Was any joint response to the situationdiscussed?Did the SADF indicate its fears that this group was going to attack KwaMadala?)

22:55 £Iscor1

Rapport J Steyn te GOS wat monitor vertrek onraiddellik vir ondersoek.

(QUESTIONS ARISING Where did Steyn go?What and where is GOS?)

22:55 (Iscor - Nell

Pocket Book Entry Ontvang boodskap optog swart jeugdiges op pad vanaf Boipatong na KwaMadala.

(QUESTION Where did Nel get this report - it mentions youths, Boipatong and KwaMadala?)

22:56 flscor)

Rapport Kontak Sktr Du Preez te Vaal Kommando wat meld dat die Swartes uit Boipatong in die rigting van Kwa-Madala beweeg. SAP en Kommando lede is op toneel en monitor die mense.(NOTE both the SAP and SADF are on the scene and monitoring the group; how could they possibly disappear? Why did the SAP not inform the SADF and Iscor about the events in Boipatong, the nature of which was by then absolutely clear?)

22:56 flscor - Nel)

Pocket Book Entry Bevestig Berig met skutter Du Preez Vaal Kommando

22:57 ('SADF)

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log 31C By Ooshek.

23:00 (Iscor)Rapport Kmdt Vermaak is getontak en van nodige inligting voorsien, versoek verdere inligting.

(Is Vermaak in the SADF or is that a rank in the Iscor security department? What was conveyed to him?)

2 3 : 0 0 ( SADF)

Group 17 Incident Report Ora 172300 B Jun 92 het Vaal Komdo berig dat on<50veer 300 raense op pad was ora KwaMadala hcstslle aan te val. Hulle was te voet. SAP het uitbeweeg na die toneel asook die reaksiemag van 21 SAI. Die situasie het egter gestabiliseer an daar staan net klein groepies mense rond. SAP monitor die situasie.

['NOTE that this record also suggests that the report construing the group as being intent on an attack on the hostel came from the Vaal Commando; insofar as it refers to the SAP moving out to the scene, it likewise suggests that the SADE personnel did not see SAP vehicles near the group at that time)

23:00 ('Boip'iSit Rapp Alles is nog nie doodstil te Ak as 00k gebiede.

23:02 ('Iscor')

Rapport Mnr Jansen van Rensburg is 00k van inligting voorsien wat meld dat Sekerheid Reaksiemaa nie verder as hek mag gaan nie. BoodsKap so oorgedra aan J Steyn.

23:02 fIscor1Rapport Oscar 2 verlang alle reaksie mag lede by Ooshek vir bystand met alle toerusting.

(Is Oscar 2 an Iscor security unit or SADF code? - (It seems from Nel's pocket book that he could be Oscar 2).Who was to be assisted with what sort of action?)

23:03 (Iscor)

Rapport Alle lede het gesprek gemonitor en vertrek vir bystand.

23:05 flscor'l

Rapport Oscar 2 berig dat alle inwoners van KwaMadala daar is, alles is daar rustig.

(By whom was this information given? Was it given in the context of the report that there was a group of 800 on the move? Given that report, was anything done to verify that all the KwaMadala residents were indeed asleep? If it was accepted that all the KwaMadala people were there, was it then conveyed to the Hostel guard that there was an alien force of 800 in the vicinity, which might be bent on an attack? If so, what precautions were taken eg. waking of residents?)

<SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: From Nel's pocket book, it appears that

he spoke to "MOSES" at KwaMadala (presumably Moses Mthembu,- L - f— 1— — , . 1 — 1 — - - - — — — — — • ! — - — . — « — T T — . - J 1 mm m 1 « M y s r T m I t O - P 1 / Y 1 1 V O ^ •L f i e l l U b > L t i l t > u p t : i v i b u i a . 1 i u a n c y c u i ^ a i c a u i i i y j . i i j \ a u n a i x y u j ; f

Nel's note reads: "Al sy mense egter te Hostel alles lyk rustig" - a question does arise: why should Nel go to make this enquiry because of a report of a group of youths marching from Boipatong to KwaMadala; there is no suggestion in Nel's book that he sounded an alarm or even that Moses was informed of the "march")

23:05 fBoip)

Laat Inskrywina Wyk Sers Kele, Kst Serobe en Sers Lesibo rapporteer terug te C.O.P. alles stil en rustig met voertuig SAP 102250 en km lesing 115777.

23:06 flscor - Nel)

Pocket Book Entry Te kwekery alles in orde.

(NOTE This must be the nursery at the corner of Frikkie Meyer and Noble (on the KwaMadala side); Nel makes no mention of any SAP or SADF vehicles or of anything unusual.

23:08 (ISU-Ver)

Klaate ontvana By Victor (?) dat by 772 Batswana str Boipatong- dat hulle skiet en klip gooi.

23:10 f VdBP'l

Klaate David van 772 Batswana str Boipatong kla steeds van openbare geweld. Victor Zero is weer gekontak vir aandag.

(Presumably this is the complaint noted as received at 23:08)

23:10 (SADF)

Buffel 3 2A Frikkie Meyer by robot van Metalbox. Sien 'n groot groep swartes met wit kop bande oor die pad beweeg in die rigting van KwaMadala (raporteer aan basis). Patroleer gebied vir swartes saam met 31C en 31B onder die bevel van Majoor Jordaan.

(NOTE there is no mention here of the SAP being present, although it is possible that this report was concerned only with the SADF contingent. NOTE ALSO that Sktr Pienaar is part of the crew of this Buffel - it may be therefore that this vehicle was at Cape Gate earlier, when a Buffel was requested to assist. This vehicle was booked back in at 01:18.)

23:10 flscor - Nel)

Pocket Book Entry Te grens buite by water put. Patroleer oiTiyswing. Majoor Jcrdaan en sy mense stap verder patrolie.

fNOTE the SADF is on the scene)

23:10 (SADF1

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log 19A Op pad na Kwa Mandela.

23:12 (SADF1

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log 3 2B Beweeg saam met SAP.

(NOTE that this appears to be the first explicit reference by the SADF to the SAP being on the scene - and acting jointly with the SADF)

23:16 fIscor!

Rapport Oscar 2 berig dat reaksiemag lede ontplooi word teen grensdraad aangesien verdagtes vermoedelik oppad is na grensdraad.

(NOTE the reference to "verdagtes"? what were they suspected of? What were the instructions of this security force? NOTE also that there is reference to the border fence only precisely where is that? What about the "back" entrance to KwaMadala (the one seen during the inspection) - what steps were taken to monitor and/or safeguard this entrance? NOTE also the statement that the suspects were "supposedly" on the way to the border fence - by 22:56 they were being monitored by the SAP and SADF; how could they simply have disappeared? How exactly did it happen that they got back inside KwaMadala hostel? Someone must have observed it - who? And with what consequences? (cf the earlier report that all were present)

23:18 (Iscor)

Rapport Kmdt Vermaak is weer gekontak en op hoogte gebring van alle beskikbare inligting.

23-:22 flscorlRapport SAP onluste eenheid gekontak om te (illegible), Knst Cornelisen meld dat daar groot moeilikheid is in Boipatong aangesien Inkata lede van Kwa Madala blykbaar daar gaan probleme skep het.

(NOTE It would appear that Iscor contacted the SAP and not vice versa; if that is indeed the position, here is again confirmation that the SAP is aware that there is a link between the events in Boipatong and the Kwa Madala hostel, yet

it has not taken the initiative to contact Iscor to help take steps to apprehend the attackers. NOTE FURTHER this report directly contradicts the statement in the Iscor submissions (para 9.14, page 7) that Iscor security were not aware throughout the night of the attack on Boipatong (it is inconceivable that they would not have established in at least basic terms what the "groot moeilikheid" had been about)

23:25 Clscor)

Rapport J Steyn is so ingelig wat weer sal gaan navraag doen

(NOTE this might indicate that there was some degree of lack of clarity on the part of Iscor security)

23:28 (ISU-Ver1

Klaate ontvang By Victor dat by huis 2 29 Sinkue (?) str is daar 3 lyke, soos ontvang vanaf 'n swartman.

21:30 (VdBP)

Klaate Jerry van 229 Sinker str kontak en kla van moord van 3 swartpersone wat gekap is. Victor S^ro gekontak vir aandag.

(See entry of 23:28)

23:30 (ISU-Ver)

Rapport O/Sers Schlebusch rapporteer dat by huis 765 Hlubi str is daar +/- 200 Inkatha lede het ingegaan en geplunder.Die eienaar is kst Patrick Njoli (?) verbonde aan Vereeniging SAP. Sy vrou Martha Njoli 54jr het steek en skiet wonde.Rolo (?) Njoli 14jr is dood en Tsehelo (?) Njoli 8jr oud het noodlottige skietwonde. Het ook 2 x 9mm doppies daar opgetel. Skade is ongeveer R5000. Sglfgemaakte vuurwapons.------------

23:31 flscor)

Rapport Romeo berig dat Weermag meld dit is nie Kwa Madala inwoners nie, maar blykbaar ' n klomp jeugdiges is wat nou tussen die grasse is, en nie sigbaar is nie.

(QUESTIONS Who is Romeo? Who in the SADF furnished this information and on the basis of what observations and by whom? Does this mean that there was no longer any concern that there had been an attack on Boipatong and that hostel dwellers had been said to be involved? Was this information processed through or by the SAP in any way? Is there an element of deliberate disinformation?)

23:40 ('VdBP')

Uitslag Klagte te swartwoongebiede word deur Victor Zero wel bygewoon en die noaige stappe is geneem.

23:40 flscor - Nell

Pocket Book Entry Beweeg na GOS. Kyk vir hoof

23:42 flscor)

Rapport Monitor gesprek dat Romeo meld dat daar nog geen verwikkelinge is, verdagtes nog in veld an onsigbaar.

(NOTE at this stage it seems that the "suspects" have been labelled as a group of youths and that attention has been drawn away from the hostel residents themselves: see 23:31 entry)

23:45 flscor)

Rapport Kmdt Vermaak is so ingelig en sal eers weer indienc*aar verklik iets gebeur gekontak word,

(NOTE the perception that nothing has really happened; Vermaak (like Roos) is not to have his night further disturbed)

23:45 fISU-Ver)

Rapport O/Sers Schlebusch berig dat by huis 763 Hlubi str Boipatong Petrus Swani 34jr. Ruite voor is gebreek. +/- R500 se skade. Geen beserings.

23:45 fCape Gate) (Workers have downed tools)

23:46- fISU-Ver)

Klaate ontvang Sers Kruger berig dat hulle by hui^J75j) 'n dogtertjie vanaf hui^b25j)af gedra is wat panga kapwonde oor aar hele lyf het. ___ _

23:50 flscor - Nel)

Pocket Book Entry ontvang berig oor radio van arrestasie te pypiyn•fNOTE this is presumably the pipeline that runs up the embankment as seen during the inspection. Who carried out the arrest - was it the SADF or Iscor personnel?)

23:55 fBoip)

Rapport as per V.B. 1286 (entry of 22:35) Polisie en weermag manne net by tonele wat aangevai bygewoon; daar was mense van af Kwa-madala wat Boipatong Residents aangevai, baie mense te Boipatong het seergekry en die anders is doodgeskiet, en hulle beweer dat is Inkatha se mense; ons was by Kwa-madala gewees, en toe se victor zero ons moet terug keer.

(NOTE that this prima facie puts the SADF personnel at the scenes where attacks had taken place and not only the SAP; note also that this unit was sent away from Kwa-madala by Victor Zero (presumably the ISU); was it given alternative functions to perform or did it basically do nothing of use?)

23:55 (Iscor)Rapport Romeo berig dat een Swarte gekry is tussen biesies, sal nog uitvind of hy deel is van groep.

23:56 flscor - Nel)

Pocket Book Entrv Te pyplyn. Ondervra M S Luvomo w/nr 813 74 41. Hy dr-el moe: l) Kruip weg aangesien hy in KwaMadala bly en mense baklei; 2) Hy deel van groep mense was waarvan die res in veld is. Hy is gevind (?) deur Lompran (?) & Hibbert.

(QUESTIONS ARISING What was done in response to this arrest and information - was the SAP notified? (apparently done only some time later:see later entry). Was the SADF notified? Was the SADF still on the scene? The information that the man lived in KwaMadala is inconsistent that the group was one of youths. More importantly, the information that the people were fighting is inconsistent with the earlier information from Moses that everyone was present in KwaMadala and that everything was peaceful; in the light of the information from Luvomo, was any follow-up enguiry made? (None appears from Nel's pocket book))

24:00 (SADF1Group 17 Patrol Report 21 Battalion sent to Boipatong with the general mission: Om in samewerking met die SAP die pleeg. (?) van geweld te onderdruk. J/~The~~specifictask: Beweeg na

CMetalbox Trek vulstasie om SAP te help om mense van Boipatong te verhoed om oor te beweeg na KwaMadala hostel.

(NOTE the purpose of the exercise was to contain the people of Boipatong; there is no suggestion of deployment of this unit to assist in the location and apprehension of the attackers)

00:00 (Boip)Sit Rapp Alles stil by die kamp asook by die A.K.

(Presumably the "kamp" is the Boipatong township - all is

quiet!!!)

18 JUNE 1992

00:01 fISU-Ver1Klaate ontvana "5D" Kapt Roos berig dat ons die reaksiegroep moet uitkry na Central Hotel, Vereeninging, Beaconfieldlaan.

fQUESTIONS ARISING: Who made contact with Capt Roos and whatwas conveyed to him?Was the reaction group mobilises and did it take any action?Other than to issue this order, did Capt Roos concern himself any further with the events that night?What were his responsibilities in this type of situation?

0A:la • Iscor)Rapport Romeo berig dat die persoon wat gekry is 'n werknemer van Yskor is, en 'n inwoner van Kwa Madala. Hy is M S Luvono (?) no 8137441. Versoek dat Kmdt in kennis gestel moet word.

fQUESTION Was this person thought at the time to be associated with the problems in Boipatong or not?Was the SAP advised? Was the SADF advised? Apparently the Iscor security personnel thought it of sufficient moment to disturb the Commandant!)

00:19 flscor)Rapport Kmdt Vermaak is so verwittig, wat kennis neem,

(NOTE no reaction from the Kmdt)

00:30 fISU-Ver)Klaate ontvana "BV" Sers Smit rapporteer dat by huis 194 in Sinkwe str is 3 in die huis dood en 6 le in die straat dood.

<QUESTIONS ARISING: When and from where did Smit arrive on the scene?

00:33 fISU-Ver) (Schlebusch report re deaths etc including stolen blankets from 722 Bophelongstr)

00:40 flscor - Nel)Pocket Book Entry Kry Komando by Ooshek. Neem hulle via

spoorvervoer na pyplyn.

(What was the purpose of this and precisely who was taken? Was it to the top or the bottom of the pipeline?)

00:50 (Iscor - Nel)

Pocket Book Entry Schneider, Botes, Delport, Venter & Steyn by biesies. Kry geen beweging slegs 'n trapfiets in die veld

(Presumably this was still part of the search for the group. At that time, had any search been carried out by Iscor security within the hostel itself?)

00:58 (Iscor)

Rapport Weermag het gas geskiet, reaksiemag onttrek vanaf grensdraad en keer terug na Ooshek.

(NOTE that Nel records this as having been two gas grenades, fired by Major Jordaan)

(NOTE that it seems that at least part of the Iscor reaction unit has remained until now at the boundary fence; has there been a security presence at both the gates to Kwa Madala and is there still one in position now that the unit goes back to the East Gate?Where, at what and with what result has the SADF been firing teargas? Has there been any contact with the SAP during the period leading up to the withdrawal of the Iscor people? Was the withdrawal of the Iscor unit discussed with and approved by the SADF and/or the SAP?)

01:00 fISU-Ver) (Schlebusch report re deaths etc from 73 4 Mafokengstr)

01:00 (Boip)

Sit Rapp Alles stil by A.K. as ook by die kamp.

01:00 (SADF)

Vaal Cmdo Signals Log SAP terug in Boipatong sal deurstuur (?)•

01:15 fIscor)Rapport J Steyn telefonies meld dat hy SAP gekontak het wat verdagte sal kom ondervra en moontlik wegneem. Hy stuur 3 seksies uit vir voetpatrollie teen grensdraad.

(QUESTIONS This apparently relates to the person who was

found at 23:55; what had been done with him in the mean time? Had no information been obtained about the group and what it had been doing? What were the Iscor foot patrols to do? At that stage, had there been any further checks by the Iscor security on the situation inside KwaMadala? Were there any controls on the gates etc?)

01:18 (SADF)

Buffel 32A Clocks back in at Vaal Commando. (Also 32B)

01:20 (SADF)

RIO 31C Clocks back in at Vaal Commando.

01:30 flscor - Nell

Pocket Book Entry Onttrek met alle lede vanaf toneel.

(It is clear from this that Iscor security were satisfied th^t no further action was called for; it is also clear that there is no suggestion that they had been reguested by the SAP or the SADF to stand by in order to assist with a search of the hostel)

01:30 (ISU-Ver) (Report re 625 Bopedistr: includes statement that "Inkathe lede het na berigte in die huis ingekom en almal in die slaapkamer begin aanrand met steek en kap metodes").

01:40 fIscor)

Rapport J Steyn telefonies meld dat voetpatrollies terug is. Alles is nou terug na normaal. Almal keer terug na poste.

(QUESTIONS This suggests that there was no activity around or relating to KwaMadala. This entry seems to support the absence of any proper information having been relayed by the SAP to Iscor concerning the events in Boipatong. One matter of interest would be to define precisely what had earlier been abnormal in the view of the Iscor security personnel and what it was that satisfied them that that situation had now returned to normal)

01:48 (Cape Gate)

Rapporteer Mev Texeira skakel SAP kantore om uit te vind wat die oorsaak van die geskietery binne Boipatong was. Sers Smit noem dat hulle nie weet wat die rede daarvoor is nie, of dit die ANC & Inkatha is of ras vs. ras. Sal om 04:00 terug voering gee (SAP). Heelwat swart inwoners van Boipatong dood geskiet.

01:50 {ISU—Vc-l ) f Schlebusch report its deaths etc 194 Singustr; hi-fi and television taken).

01:58 fISU-Ver) ("512" Sgt Kruger report re deaths etc house 696 - NOTE this is in response to the complaint made at 22:45)

02:00 (SADF)

Group 17 Patrol Report 21 Battalion withdrawn from Boipatong.

02:00 (ISU-Ver)

Rapporteer O/Sers Schlebusch rapporteer dat van die inwoners oorstap na Kwa Madala hostels toe, kan hy nie sien wat hulle dra of by hulle het nie, hy het toe 300M beligtingsfakkel opgeskiet om te sien wat gaan aan.

{QUESTIONS ARISING: Who were these "inwoners"?Where were they seen?What did Schlebusch see once he had fired the flare?Did he take any conseguent action?)

02:00 f Boip'l

Sit Rapp Alles stil en rustig te Ak as ook kamp

02:30 (SADF'l

Group 17 Patrol Report 21 Battalion back at Group 17.

02:54 flscor)

Rapport J Steyn telefonies meld dat SAP die Swarte saam neem en gaan toesluit as 'n verdagte.

(NOTE WELL This relates to the report to the SAP about the arrested person, which report was made at 01:15. It has taken the police over 1,5 hrs to call for this person, who might have vital information about the attack on Boipatong. Other than an apparent intention to lock the man up as a suspect (for what?), there does not appear to have been any reaction by the police to the fact that they had this person in custody)

Sit Rapp Alles in orde te Ak as ook kamp.

04:00 (Boip)

Sit Rapp Alles in orde te Ak as ook kamp.

04:00 (Cape Gate)

Rapporteer SAP Sers Smit noem dat die probleme van die geskietery gisteraand te Boipatong veroorsaak was deur Inkatha van die Yskor hostels. So oorgedra deur Mev Texeira aan Mnre Joubert en Fourie.

(NOTE that this appears to be something of a considered police view; this bears on the question of the steps taken by the police to investigate and apprehend).

04:40 fBoip)

Voertuiq uit (Two vehicles leave to pick up members from Sebokeng)

.QA-50 fISU-Ver)

Klaate ontvana "5I211 gee aandag. Gooi klip te 3oipatong en Cap* Gate.

05:00 (ISU-Ver>

Sitrap "512" Sers Kruger berig dat Sebokeng (?) alles stil en rustig is.(NOTE it is difficult to understand this entry, if it indeed refers to Sebokeng, which is a large area, particularly if Kruger is occupied with a stone-throwing incident at Boipatong.)

05:10 fBoip)

Oordrag (transfer)

05:30 riSU-Ver)

Diens aan "A" Aflossing rapporteer aan diens...

05:45 (Boip)Voertuiq in (The two vehicles which are logged out at 04:40 are checked back in; there is no report of anything unusual en route).

05:48 fISU-Ver)

Rapport Om 05:20 het ' n groep van +/- 150 klippe op karre begin gooi. "512" gee verslag. Optreue soos voly^- (Various members fire a total of 23 x no 5 shotgun rounds) (NOTE that this is the Casspir which is still under Sgt Kruger's command)

05:51 (ISU-Ver ~l

Rapport "511" (Schlebusch reports a burning Mazda 626)

06:20 fISU-Ver\

Sitrap By Kwa Madala Hostels staan 'n groep van +/- 150, bewapen met tradisionele wapens. Daar kom toe 'n man van Lekoa en se dat "512" Sers Kruger hulle moet gee pad want hulle is vreedsaam. _—

(QUESTIONS ARISING: Were these hostel residents?Where did they want to go?Who was the man from "Lekoa"?What was the outcome of this encounter? Does this relate in any way to the account given that 3t some stage during the morning there was a stand-off between Hostel residents and Boipatong? If it was this group, it means that Kruger let them through; if it was not this group, it means that police failed to prevent a group from entering Boipatong when it had forewarning that there was such an intention)

06:28 (ISU-Ver)

Rapport "511" berig dat hulle 3 swart mans gesien het wat klippe in die pad pak. Toe hulle omdraai, hardloop hulle weg. (1 x no 5 and 1 x teargas fired - no arrests)

07:05 (Cape Gate)

Rapporteer Sers Smit van die SAP noem aan Mev Texeira dat die voorval vanoggend om 04:30 by die hoof hek te C.G. vermoedelik deur die inwoners van Boipatong self begin is. Van die polisie is ontrek & na Donges straat, blanke gebied, gestuur omrede die swartes in daardie rigting beweeg het.

(NOTE that there are various references to Donges St (white area) throughout the events of the night; it seems that the police acted effectively to prevent any outbreak of violence there).

Rapport Sers Duvenage rapporteer dat Sers Kruger skare

volgens art 48 waarsku om uiteen te gaan. Hulle versuim en gooi klippe na SAP lede in Boipatong. Optrede soos volg:(13 members fire off a total of 13 x gas rounds and 25 x no 5 shotgun rounds)

07:50 (ISU-Ver)

Mea vervoer Kst le Grange boek voertuig SAP 108100H terug met lesing 11490. Alles in orde. Voertuig het skrape opgedoen.

10:00 (Boip)Sit Rapp Alles nog stil en rustig geen klagtes.

10:50 fBoiplRapport Sers Erasmus het een patrone gebruik met vuurwapen nr9094 4 en nr 5 patrons.(NOTE that the there is no indication of tne circumstances in which this round was fired; there is no mention of any attack on the Boipatong Police Section or of petrol bombs; however, it may be suggested that there was an attack which was warded off by this single shot by Erasmus)

11:30 (SADF)Incident Report Schedule Aanval op Munisipale polisie met petrolbomme en klippe. Boipatong.

(NOTE the primary source for this report is not clear; it is also not clear whether this refers to an attack on the police station itself)

16:00 f SADF)Group 17 Situation Report Situasie in Sharpeville, Boipatong steeds baie gespanne. Beplande deursoeking van Kwamadala vind om 1600 plaas om lede betrokke by laasnag se insidente te identifiseer.

INTTMTn * S ? ^ ISSIQN— ^ PREVENTION— QE— EUBLIC__VIOLENCE AND

IN RE : BOIPATONG MASSACRE

MEMORANDUM ON THE ONGOING VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE 'BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO PREVENT THE VIOLENCE, PROTECT RESIDENTS AND BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THE VIOLENCE TO JUSTICE

The massacre at Boipatong and Slovo Park on the night

°f 17 June 1992 is not an isolated incident, but is

part of a pattern of violence which has been

experienced in various parts of South Africa during the past 2 years.

The pattern of violence is a matter of common knowledge

in South Africa and has been referred to in innumerable

media reports dealing with particular incidents and

accounts of violence, and is acknowledged by the

Government, its security forces, and all political

movements in South Africa. It was because of this

pattern of violence that the Goldstone Commission was

established. Various aspects of the violence have

already been investigated by the Goldstone Commission

snd the nature and extent of the violence is known to

members of the Commission from their own investigations.

Although press reports of events concerned with the

violence may not always be accurate, and are often

subject to disputes concerning the details of

particular incidents and responsibility for them, these '

press reports provide convincing evidence of the nature

and extent of the ongoing violence. In many instances

allegations have been made and reported in the press

(but denied by the security forces) that the security

forces are either actively involved in the execution of

the violence, or passively stood by and allowed it to happen.

In this Memorandum 10 incidents have been chosen from a

survey of press reports to illustrate a pattern of

organised and premeditated attacks which occurred prior

to the Boipatong Massacre, and which, in each instance

resulted in multiple deaths, injuries and damage to

property. Other incidents which occurred in the Vaal

Triangle are referred to in the Memorandum dealing with

the Vaal History. The description of the incidents has

deliberately been kept brief, and certain disputed

matters have been omitted. The descriptions provide

sufficient information to identify the time, place and

nature of the attack, as well as the allegations made

concerning the groups responsible for the various attacks.

©- 3 -

~ 'S

The 10 incidents are as follows : -

QK THE 15TH— AUGUST 199Q, 24 people were killed in a

pre-dawn attack at the Crossroads informal settlement

in Katlehong. Residents reported that armed men

arrived at the settlement and raided shacks, killing

men and looting valuable items.

(Ref : Sowetan 16/8/90; Citizen 16/8/90).

OH— IHE— film___ SEPTEMBER__113.0, the Tladi informal

settlement near Merafe Station in Soweto was attacked

by a group of men during the night. It was reported

that the group approached the settlement from the side

of the railway line which borders the settlement and

separates it from the nearby hostel. The attackers

wore red headbands and were armed with firearms and

dangerous weapons, including pangas. Some deaths

resulted from gunshot injuries, while others had been stabbed and hacked to death.

Allegations were made that the attackers had numbered

approximately 100, and were from the Inkatha controlled

©- 4 -

Ke^afe Hostel. The official police reports stated that

9 people died in this attack.

(Ref : Press Reports : Citizen 10/9/90; Business Day

10/9/90; Sowetan 10/9/90).

QN THE 12TH SEPTEMBER_1990, 25 workers were hacked to

death at the Vusumuzi Hostel in Tembisa, during the

early hours of the morning. They were attacked by a

group of men who arrived at approximately OlhOO.

Fifteen people were killed in the attack.

(Ref : The Star 13/9/90; Business Day 13/9/90).

ON THE— 18TH NOVEMBER 19 9 0, 19 people were killed in an

atack on the Zonkezizwe informal settlement on the East Rand.

Witnesses and victims of the attack allege that the

attackers were from the Kwesini Hostel in Katlehong.

(Ref : Press Reports : Sunday Star 25/11/90; Sowetan 23/11/90).

QN THE 2STH HQVEMBER— 1990, 11 people were killed and

10 were injured at Mandela View informal settlement on

the East Rand. The attack occurred at approximately

10:50p.m, when a group of approximately 150 men armed

with pangas, knifes and firearms rampaged through the

informal settlement.

Prior to the attack, residents had received a tip off

that an attack was imminent.

(Ref : Citizen 28/11/90, Sowetan 28/11/90).

— IHE— 27TH---MARCH--1_2_2JL, at approximately 4a.m

approximately 20 armed men arrived at an all-night

vigil in Alexandra for a violence victim, Mrs. Jane

Ramakgola, and killed 15 people and injured 16. The

assailants shot first with AK 47 rifles and then hacked people with pangas.

Prior to the attack, the police had been asked to

protect the house from attack during the vigil, and had

given assurances that they would do so.

c - 6 -

(V)

On the 4th April 1991, Witwatersrand Police Liason

Officer, Col. Frans Malherbe, reported that 7 of the

assailants had been arrested and would be charged.

(Ref : Sowetan 5/4/91)

Ultimately, five persons appeared in the Witwatersrand

Supreme Court on the 14th October 1991, on charges of

murder, attempted murder, house breaking, possession of

firearms and ammunition.

(Ref : City Press 14/10/91).

On the 7th January 1992, one of the accused was

acguitted. The case against the remaining four

accused has been postponed to 10 August for judgement.

(Ref : Citizen 17/1/92. )

PN THE— 2.8TH APRIL 1991, 22 people were killed and

several others were injured, when heavily armed Inkatha

members, who had attended a funeral attacked residents

at random after leaving the Meadowlands Stadium, where

services for Moses Khumalo were held. The men were

carrying pangas, spears, axes, sharpened fence poles,

butcher knifes and guns. Prior to this event, the

local civic association had approached the SAP to

request protection and to request that they disarm the

Inkatha members as they feared an attack by them. The

SAP did not confiscate a single weapon before, during

or after the funeral and did nothing to prevent the

Inkatha supporters rampaging through Soweto. No

arrests were made in relation to this attack.

(Ref : CASE report March 1992).

THE— 12TH MAY— 12JL1, 27 people were killed and at

least 30 injured and 112 shacks were burnt to the

ground in a dawn attack by about 1 000 men at the

informal settlement known as Swanieville, near Kagiso.

Allegations were made that the attack lasted for about

2 hours and that the attackers all wore red headbands.

The police are reported to have claimed that the reason

<D- 8 -

why they did not respond immediately to the attack was

that the local riot squad members were changing shifts

between 5:15 and 5:30 am and that the first warning of

violence was issued to them at 6:30a.m.

Almost 24 hours passed before the hostel was searched for weapons.

(Ref : Document compiled by LHR, IBIIR and CALS).

Maj. Ray Harrold of the South African Police is

reported to have said : "to prevent the group of Zulus

moving through Kagiso and thereby causing further

possible incidents, the police escorted the group of

Zulus via a detour back to the hostels. Meanwhile, it

was found that 27 people had been killed and that 82

squatter huts had been burned at the squatter camp".

(Ref : Citizen 13/5/91).

Law and Order spokesman, Brig. Leon Mellet, when asked

how the Swanieville Massacre could occur in a declared

unrest area stated "We cannot stop the violence. We

5.10

cannot stop the killings. We can only control it". He

further stated that Swanieville and neighbouring Kagiso

had been declared unrest areas after information was

received that people were preparing for a "big fight".

(Ref : Business Day 13/5/91).

On the 9th February 1992, 12 men appeared in court on

29 counts of murder and were granted bail of R500,00 each.

(Ref : City Press 9/2/92).

Q-N THE— 13TH Q.CTQBER_1991, 10 people were killed and 4

injured, when about 20 gunmen entered the Twelepele Bar

Lounge and opened fire with AK 47's. The gunmen then

also opened fire on people in the street outside the

tavern. Witnesses to the attack reported that the

attack lasted about 45 minutes and after the attack the

gunmen disappeared in 2 minibuses. SAP spokemen Lt.

Col. Tienie Halgryn, said that the police had

information that the killers had come from Merafe Hostel.

(Ref : Sunday Times 14/10/91).

Leaving aside the disputed allegations concerning

police participation in the violence”, or their standing

by and allowing it to happen, there is overwhelming

evidence that the security forces have, over a long

period, persistently failed to protect communities in

Black residential areas against violence, and in most

instances, have failed to bring the perpetrators of the

violence to justice. The inability or unwillingness of

the police to provide protection to residents and to

bring the perpetrators of violence to justice is

important for an appreciation of the attitude of

residents in black townships to the police and to the

outrage, anger and resentment which followed at the

Boipatong Massacre.

It is submitted that the abject failure by the security

forces to protect the citizens and to carry out the

duties expected of them, calls for an explanation by

the persons in command of the security forces, and for

the making of appropriate recommendations by the

Goldstone Commission.

c

4.

The fieldvorkers employed by the Justice and Social

K:nistries of the South African Council of Churches for

the Vaal Region date the outbreak of violence in the

Vaal to the 22nd April 1590.

Although the Commission is not hereby requested to

investigate the incidents of violence prior to July

1991, reference will be made to such incidents, in

order to give the Commission a view of the pattern of

violence which has existed since April 1990 and which still continues.

In December 1990 a fieldworker of the Justice of Social Ministry of the Vaal Council of Churches's Saul Tsotsetsi, was asked to intervene on behalf of two young men, who had reported to him that they had been attacked by comrades. At the time of the report they did not identify the comrades, but asked the fieldworker to investigate who had attacked them and to intervene to resolve the conflict peaceably.

Shortly thereafter, one, Nangalembe was found dead. It

was reported to the same fieldworker that Nangalembe

had been abducted by the two young men who had

approached him to intervene on their behalf.

»I *

8 .

- 2 -

The fieldwor.Ver, Saul Tsotetsi, visited the family of

the late Kanaaleir.be and was informed by the family that

the young men who had abducted their son had returned

to the house and had threatened an attack on the night

vigil prior to the funeral of Nangalembe.

6 ‘ An attack took place on the night vigil and forty eightpeople were killed.

7 * The fieldvorkers of the Vaal Council of Churchescarried out an investigation and discovered a linkbetween the group who carried out the attack on thenight vigil and the two young len who had approachedSaul Tsotetsi for assistance. They also identified one

^ of their attackers as one Kubeka, the son of BeulahC Kubeka, a prominent member of the Inkatha Freedom

Party.

Eleven people were arrested for the attack on the night vigil and their trial is still pending in the Vereeniging Magistrate's Court. They were granted bail and are residing at the Kwa-Madala Hostel.

After the attack on the night vigil, homes of certain

members of the Inkatha Freedom Party were burned. The

families whose homes had been attacked immediately

thereafter vent to live at the Kva-Madala Hostel.

During the first five months of 1991, the fieldworker received several reports of abductions of residents of the Kva-Masiza Hostel by residents of the Kva-Madala Hostel. The fieldvorker approached the District Commander of Police to relate to him the details of the abductions and the unlawful detentions by residents of the Kva-Madala Hostel.

A number of further incidents took place during the period January to June 1991. In April 1991, Ernest Sotsu, a member of the ANC, Boipatong Branch, and employed by COSATU at the time, received telephonic threats to his life. In addition, his house was visited and the same threats were made to his family ■embers, in his absence.

On the llth May 1991, Wellington Makhalima, a member of the National Union of Metalvorkers of South Africa and

a resident at the Kwa-Masiza Hostel, and Rev. Jiholo

Ehenene, were taken at gun-point to the Kwa-Madala

Hostel where they were asked to give information about

shop stewards of NUMSA. They were then released from

the Kwa-Kadala Hostel.

13 • On the 23rd Kay 1991, an attack took place at a

beer-hall in Zone 14, Sebokeng, perpetrated by unknown gunmen, using AK 4 7 weapons. Four people were killed instantly. Four people died later in the Sebokeng Hospital and fifteen others were injured.

14 • On the 28th May 1991, five people were injured at asquatter camp next to the Houtkop railway station, when

£ three unknown gunmen shot at then; with AK 47 weapons.

C %15. During the last week of June and the first week of July

1991, a group of »en attended a number of ti»es at Ernest Sotsu's house, amongst them Khetisi Victor Kheswa and Darkie Nconco. They informed Mr. Sotsu's family that he should report to them at the Kwa-Madala Hostel. They threatened to take drastic action against him, should he fail to do so.

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17.

C

19.

While Mr. Sotsu was in Durbar, attending the ANC

National Conference, an attack was carried out on his

house on the 3rd July 19S1. His wife, daughter and

grandson were killed in the attack. Two of his

grandchildren were injured. Khetsisi Victor Kheswa and

two others were arrested in relation to this attack.

On or about July 1991, an attach took place on the Erica Tavern in Zone 7, Sebokeng, where again a group of unidentified Ben arrived at the beerhall and opened fire on the patrons. One, Darkie Nconco, was arrested for this attack. He resides at the Kwa-Madala Hostel.

The Commission is referred to the affidavits of Saul Tsotsetsi and Rev. Peter Moerane regarding the above events. The Commission is, hovever, not requested to enquire into the above events.

On or about the 15th August 1991, Rev. Peter Moerane accompanied a group of women from the Boipatong township to a representative of the Iscor management and handed a letter to him.

In their letter the women expressed their belief that

the Kwa-Madala Hostel was the springboard for a number

of the violent attacks on residents of Boipatong. They

also stated that several people, including children,

from Boipatong had been abducted and held at the Kwa-Madala Hostel against their will. The ISCOR management replied by enclosing a copy of their policy statement on the Kwa-Madala Hostel, which policy statement denied the allegations that violence is planned and executed from the Kwa-Madala Hostel. Their policy statement averred that all allegations had been thoroughly investigated by ISCOR and no evidence had been found to convince management that the Kwa-Madala Hostel Bhould be managed differently to that of ISCOR's other hostel, the Kwa-Masiza Hostel. ISCOR invited interested parties to bring specific instances of misconduct to its attention.

On the 24th September 1991 five residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel were killed by police. Pursuant thereto, a meeting was held between the Vaal Council of Churches and representatives of the ISCOR management, where the setting up of a joint Monitoring Committee

was proposed. A memorandum was submitted to the ISCCR

management by the Vaal Council of Churches and a copy

thereof is enclosed herewith attached to the Affidavit of Rev. Koerane.

Rev. Mpho Peter Moerane states in his affidavit that an attempt was made to establish a Monitoring Committee in conjunction with the ISCOR management. Efforts were

*ade in this regard until he was approached by residents of the Kwa-Masiza Hostel who requested that they withdraw from the Monitoring Committee as the workers disagreed with the approach taken by the ISCOR management in relation to the problems.

On or about the 17th October 1991, Johannes Mthimkulu was abducted at Voortrekker Street, Vereeniging, by three nen wearing Inkatha T-shirts. At the same time Sipho Mtiakulu, who was a friend of Johannes and who was in his company, was also abducted by a group of four men, three of whom were wearing Inkatha T-shirts. They were driven to the Kwa-Madala Hostel where they were placed in a room with nine women and eight other

men who were also being held at the hostel against their will.

They were forced to join Inkatha and forced to attend a

funeral of an Inkatha member.

Johannes witnessed attacks of residents and on-lookers

by Inkatha mourners at the funeral.

Johannes was able to escape from the hostel on a day when several of the Inkatha members residing at the hostel had left to attend a rally at a stadium nearby. The affidavits of Johannes Mthimkulu, Patience Mthimkulu and Nono MthimXulu are enclosed herewith.

On the 29th November 1991, Petrus Hlazo and Sipho Mazibuko were abducted from the Boipatong Industrial area at or near the Trek Garage by a group of young boys. Petrus was wearing an ANC T-shirt at the time. Petrus and Sipho were then taken to the Mabiki Dump where they were questioned as to the whereabouts of guns belonging to comrades.

They were then forced to vai>: to the Kwa-Kadala Hostel

On route, Petrus was assaulted by being scratched c.n

his right chin with a piece of broken bottle by one of

the boys. They were taken into the hostel and

assaulted further in a rondavel in the premises of the

hostel, by being sjambokked repeatedly.

They were taken out of the rondavel and as Petrus exited, he was stabbed on his left buttock with a knife. Thereafter, he was assaulted with fists on his face and kicked on his body by approximately 15 men. During this assault, Petrus was aware of Sipho being held a short distance from hi*. When the assaults stopped, he could no longer see Sipho.

Petrus was then told to leave the hostel, which he did, and returned home.

The following morning he accompanied Sipho's brother to the Sebokeng Government Mortuary where they identified Sipho's body. The affidavit of Petrus Hlazo is enclosed herewith.

On or about the 8th December 1991, a number of young women were abducted from various places in Sharpville.

c27.

.ihe} were taken to the home of Nana Shabangu in

Boipatong. They were held against their will and were

raped by their abductors. Some of the young women were

raped by more than one of the abductors.

Lizzy Tshabalala and Anna Thabane were able to escape

from Nana Shabangu's house. The other young women were

taken the following day to the Kwa-Madala Hostel where

they were held against their will for several days and

were raped further. Annacletta Thithi was allowed to leave the hostel later in the week on condition that she joined Inkatha. She agreed to do so. Mamogola Mokone was able to escape on the 15th December 1991, after having been taken out of the hostel to accompany two of the young Ben. The affidavits of Annacletta Thithi, Lizzy Tshabalala, Mamogola Mokone and Anna Thabane are enclosed herewith.

On the 9th January 1991, the fieldworkers of the Vaal Council of Churches and attorney Crystal Cambanis of Attorneys Nicholls, Cambanis, Koopasammy & Pillay made representations to the local police requesting their assistance in securing the release of the people still

-10-

28.

being held against their will at the Kwa-Kadala J.’ostel.

Pursuant to their representations a raid was carried

out at the Kwa-Kadala Hostel on the 16th January 1991.

The police reported to Saul Tsotetsi that they had

raided but had not found any evidence of unlawful

detentions or abductions.

On the 21st February 1992, an attack took place on the Ha-Hlolo-Ya-Pape Tavern in Sharpville. A group of four to five Men kicked opened the door and fired shots into the house, killing five people. Several others were injured. Affidavits from the victims are presently not available. However, Saul Tsotetsi, in paragraphs 32 and 33 of his affidavit refers to this incident, wherein he states that he consulted with the injured, while they were at the Sebokeng Hospital and they informed him that they had recognised one of the people responsible for the attack, who is known to them as Fish. It is also known to them that he resides at the J?wa-Madala Hostel. Rev. Peter Moerane also refers to this incident in paragraph 17 of his affidavit.

29. On Sunday the 15th March 1992, an attack took place at the Chief’s Place shebeen in Sharpville. Dennis

Moerane, accompanied by three other men, by the nates

of Ndundu, Kgosi and Mojalefa were the perpetrators of

the attack. They were members of a "unit" being part

of a system of units which exists at the Kwa-Madala Hostel. They were sent by one, Buthelezi, and were handed Ri rifles to attack Chief's Place and the Philadelphia Tavern in Sharpville. These places were chosen as they are known to be taverns where "comrades" drink. The motive for the attack was firstly to attack comrades who had been responsible for the killing of an Inkatha member, one, Tlhola and secondly to attack comrades for the purpose of Inkatha regaining entry to the township. In the course of the attack, two women were fatally shot and several other of the patrons were injured. The affidavits of Dennis Moerane and two of the victims, namely Lucky Ledino and Goodman Madikwe are enclosed herewith.

Rev. Peter Moerane states in his affidavit that he is aware that Dennis Moerane would like to leave the Kwa-Madala Hostel and return home. He is aware from Dennis that other residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel would likewise want to return home. He has therefore suggested to the Commission that steps which could be

taken in order tc prevent further public violence would

be to establish a forum to manage the re-integration of

the residents of Kva—Madala back into the township.

The residents of Kwa-Madala do not return to the

township for fear of attack. It would thus be the task

of such a forum, under the guidance of the Commission

to establish a safe method of re-integration.

Details of attacks on other Vaal Residents bv Kwa-Madala residents prior to the

Boipatong Massacre - Per ANC memo to Goldstone Commission on Boipatong

Massacre

1. Early December 1990 an exclusively Black police patrol (formed to patrol the

area around Sebokeng Hostel) arrested 15 men who were approaching

Sebokeng hostel. The men had in their possession firearms and explosives.

The men were said to be Inkatha members and 13 of them gave their

addresses as Kwa-Madala hostel - (no report says so, but the men were

probably planning to attack Sebokeng hostel).

2. There is (was) a general belief that the "white controlled CID" frustrates

(frustrated) investigations into complaints of abductions, killings and assaults

committed by Kwa-Madala residents - (here we obviously have to investigate

the alleged complaints).

3. On 11 January 1991 at a night vigil held at house number 11472 Zone 7B

Sebokeng, gathered mourners were attacked and 38 were killed. Following this

11 people were charged and at their bail hearing an Inkatha leader testified

and requested that the accused be released to the care of Kwa-Madala.

Eventually only 7 stood trial for murder but were discharged to Kwa-Madala

hostel.

4. In the months following the 11 January 1991 vigil attack there were regular

incidents of assaults, kidnappings and killings - a great number of reports

included allegations of the involvement of Kwa-Madala residents (Again we

may have to investigate the "regular incidents").

5. On or about 8 July 1991 5 people were killed and 4 injured in an attack on a

tavern in Zone 7 Sebokeng. Following this Kwa-Madala hostel was raided and

3 AK-47 rifles and ammunition were seized - (no known arrests).

On or about 4 September 1990 in the morning Sebokeng Hostel was attacked

allegeldy by Inkatha members from Kwa-Madala. The attackers were cornered

and Themba Khoza (Transvaal regional chairman of Inkatha) was found with

firearms and explosives in the boot of his car - he was subsequently acquitted

on a charge of possession.

One Editar Baba in an affidavit testifies to being involved in attacks - see

attached affidavit "A".

Collection Number: AK2672 Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records 1990-1999 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012

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