Wastewater Workshop Presentation 2007[2 R]

Wivenhoe Management Group

POST “9/11” SECURITYPOST “9/11” SECURITY

What Does It Mean for What Does It Mean for Industrial and Wastewater Industrial and Wastewater

Treatment PlantsTreatment Plants


Security Wake-Up CallSecurity Wake-Up Call

• America is vulnerable to a terrorist attackAmerica is vulnerable to a terrorist attack

• Implementing proper Security is a Implementing proper Security is a

challengechallenge

• There are many types of threats There are many types of threats

• Countermeasures must be effectiveCountermeasures must be effective


Industrial & Wastewater Industrial & Wastewater SecuritySecurity

• Security is importantSecurity is important• Health IssuesHealth Issues

– DiseaseDisease– Breeding Ground for Biological AgentsBreeding Ground for Biological Agents

• Economic ConsequencesEconomic Consequences– Inability to Treat Waste Shuts Down Inability to Treat Waste Shuts Down

Industry/CommerceIndustry/Commerce

• Lack of Public ConfidenceLack of Public Confidence– Messy InconvenienceMessy Inconvenience

• Spreads to Other SectorsSpreads to Other Sectors– General Loss of ConfidenceGeneral Loss of Confidence


Industrial & Wastewater Industrial & Wastewater SecuritySecurity

• Government LegislationGovernment Legislation

• Vulnerability Assessments (VA)Vulnerability Assessments (VA)

• Meeting VA RecommendationsMeeting VA Recommendations


Key InfrastructureKey Infrastructure


Recent Security Recent Security LegislationLegislation

• 2002 – Wastewater Security Act (not promulgated)2002 – Wastewater Security Act (not promulgated)• 2003 – 2004 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 2003 – 2004 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism

Preparedness and Response Act (BPRA)Preparedness and Response Act (BPRA)• 2003 – Hazardous Materials Transportation – 49 CFR Parts 2003 – Hazardous Materials Transportation – 49 CFR Parts

171-178171-178• 2003-2004 Maritime Transportation Security Act2003-2004 Maritime Transportation Security Act• 2003 – International Air Transportation Administration 2003 – International Air Transportation Administration

(IATA) Regulations(IATA) Regulations• 2006 – DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism (CFAT) 2006 – DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism (CFAT)

Standards, (ANPR) – 6 CFR Part 27Standards, (ANPR) – 6 CFR Part 27• 2006 – Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Rail 2006 – Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Rail

Transportation Security (ANPR) – 49 CFR Parts 1520 & Transportation Security (ANPR) – 49 CFR Parts 1520 & 15801580

• 2007 – DHS CFAT Interim Final Regulations2007 – DHS CFAT Interim Final Regulations


Recent Security Recent Security LegislationLegislation

• 2004-2006 City of Baltimore; MD 2004-2006 City of Baltimore; MD state; New Jersey; New York – state; New Jersey; New York – various state and local regulationsvarious state and local regulations– Maryland Maryland did not excludedid not exclude Wastewater Wastewater

– New Jersey developing extensive New Jersey developing extensive additions to current legislationadditions to current legislation

– Illinois following New JerseyIllinois following New Jersey


Current LegislationCurrent Legislation

• It is likely that what we are seeing at the It is likely that what we are seeing at the moment is simply the “moment is simply the “Tip of the IcebergTip of the Iceberg””

• Many States are planning new Security Many States are planning new Security Related Laws aimed at:Related Laws aimed at:

• ANYONE involved in the manufacture, use ANYONE involved in the manufacture, use of, storage of, distribution of or any other of, storage of, distribution of or any other form of involvement with Dangerous, or form of involvement with Dangerous, or Strategic Chemicals and GasesStrategic Chemicals and Gases


Security Vulnerability Security Vulnerability AssessmentAssessment

• Focus of LegislationFocus of Legislation• Pre “9/11” Known as Risk Pre “9/11” Known as Risk

AssessmentAssessment• Essential Elements:Essential Elements:

– MethodologyMethodology– Assess Threat LevelAssess Threat Level– Identify Critical AssetsIdentify Critical Assets– Detect Delay RespondDetect Delay Respond– RecommendationsRecommendations


RecommendationsRecommendations

• Based on Methodology Based on Methodology UtilizedUtilized– Detect, Delay and RespondDetect, Delay and Respond– Deter, Detect and RespondDeter, Detect and Respond

• Typically CostlyTypically Costly

• IST FactorIST Factor

• Practical ConsequencesPractical Consequences


What To DoWhat To Do

• Meet RecommendationsMeet Recommendations

• Do NothingDo Nothing

• CompromiseCompromise

• Follow Security IndustryFollow Security Industry


Prudent ManagementPrudent Management

• Understand Your Individual Understand Your Individual SituationSituation– Vulnerability AssessmentVulnerability Assessment

• Realistic RecommendationsRealistic Recommendations– Act on Sensible RecommendationsAct on Sensible Recommendations

• Phased ImplementationPhased Implementation– Consider Implementation over StagesConsider Implementation over Stages

• Deterrent ApproachDeterrent Approach– Follow Security Industry StandardsFollow Security Industry Standards


The Deterrent ApproachThe Deterrent Approach

• Sandia ApproachSandia Approach::– Detect Delay RespondDetect Delay Respond

• Security Industry Approach:Security Industry Approach:– Deter Detect RespondDeter Detect Respond


Factors Affecting Factors Affecting RecommendationsRecommendations

• Problem AreasProblem Areas– Cost Cost – Number and Location of Critical Number and Location of Critical

AssetsAssets– Response TimeResponse Time– Practical ConsequencesPractical Consequences

Operational ImpactOperational Impact


Delay/ResponseDelay/ResponsePath 1: Access facility via boat, enter unobstructedUse Light Sea Craft to traverse lakes and come

ashore at Intake Pit area, Remove explosives,Access Gate, Pack & Set Explosives, set Detonator/Timer, Return to craft & Detonate safe distanceawayEstimate of Probability ofAdversary Alarm Response Force Time (in Seconds)Sequence Communication Mean Standard DeviationInterruption 0 600 180

Delays (in Seconds):Task Description P(Detection) Location Mean: Standard Deviation

1 Using light sea craft come ashore at Intake Pit area and 0 E 60 18remove explosives

2 Access Gate 0 E 30 93 Cross to Intake Pit 0 E 8 2.44 Pack & Set Explosives in Piping & Valves 0 E 1205 Set Detonator/Timer 0 E 306 Return to Craft and Detonate Safe Distance Away 0 E 9078

Adversary Task Time 338Probability of Interruption: 0.00

(1) Response Force Unlikely to Respond as No Detection(2) No Perimeter Detection or Assessment(3) No Detection at Structure(4) No Restrictions to Lakes(5) Destruction of Asset will cause substantial damage and will

also lead to Loss of Public Confidence


Client XXXClient XXXSecurity Improvement Cost EstimateSecurity Improvement Cost Estimate

Sandia Methodology ApproachSandia Methodology Approach

RISK REDUCTION SOLUTION

CRITICAL ASSET

DESCRIPTIONESTIMATE

D COST

(1A) Control # X Relocate with New Housing $TBD

(1B) Control # XPerimeter Security Improvements & Upgrades

$600,000

(2A)Control # Y & I-XX/C-XX Culverts

Perimeter Security Improvements $200,000

(2B) As Above Hardening Measures $190,000

(3A)WTP Facility

Perimeter Security Improvements & Upgrade

1,240,000

(3B) As AbovePerimeter Security Improvements & Upgrade

300,000

(3C) As Above Hardening Measures 1,060,000

TOTAL$3,590,000

Summary of Risk Reduction Solutions for Client Summary of Risk Reduction Solutions for Client XXXXXX


Deterrent ApproachDeterrent Approach

• DeterDeter• DetectDetect• RespondRespond

Successfully utilized within the Successfully utilized within the security industry for many yearssecurity industry for many years


Main Features of Deterrent Main Features of Deterrent ApproachApproach

• Emphasis on perimeter Emphasis on perimeter protectionprotection– FencingFencing– SignageSignage– LightingLighting– SurveillanceSurveillance– DetectionDetection– Effective Audible Alarm(s)Effective Audible Alarm(s)


Differences in CostDifferences in Cost

• FencingFencing• LightingLighting• SignageSignage• SurveillanceSurveillance• DetectionDetection• AlarmAlarm• Hardening of Hardening of

Critical AssetsCritical Assets

• FencingFencing• Perimeter LightingPerimeter Lighting• Perimeter SignagePerimeter Signage• Perimeter Perimeter

SurveillanceSurveillance• Perimeter Perimeter

DetectionDetection• Effective Audible Effective Audible

Alarm(s)Alarm(s)

Sandia Sandia ApproachApproach

Deterrent Deterrent ApproachApproach



Sandia Methodology ApproachSandia Methodology Approach


CRITICAL ASSET

DESCRIPTIONESTIMATED

COST



$600,000



(2B) As Above Hardening Measures $190,000

(3A)WTP Facility


1,240,000


300,000

(3C) As Above Hardening Measures 1,060,000

TOTAL $3,590,000

Summary of Risk Reduction Solutions for Summary of Risk Reduction Solutions for Client XXXClient XXX



Deterrent Methodology ApproachDeterrent Methodology Approach


CRITICAL ASSET

DESCRIPTIONESTIMATE

D COST



$276,000



(2B) As Above Hardening Measures N/A

(3A)WTP Facility


$560,500


$192,000

(3C) As Above Hardening Measures $1,060,000

TOTAL TOTAL REDUCTION OF REDUCTION OF 68.42%68.42%

$1,133,90$1,133,9000

Summary of Risk Reduction Solutions for Summary of Risk Reduction Solutions for Client XXXClient XXX


Industry QuotesIndustry Quotes

““The current approach to facility The current approach to facility sites ignores the tremendous value sites ignores the tremendous value of deterrence that can be achieved at of deterrence that can be achieved at a fraction of the cost proposed for a fraction of the cost proposed for hardening the site. Except at the hardening the site. Except at the highest profile sites, the threat to highest profile sites, the threat to the site can be reasonably deterred the site can be reasonably deterred without building a fortress.”without building a fortress.”

James M. Woodruff, PE, CPPJames M. Woodruff, PE, CPP

CEO American Consulting EngineersCEO American Consulting Engineers


Industry QuotesIndustry Quotes

" The Design Basis Threat for many " The Design Basis Threat for many facilities is ‘Environmental/Social facilities is ‘Environmental/Social Extremist’ or lower. This level of threat Extremist’ or lower. This level of threat does not need the levels of protection does not need the levels of protection recommended for ‘domestic terrorist’ or recommended for ‘domestic terrorist’ or ‘state sponsored foreign terrorist.’ ‘state sponsored foreign terrorist.’ Concentration on deterrence Concentration on deterrence countermeasures can markedly reduce countermeasures can markedly reduce the cost of protecting the site and the cost of protecting the site and provide an appropriate measure of provide an appropriate measure of security protection consistent with the security protection consistent with the Design Basis Threat level."Design Basis Threat level." David L. RockfordDavid L. RockfordPresident, The Wickford GroupPresident, The Wickford Group


ConsiderationConsideration

• In following the Deterrent Approach, it is estimated that industrial facilities can reduce their security costs by a factor of 30-60 percent.


Summation of BenefitsSummation of Benefits

• Significant Reduction in CostSignificant Reduction in Cost

• Less Operational ImpactLess Operational Impact

• Easier ImplementationEasier Implementation

• Greater Acceptance by Staff Greater Acceptance by Staff and Vendors/Visitorsand Vendors/Visitors


ConclusionConclusion• Significant Security Legislation & Likely to Significant Security Legislation & Likely to

IncreaseIncrease• Legislation Encourages Security Legislation Encourages Security

Vulnerability Assessments (SVA)Vulnerability Assessments (SVA)• Important to Understand VulnerabilitiesImportant to Understand Vulnerabilities• Pursue Sensible SVA Incorporating Security Pursue Sensible SVA Incorporating Security

Industry Standards & Deterrent ApproachIndustry Standards & Deterrent Approach• Seek Degree of Professional AssistanceSeek Degree of Professional Assistance

– NO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPERIENCE IN SECURITYNO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPERIENCE IN SECURITY


QuestionsQuestions

• Wivenhoe Management GroupWivenhoe Management Group– Tel. (609)-208-0112Tel. (609)-208-0112– Fax (609)-208-1295Fax (609)-208-1295

– www.wivenhoegroup.com– [email protected]

Wastewater Workshop Presentation 2007[2 R]

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Transcript of Wastewater Workshop Presentation 2007[2 R]