Ward, Julie K. is Human a Homonym for Arostotle [Pregunta], Apeiron 2008

8/12/2019 Ward, Julie K. is Human a Homonym for Arostotle [Pregunta], Apeiron 2008

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Is Humana Homonym for Aristotle? 75

Is Humana Homonym for Aristotle?

Julie K. Ward

I Some Puzzles about Human Capacities

By combining specific claims that Aristotle makes about human natureand capacities with other claims about substances, two aporiaiarise thatrequire an investigation and if possible, a resolution. The general issueto be taken up concerns whether the term human or the character-istic of being human is synonymous, or said in the same way, across

various social and political groups (Greek, barbarian, free, slave, man,woman, etc.).1While the answer might seem obvious given the sup-position that humanis a univocal characteristic, the textual support forthis view is neither clear nor consistent. As a consequence, we need toweigh whether the term should be considered to refer to a univocalcharacteristic shared among human beings (be synonymous) or to anon-identical characteristic (be homonymous). In this section, I shalldescribe the two problems briefly and give an explanation why I takethem to be difficulties that merit attention.

The first aporiato be examined arises from certain assumptions re-lated to the idea that human beings constitute the same natural kind, orare the same quasubstance. Given that they are identical as substance,they cannot differ in degree insofar as no substance, and therefore, nohuman being as substance is more or less a substance than another (cf.

1 Aristotle typically uses a word to refer either to the characteristic signified by the

word or to the term itself (cf. Categories1a9, where both ox and human are calledanimal and are animal); where the context requires a distinction, I use the word inquotation marks to refer to the term and the italicized word to refer to the propertysignified.

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Cat 3b33-4). As Aristotle states in Categories5, If this substance is hu-man, it will not be more or less human, either than itself or than another

human (Cat3b37-8).2

While this denial clearly carries an anti-Platonicsentiment, the implication is that humansignifies an invariant, non-sca-lar characteristic.3In this regard, if we consider various human beingsas primary substances, there is no difference of degree among them withregard to their substantiality, their humanness. Nor is the notion thatco-specific individuals share synonymous characteristics challenged bythe central books of Metaphysics (e.g., Z) that weigh the possibility ofnon-synonymy for substance (ousia) insofar as it signifies, among otherthings, form, matter, or the composite.4MetaphysicsZ 3 and 10, for ex-

ample, support the notion that members belonging to the same kind ofsubstance are formally identical, or possess the same species-form.5So,it seems uncontroversial to understand Aristotle as being committed toholding a formal equality, what we might term metaphysical equality,in regard to human beings as co-specific members. Having noted theevidence with regard to the univocity of substance, there is a differ-ent set of views about humans that seems to overturn the present data.Specifically, he seems to contradict or at a minimum restrict his viewabout metaphysical equality in Politics. For example, in PoliticsI 7 and

I 13, he rejects the idea that all humans possess qualitatively identicalrational capacities. As he states in I 13, all have the same parts of thesoul, but have them in different ways (Pol1260a10-12), having in mindthe deliberative faculty (to bouleutikon) which, it is implied, is not uni-

2 Translations are my own.

3 The term non-scalar I owe to Chris Shields, my commentator on an earlier ver-sion of the paper that was presented at a conference entitledAristotle and Life heldat University of Alaska, Anchorage, August 7-10, 2007. In addition to benefitingfrom Shields comments, I would like to acknowledge those offered by the otherconference participants, and especially to thank John Mouracade for his dual roleas conference organizer and gracious host.

4 For the familiar tri-partite list, see, for example,MetaphZ 3, 1028a2-5; a chief diffi-culty in these books ofMetaphysicsarises from the fact that eidos, rather than ousia,turns out to be so highly variable in its applications, as Paul Studtmans paper oneidosin this volume makes clear.

5 I am taking substantial form as picking out the shared characteristics of the spe-cific kind, typically, the functional capacities of the thing (if living, taken as thecomposite). For related discussions on the nature of substance and form, see Code1984, 1985, Driscoll 1981.



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versally present among all humans. Here lies the rub. Assuming thatthe capacity for deliberation belongs to humans in virtue of having the

capacity for reason, it must be per se, or essential, to humans.6

By con-necting this with the previous claim, we find that some humans cannotlack, and yet do lack, aper seproperty of being human. We thus arriveat one aporiaabout human nature that may be stated as follows, Howcan humans considered as substances possessing the same species-formfail to have the sameper seproperties? The corollary to this aporiacon-cerns a question about predication, namely, whether the term humancan be applied synonymously across all cases, or with regard to all hu-man beings. Alternatively, assuming Aristotles distinction in Categories

1 between synonymy and homonymy, we may ask whether the termhuman or the real property humanis supposed to be taken as homony-mous, not by chance (apo tuchs),7but in some systematic fashion.8

The second aporiato be discussed develops from claims centering onthe disputed status of what may be termed the psychological, ratherthan the metaphysical,equality of human beings. This problem arisesfrom a tension between statements about the human capacity for mor-al development as sketched in Nicomachean Ethics II and those madeabout the variations in deliberative capacity already described from

PoliticsI. One half of the present inconsistency stems from the familiaraccount about moral habituation from Nicomachean Ethics II 1, whereAristotle asserts that humans develop a fixed moral ability, or hexis, byway of practical training, as in the arts. In Politics, however, he appearsto neglect the thesis about the general human capacity for moral virtue,arguing, in effect, that some groups of humans are prevented from theoutset in attaining it. So, in PoliticsI 7, 13, and VII 7, Aristotle excludescitizen women, barbarians (non-Greeks), and natural slaves (both menand women) from being considered potentially virtuous citizens on the

grounds that they are unable to deliberate either at all or properly. Inthis way, we arrive at a second aporiaabout human nature that may beexpressed as the following question: If human nature is neither good

6 The inference here needs expansion; I note the difficulty because the implicationinvolves capacities or dispositional properties, not simple properties.

7 Chance homonyms are things having only the name in common and no overlap-ping feature, as for example, at EN1096b26-7, where Aristotle contrasts the goodwith things that are homonymous by chance.

8 See section II in brief for kinds of homonymy; for full discussion, see Shields 1999,9-41, and also Ward 2008, 77-102.



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nor bad in itself but capable of moral virtue depending on habituation,why it is impossible for some human beings to become virtuous even if

they are exposed to the proper methods of moral habituation and train-ing? The two problems are inter-related by virtue of a shared minorpremise: the first one uses a major premise about a formal feature ofsubstance and a minor about differing deliberative capacity, and thesecond, a major premise about moral habituation and the minor prem-ise about differing deliberative capacity.

Before opening investigation of these aporiai, I wish to raise and an-swer two general objections, or issues, that may be considered prob-lems with the project overall. First, it might be objected that Aristotle is

concerned with strictly metaphysical problems in the Categories,Meta-physics, and de Anima, and that these stand in contrast to the moral andpolitical problems addressed in Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, withthe result that cross-textual comparisons are either compromised or fu-tile. Although there are, admittedly, certain difficulties involved withthe kind of investigation proposed, it seems fair to expect consistencyamong texts where the discussion is unified by subject-matter. In thecase of the aporiai, these claims share a common subject-matter insofaras they are concerned with one natural kind, human beings, and their

natural abilities. Thus, to find the thesis about metaphysical equality asit applies to substance so conspicuously absent from Aristotles discus-sion of human nature and abilities in Politicsseems to suggest a lapse ofconsistency and deserves an explanation.

Another criticism that might be thought to diffuse the aporiaiI haveposed concerns postulating extra-theoretical claims to account forAristotles inconsistencies. In general, I find this line of interpretationunsatisfactory in that it serves, essentially, to block the possible incon-sistency and avoid a genuine explanation. It may be noted, as well,

that postulating extra-theoretical claims for theoretical conclusions isnot uncommon in the scholarship surrounding Aristotles views abouthuman nature with regard to women and slaves. One exception in therecent scholarship is an essay by Malcolm Schofield on the foundationsof Aristotles theory of natural slavery. Herein Schofield considers therole of extra-theoretical elements, such as cultural elitism or tacit ide-ology, rather than theoretical commitments as being determinants inAristotles theory.9The point is that if the deciding cause for natural

9 See Schofield 2006, 94-7.



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slavery were provided by tacit assumptions about class superiority orsheer prejudice against non-Greeks, the conclusion would not be gen-

uinely theoretical in the sense of following from Aristotelian premises.Equally, to account for the connection that Aristotle draws betweenwomen and barbarians in regard to deliberative and political capaci-ties simply by posing sexism or cultural elitism as the cause is differentfrom being theoretically adequate. The present essay rejects the kindof explanation that introduces non-theoretical claims as the decisivefactors for explicit conclusions in two ways. By formulating the issuesof deliberative and rational capacities against the larger backdrop ofbeing human, the paper seeks to avoid covering the by-now familiar

ground that has been discussed by other scholars in regard to the issuesof Aristotles view on women, slaves, and deliberation.10Additionally,and more to the point, it is theoretically unsatisfactory to supply non-theoretical bases instead of premises as reasons for Aristotles explicitconclusions. So, to postulate a tacit prejudice against women or non-Greeks as a reason for Aristotles conclusions resolves the problem inadvance so that no aporia can arise. Alternatively, the present essayassumes that the inconsistencies in the aforementioned aporiai resultfrom genuine theoretical commitments and deserve explanations of

the same kind.In addition to the consideration of the passages about deliberative

capacities, which are clearly pivotal, two other areas seem central.These include the theory of predication involving non-univocal char-acteristics as developed in Metaphysics, , and , and the tripartitedistinction concerning actuality and potentiality in de AnimaII 2, andthe related one about natural and rational potentialities inMetaphysics.11Mentioned previously en passant, the first discussion arises, as iswell-known, in regard to beinginMetaphysics2 (subsequently, 1,

1) where beingis afforded sufficient unity of subject-matter to allow forscientific study. Given that common predicates other than being suchas one, same, nature, medical, healthy, friendship are thought to ex-hibit systematic homonymy, the possibility that the predicate human

10 See, for example, the discussions by Cole 1994, Cook 1996, Fortenbaugh 1977,Homiak 1996, Modrak 1994, Smith 1983, to name but a few.

11 The account of potentiality (dunamis) in DA II 5 may be amplified by others, suchas inMetaph2 and 5 on rational and non-rational natural capacities, as well asthe entry on dunamisinMetaph12.



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falls into this kind requires consideration.12It is to the theory of predi-cation concerning things neither synonymous nor fully homonymous

that I now turn.13

II The Theory of Related and Core-Related Homonymy

II 1 Overview

The question about how human is predicated admits of various pos-sibilities of synonymy and homonymy, including what we might termsimple or restricted synonymy, in contrast to chance or systematichomonymy. Before considering the various possibilities, let me quicklysummarize the initial account of synonymy and homonymy from Cat-egories1. In this chapter, synonymous things must have the same nameand account of the shared characteristic (cf. Categories1a6-7).14To useAristotles example, a human being and an ox are animalin the samesense in that we apply the term animal and they share the same char-acteristic in being animal; hence, they are called animal synonymous-ly (cf. 1a6-8). In contrast, homonymous things have the same name butnot the same account of the common feature (cf. 1a1-2). Employing hisillustration, a human being and a picture of an animal are not animalsynonymously inasmuch as their natures differ (cf. 1a1-3). For, whilewe might use the term animal in both cases, in the one, we refer to aliving thing that is animal, and in the other, to a drawing, or likeness,of such a thing.

Departing from the account in Categories1, we find homonymy be-ing put to good use with regard to things that have related but non-identical natures in texts outside the Organon. In the most well-known

12 For discussion of these related homonyms, see Shields 1999, chs. 5, 6, 9 for analysisof being, one, and body, and see Ward 2008, chs. 4, 5, on being, nature, and friend-ship.

13 The distinction between complete and related homonymy depends on the pres-ence in the latter kind of certain shared, but non-identical, common features andoverlapping definitions. For discussion on the foundational account of homonymyin Cat1, see Irwin 1981, Shields 1999, 9-12, Ward 2008, 12-18.

14 In Categories1, Aristotle defines the term animal as synonymous or homonymousby reference to the characteristic that he takes to be signified by the term, so syn-onymy and homonymy are categories spanning words and real characteristicssignified by words.



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of these passages,Metaphysics2, Aristotle employs the theory of hom-onymy to distinguish the unity afforded by things that exist, or have

being. Preferring to keep (in part, anyway) to his denial in Posterior Ana-lyticsII 7, 92b14, that beingis not a genus and so has no special science,15he admits that the term being (to on) is not synonymous. If existingthings quaexisting do not have the same property said in the same way(kath hen), they lack a single nature as a group and cannot constitute agenus. But to the claim that beingis said in many ways (legetai pollachos),he now adds that its instances are related to one thing (pros hen), sub-stance, and thus beingcomprises a quasi-genus.

Abstracting from the case of being in 2, systematic homonymy

is thought to be present among things that have a common term, orpredicate, and share some defining characteristic; they do not, how-ever, share precisely the same characteristic or in the same way. Let usconsider one of the canonical examples of related homonymy, the medi-cal, fromMetaphysics2, 1003b1-4. As he puts it, things that are medicalare so called by being related to medicine in a certain way: one thing is amedical instrument, another, a medical operation, and another, a medi-cal practitioner. All are related to a primary case of the medical, themedical art. The items that are so called in virtue of having some rela-

tion to the primary thing, medicine, are the secondary items consideredto be medical. In this way, the medical and similarly, the healthy exhibita specific type of systematic homonymy. In sum, for things to be relatedin this way, they possess the following features: (i) one term is appliedto them, (ii) they have related, but non-identical defining characteris-tics, (iii) they have related, but non-identical definitions.

A more restrictive kind of systematic homonymy that involves theinter-relationships among therelataappears in the cases of being, medi-cal, and healthy. According to the taxonomy of kinds of homonymy,

this feature depends on the presence of some kind of inter-dependenceamong the related items. Specifically, the secondary cases will bear anon-symmetrical kind of relationship to the primary case; the relation-ship may, for example, be a causal relationship, as in the cases of themedical or the healthy. In such cases, we find that the primary instanceis the source of the characteristic for the things that are so called or isthe reason that the secondary cases are so designated. To put the thesis

15 For a similar text, see EEI 7, 1217b25-35, where he reasons that since the good issaid in as many ways as being(invoking the categorical account of being), there isno science of either one.



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as a formal condition, we may state that two things, a and b, are caus-ally core-dependent homonyms of F if and only if: (i) they share the

same name, (ii) the definitions of aand b are not identical, and (iii) if aisthe primary instance of F, then bs being Fstands in a causal relation toas being F.16To return to the case of the medical, for example, medicalitems meet the requirements for core-related homonymy: the instru-ment, operation, and doctor are all termed medical in virtue of beingrelated in different ways to the medical art, the primary medical item invirtue of which the secondary things are considered medical.

Armed with these distinctions about systematic homonymy, we mayconsider whether the term human and the property of being human

can be considered to involve homonymy and if so, whether they countas systematic homonymy. The starting point consists in determiningif humannames a synonymous characteristic, and if not, whether it issomething that applies to individuals in a loose or systematic fashion.Additionally, if it should turn out that being human is not a univocalpredicate or characteristic, this might provide an account as to whysome properties that belong to or follow from the form humancould beabsent from some humans. This, in turn, might be used to explain someof the anomalies about human beings and their capacities, such as those

concerning the capacity for deliberation. But if the predicate human istaken as referring to a homonymous characteristic, certain difficultiesfollow, such as having to deny the intuitively plausible idea that hu-man refers to a univocal characteristic across all individuals.

II 2 Problems for the Homonymy Thesis

There are clearly some problems facing the hypothesis that human ishomonymous. As a first strategy, we might think to employ one of Ar-

istotles tests for homonymy suggested in TopicsI 15, such as detectingambiguity among cases of contraries, privations, contradictories, com-parables or paronymous terms.17The difficulty is that none of these willwork for the predicate human: as we may expect in view of the claimabout substance in Categories 5, human has no contrary, privation or

16 This formal account is based on the definition of four-causal core primacy givenby Shields 1999, 118-19, although I am not presupposing a specifically four-causalmode of dependence in this discussion.

17 For fuller discussion of these strategies, see Ward 2008, 56-75.



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contradictory, does not admit of comparison, and paronymy does notmake it off the ground.18By these results, humanresists the standard

diagnostic tests for multivocity that snag many other common termsin Topics I 15. So, we return to test the possibility that human is, af-ter all, synonymous. This alternative is initially supported by the claimin Categories 5 that one substance is not more or less what it is thananother substance (cf. 3b37-8), and also by the requirement in Poste-rior AnalyticsI that common terms signifyingper seproperties are usedsynonymously across such predications (cf. 77a5-9, 83a30-5, 85b15-18).For example, if animalisper seto horse, ox, and bird, these possess thesame feature quaanimal, and the term animal is used synonymously

across such predications. If we employ human as we do animal, thatis, as a term that signifies a per se property of some kind, there is aprima facie case for this use being considered synonymous. A furtherconfirmation is that throughout many discussions about human beingsand human capacities, Aristotle never mentions the idea that humanis homonymous rather than synonymous. Where he considers exam-ples of systematic or core-related homonymy, such as the central booksof Metaphysics, he never finds human to be homonymous nor doeshe mention it in conjunction with homonymous instances in which the

relation of shared characteristics is harder to discern, as with nature(physis) or friendship (philia).19The absence of any explicit claim thathumanis homonymous, taken together with the notion that predicatessignifyingper seproperties are used synonymously and that substancesdo not admit of degree present considerable difficulty for the alterna-tive involving homonymy.

In fact, it is more natural to assume that human is taken to be syn-onymous, given that a name that can be applied with the same senseacross individuals of a kind, orgenos, can be used in a precise sense. The

lack of textual evidence that the term human has different senses oris highly variable in everyday usage (excluding the metaphorical kind)when applied to human beings seems to show it functions as an ordi-nary natural kind term. In this function, it must have a unified senseand signify a synonymous property among human beings, in the same

18 In the sense that for paronymous terms, the central term must be non-synonymousto begin with, as is the case with health (on which, see Top106b29-7a2).

19 For discussion of the various senses and unity of nature (physis), see PhII 1, 192b21ff.;MetaphV 4; for the parallel one on friendship (philia), see EEVII 2, 1236a15-32,and also, Ward 2008, 137-67.



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way that a common species-name such as horse or dog does. Butperhaps this inference is too easy. After all, other common predicates

that seem to indicate one characteristic and to be used synonymouslydo not signify such on further inspection.20In what follows, I presentsome evidence that seems to indicate homonymy arises as part of be-ing human, and so the possibility of human being non-synonymousremains open, at least at this juncture.

III Homonymy, Synonymy, and Human: Deliberation as Human Potentiality

The main argument supporting human as homonymous and againstit as synonymous stems from PoliticsI whereAristotle denies that thedeliberative capacity (to bouleutikon) is present in all humans or presentin the same way. Specifically, he claims that the deliberative faculty ispresent and operative in male citizens, present but inoperative (akuron)in female citizens and not present at all (ouk echei to bouleutikon) in slaves(Politics1260a10-14). So, in regard to levels of deliberative potentiality,adult male citizens have the most complete, or fullest, deliberative abil-

ity and natural slaves (men and women) have the least complete ability(i.e., non-existent), with women citizens and immature male citizensfalling somewhere in between these two extremes. Accordingly, Politics1260a12-14 implies that human deliberative capacity is non-universal,as justified by the following ranking: immature male citizens possessdeliberative capacity but in an incomplete (ateles) way, women, in an in-operative (akuron) way, and slaves simply do not possess it (ouk echein).Taken in this way, the various levels of deliberative capacity at PoliticsI13 (1260a12-14) appear to be pivotal in assessing the lack of synonymy

in being human. It would seem that if someone lacks deliberative abili-ty, then he or she lacks reason or some constitutive part of reason, giventhat the two capacities are connected in definition and being. As weknow from texts throughout de AnimaIII, as well as from NicomacheanEthicsVI, the deliberative capacity is found in the rational part of the

20 See Aristotles comment with regard to justice in EN V 1, where he states that

sometimes different uses of a term are closely related and so the homonymy es-capes our notice (cf. 1129a26-7); similarly, at PhVII 4 concerning the kinds of mo-tion where he finds that some cases of homonymy are closely related and so, lessevident, while others are farther apart and more evident (cf. Ph241a21-5).



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soul, and both works consistently maintain that only rational animalsdeliberate.21On the assumption that deliberation belongs to reason, the

absence of one implies that of the other. So, someone who lacks de-liberative ability lacks reason as well, and this contradicts the linkagebetween being human and being rational. If this inference is correct,human cannot be considered synonymous for all individuals: it doesnot refer to the same characteristic or in the same sense when applied tomale citizens, female citizens, and natural slaves, for example.

However, we might propose an alternative to the previous by restrict-ing the predicate to smaller groups: for example, if we apply humanspecifically to mature, male, Athenian citizens, it becomes synonymous.

This alternative preserves synonymy through restricting the range ofapplication of the term, and will be called RRS(restrictive range syn-onymy) in what follows. One disadvantage of RRSis that human be-comes multi-vocal if we consider it as a global predicate taken across allhumans: the synonymy of human collapses into homonymy when it isbeing taken as a predicate at a higher level of abstraction.

It may be suggested, as an alternative to RRS, that deliberation andreason are not precisely co-extensive capacities, and this raises the pos-sibility that someone can have reason, not deliberation, and be consid-

ered human. We might refer to this as the de-linking strategy, and this,it may be proposed, provides a solution to the aporiathat was mentionedabove in the following way. According to the de-linking proposal, hu-man beings as such would possess a general rational capacity in virtueof their human form, and in addition, a subset of humans would pos-sess a more specific kind of rational capacity, namely, deliberative ca-pacity. On this view, possessing a rational faculty simpliciteris sufficientfor a living thing to be considered human, and so, having a rationalcapacity does not strictly imply a deliberative capacity. Hence, it seems

that on the first cut human is being applied synonymously across allhuman beings. This proposal has a distinct conceptual advantage overRRSby preserving the synonymy of being human at the broadest level,and it has, as well, support from crucial passages in Politics, such as thatin I 13, concerning the restriction of full deliberative capacity to adult,

21 For example, we know from ENIII 3 that deliberation relates to choice (prohairesis)

which is present only in rational animals; again, from ENVI 5 (cf. 1140a25-b6) thatdeliberation is bound up with practical reason (phronsis); furthermore, in de AnIII3 (428a16-24) and III 7 (432b2) we find deliberation working with a rational sort ofimagination (phantasia bouleutik) open only to humans.



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male citizens. After all, it would be implausible to read passages suchas PoliticsI 13, 1260a10-14, as implying that free women, natural slaves,

and children are not humanbecause they do not deliberate properly orat all. In fact, Aristotle rejects the view of those who think slaves lackreason (logos) and deserve only admonition (cf. Pol1260b5-6), indicat-ing his disagreement with those who think that slaves are lacking inrational capacity altogether.

Weighing against the de-linking strategy just proposed is other evi-dence to the effect that Aristotle thinks of deliberative capacity as be-longing to human beings as such, as being part of the essence of beinghuman. If so, it would be impossible for someone to have reason and

be unable to deliberate, that is, to be unable to deliberate at some timeor other.22So, if being able to deliberate is essentially connected to beinghuman, and if deliberative ability is denied to some humans, the termhuman cannot be used synonymously across human beings. It wouldappear, then, de-linking, the option of disconnecting the rational fromthe deliberative capacity does not have the desired result of preserv-ing the synonymy of humanwith reference to men, women, and slavestaken together. For it will turn out that the sole application of humanthat preserves synonymy is that application to adult male citizens able

to deliberate fully.To review at this point, the alternatives for humanbeing synonymous

include: (i) restricted range synonymy, or RRS, the option that preservesthe synonymy of humanby restricting the range of application by classor group, and (ii) de-linking, the option that separates the rational anddeliberative capacities so as to find only the former necessary to beinghuman. On the first option, humanis synonymous within each grouptaken as such (viz., only free men or only free women or only slaves),but not as a global common predicate; on the second option, humanis

synonymous and refers to the same capacities when applied to rationalanimals as such. What arises as a concern is that, on either alternative,humanbecomes non-synonymous at a higher level, although not in thesame way. According to RRS, human becomes non-synonymous as aglobal predicate, although synonymous in each restricted application;in contrast, according to de-linking, human is synonymous when re-

22 For, clearly substances can have essential properties and yet lack them at certaintimes: so, water is essentially liquid and yet becomes ice; children have reason andyet are unable to exercise the ability until maturity; as Cohen points out, Aristotlesessentialism involves dispositionalper seproperties: see Cohen 1996, 51-2.



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ferring to being rational simply, but non-synonymous across differentgroups. On the assumption of de-linking, the use of humanapplied to

adult male citizens, adult female citizens, and slaves is homonymoussince the deliberative capacity is not present in the same way amongthem. Since the characteristic of rational-plus-deliberativecapacityis lack-ing as a common characteristic, human becomes homonymous.23 Butsince there is good reason to think that for Aristotle human beingsshare a common nature which encompasses rational and deliberativecapacities, the de-linking option appears to lose favor. If we excludeaccidental homonymy, we seem to be led to the conclusion that humanis homonymous unless another proposal for synonymy can be offered.

Since the case for humanbeing homonymous presents various initialdifficulties, another line of argument for preserving synonymy seemswarranted.

A third option concerning being humanpreserves synonymy by en-larging the notion of what deliberative activity is. On this alternative,being humanencompasses rational and deliberative capacities, but al-lows for some plasticity in the attribution of deliberation. Briefly put,this option consists in: (i) predicating rationality of all humans, (ii) pre-serving the link between rationality and deliberation, and (iii) allowing

for different activities to count as deliberation. The distinctive featureof this option depends on deliberation being considered as referring todifferent range of activities, at one end, a general means-ends reason-ing, and at the other, a highly specialized kind of practical reasoninginvolving a view of the good. This possibility will be referred to as dualdeliberation synonymy, or DDS. On this view, when Aristotle claimsmale citizens deliberate while female citizens, children, and slaves donot (cf. Pol1260a12-14), he means that male citizens deliberate in somemore complete way than women or children do. On this interpretation,

it is possible for a human being to deliberate in one way, but not neces-sarily in another more specialized way. The present alternative is attrac-tive in that it would allow us to rest with the natural assumption thatwhen Aristotle claims that humans have a capacity to deliberate aboutfuture alternatives in Nicomachean EthicsIII and de Anima III, he meansthat humans as suchare the kind of animal that has a capacity for de-

23 On this alternative, humans share central common characteristics but the one sig-nified by reason plus deliberation would be absent as a common feature; sincethere would be no shared feature, accidental homonymy, or by chance (cf. EN1096b27) would seem to result.



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liberation and practical reasoning.24In this case, being human ensuresthat the animal is capable of deliberating in a general sense, although

not necessarily in a narrow, or specialized, sense. In addition, it allowsthat from being human and having rational capacity, it follows that anysubject has a deliberative capacity. More to the point, since it allows de-liberative capacity to be present among all humans, the term humanremains synonymous as referring to a common complex characteristic,that of having rationality plus deliberation. Furthermore, a potential ob-jection against this option, namely, that humanbecomes homonymousby the homonymy introduced by deliberation filtering upwards, doesnot find a firm footing.25As will be developed presently, the ways of

deliberating share basic, common features; it does not appear eitherthat these cases involve accidental homonymy or that the conditionsfor core-dependent causal homonymy are in place, as in the medicaland the healthy.26

Let us recapitulate the alternatives raised in the previous discussion.At present, there are four alternatives of how to consider humanwith re-gard to homonymy or synonymy, including: (i) restricted range synon-ymy, or RRS, according to which humanis synonymous in each specialsphere of application (though not globally); (ii) de-linking, according to

which humanis synonymous as a generic property, but homonymousif considered as referring to reason plus deliberation; (iii) dual delib-eration synonymy, or DDS, according to which humanis synonymousgiven the assumption that deliberation admits of different kinds; (iv)related homonymy, RH, as a possibility if the first three options fail. Ashas been observed with regard to the first three, the option involvingde-linking (the second option) has the result that the sole group capable

24 Textual passages are numerous; see, for example, the discussion of deliberation:relating to choice (prohairesis) in ENIII 3; relating to practical reason (phronsis ) inENVI 5 (1140a25-b6); relating to a reasoned kind of imagination (phantasia) in deAnIII 3 (428a16-24) and de AnIII 7 (432b2-12); relating to thought and movementin de AnIII 10-11, esp. 433a9-16, 433a31-b4, 433b28-9, 434a10-12.

25 The upward contamination objection arises from a line of criticism offered to mefrom Chris Shields in regard to an earlier version of the paper.

26 The feasibility of establishing one case of deliberation as causally prior to the oth-

ers in a systematic fashion as shown in the medical or the healthy seems slight;we might suggest the relation of the deliberative capacity of the immature male(ateles) to mature male citizen as related by final cause, but the remaining cases ofdeliberative capacity (women, slaves) defy similar treatment.



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of deliberation is that comprised of adult, male citizens. One rather un-happy consequence here concerns that this seems to imply that human

signifies a generic property (like animal), and so, the various groups ofhumans seem to be considered sub-kinds, or species, of humans. In thisregard, the option involving de-linking, while initially plausible, willhave the following undesirable consequences.

Let us suppose for the moment that being human is a genus; if so,there will be species answering to the several groups mentioned, adultmale citizens, female citizens, children, slaves, and so on. Now whilethis alternative might be used to explain the reason for which Aris-totle finds demonstrable differences in deliberative capacities among

humans in Politics I, it would not be consistent with other claims hemakes. In fact, the counter-evidence for supposing Aristotle postulatesmore than one species of humans is two-fold. First, like Plato, Aristotlerejects the notion that human differences, e.g., cultural, geographical, orsexual differences, are sufficient to account for real, biological speciesdifferences.27For example, in weighing the political capacities of non-Greeks, or barbarians, where Aristotle follows the Hippocratic medi-cal tradition in citing climate differences for differences in dispositions,he does not infer species-differences as a result.28So, the difference in

deliberative capacities cannot map directly onto a specific differenceamong human kinds. Also, as we have noted, Aristotles claim aboutthe non-comparability of substance in Categories5 matters.29Aristotleholds that things identical in substance do not differ in degree: for ex-ample, the same substance, human, cannot be more or less human, thanitself or than another human, just as a pale thing is more [pale] than an-other or a beautiful thing more [beautiful] than another (Cat3b37-4a1).In contrast to qualitative ascriptions like color, human does not admitof comparison or degree: one human is not more human than another.

27 See Plato, Plt 262d, where the Stranger points out that the notion of dividing hu-man beings into two kinds, Greeks and barbarians, is incorrect insofar as the di-vision does not mark off human differences according to natural kinds, or gene.For discussion on Platos use of genosin regard to divisions among humans, seeKamtekar 2002.

28 See PolVII 7, 1327b20-30, where he gives a version of the climate theory of hu-man difference based on the Hippocratic treatise, Airs, Waters, Places, chs. 12-24,on which see Lloyd 1978. For discussion of Aristotles account of climate theory inPolVII 7 in regard to slaves and barbarians, see Ward 2002, 20-3.

29 Namely, where he claims No substance admits of a more and a less (Cat3b33).



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In this regard, it cannot be the case that the free male citizen is morehuman than the female, the child or the non-citizen. So the hypothesis

that human groups exist as ranked kinds within a genus conflicts withAristotles claim that human signifies an infimaspecies, not a genus.

It seems justified to pass to option (iii) dual deliberation synonymy,or DDS, the option involving differences in the ways of deliberating. Ihave presented the option as one that preserves humanas synonymous,but it might be argued that its synonymy is compromised inasmuchas deliberation invites homonymy by allowing for qualitatively differ-ent kinds of deliberating. First, we need to ascertain whether the textssupport one kind, different kinds, or different ways, of deliberating. It

might be argued, in fact, that Aristotle is using deliberation in a specific,narrow sense in PoliticsI 13 when he denies deliberation to free womenand slaves. According to this view, he is using the term in the senseof signifying the kind of rational, calculative planning dependent onhaving a conception of the good, and this, it is argued, is available onlyto those who possess full moral virtue.30This reading would restrictgenuine deliberation to the few citizens in the best regimes, and wouldlikely turn out to be a capacity present as a first level potentiality onlyin adult, male, Athenian citizens.31It has already been observed, how-

ever, that there are certain problems in arguing this position, not theleast of which is that it implies deliberation is rarely engaged in, andonly by a few. Looking across his many discussions about deliberationin Nicomachean Ethics, such as II 2, II 5, and III 3, where he discussesdeliberation as being a part of moral excellence, we do not find thenarrow reading of deliberation being borne out. Nor do we find thatAristotle restricts genuine deliberation to the few in, for example,Nicomachean EthicsVI where he reflects on it in relation to the specifica-tion ofphronsis as practical deliberation implied by moral virtue nor,

again, in Nicomachean EthicsVII in relation to akrasia and the ways inwhich we may fail to deliberate properly. On the contrary, we find thatin his central discussions of deliberation across Nicomachean Ethics, theactivity is described as a common albeit distinctively human capacity,natural to humans in virtue of being the kind of animals who are able to

30 I take it this is Krauts view on deliberation as it relates to the natural slaves ability(or lack of ability) in PolI, for which see Kraut 2002, 289-304.

31 I discuss development of the deliberative capacity in section 4; I take it that thenatural capacity is not first present as a hexis, or second level potentiality, likesight, for example.



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reason about the good in relation to the future. In this regard, delibera-tion is a universal, human capacity for rational calculation concerning

means and relative ends. The discussions about deliberation in Nico-machean Ethicsdo not, then, state that antecedent to practical reasoningwe must have a full, correct conception of the human end, or good, inorder to deliberate.

My present suggestion is to modify DDS, the dual deliberation view;instead of thinking there is one way of deliberating properly, let us sup-pose that are different ways of partaking in the same activity, one waywith, and one without, a full conception of the good. If there are differ-ent ways in which humans can partake in the same activity, we need

not assume that all kinds of people have to perform the same activity;we would need to see which kind seems more appropriate in the con-text of the discussion. In the passages about deliberation and moral vir-tue in Nicomachean EthicsII, III, VI, and VII, he appears to be referringto a type of means-ends reasoning about the day-to-day sort of good.This kind of deliberation is operable apart from having a complete con-ception of the human good, which only the fully virtuous possess. Thisgarden-variety activity of deliberation is, I take it, the basic practicalability available to us by nature as we develop from children to adults.

There is, of course, another activity of deliberation that is related tophronsisin a special sense, as being the best kind of practical reasoningallowable to virtuous, Athenian, male citizens. On the present reading,all humans, men and women, free and slave, engage in the everydaytype of deliberation, but only a virtuous few engage in the specializedactivity of deliberation in the narrow sense.

The dual reading of deliberation affords us the benefit of allowingAristotle more consistency than we first considered. In addition, itholds the key to unlocking both the aporiaiposed at the outset of theessay. The first aporiawas, in effect, the result of combining the thesisabout metaphysical equality following from Aristotles claims aboutsubstance in Categoriesand Metaphysicswith those about deliberativecapacities among humans from Politics. What we have found is that Ar-istotle is able to maintain both sets of claims. On the one hand, humansbelong to the same species or possess the same species-form, and sothey possess the same essential properties. Assuming Aristotle holds,as is generally accepted, that rational capacity is an essential humanproperty and that this capacity entails the capacity for rational calcula-tion called deliberation, it follows that humans as suchhave deliberativecapacity. What has been added as a qualification to the previous claimis that the generic kind of deliberation that humans possess by virtue



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of their species-form, namely, the everyday deliberative capacity, doesnot require having a complete conception of the human good. Rather,

having a complete conception of the human good is only required to beable to engage in deliberative activity of the highest kind. It is, I think,from this panoptic perspective about practical reason and deliberationthat in PoliticsI and VII Aristotle draws his conclusions about differ-ent political groups having or lacking a deliberative capacity. Thus, inPoliticsI 13, 1260a10-14, he finds that all humans have the same parts ofthe soul, but free women, children, and slaves do not have it or possessit fully, and in PoliticsVII 7, 1327b20-35, he claims that European andAsian barbarians also lack deliberative ability (although for different

reasons).32

If we grant that he has different standards of what it meansto deliberate, he may be able to claim without contradiction that virtu-ous male citizens alone deliberate and that other, less virtuous humans,slave or free, also deliberate. For it would be true to say that lacking afull conception of the good would imply that someone could not delib-erate in the special sense but not imply that he or she could not deliber-ate in any sense. For purposes of analogy, we may consider the lesser, orsecond-best sense of deliberation to the second-best good activity thatAristotle describes in Nicomachean Ethics X 7 and 8, 1177b29-8a14 where

he seeks to compare the qualities of moral virtue (ethik arte) with thoseof study (theoria). The activity of moral virtue seems to pale in compari-son with that of study precisely because study better fulfills the condi-tions Aristotle specified for eudaimonia in Nicomachean EthicsI.33Yet ithardly follows from this claim that moral virtue is not a eudaimon, goodactivity. In a similar way, I suggest that the everyday kind of practicalreasoning that less than fully virtuous humans display does not failto involve deliberation. From a wider perspective about deliberationand practical reason, it seems reasonable that free women, slaves, bar-

barians and perhaps children possess a basic capacity for deliberation:they actualize it in the sense of making decisions about their futureends and projects in spite of lacking a complete notion of the good thatvirtuous, male Athenians have.

32 It is interesting to note that while barbarians are groups from distinct geographi-cal areas, they are defined as such in relation to their political abilities, not to theirethnicity as such; see Ward 2002, 17-23.

33 Essays on the two kinds of good activities (and lives) are nearly too numerous tomention, but see, for example, Achtenberg 1989, Cooper 1975, Kraut 1989, Roche1988.



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Unifying the activities among the ways in which we deliberate sug-gests a solution to the second aporiaposed at the outset of the paper.

This problem concerned the issue of deliberation with Aristotles teach-ing about moral habituation, the claim which seems to be extended toall human beings in Nicomachean EthicsII. What I suggest is that the ca-pacity for deliberation exists as a natural human capacity in all humans(as a first level potentiality), but it is one that, like moral virtue, mustbe subjected to training by habituation in order to become effective as ahexis(a second level potentiality). In this discussion, I am assuming thatthe relation between the two potentialities is fully natural, or part of thethings nature, even if one of the potentialities requires training; so the

relation is not one of natural to artificial potentiality.34

IV Reason and Potentialities in de AnimaII

The tri-partite distinction among levels of actuality and potentiality inthe soul as sketched in de AnimaII 1 and developed in II 5 may afford atool for understanding the nature of the differences in deliberative ca-pacity. Placing the tri-partite schema in de AnimaII 5 against Aristotles

comments from Nicomachean EthicsII 1 about the nature and acquisitionof moral virtue yields the following conclusions.35From Aristotles dis-cussion of capacities and actualities in de AnimaII 5, 417a21-b2, we maysay that in virtue of their kind, humans possess a first level dunamisformoral excellence (or vice) when they are born in the same way that theypossess a first level dunamisfor, say, knowledge of grammar. Followinga period of training and habituation, some humans develop a secondlevel dunamis, or hexis, with regard to moral excellence (while others donot). Once in possession of the second level potentiality for moral vir-

tue, the moral agent, like the one schooled in knowledge of grammar, isable to exercise the capacity, as long as nothing impedes the exercise. Itseems reasonable to extend this sequence of change with regard to thecapacity for deliberation as well, especially since the two are related.For deliberation (boulsis) is essentially related to moral virtue (ethik

34 The relation of first to second level potentiality here is distinct both from that of es-sential to accidental potentialities, on which see Cohen 1996, 53-4, and from natu-ral and artificial ones, as in Whiting 1992, 91-2.

35 I argue for these results more fully in a paper onphysis, see Ward 2005, 294-300.



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arte) as a constituent element, and so, it is fully reasonable that forthe initial capacity of deliberation to become a hexis, it must undergo a

similar kind of habituation as that for moral virtue.What presents a problem concerns the precise nature of the change

and the kind of difference existing between the first and secondpotentiality in deliberative capacity. On the one hand, the change fromfirst level potentiality from what we may call a bare dunamis36 toa second level potentiality, the habituated state, involves a qualitativechange, or alloiosis, in the affective part of the soul (cf. de An 417a31-2).37What Aristotle explicitly states at de AnimaII 5, 417a31-2 is that thefirst change in potentiality-state in the soul, that from the bare dunamis

to the hexis, comes about by a qualitative change through learning(mathsis) and often after changes from a reverse condition (enantiashexeos). The change from first to second actuality, in contrast, does notinvolve the same kind of change in that in the latter case, the subjectuses the capacity acquired without any change in the capacity itself.Aristotle expands on the two kinds of change involved by way of anexplanation of two senses of paschein, to suffer, or be affected: onesense indicates the destruction of one thing by its contrary, and anothersense, the preservation of something in potentiality by something in

actuality and like it (cf. 417b2-5). These two states are intended to maponto the two changes previously discussed, such that the kind of pas-cheininvolved in the destruction of one thing by its contrary describesthe change from the bare dunamisto the hexis, and that involved in thepreservation of one thing by another like it, the change from hexis toentelechy.

For the moment, it is the former kind of change that is of interest:what seems clear is that in de AnimaII 5, the transition from bare du-namis to hexis involves a process of being affected (paschein) which

specifically involves a change in the patheof the subject. While thereis some plasticity in the terminology of pathe, in Categories8, Aristotle

36 A similar term is used by Annas in her discussion of moral virtue, see Annas 1999,50-1.

37 So, this rules out cases of change to a potentiality that would involve substantialchange; for example, earth is not potentially (even as a first level potentiality) a

box or a human being, as Aristotle notes inMetaphysicsVIII 7, 1049a16-18, becausethere would have to be several prior substantial changes, as, e.g., earth to woodor earth to seed. For discussion on passive and active potentialities, see Gill 1989,175-80.



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distinguishespatheas the third type of qualities (poiotetes), those whichbelong to a subject in virtue of being so qualified (cf. Cat9a28-33). This

class of qualities includes properties that belong to bodies, such as be-ing sweet or being hot (cf. Cat9a33-4), and also those qualities that be-long to soul, such as being angry (cf. Cat9b33-5).38In brief,patheare thequalifications of body or soul that may be considered either as passiveaffections (the results of some process of affection) or as active affections(the bases for effecting changes in another) as heat affects a change intemperature in another thing.

With regard to how affections, orpathe,relate to the capacity for de-liberation and moral excellence, the suggestion is that the first level po-

tentiality (dunamis) for moral virtue is in fact apathosof the subject andso, subject to change. For, we know that affections, after having under-gone many changes from one contrary to another over time themselveschange from being transitory affections to more permanent states inthe same way as an unformed dunamisbecomes a hexis. This change inthe mode of how the subject is qualified helps to explain why the firstactuality, or second potentiality, is a dunamisin another sense as thethings ability to exhibit what it really is or to use what it has, ratherthan an ability to be changed inpathe.39

The capacity for deliberation exists in relation to that for moral ex-cellence, and so exhibits a parallel transition in the affections underly-ing the change from bare dunamisto hexis. Whatever the basic contrarytendencies underlying deliberation are, for example, indecisiveness orrashness, on the one hand, and lack of concern or excessive feeling, onthe other, such feelings have to be brought to a proper, permanent stateof balance so that they are not fleeting states, aspatheare. What this mayimply as an explanation for the differences in deliberative capacitiesamong human beings is that the affections underlying the bare dunamis

in some people are less malleable than those in others; if so, the transi-tion to the second level potentiality would be diminished or blockeddependent upon some initial natural tendency. The failure of the un-derlyingpatheto be affected in the right way as to be transformed into

38 Aristotle distinguishes the latter kind ofpathefrom psychological states of longerduration such as congenital conditions like being irascible and other conditionsthat are hard to erase or unchangeable (cf. Cat9b36-10a4).

39 For a similar sense, see Cohen 1996, 164, who defines a base dunamisas that whichmarks a things ability to become different from what it is or change somethingelse.



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the qualities underlying a second level ability may, in fact, ultimatelybe due to a complex of innate and external causes, but this discussion

would take us outside the confines of the present essay.40

V Conclusions

The position that best resists refutation stands on the side of humanbeing considered to be synonymous. To sum up, we have seen thatarguing that human is homonymous using the de-linking strategy onthe grounds that some humans are said to have reason and deliber-

ate while others do not (cf. Pol 1260a10-14) has deficits. The de-link-ing alternative fails to make sense of many passages in NicomacheanEthics and de Anima about deliberation being a human capacity andspecifically, one needed for choice, practical reason, and local motion.In contrast, holding humanto be synonymous is made on various, un-contested grounds, including that: (i) substances cannot be compared,or do not differ in degree, (ii) being rational is taken as a common, perseproperty of every human, (iii) deliberation is a widely distributedhuman capacity following from being rational, (iv) slaves, too, are said

to possess the rational part of the soul (to logistikon). But there remainsthe issue of whether we are speaking about a restrictive or a globalkind of synonymy for the predicate human. According to RRS, or re-strictive range synonymy, we have humanapplying synonymously toeach separate group, but the view threatens to lead to homonymy ifthe predicate is applied to the whole class. For, homonymy in regard todeliberation seems to result from the following claims: (i) deliberativecapacity is absent in some humans, (ii) rational and deliberative capaci-ties are separable and not mutually implicative; (iii) being of two kinds,

there is no common element across deliberation. As has been observed,finding deliberation to be homonymous is unwelcome as it threatensto filter upwards to human. However, by revising the initial interpreta-tion of DDS, the upwards filtration is not necessary in that we preservethe synonymy of deliberation itself on this interpretation. As was sug-gested, it is plausible to argue that deliberation is a human activity that

40 Thinking about the lack attributed to women and slaves, we might speculate aboutwhich cause is implicated; in regard to womens lack, the cause may be single ora complex: see for example, Cook 1996, Tress 1996; in regard to slaves and barbar-ians, see Ward 2002.



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can be present in different ways, all of which employ rational activ-ity involving practical reason, just as the activities of study and moral

excellence may be considered to count as different ways of exercisinghuman goodness and flourishing. Consequently, the difficult objectionthat humanis not synonymous but homonymous based on the result ofdeliberation being homonymous is not warranted; the conclusion thathumanis synonymous remains intact and alive.

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