Military organisation and planning rather than technology were the most significant elements in the development of land warfare 1792-1918

Military organisation and planning rather than technology were the most significant elements in the development of land warfare 1792-1918.

INTRODUCTION

During the period 1792-1918 armies were frequently reorganised and the role of planning changed. By 1918 strategic and tactical planning had been separated as leadership functions whilst the merits of professional volunteers over conscription became prominent. Significant as they are , the changes in organisation and planning only happened because of a symbiotic relationship with technological developments.

THE MIDDLE BIT

ORGANISATION

The major debate in organisation was how to create a mass army for mobilisation without loss of fighting efficiency (conscripts or professional standing army)

The British would retain volunteer status until 1916 (why are professionals so good)

France introduced the idea of conscription (nation in arms 1793) which was eventually copied by most armies in the Napoleonic period (Austria 1809)

Conscription provided a mass army (1812-800,00) but conscription led to problems for Napoleon (blood tax & progressive degradation 1813-14).

1815-50 Armies reduced in size and reverted to small professional forces designed to be used as internal security rather than external war (Peterloo 1819)

Prussia devised a method that would provide highly trained soldiers and a mass army for mobilisation (Reservist system). With the outbreak of the Great War reservists were conscripted giving the Schlieffen plan about 3 million men

Britain relied upon volunteers (Kitchener volunteers) until 1916 when conscription was finally introduced after the Somme.

Organisation also relates to how troops would be used. The Guibertian warfare1792 devised the Corps system. (discuss what an army corps is and how used)

The corps system was copied by all by 1914 (Somme offensive is British V Corps).

Mass armies necessitated a change in planning.

PLANNING

The major development in planning is the division of responsibilities regarding monitoring the war , strategic planning and tactical planning.

1792-1815 was characterised by heroic leadership that combined all areas of planning. Leaders such as Napoleon (Waterloo / Lee(Gettysburg) decided strategy (central position 1815/63) and tactics (frontal assault 1815/63).

The French mass armies necessitated Corps commanders , however Napoleon did not encourage initiative (Bernadotte 1806 or Grouchy 1815).

Arguably able Corps commanders such as Davout 1805 or Desaix 1800 were the equal of Napoleon .

Lee was fortunate in the quality of his Generals Jackson & Longstreet but this was an ad-hoc provision

Reacting against Napoleon a new style of planning was formalised by the Prussians 1832-1869 and put into effect in the Wars of German unification 1866-71 and Great War 1914-18

The decision of war and peace was to be separated (Clausewitz 1832) so that political masters would ensure the primacy of politics (Bismarck 1866-71).

The Prussian General Staff was created that provided specialist knowledge at war councils for war planning (Schlieffen 1898)

Using the advice of staff officers the Army commander was responsible for war strategy (Hindenberg and Ludendorf 1916-18)

Army command would monitor the operations of the various army corps. Tactical planning was delegated to local commanders (Prittwitz 8th Army 1914).

The idea of leading from the rear was codified in Moltke( 1869 Instructions) and was copied by all armies

Derided as Chateau Generalship, planning in the Great War follows the pattern set by the Prussians (At the Battle of the Somme 1916 Haig was responsible for strategy and Rawlinson for tactics)

Delegated command had become necessary because of the size of frontage now involved in war (compare Waterloo 1815 to Western Front 1915-17).

TECHNOLOGY

Military planning and organisation altered because of a symbiotic relationship with technological development

Industrialisation allowed for mass armies because of mass production (Britain as First Industrial Nation 1700-1815 with regard to allies)

Machine tools led to greater firepower necessitating the empty battlefield (bigger frontage held by less men with greater firepower)

The railway boom of 1840s allowed for the consumption of more logistics at a faster and greater distance than previously

Larger frontage led to delegated command that was possible at a strategic level because of the telegraph and later telephone (tactical level involved runners such as Hitler at Ypres 1915)

CONCLUSION

It is impossible to declare which is most significant in the development of land warfare 1792-1918. Military planning and organisation enable warfare to become more destructive yet without the technological changes of 1815-70s the delegated command and mass armies would have been restricted in their operational use and constantly out of command and control.