SECURITIES ANDEXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D. C. 20549(202) 272.-2650

FOR RELEASE 10:45 A.M., EST,

THE SECURITIES INDUSTRYIN THE YEARS AHEAD

An Address By

DECEHBER 4, 1980

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Harold M. Williams, ChairmanSecurities and Exchange Commission

The Securities Industry Association1980 Annual ConventionBoca Raton, Florida

December 4, 1980

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INTRODUCTION

I am pleased to have the opportunity once again to

address this gathering of the Securities Industry Association.

Today marks my fourth appearance at your Annual Convention.

This is, I believe, a fitting occasion for me to share with

you, as leaders of a vital national industry, my perception

of our experiences over the last several years and of the

future which lies ahead.

Such an exercise is important. Because of the rapid

pace of change in the economic and regulatory environment, the

securities industry has not typically taken the opportunity

to formulate a long-term perspective. Indeed, the past

decade saw the industry buffeted by unprecedented economic

and regulatory waves. May Day, 1975, and its aftermath, the

trend towards industry concentration, the emergence of new

product lines and services, the increasing dealer-orientation

of many firms, and the extraordinary levels of interest and

inflation rates have all served to alter permanently the

familiar contours of the securities business. Nevertheless,

I believe that the industry has emerged from this traumatic

period more efficient, better managed, and better capitalized

than it entered. While the changes have not been pleasant --

and, for some who were in this audience ten years ago, have

even proven fatal -- those changes have, I believe, produced a

stronger securities industry.

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The pressure of these developments has, however, forcedmany in the industry to devote themselves to dealing with aseries of crises rather than to planning for the long-termfuture of their firm or their indus~ry. As a result, I do notbelieve that any of us -- in the industry, in government, or inthe academic world -- understand fully the ultimate consequencesof the changes which the past decade has wrought. Yet, asinvestor interest in the markets begins its long overduerenewal, as the Nation's need for new investment capitalaccelerates, and as the 150 million share day Ipoms on thehorizon, it becomes increasingly important that we develop anunderstanding of what the securities industry is and what ~tshould be during the balance of this century.

For that reason, I would like today to raise for youquestions which I believe must be asked as the securitiesindustry faces the future. I do not claim to have the answers.It is, however, clear to me that both the industry and theCommission need to understand better the long-term implicationsof our past and present actions and to ensure that our short-rundecisionmaking is in harmony with the longer-term.

IQ that light, let me share with you my perspective onthe securities industry's future. I want to divide my remarks-- the concerns which I believe you need to address into five

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areas: the economic challenges~ the industry's role in thecapital formation needs of our country~ the market structurechallenges~ the challenge of preserving the vitality of thesecurities industry's unique self-regulatory system~ and,finally, the role which the SIA ought to play in addressingthese matters. I have placed industry economics first because,without an economically viable securities industry, any otherquestions concerning the industry's future are irrelevant. Iwant, therefore, to turn first to the economics of thesecurities business.

The Economic Challenges Ahead

The long-term implications of the economic environmentin which the industry today operates are both especiallyimportant and especially difficult to fathom. For example,changes in the composition of security firm income streams,financing arrangements, and capital structure cannot helpbut have significant implications for the future structureand regulatory environment of the industry. As all goodmanagers must in an inflation-plagued economy, those in thesecurities industry also should take careful stock of thebusiness planning and risk management implications of theirimmediate reactions to inflationary pressures. Moreover,such managers must expect that non-traditional solutions to

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current economic problems may call for careful considerationof the regulatory implications of those innovative businessdecisions. The efforts of firms to protect themselvesagainst market volatility and cyclicability, by diversificationand by measuring its trading and investment activities also hasits regulatory, as well as business implication.

Similarly, the increasingly dealer-oriented nature ofthe securities industry may well have profound implicationsfor the way in which such firms do business and raise therequisite capital to support securities activities. Howadequate is industry capital and how able is it to competefor capital in the marketplace or raise capital by means otherthan retained earnings. And, concerns about the efficiencyof the pricing mechanisms of the securities markets and thebest use of scarce industry capital cannot be ignored. Norare the potential regulatory and competitive concerns raisedby such an industry configuration without moment.

Finally, the tendency towards industry concentrationmay lead to changes in the short-term which could have long-term impacts on the industry. The Commission Staff Report onthe Securities Industry in 1979 reported, on the basis of notfull comparable data, an increase j~ concentration levels of thetop 25 broker-dealer firms in the industry from 44 percent ofgross revenues in 1971 to 61 percent in 1979, and from 56 percent

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of total assets in 1971 to 77 percent in 1979. The study pointsout, however, that there is an inverse correlation between size offirm and profitability, i.e., the larger the firm the lower thepercentage of profitability -- however measured. Here we are,of course, all aware of the short-term difficulties which somefirms have experienced in merging together the operations of twodisparately organized and functioning entities. Just assignificant, however, are the long-term implications of themarriage. It is, for example, much easier to talk thebenefits of merger than to achieve -- and sustain -- them.Similarly, diversification of product lines in one entitywithout sufficient attention to sound management organizationand internal control has, at times, threatened to allowdifficult situations in one area to ripple not only throughouta firm, but also beyond the individual firm to the ever-increasingly-interdependent sister firms and markets of thesecurities industry.

But, just as responsible individuals in the managementof securities firms and industry bodies must proceed with afull awareness of the implications of their present-dayactions, so, too, the Commission is endeavoring to understandbetter the economics of the industry and the long- and short-term implications of regulatory actions which it may take.

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Recently-proposed changes to the FOCUS reporting system aredesigned in part with the goal in mind, of providing betterinformation to both the industry and the Commission.

Also, as you know, the Commission, in conjunction withthe SlAts recommendation, is presently taking a careful lookat the Commission's net capital and customer protectionrules to ensure that they are consistent with present economicand regulatory needs. Recognizing the need of heavily-lever-aged firms for increasing amounts of business capital, theCommission is exploring the possibility of freeing up someof the regulatory capital presently restricted by the Commis-sion's rules. At the same time, however, the Commission isalso considering the effects of inflation and the federalgovernment's monetary policy on the volatility of the debtmarket -- and the resulting impact which such volatility hason the liquidity position of firms -- while attempting toadjust the "haircut" requirements of the net capital ruleaccordingly. Again, the Commission's proposed changes tothe FOCUS reporting system should enable us to move moreintelligently and responsibly in these areas.

Fi~ally, the Commission is also committed to fully under-standing and taking into account the issues of industryconcentration and firm size and div~ 'sification. In the

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first place, the Commission has long been conscious of theneed to carefully differentiate between industry firms accordingto their size and their functions. An awareness of thepossibly differential impact of regulation has formed asignificant part of the Commission's deliberations concerningthe still-pending Papilsky proposal from the NASD and hasalso been integral to its reconsideration of its net capitalrule and FOCUS report system. At the same time, however, Iam concerned that, while SIPC coverage may indeed be a factorwhich the Commission can responsibly take into account whenattempting to guage the proper level and mix of regulatorycapital that should be required, the increasingly large andcomplex nature of some securities firms may require us toconsider carefully whether some system to rehabilitate troubledfirms may be called for as an alternative to SIPC liquidation.So, too, I have repeatedly expressed my views concerning theneed for securities firms to ensure the continuing integrityof existing activities before embarking into new areas, andI have stressed the urgent need to take meaningful action toprevent crises in one product line from bringing down theentire firm.

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The Securities Industry's Vital Role in theCapital Raising and Distribution Process

Simply stated, the securities industry and the Commissionmust not lose sight of the importance of the traditionalunderwriting and broker-dealer functions -- which thesecurities industry has performed so ably over the yearsto the vital capital raising and distribution process ofthis Nation. While competitive pressures and customerpreferences cannot Qe ignored, the industry must take carefulstock of the type of core businesses to which it has committeditself before venturing into new areas. Neither the economynor the government can long tolerate a lack of commitmentboth in terms of capital and regulatory oversight -- tothose areas which have traditionally provided the securitiesindustry with its reason for being. Rather, the industry'straditional role is what the "public interest" prote~ts, andwhat forms the basis for the special and favored treatmentafforded the industry. And, it is that special and favoredtreatment which also carries with it special responsibilities.

Thus, just as the Commission has devoted conside~ablymore attention in the last few years to removing impedimentsto and"facilitating the capital raising and distributionprocess of this Nation, so too the securitie~ ~ndustry mustrecognize that it is the industry's preeminent role in that

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process that forms its greatest contribution to the publicinterest and the national welfare. In this regard, theCommission has become increasingly concerned about capitalformation in American business and the health of the securitiesindustry which is so vital to that formation and distributionprocess. It has done so without a specific statutory mandate,sensing a strong responsibility to contribute, where it can,to facilitating this crucial process.

In addition to being able to serve the capital needs ofestablished clients, the special problems of small or start-upbusinesses must be addressed. Commission concerns and senseof responsibility for the capital raising needs of suchbusinesses must be shared by the industry. As securitiesfirms become larger, more diversified, and seek to "go national"-- or "international" -- and the industry becomes moreconcentrated, the financing needs of small or local enterprisesmust not go unmet. We must assure ourselves that the securitiesindustry will provide adequately for the capital needs ofthose issuers which can presently muster only localizedinterest and support.

Similarly, Commission actions to help small business andto integrate and streamline the registration process shouldnot be met by the industry only with narrow concerns aboutunderwriters' potentially increased exposure to liability or

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economic risks. Rather, th~ Commission's efforts to removeunnecessary impediments to securities sales to businessdevelopment companies or through limited or secondarydistributions present the indust~y not only with addedopportunities to contribute its genius and resources torestore the lost luster of American productivity, but alsowith new and additional responsibilities to ensure that theseinnovative avenues of capital flow are not choked off due tothe irresponsible actions of the few, In sum, it is a spiritof cooperative and constructive dialogue between the industryand the Commission -- such as that which characterized theCommission's recent deliberations on the Papilsky matterthat must prevail if this Nation's capital raising andallocation needs are to be met in the future, and if theindustry is to demonstrate its continuing strong cQmmitmentto its traditional roles.

Indeed, to the extent that the C9mmission's and theindustry's actions succeed in facilitating the vital capitalformation and distribution process of tois Nation, theyserve also to present renewed opPQrtunities for the securitiesindustry to demonstrate to the Congress and the Americanpublic that it fulfills a unique and notable role which oureconomy cannot afford to weaken or endanger in any way. Atthe same time, however, to the extent that American industry

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finds itself unable to raise the capital necessary to sustainits productive capacities and our national well-being orseeks it elsewhere -- it will be the securities industrywhose reason for being may well be called into question.It is here -- rather than in com~ercial banking, real estate,or insurance -- where the future of the securities industry,and the expectations of the American public for it, lie.

Thus, while the securities business of tomorrow maydiffer vastly from that of today, the industry must not losesight of its core responsibilities as dealer-underwritersand secondary market brokers and dealers. The public andthe government will have very little patience for industrydiversifications into new product lines to the extent thatthe industry's capital, managerial, and regulatory commitmentsto the core area of its traditional concerns go unfulfilled.An increasingly leveraged, concentrated, dealer-oriented,and diversified securities industry must, as several of myfellow Commissioners have stated, be prepared for thatinevitable day when it is perceived by the Congress that thesecurities industry has succeeded in breaking down thebarriers between its traditional functions and those of, forexample, the commercial banking sector. While the implicationsof the Congress' relooking Glass-Steagall are beyond thescope of my remarks toaay, the securities industry should not

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proceed without a fu~l awareness of the effects of thetransmutation whtch it has been undergoing.

Progress Towards the National Market SystemBut, more is necessary, of course, to ensure a truly fair

and efficient securities industry than simply understandingand dealing with the economic health of the industry andensuring that the industry continues to focus on its traditionalroles. As you know, the 1975 Acts Amendments direct thatthe Commission ensure that there be no burgens on competitionin the securities industry that are not necessary or appropriatein the public interest and for the protection of investors,and that the Commission facilitate the development of a nationalmarket system. Time will not permit me to cover the near-termnational market system priorities of the Commission in thesame detail here as I did in my prepared remarks before theNational Securities Traders ASSQciation this past October5th. But, I do wish to say a few words about industry progresstowards the NMS.

Here, too, the Comm~ssion is proceeding cautiously --fully mindful of the risks involved in tinkering with asystem as delicate -- and successful -- as the presentsecurities markets. As you all know, the Com~ission recentlyadopted Rule 19c-3 as an "experiment" by which it expects to

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better understand the effects that enhanced dealer competitionwould have on the fairness and efficiency of the securitiesmarkets. The Commission views the process of the evolutionarydevelopment of a national market system as one during whichrisks must constantly be reappraised -- and appropriatecorrective action taken. In order to ensure that the vitalmechanisms of our existing securities markets are not undulythreatened in preparing for an even more competitive andefficient future, it is continuing to monitor the industry's19c-3 experience and actively considering whether and whenit becomes necessary or appropriate to address theinternalization, equal regulation, and other concerns whichhave been raised concerning it. Nevertheless, as allparticipants seem to recognize, an effective ITS/NASDAQlinkage must be implemented before the 19c-3 experiment istruly operational and the industry and the COMmission cangather the necessary data and experiences on which to basethose difficult -- but crucial -- regulatory decisions.

From the perspective of facilities design andimplementation, the industry has made considerable progressin the last few years, but much more needs to be done. Promptimplementation of a workable -- and meaningful -- "LOIS"pilot must be a near-term national market system goal of theindustry and the Commission. So, too, the ITS must be

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improved, the NASDAQ enhancements must come on line, and thetwo trading systems must be interfaced. Similarly, effortsto improve audit trail and surveillance capabilities in anincreasingly active, complex, and competitive marketplacemust not flag.

Commission action on the first step in the process ofdesignating securities as qualified for trading in thenational market system can be expected shortly. While theCommission has not yet considered the matter, any suchinitiative should, in my view, include the designation of atleast a limited number of over-the-counter stocks as qualifiedsecurities. Over-the-counter securities which do become sodesignated should immediately be introduced to last sale andquotation reporting of the type that now prevails for listedsecurities and, in general, should eventually be eligible forunlisted trading privilege applications by exchange markets.Such initiatives, of course, would build on the enhancementsto the NASDAQ system and the ITS/NASDAQ interface and theireventual realization would, in turn, make such facilitiesdevelopments all the more necessary and rewarding.

Thus, significant additional progress must be made --and made as rapidly as possible without jeopardizing thecontinuing health and vitality of ~~e current securities

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markets. Indeed, significant advancements must be made simplyto ensure the continued efficient and effective functioningof our markets in light of changing economic and regulatorycircumstances.

As I stated from this podium last year, the industry mustdevelop the near-term capability to handle a growth in tradingvolume characterized by 150 million share days on the NYSE.Some at that time May have thought that I was being undulyalarmist. Today, in looking at recent volume figures, Iwonder -- as must we all -- whether even that capacity issufficient.

Much of what needs to be done to deal with increasedvolume -- in terms of back office, exchange floor, execution,and settlement capacities, through automation and systems ratherthan bodies pushing paper -- must occur regardless of nationalmarket system developments, but must be designed and implementedin such a way so as both to reflect those developments whichhave occurred to date and to facilitate the continued evolutionof the markets. Increased exchange automation is inevitable ifthey are to be able to deal with and hope to retain their orderflow. Existing economic interests had best recognize thealternatives. In fact, the most critical tests of the industry'singenuity, innovation, and capital may derive not from the

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evolution of the national market system viewed by itself, but

from more fundamental demands to service the marketplace as

it exists today, and as it will change in the future. Assuming

this objective requires heavy investment in capacity which is

absolutely non-discretionary on the part of any firm or exchange

-- and yet provides none of the internal or marketplace excite-

ment as does an equal investment in creating a new profit center.

Preserving the Industry's Host Valuable asset

At the same time, however, in addition to focusing on

these economic and structural challenges, the industry must

continue to safeguard the sense of integrity, fairness, and

efficiency which is its greatest asset -- and which is best

sustained by self-regulation. Strong self-regulation, with

effective government oversight, is clearly the regulatory

system which most challenges its participants -- but which,

in my opinion, also has the best built-in capacity to

continually and sensitively serve, as necessary, the interests

of the industry and the public.

1. The Self-Regulatory Model

Self-regulation, first of all, tends to result in much

ditferent regulatory standards than does direct governmental

regulation. Historically, direct regulation has shown in-

adequate sensitivity to its costs and practical consequences.

~he result is too often poor regulation.

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self-regulatory standards, in contrast, which emanatefrom the regulated industry itself, are more likely toconfront in realistic fashion difficult questions such as,what will it cost~ what behavior will it encourage or hamper~and what potential business will it attract or discourage.self-regulation thus tends to be a more knowledgeable andsensitive standard-setter: Rarely does an industry imposeunreasonable economic burdens on itself.

But, at the same time, self-regulation can easily ignorethe public's needs, compromise them in favor of industryprofits, or neglect to enforce its standards. Thus, self-regulation places special obligations on those who administerthe system. When an industry establishes its own standardsof conduct, the industry itself must accept responsibilityfor justifying and enforcing those standards. Blame cannotbe shifted to the government or others, and it is the industry

as well as the public -- which suffers most directly whenfailures do occur.

There is, a vital role for government to play in theself-regulatory process. Indeed, experience instructs us that,absent external oversight, self-regulation is not effective --particularly when the self-regulator also has a mandate fromits members to promote the industry's business.

The responsibility of government, in its oversight capacity,is to assure a reasonable balance. And, of course, if the private

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sector, for whatever reason, fails to meet the public'sexpectations, government may be compelled to fill the void.

2. Self-Regulation: A Promotional ProgramI would expect that, if the securities industry maintains

a perspective of its own long-term interests, a strong commitmentto meaningful self-regulation will flourish. Simply stated,the most productive promotional program that the industrycan undertake is effective self-regulation.

The investment process is bottomed on trust. Thesecurities industry requires the investor to part withsubstantial sums of money -- often a considerable portion ofhis life savings in exchange for an uninsured and in-tangible concept: a property right in a risk venture oftenevidenced only by some book entry or an intrinsicly worthlesscertificate. Moreover, the potential investor has anincreasing number of alternatives to traditional securities:Some, like bank certificates, are federally-insured 1 others,such as art or real estate, also provide their owners withpossession, beauty or utilitY1 .still others, such as insurance,are promoted by sophisticated marketing systems and also guardagains~ a measure of actuarial risk.

In such a competitive environment, a potential investorwill come to the securities marketplace only if he expects toreceive fair treatment and quality services. Thus, for example,

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the most severe penalty for back-office problems, I need notremind you, is not a Congressional reprimand or a Commissionrule, but rather customers who are lost to the securitiesindustry, and capital which is lost to American industry.And, a customer who feels mishandled or mistreated is notlikely to further participate in the market.

The point here is that, even in its most promotionalsense, the industry's profitability and worth depends uponthe public's perception of its integrity, quality and purpose.It is, therefore, the industry itself which has the greateststake in maintaining high standards of conduct and purposeamong its members. This fact often becomes lost in theshuffle of day-to-day interaction between the Commission andthe industry -- as though the stake and responsibliity wasprimarily that of the Commission rather than the industry.

3. Self-Regulation: Recognizing the Limits of GovernmentOf course, the Commission also has a strong commitment to

the self-regulatory model. In providing the constructivetension of which I spoke earlier, the Commission, through itsoversight activities, seeks not to displace or overrideindustry self-regulation, but to support and enhance itnot to question or erode its legitimacy and value, but tosupport and bolster it.

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successful regulator~ in part, precisely because its regulatoryrole has traditionally been a rather limited one. Unlike somesister agencies, the Commission's organic statutes, for the mostpart, require it only to administer a disclosure system andprovide effective oversight to industry self-regulators.

The 1975 Acts Amendments, in contrast, place the Commissionin the less comfortable posture of both industry regulator andfacilitator of the development of a national market system anda national market system for the clearance and settlement ofsecurities transactions. And, during my tenure as Chairman,some of the most difficult decisions we have faced have grownout of that new role. The dilemma in which this has placedthe Commission is an apt illustration of the limitations ofgovernment as a planner for industry -- a role for which it isnot well suited by experience or disposition -- as a consequenceof which I have so strongly urgeq -- and urged again -- that theindustry maintain the initiative in des~gn and implementationof the system. Our slow and deliberate movement is aconsequence of the recognition of our limited competence ratherthan the naive, dangerous and careless conclusion that we aretimid.

4. Self-Regulation; Shared Interests and ObjectivesIn sum, both the Commission and the industry are best

served by the self-regulatory systeffl. Indeed, for most

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important issues, we share a commonality of interests andobjectives. Therefore, while I recognize that there mayalways be good-faith differences of opinion on how to reachour shared goals -- and that these differences need to be airedand resolved -- I do not fully understand the seeminglyadversarial postures which sometimes develop between theCommission and the industry's spokesmen.

5. Self-Regulation: The ChallengeTo a much greater extent than we have succeeded in doing, we

should be able to encourage and support each other's goals. Inthis regard, for example, the industry should champion theCommission's efforts to secure sufficient resources to adequatelyand credibly meet our oversight responsibilities. Thatresponsibility, in turn, necessitates for example, an inspectionprogram greater than the Commission has monitored in the past.

Similarly, in a sophisticated financial world, adequate andcredible Commission market oversight requires that the Commissiondevelop the kind of technically advanced capabilities onwhich the industry itself relies. This is the objective of theUarket Oversight and Surveillance System -- MOSS -- which theCommission is currently implementing. noss is not a tool for theCommission to usurp the surveillance role of the self-regulators. On the contrary, MOSS will, make the Commission'soversight of the self-regulators credibile and enable it, when

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necessary to demonstrate to both Congress and the public that self-regulation is a meaningfu! altern~tive to government regulation.

Mutual support also means that both the Commission and theindustry have the same interest in endorsing a read~ng of thefederal securities laws which allows the Commission to protectadequately the investing pUblic. In the long-run, the credibilityof Commission and private pl~intiff enforcement of the securitieslaws is, in my jUdgment, directly related to the public'sperception of the indust~y's integ~ity.

The experience of the last four decades has demonstrated thewisdom and value of the self-regulatory model. Indeed, I, forone, have long wonder~d why the model of sec~rities industryself-regulation has not been copied -- or at least consideredseriously -- whenever the government perceives a need for regulatoryintervention. Yet, the secur~ties ind~stry should not be sanguinethat self-regUlation of its activ~ties is immutable. Effectiveself-regulation r~quires continuous nuturing to survive.

The Role of the SIAThe SIA has an import~nt role to play in sustaining self-

regulation. Its members ar~ not simply businessmen. You arealso imPortant participants in the self-regulatory process. And,in-that capacity you must continually strike a balance betweenyour individual economic interests and your aggregate responsibil-ities in making this unique regulatory scheme effective.

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Nor is the SIA simply a trade organization. As the mostinclusive organization of securities professionals -- and onewhich transcends the bounds of particular SROs -- the SIA shouldbe expected to contribute significantly to the broad perspectivenecessary to make the system work.

Such a uroad perspective, first of all, recognizes that thelikely substitute for failed self-regulation is not the absence ofregulation, but an ultimately greater level of direct governmentcontrol. And, as the umbrella organization of the industry, itis the SIA, rather than a government agency, which is in a uniqueposition to ensure -- by education, by advocacy, and by peerinfluence -- that an effective self-regulatory system does noterode.

In this vein, one would expect the SIA to relate to theCommission with a presumption of common purpose -- not a postureof reflexive opposition. And, as a corollary, one would expectthe SIA to support the Commission's requests for sufficientresources to adequately and credibly meet its responsibilitiesin the self-regulatory process. Yet, this has not always been

the case.Finally, the SIA is perhaps the body best situated to

appreciate the longer-term consequences of the new industryenvironment. The securities industry performs tasks which

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effect our National economic well~being and are infused with asubstantial public interest. Regardless of the composition ofgovernment or the particular political philosophies of the moment,the industry will inevitably and ultimately be held accountableaccording to its success or failure in meeting these challenges.I would urge you, as strongly as I know how, not to permit thecurrent political euphoria to cause you to lose sight of thatultimate fact. Am I naive in urging your enhanced supportfor the self-regulatory model and for a statemanship role forSIA? No I am not. I understand the countervailing forces atwork. Unrealistic. Not for those who are prepared to gobeyond complaining about the existing business-governmentrelationship and committed to righting the balance.

ConclusionIn conclusion, based on my personal experience over the

past three and one-half years, I am most confident about thefuture of the securities industry. The industry's directionhas been encouraging: It includes improved market mechanisms,a sounder financial footing, better management and strongerleadership.

If you are to shift the balance in the bus~ness-governmentrelationship back t9 business and keep it there, it will takeincreased business initiative and assumption of responsibilitiesto achieve. Whether my relationship with the industry willcontinue in its present capacity to the completion of my full

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full term remains to be seen. If it does not, I will leave theCommission with a sense of optimism for the industry's future andfor its continuing contribution to our Nation. If, on the otherhand, I have the opportunity to visit with you next year for afifth time as the Commission's chairman, I expect to be able to

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observe that the trend of the industry is even more positive.Thank you.

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