Water Vulnerability Assessment

Col Lisa “SWAT” Snyder

Credit to Ms. Martina Schmidt

Overview Water Vulnerability Assessment (WVA)

Process

OEHSA Overview

Water Vulnerability Assessment

Dilution is the Solution? CALCULATE the amount of water contaminated to a lethal concentration (based CALCULATE the amount of water contaminated to a lethal concentration (based

on 1 L consumption) by 110 lb of Sodium Cyanide. on 1 L consumption) by 110 lb of Sodium Cyanide.

EPA online Water Contaminant Information Tool EPA online Water Contaminant Information Tool (access restricted)(access restricted)

Maybe dilution is not always the solution!

Answer

Don’t forget the other route of exposure

Inhalation!

Inherent Water System Design Characteristics─ Size (large geographic area and miles of pipeline)─ Accessibility (numerous access points, and access

points often in areas that are remote or accessible to the public)

Dependencies On Non-AF Water Suppliers/Privatization

On-line Contaminant Monitoring & Alarm Systems Not Yet Reliable or Practical

Lack Of Resources and/or Local Initiatives Dedicated To

─ Water System Security Measures─ Water System Maintenance, Upkeep, & Modernization─ Water Contingency Response Planning, Training, &

Equipment

6

Why Vulnerabilities Exist

Drivers

Safe Drinking Water Act – 2002 Bioterrorism Response Amendment

AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program AFI 48-144, Safe Drinking Water Surveillance Program DoDD 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program AFPD 10-24, AF Critical Infrastructure Protection Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009

WVA Objectives

• Reduce Unnecessary Risks to Personnel and Mission-Critical Operations─ Identifying Observations (Vulnerabilities & Concerns)─ Characterizing & Estimating Associated Risks─ Recommending Credible Control Options

Observations

Identified through the use of checklists that include detailed water-specific criteria that were established to ensure the security and survivability of potable water supplies.

A criterion that is not met is considered a “deficiency,” and one or more deficiencies result in an observation for the respective program area or asset/access point being assessed.

Water-specific criteria consist of basic administrative and physical control requirements derived from various DoD and AF directives.

In the absence of specific requirements, best management practices derived from DoD and AF guidance documents, or identified by EPA’s Water Security Division and AF functional experts are applied.

Additional or more restrictive criteria derived from MAJCOM, Primacy Agency, or installation regulations or policies may also apply locally

Observations

WVA Observations fall into the following four general areas:─ Water Security─ System Design & Integrity─ Operations and Maintenance─ Water Contingency Response

Common Water Security Issues • Water asset and access point entryways found

unlocked/unsecured• Absence of AT provisions in contracts (water utility

privatization, construction, bottled/bulk water) and insufficient control of contractors connecting to system

• Off-base above ground water supply connections with no additional security connections.

• Easily accessible off-base well facilities • Damaged fencing around water storage tanks and

well houses

System Design & Integrity No redundant water source or supply connections• Deteriorating infrastructure and lack of Capital

Improvements Plan (CIP) Inadequate looping of mains Inadequate system pressure for fire-fighting purposes

Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

• No valve exercising• No storage tank inspections & lack of preventive

paintenance (PM) (deteriorated vents, unsealed openings, excessive corrosion, deteriorated coatings, accumulated sediment/debris)

• Improper tank operation (inadequate turnover, no chlorine residual/stagnant water, improper water levels

Contingency Response Capability Installation Water Contingency Response Plan (WCRP)

insufficient/incomplete/not executable WCRP not reviewed/updated annually Inadequate Contingency Monitoring Plans, Equip,Tng No water-related scenarios in base disaster exercises

(per AFI 10-246)

Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) A secure, Web-based data management program

accessible via SIPRNet by authorized administrators and a few other designated personnel (not BE)

CVAMP enables all base AT observations to be prioritized, tracked, and reported by DoD installations, Major/Unified Commands, and Joint Staff (J3 Deputy Director for AT/Homeland Defense).

CVAMP can provide an important mechanism to elevate visibility and support needed for water capital improvements, equipment and process upgrades, and other measures that improve the overall security, safety, and reliability of the potable water system.

WVA Process Overview

Coordinate With

Stakeholder

Assess Security & Survivability Programs

Plan Approach

Coordinate With Stakeholders

Assess Water Assets and Access

PointsDocument Review

Delineate Observations

Analyze Risk

Identify Control Options

Develop Report

Phase 1Pre-

Assessment

Phase 2 Information Gathering

Phase 3 Information Processing

Phase 1 - Pre-Assessment Plan the Approach

Threat Level and Force Protection Condition Deployment vs. Fixed Installations Baseline Assessment and Assessment Updates

Coordinate with Stakeholders Document and Key Reference Review

Phase 1 - Stakeholders Primary Stakeholders

CE Water Utilities Contractor Privatized Water System CE Programs CE Asset Manager Anti Terrorism Officer (ATO)

Secondary Stakeholder Private/Municipal Purveyor Contractor Privatized Housing CE Emergency Management CE Hearing, Ventilation & Air Conditioning CE Power Production CE Exterior Electric Fleet Services Base Contracting

Consolidated Interview

Primary May Refer You To Secondary Stakeholder

Phase 1 – Key Documents Key Documents

─ WVA ─ Sanitary Survey ─ WCRP

Primary References ─ AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT)─ AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program

Secondary References ─ 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program ─ 32-1067, Water Systems

Phase 2 - Information Gathering

Assess Water Security and Survivability Programs

─ Interview SMEs ─ Review Program Documentation─ Checklists 1-3 Questionnaires ─ Checklists 4-8 Program Review

Assess Water Assets and Access Points ─ Checklists 9-15 Physical Assessment

Checklists

Physical Security Observations Examples

Secluded area along

fence line

Ladder is ea

sily

accessible

Corroded Lock

Physical Security Observations

• Contractors, Base Construction, Grounds Maintenance, Pest Management, etc. who need to draw water should be directed to a non-potable water filling point if possible.

• If the Potable Water System is used, then filling points must be protected against temporary Cross-Connections by use of BPDs.

• Filling points should be located where activities can be observed, and preferably on a dead-end or otherwise in an area without high-value targets or with minimal consume

• Absence of protected fill point(s) is a “concern” (for both intentional and accidental incidents).

Physical Security Observations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Options: Remove exposed valve handles or at least chain them, and/or enclose valves within a locked barrier (e.g., fence or “tough cage”). Secure critical valve vaults/pits under hardened, locked covers. Use high security locks (shrouded shackle type).

Example

BenchmarkBenchmark(Lock and IDS)(Lock and IDS)

ExamplesExamples ExamplesExamples

System Integrity Observations

Phase 3 - Information Processing

Delineate Observations ─ Vulnerability – A situation or circumstance that, if

left unchanged, may result in the loss of life or damage to mission-essential resources.

─ Concern – An existing condition that is exploitable and can indirectly lead to the death of DoD personnel and/or damage resources.

─ Neutral – An existing condition that is neither exploitable nor can be reasonably assessed as leading to the death of DoD personnel and/or damage to resources, but is being identified to suggest consideration of modification and/or continuance.

Observation Table/CVAMP Inputs

OBSERVATION DISCUSSION (Deficiencies) RECOMMENDATIONS

Designation: ConcernClassification: FOUODescription: The potable water source lacks sufficient redundancies. The base does not have an alternative source of water in the event of a supply interruption, and only one supply connection to the off-base water supplier. AT Benchmark Code: IE-PLN-17DoD AT Standards: 21; AFI 10-246, UFC 3-600-01 Repeat Observation? No

Classification: FOUO1.Although the City of XXX water supply has been historically reliable, the AF has no control over the continued reliability of this source. To avoid potential interruptions of the water supply and of the critical operations that depend on water, the base should have an alternative water source IAW AFI 10-246. 2.Also, because the base water supply is provided exclusively by an off-base purveyor, there should be two or more supply connections to provide adequate looping and back-feed capability.

Classification: FOUO Recommendation/Mitigation Type: ProgrammaticATWG, consider the following actions:1.Initiate a feasibility study to assess viable options for an alternative source of water that can provide sufficient quantities of potable water to meet demands during all mission modes in the event the primary source of water is interrupted. Options include, but are not limited to, installing a connection to the county water system, and installing one or more wells on base. 2.Install one or more additional connections between the City of XXX water system and the base distribution system to provide adequate looping and back-feed capability on base.

CVAMP DESCRIPTOR INPUTSInstallation Access

Controls Symbolic Value Population Centers Mitigate Vulnerability With Security Equip./Construction

Uncontrolled/Open Activity/Off Installation

High Visibility/Large News Coverage

301 Personnel and Over

Equipment None

Observation Risk Analysis The WVA risk analysis methodology incorporates

principles, concepts, and techniques derived from ORM as well as the DoD AT tools MSHARPP and CARVER.

ORM risk estimate categories of Extremely High, High, Medium, and Low provide a common frame of reference across DoD for relative risk ranking purposes (these designations are not associated with an absolute risk scale; there is no absolute scale for risk).

Risk levels of Extremely High or High, however, generally indicate conditions of unacceptable risk to personnel and/or the mission due to the probability and severity of a water degradation and/or disruption incident, and warrant corrective actions on a priority basis.

Observation Risk Analysis Probability

─ Incident History ─ Confidence in Existing Controls ─ Recovery Difficulty ─ Importance ─ Psychological Impact ─ Accessibility

Severity ─ Health and Safety ─ Mission-Essential Systems and Services

WVA Report

• Section 1 – Introduction • Section 2 – Overview of Potable Water

System • Section 3 – Observations • Appendix A – References, Acronyms • Appendix B – Risk Analysis • Appendix C – Water Security Operational

Measures • Appendix D – Representative Photographs

Note: Use the example report from USAFSAM

Classification Instructions

Definitions─ Secret: Unauthorized disclosure could be

expected to cause serious damage to national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe

─ Confidential: Unauthorized disclosure could be expected to cause damage to national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe

─ For Official Use Only: (FOUO) is a designation (not a classification) that is applied to controlled unclassified information that is exempt from mandatory release to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Question Have you been involved with a

water vulnerability assessment?

Food handling and storage Temperature control Handling Storage Problematic public health concerns

in a deployed location

The End That was a brief overview…

Questions (your BEO can help you!)

Classification Instructions Key References

─ AFI 10-245─ DoDI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards─ DTRA, Security Classification Guide for Vulnerability

Assessments Decision to Classify

─ The unauthorized disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security, and that the damage can be identified or described

─ Determine the probable operational, technological, and resource impact of classification

Classification Instructions According to DTRA SCG, vulnerabilities are

always classified. Concerns may or may not be classified, and neutral observations are typically not classified

When in doubt check with your

ATO

What’s Next? Provide Observations to CVAMP administrator

within 90 days All observations must be in CVAMP within 120

days Coordinate and brief results with MRC, FPWG,

EMWG, or ATWG Review and validate annually Use WVA to improve upon emergency

response procedures Do not submit the report to non-AF water

suppliers or agencies, or base contractors (the commander and ATO should make that decision).

Questions?

TIC/TIM Vulnerability Assessment

Background Bhopal, India Disaster Fatal Ammonia incident in Swansea, SC Texas City refinery accident Train Collision in Graniteville, SC Minot Train Derailment

Why TIC/TIM VA? Provide valuable information to various

installation personnel (e.g., emergency management, fire, medical, and antiterrorism personnel)

Provides identity, quantity, and location of local TIC/TIM

Identifies potential risk levels associated with local TIC/TIM

Enables personnel to better plan/train for possible releases

Drivers AFI 41-106, Unit Level Management of

Medical Readiness Programs, 14 Apr 08 (Updated 28 Jul 09).

AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations, 24 Jan 07 (Updated 6 Apr 09).

BE Capability 1 (Execute SG related VA): To identify potential TIC/TIM concerns and assess the probability or potential consequences of an accidental/intentional release

Key Terms Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) – All toxic industrial

materials manufactured, stored, transported, used in industrial or commercial processes. It includes toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and toxic industrial biologicals. TIMs produce toxic impacts to personnel, materials, and infrastructure.

Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) – Chemical compounds used or produced in industrial processes that are toxic to humans and animals.

Toxic Industrial Biologicals (TIB) – Biological materials found in medical research, pharmaceutical, or other manufacturing processes that are toxic to humans and animals.

Toxic Industrial Radiologicals (TIR) – Radiation-emitting materials used in research, power generation, medical treatment, and other non-weapon developmental activities that are harmful to humans and animals if released outside their controlled environment.

TIC/TIM Overview Planning & Coordination Data Collection Data Analysis Report

TIC/TIM Process

Planning & Coordination Identify Lead Assessor

─ Manages assessment team; performs overall coordination; assigns tasks; ensures VA completion according to schedule

Identify Team─ Multi-disciplinary team with strong technical

background─ Familiarity with overall assessment methodology,

base operations/infrastructure, off-base industries, TIC/TIM characteristics & health effects, transport of contaminants

Develop List of Stakeholders─ On-base stakeholders─ Off-base stakeholders

Stakeholders Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) Civil Engineering (CE):

Emergency Management Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)

representative Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know

Act (EPCRA) POC Fire Department Pest Management Hazardous Waste Program Manager

Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) Office of Special Investigations (OSI)/Intel Security Forces Base Contracting Hazardous Material Pharmacy Manager Weather Office

Data Collection Off-Base TIC/TIM Data (20 mile radius) Transportation TIC/TIM Data On-Base TIC/TIM Data Verify Data Compile Comprehensive TIC/TIM Inventory Obtain Base Map Collect Meteorological and Terrain Data Collect Natural Disaster and Accident Data Collect Data on TIC/TIM Characteristics

Data Collection TIC of Concern includes toxic substances

regulated under the EPA RMP and toxic chemicals that have an established NIOSH IDLH concentration value.

─ List of substances regulated under the EPA RMPhttp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get-cfr.cgi?TITLE=40&PART=68&SECTION=130&TYPE=TEXT

─ List of NIOSH IDLH chemicals http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/intridl4.html

─ Toxic no-volatile liquids are inventoried but not evaluated

Primary Focus─ Chemicals or materials with acute toxicity─ Primary route of concern: Inhalation

Tier 2 Data Example   ID Facility Name Location City SIC Chemical CAS Amount, lb1 Site 1 A & A Engraving, Inc 2301 East St Charles Street San Antonio 7 6 6 9 Used Motor Oil 0 6 4 7 4 2 - 6 5 - 0 5002 Site 2 A & B Welding Supply 914 East Chicago Street San Antonio 0 9 0 4 Portland Cement 0 6 5 9 9 7 - 1 5 - 1 4003 Site 3 Hubbard Feeds Inc. 426 Omaha Street San Antonio 2 0 4 1 Sulfur Dioxide 0 0 7446-09-5 100004 Site 4 Merillat Industries, Inc 4300 South Highway 79 San Antonio 2 4 9 2 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 - 5 8000000

5 Site 5Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of the Black Hills 2150 Coca-Cola Lane San Antonio 2 0 8 6 Anhydrous Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 - 7 200000

6 Stie 6 Browning Resources U.S. 3290 Lien Street San Antonio 3 3 4 1 Soda ash 0 0 0 4 9 7 - 1 9 - 8 200

7Site 7

Black Hills Corporation - Ben French Plant & Service Center 409 Deadwood Avenue San Antonio 4 9 1 1 Chlorine 0 0 7 7 8 2 - 5 0 - 5 300

8 Site 8Rapid City Regional Hospital-Main 353 Fairmont Boulevard San Antonio 8 0 6 0 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 - 5 75000000

9 Site 9 Gillette Dairy of the Black Hills 1699 Sedivy Lane San Antonio 2 0 2 6 Chlorine 0 0 7 7 8 2 - 5 0 - 5 100000

10 PE 0078 Dakota Masonry Supply 1543 Deadwood Avenue San Antonio 5 2 1 1 Calcium Hydroxide 0 0 1 3 0 5 - 6 2 - 0 500

11 PE 0084Hills Materials Company--Emulsion 3730 Sturgis Road San Antonio 1 4 4 2 Acetylene 0 0 0 0 7 4 - 8 6 - 2 300

12 PE 0085Hills Materials Company--N Shop 702 Spruce San Antonio 1 4 4 2 Acetylene 100

13 PE 0087Hills Materials Company--Red-E-Mix 225 East Main Street North San Antonio 1 4 4 2 Acetylene 100

14 PE 0091E Horace Mann Pool 818 Anamosa Street San Antonio Sodium Hypochlorite 0 0 7 7 8 2 - 5 0 - 5 10015 PE 0092 Hubbard Feeds Inc. 426 Omaha Street San Antonio 2 0 4 1 Bentonite Clay 0 0 1 3 0 2 - 7 8 - 9 50016 PE 0100 Landstrom's 405 Canal Street San Antonio 3 9 1 1 Acetone 0 0 0 0 6 7 - 6 4 - 1 1017 PE 0101 Merillat Industries, Inc 4300 South Highway 79 San Antonio 2 4 9 2 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 - 5 500000018 PE 0114 Nash Finch Company 1313 East St Patrick San Antonio 5 1 4 1 Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 - 7 410

19 PE 0133Rapid City Regional Hospital-Main 353 Fairmont Boulevard San Antonio 8 0 6 0 Diesel Fuel 0 6 8 3 3 4 - 3 0 – 5 500000000

20 PE 0151 The Icehouse Inc. 1703 East St Patrick Street San Antonio Anhydrous Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 – 7 20021 PE 0153 Riddle's Group 2707 Mount Rushmore Road San Antonio 3 9 1 1 Sulfuric Acid 98% 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 9 3 – 9 250

22 PE 0161 Suds and Duds, Inc 410 4th Street San Antonio 7 2 1 8Nonylphenol Ethoxylates 0 0 9 0 1 6 - 4 5 - 9 350

23 PE 0168Stamper Black Hills Gold Jewelry 7201 South Highway 16 San Antonio 3 9 1 1 Ammonia 0 0 7 6 6 4 - 4 1 - 7 410

24 PE 0180Warne Chemical & Equipment Company 2680 Commerce Road 3 5 2 3 Aluminum Phosphide 0 2 0 8 5 9 - 7 3 - 8 200

Tier 2 Data Example

Data Collection TIB of Concern should include, at a

minimum, those substances regulated by the Department of Health and Human Services as “HHS Select Agents and Toxins” and “Overlap Select Agents and Toxins” HHS Select Agents and Toxins are listed in 42 CFR

73.3 and can be found at the following website:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get-cfr.cgi?TITLE=42&PART=73&SECTION=3&TYPE=TEXT

Data Collection TIR of Concern should include radiological

materials that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as “Nationally Tracked Sources” that equal or exceed Category 2 quantity thresholds. The list of nationally tracked sources is provided in

Appendix E of 10 CFR 20, and can be found at the NRC website listed below:http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part020/part020-appe.html

Contact the LEPC or state radiation safety officer

Transportation TIC/TIM Data Highways

─ Contact the Department of Transportation (National HM Route Registry)

Railways─ CSX/Norfolk Southern/Union Pacific/Burlington Northern─ Use Google Earth/Google Maps to locate rail roads in your

area ─ Contact the Federal Railroad Administration (Regional POCs)

http://www.fra.dot.gov/

Waterways─ Contact the local port authority

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/

Example Rail Density Study

On-Base TIC/TIM Data HAZMART Pharmacy Hazardous Waste Program Manager Central Hazardous Waste Storage Facility

Manager Base Supply CE Storage Tank Manager Fire Department and/or Emergency

Management Installation Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)

TIC/TIM Inventory Once the data is collected and verified, all

TIC/TIM should be compiled into a combined inventory. TIC/TIM Name Facility/Location EmergencyConta

ct Lat./Long. Max. Quantity (lbs)

Dist. (mi)/ Dir. from Base

Notes:

1 CHLORINEAIRGAS SOUTH INC. MERIDIAN #202136 BONITA ROADMERIDIAN, MS 39301LAUDERDALE

TIM TRAMMEL601-483-4846

32º 21.9788º 40.18 2400

4.47 mi.70.04º448 ft.

Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base alternative scenario does not

2 SULFURIC ACIDAT&T INTERSTATE DIVISION4600 SKYLAND DRIVEMERIDIAN, MS 30094LAUDERDALE

LESTER CAGLE6622569347

32º 19.3288º 41.09 1,163

3.63 mi.116.98º394 ft

Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base; alternative scenario does not .

3 SULFURIC ACID, Batteries AVERY DENNISON4100 HWY 45 N.MERIDIAN, MS 39301

KEVIN STEIFEL601-481-6903

32º 23.7288º 39.82 99,999

5.67 mi.50.86º376

Chemical does not meet the definition of volatile toxic liquid. Plume model not required.

4 SULFURIC ACIDBatteries

BELLSOUTH – 741808789 OLD MERIDIAN DEKALBMERIDIAN, MS 32063LAUDERDALE

EH&S HOTLINE1-800-566-9347

32º 28.6188º 41.10 606

9.22 mi.19.14º461 ft

Chemical does not meet the definition of volatile toxic liquid. Plume model not required.

5 CHLORINECITY OF MERIDIAN2304 HWY 11 SOUTHMERIDIAN, MS 39307LAUDERDALE

YOLANDA BROWN601-485-1815

32º 19.1688º 45.13 24001.8 mi.199.07º292 ft

Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base;

6 SULFUR DIOXIDECITY OF MERIDIAN2304 HWY 11 SOUTHMERIDIAN, MS 39307LAUDERDALE

YOLANDA BROWN601-485-1815

32º 19.1688º 45.13 9,999.8 mi.199.07º292 ft

Worst-Case scenario plume impacts the base;

Base Map The assessment team should obtain a base

map that includes a 20-mile radius around the base.

TIC/TIM # 4 Burns Chemical CoTIC/TIM # 1-6 ESCO Plant TIC/TIM # 8-12 City of XYZ Water Treatment Plant TIC/TIM # 15-21 Petro Chemical

SME Interviews Antiterrorism Officer (ATO)

Provide overall threat briefing LEPC Representative

Tier 2 reports Validate chemical inventory Provide insight to past accidents incidents within

county Emergency Management

Assist with plume modeling Response capabilities

Fire Department/ HazMat Response Response capabilities

Also a great forum to assess the bases overall response capability and

establish rapport with local LEPC

Plume Modeling Modeling and/or Calculations Are Used to

Determine the Hazard Zones Associated With a TIC/TIM Release Scenario The following options are currently available for

chemical release scenarios Area Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) model

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) model

Joint Effects Model (JEM) Spreadsheet Calculation Method

For radiological release scenarios, a manual calculation or HPAC can be used

Worst Case and Alternative Scenarios Worst Case Release Scenario

Based on maximum quantity released and worst-case meteorological conditions

Used to determine which sources listed in the comprehensive inventory have the potential to impact the base; and to determine the highest level of risk associated with those sources

Alternative Release Scenario Performed only on those sources identified by the

worst-case release scenario as potentially impacting the base

Based on average/typical quantity released and average/predominant meteorological conditions

Used to determine a more realistic/typical risk level

Plume Modeling

Number ofContainers

Worst-CaseRelease Quantity

Alternative Release Quantity

Multiple(two or more)

Full contents of all containers

Full contents of one container

One Full contents of one container

Two-thirds contents of one container

Unknown Total quantity listed for the source

Two-thirds the quantity listed for the

source

Release Quantities used for Worst-Case and Alternative Scenarios

Scenario Examples• Railcar/Chlorine:

Density Study: 780 total railcars carried chlorine through the location per year.Tech Guide: Assume 365 as the estimated number of days a railcar can be expected to travel through the area.

780 loads/365 times per year a rail car travel by the area =2.14

Tech Guide: Average railcar capacity 180,000 lbs.

Worst Case Plume Modeling: 180,000 lbs x 2.14=385,200 lbs Alternative Case Plume Modeling: 180,000 lbs

• Truck/Chlorine: Tech Guide: 34,000lbs truck capacity

Worst Case Plume Modeling: 34, 000 lbs Alternative Case Plume Modeling: 34,000 lbs x 0.67 = 22,780 lbs (2/3 of truck capacity)

• Fixed Facility RMP inventory: 99,999lbs listed on report

Worst Case Plume Modeling: 99,999 lbs Alternative Case Plume Modeling: 50,000 lbs

Meteorological Conditions

Wind Speed Daytime Solar Radiation Nighttime Cloud Cover

meters/second

miles/hour

Strong Moderate

Slight >50% <50%

< 2 < 5 A A – B B E F

2 – 3 5 – 7 A – B B C E F

3 – 5 7 – 11 B B – C C D E

5 – 6 11 – 13 C C – D D D D

> 6 > 13 C D D D D

Obtain meteorological conditions from the Air Force Climatology

Center Website

https://notus2.afccc.af.mil/SCISPublic/

Example Weather Data

Predominant Wind from 310o

Plume Modeling

65

SITE DATA: Location: Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.38 (unsheltered single storied) Time: May 14, 2012 0929 hours CDT (using computer's clock) CHEMICAL DATA: Chemical Name: CHLORINE Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol AEGL-1 (60 min): 0.5 ppm AEGL-2 (60 min): 2 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 20 ppm IDLH: 10 ppm Ambient Boiling Point: -30.4° F Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA) Wind: 3.35 miles/hour from 307.08° true at 3 meters Ground Roughness: open country Cloud Cover: 5 tenths Air Temperature: 77° F Stability Class: F (user override) No Inversion Height Relative Humidity: 50% SOURCE STRENGTH: Direct Source: 36,000 pounds/min Source Height: 0 Release Duration: 10 minutes Release Rate: 36,000 pounds/min Total Amount Released: 360,000 pounds Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow. THREAT ZONE: Model Run: Heavy Gas Red : greater than 6 miles --- (20 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min]) Orange: greater than 6 miles --- (2 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min]) Yellow: greater than 6 miles --- (0.5 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])

Hazard Zone Effects

Zone 1 Life Threatening Effects (AEGL 3, ERPG 3, &TEEL 3)

Zone 2 Serious Long-Lasting Effects (AEGL 2, ERPG 2, & TEEL 2)

Zone 3 Notable Discomfort (AEGL 1, ERPG 1, & TEEL 1)

Form 1 – 5: TIC/TIM Inventory Hazard Zones

Example calculation

Worst Case: 60*2.5/3.35= 44.77

TIC/TIMNO.

Chemical

Scenario Type

Quantit

y(lbs)

Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3

Distance to Base (mi)

Time to Impact Base5 (min)

Furthest

Extent3 (mi)

Time to

Extent4

(min)

Furthest

Extent3 (mi)

Time to

Extent4 (min)

Furthest

Extent3 (mi)

Time to Extent4 (min)

1 Chlorine

Worst-Case 2,400 2.5 44.7 3.5 5.5 4.5

Alternative 1,200 1.5 2.2 4.2 4.5

9 Ammonia

Worst-Case 2,400 0.28 0.88 2.1 2

Alternative 1,200 0.5 1 2.1 2Equation: t=60*d/v

Where: .t= time to impact d= distance from point of release to closest point on base perimeter (mi)v= scenario wind speed

Remember the wind speed for an alternative scenario are the prevailing winds

Severity Severity of a TIC/TIM release scenario is based

on hazard zones. Either modeling or calculations are performed to identify up to three hazard zones for each release scenario

─ Zone 1: It’s the area that is closest to the source; where death may result (i.e., area where levels are greater than the LOC-3 value)

─ Zone 2: It’s the area where severe injuries/illnesses may result (i.e., area where levels are greater than the LOC-2 value)

─ Zone 3: It’s the area further from the source; where minor injuries/illnesses may result (i.e., area where levels are greater than the LOC-1 value)

Hazard Zone Impacting the Base

Severity Level

Zone 1 Catastrophic

Zone 2 Critical

Zone 3 Moderate

No Zone Negligible

Probability Probability of a TIC/TIM release scenario is

based on the following definitions and on accident/natural disaster data Frequent and/or Likely: May occur immediately,

with in a short time, or repeats every other year Occasional: More than likely will occur in time Seldom: May happen, if given enough time. Unlikely: May never happenNatural Disasters:

In U.S. - National Climactic Data Center (NCDC) Storm Event DatabaseOutside U.S. – Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ (CRED’s) Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)

Accidents:On-base and off-base emergency response personnelNational Response Center (NRC) Database

Risk LevelSeverity + Probability = Risk Level

ORM Risk Assignment Matrix

SeverityProbability

Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely

Catastrophic Extremely High

Extremely High High High Moderate

Critical Extremely High High High Moderate Low

Moderate High Moderate Moderate Low Low

Negligible Moderate Low Low Low Low

Form 1 – 6: Risk TableTIC/TIM No.

Facility Chemical Scenario Type

Severity Probability

Risk Level

1

Bowater Pulp &

Paper 27 S. Highway 161Perryton, TX

79021

Anhydrous

Ammonia

Worst-Case

Catastrophic Seldom High

Alternative Moderate Seldom Low

Worst-Case

Alternative

TIC/TIM Assessment ReportThe report should include the following:

Executive Summary Introduction Methodology Scope & Limitations TIC/TIM Assessment & Inventory Risk Assessment Conclusion References Appendices (forms, maps/plots, weather

data, comprehensive inventory)

What’s next? Coordinate and brief results with MRC, FPWG, EMWG, or ATWG

Identify equipment shortfalls and order critical items

Incorporate TIC/TIM scenarios into base exercises

Update emergency response checklists Build relationship with local LEPC or equivalent

Verify actual quantity on-siteUpdate annually

Questions?