Walsh - Kant's Criticism (Art.) Horiz.
Transcript of Walsh - Kant's Criticism (Art.) Horiz.
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Kant's Criticism of
Metaphysics
W. H. Walsh
Published by: Cambridge University Press on
behalf of oyal !nstitute of Philosophy
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Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics: !
"uthor#s$: W. H. Walsh
evie%ed %ors$:
ource: Philosophy( )ol. *+( ,o. -- #ul.( */0/$( pp. 0*01
02-
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of
oyal !nstitute of Philosophy
table U3: http:44%%%.5stor.org4stable406+7*8+
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Kant's Criticism of Metaphysicsi: !
WHAT is the Critique of Pure Reason about? The
terminology of the work is so perplexing, its argument so
obsurely expresse!, that the or!inary rea!er may be forgi"en
if he puts it !own at the en! "ery muh in the !ark as to what
it all means# He will ha"e seen that in it $ant has attempte! toestablish ertain onlusions% the sub&eti"ity of spae an!
time, the existene an! ob&eti"e "ali!ity of a number of a
priori onepts or ategories, the falsity of the arguments use!
to !efen! the metaphysial system most wi!ely fa"oure! in
'erman learne! irles in the eighteenth entury( but though
he has graspe! all this he may yet ha"e faile! to make sense of
the work as a whole# )t is the ol! story of not seeing the woo!
for trees( an! in this ase the fault is more exusable than in
most, for the in!i"i!ual trees eah !eman! so muh attention
an! are so !iffiult to get roun! that it is all too easy to forget
the "ery existene of the woo!# At the worst, one may think
that there is no woo! at all( only a misellaneous aggregate of
in!i"i!ual trees whih ha"e nothing to !o with eah other#
*et this onlusion, if true, woul! be a strange one,
ontra!iting not only ommon expetation +for it is
reasonable to expet that a work on whih its author spent so
muh trouble woul! ha"e a unitary theme, but also the
impliations of expliit statements of $ant himself# The
Critique of Pure Reason is presumably itself a pro!ut of pure
reason, an! pure reason, as $ant is onstantly telling us, iiis a
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unity( or again, the Critique is a piee of +immanent
metaphysis, iii an! metaphysis, as $ant un!erstan!s it, is
nothing if not systemati# )t is true that $ant says that the
Critique is not itself the system of reforme! metaphysis
whih his philosophy is to make possible(i"but there is little
!oubt that the ontents of the first part of the latter +the
metaphysi of nature as oppose! to the metaphysi of morals
woul!, if it ha! e"er been written, ha"e onsiste! of little but
the onlusions establishe! in its so-alle! .propae!euti#."
)t is the least we an !o, then, to assume that the
Critique is the answer to a single question or set of questions#
The problem next arises% what is this question to whih $ant/s
work is the answer? $ant himself says in a passage in the
seon! e!ition )ntro!ution +0 )1% .The proper problem of
pure reason is ontaine! in the question% how are syntheti a
priori &u!gments possible?. )n the first e!ition Prefae +A x"ii
he says% .The hief question is always simply this% what an!
how muh an un!erstan!ing an! reason know apart from all
experiene?. These two statements are not quite alternati"e
formulations of the same problem# The seon! puts a general
question, whih the first partiulari2es( an! the
partiulari2ation is at the same time a beginning of a solution
of the !iffiulty# The general question onerns the extent ofour a priori knowle!ge% it asks what knowle!ge human beings
an aquire in!epen!ently of sense-experiene or
introspetion# "i 3any philosophers, an! partiularly in the
eighteenth entury, ha"e belie"e! that there are ertain
propositions whih we an know to be true in!epen!ently of
the e"i!ene of the senses% the propositions of mathematis
an! many metaphysial propositions were allege! to be of this
type# Clearly it is important for any philosopher who aepts
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this general position +as $ant !oes to ask after the extent an!
nature of our knowle!ge of these propositions# )t is this
problem whih $ant has before him throughout the Critique,
an! if we go through the work with some suh formula in our
min!s as .What an we know by simply thinking?. or better,
.What an we know by other means than sense-experiene?.
we shoul! be able to see what it is about# 0ut we shall fin!
that $ant himself is more apt to use the other formula, .How
are syntheti a priori &u!gments possible?.4 an! this shoul! be
explaine!# )n the famous passage in the )ntro!ution to the
Critique +0 )5 6 A 7 ff# $ant !istinguishes between two typesof &u!gment, analyti an! syntheti# Analyti &u!gments are all
a priori( they are what we an onlu!e from the &u!gments
we know alrea!y by analysing their sub&et-onepts in
aor!ane with the priniple of ontra!ition# 8o analyti
&u!gment, therefore, gi"es us new or what might be alle!
.positi"e. knowle!ge# .Positi"e. knowle!ge is always
expresse! in syntheti &u!gments# 8ow it is lear that the sort
of knowle!ge aquire! in!epen!ently of sense-experiene
whih interests $ant is that expresse! in syntheti &u!gments(
so that for him the question whether we know anything
in!epen!ently of sense-experiene is simply the question
whether we know any true syntheti a priori propositions,
sine a priori means aquire! in!epen!ently of sense-
experiene# $ant belie"es that the answer to this question is
.yes.( that we know propositions of this sort in mathematis
an! e"en in physis, the fun!amental presuppositions of whih
are not !rawn, as are the propositions making up the bo!y of
the siene, from sense-experiene( an! that metaphysiians
laim to know propositions of this nature also# He therefore
proposes to set about answering his general question, .What
an we know in!epen!ently of sense- experiene?. by asking
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another question, .What are the on!itions of our knowing
syntheti a priori propositions?. 9or it seems to him lear +an!
it is surely not an unreasonable position that an in"estigation
of the syntheti a priori knowle!ge we un!oubte!ly ha"e will
throw light on the nature an! extent of syntheti a priori
knowle!ge in general#
9rom all this it shoul! be lear that the sub&et of the
Critique is the same as that of so many other philosophial
treatises% an in"estigation of the soures of knowle!ge open to
human beings# 5nly $ant is partiularly intereste! in the
suggestion that reason or intelligene is a soure of
propositions whih are both true an! .positi"e.( an! his main
aim is to estimate the "alue of this suggestion# That is why his
work is a .ritique of pure reason.-a ritial estimation of the
powers of pure reason, i#e# of the intellet by itself# The ob&et
is to say what pure reason both an an! annot !o# The
existene of ertain propositions whose apriority, syntheti
harater, an! ob&eti"e "ali!ity are all regar!e! as ertain by
$ant shows that reason +in a wi!e, non-tehnial sense has
some powers( the existene of metaphysis shows that some
philosophers laime! other, apparently more signifiant,
powers for it# As a result of the Critique, $ant will be in a
position to pronoune on the laim# An! in!ee! it is to makethis pronounement that the whole inquiry is un!ertaken% the
ob&et of the work is to !etermine the possibility of
metaphysis, a siene the "ery onept of whih, as we are
tol! in the Prolegomena +? ), implies that its soures annot
be empirial# 3etaphysial knowle!ge, if suh a thing is
possible, is the supreme example of non-empirial knowle!ge%
is there any metaphysial knowle!ge?
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This question of the possibility of metaphysis is one
whih ha! a partiularly strong interest for $ant# )t intereste!
him both as a tehnial philosopher an! as an or!inary man# )n
tehnial philosophy his hief aim, from the /sixties onwar!s,
seems to ha"e been to !etermine whether metaphysis in the
tra!itional sense is possible, an!, if not, what sort of
metaphysis oul! be legitimate# Again an! again he !isusse!
points onnete! with this sub&et, treating of it partiularly in
the Tra:me an! the inaugural ;issertation# His
pronounements in the Critique an! the Prolegomena show
that he thought that metaphysis oupie! a quite peuliarposition among the sienes# )t was a siene whih .oul!
ne"er ease to be in !eman!, .) a siene whih respon!e! to
a natural want in human beings# To eliminate metaphysis
altogether woul! be impossible( the most that oul! be !one
woul! be to abolish ertain illegitimate types of metaphysis,
making room for a new .sientifi. !otrine# )s not the aim of
the elebrate! .Copernian. re"olution in philosophy !elare!
to be the setting of metaphysis on the sure path of siene?eibni2ian terminology, there
is a fun!amental !ifferene between .truths of reason. an!
.truths of fat,. so that a transition from the first to the seon!
+the kin! of transition whih all rationalists hope! for was
impossible# 0ut though this was plain enough to $ant himself,it is not always plain from his language# +What $ant !i! in
fat was show that .truths of reason. were presripti"e# 5f
ourse not all >eibni2ian .truths of reason. purporte! to be
suh, e#g# .'o! is#. 0ut $ant thinks that the truth of a
proposition like this annot be !etermine! by any intelletual
proess# All .truths of reason. whih are "ali! are presripti"e
in harater-among others, the propositions of logi an!
mathematis, an! the general law of ausality#
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