d o c trin e of su ccess io n fro m St. P e te r to the end of the w orld . The ex istin g church , though founded on C h ris t, w ill have to y ie ld to the com ing chu rch of the S p ir it, w hen the h is ­to ry of sa lv a tio n h as reach ed its p len itude.

W ith A ugustine and T hom as, the C h ris tia n tru th r e s ts once and

fo r a ll on c e r ta in h is to r ic a l fa c ts . With Jo ach im , C h ris tia n tru th , like

H eg e l's s p ir i t , has a te m p o ra l se tting in its su cc e ss iv e developm ent.

H ence co m p ared w ith A ugustine and T hom as, the thought of Jo ach im is

1 Pifi" th eo lo g ica l h ls to r is m . " T h e re fo re , d esp ite the fac t th a t Joach im

h im se lf did not o v e rtly c r i t ic is e the chu rch of h is day, Ms sp ecu la tio n s

18?did in d ire c tly encou rage the " s tr iv in g fo r new h is to r ic a l re a l iz a t io n s ,"

e sp e c ia lly those of the F ra n c is c a n s p ir itu a ls , "T o th em the c le r ic a l

chu rch was indeed a t i ts end. R ejec ting the a llev ia tin g d is tin c tio n s

185Ib id . , p. 151.

^ ^ Ib id . , p. 156.

96

betw een s t r ic t p re c e p ts and flex ib le co u n se ls , they m ade a ra d ic a l a t ­

tem p t to live a C h ris tia n life in unconditional p o v erty and hum ility . “

They w anted Hto tra n s fo rm the church into a com m unity of the Holy S p ir it

w ithout P ope, c le r ic a l h ie ra rc h y , s a c ra m e n ts , Holy S c rip tu re and th e o l­

ogy, ” In sh o rt then , they "expected every th ing fro m the fu tu re .

A nother th in k e r who, in L ow ith 's view , "expected every th ing fro m

the fu tu re ” w as K a rl M arx. M arx , a s ind ica ted , view ed h is to ry a s a b ­

so rb ed into a to ta l a ll-e n co m p ass in g econom ic p ro c e ss which he con­

ceived a s m oving tow ard a final fu tu re w orld revo lu tion and w orld re n o v a ­

tion . And " it is p re c ise ly fo r the sake of th is final and fu tu re co n su m m a­

tion of the whole h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s th a t M arx s tro v e to h asten the d is in -

te g ra tio n of bo u rg eo is c a p ita lis tic socie ty . ” y But h e re Lowith is not

sim ply in te re s te d in d e te rm in in g the key feature© of the M arx ian outlook

a s such but, m o re sp ec ifica lly , in. uncovering the m otivation fo r such an

outlook. Ju s t a s M arx h im se lf w as g re a tly concerned with w hat he te rm e d

the “h idden” o r s e c re t h is to ry of the ch ief concep ts of bo u rg eo is socie ty ,

l i e . , the “ s e c re t” econom ic base of i ts leg a l, p o litic a l, and so c ia l fo rm s ,

so Jhdwith seek s to uncover the “hidden” h is to ry of M arx 's own " id eo lo g ica l”

and “ s o c ia lis t ic ” fu tu r ism . And not su rp ris in g ly , he finds the re a l d r iv ­

ing fo rc e behind a l l of M a rx 's conceptions to be “ the old Jew ish m e ss ia n -

is m and p ro p h e tism u n a lte re d by two thousand y e a rs of econom ic h is to ry

97

fro m h an d ic ra ft to la rg e - s c a le in d u s try , 1,190 The fundam ental an tagon­

is m betw een b o u rg eo is ie and p ro le ta r ia te , he tr a c e s back to the Old T e s t-

am en t an tagon ism betw een the “ch ild ren of d a rk n e ss ' 5 and the " ch ild re n

of lig h t . 55 The m is s io n a ry ta sk of the p ro le ta r ia te "co rre sp o n d s to the

w o r ld -h is to r ic a l m iss io n of the chosen people. " Even M arx 's " sc ien tific "

p re d ic tio n of a fina l s tru g g le betw een the b o u rg eo is ie and p ro le ta ria t© ,

Ikswith see s fo reshadow ed in the H ebra ic v is io n of an A rm ageddon and

a la s t judgm ent. C lea rly i t is the "Jew ish in s is te n c e on abso lu te r ig h t-

191eo u sn ess" and fu tu re fu lfillm en t w hich l ie s a t the b ase of M arx 's

m a te r ia l is m and is the tru e so u rce of i ts popu lar appeal.

H is to r ic a l m a te r ia lism is e sse n tia lly , though s e c re tly , a h is to ry of fu lfillm en t and sa lv a tio n in te rm s of so c ia l econom y. What seem s to be a sc ien tific d isco v e ry fro m which one m ight d e ­duce, a f te r the fash ion of M arx is t " r e v is io n is ts ," the ph ilo soph i­cal g a rb and the re l ic of a re lig io u s a ttitu d e is , on the c o n tra ry , f ro m the f i r s t to the la s t sen tence in sp ire d by an esch a to lo g ica l fa ith , w hich, in i ts tu rn , "d e te rm in es" the whole sw eep and range of a ll p a r t ic u la r s ta tem e n ts . It would have been quite im p o ssib le to e la b o ra te the v is io n of the p ro le ta r ia te 's m e ss ia n ic vocation on a p u re ly sc ien tif ic b a s is and to in sp ire m illions of fo llow ers by a b a re s ta te m e n t of fac ts .

A nother m a jo r, if not p e rh ap s the m o s t im p o rtan t, p roduct of the

e sch a to lo g ica l h is to ry of sa lv a tio n , acco rd in g to Lowith, w as the idea of

p ro g re s s . Such an id ea could only becom e the lead ing p rin c ip le fo r the

und ers tan d in g of h is to ry w ith in the p r im a ry h o rizon of the fu tu re as

19° ib ia , , p. 44*

191 Ib id . * p, 44.

m ibid. , p. 45,

98

es ta b lish e d by Jew ish and C h ris tian faith* "W ithin a cyclic W eltanschauun;

and o rd e r of the u n iv e rse , w here ev ery m ovem ent of advance is , a t the1 9 3

sam e tim e , a m ovem ent o f re tu rn , th e re is no p lace fo r p rog ress*

But g ran ted th a t the id ea of p ro g re s s is u ltim a te ly d e riv ed fro m H ebrew -

C h ris tia n hope and expecta tion , Bowith again ta k es p a ins to point out th a t

th is s e c u la r d e riv a tio n m u st be carefu lly d is tingu ished fro m the c a rd in a l

te n e ts of the fa ith itself* The G ospels n ev e r p ro c la im a fu tu re im p ro v e ­

m ent in our e a r th ly condition, only the sudden advent of the K ingdom of

God. S alvation is not to be a tta in ed th rough a g radua l developm ent of our

n a tu ra l fa c u ltie s but, on the c o n tra ry , th rough a d ec is iv e conversion , e f­

fec ting a to ta l tra n s fo rm a tio n in the life of the individual* Saint P a u l’s

adm onitions to " p re s s fo rw ard 15 have little to do w ith m o d ern a c tiv ism

and p ro g re s s iv ism ; P au l is so le ly concerned w ith a tra n sce n d e n ta l t r a n s ­

fo rm atio n and consum m ation w hich, although s t i l l d is tan t, is n o n e th e less

defin ite and a t any tim e im m inen t. In o th e r w o rd s , 11 C h ris tia n ity , fa r

fro m having opened the h o riso n of an indefin ite fu tu re like the re lig io n

of p ro g r e s s , has m ade the fu tu re p a ram o u n t by m aking i t d e fin ite ;51 and

th e reb y i t has a lso im m en se ly accen tu a ted and deepened the e a rn e s tn e ss

of th e p re s e n t in s tan t. The only " p ro g re s s 51 th a t could p o ssib ly in te re s t

a C h ris tia n would be th e p ro g re s s iv e im ita tio n of C h ris t who h im se lf did

not re a lly c a re fo r w orld ly im p ro v em en ts and w hose divine p e rfec tio n

194cannot be su rp a ss e d by hum an im ita to rs ,

193Ibid. , p. 111 .

194Ibid. , pp. 112-113,

99

Y et w ith the em erg en ce in the seven teen th cen tu ry of the c o n tro l

v e rs y betw een the "an c ie n ts and the m oderns* H the b e lie f in an im m anent

and indefin ite p ro g re s s g rad u a lly began to re p la c e the b e lie f in a defin ite

tra n sc e n d e n t p ro v id en ce , and in the eigh teen th cen tu ry V o lta ire boldly e x ­

p la ined re v e a le d re lig io n in te rm s of p ro fane history* But* th e reb y , Lo-

w ith a rg u e s , he did not a tta in to a m o re com plete u n iv e rsa lity o r a su p e rio r

v is io n of truth, in co m p ariso n to h is co u n te rp a rt B ossue t, who s t i l l explained

p ro fan e h is to ry relig iously* In stead , V o lta ire desp ite h is p o lem ics ag a in s t

C h ris tia n ity m e re ly s e c u la r is e d " th e C h ris tian hope of sa lv a tio n in to an

in defin ite hope of im p ro v em en t and fa ith in God’s p rov idence into the b e lie f

in m an’s cap ac ity to p ro v id e fo r h is own e a r th ly happiness*

Turgot* a n o th e r e igh teen th cen tu ry ap o stle of the re lig io n of p ro ­

g re s s , JLbwith ju d g es a som ew hat su b tle r th in k e r than V o lta ire , s ince he

sp ec ific a lly acknow ledged C h ris tia n ity ’s con tribu tions to p ro g re s s ra th e r

th an co n sid e rin g i t a ch ief im ped im en t. Bbwith a lso finds tha t T u rgo t

w as one of the f i r s t to u n d e rs tan d h isto rica l, m ovem ents a s not m e re ly

a s im p le one-d im en sio n a l p ro g re s s io n but a s "an in tr ic a te sy s te m

of p a ss io n a te In ten tions and unexpected resu lts* " Yet T u rg o t, too

^ ^ Ibid . , p* 1 1 1.

^ F o r T u rg o t C h ris tia n ity w as the ’'n a tu ra l re lig io n ," sp read in g c h a r ity and gentleness* "T h a t th o se p rin c ip le s have been in c re a s in g ly e ffec tive in the m id s t of m an ’s tum ultuous p a ss io n s ; th a t they have m it i ­gated h is ra g e s , te m p e re d h is a c tio n s , and m o d era ted the fa ll of s ta te s by having m ade m an b e tte r and h ap p ier . . . seem s to T u rg o t a w e ll- e s ta b lish e d and ind isp u tab le fac t. " Ibid. * p. 101.

100

se c u la r iz e d p rov idence in to a " n a tu ra l law of p ro g re s s " and re ta in ed a

" re lig io u s re sp e c t" fo r such sec u la r m an ifesta tio n s of C h ris tian ity as

"p e rso n a l lib e r ty and la b o r; inv io lab ility of the r ig h t of p ro p e rty ; equal

ju s tic e fo r everyone; m u ltip lica tio n of the m eans of su b sis ten ce ; in c re a s e

of r ic h e s ; and augm entation of en joym ents, en ligh tenm ent, and a ll m eans

to h ap p in ess . " Thus T u rg o t’s w ork shows th a t even if one a ttem p ts to

u n d e rs tan d h is to ry th rough a s tr ic t ly ra tio n a l an a ly s is of " ’the so u rc e s

and the m ech an ism of the m o ra l cau ses and th e ir e ffec ts , * the theo log ica l

schem e ©till re m a in s v is ib le a s long as h is to ry is not com ple tely s im p li­

fied to a p la in and in te llig ib le p ro g re s s io n of su c c e ss iv e s tag es and

ev en ts .

T his underly ing " th eo log ica l schem e" i s a lso re a d ily d isce rn ab le

in the thought of C ondorcet, C om te, and P roudhon fo r whom h is to ry w as

c e r ta in ly m o re than a m e re "p la in and in te llig ib le p ro g re s s io n of s u c c e s ­

s iv e s tag es and ev en ts . " F o r exam ple, C o n d erce t’s O utlines of an H is ­

to r ic a l View of the P ro g re s s of the Hum an Mind sought to d em o n stra te

th e c o n c re te fu tu re p e rfe c ta b ili ty of m an on the b a s is of man* s ap p aren tly

l im it le s s cap ac ity fo r in itia tin g " im p ro v em en ts . " And C ondorcet su p ­

p o rte d th is a rg u m en t w ith a ll kinds of in fe re n c es and o b serv a tio n s which

he te rm e d " s c ie n tif ic ," such a s the o b se rv a tio n th a t p h y sica l im p ro v e ­

m en t au to m a tica lly e n ta ils m o ra l b e tte rm e n t, ye t T-owith finds " th a t

th e re is nothing sc ie n tif ic , p re c is e , and quantified in C on d o rcet’s -

^^Ibid. , pp. 101-103.

101

sp ecu la tio n s about m an ’s fu tu re p ro g re s s , " In fac t “C o n d o rce t's hopes

fo r the fu tu re p e rfe c tio n of m en w ere not the re s u lt of sc ien tif ic in fe ren ce

and ev idence but a c o n jec tu re , the roo t of w hich w as hope and fa ith . n

. C om te, who w as a d isc ip le of Condo m e t, fa re s li t t le b e tte r in

JLdwith'e judgment* H is only d istingu ish ing fe a tu re is seen to be “ the

co m p le ten ess and p e rs is te n c y of h is e lab o ra tio n *5 in co m p ariso n to the

sk e tch es and ou tlines o£ .h is p re d e c e s s o rs upon w hom he w as dependent

fo r the b a s ic s tru c tu re of h is work* * ^ F ro m a study of the “g en era l

developm ent of mankind* H C om te deduced “ a g re a t fundam ental law ” of

developm ent, nam ely , th a t each b ran ch of c iv ilisa tio n p a sse s through

th re e su c c e ss iv e s tag es ; the th eo log ica l o r f ic titio u s (the stage of ch ild ­

hood), the m e tap h y sica l o r a b s tr a c t (the s tag e of youth), and finally the

sc ie n tif ic o r p o s itiv e (the stage of manhood)*

In the f i r s t s tag e , C om te env isaged m an a s constan tly sea rch in g

fo r the f i r s t and fin a l c au se s of th ings, and a s even tually d isce rn in g th ese

c au se s in a s u p e rn a tu ra l agent or agen ts . In the m etap h y sica l stage*

th e se su p e rn a tu ra l agen ts a r e re p la ce d by a b s tr a c t e n titie s but the se a rc h

fo r u ltim a te c au se s is s t i l l the sam e as in the theo log ical s tage . Only in

th e p o s itiv e s tag e does the m ind fina lly u n d e rs tan d the im p o ssib ility of

g ra sp in g ab so lu te notions* i t ren o u n ces the vain search, fo r the o rig in and

198Ib id ., p. 9 6 .

^ " " T h e p rin c ip le of o rd e r and p ro g re s s had a lre ad y been fo rm u - la te d by C ondor ce t, and the law of the th re e s tag es by S ain t-S im on and T u rg o t. M Ibid. , p.

102

d estin a tio n of the u n iv e rse and confines re s e a rc h to the e m p ir ic a l ob­

se rv a tio n of phenom ena w ith the in ten tion of e lic itin g n a tu ra l law s.

Thus the g en e ra l outlook of C om te’s study of m ankind is d e te rm in ed

by the open fu tu re of a l in e a r p ro g re s s io n fro m p rim itiv e to advanced

s tag e s . T h is p ro g re s s is* of course* m o re conspicuous in the in te l le c t­

u a l than in the m o ra l re a lm and m o re f irm ly e s ta b lish e d in the n a tu ra l

th an in the so c ia l sc ie n c es . But the u ltim a te a im and ta sk , acco rd in g to

C om te, i s the ap p lica tio n of the ach iev em en ts of the n a tu ra l sc ie n c es to

the c re a tio n of a so c ia l p h y s ics or "socio logy” fo r the sak e of a w hole-

sca le so c ia l re o rg a n isa tio n .

H ow ever Comte* lik e a l l of h is p re d e ce sso rs* did not r e a l is e the

depth to w hich h is lead ing conceptions a r e s t i l l theo log ica l. F o r example*

"he b lam es C h ris tia n ity fo r having b a r re d i ts own p ro g re s s iv e tendency

by i t s c la im to being the fin a l s tag e of m an’s p ro g re s s io n and y e t he a t ­

tr ib u te s the s e lf -s a m e u ltim acy to the sc ien tif ic s tag e , ’w hich alone in d l-

201ca te s the f in a l te r m of hum an h is to ry . Lowith a lso a rg u e s th a t, fo r

G om te, " th e law of p ro g re s s iv e evolu tion re p la c e s the function of p ro v i­

d en tia l governm ent* p e rv e r tin g the s e c re t p ro v is io n by p rov idence info a

S cien tific p ro v is io n by a p re v is io n ra tio n e lle , " F u r th e rm o re C om te’s

"ex p ec ta tio n s of a ’fundam ental m odifica tion of hum an e x is ten c e , ’ a f te r

the fu ll e s ta b lish m e n t of the p o s itiv e philosophy is but a pale shadow of

2 Q0Ibid, , pp. 69-72.

201 Ibid. , p. 83,

103

th a t e sch a to lo g ica l expec ta tion which constitu ted the co re of e a r ly C h r is ­

tian ity , h202 gum

if Com te had re a lly re a so n ed on a p u re ly po sitiv e b a s is , th a t i s , w ith th e n e u tra lity of the s c ie n tis t . . . he would n e ith e r have “d isco v ered " the id ea l law of p ro g re s s io n nor have been co n ­ce rn ed w ith the fina l re o rg a n iz a tio n of hum an socie ty , the a b o li­tion of w a rs , and the re lig io n of hum anity. On the o th er hand, if he had p e n e tra te d to the c o re of the theo log ical sy stem , which is , a f te r a l l , no sy s te m but an appea l and a m essag e , he would not have stopped w ith the sc ien tif ic m ethod a s the final so lu tion and salva tion ,

Proudhon , lik e C om te, a lso view ed h is to ry a s a t r ip a r t i te p r o ­

g re s s io n , But in c o n tra s t to C om te’s stages, P roudhon saw h is to ry as

advancing by c e r ta in key rev o lu tio n a ry c r i s e s th a t inev itab ly gave b ir th

to new concep tions of ju s tic e . The f i r s t w as p rovoked by Je su s when he

den ied the concept of the chosen people and p ro c la im ed the equality of a ll

m en b e fo re God; the second was in au g u ra ted by the R efo rm ation and

D e sc a r te s and re su lte d in equality b e fo re co n sc ience and re a so n ; the th ird

began w ith the F re n c h R evolution and e s ta b lish e d equality be fo re the law,

The com ing c r i s i s , acco rd in g to P roudhon, w ill be sp ec ific a lly econom ic

and so c ia l in c h a ra c te r and w ill m a rk the end of the bo u rg eo is age. If

w ill a lso b rin g about a fina l equality by the ’“ equation of m an w ith hum an­

ity . *"E04

But in o rd e r to r e a l is e th is fin a l equality , P roudhon em p h asised

202 Ibid. , p. 84.

203Ibid, , p. 91.

^ 4 Ib id , * p. 63.

104

th a t m an has yet to o v e rcam e the u ltim a te o b stac le to hum an p ro g re s s ,

i. e. * the one g re a t so u rc e of a ll dogm atism s! th e deity . A gainst the

re lig io u s in te rp re ta tio n , of re a lity , P roudhon a rg u ed tha t i t is m an’s

p riv ileg e to app reh en d the ap p a ren t in ev itab ility and in sc ru tab ility of

p ro v id en ce , to p e n e tra te i ts p ro m p tin g s, and to influence it. The p ro v i­

dence of God is only Htk e ’co llec tiv e in s tin c t’ o r ’u n iv e rsa l re a so n ’ of

m an a s a so c ia l being. The God of h is to ry is but m an’s own c rea tio n . "

Thu®, fo r P roudhon , " ’the f i r s t duty of a free and in te llig en t m an is to

ch ase the id ea of God out of h is m ind and consc ience i n c e s s a n t l y . F o r

if God does e x is t , he is e s se n tia lly in im ic a l to m an. "'W e a tta in to s c i ­

ence in sp ite of h im , to w e ll-b e in g in sp ite of h im , to so cie ty in sp ite of

2QShim? e v e ry p ro g re s s i s a v ic to ry in which we c ru sh the diety.

Yet th e se ap p a ren t b la sp h em ies notw ithstanding , L.owith finds

th a t P roudhon w as deep ly m ark ed by C h ris tia n ity . In h is p o lem ics ag a in s t

the deity , " th e re is a lso m uch of the p a ss io n and e a rn e s tn e ss of a r e l ig ­

ious soul w hich n eed s a v io len t e ffo rt to a s s e r t i ts freed o m and independ­

ence . " M o reo v er, P roudhon’s " language, im ag ination , and tu rn of m ind

w e re decided ly th eo log ica l, ” fo r " in a ll h is p a ss io n fo r d e s tru c tio n , [h e ]

w anted to p re p a re Ig- foi n o u v e lle , ask ing fo r a ’token of salvation* when

he se a rc h e d in the sp ec ta c le of m o d ern rev o lu tio n s 'a s in the e n tra ils of

a victim .’ fo r the s e c re t of i ts d e s t in y ." Thus, a s w as the c a se w ith a ll

of the a fo rem en tio n ed advocates of a boundless hum an p ro g re s s and

^ ^ Ibid. , pp. 62,-63.

105

im p ro v em en t, i t w as ’’the fa ith in a com ing Kingdom of God [o n earth ]

w hich in sp ire d P roudhon1© s tru g g le ag a in s t God and. p rov idence fo r the

sake of hum an p ro g re s s .

But w hile o u r d e s ire to a sc e r ta in the m eaning of the whole h is ­

to r ic a l e n te rp r is e , as w ell a s our in te re s t in h is to ry as the fu tu re and

as p ro g re s s , a re c le a r ly the p roduct of a p e rv e rs io n and sec u la riz a tio n

of the H e b rew -C h ris tian re lig io u s o rien ta tio n , JLowith a lso acknow ledges

th a t the d e lin ea tio n of th is a sp e c t of m odern h is to r ic a l thought does not

co n stitu te a to ta l o r exhaustive explanation . Our in te re s t and co n cern

w ith the v e ry p ro c e s s of h is to ry its e lf , v iew ed a s a kind of en d less con­

tinu ity , is c e r ta in ly not H e b rew -C h ris tian in o rig in ; r a th e r it is an off-

sho t of i ts g re a t co u n te rp a rt: the c la s s ic a l trad itio n . Lbwith i l lu s tr a te s

th is conten tion by f i r s t jux taposing the H eb rew -C h ris tian and c la s s ic a l

h is to r ic a l o rie n ta tio n s , and then by tra c in g the in fluence of th is p o la rity

upon the thought of such lead ing th in k e rs a s T ico , M ietzsche, S pengler,

Toynbee, and B u rck h ard t,

In c o n tra s t to the H e b rew -C h ris tian and, m o d ern co n ce rn s w ith

the u ltim a te m eaning and p u rp o se of h is to ry , Lbwith finds tha t the a n ­

c ien ts w e re m o re m o d est in th e ir sp ecu la tio n s . ’’They did not p re su m e

to m ake sen se of the w o rld o r to d isco v e r i ts u ltim a te m eaning. They

w ere im p re s se d by the v is ib le o rd e r and beauty of the co sm o s, and

the co sm ic law of grow th and decay w as a lso the p a tte rn fo r th e ir

206I b i d . , pp. 65-66 .

106

• * 207un d erstan d in g of h is to ry . " M oreover in co m p ariso n to the Hebrew*

C h ris tia n focus upon h is to ry as the fu tu re and as p ro g re s s , Lowith a rg u e s

th a t in the G reek and R om an m ythologies and genealog ies the p a s t i s r e p ­

re s e n te d a s an e v e r la s tin g foundation. "G reek p h ilo so p h ers and h is to r ­

ian s w e re convinced th a t w hatever is to happen w ill be of the sam e p a tte rn

and c h a ra c te r a s p a s t and p re s e n t ev en ts ; they n ever indulged in the p ro s -

pec tiv e p o s s ib il it ie s of the fu tu re . M Thus " if the idea of p ro g re s s had

been p re se n te d to a G reek , if would have s tru c k h im as i r r e l ig io u s , d e ­

fying co sm ic o rd e r and f a t e . B u t JLowith a lso finds th a t th is c la s s i ­

c a l em p h asis upon the n a tu ra l ra th e r than su p e rn a tu ra l d im ension of

h is to ry (upon e te rn a l re c u r re n c e ra th e r th an fu tu re fu lfillm ent) underw ent

the sam e tra n sm u ta tio n s , p e rv e rs io n s , and s e c u la r iz a tio n s a s the H ebrew -

C h ris tia n point of view .

V ico 's New Science is one of the e a r l ie s t w orks to effect an uncon­

sc io u s union of the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n tra d itio n s w ith the re s u lt tha t

both a re p e rv e r te d and d is to rte d . Vico d istingu ished fchx-ee ag es which

210follow the p re -h is to r ic pe rio d : the age of the gods, " in w hich the

Ibid . , p. 4,

208., , , ,Ib id . , p. 6 .

Ib id , , p. 200, L bw ith 's e s sa y "D as V erhangnis des F o r t s c h r i t t s , " ed. by E r ic h B urok in Die Idee des F o r ta e h r i t ts (M unich: C. H. B eck V e r - lag , 1963), pp. 17*40 en ta ils a s im ila r o b serv a tio n ,

210 F o r exam p les of the p e rs is te n c e of th is t r ip a r t i te approach to h is to ry s in ce i t s f i r s t ap p ea ran ce w ith Jo ach im , see M eaning, A ppen­d ix I, pp. 208-213.

107

gentiles believed they Xrvecl under divine government, and everything was

commanded them by auspices and oracled" the age of the heroes, ,,4i»

w hich they re ig n ed ev ery w h ere in. a r is to c r a t ic com m onw ealths on account

of a c e r ta in su p e r io r ity of n a tu re w hich they held th em se lv es to have o v er

the p lehsf" and the age of m en, n ,in w hich a ll m en reco g n ized th em se lv es

a s equal in hum an n a tu re , and th e re fo re th e re w e re e s tab lish ed f i r s t the ■

2 11p o pu lar com m onw ealths and then m o n a rch ies , ,}{ The divine age is ,

of c o u rse , s tr ic t ly th e o c ra tic ; the h e ro ic age is a m an ifesta tio n of tru e

m ythology, and the hum an age is c h a ra c te r iz e d by ra tio n a lity . The f i r s t

and second ages a re a lso uniquely "p o e tica l" epochs, i. e. , tim e s of r ic h

im ag in a tiv e c re a tiv ity . C orrespond ing to th e se th re e ag es , Vico a lso

d is tin g u ish ed and analyzed th re e k inds of languages, law s, and c iv il s ta te s .

The c o u rse of hum anity th rough th e se ag es m ay be co n sid e red a

" p ro g re s s 15 - - a t le a s t in so fa r a s th e re i s a defin ite m ovem ent fro m

an arch y to o rd e r and from, savage and h e ro ic cu sto m s to more ra tio n a liz ed

and c iv iliz ed ones. It is , how ever, a p ro g re s s w ithout a goal and fu lf i l l­

m en t. F o r V ico, i t s r e a l end is a decadence and an u ltim a te re la p se into

a p e rio d of re ju v en atin g b a rb a r is m a f te r which the whole co u rse (c o rs o )

beg ins anew. T his new c o u rse is th e re fo re m o re than a simple r e c u r ­

re n c e (r ic o r s o ); i t is a lso a re su rg e n c e o r re v ita liz a tio n . Such a r e v i t ­

a liz a tio n had a lre a d y o c c u rre d once, a f te r the fa ll of R om e, w ith the

r e tu rn of b a rb a r ic tim e s in the M iddle A ges, and , in a ll likelihood , it

Quoted in Ibid. , p. 131.

108

w ill o ccu r again a t the end of the p re se n t co r go, which i ts e lf is a lread y

a r ic o r s o .

Thus fa r , V ico 's view of h is to ry ap p ea rs to be a re s ta te m e n t of

the c la s s ic a l th eo ry of cy c lica l grow th and decay. But, as Lowith points

out* "V ico becom es in c o n s is te n t when co n sid e rin g , tow ard the end of his

w ork , the p o ss ib ility of a fina l Tel os and se ttlem en t of the h is to r ic a l p r o ­

c e s s . " R eview ing the s itu a tio n in E urope, R u ss ia , and A sia in h is day,

he o b serv ed "today a 'co m p le te ' hum anity 's e e m s ' to be sp re ad through

a ll na tions b ecau se a few C h ris tian monarch® ru le o v e r 'th is w orld of

7 1 2p eo p les . " * Obviously* th is ten ta tiv e outlook tow ard a "co m plete" C h r is ­

tia n w orld , a s the fu lfillm en t of h is to ry , is incom patib le w ith the c o n s is ­

ten t them e of h is w ork which s t r e s s e s tha t h is to ry has no fu lfillm ent since

i t i s ru le d by re c u r re n c e s . F u r th e rm o re , when com pared w ith the d a s -

s i d e th eo ry of c y c le s , V ico 's

r ic o r s o is not a cosm ic re c u r re n c e but a h is to r ic a l s t r u c ­tu re w ith the ju r id ic a l connotation of "appeal. " Since the h is to r i ­cal co rao has fa iled to a tta in i ts end, i t m u st, a s i t w e re , appeal to a h ig h er c o u rt to have i ts c a se re h e a rs e d . The h ighest cou rt of ju s tic e i s , how ever, p ro v id en tia l h is to ry as a whole, which r e ­q u ire s an age of disintegx*ation and over so p h istica tio n , the " b a r ­b a r is m of re f le c tio n 1,' to re tu rn to the c re a tiv e b a rb a r is m of sen se in o rd e r to beg in anew.

And it is th is r e c u r re n c e of the " c re a tiv e b a rb a r is m of s e n s e ," but not a

t ru e tra n sc e n d e n ta l red em p tio n , which is the r e a l end and "p rov iden tia l"

212Ibid. , p. 132,

1 Ib id . , p. 133.

109

m eaning of h is to ry for Vico, Thus h is leading idea is n e ith e r the se c u ­

la r is e d H ebrew -"C hristian p ro g re s s io n tow ard fu lfillm en t, no r the c la s ­

s ic a l co sm ic cycle of sh e e r n a tu ra l grow th and decay, but a s tran g e

am alg am and p e rv e rs io n of both. In effect, it is “a h is to r ic o -c y c lic p r o ­

g re s s io n fro m c o rs e to r ig o r so in which the cycle i ts e lf has p ro v id en tia l

s ig n ificance by being an u ltim a te rem edy fo r m an ’s c o rru p ted n a tu re . “

In o th e r w o rd s , “V ico’s p e rsp e c tiv e is s t i l l a theo log ical one, but the

m eans of p ro v id en ce and sa lv a tio n a re in th em se lv es h is to r ic o -n a tu ra l

ones. H is to ry , as see n by V ico, ha® a p re h is to r ic beginning but no end

and fu lfillm en t, and ye t it i s ru le d by p rov idence fox the sake of m an k in d .“

A nother th in k e r who a lso unconsc iously am algam ated and. d is to rte d

both the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n tra d itio n s w as N ie tzsch e ; although he,

iro n ic a lly , re g a rd e d h im se lf a s the cham pion of the fo rm e r and a r c h ­

enem y of the la t te r . Z .a ra th u a tra , one of N ie tz sch e ’s m o st im p o rtan t

w o rk s , w as in tended a s a p u re and d ire c t re s ta te m e n t of the c la s s ic a l

po in t of view . H ow ever Ldwit'h judges i t to be “ fro m cover to co v er a

cou n terg o sp e l in s ty le a s w ell a s in content, “ It re f le c ts “ the God

of the Old T es tam en t, “ s in ce i ts underly ing m otif is not the con tem pla­

tio n of the p a s t a s an “ e v e r la s tin g foundation*1 bu t the “thought of the

2 1 Afu tu re and the w ill to c re a te it. " Yet even m o re consp icuous, in

2 I 4M £* * p*

Z l5 Ibid. , p. 2 2 0 .

2 I 6Ibid. , pp. 2 2 1 - 222 ,

214

110

Jbdwith*9 ey es , 1b N ietzsche*s ap p lica tio n of th is w ill to the e te rn a l r e ­

c u rre n c e of a c la s s ic a lly und ers to o d cosm os w hich is beyond a ll w ill and

p u rp o se .

To th e G reeks the cy c lic m otions of the heavenly sp h e res m an ife sted a u n iv e rsa l ra tio n a l o rd e r and divine perfec tio n ; to N ie tzsch e the e te rn a l re c u rre n c e is "the m o st frigh tfu l" concep­tion and " th e h eav ie s t burden" b ecau se i t b e a rs upon and conflic ts w ith h is w ill to a fu tu re redem ption , To the C re ek s the e te rn a l r e c u r re n c e of g en era tio n and co rru p tio n exp lained tem p o ra l ch an ­ges in n a tu re a s w ell as- in h is to ry ; to N ie tzsche the w illed a c c e p t­ance of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e re q u ire s a standpoin t "'beyond m an and t im e ." The G reeks fe lt awe and re v e re n c e fo r fa te ; N ie tzsche m akes the superhum an e ffo rt to w ill and t© love it. Thus he w as unable to develop h is v is io n a s a su p rem e and ob jective o rd e r , a s the G reek s did, but in tro d u ced i t a s a sub jec tive e th ic a l im p e ra ­tive . The th e o ry of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e becom es w ith h im a p r a c ­t ic a l dev ice and a " h a m m e r ," to pound in to m an the idea of an abso lu te re sp o n s ib ility , sub stitu tin g th a t sen se of re sp o n sib ility w hich w as a liv e a s long a s m en liv ed in the p re se n c e of God and in the expec ta tion of a la s t judgm ent. *

M oreover since the w ill tra d itio n a lly m oves in a s tra ig h t line and

in an i r r e v e r s ib le d ire c tio n ra th e r than, ia a c i r c le , N ie tzsch e w as a lso

faced w ith the c ru c ia l p ro b lem of red eem in g the w ill fro m its o n e -

d im en sio n al s tru c tu re . F o r how can the w ill in te g ra te i ts e lf w ith the

cy c lic re c u r re n c e of th e co sm o s , w here ev e ry fo rw ard m ovem ent is a t

th e sam e tim e one of re tu rn ? A ccord ing to Low ith, N ie tzsch e suggests

th a t " the w ill m u st re d e em i ts e l f f ro m i ts e lf by a lso w illing backw ard ,

h » by accep tin g v o lu n ta rily w hat it did not w ill, the whole p a s t of a ll

th a t is a lre a d y done and e x is ten t in p a r t ic u la r , the fac t o f our own

ex is ten c e , w hich nobody had. p roduced by h is w ill, " How ever th is is a ll

217I b id . . p. 221.

" e n tire ly u n -G reek , not c la s s ic , not pagan but d e riv ed fro m the H ebrew -

C h ris tia n tra d itio n , fro m the b e lie f th a t the w orld and m an a re c re a te d

by God*© p u rp o se fu l w ill* 1,218 Thus Lowith concludes tha t d esp ite M e t-

a s e h e 's c la ss ic a l-D io n y s ia n stance* he uw as no t so much 'the la s t d isc ip le

o f Dionysios* a s the E r s t ra d ic a l ap o sta te of Christ*

But i f Lbwitfe E nds Vico and M etaech e in co n sis ten t, w hat about

co n tem p o rary th in k e rs lik e S pengler and Toynbee? As h e ir s of the en ­

t i r e c r i t ic a l tra d itio n of the n ineteen th cen tu ry and a s consc iously e m p ir ­

ic a l o r " sc ie n tif ic * " one m igh t expect th em to have overcom e the in ad e ­

q uacies of th e ir p re d e c e s s o rs . At f i r s t glance* I S w ith finds Spengler*s

m orphology of w o rld h is to ry to ad h e re c lo se ly to the c la s s ic a l p a tte rn of

g e n e s is , grow th, flow ering , and decay. The p r im a ry s ig n ifican ce of h i s ­

to r ic a l c u ltu re s c o n s is ts in the fa te fu l fu lfillm en t of p re d e te rm in e d l i f e ­

c y c le s , and s in ce th e se c y c le s a re d ire c te d n e ith e r by the w ill of God

n o r by the w ill of m an, h is to ry is com pletely devoid of a goal o r p u rp o se ;

in fac t I ts sublim ity ' i s seen to He in th is v e ry p u rp o se le s sn e s s . Yet

S peng ler w as fa r f ro m accep tin g the in ev itab ility of the c iv iliaa tio n a l

cy c le w ith c la s s ic a l de tachm ent. He a lso c o n sid e re d h im se lf a son of

the "F a u s tia n c u l tu r e ," w hich a ro s e a t the heigh t of the M iddle A ges but

independent of the C h ris tia n re lig io n ; and a s such a F a u s tia n m an, he

fe lt h im se lf in p o s se s s io n of the unique " se n se of the fu tu re" w hich is

112

p e cu lia r to th e dynam ic F a u s tia n soul and W eltansehauuna. Hence when

Spang ler in tro d u ces and defines h is su p rem e concept* "d estin y , " L-dwith

a rg u e s , "he in tro d u ces the notion of a noncyelica l "h isto rical* tim e d i-

220re c te d to w ard the fu tu re ;" and th e reb y he v itia te s h is own n eo -

c la s s ic is m . F o r the F a u s tia n Spongier, "d es tin y " does not have the co n ­

n o ta tio n of a p a ss iv e accep tan ce and re c o n c ilia tio n to the in ev itab le a s

fo r the G reek s; on the c o n tra ry , i t is re p le te w ith m odern ac tiv ism and

th e H e b rew -C h ris tian em p h asis upon the w ill. Thus Speng ler, like N ie t­

z sc h e , u rg e s h is fellow m en to w ill and love fa te , even p rom ote and fu l­

f il l i t . T h is counse l Lowith finds unaccep tab le .

No an c ien t e v e r fancied th a t the fa te of decline should be w illed and chosen ; fo r fa te is eithjer re a lly fa te , and then i t is fu tile to d ecide upon it , o r i t is a se lf-c h o se n destin y , and then it i s no unavoidable fa te . S p eng ler does not solve th is p ro b lem of n a tu ra l fa te and h is to r ic a l destin y . H is pa thos grow s fro m the confusion o f the w ill to a fu tu re , s t i l l ooen to p o s s ib il it ie s , w ith the accep tan ce of a d e fin ite outcom e.

Ldwith a lso finds Toynbee s im ila r ly d ivided betw een the C h ris tia n

and c la s s ic a l tra d itio n s , e sp e c ia lly in Ms a ttem p t to re s c u e the C h ris tian

re lig ion fro m the lo g ica l conclusion of h is own schem e of the cy c lica l r i s e

222and fa ll of c iv iliz a tio n s and re lig io n s . ' In itia lly , Toynbee a p p ea rs to

be a d e tached e m p ir ic a l o b se rv e r of the h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s , ca re fu lly

220Ibid. , p , 12 .

221 Ibid., p. 12.

222 lib w ith 's view of Toynbee is b ased so le ly on the f i r s t s ix v o l­u m es of the Study of H lfttory and th e re fo re does no t re f le c t the m o d ifica ­tions and a d ju s tm en ts in the la te r volum es.

113

ch ron ic ling the r i s e and fa il of tw enty-one c iv il!na tiona l cy c les . One of

the m o re in te re s t in g of T oyn b ee 's e m p ir ic a l o b se rv a tio n s p e rta in s to the

r i s e of re lig io n s . In c o n tra s t to S peng ler, Toynbee does not view r e l ig ­

ions a s homogeneous e x p re ss io n s of th e ir c u ltu re but a s genuine t r a n ­

scen d en ta l fo rc e s , They a re the only " c re a tiv e " m eans of escap e fro m

a d is in te g ra tin g c iv ilisa tio n - They g en e ra te a new c lim e and dim ension ,

in e ffec t, a new kind of so c ie ty , a u n iv e rs a l ch u rch over ag a in s t the

dom inant u n iv e rsa l s ta te s - A lso, acco rd in g to Toynbee, the s tan d a rd

d is in te g ra tio n rh y th m of e v e ry c iv ilisa tio n is exac tly th re e and o n e-h a lf

"b e a ts " and our own W este rn c iv ilisa tio n is a lre ad y supposed to have

undergone the ex p erien ce of one and o n e -h a lf bea ts- Hence following

Toynbee’s schem e of the breakdow n of c iv ilisa tio n s and r is e of relig ions*

one would n a tu ra lly expec t th a t C h ris tia n ity i s about to foe su p erceded by

the a p p ea ran ce of a new tra n sce n d e n ta l s a v io r re lig io n . Yet h e re T oyn­

bee the detached e m p ir ic a l o b s e rv e r and Toynbee the b e lie v e r suddenly

p a r t com pany, and he r e v e r t s to a co n fess io n and a com m itm ent which,

judged by h is own s tan d a rd s of o b jec tiv ity , n e u tra lity , and de tachm ent,

can only be te rm e d "p aro ch ia l, "

As a loya l son of the C h ris tia n ch u rch , Toynbee cannot re a l ly e n ­

v isag e a su p e rse s s io n of the fa ith ; and w ith a ll th e e m p ir ic a l knowledge

he can m uster* he en d eav o rs to show th a t, in sp ite of a co n sid e rab le

p re v io u s developm ent, C h ris tia n ity is s t i l l the g re a te s t "new " event in

m an ’s h is to ry . H ow ever i t i s XkJwith’s c o n sid e re d opinion th a t

114

Toynbee is n e ith e r an e m p ir ic a l h is to r ia n nor a good th eo ­logian, In s tead of argu ing w ith A ugustine and a ll the church F a ­th e rs th a t C h r is tia n ity is the la te s t news b ecause i t is the good news and b ecau se God re v e a le d h im se lf in h is to ry only once and fo r a il , he a rg u e s on a s tro n o m ic a l grounds, In stead of dem on­s tra tin g by the know ledge of fa ith th a t C h ris tian ity is tru e o r by the s ta n d a rd s of h is to ry th a t i t w as once young and is , therefore* now old, he r e f e r s to the m o dern sc ien tif ic d isco v e rie s of geo lo­g is ts and a s tro n o m e rs w hich have v a stly changed our tim e-sca le* on w hich the beginning of the C h ris tia n e r a is an ex trem ely r e ­cen t date.

But how c a n one in fe r h is to r ic a l and even re lig io u s sign ificance fro m

im p e rso n a l a s tro n o m ic a l and geological fa c ts? Ed w ith a rg u e s tha t Hit Is

s h e e r b e lie f, qu ite a p a r t fro m an e m p ir ic a l study of h is to ry , w hich p rom pts

Toynbee to a s s e r t th a t C h ris tia n ity is s t i l l new and that' i t w ill not only s u r -

v iva o u r Wes te r n civilissation but even becom e the w o rld re lig io n . 11

Yet even assu m in g th a t th is ’’evidence'* is accep tab le and tha t

C h ris tia n ity t ru ly is the g re a te s t "new " event in the h is to ry of m an , one

is then fo rce d to a s k how the c la s s ic a l cycle of grow th and decay can be

a d ju sted to the b e lie f in a m eaningful goal and a p ro g re s s iv e re v e la tio n

of d iv ine tru th in h is to ry ? H ere again , Toynbee1 s an sw er is not e m p iric a l

o r sc ien tif ic but poetic* in te rm s of a s im ile . If the C h ris tia n fa ith is

conceived a s a c h a r io t, then "*it looks a s if the w heels on w hich it m ounts

to w a rd s H eaven m ay be the p e rio d ic dow nfalls of c iv ilisa tio n s on E a rth

[sic] . It looks a s if th e m ovem ent of c iv ilisa tio n s m ay be cyclic and

r e c u r r e n t , 'while the m ovem ent of re lig io n m ay be on a single continuous

^^^libw ith , M eaning, pp. 14-15,

224.,,Ib id . , p. 15,

115

upw ard lin e . 1 ” In o th e r w o rd s , ' ’1 the continuous upw ard m ovem ent of r e ­

lig ion m ay be se rv e d and p rom oted by the cy c lic m ovem ent of c iv iliza tio n s

a round the cycle of b ir th -d e a th -b ir th . Thus behind T oynbee 's " s u r ­

fa c e ” c la s s ic is m and the ap p a ren t n e u tra lity of h is e m p ir ic a l outlook, the

u ltim a te b a se of Ms u n iv e rsa l h is to ry of tw enty-one c iv iliza tio n al cycles is

h is e sch a to lo g ica l co n ce rn fo r the re a liz a tio n of a Very p a r t ic u la r faith*

In sum then, i t is L bw ith 's contention th a t any and a ll a ttem p ts to

acco m p lish a re c o n c ilia tio n of the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n tra d itio n s a re

fo redoom ed to fa ilu re .

T h is a ttem p t has nev er succeeded and i t cannot succeed * . . th e in itia l d ec is io n betw een C h ris tian ity and p ag an ism r e ­m ains d ec is iv e i fo r how could one re c o n c ile the c la s s ic a l th eo ry th a t the w o rld Is e te rn a l w ith the C h ris tia n fa ith in c re a tio n , the cycle w ith an eseha ton , and the pagan accep tan ce of fa te w ith the C h ris tia n duty of hope? They a r e a ll the m o re irre c o n c ila b le ■ b ecau se the c la s s ic a l view of th e w orld is a view of th ings v is ib le w hile the C h ris tia n " view ” of the w orld i s , a f te r a l l , not a view

[ a t a l l] bu t a m a tte r of hope and fa ith in th ings in v is ib le .

^ ^ Q u o te d ia Ibid*, p. 1?.

Ib id , > pp. 16:5-146. M o reo v er, a cco rd in g to Lbwilh, th is sam e s tra n g e amalgamation and a ttem p ted fusion of two b a s ic a lly ir re c o n c ila b le tra d itio n s is not only manifest in the w orks of N ie tzsch e , S peng ler, and Toynbee but i s to som e extent c h a r a c te r is t ic of the e n tire h is to r ic a l co m ­m unity . O ur co n ce rn w ith the un ity of u n iv e rsa l h is to ry and i ts " p ro g re s s" to w ard a b e t te r w o rld , o r , a t le a s t , a co n sid e rab ly im proved one, he a rg u e s , is a c le a r in d ica tio n of the H e b rew -C h ris tian tra d itio n , w hile our ex p lo ra tio n of the p lu ra lity of c u ltu re s fo r th e sake of a d is in te re s te d know ledge, qu ite untouched by any in te re s t in red em p tio n , is a c le a r in ­dication of the c la s s ic a l h e rita g e . Ib id . , p. 19. A lso see Lbwith's " H is ­to ry and C h ris tia n ity ” ed* by C. W, K egley and R. W. B re ta ll in The Ld« b ra ry o f Living T heology, K einhold N iebuhr, H is R e lig io u s , S o c ia l, and P o li t ic a l Thought (New Y ork: The M acM illan C o ,, 1956), II, pp. 282-290* T his a r t ic le is a sca th ing c r itiq u e of N ieb u h r 's a tte m p t, and by im p lica tio n a l l s im ila r a tte m p ts (B ultm ann, e t a l . ), to b rin g about a re c o n c ilia tio n

116

The only m odern h is to r ia n who, in JLowith’s view , avoided the

p itfa lls not only of a s ec u la riz a tio n of the H eb rew -C h ris tian tra d itio n

but a lso of the am alg am atio n of both the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n t r a d i ­

tio n s w as Jacob B u rek h ard t, In c o n tra s t to H egel and, in e ffec t, to a ll

of th e W este rn p h ilo so p h ers of h is to ry , Lowith p ra is e s B u rc k h a rd t's

a s s e r t io n th a t the H ra tio n a lity " a s w ell a s the "p ro g re s s iv ity " of the

h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss a r e beyond our ken; a s o rd in a ry 'm e n and c re a tu re s

of h is to ry we a r e not p riv y to the w orking of such ir a n s -h is to r ic a l f o r ­

ce s . And in c o n tra s t to the m odern tendency to judge c e r ta in h is to r ic a l

o c c u r re n c e s a s fo rtu n a te o r d e s ira b le and o th e rs a s un fo rtunate and u n ­

d e s ira b le , Low ith a d m ire s B u rc k h a rd t 's condem nation of a ll such b lind

d e s id e ra ta a s m the deadly en em ies of tru e h is to r ic a l in s ig h t;1*' fo r , in

th e la s t a n a ly s is , such judgm ents alw ays annul one an o th e r, and the

n e a r e r we com e to the p re s e n t, the m o re opinions d iverge .

If B u rck h ard t w ere a liv e today and w ere ask ed about Ms judgm ent of co n tem p o rary ev en ts , a s a E u ro p ean he would p r o ­bably say th a t the d efea t of a N azi G erm any w as fo rtu n a te and d e s ira b le , th e r i s e of R u ss ia appalling and u n d e s irab le , though the f i r s t depends on the second* As a h is to r ia n , how ever, he w ould re fu se to p re d ic t w hether the a llia n ce and v ic to ry of the A llie s is u ltim a te ly a " fo rtu n e" or a 'M isfo rtu n e" in th is in c a l­cu lab le w o r ld -h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s .

betw een C h ris tia n ity and the v a rio u s p o litic a l and ph ilosoph ical m ove­m en ts of the m o d e rn w orld such a s so c ia lism , tra d e un ion ism , ex is ten t ia lis m , e tc .

117

In Burckhardfc's view , the only tru ly s ign ifican t a sp e c t of the

h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss is i ts continuity . It alone is the com m on s tan d a rd of

a l l o f o u r p a r t ic u la r h is to r ic a l evaluations. But continuity , a s u n d erstood

by B u rck h a rd t, is co n sid erab ly m o re than m e re continuance and co n sid ­

e ra b ly le s s than a p ro g re s s iv e developm ent. It cannot be p ro g re s s iv e

b e ca u se , a s ind ica ted , B ur ckhard t w as convinced th a t m an’s m ind and

soul w e re com plete long ago, i. e. , the p e rm an en t c en te r of h is to ry is

‘"m an* a s he is and w as and e v e r sh a ll be. '«»*228 A ccord ing ly , he is not

su b jec t to any p ro g re s s iv e a m e lio ra tio n . But continuity Is a lso m ore

than m e re con tinuance o r s h e e r "going o n ," s in ce , fo r B u rck h ard t, i t

im p lie s a co nsc ious re m e m b ra n c e , ren ew a l, and re a p p ro p ria tio n of the

h e r ita g e r a th e r than a m e re p a ss iv e accep tan ce of custom* V ery sim ply

then* con tinu ity a s co n stitu ted by h is to r ic a l co n sc io u sn ess , i s !,ta p rim e

c o n ce rn of m an ’s existence* *" b ecau se i t is th e only p ro o f of the " ’s ig n i­

fican ce of the d u ra tio n of our e x is ten c e , and our only gu aran tee ag a in st

th e a tte m p ts of p r im itiv e a s w ell a s "civilised" b a rb a r ia n s to e ffec t " p e r -

■ • ,,229m anent re v is io n s , "

B u rc k h a rd t’s em p h asis upon continuity w as, of c o u rse , s tro n g ly

in fluenced by h is conv iction th a t s in ce the F re n c h R evolution E urope has

been liv ing in a s ta te of rap id ly d is in te g ra tin g trad itio n . Thus by s tre s s in g

^ ^ Q u o te d in ib id , , p. 2 1 , A lso co n su lt LBwith’s "T h e T heo lo g i­c a l B ackground of the Ph ilosophy of H is to ry ," S ocia l R e s e a rc h , XIII (1946), p. 59.

220 Ebwith, Meaning, pp. 21-22 .

th e c iv iliz in g m iss io n of conscious h is to r ic a l continuity he, a t least* t r ie d

to r e ta rd the fo rthcom ing d isso lu tion . Seen in this content,. Bureldn&rdt*®

em p h as is on con tinu ity is c e r ta in ly understandable* Yet even w ithout tM«

con tex tual pe rsp ec tiv e* Ldw ith judges B u rc M ^ M l’a re so lu tio n of the e n tire

M sto r ic a l p ro c e s s to the thin th re a d of m e re continuity* w ithout beginning*

p ro g ress* and end to be the "so u n d est m o d e m re f le c tio n on b is to ry * f*

it i s "m o d e rn " in m m uch a s Brnreldmrdt u n d e rs tan d s the c la s s ic a l a s w e ll a s th e C h ris tia n p o sitio n w ithout com m itting him* s e lf to e i th e r of them-* O ver ag a in s t the m o d ern s tr iv in g fo r so c ia l security* he p ra is e s the an c ien t g re a tn e s s ®! p a ss io n and s a c r if ic e fo r the sake of the c ity s ta te j over ag a in s t the m odern s tr iv in g fo r a h ig h er s ta n d a rd of living* he h as a deep a p p re c ia tio n fo r the C h ris* t ia n G-onqm&i o f a l l th ings earthly* A t the sam e tim e he knows p e r ­fe c tly w e ll th a t " the s p i r i t of an tiqu ity is s o t any lo nger o u r s p ir i t" and th a t " fro m C h ris tia n ity 1800 y e a rs a r e sep a ra tin g u s .

H ow ever in sp ite of th is p ra is e of B urckh& rd^s view of history*

W w lth a lso finds M s ap p ro ach defic ien t in s e v e ra l Im p o rtan t respec ts#2>-a»Futting aside for the moment Lewith*® e a rlie r critique* here he finds

that "M storical eoMdnmity and consciousness have an alm ost sacram ental

ch arac te r15 for Burcklmrdt* They a re a " las t religion" and a "poet

rem ainder of a fu ller motion of meaning. la addition* L&with observes

to be theoretically consistent* however the tru s t in continuity

■? 3 c)■' Ibid* # p* Ed* L&with fu r th e r em phasis*# B u rc k b a rd t1® under*stand ing of* and yet Independence from* both the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n tra d it io n s by jux taposing him to T u rg o t (p. 101)* Com te (pp. 86-87)* H egel (pp. 31 -S9 )f. and M arx (p. 33).

231■ See above Chapter .1.

119

would have to com e back to the c la s s ic a l th eo ry of a c irc u la r m ovem ent, fo r only on the b a s is of a c irc u la r en d less m ovem ent w ithout beginning and end, is continuity re a lly dem o n strab le .But how can one im agine h is to ry as a continuous p ro c e ss w ithin a lin e a r p ro g re s s io n , w ithout p resupposing a d iscontinuing te r m ­inus a quo and_ad quem , i. e. , a beginning and an end?

Y et B urckhard t! s continuum is , in effec t, ju s t such a lin e a r p ro g re s s io n

w ithout beginning and end; in fac t, he even went so fa r as to devote a

c o n sid e rab le segm en t of h is sch o la rly a c tiv ity to an ap p aren t re fu ta tio n

235of the c y c lica l und ers tan d in g of h is to ry . Thus w hile B u rck h ard t m ay

have p re se n te d the " so u n d es t m o dern re fle c tio n on h is to ry " and genera lly

m an ife s ted a "m o d ern w isdom , " in co m p ariso n "to a ll those philosophies

of h is to ry fro m H egel to A ugustine - - which defin ite ly know, o r p ro fe sse d

to know, the tru e d e s ira b il ity of h is to r ic a l even ts and su cc e ss io n s , "

i t is quite c le a r th a t Eow ith cannot accep t h is view a s com pletely s a t i s ­

fac to ry .

But then the question a r i s e s w hether JLowith w ill e v e r find a m o ­

d e rn philosophy of h is to ry w hich is com patib le w ith e ith e r the C h ris tia n

o r c la s s ic a l poin ts of view . Thus fa r he has a rg u ed tha t the c lo se r we

com e to the p u re ly re lig io u s so u rc e s of the philo sphy of h is to ry the le s s

*? Ib id . , p, 20?. See a lso R. B oehm 's com m ents on JLowith's c r itiq u e of B u rck h ard t. ‘'K a rl Lowith und das P ro b lem d e r G e sc h ic h ts- ph ilosoph ie , " Z e its c h r if t fu r ph ilosoph ische P o rsch u n g , X (1956), p. 105.

B u rc k h a rd t 's day, the cy c lica l th eo ry w as re p re se n te d by E rn s t von Lasaubc who se rv e d a s a kind of s ile n t p a r tn e r to the dialogue in F o rc e and F re e d o m . B u rck h ard t, op. c i t . , pp. 53-54.

^^JL&with, M eaning, pp. 26-2?.

120

do we find, w ith the s ing le exception of Joach im , an e lab o ra te p lan of

w orld h is to ry u n derstood on a p ro g re s s iv e b a s is . And "in the G o sp e ls ,rt

say s Cowith, " I cannot d isco v e r the s lig h te s t h in t of a ’philosophy of h is -

to ry ’ but only a schem e of redem ption th rough :G hrist and fro m pro fane

h is to ry . The w ords of J e su s contain only one re fe re n c e to the w o rld ’s

h is to ry ; it s e p a ra te s s tr ic t ly what we owe to C a e sa r fro m w hat we owe

237to God. " C onsequently , nothing in the New T es tam en t i ts e lf w a rra n ts

a conception of the even ts th a t co n stitu ted e a r ly C h ris tian ity as the b e ­

ginning of a new epoch of s e c u la r developm ents w ith in a continuous p ro ­

c e s s . What re a lly begins w ith the ap p ea ran ce of Je su s is not a new

’'C h r is t ia n '1 epoch of s e c u la r h is to ry , but the beginning of an end, "The

C h ris tia n tim e s a re C h ris tia n only in so fa r a s they a re the la s t tim e . "

And sin ce the K ingdom of God is not to be re a l is e d in a continuous p r o ­

c e s s of h is to r ic a l developm ents , the esch a to lo g ica l h is to ry of sa lv a tio n

cannot re a lly im p a r t a new and p ro g re s s iv e m eaning to the h is to ry of the

w orld , w hich is a lre ad y fu lf illed by having reach ed i ts end.

If we u n d e rs tan d , a s we m u st, C h ris tia n ity in the sen se of the New T e s tam en t and h is to ry in our m odern sen se , i. e. , a s a continuous p ro c e s s of hum an ac tio n and s e c u la r developm ents, " a C h ris tia n h is to ry " is nonsense . The only, though w eighty, excuse fo r th is in c o n s is te n t com pound of a C h ris tia n h is to ry is to be found in the fac t th a t the h is to ry of the w orld has continued its co u rse of s in and death in sp ite of the e sch a to lo g ica l event, m e s ­sag e , and co n sc io u sn ess . The w orld a f te r C h ris t has a ss im ila te d the C h ris tia n p e rsp e c tiv e tow ard a goal and fu lfillm en t and, a t the sam e tim e , has d isc a rd e d the liv ing fa ith in an im m inen t eschaton , ^38

“ 37Ibid. , p. 191,

238Ib id , , pp. 197-198.

121

But if it is thus im p o ssib le to e lab o ra te a philosophy of h is to ry on

the b a s is of the C h ris tia n fa ith , w ithout sev e re ly d is to rtin g the v e ry foun­

dation of th a t fa ith , it is a lso JLdwith*s contention th a t i t is equally im p o s­

s ib le to e s ta b lish a philosophy of h is to ry on the b a s is of a pu re c la s s ic a l

o rien ta tio n . V ico, N ie tzsch e , Spengler, Toynbee, and even B u rckhard t,

to som e ex ten t, m ay have fe lt th em se lv es the cham pions and advocates

of c la s s ic a l h is to r ic a l p r in c ip le s ; but d esp ite th e ir conscious c la s s ic ism

and unconsc ious C h ris tia n ism , th e ir v e ry in te re s t in and co n cern fo r h is ­

to ry ra th e r than n a tu re , and e sp ec ia lly fo r h is to ry a s alone the re a lm of

m eaningful happen ings, w as fa r rem oved fro m the tru ly cosm ic approach

of the an c ien ts .

F o r the an c ien t G reek s every th ing m oved in re c u r re n c e s ; th e re

w as the daily re c u r re n c e of su n r is e and su n se t and the annual re c u rre n c e

of the sea so n s. A ccording to jLowith, th is conception of e te rn a l r e c u r ­

re n c e sa tis f ie d the G re e k 's d eep es t in te lle c tu a l y earn in g s because it w as

a n a tu ra l a s w ell a s ra tio n a l und ers tan d in g of the u n iv e rse ; it in te g ra te d

te m p o ra l changes w ith the reco g n itio n of p e rio d ic re g u la r ity and co n ­

s tancy . M o reo v er, Lowith a rg u e s , the im m utab le , a s v is ib le to them

in the fixed o rd e r of the heavenly b o d ies , com m anded a h igher in te re s t

and value than the m utab le a s m an ifest in the re a lm of hum an happenings.

HXn th is in te lle c tu a l c lim a te , dom inated by the ra tio n a lity of the n a tu ra l

co sm o s, th e re w as 110 ro o m fo r the u n iv e rsa l sign ificance of a unique,

in co m p arab le h is to r ic event. u As for th e destiny of m an in h is to ry , "the

Greeks b e lieved th a t m an has re so u rc e fu ln e ss to m eet ev e ry s itua tion with

m agnanim ity ~~ they d id not go fu r th e r than that.

Even H erodotus* T hucydides, and Polybius who seem exclusively

concern ed w ith m an and h is to ry m an ife st th is ob serv atio n , fo r th e ir " h is ­

to r ic a l" judgm ents a re alw ays u ltim a te ly d e te rm in ed by th e ir experience

of n a tu re , "In the view of H erodotus, h is to ry shows a rep e titiv e p a tte rn ,

re g u la ted by a cosm ic law of com pensation m ain ly through n e m e s is , which

tim e and ag a in r e s to re s the eq u ilib riu m of the h is io r ie o -n a tu ra l f o r c e s ."

F o r T hucydides h is to ry w as a re c o rd of p o litica l s tru g g le s b ased on the

n a tu re of m an , and since he w as convinced th a t "hum an n a tu re does not

change, even ts th a t happened in the p a s t ‘w ill happen again in the sam e

o r in a s im ila r way. ’ Nothing re a lly new can occu r in the fu tu re when it

is 'th e n a tu re of a ll th ings to grow a s w ell a s to decay. And, for

P o ly b iu s, " h is to ry rev o lv es in a cycle of p o litic a l rev o lu tio n s , w h ere in

co n stitu tio n s change, d isa p p e a r , and r e tu rn in a co u rse appoin ted by na~

240tu re . " T hus, in JLowith's view , s in ce c la s s ic a l an tiqu ity believed

th a t hum an n a tu re and h is to ry im ita te the n a tu re of the cosm os, the ch ief

co n ce rn of the an c ien ts w as "the logos of the co sm o s" ra th e r than "the

I^ord and the m eaning of h is to ry . " In e ffec t then , " to the G reek th inkers*

241a Philosophy of history would have been a contradiction in term s Ir

But if a ll ou r co n tem p o rary th e o rie s and ph ilosoph ies of h is to ry

123

a re thus m e re s e c u la r is e d d is to rtio n s , p e rv e rs io n s , and even, a t t im e s ,

s tran g e am alg am s of the fundam entally " a h is to r ic a l" c la s s ic a l and C h r is ­

tian poin ts of view , why a re we then a s m oderns so enam oured of h is to ry

th a t the d ifficu lt and often o b scu re w orks of Spengler and Toynbee could

becom e b e s t s e l le r s ? O r, v e ry sim ply , why the w id esp read fa ith in !,the

242abso lu te re lev an ce of h is to ry as su c h ? ” Lowlth o ffe rs us two exp lan ­

a tions fo r the o rig in s of ou r m o dern h is to r ic a l con sc io u sn ess o r fo r h is -

to r ic ism : f i r s t , as a lre ad y im p lied in Vom H egel, he a rg u es tha t the

em ancipa tion ofr.the m o d ern h is to r ic a l co n sc io u sn ess fro m the in h eren t

lim ita tio n s im posed by both the c la s s ic a l and C h ris tia n tra d itio n s was

the re s u lt of the ab ru p t ru p tu re th a t o c c u rre d in E uropean life a t the end

of the e igh teen th cen tu ry , i. e. , the p o litica l rev o lu tio n in F ra n c e and the

in d u s tr ia l revo lu tion in England. Both had fa r reach in g effec ts upon the

e n tire c iv iliz ed w orld and enhanced the m o d ern feeling of liv ing in an

epoch w here h is to r ic a l changes a re a ll and every th ing ; hence '’the p h ilo so ­

phy of h is to ry has becom e a m o re fundam ental co n ce rn than e v e r b efo re ,

b ecau se h is to ry i ts e lf has becom e m o re r a d ic a l ." " And secondly , and

even in som e sen se m o re im p o rtan t, is Jhowith1 s judgm ent of the ro le of

m o d ern n a tu ra l sc ien ce .

Not only have the innovations of n a tu ra l sc ien ce a c c e le ra te d the speed and expanded the range of so c io -h is to r ic a l m ovem ents and changes, bu t they have m ad e n a tu re a highly co n tro llab le e le ­m ent in m an ’s h is to r ic a l ad v en tu re . By m eans of n a tu ra l sc ience

^ ^ Ibid . , p. 193.

^ •^ Ib id . , p. 193.

124

we a re now, as n ev e r b e fo re , "m aking" h is to ry , and yet we a re overw helm ed by it b ecau se h is to ry has em ancipa ted i ts e lf fro m its an cien t and C h ris tian boundaries* With Yico divine prov idence has a lre ad y becom e the n a tu ra l lav/ of h is to ry ; and w ith D esca rte s n a tu re has a lre ad y becom e a m a th em atica l p ro je c t, se rv in g m an’s m a s te ry . Thus h is to ry now occupies a position w hich is analogous to th a t occupied by m a th em atica l p h y sics in the sev en teen th c e n ­tu ry , and in consequence of it. To in te rp re t so c io -p o litic a l h is ­to ry s t i l l in te rm s of ancien t ph y sics and cosm ology o r in te rm s of C h ris tia n e th ic s and theology seem s to have becom e an a n ach ro n ­is m fo r m o d ern thinking on h is to ry .

Yet in sp ite of th e se "an a c h ro n ism s" and the ap p aren t su cc e ss of

the n a tu ra l s c ie n tis t in prognosticating , and reg u la tin g n a tu ra l p ro c e s s e s ,

Low ith is highly sk ep tica l of the ab ility of the h is to r ia n to e x e rc is e a

s im ila r co n tro l o v e r the h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s . The im p o ssib ility of e la b o r ­

a tin g a p ro g re s s iv e system , of s ec u la r h is to ry on the H eb rew -C h ris tian

b a s is of fa ith o r the c la s s ic a l b a s is of n a tu re , he fla tly a s s e r t s , "h as

i ts c o u n te rp a r t in the im p o ss ib ility of e s tab lish in g a m eaningful p lan of

245h is to ry by m eans of re a so n . " And fo r I/dw ith, th is o b se rv a tio n is

" c o rro b o ra te d by com m on sen se ; fo r who would d a re to pronounce a de fin ­

ite s ta tem e n t on the p u rp o se and m eaning of co n tem p o rary e v e n ts? " Ob­

v iously we can a s c e r ta in c e r ta in defin ite fa c ts , but "w hat we cannot see

2,a hand fo re se e a r e the p o te n tia litie s of th e se fa c ts . " In o th e r w o rd s ,

one m u st alw ays "d is tin g u ish . . . betw een a h is to r ic a l so u rce and i ts

247p o ss ib le c o n se q u e n c e s ." F o r exam ple,

244Ibtd. , P* 194.

245Ib id ., p. 193.

246Ibid. , p, 198.

247Ibid. , p. 196 .

125

T h e re would be no A m erican* no F ren c h , and no R u ssian rev o lu tio n s and co n stitu tions w ithout the idea of p ro g re s s and no idea of s e c u la r p ro g re s s tow ard fu lfillm en t w ithout the o rig in a l fa ith in a Kingdom of God, though one can h ard ly say th a t the teach ing of J e su s is m an ife st in the m an ifesto es of th ese politics.! m ovem ents. T h is d isc rep a n c y betw een th e rem o te re s u lts and the m eaning of the in itia l in ten tions shows tha t the schem e of d e riv a tio n by se c u la r iz a tio n cannot be equated w ith a hom ogeneous cau sa l d e te rm in a tio n .

F u r th e rm o re , the v e ry fac t f,fchat the re s u lt of such a d e riv a tio n usually

d is to r ts and p e rv e r ts the o rig in a l in ten tion of the h is to r ic a l s o u rc e ,M

c o n stitu te s , fo r JLowith, a con firm ation of h is " law 1' of h is to ry , nam ely ,

’’the ru le of h is to r ic a l developm ents is th a t the w ays by w hich ideas be*

com e effec tive a re beyond m an ’s in ten tion . H is to ry alw ays ach ieves m o re

249and le s s than what has been in tended by the au th o rs of a m ovem ent. "

But Low ith’s doubts do not m e re ly co n ce rn the ra tio n a l e lucidation

of m a n ’s h is to r ic a l in ten tio n s , they a lso ex tend to the e n tire h is to r ic a l

p ro c e s s its e lf .

Such u n p red ic tab le developm ents* even when unfolded and e s ta b lish e d a re not so lid fac ts but re a liz e d p o te n tia litie s , and as such they a re liab le to becom e undone again , C h ris tia n ity could have v an ished fro m the h is to ry of the w orld a s c la s s ic a l pagan ism did, could have succum bed to a g n o stic ism , o r could have rem a in ed a sm a ll s e c t. C h ris t h im se lf, a s a h is to r ic a l m an, could have y ie ld ed to the tem p ta tio n of e s ta b lish in g the K ingdom of God h is ­to r ic a lly am ong the Jew s and on e a r th . In the p e rsp e c tiv e of hu ­m an w isdom and ig n o ran ce , every th ing could have happened

2 Ib id . , p. 2.1Z. A lso see above C hap ter I, e sp e c ia lly the s e c ­tio n s p e rta in in g to L bw ith’s d iscu ss io n of the conscious and unconscious w ell sp rin g s of h is to r ic a l action .

HOne cannot ch arg e the in it ia to rs of a m ovem ent w ith p e rso n a l re sp o n s ib il ity fo r i ts h is to r ic a l r e s u lts . In h is to ry ’responsib ility* has

126

d iffe ren tly in th is v a s t in te rp lay of h is to r ic a l d ec is io n s , e ffo rts , fa i lu re s , and c irc u m sta n c e s .

G rudgingly , Lowith w ill adm it th a t " a f te r i t re a c h e s a c e r ta in c lim ax the

g e n e ra l c o u rse of h is to r ic a l d e stin ies seem s to be fina l and th e re fo re su b ­

je c t to p ro g n o s tic a t io n ," but he is adam ant in the conviction th a t no h is ­

to r ic a l p ro p h e t e v e r 51 fo re saw the r e a l co n ste lla tio n s and the outcom e0

of a h is to r ic a l even t. A t b e s t "w hat they p ro g n o stic a te is only the g en e ra l

261p a tte rn th a t h is to ry w ill p robab ly follow '1 * - - a s if th is , in I tse lf , w as

not a lre a d y quite s ig n ifican t and p ra isew o rth y ,

However* fo r Lowith, a "p ro b ab le" g en e ra l p a tte rn is re a lly no

p a tte rn a t a il. T hus in sh a rp c o n tra s t to a ll of the " ra tio n a l" as w ell as

" th eo lo g ica l" a tte m p ts to c o n stru c t m eaningful sch em es of h is to ry , Lo~

with finds th a t h is to ry its e lf is a r e a lm of sh e e r contingency w hose only

262d e m o n strab le "law " is not i ts " p ro g re s s iv e m an ag eab ility '' "* but ra th e r

i ts in c re a s in g com plex ity and tra c k le s s n e s s . In sh o rt, Lb w ith is f irm ly

convinced th a t

the p ro b lem of h is to ry is unansw erab le w ith in its own

alw ays two s id e s ; the re sp o n s ib ility of those who teach and in tend so m e­thing and the re sp o n s ib ility of those who a c t and re s p o n d ," H ence " b e ­tw een the la t te r and the fo rm e r th e re is no s im p le equation but a lso no independence both to g e th e r p roduce h is to r ic a l re s u lts , which a r e th e re fo re am biguous and n e v e r defin ite in th e ir p o ten tia l b ea rin g and m ean ing . 1' Ldw itb, M eaning, pp. 212-213.

2 5 0 Ibid. , pp. 193-199.

2 5 1 Ibid. * p. 199.

252., .Ib id . , p. 2U0.

127

p e rsp ec tiv e . H is to r ic a l p ro c e s s e s as such do not b e a r the le a s t ev idence of a com prehensive and u ltim a te m eaning. H is to ry as such has no outcom e. T h e re never lias been and n ev er w ill be an im m anen t so lution of the p ro b lem of h is to ry , fo r m an’s h is ­to r ic a l ex p erien ce is one of steady fa ilu re .

The only w isdom th a t JLowxth can glean from, th is scene of p e rp e tu a l

s tru g g le , d isappo in tm en t, and 11 s tead y fa i lu re ” is tha t "h is to ry in s tead

of being governed by re a so n and p rov idence seem s to be governed by

chance and fa te . " Yet Lbwith a lso finds th a t if one red u ces the b e -

lie f in p ro v idence to i ts genuine c h a ra c te r ; i. e . , "d irec tin g ind iv iduals

and nations not v is ib ly and co n sis ten tly but in a r a th e r c ry p tic and in te r ­

m itte n t way, " and " if fa te m eans a su p rem e pow er not at our d isp o sa l

w hich ru le s o u r d e s tin ie s , then fa te is co m p arab le to p ro v id en tia l d iv in ­

ity . " F o r " in the re a li ty of th a t ag ita ted s e a w hich we ca ll ’history* i t

m akes l i t t le d iffe ren ce , w h e th er m an fe e ls h im se lf in the hands of God's255

in sc ru ta b le w ill o r in the hands of chance and fa te ." H ow ever, it

does m ake a d iffe ren ce ; and in sp ite of Jbowith's ve iled p e rso n a l sy rnpa-

* 256thy io r the c la s s ic a l p o sitio n , h is fa ilu re to specify c le a r ly the n a tu re

25% b id ., p. 191.

254Ibid. , p. 199.

255lbid. , pp, 199-200.*]? K £*

Ldwith d isp a ra g e s the C h ris tia n em p h asis upon hope a s " fo o l­ish " in co m p ariso n to the " so b e r and w ise" c la s s ic a l view " th a t hope is an illu s io n w hich helps m an to endure life but which, in the la s t r e s o r t , is an ig n is fa tuus. " He a lso o b se rv es th a t the id ea l of m o d ern sc ien ce , the id ea of p ro g r e s s , o u r em p h asis upon being c re a tiv e , and our d e s ire to " sa v e u n re g en era te na tions by W este rn isa tio n and re -e d u ca tio n " a re c e r ta in ly not the p ro d u c t of a c la s s ic a l po in t of view but a r e ra th e r "ev ils

123

of the e x tra “te m p o ra l point of re fe re n c e is again a defin ite indication

th a t here* too, a s in V cm H egel, he has ye t to sev e r the bonds tie ing

h im to h is age. lit fa c t h is com m itm en t to both fa te and p rov idence, i. e . ,

to sh e e r u n sp ec ified tra n sce n d e n ta l d ire c tio n a s such, b e a rs a r e m a rk ­

ab le s im ila r i ty to h is e a r l ie r com m itm en t to the o b scu re and indefin ite

"feeing of e te rn ity . "

But h e re , in c o n tra s t to Yom H egel, Bowiib. a lso b rie fly ex p lo res

the p o ss ib ility of an o th er a lte rn a tiv e to the m odern fa sc in a tio n w ith h is ­

to ry , nam ely , sk ep tic ism . A dm ittedly, a t f i r s t g lance, sk ep tic ism and

the fa ith in tra n sc e n d e n ta l d irec tio n ap p ear to have l i t t le in com m on b e ­

yond a m utual opposition to the p re su m p tio n s of a se tt le d knowledge.

But Bowith, prob ing d e ep e r, finds th a t both the skep tic and the b e lie v e r

s h a re a p a r t ic u la r a v e rs io n to an "ea sy read in g of h is to ry and i ts m ean ­

ing. " N e ith e r p re te n d s to d is c e rn the u ltim a te p u rp o se o£ the h is to r ic a l

p ro c e s s i ts e lf . "T hey r a th e r seek to s e t m en free fro m the w orld 's o p ­

p re s s iv e h is to ry by suggesting an a ttitu d e , e ith e r of sk ep tic ism or of

fa ith , w hich i s ro o ted in an ex p erien ce c e r ta in ly n u rtu re d by h is to ry but

de tach ed fro m and. su rp a ss in g it. ” Thus they enable m an "to endure i t

257w ith m a tu re re s ig n a tio n o r w ith fa ith fu l expectation , " Yet th is

w hich a r e the f ru it of too m uch good w ill and of a m is tak en C h ris tian ity , "Xfeid, , pp. 202-207, A lso Bohm , oj>. b i t . » p. 101. F u r th e r consu lt L*d- w ith 's : ’ W eltgesch ich te und H ell s ge s c he hen1' in A nte ile M. H eidegger gum 60, G e b u rts ta g , (F ra n k fu rt/M a in : V itto rio IG osterm ann , 1950), pp. 106-153.

^ ^ B o w ith , M eaning, p. VL

129

" m a tu re resignation '* of the skep tic is not to be confused w ith the ’'r e s o ­

lu te re s ig n a tio n " of th o se who in Vora H egel succum bed to " th e s p ir i t of

th e ir age. " A ccord ing to Ebwith, h is to r ic is t re s ig n a tio n is the p roduct

of f r u s tr a te d hopes and d e s ir e s , of a " lo ss of n e rv e" and of a fa lse fa ith

in the a p p a re n t om nipotence of the h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss a s such* On the

o th e r hand, the " m a tu re re s ig n a tio n " of the skep tic is m e re ly " the w o rld -

ly b ro th e r of devotion, in the face of the in ca leu lab ility and u n p re d ic ta ­

b ility of h is to r ic a l is s u e s .

In con clu sio n then , Ldwith has sought to overcom e o u r m odern

h is to r ic a l co n sc io u sn ess o r h is to r ic is m f i r s t by tra c in g i ts rem o te o r i ­

gins to th e H ebrew C h ris tian and c la s s ic a l tra d itio n s , then by showing

th a t i t s p re s e n t fo rm is the p ro d u c t of a d is to rtio n and p e rv e rs io n of

th e se two tra d it io n s , and finally by pointing out th a t m an’s "planning and

g u essin g , h is d esigns and d ec is io n s , fa r - re a c h in g a s they m ay be , have

258Ibid . , p. 199. F u r th e r o b se rv a tio n s by Lowith on the r e l a ­tionsh ip betw een sk ep tic ism and fa ith can be found in the following: " C h ris te n tu m und G esch ichfe , " M erk o r, IV (1950), pp. 1241-52; " N a tu r- lich e T heolog ie , c k r is t l ie h e r G laube, ph ilosopM sche S k e p s is ," ed. by C. J . B leek e r, G. W. J . JDrewes, and K. H. H. Bidding in P ro ceed in g s of the Seventh In te rn a tio n a l C o n g ress for th e H is to ry of R elig ions (A m ­s te rd am ; N orth H olland Co. , 1951), pp. 170-171; "S kepsis und G laube," Wort und W ahrhelt, VI (1951), pp. 247-258; "S k ep tic ism and F a ith , in M em ory of E r ic h F ra n k , " Social R e s e a rc h , XVIII (1951), pp. 219-236; "S kepsis und G lau b e ," N eue S chw elaer R undschau , XIX (1951/52), pp. 348-364; " W isse n u n d G lauben,1? Z eltw ende, XXV (1954), pp. 223-234; "C h ris ten tu m und G esch ich te , " N um en, II (1955), pp. 147-155; 'W is sen , GXauben und S kepsis (G ottingen; Vandenhoek und R u p reeh t, 1956); "K now ledge and F aith ; fro m the P re -S o c ra t io s to H e id e g g e r ," ed. by W. JLeibrecht in R elig ion and C u ltu re , E ssa y s in Honor of P au l T illich (New V ork: H a rp e r and B ro th e rs , 1959), pp. 196-210.

130

only a p a r t ia l function in the w astefu l econom y of h is to ry w hich engulfs

them , to s s e s them , and sw allow s them ,

But g ran ted th a t B ow ith 's an a ly s is i s c o rre c t , does i t m e re ly su f­

fice to d e lin ea te th is s itu a tio n in o rd e r to in itia te its overcom ing? “With­

out doubt h is to r ic is m has becom e the dorninent a ttitude of our tim e , in

effec t, a ’’la s t re lig io n 1' a s the w orks of B u rck h ard t, D ilthey, T ro e ltsc h ,

C ro ce , Collingw ood, and num erous o th e rs c le a r ly d em o n stra te . Yet

JLowith’s d e lin ea tio n w ith its reco m m endation fo r a re tu rn to the old

fa ith o r the adoption of sk ep tic ism co n stitu tes no re a l overcom ing of the

p re s e n t " fa lse fa ith , " F o r if JLdwith is s e r io u s about a r e tu rn to the old

fa ith , in e ith e r i ts C h ris tia n o r c la s s ic a l g u ise , he is then open to the

sam e ch arg e he h im se lf had e a r l ie r leveled a t N ie tzsche and K ie rk e ­

g aard . He em p h asized th a t th e ir in te re s t and co n cern w ith the c la s s ic a l

and e a r ly C h ris tia n po in ts of view w as not the p roduct of a genuine e x tra -

te m p o ra l in v estig a tio n of n a tu re o r con tem plation of the deity , but was

ra th e r m o tiv a ted by th e ir d isp le a su re w ith the dom inent a ttitu d e s of th e ir

day, T hus, given B dw ith 's un m istak ab le a v e rs io n to the m odern h is to r i ­

ca l c o n sc io u sn ess , a "dec is io n " by h im fo r e ith e r c la s s ic is m or C h r is ­

tian ity would then , in e ffec t, m e re ly va lid a te the h is to r ic !s t contention

th a t he has not " tra n sc e n d ed " a t a ll but sim ply re a c te d in a negative way

to h is age. Hence the only way jLowith can escap e the c la im s of h is to r i ­

c ism is to adopt a sk ep tica l a ttitu d e . But sh e e r sk ep tic ism a s such is

JLdwith, Meaning, p, vi.

131

no re a l an sw er. F o r , a s he free ly ad m its , Mit is l i te ra lly a p ass io n fo r

s e a rc h ~~ wliich m ay end in upholding the question a s question o r in a n s -

w erin g it by tran scen d in g . . . doubt th rough f a i th ,1,260 in w hich case ,

how ever, he is open to the a rg u m en t ju s t d iscu ssed .

Ldwith m ay be f irm ly convinced th a t h is to ry a s a m e re 11 p a r tia l

r e c o rd of hum an ex p erien ce is too deep and, a t the sam e tim e , too s h a l­

low to put info r e l ie f the hum ble g re a tn e ss of a hum an soul. " 26* And he

m ay co nsc iously seek to defend the fundam entally a h is to r ic a l c la s s ic a l

and C h ris tia n ap p ro ach es to m an and the w orld in the face of th e ir m odern

d is to r tio n s and s e c u la r is a tio n s . But h is in ab ility to acco m p lish a non-

h is to r ic ls f r e tu rn to e ith e r of th e se v iew s, o r to o ffer a tru ly v is ib le a l ­

te rn a tiv e to them , te s t if ie s to h is own unconscious ro o ted n ess in M s age,

to the fac t th a t h e re , a s in Vom H egel, he is s t i l l ph ilosophising on the

b a s is of the te m p o ra l ” s p i r i t of the age" ra th e r than fro m a tru e e x tra -

te m p o ra l point of view .

Yet d e sp ite the s tre n g th of the h is to r ic is t position , Ldwith is not

n e c e s s a r i ly condem ned to re m a in a m e re d is s id e n t ch ild of h is age. He

could have co u n te red h is to r ic is m m o re e ffec tiv e ly if in s te ad of lim itin g

the a lte rn a tiv e s to sk e p tic ism and faith , he would have co n sid e red a th ird

p o ss ib ility , nam ely a cy c lica l view w h ere in h is to r ic a l change and m utation

is u n d e rs to o d as a m an ife s ta tio n of the b a sic cy c lica l rh y th m s in h e ren t

^60Ibid. , p. vi.261. .Ibid. , p. v.

132

in n a tu re i ts e lf . Such a view is , in fac t, im p lic it in h is o b se rv a tio n tha t

" i t is not the h is to r ic a l w orld but r a th e r hum an n a tu re which p e r s is ts

th rough a ll h is to r ic a l changes, n and th a t h is to ry if f illed w ith disap**

p o in tm en ts i s , a t le a s t , a "continuous rep e titio n " of e s se n tia lly the sam e

263d isap p o in tm en ts . In o th e r w ords, is not h is to ry re a lly a "m o n stro u s

phenom enon of n a tu re in w hich hum an w ill p a r tic ip a te s but w ithout being

7 A Aab le to m a s te r i t ? " And it is fro m such a "n a tu ra l is tic " o r cosm ic

e x tra - te m p o ra l s tan c e , i, e. , viewing h is to ry as a m e re m an ifesta tio n

of an a l l encom passing n a tu re , tha t Jbowith, a f te r M eaning, seek s to

o v erco m e our m o d ern h is to r ic a l co n sc io u sn ess o r h is to r ic ism .

262Ibid. , p. 200,

263Ibid. , p, 190.

Lowith, "S kepsis und G laube in d e r W eltgesch ich te , M Die Welt a ls G esch ich te , X (1950), p. 154.

CHAPTER V

H isto ry as a N a tu ra l Happening

Liowith’s view th a t h is to ry is a m an tle s ta tio n of an a ll-en co m p assin g

and " t im e le s s un a tu re is m o s t cogently s ta ted in the se v e ra l books and a r t i ­

c le s th a t ap p ea red a f te r M eaning ijx H is to ry . In th e se w ritin g s , tha t a lso

co n stitu te hie fin a l o r developed a rg u m en t ag a in s t h is to r ic ism , Lowith

u n d e rtak es a fourfo ld a n a ly s is of the e n tire p ro b lem of h is to r ic a l thought:

firs t* he in v e s tig a te s the re la tio n sh ip betw een h is to ry and h is to r ic a l con­

sc io u sn e ss ; secondly , he an a lyzes the d is tin c tio n betw een the n a tu ra l s c i ­

en ces and the c u ltu ra l o r h is to r ic a l sc ien ces ; th ird ly , he seek s to dem on­

s t r a te the innate lo g ica l w eak n esses and fa lla c ie s of the h is to r ic is t p o s i­

tio n its e lf ; and fina lly , he a s s e r t s th a t h is to ry , fa r fro m being a re a lm

of f re e hum an a c tiv ity , i s , in e sse n c e , a s h e e r ’‘happening” o r a G eschehen

a s au to m atic , au tonom ous, and in ev itab le as the happenings in n a tu re .

Edwith*a in v estig a tio n of the re la tio n sh ip betw een h is to ry and h is ­

to r ic a l co n sc io u sn ess is c lo se ly bound up w ith a c r i t ic a l exam ination of

the d is tin c tio n u su a lly m ade betw een the ac tu a l h is to r ic a l event i ts e lf and

the inq u iry and a n a ly s is of th is event. Ebwith contends th a t th is d is tinc tion

is a r b i t r a r y a s w ell a s m islead in g because it im p a r ts a c e r ta in autonom y

and "o b je c tiv ity ” to the even t w hich the event i ts e lf does not ac tu a lly p o s ­

s e s s . J u s t as the m o d ern s c ie n tis t , and p a r t ic u la r ly W erner H eisen b erg ,

has com e to reco g n ize the fundam ental re c ip ro c ity betw een the n a tu ra l

133

134

265phenomena, and the o b se rv e r , so Lowitb. is convinced ITthat what holds

tru e fo r the n a tu ra l sc ie n c es should a lso hold tru e fo r the in te lle c tu a l and

h is to r ic a l sc ie n c es w here the e sse n tia l re la tiv ity of the w orld to m an is

so m uch m o re im p o r tu n a te .11* Obviously h is to ry even m o re than n a ­

tu re is in se p a ra b le fro m m an because "w hat sim ply happens som ew here

and so m etim e is not ye t, in itse lf , a h is to r ic a l happening. " ' It only

beco m es h is to r ic a l in so fa r as m an acknow ledges i t a s such. But then

the question a r i s e s on w hat b a s is does one d e te rm in e the h is to r ic a l fro m

the n o n -h is to r ic a l? Ldwith c e r ta in ly does not deny tha t even ts like the

b ir th and death of J e s u s a r e h is to r ic a l. Yet he a lso em p h asizes tha t

such ev en ts a r e h is to r ic a l only "fo r us*' s in ce we have im p a rted a sp ec ia l

s ig n ifican ce and m eaning to them . An e v e n t5vis no t a lre ad y in i ts e lf an

s i eh re m a rk a b le ; s ig n ifican t and im p o rtan t. M - ' O th erw ise , Ldwith

a rg u e s , the R om an h is to r ia n s T ac itu s and P liny would have re g a rd ed the

265W. H e isen b erg , The P hysicist* s C onception of N a tu re , t r . by A. S. P o m e ra n s {London: H utchinson, 1958). H e isen b erg a rg u e s th a t in th e in v es tig a tio n of n a tu ra l happenings, the v e ry too ls and m ethods of ob­s e rv a tio n in tro d u ce d is tu rb a n ce s into w hat is to be o b se rv ed so th a t m an no lo n g er co n fro n ts n a tu re a s an ob jective o b s e rv e r but see s h im se lf a s an a c to r involved in a dynam ic in te rp lay w ith n a tu re .

266 JLowith, "D ie D ynam ik, " pp. 219-220. A v e ry c r i t ic a l a s s e s s ­m en t of Low ith’s u n d ers tan d in g of H e isen b erg fro m a p o s itiv is t point of view can be found in H eins Lubas s 's rev iew of Ldw ith1 s G esam m elte A bhandlungen, in H is to ry and T h eo ry ? II (1962), pp. 215-216.

£ *7Ldw ith, "D ie D ynam ik, " p'. 220.

263Ibid. , p. 220.

135

happenings in the p ro v in ce of Judea in the f i r s t cen tu ry A. D. as co n sid ­

e ra b ly m o re than an in sig n ifican t Jew ish quarx*el hard ly w orthy of note

a t a ll. T hus, fo r JLdwith, the ''h is to rica l* ’ re m a in s e sse n tia lly a su b je c t

tive d e te rm in a tio n , In fac t, he even goes so fa r as to a rg u e tha t th is

inna te su b jec tiv ity of our h is to r ic a l judgm ents in te rp re ta tio n s does

not m e re ly ex tend to an ob jective re a lm of ' ’n e u tra l '? even ts but actua lly

p lays a c ru c ia l ro le in the v e ry ex isten ce and g en esis of even ts them *

se lv e s .

W ithout an ’’epochal co n sc io u sn ess*1 th e re would be no epo­chal happening, and w ithout the m o dern fa ith in p ro g re s s , h is to ry i ts e lf would p ro ceed in a d iffe ren t m an n er, . . . If i t is c o r re c t th a t the tra n sc e n d e n ta l K ingdom of God acq u ired a s e c u la r re v o ­lu tio n a ry p o ten tia l w ith R ousseau and M arx and a defin ite h is to r i ­c a l pow er w ith R o b e sp ie rre and Lenin, thesa th is m eans tha t our h is to ideal co n sc io u sn ess ac tu a lly p roduced happenings, which would not e x is t w ithout it. In o th e r words# we a re not m oved d i­re c t ly by the dynam ic of h is to ry , ra th e r i t is m oved by our h i s ­to r ic a l co n sc io u sn ess , by the way we th ink h is to r ic a lly . ^

E ven the avow edly an ti - sub je c ti v is t ic and openly m a te ri a lls tic in ­

te rp re ta tio n s of in.story a r e not e n tire ly f re e fro m th is fundam ental su b ­

je c t iv ism ; fo r the u ltim a te b a se of th e se v iew s, the ’’c la s s s t ru g g le ,” is

no t a s ob jec tive as i t f i r s t a p p e a rs . G lass s tru g g le s th em se lv es a re , of

c o u rse , ab so lu te ly dependent on the ex is ten ce of c la s s e s which in tu rn ,

s a y s Lb w ith, a r e so le ly dependent on the sub jec tive co n sc io u sn ess of a

group th a t i t , a s such , c o n stitu te s a c la s s . Thus w ithout the sub jec tive

a w a re n e ss of i ts e lf and of i ts ’’h is to r ic a l m is s io n ,” th e re would be no

26<?Ibid. , p. 221.

' 136

grounds fo r the ex is ten ce of c la s s an tagon ism s o r even of c la s s e s th em -

270se lv e s . But g ran ted tha t a ll of our h is to r ic a l judgm ents and in te r ­

p re ta tio n s can be ca lled in to question on the b a s is of th is innate su b jec ­

tiv ity of a l l h is to r ic a l know ledge, to be co n s is ten t, Lowith would a lso

have to question the v e ry e n te rp r is e of h is to ry itse lf . F o r if ev en ts a re

not "an s ich 11 of im p o rtan ce o r m eaningful but only acq u ire such m eaning

and im p o rtan ce " fo r u s , " a s sub jec tive s e le c to rs and im p a r te r s of m ean ­

ing, then h is to ry i ts e lf is red u c ib le to a m e re fic titio u s co n stru c t on the

p a r t of the su b jec tiv e o b se rv e r . Yet Low ith re fu se s to d raw th is conclu ­

sion f ro m his own p re m is e s , and w hile em p h asis in g the re la tiv ity and

in e scap ab le su b jec tiv ity of a l l of our " h is to r ic a l v iew s and p e rsp e c tiv e s , "

he con tinues to ask : "w h ere is the happening i ts e lf w hich is re le v an t to

a l l of o u r in te rp re ta tio n s and concep tions and w hich o ccu rs w hether we

in v e s tig a te i t h is to r ic a lly and u n d e rs tan d i ts m eaning o r not [ i ta l ic s

m ine} ?*'271

H ence Low ith finds h im se lf in a s tra n g e d ilem m a. On th e one hand,

he a s s e r t s h is to ry to be som ething com ple te ly autonom ous and independent

of a l l of ou r v a rio u s sub jec tiv e th e o rie s and ap p ro ach es and yet, on the

o th e r, he m ak es th is sam e h is to ry abso lu te ly dependent upon m an and his

su b jec tiv e th e o r ie s ; " fo r how should one ex p erien ce and u n d e rs tan d h is to ry ,

w hich is a lw ays only a h is to ry of m an , by i ts e lf o r 'a n s ic h ' w ithout som e*

2 7 0 Ibid. , p. 2 2 1 . 271

Ibid, , p. 222.

137

how being a p a r t of it , i. e. , w ithout hum an co nsc iousness and conduct,

272u n d ers tan d in g and p re ju d ice? 11 As a lre ad y ind icated , "w hat sim ply

happens som ew here and som etim e is not ye t in i ts e lf a h is to r ic a l happen­

ing. " Lowith has no im m ed ia te so lu tion to th is d ilem m a, even the c a r e ­

ful co llec tio n and an a ly s is of docum ents o ffers no help for it m e re ly r e ­

i te r a te s the d is tin c tio n betw een the sub jec tive im p re ss io n and the ob jec-

273tive happening. In fac t, the only way Lowith can leg itim a te ly m ain ta in

such an unusual p o sition is to view h is to ry as som ething which, although

u ltim a te ly dependent upon m an, is not exhausted by the v a rio u s sub jective

ind iv idual in te rp re ta tio n s but ra th e r tra n sc e n d s them and enjoys an in d e ­

pendent autonom ous ex isten ce on its own. In L ow ith 's view , "h is to ry

e x is ts b e fo re and a f te r a l l of ou r h is to r ic a l-p h ilo so p h ic a l sp ecu la tions. "

We " 'o v e r - a s k ' and 'o v e r - in te r p r e t1 h is to ry in te rm s of i ts p o ssib le s ig ­

n ifican ce , and the only im p o rtan t question: w hat it is , in its e lf , e s s e n tia l-

274ly and b e fo re a ll in t re p re la tio n is not posed . " F u r th e rm o re , Lowith

272 Ibid . , p. 220. See a lso Low ith1 s an a ly s is of "M ensch und G e- sch ich te" in G esam m elte Abhandlungen. H ere Lowith d e sc rib e s the r e ­la tio n sh ip betw een m an and h is to ry in a lm o s t P au lin ian fashion. "One has to hold on to the fac t th a t although m an has a h is to ry and stands in ­escap ab ly in h is to ry , he h im se lf is not h is to ry and does not live fro m it; th e re fo re h is to ry and m an n e v e r co incide. " p. 163. In o ther w ords, m an is in h is to ry but not of it.

273 "It docum ents what m any ind iv idua ls , a t a c e r ta in tim e su f­fe re d , thought, p lanned, and concealed . But the to ta lity of w hat actua lly happened evades exac t h is to r ic a l d e te rm in a tio n to the sam e deg ree as da ta p ile s up in re la tio n to the d e ta ils . " Lowith, "D ie Dynam ik, " p. 222.

274Ibid, , p. 223.

138

is v e ry p e s s im is tic about the p ro sp e c ts of finding an answ er to th is q u es-

tio n - - even if it w ere posed - - a s long as we continue to d is tin g u ish and

to jux tap o se n a tu re and h is to ry a s su ggested by D ilthey, W indelband,

R ic k e rt , and S im m el. T h e ir "d isco v e ry , " th a t h is to ry is an autonom ous

re a lm in w hich a lone m eaning and im p o rtan ce re s id e , is , he a rg u e s , no

r e a l an sw er a t all* In fac t, " in the fina l a n a ly s is ," it is " a concealm ent

of w hat a c tu a lly happens in h is to ry , Thus in o rd e r to "unconceal"

th is rco n cea lm en t and to a tta in to an " e s se n tia l" view of h is to ry , we need

a c r i t ic a l in v estig a tio n of the h is to r ic is t d is tin c tio n betw een n a tu re and

h is to ry .

Lowith* s in v estig a tio n begins w ith an a n a ly s is of the h is to r ic a l

ro o ts of the d is tin c tio n its e lf . He a rg u e s th a t the ap p a ren t se lf evidence

of our d iffe ren tia tio n betw een n a tu re and h is to ry , and acco rd in g ly betw een

n a tu ra l sc ie n c es and c u ltu ra l o r h is to r ic a l sc ie n c es , has i ts o rig in a t the

be ginning f of m o d ern tim e s . It goes back to the sc ien tif ic revo lu tion w hich

began in the s ix teen th cen tu ry . The p re m o d e rn a n tith e s is to n a tu re w as

not h is to ry bu t a r t , " In epochs when m en w e re c lo s e r to n a tu re than we

a r e , a s in c la s s ic a l an tiqu ity , n a tu re o r physifr w as c o n tra s te d w ith

a r t , o r tecfane, th a t i s , w ith the a r t i f ic ia l w hich i s not *by nature* but is

277w rought by m an, i ts a r t i f i c e r . " Thus o u r d is tin c tio n betw een n a tu re

275* Ib id ,, p. 247.

27 hO rig in a lly physio w as un d ers to o d a s " th e ground of a l l being. "

277K. Low ith, "M ature, H is to ry and E x is te n tia l is m ," Social

139

and h is to ry is only a re la tiv e ly re c e n t developm ent, and the individual

who c le a r ly s ta ted i t fo r the f i r s t tim e , acco rd ing to Lowith, w as D es­

c a r te s .

D e sc a r te s d iv ided the whole re a lm of re a li ty in to two kinds of being; the r e s cog itans and the r e s ex tensa . F ro m the p rin c ip le of be ing-th ink ing he co n stru c ted n a tu re as the ob ject of .m athem at­ic a l p h y s ics . T h e re is tru e and c e r ta in knowledge about n a tu re ; about h is to ry nothing can be known tru ly and w ith ce rta in ty . What we seem to Imow about h is to ry r e s ts on m e re trad itio n , opinion, and custom ,

V ico, about a hundred jrea rs la te r , w as the f i r s t who v en tu red to co n s tru c t

a sp ec ific coun ter a rg u m en t to D e sc a r te s . In h is " New S cience"

he f r ie d to d em o n stra te th a t tru e and c e r ta in knowledge is p o ssib le only of th ings w hich we have m ade o u rse lv e s - - th a t is , of the w orld of h is to ry , the mondo c iv ile , w here the tru e (v e ru m ) and the m ade (factum ) c o n tro v e rt. The w orld of n a tu re is in a c c e s ­s ib le to m an b ecause he did not m ake it. It is in te llig ib le to God alone as its c re a to r .

H ow ever a s fa r a s the fundam ental d iv is io n i ts e lf is concerned , betw een

a n a tu ra l w o rld and a m an -m ad e o r h is to r ic a l w orld , V ico, by accep ting

it , rem a in ed w ith in the fram ew o rk e s ta b lish e d by D e sc a r te s in sp ite of

R e s e a rc h , XIX (195&)» p. 79. T his ai*ticle w as o rig in a lly pub lished in G erm an , u n d er the t i t le “ N atur end G esch ich te" in N eue R undschau ,LXII (1951), pp. 65-79.

273 Ib id . , p. 79. .Lowith a lso em p h as izes tha t the c r i te r io n of the C a r te s ia n d is tin c tio n does not r e s t p r im a r i ly upon an e s se n tia l d ifference betw een the two fie ld s but " in the secondary d is tin c tio n a s to what can be known about n a tu re and h is to ry sc ie n tif ica lly . The p r io r i ty of the p ro b lem of know ledge and m ethod over the question of su b jec t m a tte r is again ty p ica lly m odern . ” p. 79.

279Ibid. , p. 80.

140

h is opposition .

The only m odern th in k er who se r io u s ly a ttem p ted to overcom e

th is b ifu rca tio n betw een n a tu re and h is to ry , in Lb w ith’s opinion, w as

Hegel* H egel, he a rg u e s , view s n a tu re as m uch m o re than a m e re re a lm

of p h y sica l m a ss and fo rce ; in s tead he see s it a s p ervaded by s p ir it , In

fac t, h is philosophy of h is to ry " is but the re v e rs e of h is philosophy of

231n a tu re . ” H egel does not p o stu la te a p a r tic u la r re a so n in w orld h is ­

to ry ju x taposed to a n o n -ra tio n a l n a tu re but r a th e r a u n iv e rsa l re a so n

w hich governs both the n a tu ra l u n iv e rse a s w ell a s the h is to r ic a l w orld.

In n a tu re , th is re a so n is d isce rn a b le in the x*egular p ro g re s s io n of the

sea so n s and in the law ful m otion of the c e le s tia l b od ies; in h is to ry it is

d isc e rn a b le in the re g u la r p ro g re s s io n of the w orld s p ir i t tow ard the

re a liz a tio n of e v e r g re a te r freedom . The only d iffe ren ce is th a t in n a ­

tu re , in c o n tra s t to h is to ry , " re a so n o p e ra te s w ithout co n sc io u sn ess . ”

T hus " fo r Hegel the h is to r ic a l w orld is a s o r t of ’’second n a tu re ' and a

’second w o rld ' w ith in the context of the one u n iv e rse w hich is fundam entally

A lthough JLowith holds D e sc a r te s and Vico p r im a r i ly re sp o n sib le fo r our co n tem p o rary d is tin c tio n betw een n a tu re and h is to ry , he a lso a c k ­now ledges th a t the u ltim a te grounds fo r th is d is tin c tio n lie in the la te c la s ­s ic a l, i. e* , Stoic and E p icu rean fligh t fro m the w orld and e sp e c ia lly in the C h ris tia n red u c tio n of the a ll-e n co m p ass in g c la s s ic a l cosm os to a m e re tra n s i to ry and contingent c re a tio n of a tra n sc e n d e n ta l c re a to r God. "D er W eltbeg riff d e r n eu ze itlich en P h ilosoph ic" in g itg u n g sb e rich te d e r H eidel - b e rg e r A kadem ie d e r W issen seh a ften , P h ilo so p M sch e- H is to risch e K la sse . (H eidelberg : K a rl W in te r, i960), p. 13; "M ensch liche N atu r und S p ra c h e ," Neue R undschau , LKVI (1955), pp. 444-445; and "W elt und M en.schenwelt" in G esam m elte A bliandlungen, pp. 235-237.

281.Lbwith, "N atu re , H is to ry , and E x is te n tia l is m ," p. 81.

141

d e te rm in ed by re a so n , o r in C h ris tia n te rm s . . . of the one God, who

282is s p ir i t . " And " in consequence of th is fundam ental conception of the

one w orld of s p ir i t , H egel’s exp lanations of the w orking of the 'cunning

of re a so n ' r e fe r equally to quite d iffe ren t phenom ena; to e lem en ta ry n a ­

tu ra l p ro c e s s e s , to the building of a house, to the w orld of h is to ry . "283

N o n e th e le ss , H eg e l's conception of s p ir i t a s encom passing both na tu re

and h is to ry fa iled to im p re s s subsequen t th in k e rs ; consequently , we a re

s t i l l thinking in te rm s of the dichotom y e s ta b lish e d by D e sc a r te s and Vico.

In fac t, the v e ry s tru c tu re of the w orks of C roce , Collingwood, and m ost

of o u r co n tem p o ra ry h is io r ic is ts is ab so lu te ly dependent upon the c le a r

cut d is tin c tio n betw een n a tu re and h is to ry .

Y et in sp ite of the g en e ra l accep tance and p o p u la rity of th is point

of view , Dowith p ro ceed s to question it in the c o u rse of an an a ly s is of

the thought of G o tti-O ttlilien fe ld , a re p re se n ta tiv e of the neb-K an tian

S ou th -W est G erm an school {’W indelband, R ic k e rt, S im m el, e t a l , ). G o tti's

282 lMd, , p. 81,

233 F o r exam ple , "ch em ica l and p h y sio -m ech an ica l p ro c e s s e s a re m ade se rv ic e a b le to h igher b io lo g ica l ends th rough the cunning of reason* The flam e a b so rb s the a ir but i t is , a t the sam e tim e , fed by wood which grow s in the t r e e s , w hich a r e fed by the oxygen of the a ir . " Thus "the burn ing wood, w hile ab so rb in g oxygen fro m the a i r , figh ts ag a in s t its own so u rc e . A s im ila r d ia le c tic can be seen in the building of a house. The n a tu ra l e lem en ts ~~ f ire to m e lt iro n , a i r to s tim u la te f ire , w a te r to o p ­e ra te the m ill w hich cu ts the lu m b er - - a ll help to build the house." And y e t the p u rp o se of the house is to p ro te c t u s a g a in s t f ir e , w a te r , and a ir . "T h rough a 'cunning of re a so n ' the e lem en ts a r e u sed ag a in s t th em se lv es . " Ib id . , p. 82.

142

o b se rv a tio n s on the re la tio n sh ip betw een n a tu re and h is to ry a re p a r a ­

p h ra se d by Low ith a s follow s: neither biology n o r geology, though both

have a h is to r ic a l d im ension , d isc lo se genuine h is to r ic a l happenings.

"G enuine h is to ry is an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w hich e lic its the sign ificance

of hum an happenings. M F o r " h is to ry is a s ign ifican t and exp licab le hu ­

m an happening. It is caused by m en acting reaso n ab ly and only fo r them

is i t p e rc ep tib le . The ’L ogos' belongs to the su b stance of h is to ry and

i t s only lim its a re the lim its im posed by the 'logic* of the happening

its e lf . " 284

Lowith r a is e s two ob jections to th e se v iew s. F i r s t , g ran ted th a t

m an is capab le of acting reaso n ab ly bu t " th e re fo re not a ll re a so n ab le

ac tio n i s a lre ad y p e r se h is to r ic a l . R ational ac tio n is only a su ffic ien t

but not a n e c e s s a ry condition for h is to r ic a l happenings. " M adm en a re

also* quite capab le of in itia tin g ac tio n s w hich can becom e h is to r ic a l.

Secondly, the "logos" in s te ad of belonging to "the substance of h is to ry "

a p p e a rs to have a m uch g re a te r affin ity fo r n a tu re .

If a logos a p p e a rs som ew here d is tin c tly , then c e r ta in ly not in h is to ry but c le a r ly in every th in g d e te rm in ed by n a tu re , be i t the ro ta tio n of the s ta r s o r the c irc u la tio n of the blood, o r a ll n o rm a l grow th and decay. N a tu re 's happenings a rra n g e th em se lv es in tr in s ic a lly in to a co sm o s; th o se of h is to ry re m a in m o re o r le s s chao tic and th e ir logos i s ; ha rd ly d isce rn ab le a t a ll.

H ence L o w ith 's r e a l ob jection to G otti, and in d ire c tly to a ll of the

Lowith, "D y n am ik ," pp. 227-228.

2 8 5 Ibid. , p. 228.

143

c o n tem p o ra ry re p re se n ta tiv e s of the n a tu re -h is to ry dichotom y, r e s ts on

the conviction th a t the sp ec ific conception of n a tu re , upon which the o rig in a l

d is tin c tio n i ts e lf is based* is in c o rre c t. G otti, he sa y s , " a s su m e s a con­

cep tion of n a tu re w hich is no longer o rie n te d on the physis a s such, but

r a th e r on i ts m a th e m a tica l-p h y s ic a l co n stru c tio n to w hich the cu ltu ra l,

i. e . , the h is to r ic a l sc ie n c es in tu rn o rie n t th em se lv es an tagon istica lly .

But Lb w ith then goes on to r a is e the v e ry in te re s tin g question , what

if the genuine su b stan ce of n a tu re , its " n a tu ra ln e s s ," w ere fa r rem oved

fro m the th e o r ie s of m o d ern n a tu ra l sc ien ce? Our view of n a tu re lias

c e r ta in ly changed s in ce the advent of G alileo , D e sc a r te s , and Newton but

h as n a tu re i ts e lf re a lly changed? What gu aran tee do we have tha t m odern

m a th em atica l p h y s ics u n d e rs tan d s the p h y sis m o re a p p ro p ria te ly than the

p h y s ics of the an c ien t s c ie n tis ts ? "T h e re e x is ts a m odern n a tu ra l sc ien ce

but no m o dern n a tu re , and one cannot dogm atically r e s t r i c t the quest for

the n a tu re of a l l th ings to one p a r t ic u la r and h is to r ic a lly conditioned point

of view . " E ven the " su c c e s s e s " of m o dern n a tu ra l sc ien ce have brought

us no c lo se r to an e s s e n tia l u n d erstand ing of n a tu re . It has only m ade

n a tu re fa r "m o re s e rv ic e a b le to m an’s h is to r ic a l p u rp o ses and p ro je c ts "

than e v e r b e fo re . Yet the u ltim a te re s u l t of th is h a rn ess in g of n a tu re to

h is to ry is th a t

^8 8 JLbwith, "D ie Dynam ik, " pp. 228-229.

287 Ibid. , p. 229*

Low ith, "Schdpfung und E x is te n a ," M erk u r, IX (1955), p. 230.

144

i t m ade n a tu re re la tiv e to u s , w ith the e ffect tha t ac tua lly nothing n a tu ra l w as le ft over. In our sc ie n tif ica lly o rgan ized w orld , n a tu ra ln e s s is no longer the s tan d a rd of n a tu re . What s t il l re m a in s of n a tu ra l th ings seem s to be a m e re le f t-o v e r of th a t which has not ye t been thoroughly su b jec ted by m an. T his h is to r ­ic a l a p p ro p ria tio n of the n a tu ra l w orld is a t the sam e tim e an e s ­tran g em en t fro m it. The e a r th has not becom e m o re fa m ilia r to us since we have becom e capable of covering im m ense d is tan ces in a sh o r t tim e . The m o re we p lan globally and exploit the e a r th tech n ica lly the fu r th e r n a tu re re c e d e s , in sp ite of a ll our tech n ica l s e iz u re of it,

A gainst th is w h o lesa le e s tran g e m e n t fro m n a tu re and concom itant

"h is to r ic iz a tio n of r e a l i ty ," ^ ® Lbwith su g g es ts th a t " in the end, the w orld

i t s e l f is p robab ly s t i l l today a s H e rac le itu s and N ie tzsche d e sc rib e d it: a

co sm ic o rd e r m ade n e ith e r by God no r m an * fo r a ll and everyone the sam e , 1

an e te rn a lly v ita l lo g o s -f ire flam ing up and dying down acco rd in g to an in ­

h e re n t m e a su re " - - the H arm onia of H e rac le itu s . H ow ever he is a lso

w ell aw are th a t th is suggestion is bound to re m a in u n feasib le as long as

we continue to allow o u r view of n a tu re to be d e te rm in ed by m o dern n a tu ra l

sc ien ce and by the " n e a r-s ig h te d b ias of h is io r ic is m ," which "o b s tru c ts

o u r f r e e and un im peded view of the re g u la r m ovem ents of the heavens and

re d u c es the G reek d isco v e ry of the cosm os to an ap p aren tly ir re c o v e ra b le

^^JL dw ith , ‘M a tu re , H is to ry and E x is te n t ia l is m ," p. 83.

290 T his com plete and to ta l h is to r ic is a tio n of re a li ty is a lso m an i­fe s t in the fa c t th a t " C h ris tia n dogm atics w as tra n s fo rm e d by the H egelian F . Gh. B au e r in to the h is to ry of d o g m atic s , econom ics by M arx into a m a te r ia l is t ic philosophy of h is to ry , philosophy i ts e lf by J . £ . E rdm ann in to the h is to ry of philosophy, and. biology by D arw in into the h is to ry of ev o lu tio n ." Dowith, "D ie D y nam ik ," pp. 229-230,

291 . . * -4Ixiw ith, "W eltb eg riff d e r n eu ze itlich en P h ilo scp h ie , " p. 22.

145

W eltanschauung . u^ 2 And he now p ro ceed s to launch a two pronged a ttack

a g a in s t th is "n e a r sigh ted b ias . " F i r s t he a ttem p ts to d em o n stra te the

in h e re n t " lo g ica l" lim ita tio n s and in co n sis ten c ies of the h is to r ic is t u n d e r­

standing of re a lity , Secondly, he a rg u es th a t h is to ry in s te ad of en lis ting

n a tu re in i ts e rv ic e is i ts e lf ac tua lly a m e re m an ifesta tio n of an a l l -

enco m p assin g c la s s ic a l p h y s is . And once u n d ers to o d as such, i t re v e a ls

i ts e lf to be the d ire c t opposite of a re a lm of f re e hum an ac tiv ity ; ra th e r

i t is a sh e e r im p e rso n a l "happening" or G eschehen akin to the re g u la r

im p e rso n a l happenings in n a tu re .

L ow ith 's f i r s t " lo g ic a l” a rg u m en t a g a in s t h is to r ic is m is based

on the fac t th a t, as a consc iously re la t iv is t ic point of view , i t en ta ils a

2927 Ix iw ith 's rev iew of G e rh a rd t K ru g e r 's G rundfragen d e r P h i - losophie and F re ih e it und W eltverw altung in P h ilo s aphis eke R undschau, VII (1959)# p. 8 . A lso , re m a rk a b ly enough, even m odern n a tu ra l sc ien ce h as re c en tly adopted a point of view which is v e ry c lose to the ancien t c y ­c lic a l notion of H e rac le itu s . A stro n o m ers now a rg u e th a t the u n iv e rse w as once a s ing le ex tre m e ly hot, dense "p rim ev a l m a ss" th a t exploded and sen t m a tte r ru sh in g out into space* The v a rio u s reced in g g a lax ies w hich we can s ti l l d is c e rn in the fo rm of a " re d sh ift" in the galaxy sp e c ­tru m a r e s im ply the d e b ris of th is explosion . However th e se galax ies a r e not re g a rd e d a s ru sh in g outw ard fo re v e r. M utual g rav ita tio n a l a ttra c t io n w ill even tually cau se th em to slow down, stop, and fa ll back to g e th e r again like a handful of pebb les th row n up into the a ir . But as th is new m a ss condenses, p r e s s u r e s and te m p e ra tu re s r is e ; and in tim e it too w ill explode again and re p e a t the life cycle of i ts p re d e c e s so r . Thus the u n iv e rse seem s to re p e a t the .sam e b a s ic p a tte rn over and ov er again . As D r. A llen Sandage of the Mt. P o lo m ar o b se rv a to ry pu ts it ," th e c lu es in d ica te th a t o u r u n iv e rse is a c lo sed sy s te m o rig in a tin g in a 'b ig b a n g , ' th a t the expanding u n iv e rse is slow ing down, and th a t it m ay p u lsa te p e rh ap s once ev ery SO b illio n y e a rs . " Quoted by G. P. G ilm ore in h is a r t ic le "T he B irth and l i f e of the U n iv e rse , " The New Y ork T im es M agazine , June 12, 1966, p. 8 8 .

146

b lanket and un ju stified den ial of the very ex isten ce of a re a lm of unchanging

and abso lu te tru th .

A p r io r i h is to r ic is m denies the ex isten ce of u n iv e rsa l and e te rn a l tru th s excep t p e rhaps in the re a lm of m a th em atics . It p re su p p o ses tha t h is to ry is a p ro g re s s iv e p ro c e ss of en rich m en t p e rp e tu a lly su rp a ss in g its p rev ious s tag es of developm ent. Thus the a ttem p t to r e s u r r e c t a fo rm er d o c trin e is reg a rd ed a s an a h is to r ic a l and ir r a t io n a l undertak ing .

And L-owith c o r re c t ly poin ts out th a t " th e reb y , h is to r ic is m overlooks the

fac t th a t the re la tio n sh ip of a philsophy to i ts age is by no m eans im equi-

294vocal. " But his subsequen t i l lu s tra tio n of th is inadequacy is som ew hat

unusual. F o r exam ple, he a rg u e s tha t the ph ilosopher, who has a tta ined

a c r i t ic a l d is tan ce to h is age, often "c le v e rly adap ts h is pub lica tions to

the p re ju d ic e s of his age in o rd e r to be h ea rd ;" he u n d e rs tan d s the a r t of

conveying his su p e r io r and "un tim ely know ledge" to h is ignoran t conte m -

295p o ra r ie s . ' But if th is is the case , why then does JLowith accu se such

th in k e rs as N ie tzsch e and Spengler of unconsciously re fle c tin g the sp ir it

of th e ir a g e s? Could they not c la im th a t they too have m e re ly clo thed

th e ir a c tu a l thoughts and id eas in a co n tem p o rary ga rb ?

Seen fro m th is point of view , N ie tz sch e 1 s a ttem p t to r e a s s e r t the

^^^JLowith, "D ie Dynam ik, " p. 236, F o r Bowith, "if tru th e x is ts and if it m ak es sen se to seek fo r it, then th e re is no consecu tive G reek , C h ris tia n , and m odern tru th , but only one and the sam e tru th . And th is c irc u m sta n c e . . . inc ludes the p o ss ib ility tha t p rev io u s th in k e rs m ay have gained in s ig h ts w hich w ere tru e and re m a in tru e even if, a t tim e s , they a re . . . c o v ered up and fo rgo tten . " "M ensch liche N atu r und S p rach e , " p. 446.

294Bowith, "Die Dynam ik, " p. 23b.

2 9 5 - , . .Ibid. , p. 2 oo.

14?

untim ely G reek teach ing of e te rn a l re c u rre n c e w ith a B ism ark ian "W ill

to P o w e r ," and Spengler'© counsel to "w ill" and ac tiv e ly "decide" for the

com ing of an inev itab le stage in a p red e te rm in ed cycle could actua lly be

the fina l outcom e of a ca re fu l and conscious a ttem pt to gain accep tance

of o th e rw ise unaccep tab le notions among highly c r i t ic a l and negatively

o rien ted c o n tem p o ra rie s . Hence to a rg u e tha t the ph ilsopher often " c le ­

v e rly adap ts his publications to the p re ju d ices of his age" is c le a rly no

re fu ta tio n of the h is to r ic is t c la im of the unequivocalness of an age and

i ts philosophy. It is a lm o s t im p o ssib le to d e te rm in e with c e rta in ty if a

m an is tru ly un tim ely and ms re ly "adapting , " o r if he is ac tu a lly only

m an ifesting an unconscious h is to r ic is t re a c tio n ag a in s t h is age in favor

of som e p rev io u s point of view.

H is to r ic ism a lso cannot be overcom e by argu ing tha t its em phasis

upon the om nipotence of the h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss and i ts red u c tio n of " a ll

d is tin c tio n s to the one lev e l of th e ir 'being equally h is to r ic a l ' fa ils to

reco g n ize the p o ss ib ility th a t a c e r ta in h is to r ic a l situa tion o r age could

2,96have been, m o re favo rab le fo r the d iscovery of tru th than any o th e r. "

F o r th e reb y , in sp ite of h is concern w ith the qua lita tive d is tin c tio n s b e ­

tw een d iffe ren t h is to r ic a l epochs, Fdw ith is , in effect, s ti l l m aking tru th

dependent upon h is to ry , an insigh t which is basic to the h is to r ic is t p o s i­

tion as such. A genuine e x tra - te m p o ra l s e a rc h fo r tru th , a s m an ifest,

fo r exam ple, in the a c tiv itie s and. c a re e r of a G oethe, is not dependent

^ ^ Ibid. t p. 236.

148

upon any p a r t ic u la r h is to r ic a l s itua tion o r age, it can o ccu r a t any tim e

and under any and, a ll c irc u m stan c es .

H ow ever in c o n tra s t to the h is to r ic is t contention that i t alone p o s ­

s e s s e s the p ro p e r view of hum an thought and action* Lowith c o rre c tly

po in ts out that h is to ry , fa r fro m dem o n stra tin g the "truth*' of h is to r ic ism

or any p a r t ic u la r th eo ry fo r th a t m a tte r , m e re ly d em o n stra tes " th a t in

298the c o u rse of tim e c e r ta in v iew s a re abandoned in favor of o th e rs . "

Thus " h is to r ic a lly , the tru th o r fa lsehood of any view is n e ith e r dem on­

s tra b le no r re fu tab le [ i t a l ic s m ine] , n^99 tixe fa c t tha t one cannot

e s ta b lish the abso lu te va lid ity of a p a r tic u la r point of view no r obtain a

knowledge of a p e rm an en t re a lm of tru th fro m a study of the h is to r ic a l

p ro c e ss does not n e c e s sa r ily im ply th a t one can obtain no knowledge a t

a ll fro m h is to ry . F o r exam ple, Lowith ad m its th a t the h is to ry of V /est-

e rn philosophy is m uch m o re than a m e re "p e rp e tu a l su ccess io n of w orld

v iew s;" r a th e r it d isp lay s "the re m a rk a b le continuity with which occiden ta l

thought alw ays ponders the sam e th em es and p ro b lem s fro m A ris to tle to

300H egel and fro m P a rm e n id e s to H eidegger. " Yet, a t the sam e tim e ,

2^ D b w ith 's em p h asis upon a p a r tic u la r h is to r ic a l s itua tion as co n stitu tin g an e sp e c ia lly fav o rab le ground fo r the d isco v ery of tru th a p p ea rs to be m o tiva ted by his d e s ire to re e s ta b lish the c o r re c tn e s s of the c la s s ic a l understand ing of n a tu re . Algo see below.

2^®.Ldwith, "D ie Dynam ik, " p. 239.

299 Ibid. , p. 237.

3QQIbid. , pp. 237-238 .

149

he em phasiises tha t in o rd e r to d isc e rn th is " re m ark ab le continuity" one

has to be in te re s te d in the h is to ry of philosophy " ’philosophically* and

not only h is to ric a lly . u In o ther w ords, u n less one p o s se sse s a knowledge

of the " e s s e n tia l content" of the sub ject under investigation , "one cannot

d isc e rn the h is to r ic a l m odifications of th is co n ten t."

But g ran ted tha t h is to ry view ed "ph ilosoph ically" can se rv e as a

leg itim a te so u rce of knowledge, the big question s til l rem a in s how one

a tta in s to th is sp ec ia l knowledge in the f i r s t p lace? Ju s t how does one

com e to know w hat "the e sse n tia l content" of re lig io n , or p o litic s , o r

econom ics is ? Is i t the re s u lt of an e m p ir ic a l observation , a divine

rev e la tio n , a P la ton ic ra tio n a l v is ion? Does one in tu it e sse n ce s as H u sse rl

reco m m en d ed v ia a p ro c e s s of e id etic reduction , i. e. , phenom enological

"b ra ck e tin g "? Or does a sim ple com m on sen se insigh t suffice , a s Do-

w ith seem s to im ply when be o b se rv es in Vom Hegel tha t " the sim ple fac t that

m an m ust live in the m id st of n a tu re , his environm ent, and w orld h is to ry

302d e te rm in e s the way philosophy m ust app roach the even ts of the w orld . "

In any c a se , s ince Ddwith fa ils to specify how one a tta in s to a knowledge

of the " e s s e n tia l content*' of th ings, he iro n ica lly desp ite h is p rev ious

c a re fu l c irc u m sc rip tio n of the p o ss ib il it ie s of obtaining knowledge and

tru th fro m h is to ry ~~ leav es the p o ss ib ility open tha t one m ight ju s t com e

to know the e sse n ce of a th ing, v ia h is to ry , i. e. , v ia a study of its growth

301 Ibid. , p. 238.

'Ldw ith, tra n s la t io n of Vom H egel, p. 214.

150

and developm ent. M oreo v er, g ran ted tha t one has a tta in ed to a knowledge

of the e sse n c e of a thing, by w hatever m eans (in tu itive , e m p iric a l, ra tio n ­

a l, e t c . ), and is thus in a position to view i ts h is to ry "p h ilo so p h ica lly ,"

th is , in i ts e lf , co n stitu tes no gu aran tee th a t one w ill th e re fo re a r r iv e a t

a "proper* ' view.

As ind ica ted , Bowith "ph ilosoph ica lly" su rvey ing the h is to ry of

W este rn philosophy has found it to m an ife st " a re m a rk a b le con tinu ity5"

and Jaco b B u rck h ard t, a d m ire d by Lb with a s one of the few nineteen th

cen tu ry h is to r ia n s who "ap p roached h is to ry ph ilosoph ically and not m ere ly

h is to r ic a l ly ," a lso d isc e rn e d "the constan t and re p e titio u s in a ll change.

But G eorg F r ie d r ic h H egel, ano ther m a jo r advocate of the "ph ilosophical"

30^a p p ro ach to h is to ry , cam e to a som ew hat d iffe ren t conclusion. F o r

H egel, h is to ry did not m an ife s t a b a s ic continuity and rep e titio n ; in s tead

i t c o n s is te d of a p ro g re s s iv e unfolding of an a ll-en co m p ass in g m etap h y sica l

p rin c ip le . T hus the v e ry fac t tha t such th in k e rs a s B urck h ard t and H egel,

w hile c le a r ly sh arin g "ph ilo soph ica l" r a th e r than " h is to r ic a l" app ro ach es

to the phenom enon of h is to ry , could com e to d ia m e tr ic a lly opposite con­

c lu sio n s in d ica te s th a t th is "ph ilo soph ica l" approach is b asica lly as re la tiv e

a s the h is to r ic is t app roach , a t le a s t i t com es no c lo se r to d isco v erin g the

tru th o r in n e r e sse n c e of h is to ry its e lf .

303Ldwith, "D ie D yaam ik, " p. 238.

3^ I n fac t "H egel says th a t the only thought w hich philosophy b rin g s to the con tem plation of h is to ry 'i s the s im p le concept of reason* as the 'so v e re ig n of the w o r ld . '" Q uoted in M eaning, p. 54.

151

One m ight ob ject th a t th is juxtaposition, of B u rck h ard t and Hegel

is unw arranted , since both obviously do not sh a re a com m on "philosophical"

ap p ro ach to history* But. th is ap p aren t c a re le s sn e s s in se lec tin g "p h ilo ­

so p h ica l" ap p ro ach es to h is to ry is p re c ise ly the point. F o r now here does

Lbwlth b o th e r to specify ju s t w hat he m eans by the te rm "p h ilo so p h ica l,"

ou tside of a vague knowledge of " e s s e n tia l con ten t* '5 and su re ly both

B u rck h ard t and H egel could c la im such a knowledge. A ccordingly , we

a re h e re confron ted w ith a s itu a tio n v e ry s im ila r to th a t in the p rev ious

c h a p te rs w here Lowith fa iled to specify the n a tu re of the "being of e te rn ity "

o r to d iffe ren tia te c le a r ly betw een the C h ris tia n and c la s s ic a l e x tra -

tem p o ra l f ra m e s of re fe re n c e . In o th e r w o rd s , Ldwith is s t i l l m o re co n ­

c e rn ed w ith the negative co u n terp o ise to h is to r ic !sm and hence s ti l l

uncounsc iously h is fo r ic is t than w ith a po sitiv e s ta tem en t of a defin ite

n o n -h is to r ic is t point of view.

Yet if the fo rego ing a rg u m en ts have shown th em selv es open to c r i ­

t ic is m , Lowith* s fina l a rg u m en t is re m a rk a b ly c le a r and concise and

a lm o s t im p en e trab le to c r i t ic a l a ttack . If, a s h is to r ic !sm a rg u e s , the

in te lle c tu a l m an ife s ta tio n s of ev ery age a re nothing but m e re tra n s ito ry

e x p re ss io n s of the dom inant sen tim en ts and a sp ira tio n s of tha t age itse lf ,

then h is to r ic is m fa lls v ic tim to its own p rin c ip le .

It cannot e scap e the consequence th a t if, too, is only h is ­to r ic a lly v a lid fo r a c e r ta in h is to r ic a l tim e and situa tion . It is re la tiv e to the m o d ern th inking of m odern m an. The h ia to r ic is t th e s is th a t a ll thought, and not only co n tem p o rary thought, is h is to r ic a lly d e te rm in ed co n trad ic ts i t s own p rin c ip le s of h is to r ic a l

152

re la tiv ity [ i t a l i c s m ine] .

In sh o r t, h is to r ic ls m su b v erts i ts e lf when it c la im s its re la tiv ism as an

abso lu te tru th .

But even acknow ledging th is in h e ren t lo g ica l w eakness of the h is -

to r ic is t position , JLowith s t i l l em p h as ises tha t the only way one can o v e r­

com e it p e rm an en tly , without any chance of i ts rev iv a l, Is , sim ply and

ra d ic a lly , to d ivorce the s e a rc h fo r tru th and knowledge fro m any and a ll

t ie s to the h is to r ic a l p ro c e ss itse lf . Instead , one m ust seek to u n d erstand

m an s u p ra -h is to r ic a lly o r e x tra - te m p o ra lly as e ith e r a sp ec ia l c rea tio n

of a divine tra n sce n d e n ta l fo rce o r a s a com pletely n a tu ra l p roduct of

an im m utab le and a ll-e n co m p ass in g n a tu re ; and i t is to th is la t te r a l te rn a ­

tiv e th a t he now finally com m its h im se lf. A lthough h is d ecision for th is

view has a lre a d y b een fo reshadow ed in h is p re fe re n c e fo r the ancien t

G reek und ers tan d in g of n a tu re , he now exp lains i t as a m a tte r of p h ilo so ­

p h ic a l p r in c ip le . "Since the advent of C h ris tia n ity , ph ilosoph ical thought

cannot avoid d iffe ren tia tin g i ts e lf fro m the fa ith , a s w ell a s evaluating

i ts e lf a cco rd in g to i t s c la im s. But i t a lso cannot a ss im ila te the faith in

re v e la tio n w ithout abandoning its e lf . T h e re fo re , i t m ust o rie n t i ts e lf 011

th e n a tu ra l w orld .

F o r JLowith, m an is "no se lf m ade hom unculus" o r sheet* " h is to r ic a l

JLowith, "D ie D ynam ik, " p . 237.A/

JLdwith, "M ensch liche N atu r und S prache , " pp. 445-446.

153

e x is ten ce , M ra th e r an "o ffsp rin g of n a tu re" ein G eschopf d e r N atur

am i s in ce L ow ith 's n a tu re is th a t of the an c ien t G reeks, m an is a lso an

in te g ra l p a r t of the a ll-en co m p ass in g p h y sis , w hich "co n tro ls the c i r c u ­

la r m ovem ent of the s ta r s . . . a s w ell as the cycle of m an. M o re ­

o v e r in rep ly to the ch arg e th a t th is c la s s ic a l view of m an and n a tu re is

h o p e less ly a n ac h ro n is tic in the ligh t of m o dern m a n 's ex p erien ce , L<5-

w ith ca lm ly o b se rv e s ,

ju s t as th e re is no "m odern" n a tu re but c e r ta in ly a m odern n a tu ra l sc ien ce , so th e re is no m odern hum an n a tu re and th e r e ­fo re no "m o d e rn m an" but c e r ta in ly tim e bound and an tiquated an th ropo log ies. The m odern c la irvoyance fo r the d iv e rs ity of h is ­to r ic a l ex is ten ce and m odes of thinking h as, a s i ts an tipode, a b lin d n ess in the face of the unchanging b asic t r a i t s of the e te rn a lly hum an.

If the m en of today w ere to ta lly d iffe ren t fro m the m en of a few cen tu rie s

o r of a few thousand y e a rs ago, we could not u n d e rs tan d o r p a r tic ip a te in

the acco m p lish m en ts of fo rm e r tim e s not to m ention fo re ign cu ltu re s .

"Y et even if we a ssu m e th a t m an can change, then th is change m u st p e r ­

fo rce be su p e rf ic ia l ra th e r than e s s e n tia l fo r only th a t which end u res can

ex p erien ce change. " When we see an old acquain tance a f te r a p ro longed

se p a ra tio n and find him com plete ly "changed, " we only gain th is im p re s s io n

307Ibtd. , p. 239.

L-dwith, ’’Natur und Hurnanitat d es M en sch en ,11 ed. by K.Z ie g le r in We sen und W lrk lichke it des M enschen, F e s ts c h r if t fu r Helm ut F le s s n e r , (G dttingen: V andenhoeck und Ruprecht* 1957), p. 63.

^°^Ibid. , p. 64. See a lso L ow ith 's "D ie im m e r gleiche N atur des M enschen im W andel s e in e r geseh ieh tlichen Existfenz," ed. by U. von M angoldt in G efahrdung und Bew ahrung des M enschen im U m bruch der Z e it t (M unich: O. W. B arth , 1959), pp. 29-50.

154

’’b ecau se we recognise© in the changed p e rso n the one we knew long ago, ‘*310

F u rth erm o re* given th is e te rn a l n a tu re of m an, "we can then g a ­

th e r e s se n tia l in fo rm atio n fo r the understand ing of o u r own age and of

h is to ry in g e n e ra l fro m a G reek o r Rom an h is to r ia n like Thucydides o r

T a c itu s ;*1 fo r th e se c la s s ic a l h is to r ia n s , ’’lacking a ll h is to r ic a l co n sc io u s­

n e s s of th e ir own h is to r ic a l lim ita tio n s , p o sse sse d a r a r e knowledge of71 1

the enduring e sse n c e of m an and of p o litic a l c irc u m s ta n c e s ,!l In fact,

the c o u rse of h is to ry its e lf , in Lb w ith 's view , is e sse n tia lly as the G reeks

saw it , a v a s t and e te rn a l cy c lica l rep e titio n , “ It is a continuous r e p e t i ­

tion of co stly ach ievem en ts w hich end in o rd in a ry fa ilu re s - - fro m H an­

n ibal to N apoleon and the co n tem p o rary le a d e rs , ” Thus “what has h ap ­

pened has alw ays been the sam e [ i ta l ic s m ine] .

H ow ever, d esp ite th is s tro n g p e rso n a l a ttra c t io n to the c la s s ic a l

un d e rs tan d in g of m an, n a tu re , and h is to ry , Lowith cannot sim ply p o s tu ­

la te i ts c o r re c tn e s s . In o rd e r to v a lid a te the th e s is tha t m an and h is to ry

m u s t be u n d e rs to o d su p ra -h is to r ic a lly , “w ithin the confines of an a l l -

3 *^Lbwith, “M ensch und G e sc h ic h te ,” p. 161.

311 Ibid. , p. 162.

3 *3 L6’w ith, M eaning, p. 190, and “ Die Dynam ik, “ p. 244. Lowith*s c la s s ic a l view of h is to ry is a lso m an ife s t in h is conviction “th a t h is to ry is no t p r im a r i ly c u ltu ra l and in te lle c tu a l h is to ry o r the h is to ry of p ro b lem s and id eas but r a th e r p o litic a l h is to ry . “ In the m odern d iscu ss io n of the p ro b le m of h is to ry , “the ’h is to r ic a l world* [D ilthey] and the 'h is to r ic a l existence* [H eid eg g er] have g radua lly d isp laced the n a tu ra l, i. e . , the c la s s ic a l p re fe re n c e fo r p o litic s . “ “M ensch und G esch ich te, “ pp. 152-153.

195

en com passing c la s s ic a l p h y s is , M 3 he m u st f i r s t c la r ify the re la tio n sh ip

betw een the ap p aren tly f r e e hum an “action” o r Baodlung w hich we cu s to ­

m a rily d is c e rn a s the ch ief c h a ra c te r is t ic of h is to ry and the u a free and

im p e rso n a l ''happen ing” o r G eschehen, w hich we d is c e rn a s the ch ief c h a r ­

a c te r is t ic of n a tu re . G ran ted tha t m an a s the ch ief a c to r of h is to ry 1$ a lso

a p roduct of nature* then h is to ry undoubtedly w ill en ta il a c e r ta in am ount

of unconsc ious happening along w ith conscious action . But, in Ldw ith1®

view , the e s s e n tia l c h a ra c te r of h is to ry i ts e lf is tha t

i t is not p r im a r i ly hum an actio n bu t ra th e r a happening which, although it has a v ita l re la tio n to hum an action does not com ple te ly m e rg e w ith it. H appening and ac tio n a r e not d ivorced but they a r e d iffe ren t. What happens in h is to ry is alw ays m o re and le s s than w hat is d e s ire d and in tended fey the m an who a c ts .An ac tiv e d ec is io n fo r w a r soon tra n s fo rm s i ts e lf in to a w ar* happening w hich hen cefo rth , fey i ts e lf , in s tig a te s e v e r new d e ­c is io n s and action© and thus, a s a happening, exceeds a l l of ou r indiv idual in ten tions and d ec is io n s . We “m ak e” h is to ry and yet we a r e overw helm ed fey it.

Jbfewith a lso goes on to point out th a t th is d ia lec tic betw een acting

f re e ly and being a c ted upon o r the “dynam ic11 of h is to ry , a s he p re fe rs

to c a ll i t , has been reco g n ised throughout the co u rse of W este rn c iv i l is a ­

tion , The an c ien ts r e f e r r e d to i t a s chance o r fa te , Tyche o r A nanke; the

C hris tians, r e f e r to i t a s P rov idences H egel designa ted it a s the "cunning

of reason .;" and M arx re in te rp re te d H egel’s “cunning of reaso n " in te rm s

of the “ c la s s s tru g g le , " But no m a tte r how it is d esigna ted , the v e ry fac t

^ ^ L d w ith , "N atu r und H um anita i de® M enschen, “ p.- 63.

^ ^ L d w ith , "D ie Dynam ik, “ p. 248.

156

th a t h is to ry i ts e lf is the p roduct of such a d ia lec tic arid " the ap p aren t inner

n e c e s s ity w ith w hich i t m w e s and happens m akes i t com parab le to a n a tu r -

a l happening . 15

Ldwith ’s em p h asis on h is to ry a s a n a tu ra l happening and on the

d ia lec tic betw een conscious ac tio n and the unconscious re s u lts of th is

ac tio n is a lso s tro n g ly re m in isc e n t of h is understand ing of the T olstoyan

and G oethean view s of h is to ry , which he had e a r l ie r suggested a s an a l ­

te rn a tiv e to the “h is to r ic i ty of H eidegger and the “h is to r ic ism " of Hegel,

It i s , in fac t, Ldwith*s way of ex p re ss in g the re la tio n sh ip betw een f r e e ­

dom and n e c e ss ity in h is to ry and th u s , in so m e sen se , the p e rfe c t answ er

to h is q u est fo r a point of view which tak es cognisance of m an ’s '‘ontology

ic a l dual n a tu r e .“ It c le a r ly acknow ledges m an’s unique, 1. e. , “h is to r ic a l*1

capac ity fo r ac tio n w ith h is fellow m en, h is M itw elt; yet, a t the sam e tim e ,

i t in te g ra te s th is ap p aren tly “£ree“ ac tiv ity in to the m o re fundam ental and

autonom ous n a tu re , o r U rnwelt, of w hich he is a m e re p a rt.

Ib id . , p, 252. And again Ldwith c ite s G oethe’s ob serv a tio n “ in th is g igan tic e m p ir ic ism [h is to ry ] , one se e s nothing but n a tu re and nothing of what we p h ilo so p h ers would like so m uch to c a ll freed o m . “ Ib id , , p. 253, F o r an in te re s tin g c r itiq u e of Ldw ith1 s understand ing of the d ia le c tic of h is to ry as a m an ife sta tio n of an unconscious H egelian ism consu lt T heodor Littfs “ D er H is to rism u s und se in e W id ersach e r” in Die W iedererw eckung ties gesch ich tlich en B ew u sstse in s (H eidelberg : Q uelle k M eyer, 1956), pp. 19-93. See a lso H e in rich O tt’s o b se rv a tio n s on Ldw ith in “M euere P ub likationen zium P ro b le m von G eschichte und G es- c h ich tlich k e it” T heo log ische R undschau , Vol. XXI (1953), pp. 63-96,

^ ^ S e e above c h a p te rs I and III.

157

But if h is to ry is e sse n tia lly a n a tu ra l happening, i t is a lso , a c ­

cord ing to Lowith* b a s ic a lly im p en e trab le to man* One m ay d isc e rn a

c e r ta in re g u la r ity in the g e n e ra l co u rse of events in te rm s of a cy clica l

o r s p ira l re p e titio n but, in the end,

no m a tte r what the final exp lana to ry p rin c ip le m ay be, the ac tu a l s itu a tio n d e sc rib e d by the h is to r ia n s u ltim a te ly re so lv es i ts e lf to an und isc over ab le happening w hich sim ply "happens” and w hich is beyond a ll in te rp re ta tio n . . . because the dynam ic of the happening i ts e lf is s im ply what i t is .

Thus in sh a rp c o n tra s t to the m odern fa ith in the in c re a s in g m anageab ility

of h is to r ic a l happenings, w hereby " the inexp licab le re m a in d e r of the h a p ­

pening only a p p e a rs as a m ean in g less c irc u m s ta n c e ," JUowith s ta te s th a t

i t is " p re c is e ly th is inexp licab le re m a in d e r" w hich en ta ils the tru e " r id ­

d le of h is to ry , "

Yet why should h is to ry en ta il such a " rid d le " a t a ll if, fo r Dowith,

m an is "an o ffsp ring of nature* " and if th is n a tu re is not the n a tu re of

the m o d ern p h y s ica l s c ie n tis t but ra th e r the a ll-en co m p as sing p fay s is and

cosm os of the an c ie n ts? F o r the an c ien t G reeks n e ith e r m an no r n a tu re

co n stitu ted a p a r t ic u la r riddle* N a tu re , conceived a s a cosm os and gov­

e rn e d by an in h e re n t ra tio n a lity o r logos, w as re a d ily in te llig ib le to m an;

and m an h im se lf , conceived as an in te g ra l p a r t of n a tu re , w as only d is ­

tinguished fro m the o th er an im ate beings by his capac ity fo r thought and

speech (eoon logon eehon) and fo r o rgan ized com m unal ex isten ce (moon

3 1 7 Ldwith» "D ie D y n am ik ," pp. 252-253.

318 Ib id . , pp. 252-253.

158

goUtikon). But th e se c a p a c itie s , w hile they a lso enabled him to dom inate

the o th e r fo rm s of life , did not m ake him o r h is ac tio n s , 1. e. , h is to ry ,

any le s s in te llig ib le than the cosm os itse lf . 3 ‘

H ow ever, fo r Low ith , the c ase is som ew hat d ifferen t. He is ju s t

too f irm ly ro o ted in h is own age to accom plish a genuine su p ra -h is to r le a l

re tu rn to a tru ly c la s s ic a l view of m an, n a tu re , and h is to ry . He m ay

seek to fo re s ta l l t& s to ric is t c r i t ic is m by consc iously disavow ing any in ­

ten tion “of m aking p r is t in e ag a in j\* e p r is tia ie re n j a p a s t stage in the

h is to ry of p h ilo so p h y ." And he m ay be f irm ly convinced '‘th a t the G reeks

m ade a d isco v e ry w hich - - like ev ery genuine d isco v ery - - alw ays r e -

320m ain s tru e even though i t is b u ried and fo rg o tten or d isc red ited . "

N e v e rth e le s s , Lowith*s own understand ing of the re la tio n sh ip betw een m an

and n a tu re is by no m eans a s unequivocal a s i t w as fo r the G reeks. The

G reek s tru ly lived in one w orld governed by an a ll-e n co m p ass in g physis

w hich, as the ground of a ll being, d e te rm in ed not only m an and n a tu re

but even the n a tu re of the gods, the " n a tu ra d e a r am . " - Low ith’s w orld

in c o n tra s t, w hile o s ten s ib ly such a fundam ental unity, is , in effec t, two

w o rld s ; and, h is p ro te s ta tio n s no tw ithstand ing , the C a r te s ia n and V icoan

d is tin c tio n has m ain ta ined i ts e lf in h is thought.

Low ith, p a ra p h ra s in g P o lyb ius, has h im se lf pointed out " i t is the logos of the one n a tu ra l w orld w hich m oves both the s ta r s in the sky and the m an in h is to ry . 11 Ib id . , p. 246.

32 3 Lowith, "W elt and M enschenw eli, " p. 244.

321 Lowith, "Dynam ik, " p. 239.

Fo t exam ple , Lowlth. finds the "middle of hi s to ry ” to re s id e in the

rid d le w hich is m an, nam ely , “th a t n a tu re could c re a te a being capable

of cu ltiva ting .nature i ts e lf and of producing a second w orld w ith in the

f i r s t . In addition , he is convinced th a t th is ’’second” o r h is to r ic a l

w orld , ”the m undus hom in ium , does not m ove w ith the sam e n ece ss ity

as. the n a tu ra l w orld , the m undus r e r u m , w hich lacks, hum an cap rice and

freedom . H is to ric a l rev o lu tio n s do not p ro ceed like cosm ic revo lu tions,

i. e. , in re g u la r cy cles . ” Thus w hile Lowith m ay c la im th a t a h is ­

to r ic a l happening is ” co m p arab le to a n a tu ra l happening, ” i t is c e r ta in ly

not a happening on the sam e p lane o r the sam e lev e l a s the re g u la r p r e ­

d ic tab le happenings in n a tu re . H ow ever fo r the G reek s , genuinely in te ­

g ra te d w ith n a tu re , h is to ry tru ly w as such a p re d ic tab le ’’n a tu ra l happen­

ing. ” Once the n e c e s sa ry data had been co llec ted , Thucydides and Polybius

e x p e rien ced l i t t le if any d ifficu lty in p ro g n o stica tin g the g en e ra l c o u rse of*374,

h is to r ic a l ac tio n ami e sp e c ia lly not of rev o lu tio n s . Fox'* Lowith* on the

32ZIbid, , p. 253.

Lbwith, ’’W elt und M enschenw elt, ” p. 233.

Po lyb ius o b se rv e s , "In m y opinion, the fu tu re is c le a r . . . i t is ev iden t th a t the v io len t influx of p ro sp e r ity w ill p roduce a m o re e x ­tra v a g an t s ta n d a rd of liv ing and an e x ce ss iv e ly keen com petition betw een in d iv id u a ls fo r office and o th e r ob jec ts of am bition . ” Soon ’’the m a sse s becom e so in ten se ly e x a sp e ra te d and so com plete ly guided by p ass io n tha t they rep u d ia te a l l su b o rd ina tion to o r even equality w ith the u p per c la s s e s and iden tify the in te re s ts of the com m unity w ith fheM own. ” When th is po in t i s re a ch e d ’’the com m onw ealth a c q u ire s the f la tte r in g appella tions of L ib e rty and .'Democracy w hile i t is sub jec ted to the appalling re a lity of the ’d e sp o tism of the crow d. *” Quoted in G reek H is to r ic a l Thought, ed. by A. J. Toynbee (New Y ork; M entor B ooks, 1955), p. 110. A lso

160

o th er hand, the happening which is h is to ry is fo redoom ed to im peiie.tra*

b ility , s in ce he is f irm ly convinced th a t 1 ’n a tu re is w hat i t is by its e lf

and w ithout us. It Is a lw ays tru e and c o r re c t w hile h is to ry is sub jec t to

co sm ic w o rld of heaven and e a r th , which is to ta lly se lf-su ffic ie n t and

au tonom ous, in fin ite ly s u rp a s s e s th a t w orld w hich stands and fa lls w ith

m an. The co sm ic w orld and the hum an w orld a re not equal to one an o th er,.

Lbwith even finds th a t although m an owes Ms v e ry ex istence to n a ­

tu re , hb is not re a lly " n a tu ra l*1 in the sam e sen se a s the o ther an im ate

c re a tu re s a re n a tu ra l. In fac t o f 'a ll the o ffsp ring of n a tu re , he is the

m o s t "un n atu ra l. " His un iqueness "ex tends to h is em bryonal developm ent*

it m a n ife s ts i ts e lf in the way he sa tis f ie s h is m o st p rim itiv e n a tu ra l needs*

and It p ro v es i ts e lf in the sp ec ifica lly hum an p o ss ib ility of su icide, Man

a lone , of a ll liv ing c re a tu re s , can cu ltiva te o r p e rv e r t and negate b is own

n a tu re . " H ence "w e a re n a tu re and we a r e h is to ry and th e re fo re we can

u n d e rs tan d the one a s w ell a s the other* but, p r im e rd ia lly , m an, n a tu re ,

and h is to ry a r e not equ itab le , fo r before we cu ltiv a te n a tu re , a c t h is to r i ­

ca lly , and include n a tu re into our w orld , we a r e a lre ad y , by n a tu re , beings

T hucyd ides, The P e loponnesian W ar, tr* by Hex W arner (B altim ore : P e n ­guin B ooks, 1961), pp. 203-212.

^ ^ B b w ith , "W elt und M en sch en w elt," p* 228; a lso "M ensch und G e sc h ic h te ," pp. 152, 163, 177.

barg a in in g and in te rp re ta tio n . >»325 in o th er w ords, the " su p ra -h u m an

325 Bo w ith, "D ie D ynam ik, " p. 238.

161

capab le of h is to ry . In sum then, m an’s in h e ren t "h is to ric a ln e se"

a lw ays tak es p reced en ce over h is p rim ev a l " n a tu ra ln e s s . 11

Thus in: sp ite of Low ith’s genuine d e s ire to re in te g ra te m an into

a c la s s ic a lly u n derstood phygis and co sm o s, the d istingu ish ing fea tu re

of hum an ex is ten ce i ts e lf , a s i t e m erg es in h is w ritin g s , is not re a lly

m an ’s b a s ic unity w ith n a tu re . R a th er i t is h is capacity to sep a ra te him *

se lf fro m n a tu re and to m ake i t su b se rv ien t to a unique and in com parab le

"seco n d w orld" of h is to ry . T his p reced en ce of h is to ry over n a tu re is a l ­

so in d ire c tly re v e a le d in Ldwith* s v e ry r e a l fe a r tha t, through m odern

technology, m an m ay som e day a tta in to a com plete m a s te ry of the phy ­

s ic a l cosm os and th e reb y ra d ic a lly tra n s fo rm both h im se lf and the w orld

in to som eth ing h ith e rto unknown* "Suppose m an would be able to co n tro l

the e n tire n a tu ra l w orld a s lie now co n tro ls h is im m ed ia te env ironm ent

and thus b rin g to p e rfec tio n B acon’s equation of knowledge and pow er,

then no longer would m an be m an and the w orld no longer world*

Such an even tuality would have been inconceivab le fo r a G reek not sim ply

b ecause of h is ig n o ran ce of the ach ievem en ts of m odern sc ience and te c h ­

nology, bu t p r im a r i ly becau se h is b a s ic view of change a s such w as d e ­

te rm in e d by a genuine s u p ra -h is to r ic a l in s ig h t into the fixed and re g u la r

m otions of the n a tu ra l cosm os. As Polybius o b serv ed " ‘The d is in teg ra tio n

and tra n s fo rm a tio n to w hich every th ing in the U niverse is exposed m ay

^ I b i d . , p. £54.

^ ^ L b w ith , "W elt und M en sch en w elt," p. 255j a lso H, G* G ad am er’s o b se rv a tio n s on Ldwith in op. c i t . , p. £67.

re a lly be taken fo r g ran ted a s a se lf-e v id en t c o ro lla ry to the U niform ity

of M ature, »*»329 ^ e< f ^0 e te rn a l re c u rre n c e of a ll th ings. Hence any

se r io u s co n sid e ra tio n of a fo rthcom ing ra d ic a l change in the v e ry being

and e sse n c e of m an and the w orld , a s Dowith h e re seem s to im ply , is

fa r fro m the c la s s ic a l s u p ra -h is to r ic a l view he is s tr iv in g fo r.

Yet the su p rem e exam ple of Dowith’ s unconsciously m odern - - a t

le a s t m o st u n c las s te a l - - view of m an and n a tu re is the fact tha t he can ­

not conceive of m an a s an e s se n tia l ex isten ce o r a n e c e s sa ry being w ithin

the one cosm os of n a tu re but only as an acc id en ta l ex isten ce o r contingent

being. 1/5w ith a rg u e s th a t if one d iscoun ts the theo log ical view of the

o rig in s of m an, “then , acco rd in g to our hum an judgm ent, n a tu re w as not

obliged to b ring m an into being; and when m an is no lo n g er, n a tu re w ill

continue to e x is t w ithout finding th is te rm in a tio n of a l l h is to ry , h is to r ic a lly

330 «»,n o te w o rth y ." No G reek could question the v e ry fac t of m an ’s ex is ten ce

a s Lowitli is question ing i t h e re . F o r th e G reek s , and A ris to tle in

3 yq■Quoted in A. J . Toynbee, op. c it. , p. 109.

O-J A■ X/dwith, "D ie D ynam ik, " p. 254; again a fu r th e r ind ica tion tha t

fo r i/d'with "h is ta r lc a J iie s s " r a th e r than " n a tu ra ln e s s 11 is the tru e e ssen ceof m an. A lso "M enseh und Geschichteb" pp. 152, 178; 11 N atur und H um an!- ta t d e s M enschen,", pp. 7.4-76; "W elt und M enschenw elt,11 pp. 228-255; and " J e n e r E lnaelne; K ie rk e g a a rd ," M erk u r, X (1956), p. 161. F u r th e r con­su lt Dbwith’s rev iew of the w ritin g s of T e ilh a rd de C h ard in in Ph ilo so phi -sche B undschau , X (1962), pp. 187-208, H ere he p ro ceed s to view m an as a sh e e r "n a tu ra l a c c id e n t11 e in n a tu r lic h e r Z ufall and as a co sm ic freak ,"an ab n o rm al c re a tu re " ab so n d e rllch e s Lebew egen. M oreover he a lso b ro ad en s the notion of the contingency of ex is ten ce to include not only m an and life in g e n e ra l but even the m a te r ia l u n iv e rse its e lf . See e sp ec ia lly p, 205,

163

p a rticu la r* a s Eowith has h im se lf pointed out# w hatever is a lre ad y has

i ts re a so n lo r being and one does not question, its sh ee r ex is ten ce a s such.

“The in q u iry into w hat som ething is ( its e ssen ce ) a lso decides if it is (its

ex isten ce). E sse n c e and ex is ten ce a re both m an ife s t to ’the sam e kind

? 3 1of thinking.*'**** ~ Hence* A ris to tle w as ’’not concerned w ith the sh ee r

fae tu a llty of ex is ten ce in g en era l o r w ith the contingency of hum an ex ist*

once in p a r t ic u la r but w ith e sse n tia l ex is ten ce , because w hatness and

% *5 ?fh a tn ess a r e in se p a ra b le and n e ith e r p re c ed e s the .other. ” F o r A r is ­

totle* ’’ex is ten ce a $ such - - tha t th e re is som ething - - w as an unquestion ­

ab le e lem en t w ithin the e s s e n tia l s truc tu re* o rd e r , and beauty of an alw ays

ex istin g cosm os w ithout beginning and end., including the ex isten ce of ra~

333tio n a i an im a ls ca lled m en, ”

Thus Eow ith’s a ttem p t to overcom e the co n tem p o rary his to r i c is t

o rie n ta tio n m u st fee co n sid e red incom plete. In s tead of m an ifesting a v iab le

n e o -c la s s ic a l p o sitio n , Efewith em erg es as a s tran g e m elange of the h is -

334to ric is t* the e x is te n tia lis t , and the c la s s ic a l po in ts of view . His his**

to r ie is m is re v e a le d in h is p e r s is te n t fa ilu re to overcom e the m o d ern

33)'Eowith# '‘H e id eg g er, P ro b lem and B ackground of E x is te n tia l-S ocia l R esearch* XV (1948), p. 359.

Ibid, * p. 359.

333 Ib id . , p, 360,

a lso A. L ev ison1 s com m ents on the h is to r ic is t-e x is te x rtia lis t d im ension of Efewifh’s thought in h is in tro d u c tio n to L ow ith 's N ature* H is ­to r y * and E x is te n tla lism and O ther E ssa y s in the P h ilo so p hy of H is to ry * pp. xv -ad.

164

dichotom y between n a tu re and h is to ry and to re in te g ra te m an into a

c la s s ic a lly understood. p hysis and cosm os. The n e t re s u lt of h is v a rio u s

an a ly se s is always- the p reced en ce of m an’s ' 1 h is to r ic a ln es s 11 o v e r h is

Tln a tu ra ln e s s , “ i. e. * the un iqueness and in co m p arab ility even the ’’rid**

d ie1* of the ‘’second'* w o rld of h is to ry when jux taposed to- the re g u la r ity

and im m u tab ility o f the “f i r s t 11 w orld of n a tu re . His e x is te n tia lism is

c le a r ly m an ife s t in h is conception of m an a s a sh e e r chance existence#

e in n a tu r lic h e r Z ufall in s te a d of an A ris to te lia n e s s e n tia l existence# a

%oon logon echon and goon p o litikon . And yet h is a e o -c la s s ic ism . and open

a n ti-h is to r ic is m **- in sp ite of h is d ifficu lties in ach iev ing a genuine union

betw een m an and n a tu re ~~ is a lso c le a r ly m an ife s t in h is conception of

th e g e n e ra l c o u rse and c h a ra c te r of h is to ry its e lf . It is seen to be an

au tonom ous independent happening ak in to the re g u la r c y c lica l happenings

in n a tu re r a th e r than a re a lm of f re e hum an ac tiv ity su b jec t to p ro g re s s iv e

tech no log ica l dom inance and m anageab ility .

In e ffec t then , Lbwith is a paradox and an innate con trad ic tion ,

and a s such he is a lso , iro n ic a lly , open to the sam e charge of a ttem p ting ■

to re c o n c ile ir re c o n c ila b le s w hich he had e a r l ie r lev e led a t such th in k e rs

a s N ie tz sch e , Spongier# and Toynbee. In fa c t, h is o b se rv a tio n th a t N ie t­

z s c h e 's d o c trin e of e te rn a l re c u r re n c e “b re a k s a su n d e r becau se the w ill

to e te rn a liz e the chance ex is ten ce of the m o dern ego does not fit into the

§35a s s e r t io n of the e te rn a l cycle of the n a tu ra l w orld1* is a s app licab le

33SK. Lowith# M eaning in H isto ry # p. 222,

165

to Xxiwith h im se lf a s to N ie tzsche . But g ran ted tha t th e se in co n sis ten c ie s

r a is e c e r ta in doubts a s to the va lid ity of Lowith*s n e o -c la s s ic is m fro m

a s tr ic t ly ra tio n a l po in t of view , do they th e reb y a lso con stitu te su ffic ien t

grounds fo r re je c tin g h is e n tire s tru g g le ag a in s t M sto ric ism fro m a pu re ly

’’h u m an is t*1 po in t of v iew ? And w ith a su m m ary an a ly s is of th is p a r tic u la r

p ro b lem , we should conclude o u r su rv ey of K arl l^dwith’s thoughts and

o b serv a tio n s on h is to ry .

CHAPTER VI

C onclusion

Thus fas* we have seen th a t L dw ith 's c r i t ic a l view of m odern h is -

to ry , and of the n ineteen th cen tu ry in p a r t ic u la r * is a lm o s t wholly d e te r ­

m ined by h is d e s ire to overcom e the hisfcaricist o rien ta tio n . We have

a lso tra c e d E dw ith 's own in te lle c tu a l developm ent fro m h is phenom enolog ist-

hu m an is t re je c tio n of H eidegger to a D iltheyan h is to r ic !s t re la tiv ism * then

to a negative a n ti-h is to r ic ! sm m an ife s t in h is re so lu te com m itm ent to an

u n sp ec ified ’'being of -e te rn i ty ;" and fina lly to h is u n sa tis fa c to ry a ttem p t to

re e s ta b lis h the v a lid ity of the s u p ra -h is to r ic a l c la s s ic a l view of m an, n a ­

ture* and h is to ry . B ut when jux taposed to the a lte rn a tiv e s of a n a ly tica l

philosophy and e x is te n tia l ontology, the two lead ing n o n -m etap h y sica l op-

336patien ts of h is to r le t sm m our day, L hw ith 's an ti -h is to r ic ! sm , desp ite

i t s w e ak n e sse s , e m e rg e s a s the le a s t e x trem e and m o re hum anist point

of view .

Both a n a ly tic a l philosophy and e x is te n tia l ontology sh a re a com m on

336 M arx ism , w hich in i ts e a r ly days held the p ro sp e c t of a defin ­i te cu lm ina tion w ith in .h isto ry and thus s e rv e d a s a p o s itiv e a lte rn a tiv e to h is to r ic is m , h as long s in ce cap itu la ted to the a l l so v ere ig n h is to r ic a l p ro c e s s . As E. K ah ler has o b serv ed , "C om m unism in i ts p re se n t s ta te , w ithout giving up the p rin c ip le of rev o lu tio n In a p p ro p ria te s itu a tio n s, a p p e a rs in c re a s in g ly convinced by the e x p e rien c e s a f te r i ts v ic to r ie s that a fin a l s ta te of fe lic ity w ill fo re v e r be un a tta in ab le . T his is m an ife s t in the c o u rse of Soviet po licy , s tro n g e r s ti l l in the philosophy of Mao T s e - iu n g ," E . K ah le r , op. e f t . , pp. 173-174.

166

167

d is ta s te fo r h is to r ic ! sm* E x is te n tia l ontology, a s in d ica ted above,

s e e k s to ov erco m e it by d isca rd in g the e n tire p o st*S ocra tic developm ent

of m e tap h y sic s , and by ab so lu tiz in g i ts notion of the fundam ental tem p o r -

a lity of hum an ex is ten ce in to ah a l l p e rv a s iv e and to ta l '’h is to r ic ity ” of

a lltth in g s , M o reo v er, s ince Sein und Z e jt, H eidegger has developed h is .

conception of h is to r ic ity to include not only m an and the w orld but a lso

B eing its e lf . W ern er M arx d e sc r ib e s H eidegger’s c u r re n t understand ing

of the re la tio n sh ip betw een m an and B eing a s follow s: "As H eidegger now

fo rm u la te s it , ’B eing com m ands and d ire c ts the th in k e r, * o r 'B eing c la im s

the th inking of the th in k e r so th a t i t th e re b y m ay unconceal i ts e lf in i ts

338tru th , In o th e r w ords H eidegger has developed an e n tire ly new

u n d ers tan d in g of the "e s se n c e " o r We sen of Being and of m an. T rad ition*

a lly e sse n c e , w hether in its s ch o la s tic s ign ificance of "defin ition" o r as

the P la to n ic " id e a ” o r A ris to te lia n " e id o s ," is only the s ta tic "w hat" of

a p a r t ic u la r phenomenon* But H e id eg g e r 's new notion of W egen co m p rise s

not only the unchanging "w hat" of a p a r t ic u la r phenom enon but a lso i ts

m utab le and v a r ia b le " th a t ," tra d itio n a lly ca lled i ts existence* Hence

H e id eg g e r 's We sen is p a r tic u la r ly su ited fo r the a r tic u la tio n of a dynam ic

B eing w hich "u n co n cea ls" its e lf , "B eing w est in and th rough the 'p a r t i c u ­

l a r b e in g s , ' and th e reb y i f co n stitu tes th e ir 'w hat' and 'that' a t the sam e

In troduction and C h ap ter I.

^ ^ W e r n e r M arx , "H e id e g g e r 's New Conception of P h ilo so p h y ," Socia l R e s e a rc h , XXII (1953), p. 487.

168

time* The E ssen c e of Being is thus a r t ic u la te d a s an even t o r o c c u r­

re n c e , “ 33^

F u rth e rm o re ,, fo r H eidegger, We sen has the c h a ra c te r of an

app©al» o r a c la im on m an. “A m an who reco g n ise s h is E ssen c e of Da*

a ©in re a l iz e s th a t he is by n a tu re exposed to the ’w ays th a t B eing w e s t, *

an.4 i s th e re fo re ’re sp o n s ib le ’ *** m u st respond to th is c la im .” He m ust

“l is te n to the ’w ays th a t B eing w e st’” and ’’b ring to conception what Being

bestow s on m an a s fate* " The th in k e r is not conceived as ‘'one who a r b i -

t r a r i l y o r because of h is sub jec tive v iew s can b ring about changes of

W esen, E s se n c e s , “ but only a s on© who “ speaks out w hat is fated . “ Thus

“i t is w rong to say th a t H eidegger is a h is to r ic ie t o r re la tiv is t . R a th er

i t should be recognisse-d th a t the p ro b lem w hether the E ssen c e of Being

is im m u tab le o r m utab le is h e re developed beyond the d im ensions of the

340c u r re n t c o n tro v e rsy , “ *

A naly tical philosophy is not quite a s ra d ic a l in its d e p a rtu re fro m

th e e n tire m e tap h y sica l tra d itio n , but it too defin ite ly d iscoun ts the ro le

of m e tap h y sic s p re fe r r in g to ph ilosoph ize on the b asis of the p a tte rn e s ­

tab lish ed by the n a tu ra l 'sc ien ces . M ost a n a ly tica l p h ilo so p h ers ag re e-24I

th a t “philosophy is nothing but the log ic of sc ien ce , “ and th e ir u ltim a te

33^lb id . , p. 472.

34QIbid, , pp. 472-473.

341 The A m of A n a ly sis , 20 th C entury P h ilo so p h er a , ed. by M o r­ton W hite (New Y ork: M enton B ooks, 1957), p. 205.

169

goal* th rough the m ethod of e m p ir ic a l and lin g u is tic an a ly s is , is to r e ­

duce the w orld to a point w here the p ro b lem s th a t rem a in a f te r an a ly s is

342" a re b e t te r handled by s c ie n tis ts * "

Applying th e ir m ethod to the re a lm of history* they find tha t it

soon re v e a ls i ts e lf to be an em pty and m ean in g less endeavor.. A s one of

th e ir leading spokesm en* K a rl R. Popper* puts it, m ost people u se the

te r m "w orld h is to ry " a s designating "a m o re Or le s s defin ite s e r ie s of

facts* And th e se fa c ts co n stitu te , they be lieve , the h is to ry of m an k in d ."

But obviously the re a lm of fac ts is in fin ite ly r ic h and th e re m u st be s e -

lec tion . "W hat people have in m ind w hen they speak of the h is to ry of

m ankind is r a th e r the h is to ry of the Egyptian* B abylonian, P ersian*

M acedonian; and R om an em pires* and so on, down to our own day. " In

o th e r w o rd s , " th ey speak about the h is to ry of m ankind but what they have

le a rn e d about in school is the h is to ry of p o litica l pow er. " Yet given the

c o r re c tn e s s of th e se a s s e r t io n s , is th e re then re a lly no such thing as a

u n iv e rs a l h is to ry in the sen se of a co n cre te h is to ry o£ m ankind? P opper

fla tly s ta te s , " th e re can be none. " The te r m "h is to ry of m ankind" e m ­

ployed p ro p e rly "w ould have to be the h is to ry of a l l m en. It would have

to be th e h is to ry of a ll hum an hopes* s tru g g le s , and su ffering . F o r th e re

i s no one m an m o re im p o rtan t than any o th e r. C lea rly th is co n cre te h is ­

to ry cannot be w ritten . We m u st m ake a b s tra c tio n s , we m u st n eg lec t,

s e l e c t ." H ence on the b a s is of th is s tr ic t ly e m p ir ic a l an a ly s is and

34?^ W . K aufm ann, pp. c i t . , p. 50.

nolin g u is tic a lly rig id understand ing of the te rm . P o pper concludes 1,1 hie -

t o r y * in the sen se in which, m o st people speak of i t s im ply does not ex ist

and th is is a t le a s t one re a so n why I say th a t i t has no m eaning. 1,543

Thus both an a ly tica l philosophy and e x is ten tia l ontology succeed to som e

ex ten t in o vercom ing h is to r ic is m , bu t the p r ic e they pay fo r th e ir tr iu m p h

is a r a th e r high one.

A naly tica l philosophy s tr iv e s fo r sc ien tif ic p rec is io n . But m ere

p re c is io n , a s P o p p e r 's a rg u m en t in d ic a te s , cannot fu rn ish the n o rm s for

In q u ir ie s concern ing h is to ry n o r, fo r th a t m a tte r , those concern ing such

a r e a s a s a r t , e th ic s , and re lig io n . As a result'., the an a ly tica l p h ilo so p h ers

freq u en tly fo rsa k e th e se a r e a s and deal in s tead w ith p ro b ab ility , o r they

an a ly se the a rg u m en ts of o th e rs , o r , in c re a s in g ly , they f ry to se ttle such

d ifficu lt and, f ro m th e ir po in t of view , r,m urkyM questions by re c o u rse to

o rd in a ry language. T h e re fo re , in the end, w hile they pay lip se rv ic e to

Hlthe e m p ir ic is t c r i te r io n of m eaning , »<» 44 they ac tu a lly tend to ig n o re

e m p ir ic a l ex p erien ce a lto g e th e r . They lim it th e m se lv e s to an an a ly s is

of the re la tio n s betw een co n cep ts , w ords, o r p ro p o sitio n s w ithout re g a rd

to the non acad em ic e x p e rien c e s and p ro b lem s fro m which th ese pu re

lin g u is tic s tru c tu re s d e riv e th e ir r e a l m eaning and sign ificance .

E x is te n tia l ontology, on the o th er hand, and e sp e c ia lly the thought

343K arl R. P o p p e r, The Open Society and Its E n em ies (P rin ce to n : P r in c e to n U n iv e rs ity P r e s s , 1950), pp. 453-454.

344Q uoted in W hite, lo c . ©it.

171

of the la te r H eidegger Is alw ays in dan g er of degenera ting in to a sh ee r

p o e tic a l se rm o n iz in g , suggestive and s tim u la ting but e sse n tia lly a r b i ­

t r a r y . At p re se n t. H eidegger openly sp u rn s the tra d itio n a l su b jec t-o b jec t

m ode of th inking a s m e re ly " re p re se n ta tio n a l" y o r s. te l lend. In i ts p lace ,

he u rg e s the developm ent of a new kind of thinking w hich seek s to " r e s u r ­

r e c t and re c a l l , " andenkendes p en k en . He seem s to dem and th a t the

p h ilo so p h er m u s t " fe e l h im se lf again as in te rm e d ia ry in s tru m e n t and

voice and th a t the ’s ty le o r c h a ra c te r of ph ilosophiz ing1 ag a in becom e

s im p le , im m ed ia te , and po e tic , like the singing and thinking of the

F h ilom ytho l and the p ro -S o c ra tio s . " The ra tio n a l exp lanation of the

m eaning of p a r t ic u la r beings m u st give way to the "e lu c id a tio n , a r t ic u ­

la tio n , and poe tic com position of a new ’E ssen c e of Being, ’ and th e reb y

of a new ’E ssen c e of m an. *«345 since H e idegger’s new re s u r re c t in g

and re m e m b e rin g kind of thinking obeys no d isce rn ab le " in n e r law” o r

" lo g o s’* a c c e ss ib le to the tra in e d th in k e r, w hat gi*arantee do we have th a t

h is p a r t ic u la r v is io n and app roach to Being is alone the tru e and p ro p e r

one? Thus although H eidegger avoids the p itfa lls of lim itin g experience

to the e m p ir ic a lly v e rif ia b le , in the la s t a n a ly s is , h is "poetic" and "c o m ­

posing" A ndenken is ju s t as a r b i t r a r y and c irc u m sc rib in g as the an a ly ses

of th e an aly tic p h ilo so p h ers . In fac t in h is o b se ss iv e co n cern fo r the

" E sse n c e of B eing, " H eidegger often sy s te m a tic a lly ig n o re s the in te lle c ­

tu a l developm ent, i. e. , the h is to r ic a l d im ension of the th in k e rs w ith whom

345M arx, egg* cij* , p. 453.

172

346he deals* As one no ted p h ilo log ist has observed* the tex ts he in te r ­

p re ts a r e u sed m e re ly a s m a te r ia l fo r an on to logical nido ln th a t '■ ’he

m olds out of lin e s p icked a rb i t r a r i ly fro m h e re and th e re .

In e ffec t then , Kowith’ s a n ti-h is to r ic ls m , w hile open to c ritic ism *

is n o n e th e less the le a s t a r b i t r a r y of e ith e r of the a fo rem en tioned a l t e r ­

n a tiv e s . H is r e a s s e r t io n of the e s s e n tia l v a lid ity of a c la s s ic a lly u n d e r­

stood co sm os p re s e rv e s m an fro m the sub jec tive e x ce sse s of e x is ten tia l

ontologizing a s w ell a s fro m the n a rro w p re c is ia n is m of an a ly tica l p h ilo s ­

ophy. M o reo v er, he does not d is c a rd the id ea l of h is to r ic a l ob jectiv ity

nor* of c o u rse , the v e ry endeavor of h is to ry itse lf . H is Mc !a s s ic ism ,!

has p re c ed e n ts going back to the R en a issan ce and the eigh teen th cen tury ;

and, a s a ll of h is w ritin g s in d ica te , h is v e ry reco g n itio n and under s tan d ­

ing of the d an g ers in h e re n t in the h is to r ic is t o rien ta tio n depend to a la rg e

ex ten t upon h is ex ce llen t h is to r ic a l a n a ly se s of the b a s ic so u rc e s of tha t

0 A ta The a n a ly tic a l p h ilo so p h e rs a lso sh a re th is d is re g a rd fo r the

h is to r ic a l developm ent of a m an ’s thought. A s W. Kaufxnann has observ ed , fo r the an a ly tica l p h ilo so p h e rs , Ha p ro p o sitio n is a p ro p o sitio n , w hether w ritte n by a s tuden t, a p ro fe s s o r , o r a P la to ; the lav/s of log ic a re no r e s p e c te r s of p e rso n s . A t th is point, .how ever, a l l m odesty is suddenly abandoned, and ev ery s tuden t can te ll you w hat is w rong w ith K ant w ith ­out tro u b lin g to re a d m o re than a few pag es . ” In fac t, 11 any su sta in ed e ffo r t to d e te rm in e what a g re a t ph ilo sopher ac tu a lly believed is ap t to be d ism is se d a s ‘to m b sto n e -p o lish in g ’ to u se one of the fav o rite p h ra se s o f P ro fe s s o r G ilb e rt R yle of O x fo rd ." W. K aufm ann, og. c i t . » pp. 24, 34.

^ ^ W a lte r M uschg, " Z e rsch w atz te D ichtung '1 in Die Z e r s to n in g d e r d eu tschen L lte ra fu r (B ern : F ran c k e V erlag , 1936), p. 98. F u r th e r consu lt K. JLowith, H e id eg g e r, D enker in d u rf t ig e r Z e it. (2nd ed. G ott­ingen; V andenhoeck and K uprech t, I960), pp. $2-83.

173

o rie n ta tio n itself* fn fac t, in th is a ttem p t to overcom e h is to r ic !sm w ith ­

out h o w e v e fo r s a k in g h is to ry p e r se, Lowith’s a n ti-h is to r ic !s m prov ides

an in te re s tin g c o n tra s t to the 'l im i te d re la tiv ism " p rev a len t am ong many

con tem porary , s c h o la rs , who a re a lso unhappy w ith the ra d ic a l so lu tions

o ffered by P o pper and H eidegger, but unw illing to a ssu m e the e x tra -

te m p o ra l s tan ce recom m ended by Lowith.

T h ese " lim ite d re la t iv is ts " a ccep t the b a s ic h is to r ie is t contention

th a t re a lity is an a ll so v ere ig n p ro c e ss of change and developm ent and

th a t a ll id e as and va lu es a r e va lid only fo r the epochs, the c iv ilisa tio n s ,

and, in e x tre m e c a s e s , only fo r the nations o r p ro v in ces which produced

them . But, a t the sam e tim e , they a lso deny the c o ro lla ry to th is con­

ten tion , nam ely , th a t h is to r ic is m a s a thoroughgoing re la tiv is m m ust

in ev itab ly lead to nihilism * In o rd e r to avoid the n ih ilis tic consequences

of h is to r ic is m , th e se th in k e rs p o s tu la te the ex is ten ce of c e r ta in im m anent

fo rc e s o r fa c to rs w hich, they a rg u e , " lim it" o r m odify the h is to r ic a l p r o ­

c e s s a s such. R aym ond A ron is one of the chief advocates of w hat m ight

foe te rm e d "m ethodo log ical" lim ita tio n .

"In th e f i r s t p lace the d eg ree of re la tiv ity Is lim ited by the u tm o s t r ig o u r in e s ta b lish in g fac ts and by th a t im p a rtia lity which the sc h o la r can and m u st have a s long a s he is m e re ly un rav e llin g tex ts and a s s e s s in g ev idence. N ext, i t is lim ited by the p a r tia l re la tio n sh ip s w hich, s ta r tin g f ro m c e r ta in data , can be d isce rn ed in re a lity its e lf , A c e r ta in d eg ree of u n ce rta in ty (but no t of e s s e n ­t ia l re la tiv ism ) is adduced by the c au sa l re la tio n betw een an event and i ts an teced en ts and by ca lcu la ting in acco rd an ce w ith p ro b ab ility the p a r t p layed by each of the an teced en ts .

Quoted in Meyerhoff, op. cit. , p. 160,

174

A lfred S te m ’s re c e n t 'book, Philosophy of H isto ry and the P ro b lem of

V a lu es , con tains an em otional explanation and a ffirm atio n of the ” civil**

i&atioaal'* lim itation*

I do not b e liev e , how ever, th a t in o rd e r to escape n ih ilism we need abso lu te v a lu es . We a re c itiz en s of o u r m o d ern c iv iliz a ­tion* a c iv iliza tio n with h u m an ita rian id ea ls . Ideals a r e d irec tiv e v a lu es . We believe in th e se va lues and in th ese Ideals of our epoch and of o u r c iv iliza tio n , we fee l them v ib ra tin g in our h e a r ts , we a ff irm th e ir v a lid ity in o u r judgm ents. T his is not n ih ilism ! N i­h ilism is the la ck of b e lie f in v a lu e s . . S ince w© live in the p re se n t epoch and not in e te rn ity , we m ay be sa tis f ied with v a lues v a lid fo r the p re s e n t epoch. A t r a n s -h is to r ic a l e te rn a l va lid ity would not co n trib u te anything to our b e lie f in v a lues w hich developed with us and w hich we c o n s id e r th e re fo re , a s o u rs .

And E d w ard H. C a r r in h is book What ig H is to ry o ffe rs a v e ry cautious

fo rm u la tio n of a lim ita tio n w hich has i ts ro o ts in the e igh teen th cen tu ry

id ea of p ro g re s s .

T he ab so lu te in h is to ry is no t som ething in the p a st fro m which we s ta r t ; i t is not som ething in the p re se n t, since a ll p r e ­sen t th inking 1$ n e c e s sa r ily re la tiv e . It is som ething s t i l l in co m ­p le te and in p ro c e s s of becom ing som ething in the fu tu re to ­w ard s which we m ove, w hich begins to take shape only a s we m ove tow ards i t , .and in the ligh t of w hich, a s we m ove fo rw ard , we g ra d ­ua lly shape our in te rp re ta tio n of the p ast, . . . O ur c r i te r io n is not an ab so lu te in the s ta tic sen se of som eth ing th a t is the sam e y e s te rd a y , today , and fo re v e r ; such an abso lu te is incom patib le w ith the n a tu re of h is to ry . But i t is an abso lu te in re s p e c t of our in te rp re ta tio n of the p ast. It r e je c ts the re la t iv is t view th a t one in te rp re ta tio n is a s good as an o th er o r th a t ev e ry in te rp re ta tio n is tru e in Its own tim e and p lace and it p ro v id es the touchstone by which our In te rp re ta tio n of the p a s t w ill u ltim a te ly be judged. It is th is sen se of d irection , in h is to ry w hich alone enab les us to o rd e r and in te rp re t the ev en ts of the p a s t. . . . But the p ro c e s s its e lf re m a in s p ro g re s s iv e and dynam ic. O ur sen se of d ire c tio n and ou r

S te rn , P h ilosophy of H is to ry and the P ro b le m of V alues (Thew i n M » i t ■>!< in ■unipiaiMimmi ft'a mnn»>nm

Hague: Mouton and Co*, 1962), p. 186,

175

in te rp re ta tio n of the p a s t a r e su b jec t to constan t m odifica tion andevolution a s we p ro ceed , ®

But th e se e a rn e s t a ttem p ts to im pede o r invalida te the re le n tle s s

rel& tivi& atioa of a ll n o rm a and s tan d a rd s by M eto rie isrn do not con stitu te

a r e a l s tep to w a rd _i ts overcom ing, At b e s t they a re bound to re m a in

m e re in te lle c tu a l way stations* F o r th e ir b a s ic accep tance of the h ls to r l -

c is t c la im th a t re a li ty is e sse n tia lly a constan t p ro c e ss of change and d e­

velopm ent and th a t tru th and value a r e 'daughters of tim e and h is to ry , r a ­

th e r than o ffsp rin g s of a t r&ns\r h is to r ic a l e te rn ity , v ir tu a lly p rec lu d es the

su c c e ss of any subsequen t a tte m p ts to 111 l im it” the p ro c e s s when it p ro v es

to be m o re than one b a rg a in ed for* T hus it Is Lowith* s sp ec ia l accom plish

m eat to have recognised, th a t a ra d ic a l o r fully developed h is io r ie is m can

only be o v e rco m e by an equally ra d ic a l o r fu lly developed e x tra - te m p o ra l

o r g u p ra -h is to r ic a l view of h is to ry in lieu , of c o u rse , of a com plete

d isavow al of tra d itio n a l h is to ry its e lf .

But is Jbowith*® a n f i-h is to r ic is m a tru ly v iab le position in the ligh t

of the v a rio u s lo g ica l in c o n s is te n c ie s w hich have b een d isce rn e d in h is

thought? In th is context i t is im p o rtan t to keep in m ind th a t JLowith’s s tru g

gie ag a in s t h ia to irlc ism is ac tu a lly tw ofold in c h a ra c te r . On the one hand,

i t is b ased upon a s e r ie s of p u re ly ra tio n a l coun ter th ru s ts to the h is to r ic

c is t c la im s and con ten tions; and on the o th e r, it r e s t s upon his genuine

H. C a r r , W hat is H is to ry ? (New Y ork; A lfred A. Xinopf, 1 9 6 2 ), pp. 160-161, A s im ila r conviction can be found in G. G. Ig g e rs , op. c ii. , pp. 16-17.

176

Mhum an ist" co n cern to p re s e rv e m an fro m the consequences of h is to r i-

c ism ’s inev itab le d e s tru c tio n of a ll tra d itio n a l n o rm s and s tan d a rd s .

T h e re fo re the re a l question is which of th e se two a sp ec ts of h is thought

is the m o re b a s ic ? In o u r an a ly s is of Ebw ith’s in te lle c tu a l developm ent

fro m h is an ti-H e id eg g e ria n Individual in H is Role a s F e llo w - Man in 1927

to h is C o llected E ssa y s in I960, we have seen th a t the underly ing m otif

of a l l of h is s tud ies has been the se a rc h fo r a point of view which would

en co m p ass m an, n a tu re , and h is to ry in one o rgan ic and harm onious whole,

i. e, , a point of view w hich would be com patib le w ith h is understand ing of

m an a s an "on to log ical dual n a tu re ," a being e sse n tia lly re la te d to his

fellow m en, his M itw elt, as w ell as n a tu re , h is tJm w elt. H is s e a rc h fo r

such a poin t of view lias a lw ays taken p reced en ce over any o th er c o n s id e r­

a tion ; and , in e ffec t, i t p rov ided the b a s ic im petus fo r his even tual com ­

m itm en t to the c la s s ic a l notion of an e te rn a l and s u p ra -h is to r ic a l physis

a s the u ltim a te ground of a ll being. Thus i t is re a lly E bw lth 's fundam ental

in te re s t and co n ce rn fo r m an; i t is re a lly his "hum an ism " r a th e r than any

p u re ly ra tio n a l and th e re fo re som ew hat dubious " n e o -c la s s ic is m " which

m akes h is a n ti-h ie to r ic is m a m eaningful and im p o rtan t a lte rn a tiv e to the

e x tre m e s which c u rre n tly confron t h is to ry .

In fac t the v e ry ap p ea ran ce of such suggestions as those advanced

by P o p p er and H eidegger in d ica tes th a t we a re tru ly on a th re sh o ld . His*

to r ic is m a s a thoroughgoing re la tiv is m has becom e a v ir tu a l im p asse

171%at

fo r co n tem p o rary h is to r ic a l sch o la rsh ip . It can no longer be d is ­

m is se d o r avoided, as som e h is to r ia n s have tr ie d , w ith the glib o b se rv a ­

tio n th a t the h is to r ic a l m ode of thought is s t i l l only " in its infancy” o r

p e rh ap s undergoing a ” c r is is of puberty . ” N or can it be a rg u ed away by

an o v e rly o p tim is tic fa ith in a fo rthcom ing technolog ica l capac ity to m an-

350age the c o u rse of hum an a ffa irs . It is r a th e r tha t if h is to ry as such

is to continue to function as a m eaningful so u rce for ph ilosoph ical sp ecu ­

la tio n and as a genuine guidepoet fo r long range so c ia l and p o litica l action ,

i t w ill have to un d ertak e a m a jo r reex am in a tio n of the v e ry foundations of

i ts p re s e n t position , L ow ith 's a n ti-h is to r ic is m , u n derstood as a sp e c if i­

ca lly ” h u m an is t” re sp o n se to the challenge of a fully developed h is to r ic is m

a s w ell a s its ra d ic a lly a h is to r ic a l an tipodes, an a ly tica l philosophy- and

e x is te n tia l ontology, d e se rv e s g re a te r a tten tio n than i t has thus fa r

rece iv ed .

|C1'J31See H. G. G adam er, "D ie G renzen d e r h is to id sch en V ernunft”

*n del P r im e r C ongreso N aclonal de F U oso fla , M endoza A rgen tina{G u errero : S e c re ta r io de A e tas del C ongreso , 1949), II, pp. 1025-26;H. H eim pel fib e r G esch ich te und Q esch ich tsw lssen sch a ft in u n s e re r Z e lt (V o rira g s re ih e d e r N ieder-sachsischen B an d esreg ieru n g zu r F o r derung d e r w issen sch a ftlich en F o rsch u n g in N ied ersach sen , ” Gottingen: V anden- hoeck und K uprech t, 1959), pp. 11*25; A. H euss, Y e rlu s t d e r G eschichte (G ottingen; V andenhoeck und E u p rech t, 1959), pp« 44*61; L. L andgrebe, P h iloaoph ie d e r G egenw art (Bonn: A thenaum V erlag , 1952), pp. 99-116; K» Z im m erm an , ” f ib e r e in ige P ro b le m s d e r G egenw artigen G esch ich ts- ph ilo soph ie , ” S aecu lum , XIV (1963), p. 17.

352 M eyerhoff, op. c it. , p. 25; O. F . A ad erle , ” T h e o re tisch e G e sc h ic h te ,” H is to r isc h e Z e its c h r if t , CLXXXV (1953), 3Off, and K. Z im ­m e r m ann, op. c i t , , pp. 23-24.

178

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H Jacob B u rc k h a rd t, d e r M ensch in m itten d e r G esch ich te . L uzern :V ita Nova, 1936,

" Vom H egel zu N ie tz sc h e . F i r s t E dition. Z-urich: E uropa, 1941

11 M eaning in H is to ry , The T heo log ica l Im plica tions of the Philosophyof H is to ry . Chicago: U n iv ers ity of C hicago P r e s s , 1949.

n E d ito r. N ie tz sc h e , Z e itg e m a sse s und U n ze itg em asse s . F ra n k fu r t/M ain: F is c h e r B u ch ere i, 1956.

M W issen , G lauben und Sleeps!s. G ottingen: Vandenhoek und Hup-*re c h t, 1956.

11 E d ito r . F r ie d r ic h N ie tz sc h e , V o rsp ie l e in e r P h ilosoph ic d e r Z u-k u n f t , aus dem N ach la ss , B r ie fe . F ran k fu rt/M a in : F is c h e r B u ch e re i, 1959,

M H eidegger, D enker in dU rftiger Z eit. Second Edition. G ottingen:V andenhoeck and R upreehf, I960.

H G esam m elte Abkandlung z u r K ritik d e r g esch ich tlich en E x is te n z ,S tu ttg art: K o h lh am m er, I960.

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Lowith, K arl. E d ito r. Die H egelache Linke: Texte aus den W e rk en von H* H eine , A. Bnge, M. H e ss , M. S tirn e r , B. B au er, L. F e u e r ­b ach , K. M arx , $. K ie rk e g aa rd . S tu ttg a r t/B ad Canst&tt: P . F ro - m m ann {G unter Holzboog), 1962.

" N atu re H is to ry and Exta t ent ia l is m , and O ther E ssay s in the P h i­losophy of H is to ry . E dited by A. Eevison. "N o rth w este rn U ni­v e rs ity S tudies in Phenom enology and E x is ten tia l P h ilo sophy ," E vanston: N o rth w este rn U niversity P r e s s , 1966.

H V o rtrag e und A bhandlungen z u r K ritlk d e r C h ris tlic h en U b e rlie - ferung. S tu ttg art: K oh lham m er, 1966.

E ssa y s

Lidwith, K arl. "N ie tzsch e im L ichte d e r Ph ilosoph le von Ludwig K la g e s ,!! E d ited by E . K othacker in R e ich l!s P h ilo so p h isch er A lm anack. R em agen /R hein : R eich l, 1927.

" "2.ur P ro b lem atik d e r H um an!tat in d e r P h ilosoph ic nach Hegel. “E dited by E. Jurkafc in R eine and angew andte Sozio log ie , eine P es tg ab e fu r F e rd in an d Tonnis zu se in em 80. G eb u rts tag e .Leipzig: H ans B uske, 1936,

11 " D e sc a r te s v e rn u n ftig e r Z w eifel und K ie rk eg aa rd s L eidenschaftd e r V erzw eiflung, " E d ited by R. B ayer in T rav au x du ECe Con- g re s in te rn a tio n a l du ph ilo so p h ie , C ongres D e sc a r te s . P a r is : H erm ann e t C ie. , 1937.

" "T h eo lo g ica l Im p lica tions of the Philosophy of H is to ry . " In A e tasdel P r im e r C ongreso N acional de F ilo so f ia , M endoza A rg en tin a ,Vol. III. G u e rre ro : S e c re ta r io de A ctas del C ongreso , 1949.

" "P h ilosophy of H is to ry . " In P ro ceed in g s of the Tenth In te rn a tio n a lC o n g ress of P h ilo sophy . A m sterd am : N orth Holland C o ., 1949.

" "B ackground and P ro b le m of E x is te n tia lism . " In A ctas del P r im e rC ongreso N acional de F ilo so fia , M endoza A rgen tina , Vol. _L G u e rre ro : S e c re ta r io de A ctas del C ongreso , 1949.

" " W eltgesch ich te und H eilsgeschehen . " In A nteile M. H eideggerzum 60. G eb u rfs tag . F ran k fu rt/M a in : V itto rio K losterm ann , 1950.

180

Lowith, Karl* ” N atu riick e T heologie, c h r is t l ic h e r G laube, philosophi s che S kepsis. ” E d ited by C. J. B leek e r, G. vV. J . D rew es, and K. H.H. Hidding in P ro ceed in g s of the Seventh in te rn a tio n a l C ongress fo r the H is to ry of R elig io n s . A m sterdam : N orth H olland Co*, 1951.

H ’’Die D ynam ik d e r G esch ich te and d e r H is to r is m u s .” In E ranos Jahrbuc.h, Vol. XgtX. Z u rich : R ein v erlag , 1952.

,f ’’C h ris ten tu m und G e sc h ic h te .” In E ighth In te rn a tio n a l C ongress fo r the H is to ry of R e lig io n s , R om e, 1955, F ire n z e : G. C. San- soni, 1956.

M ’’F r ie d r ic h N ie tzsch e , 1844-1900 .” E d ited by H, H eim pel, J . H euss, and B. R eifen b erg in Die g ro s se a D eu tschen , deufsche B io g rap h ic , Vol. III. B erlin : P ro p y laen , 1956.

” ’’H is to ry and C h ris tian ity . ” E d ited by C. W« K egley and R. W ,B ret'a ll in The l i b r a r y of L iving Theology j R einhold N iebuhr, His R e lig io u s , Social, and P o li tic a l Thought, Vol. IL New York: M acM illan, 1956.

11 ’’N atu r und H um anita t des M enschen. ” E d ited by K. Z ieg le r inW esen und W lrk lichkeit des M enschen, F e s ts c h r if t fo r H. F le s s n e r . Gottingen: Vandenhoek and R u prech t, 1957.

” "E ine E rin n eru n g an H u sse rl. ” E d ited by H, C. Van B red a inF haenom enolog ica C o llection F ub liee sous le P a tro n ag e des C ent­re s d ’A rch ives * H u sse rl, Edm und H u ss e r l , 1859*1959, V ol. IV.The H ague: M artinus N ijhoff, 1959.

” ” Knowledge and F a ith , F ro m the P re -S o c ra t ic s to H eidegger. ”E d ited by W. L e ib rech t in R elig ion and C u ltu re , E ssay s in Honor of P au l T illic h . New Y ork: H a rp e r and B ro th e rs , 1959.

” ’’Die im m e r g le iche N atu r des M enschen im W andel s e in e r g esch ieh t- lich en E x is ten z . ” E d ited by U. von M angoldt in G efahrdung und B e - w&hrung des M enschen im U m bruch d e r Z e it. M unich: O. W. B arth ,M W M M iW lM M M N nM M W p il—IWIW W** im l’ '■ »■—HP* WPHWP il«» «W«Win H W W M IM W — * I *i <1 ll—lH W II lll>l

” ” D er A theism us a ls p h ilo so p h isch es P ro b lem . ” In P ro ceed in g sof the N inth In te rn a tio n a l C o ngress fo r the H is to ry of R elig io n s ,Tokyo and K yoto, 1958. Tokyo: M aruzen , 1969.

131

Ldwith, K arl. "U nzulangliche B em erkungen su ra U n te rsch ied vonO rien t'u n d O kzident*" E d ited by D. H enrich , W. Schulz, and K« H. Volkm&nn-Sehluck in Die G egenw art d e r G rieehen im n eu eren Denken, F e s ts c h r if t fu r H a as- G eorg G ad am er.Tubingen: I . 0 . B« M ohr (P. S iebeck), i 9 6 0 ,

" “Die S p raehe a le V e rm itt le r von M ensch und W elt. " E dited byH elm ut Hdfling ia B e itrag e zu P h ilosoph ic und W ieaenschaft,W ilhelm ffgjl&ai sum 70. G eb u rts tag e . Munich: F ran e k e , I 9 6 0 .

" "D er W ettbe g riff d e r n eu ze itlich en P h ilosoph ic . '* In S itau n g s*bericht.e d e r H e id e lb e rg e r A kadem ie d e r W 'fssensctm ften,P h ilosoph iache*H iBior is c h e R la s s e . H eidelberg : K a rl W inter# I 9 6 0*

" "Vom Sinn cler G eachlch te. " E dited fey JL K ein isch in P e r Sinn dor G esch ich te . M unich: C, H. Beck, 1961.

" "H eg e l's Aufhefeung d e r c h r is t l ie h e a R e lig io n ," E dited by K«O ehler and R. S ch aeffle r in E in sich ten , G e rh a rd K ru g er su m 60.Ge bu r t s ta g e . F ran k fu rt/M a in : V itto rio K lo s te rm an n , 1962.

" !fDas V erhangnis d es F o r ts c h r i t ta . " E dited by E. B urck in Die Idee des F o r ts c h r i t t s * M unich: G. H. B eck, 1963.

A rtic le s

Lowith, K a rl. "F e u e rb ac h und d e r Ausgang d e r k la ss is c h e n deu tschen Philosophic* " Logos, XVII (1928), pp. 323*347.

!i " B u rc k h a rd t 's S tellung zu H eg e l's G esch ich tspM losaph ie . 11 D eutscheV ie r te I ja h re s &c h rif t fur L ite ra tu rw isse n sc h a f t und G e is te sg e sc h i* c h te , VX(192S), pp. 702*741.

" 1 'P hanom enolog is che O ntologie und p r o t e s ta n ti& che T heologie. "E e itsc h riff fu r T heologie und K ir ch e , II (1930), pp. 365*399.

" "C rundziige d e r Entw icklung d e r P hanom enolog ie , zu r P h ilosoph ic und ih r V e rh a ltn is z u r j> ro te s ta n ti schen T heologie. " T heo log lsche Rundschau-, II (1930), pph 26*64 and pp. 333-361.

51 "H egel und H eg e lian ism u s. " Zeltschrlffc fu r D eutsche BUdunjg,VII (1931), pp. 553*665.

Lowith, K arl. "M ax W eber und K a rl M arx.'* A rch iv fu r B azla lw issen* schaft und Soglalpollfcik, LXVII (1932), pp* 53*99 and pp. 175-214’,

" "B x is ten z -P h ilo so p h ic . " Z e its c h r li t fu r D eutsche Bildung VXH (1932), pp. 602-413.

" "K ie rk eg aa rd und N ie tzsche . " D eutsche V ie r te ija h r e s s c h r if t fu r L i te ra tu rw i$ sen sch aft und G e is te sg es s.chichte XI (1933), pp. 43-66.

" "D ie ph ilosophic che K ritik d e r c k r is tlic h e n R elig ion im 19- J&hr* . hunderi. " T heo log ische R undschau, V (1933), pp. 131-172 andPp. 201-226.

" "L 'ach ev em en t de la philosophic e iass iq n e p a r H egel e t s a d is s o ­lu tion ehez M arx e i K ie rk eg aa rd . " R ech erch e P liiiosophique, IV (1934/35), pp. 232*267.

" "M ax S ch e le r und das P ro b le m e in e r ph ilo soph ise hen A nth ro ­pologic. " T heo log ische R undschau , VII (1935), pp. 349-372,

" " P o lit is c h e r D esisionisxnus. " In te rn a tio n a le Z e its c h r if t fu rT h eo rie des Rech.ts, IX (1935), pp. 101 -123.

" "L a co n cilia tio n H egelienne. " R ech erch e ph tlosophlque, V (1935/36), pp. 393-404.

" ■ "Z u r n eu es ten N ie tzsche F o rsch u n g , ” The-ologisehe R undschau,X (1938), pp. 187-199.

" "N ingen no T o itu to S a isa i. " T etugaku- E a s s i , N IP /L IH (1938)pp. 36-72.

" " K ritis c h e Randbem erlcungen zu R. M ori Die W ahrheit u b e r Jap a n .D oeetsu , XIY (1938), pp. 2 *2 2 .

" "R o u sseau T o r i N ie tzsch e ni i ta ru S im in-Syakai no M ondai."S iso , N IP /(1939), pp. 1-32 and pp. 20*47.

" "M. H eidegger und F . E osenzw eig o r ‘T em pora lity and E te rn ity . "P h ilosophy and P henom enolog ical R e s e a rc h , 111 (1942/43), pp. 53*

" "T he H is to r ic a l B ackground of E uropean N ih ilism , " C h ris tian ityand S ocie ty , V II (1943), pp. 3-16.

183

Eowith, K a rl, "R ecen t K ie rk e g aa rd Lit e ra t o e , " Philosophy and P henom ­enolog ical R saeag ch , IV (1944), pp. 574-878.

" "M etis sch es D o c trin e of E te rn a l R ec u rren c e . " Jo u rn a l of H is to ryof Id e a s , VI (1948), pp, 273*234*

" "The T heolog ical B ackground of the Philosophy of H isto ry . "S ocial R e se a rc h , K ill (1948), pp. 51-89.

" "B es im p lica tio n s politique d© la ph ilosophic de 1’ex isten ce cheaH eidegger , 11 L es tem p s m ode m e s , 11 (1947/48), pp. 343-360,

" "Heidegger* P ro b le m and B ackground of E x is te n tia lism . 11 SocialR e se a rc h XV (1948), pp. 345-369*

M "C an th e re be a C h ris tia n G entlem an. " Theology Today, V(1943/49), pp. 58-67.

" "Skepsis and Gl&ube in d e r W eltgesch ich te . " W elt a ls G esch ich te,(1950 ), pp. 143-155.

" "M an B etw een Infinite.s:..." M ea su re , I (I960), pp. 397-310.

" "C h ris ten fu m und G esch ich te. " M erk u r? IV (1950), pp. 1214*32.

" "S k ep sis und Glaube. " Neue $ch.wel&er R undschau , XIX (1951/52),pp. 348*364,

" "H atu r und G e sc h ic h te ." Heue R undschau , DXH (1951), pp. 65*79*

" "Skepsis und G laube, " W ort und W ahrheit, VI (1951), pp. 247-258.

!5 "S cep tic ism and F a ith , in M em ory of E r ic h F ra n k . " Social R e ­s e a rc h , XVIII (1951), pp. 219-236.

" "Ideidegger’s R eh re . " Neue R undschau , X*KH (1951), pp. 48-79*

" "M, H eidegger, D enker in d u rf tig e r Z eit. " Neue R undschau,EXHI (1952)* pp. I~ t7 .

" "H eid eg g er’s A uslegung des Ungesagfcen in N ie tzsch es W ort: Gottis t t o t . " N eue R undschau, EXIV (1953), pp. 105-137.

" "M an’s S elf-A liena tion in the E a rly W ritings of M arx. " SocialR e s e a rc h , XXI (1954), pp. 204-230.

184

Eo-with, Karl* "W issen und Glauben. ” Z eitw esde, XXV (1954), pp. 223*234,

rt HSchdpfung und Ejcistenas. " Me rim y, IX (1955), pp. 224-239.

n uChristenium and Geaehiehte. H Numen, I t (190S), pp. 147*15$,

11 " J e n e r EiasselneJ K ie rk eg aa rd . ** M erk u r, X (1956), pp. 147-182,

11 H2 u Sehlechta*@ neuer Nietassche Begende.1* M erk u r, XII (1953),pp. 731*784.

11 "D ie Ent& auberung der W elt dueh W issenschaft, zu Max W ebers100. G ehurt s tag . “ M e rk u r , XVIE (1984)* pp. $01-519.

Book R eview s

Ldwith* K a rl, R eview of S. A. K aehler* W ilhelm von Hum boldt und der S ta a t. in Lagoa*- XVII (1928), pp. 361-367. '

” R eview s of P . C, F is c h e r , Die N ullpunktesdstens, d a rg e s te ll t an d e r L eb en sfo rm g , K ie rk e g a a rd s , and o f T heodor W iesengrund* A dorno, K ie rk e g a a rd , K onstxuktlon des A estheti& chen, In D eutsche L ite ra tu ra e jtu n g * Jan u a ry 28, 1934.

H R eview of G. A, M organ, W hat N ie tzsche M eans. In Philosophy and P henom enolog ical R e se a rc h , 11(1941/42), pp. 240-242.

11 Review of H. M arcu se , R eason and R evolu tion , H egel and the R ise of S ocial T heo ry , In Philosophy and Phenom enolog ical R e se a rc h , j f ( 194 X /4 2 ), pp* 560 -E67,

n R eview of H. M arcuse* R easo n and R evolution, H egel and the R ise of S ocia l T h eo ry , In Social Re s e a r Oh, IX (1942), pp. 274-276.

H R eview of B, Kuhn* F re e d o m F o rg o tte n ' and R em em b ered . In S ocial R e s e a rc h , XI (1944), pp. 115-117,

}l R eview of J , P . S a r tr e , Bhd a ten t ia l j $ m . in Social R e s e a rc h , XVI (1949), pp. 122-124.

” R eview of G iam b attis ta Vico, New" .Science. In Social R e se a rc h ,i iM lK .iW ■«> -M MMl.i i M i**P» M liM W l ,<%»•**,

XVI (1949), pp. 50?*508,

u R eview of A. B ru n n e r, C h ris tian ity and C iv ilig a tio n . In Review of Religion* XIV (1950), pp. 401-403,

Lowith, K a rl. R eview of K a rl Schlechta, P e r F a ll N ie tzsch e , fa P h i­lo so p h ise he R undschau , VII (1959)* pp. 119*124.

Review of Jo an S tam baugh, U nter suehungen aum P ro b lem d er Z e it bei N ie tz sc h e . In P h ilo so p h lsch e R undachau, IX (1961), pp. 74-76.

Review of P ie r r e T e ilh a rd de Chardin* P e r M ensch im K oem os, P ie E ntstehung des M enschen, G eheim nis and V erheisaung d er Er.de, P i lg e r d e r Zukunft. In P h ilo soph ische R undschau. X (1962), pp. IS ? *208.

T ra n s la tio n s of Low ith1 a W orks

Low ith, K arl. “Die E inheit und die V er schexdenheit d e r M enschen. “P h ilo so p h ia Y /III (1939). pp. 444-459.

“ “N a tu re , H is to ry and E x is te n tia lism , ” S ocia l R e s e a rc h , XIX (1952), pp. 79*94.

“ W eltgesch ich te und H eil a ge achehen , D ie theafog isehen V o ra u sse t-gungen d e r G eech ich isp h ilo so p h ie . S tu ttg a rt; K oh lham m er, 1953.

“ “Skepsi e F ede n e lla s to r ia u n iv e rsa le . " A rch iy io di F ilo so fla ,II (1954), pp. 12.6-137.

“ “S to r ia F . S to r ic ism o . “ R iv is ta Di F ilo so f ia , XLV (1954), pp. 131-148.

“ “M. H eidegger und F , R osensw eig , e in N ach trag zu Sein und Z e it . “Z e its c h r if t fu r phi los ophi a che F o rsc lm ag , X II (1958), pp. 161-187.

C esa , C laudio. ' T ra n s la to r . .La S in is tra H egeliana , T e s t! S ce lti da K arl Ldw ith. B aris L a te r z a , I 9 6 0 .

Ldw ith, K arl. F ro m H egel to N ie tz sc h e , The R evolution in N ineteenth C en tu ry Thought. T h ird Edition. T ra n s la te d by D avid E, G reen. New Y ork; H olt, R in eh art, and W inston, 1964.

“ “ The Q uest fo r the M eaning of H isto ry . “ T ra n s la te d by A. Levisonin N a tu re , H is to ry and E x is te n tia lism and O ther E s sa y s in the P h i-

■«—Will |I|«H|......................................... >•—!»»«> >H lid mlinrtw MMIMtMMNWMMN —** ****** in | ia,IM|ai

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A nderle , O thm ar F . "T h e o re tisch e G esch ich te. “ H is to ricch e Z e itsch y ift, C VX XXV (195$), pp. 1-54.

B au e r, Q erh ard t. Gobch lch tlich k e lt, Wege und I rrw eg e e ines Be g riffs . B erlin : W alter De G ru y te r and C o . , 1963.

B erlin , Isa iah . The Hedgehog and the F o x , an E ssay on T o ls to y 's View of H is to ry . Hew Y ork: M entor Books, 1957.

Boehm , Rudolf. ''K a r l Bdwith and das P ro b lem dor G eschichtsphilosopM e. Z e its c h r if t fu r philo & ophi s c he F o r sc hung, X (1956), pp. 94-109*

B ultrnann, Rudolf. H is to ry and E sch a to lo g y , the P re se n c e of E te rn ity .New Y ork: .H arper T orchbooks, 1962..

B u rek h ard t, Jacob . F o rc e and F reed o m : an In te rp re ta tio n of H is to ry .E d ited by J a m e s H. N icho las. New York: M erid ian B ooks, 1955.

B u tte rfie ld , H e rb e r t. H is to ry and C h ris tia n ity . Eondon: B ell, 1949.

C a r r , E dw ard H. What is H is to ry . New York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1962.

Collingw ood, R obin G. The Idea of H is to ry . New Y ork: Galaxy Books, 1956. ~~

C ro ce , B enedetto . H is to ry as the S tory of L ib e rty . T ra n s la te d by Sylvia Sprigge. New York: M erid ian B ooks, 1935 .

ts " A n tih is to r ism u s . !1 H is to rig ch e Z e its c h r if t , 0X1111(1931), pp. 437-466.

C ullm ann, O sca r. C h rls tu s und die Z e it, d ie u rc h r ls f l ic h e Z e i t -und G e&chicfat&auffaasung. Z u rich ; E vangel!acher V erlag , 1946.

E n g e l-Jan o s i, F r ie d r ic h . The G row th of G erm an H is to r ic is m . ’'TheJohn H opkins U n iv e rs ity S tudies in H is to r ic a l and P o litic a l Sciences Vol. LXIL B a ltim o re : The John Hopkins P r e s s , 1944.

P aek en h e im , E m il L*. M etaphysics and H is to r ic ity . M ilwaukee: M a r­quette U n iv ers ity P r e s s , 1961.

i a?

F r e y e r , Han©* Das jgeschlohtllche Selbstbew ussteefxi deg 20 . J a h rh u n d e rts* '‘K a ise r 'W ilhelm lu s titu t fu r K unst-und K u ltu rw iseen seh aft, Biblio- fcheea H ert& im a In Rom , V erdffea ilicbungen d e r Abteilung fu r K ult- u rw is s e n s e b a f t ,u Vol. I* Leipssig: H ein rich K e lle r , 1938.

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" HDie Gre&sse& d e r hi& torisehen V ernunft*M In A e tas del P r im e r Congyeao Ha clonal de P ilo so fla , M endoza A rg en tin a , Vol. II. G uerre ro? S e c re ta r io de A ctas de l C ongreso , 1949.

G oethe, Johann. E%mont III, ii. In G oethes sam m tlich e W erke, V ol. JL S tu ttg a rt and Tubingen: J . G, G otta*sober V erlag , 1854.

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H afkash rink , Hanna. Review of K a rl Lowith, Vom Hegel bis M etK sche.In P h ilosophy and P henom enolog ical R e se a rc h , II (1941/42),

■ pp. 2.59-263. ’

H eidegger, M artin* Sein und E eit. T en th ed ition . Tubingen: Max Hie* m e y e r , 1963.

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191

N am e;

P e rs o n a l D ata :

Education;

M em be r s hip s ;

P o s itio n s :

AtlTGBXOG&AFHICAL STATEMENT

B ertho ld P h illip R ie s te r e r

B irth : June 9, 1935, D e tro it, M ichigan, m a rr ie d , one child .

Howe E lem en ta ry School, D e tro it, M ichigan.S o u th easte rn High School, D e tro it, M ichigan.Wayne S tate U n iversity , 1953-1956, D e tro it, M ichigan. U n iv ers ity of H eidelberg (G erm any), 1956-1957.A. B. w ith high d is tin c tio n , Wayne S tate U n iv ers ity , 1953. M. A. Wayne S tate U n iversity , 1961.

P hi B eta K appa, D elta Phi Alpha, A m erican H is to ric a l A ssocia tion .

A cadem ic A d v iso r, Wayne S tate U n iv ers ity , 1960-1961. G raduate A sso c ia te , Wayne S tate U n iversity , 1961-1964. in s tru c to r , Wayne S tate U n iv ers ity , 1964-1965. In s tru c to r , Albion C ollege, 1965-