Wax, Minds, and Aristotelian Bodies

Abstract: In several works, Myles Burnyeat has suggested that Aristotles psychology is no

longer credible, because it presupposes a post-Cartesian conception of matter that none of

us, functionalists or not, can share. By focusing on the employment of Aristotles and

Descartes uses of a common example the relation of a piece of wax to its shape I pinpoint

where exactly this disagreement lies. It is shown that while there are major differences

between an Aristotelian and a Cartesian conception of matter, the Aristotelian account is by

no means as incredible as Burnyeat takes it to be. More than that, Aristotle himself addresses

a conception in many respects like that given by Descartes, and explicitly rejects it.

Keywords: Aristotle; Descartes; Wax experiment; hylomorphism; mind-body problem; functionalism;

perception, ancient theories of; matter, ancient theories of.

Introduction In this article, I would like to address two themes of contemporary Aristotle scholarship, one

larger, one smaller. My hope is that juxtaposing the smaller theme with the larger will shed considerably

more light on the issues involved in the larger one than has been done up to now.

The larger theme, drawn from the work of Myles Burnyeat, is that functionalist appropriations of

hylomorphism fail to realize just how different Aristotles conception of matter is from our own. A

corollary of this is that it is a mistake to view Aristotle as the father of modern functionalism, since this

understanding simply grafts a notion of function onto a distinctly modern conception of matter: one that

Aristotle could not possibly have accepted, nor could we accept his. Aristotles psychology is designed to

be the crowning achievement of his physics, and his physics is irretrievably dead and gone.1 Our

conception of the mental may be open for discussion and revision, but our conception of the physical is

irreversibly influenced by the demolition of the Aristotelian philosophy through Descartes and others in

the seventeenth century.2

The smaller theme, shared by Shields and Corcilius,3 is that against this backdrop, the examples

that Aristotle draws on to illuminate the case of the soul-body relation, and in particular Aristotles

likening of the soul-body relation to a wax impression, turn out not to be very illuminating at all. The

usual way into the form-matter analysis of the soul-body relation is through a series of analogical

extensions [] Now the trouble with proceeding by analogical extension is that it can be unclear which

features of the original case you are to hold on to and which you are to discard as you journey to the case

you are really interested in.4

This focus on the wax analogies serves two purposes. First, it serves to pinpoint in exactly what

respect Burnyeats critique depends on a broadly Cartesian conception of matter, since Descartes

1 Burnyeat (2002), 78. 2 Burnyeat (1992), 16. 3 Cf. Shields (1993), 162-63; Corcilius (2014), 35, fn. 49. 4 Burnyeat (1992), 17.

himself employs that very example in Meditations II and III. Second, it serves to show exactly how

Aristotles accounts of perception and memory are tied to broader themes of the physical treatises.

This article divides into two parts. The first part begins with a brief description of Burnyeats

primary arguments against Aristotles hylomorphic account of perception. From here, I move to Descartes

appropriation of the wax example in the latter half of the second Meditation, focusing on what it is that

the appropriation is supposed to convince us of. This allows us to determine in precisely what respect

Burnyeats critique is wedded to a Cartesian conception of matter.

In the second part, I turn to Aristotles uses of wax examples directly: first, as they function in

Aristotles accounts of perception and memory; second, as they function in Aristotelian physics more

broadly. Focusing on the common use of this example thus allows us to see which features of the example

should be taken to carry over to these more substantive domains.

Contemporary Spiritualism and the Cartesian Conception of Matter

Burnyeats Critique Burnyeats critique of Aristotle has two aims: first, to show that Aristotle could not be a

functionalist in the modern sense; second, to show that Aristotles actual theory of perception is

untenable. The second goal, thinks Burnyeat, is accomplished by showing that the precise points on which

Aristotle departs from contemporary functionalism are points on which we cannot follow him.

Burnyeat brings forth two principal arguments in support of the first of these aims. The first can

be summarized as follows:

(1) For contemporary functionalism, the obtaining of certain physiological processes are sufficient for

the enactment of a given function.

(2) For Aristotle, the obtaining of certain physiological processes are not sufficient for the enactment

of a given function.

(3) Therefore, Aristotle is not a functionalist.

For example, Burnyeat takes Aristotle to hold that when one is angry, the blood boils, but that is merely

a necessary, not a sufficient condition for anger; hence ones body, as he puts it, can be aroused and in

the state it is in when one is angry without ones actually being angry.5

This thesis is correct as far as it goes. But in cases of perception, the thesis stretches a step further.

For Aristotle, every perception is a manner of receiving a form without receiving its matter.6 From this it

follows, says Burnyeat, that

(2) For Aristotle, not only are material conditions for perception not sufficient: they are not even

necessary.7

The rejection of (2), thinks Burnyeat, derives its essential support from the interpretation of

Aristotles theory of perception given by Richard Sorabji. Sorabjis literalist interpretation holds, for

instance, that in visual perception the physiological process of taking on the color (in the eye-jelly)

5 Burnyeat (1992), 23. 6 DA II.12, 424a18-24. 7 Burnyeat (1992), 22.

constitutes seeing red, as a piece of bronze constitutes a statue or as a particular series of steps constitutes

a journey from Athens to Thebes8. The spiritualist interpretation Burnyeat holds, on the other hand,

denies this, and instead holds that the eyes taking on a colour is just ones becoming aware of some

colour9.

Burnyeats second argument states that

(1) A contemporary functionalist must hold that the relation of a matter to its function (=form) is

contingent.

(2) Aristotle holds that the relation of a matter to its function (=form) is not contingent, but necessary.

(3) Therefore, Aristotle is not a functionalist. 10

Burnyeat seems to take the first premise to be a necessary characteristic of modern functionalism.

If the artefact model prevails, [] it will not [] be essential to Aristotles account of perception

that it involves the particular physiological processes he invokes to explain it. [] We must be

able to [discard this account] if Aristotle is a functionalist and functionalism is Aristotelian,

because the whole point of functionalism is to free our mental life from dependence on any

particular material set-up.11

In sum, Burnyeat thinks that what modern functionalism needs to hold on to most in the analogies

Aristotle gives between the soul and artifacts is the contingency of the enactment relation, and it is

precisely this that Aristotle will not grant. In more basic cases, it turns out that higher order operations

life, sensation, etc. are constitutive of the matter they are enacted in. While In the more complicated

case of perception, Burnyeat goes so far as to say that for Aristotle, no physiological change is needed.12

This is why for Aristotle, both the order of fundamentality and the order of explanation are exactly

reversed from what they are in modern physics: life, for instance, explains the nature of the body that

enacts it, not conversely. Aristotle [] is entirely confident [] that deduction from the bottom up is

impossible.13

Descartes Wax Experiment in Meditations II and III We know that Descartes was familiar with the De Anima, since he quotes the Greek text in the

reply to the fourth set of objections.14 Descartes use of the example is similar to Aristotles own use in

the De Anima, insofar as it bears primarily on both the explanation of perception, and his account of the

identity of material objects.

8 Burnyeat (1992), 18. 9 Burnyeat (1992), 18. 10 See Burnyeat (1992), 17. 11 Burnyeat (1992), 17. Emphasis mine. Though I think the italicized assumption is questionable, the attempt to save Aristotle via a broadening of the definition of functionalism would leave some larger issues unsolved, and so the assumption may be granted for now. 12 Burnyeat (1992), 22. 13 Burnyeat (1992), 23. 14 Resp. ad IV, 251.

Descartes makes use of the wax example in two places in the Meditations: the first, in the latter

half of Meditation II; the second, in paragraph 19 of Meditation III. There are, in addition, several places

in the objections and replies that serve to illumine Descartes purposes