Corcilius - Activity Passivity and Perceptual Discrimination
Wall Radical Passivity
Transcript of Wall Radical Passivity
R A D I C A L P A S S I V I T Y Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben
Thomas Carl Wall
with a Foreword by William Flesch
STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W YORK PRESS
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Da ta
Wall, Thomas Carl, 1 9 5 4 -Radical passivity : Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben / Thomas Carl
Wall : with a foreword by William Flesch. p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 4 0 4 7 - 8 (hardcover), — ISBN 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 4 0 4 8 - 6 (pbk.) 1. Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2. Blanchot, Maurice. 3. Agamben, Giorgio.
1 9 4 2 - . I. Title. B2430 .L484W35 1999 9 8 - 2 7 8 4 3 111—DC21 CIP
A l 8 < b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
T A L L I N N A ÜLIKOOLI \
A K A D E E M I L I N E } K R A A M A T U K O G U / X
For
Steven Sbaviro
and
Mikkel Borcb-Jacobsen
Contents
F o r e w o r d ix
A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s x v
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Passivity 1
The Language of Poetry 10
O N E
T h e Al legory of Being
Image 13
Duality 17
The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork 22
The Space of Art 25
The Profane 29
T W O
Levinas ' s Eth ics
An Ambiguous Rapport 31
No One Other 34
viii C O N T E N T S
The Self 40
Impasse 46
É t h i q u e 50
Death 57
Levinas and Heidegger 62
T H R E E
B l a n c h o t , L'arrêt de mort, a n d the I m a g e of L i t e r a tu re 65
Writing 65
Proximity 77
En deçà du t e m p s 93
Image, Ipseity, and Art 106
F O U R
A g a m b e n a n d the Poli t ical N e u t e r 1 1 5
Anonymity and Belonging 115
Whatever! 121
Community 129
Object = x 138
Politics 155
N o t e s
Selected B ib l iog raphy
I n d e x
1 6 3
1 8 3
1 8 9
F O R E W O R D
Love's Characters
Wal lace Stevens , w h o loved M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , i n
a b o u t 1 9 5 5 : " F r e n c h a n d English cons t i tu te a single l a n g u a g e . "
B lancho t himself (our o w n " e x t r e m e c o n t e m p o r a r y " a s Leslie
Hill calls h i m ) , a few yea r s ear l ier : "A t r o p b o n c o m p t e , un
tex te t r a d u i t m i m e l 'effort de c r éa t i on q u i , à p a r t i r de la l angue
c o u r a n t e , celle d a n s laquel le n o u s v ivons e t n o u s s o m m e s im
mergés , c h e r c h e à faire na î t r e u n e a u t r e l a n g u e , en a p p a r e n c e
la m ê m e e t p o u r t a n t , p a r r a p p o r t à cet te l a n g u e , c o m m e s o n
absence , sa différence pe rpé tue l l emen t acquise e t c o n s t a m m e n t
c a c h é e . " Such relat ively facile t r a n s l a t i o n is t o o easy a p a t h to
s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s never the less n o t easy, t h e w a y t h a t in t h e
l i terary w o r k t h e wr i t e r will m a k e l a n g u a g e u n d e r g o " la t r a n s
m u t a t i o n qu i d ' u n e seule l angue do i t en t i rer d e u x , l ' une qu i
est lue e t c o m p r i s e sans dé tour , l ' au t r e qu i reste i gno rée , t u e e t
inaccess ible e t d o n t l ' absence ( l ' o m b r e d o n t pa r l e Tolstoï) est
t o u t ce q u e n o u s en sa is issons ." I t is this w h i c h Stevens is speak
ing o f as w e l l — t h e single l a n g u a g e n a m e a b l e on ly as t w o ,
French a n d Engl ish .
T h e ease wi th which t rans la t ion can yield mock-p ro fund i ty
ix
has been .1 hazard Foi English language readers oi Blanchot,
Levinas, and Agamben (as has perhaps the nat ive case- with
which French and Italian speake r s may read t h e m ) . The stylis
tic infelicity of the English l a n g u a g e for their k ind of wr i t i ng
h a s n o t in f requent ly t e n d e d to yield in the i r fo l lowers a k i n d
of e m p t y s loganee r ing , a c l a im to s o m e k n o w l e d g e different
f rom t h a t g r ea t eerie c lar i ty so essent ia l to w h a t they a re say
ing. ( T h a t F r ench i s n o t Levinas ' s na t ive l a n g u a g e m a y p u t
h i m in the pos i t i on of t h e n a r r a t o r in L'Arrêt de mort, r e s p o n
sive in a l a n g u a g e w h o s e respons ib i l i ty c a n n o t be a given.)
F o r years i t h a s seemed to m e , ever s ince r e a d i n g Lydia
Davis ' s supp l e a n d he ro ic a t t e m p t s t o r ende r B l a n c h o t i n E n
glish (in a let ter to Steven Shav i ro B l a n c h o t says of her, "El le
sai t ce qu ' i l en est de t r a d u i r e l ' i n t r a d u i s a b l e " ) , t h a t t h e on ly
w a y for a n Engl ish l a n g u a g e r e a d e r t o r e a d B l a n c h o t h a s been
w i t h i n t h a t single l a n g u a g e Stevens descr ibes . T h e Engl i sh w e
s p e a k e v e r y d a y h a d seemed t o o q u i r k y for B l a n c h o t . J . L .
A u s t i n sugges ts t h a t we ' l l get s o m e w h e r e in aes the t ics w h e n
w e s t o p t r y i n g t o f igure o u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e beaut i fu l a n d
s t a r t l o o k i n g t o descr ibe " t h e d a i n t y a n d t h e d u m p y " in s t ead ,
a n d i t h a s been t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l y c o m i c gen ius o f Engl i sh as
a l i t e ra ry l a n g u a g e (even the Engl ish of Stevens) , to m a r s h a l
such ca tegor i e s of expe r i ence .
We w o u l d be t e m p t e d to call this familiar exper ience , H u m e
at b i l l i a rds , A u s t e n in Ba th , T ro l l ope a t a h u n t , expe r i ence
w h o s e desc r ip t i on m i g h t b e " r e a d a n d u n d e r s t o o d d i rec t ly ."
B lancho t ' s clar i t ies seem s o m e t h i n g else, r e s t r a ined w i t h o u t
re t i cence , aus t e r e w i t h o u t h a u g h t i n e s s , careful w i t h o u t a n x i
ety, fasc ina ted w i t h o u t ca thex i s , i m p e r s o n a l w i t h o u t co ldness .
In B l a n c h o t t h e n a m e of such a s ta te is love, a w o r d used very
ra re ly in his w o r k , a n d on ly w i t h the g rea tes t diff idence. A n d
yet w h a t s ta te i s m o r e famil iar t h a n love? Fami l i a r t o u s a n d
t h e c h a n n e l of the famil iar?
T h e ( flannel 1 >l the familial DC! a use you may use the sec
o n d person famil iar wi th the one you love: tutoiement. But
p e r h a p s one way to cha rac te r i ze Blancho t i s to n o t e the ex
t r eme d e m a n d s he p laces on tutoiement. In his f ict ions his
n a r r a t o r s cons i s ten t ly insist on its rar i ty. In his la tes t essay,
" P o u r l ' ami t ié" Blanchot describes the a tmosphe re o f M a y ' 68
as one in which tutoiement w a s d e m a n d e d of everyone. It w a s
only with his friends, a n d no t with the c o m r a d e s of those t imes,
tha t Blanchot w o u l d use the formal " v o u s , " sign of po l i t eness to
his f r iends, bu t m o r e of his f r iendship , w h i c h c o u l d never use
" t u " of fhandedly . At t h e e n d of the essay B lancho t says t h a t i t
i s on ly Levinas w h o m he will " t u t o y e r , " h is f r i endsh ip w i t h
Levinas , h is f r iendship w i t h his o t h e r f r iends , a n d his fr iend
sh ip w i t h f r iendship d e m a n d i n g this d is t inc t ive , i m p e r s o n a l ,
unfamil iar , a n d u n c a n n y formal i ty wi th famil iar i ty itself.
F r e u d calls t h e u n c a n n y the r e t u r n o f the famil iar a n d sees
the fact of r e t u r n itself as w h a t m a k e s i t uncanny . Fo r B l ancho t
i t w o u l d be t h e al ien fo rmal i ty a t t he h e a r t o f t h e familiar, a n d
indeed a t t h e h e a r t o f t h a t m o s t famil iar o f all t h ings , l an
g u a g e , w h i c h i s u n c a n n y . Fami l ia r : B lancho t ' s n a r r a t o r s a re
u n c o m m o n l y ebul l ien t , l ight a t h e a r t , gay. U n c a n n y : t h a t ga i
ety itself is u n c a n n y in B lancho t , m a r k of the p r o x i m i t y of a
rad ica l u n c o n c e r n w i t h any w o r l d , c o n c e r n itself a p re sence
t h a t is p u t by.
T h i s u n c a n n y famil iar i ty, th is g rave gaie ty i s t h e o p p o s i t e
of F reud ' s n o t i o n of the u n c a n n y as t h e r e t u r n of t h e famil iar :
i t is, to use Blanchot 's i m p o r t a n t observa t ion a b o u t Nie tzsche ,
the e t e rna l r e t u r n ("Je che rcha i , ce t te fois, á P a b o r d e r " beg ins
Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas, a s to ry of endless reflec
tion, of t h o u g h t as re-flecting on t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
unp receden ted experience o f w h a t h a p p e n s to t h o u g h t ) , bu t n o t
the eternal r e tu rn of the same, n o r of the a l ready exper ienced,
nor of a w o r l d t ha t has been lost b u t is n o w resusci tated, s imply
A I I r w n B w w n w
the pu re "appearance *»f Again, the diva dame" (Stevens) .
Freud saw every e ro tu relation as Caking place be tween at
least four peop le : the lovers and their p a r e n t s . But in B lancho t
t r ue erot ic re la t ion i s u n c o u n t a b l e a n d t akes place w i t h o u t
t h o s e p a r e n t s w h o are for F r e u d the on ly ones w h o c o u n t .
T h e r e i s t h e lover, o r n a r r a t o r , o r (usual ly a n d by an e x t r e m e
c o n v e n t i o n t h a t signifies the in tense refusal of t h e d e p t h of
d e p t h psycho logy) ma le f igure, a n d an u t te r ly u n p r e c e d e n t e d
o t h e r : u n p r e c e d e n t e d a n d so b e y o n d the universa l p r e c e d e n t
of the dialect ic of p resence a n d absence .
Fo r Levinas such a r e l a t ion to t h e o ther , to autrui, is t h e
hype rca t ego r i ca l impera t ive to e thics ; for A g a m b e n i t i s t h e
future of the coming communi ty , free to be unprecedented , qual-
unque, u n c h a r a c t e r i z e d a n d in Blancho t ' s t e r m s i m p e r s o n a l .
F o r B lancho t , as for Stevens , i t i s t h e r eg ion h a u n t e d by love .
I ci te Stevens because I myself w i sh to reflect on t h e poss i
bil i ty o f an A m e r i c a n c o n t e x t for B l a n c h o t i a n t h o u g h t , t h e
c o n t e x t for w h i c h (in t h e first ins tance) Wall offers th is ex
t r a o r d i n a r y b o o k . Love is a very r a r e w o r d in Stevens as we l l ,
b u t i t is, as I say, a w o r d t h a t he appl ies to B lancho t , in a le t ter
jus t four m o n t h s before his d e a t h . In genera l i t i s a w o r d t h a t
he appl ies n o t to p e o p l e b u t to p laces ("Life i s an affair of
p e o p l e , n o t of p laces . But for me life has been an affair of
p laces , a n d t h a t h a s m a d e all t he d i f fe rence") , a s i n " N o t e s
T o w a r d s a S u p r e m e F i c t i on , " w h e r e
T h e C a p t a i n loved t h e ever-hill C a t a w b a ,
A n d there fore m a r r i e d B a w d a w h o m h e f o u n d t h e r e ,
A n d B a w d a loved t h e c a p t a i n a s she loved t h e sun .
T h e y m a r r i e d wel l because the m a r r i a g e - p l a c e
W a s w h a t they loved. I t w a s ne i ther h e a v e n n o r hel l .
T h e y w e r e love 's c h a r a c t e r s c o m e face to face.
The i r love i8 an affair <>l p l ace . , but (he m a r r i a g e p lace , the
place they love, or the place they live and t h a t Stevens loves is
l i terary space : " F r o m this the poem sp r ings , t h a t we live in a
place / That is not o u r o w n , a n d much m o r e , n o t ourse lves , /
And hard it is in spi te of b l azoned d a y s . " In the p r e f a t o r y
verse to " N o t e s " Stevens asks ,
A n d for w h a t , excep t for y o u , do I feel love?
Do I p ress t h e e x t r e m e s t b o o k of the wises t m a n
Close t o m e , h i d d e n i n me d a y a n d n ight?
In the u n c e r t a i n l ight of s ingle, ce r ta in t r u t h ,
Equa l in l iving c h a n g i n g n e s s to t h e l ight
In w h i c h I mee t y o u , in w h i c h we sit a t res t
For a m o m e n t , in t h e cen t ra l of o u r be ing ,
T h e vivid t r a n s p a r e n c e t h a t y o u b r i n g i s p e a c e .
W h o m i s th is a d d r e s s e d to? W h a t i s t h e l ight in w h i c h t hey
m e e t — t h e l ight n o t o f t r u t h , b u t a n o t h e r l ight w i t h a n o t h e r
c lar i ty? ( " R o b i n s a n d d o v e s a re b o t h ea r ly r isers a n d a re c o n
noisseurs of dayl ight before the ac tua l presence of the sun coa r s
ens i t " says Stevens in a letter.) T h e s e lines a re a tutoiement,
a n d it 's n o t t h a t w e c a n n o t k n o w w h o m t h e y ' r e a d d r e s s e d t o ,
it 's t h a t the re i s no k n o w i n g , t h e add re s see d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o
the w o r l d o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e scho la r wr i t e s the b o o k , Stevens
wil l say, h o t for an accessible bl iss , b u t t h e bliss t h e w o r k of
fers c a n never be accessible , c a n never be p re sen t .
I t i s t h e l i te rary w o r k t h a t gives us t h e m o s t ine luc tab le
m o d e l of w h a t i t i s t h a t t h e r e i s no k n o w i n g . You c a n love a
w o r k , b u t y o u c a n never k n o w it, even i f y o u love it, e spe
cially i f y o u love it, a n d th is is a lesson n o t a b o u t t h e w o r k
( a b o u t w h i c h t he re i s n o learn ing) b u t a b o u t love .
Fo r F r e u d to love the l i te rary w o r k (since i t i s t he w o r k
t h a t Stevens addresses his d e d i c a t i o n to) i s to be e n g a g e d in
transferential fantasy, i<> love what nil', sut h fantasy. But for
Levinas , Blanchot, and Agamben, as loi Prousl and Stevens be
fore t h e m , love of a n o t h e r can only be in t ima ted t h r o u g h t h e
s t r ange a n d elusive a n d a l w a y s lost love of l i t e ra ture . S tevens:
" I n p o e t r y y o u m u s t love the w o r d s , the ideas a n d images a n d
r h y t h m s w i t h all y o u r capac i ty t o love a n y t h i n g a t a l l . " T h e
r e l a t ion t o the o t h e r t h a t love n a m e s , a n d t h a t B l a n c h o t ex
p lo re s in all his f ict ion, c u l m i n a t i n g in L'attente l'oubli, is o n e
o f r ad i ca l passivi ty, i n t e r m i n a b l e a t t e n t i o n , the m o s t f o r m a l
a n d d e m a n d i n g m a i n t e n a n c e o f the severest famil iari ty. Love 's
c h a r a c t e r s a r e , m a k e u p , l i t e r a tu re . I t i s on ly in th i s s t r ange
l a n g u a g e , the o t h e r l a n g u a g e , the l a n g u a g e o f l i t e r a tu re , t h a t
love c a n be u t t e r ed (as the p a r a b l e a b o u t the n a r r a t o r ' s a d
dress ing C l a u d i a in he r na t ive l a n g u a g e in L'Arrêt de mort
a lso m a k e s c lear ) .
T h i s love i s w h a t Wal l u t te rs i n th is r e m a r k a b l e b o o k . He
t o o k n o w s w h a t i t i s t o t r an s l a t e t h e u n t r a n s l a t a b l e a n d h e h a s
f o u n d a g rav i ty of style a n s w e r i n g t h e g rav i ty of t h e o t h e r n e s s
of t h e l a n g u a g e he a t t e n d s t o . He wi l l , I i m a g i n e , defami l ia r -
i z e — o r ( w h a t i s t h e s a m e th ing) r e n d e r u n c a n n i l y f ami l i a r—
these w o r k s for F r e n c h a n d I ta l ian speake r s w h o wil l find t h e
t r a n s m u t a t i o n B lancho t speaks of: he wil l r e n d e r the i r l an
g u a g e p l u r a l a s he r e n d e r s Engl ish p lu ra l , ab le a t las t t o t r a n s
la te these figures in answerab le style, preserv ing all their al teri ty
a n d giv ing b a c k to Engl i sh , as Stevens a l so h a d d o n e , a sense
o f its o w n alteri ty, a p lace f rom w h i c h the p o e m m a y c o n t i n u e
t o sp r ing .
WILLIAM FLESCH
BRANDÉIS UNIVERSITY
Acknowledgments
T h e a u t h o r w i shes to exp res s his g r a t i t u d e to a
n u m b e r o f fr iends w h o m he enl is ted for m u c h - n e e d e d h e l p .
The fo l lowing p e o p l e have left the i r m a r k s on th is b o o k : Susie
Brubaker , S tephen D u c a , S tephen Wal l , M a g e n t a Widne r , K a t e
Ga rdne r , Kar l D u d i c k , a n d the staff of the l egendary Left Bank
Books in Seat t le , W a s h i n g t o n .
T h e a u t h o r w o u l d a l s o l ike t o t h a n k D o u g l a s B r i c k ,
C a m i l l o P e n n a , R o b e r t T h o m a s , J e a n - L u c N a n c y , a n d G i o r g i o
A g a m b e n , w h o r e a d t h e m a n u s c r i p t a n d offered cr i t ical a n d
e n c o u r a g i n g c o m m e n t s .
W i t h affect ion a n d respec t , t h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o a c k n o w l
edge his t e ache r s . A m o n g t h e m a re M i k e W i n g , J a n e G r e e n ,
R a n d y Fezel , Cha r l i e Alt ier i , C a r l D e n n i s , a n d E v a n W a t k i n s .
XV
Int roduct ion
Passivity
T h e wr i t e r s we wil l e x a m i n e he re sha re a ce r t a in
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h a p o i n t of r ad ica l pass ivi ty t h a t affects
subject ivi ty p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
image ( M a u r i c e Blanchot ) , t he O t h e r ( E m m a n u e l Lévinas) , a n d
be ing- in - l anguage (Gio rg io A g a m b e n ) , each w r i t e r c a n n o t r e
sist t u r n i n g r o u n d a n d r o u n d the p a r a d o x — o r t h e inver ted
e s sence—of th is passivi ty . N a m e l y : pass iv i ty in t h e r ad i ca l
sense , before i t i s s imply o p p o s e d to activity, is pass ive w i t h
r e g a r d to itself, a n d t h u s i t s u b m i t s to itself as t h o u g h i t w e r e
an ex te r io r power . H e n c e , rad ica l pass ivi ty concea l s , o r har
b o r s in itself, or c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h , a potentia; i t is a l w a y s
ou t s i de itself a n d is its o w n other . Passive w i t h r e g a r d to itself,
t he essent ia l pass ivi ty of t h e subject m u s t u n d e r g o itself, suf
fer itself, feel itself as other. In th is sense , pass iv i ty is pure ly
p a s s i o n a t e .
O l d e r t h a n a n y (actual) poss ib i l i ty is th is potentia-in-gen-
eral t h a t " g i v e s " n o t h i n g (except itself) a n d t h a t " i s g i v e n "
1
2 I N T R O D U C T I O N
p r i o r to any real state of affairs. Always older t han any activity,
th is r ad ica l passivi ty " g i v e s " its o w n w i t h d r a w a l , t he re fo re . I t
is and is not the subject . M o r e i n t i m a t e t h a n a n y p e r c e p t i o n ,
e xpe r i ence , o r feeling, r ad ica l passivi ty " g i v e s " n o n p r e s e n c e ,
inequal i ty- in- i tse l fness: i.e., the incalculable specificity of de
struction. T h i s p a r a d o x w o u l d r e m a i n a mere ly f rus t r a t ing
fo rmal i ty w e r e i t n o t for the fact t h a t existence i s t he n a m e for
this pass iv i ty t h a t suffers itself ou t s ide itself. Pr ior to a n y given
be ing , in sho r t , is the exis tence t h a t de s t roys itself as a p re s
ence w i t h a de s t ruc t i on t h a t leaves eve ry th ing in tac t . I t is a
very des t ruc t ive d e s t r u c t i o n — o n e t h a t c a n n o t conse rve itself
i n o r d e r t o de s t roy ; o n e t h a t c a n n o t b u t incessant ly d e s t ro y
itself. I f y o u l ike, th is p a r a d o x descr ibes the " p r o d u c t i o n " of
n o t h i n g , o r the " p r o d u c t i o n " o f an a b s o l u t e p a s t o r an ex
t r e m e y o u t h t h a t the subjec t never has been. T h a t is to say,
r ad i ca l passivi ty p r o d u c e s the imag ina ry , p r o d u c e s s o m e t h i n g
l ike fiction, s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e m a i n s only possibly intel l igible.
We h a v e l ea rned f rom Heidegger t h a t ex is tence is possi
bility in general a n d there fore it is unrea l i zab le in pa r t i cu la r ,
or i t is imposs ib le in par t icu lar . Ex is tence as t h e genera l i ty of
t h e poss ib le i s precisely t h e imposs ib le : the u n c a n n y imposs i
bil i ty of Da-sein—the be ing I myself am at my o w n m o s t . T h a t
is to say, before I t a k e on the pa r t i cu l a r i t y of a p e r s o n , I a m —
a n d am n o t — a n e x t r e m e possibil i ty. To say i t even better , I am
a potential possibi l i ty : t he null event of an inac tua l i ty . But
w h a t exposes th is potentia I am at my o w n m o s t ? W h a t ex
poses Da-sein}
Blancho t , Lev inas , a n d A g a m b e n p r o v i d e a n s w e r s , each
o f w h i c h says the s a m e th ing : W h e n the re i s n o t h i n g ( w h e n
t h e r e i s fasc ina t ion w i th the image , w h e n t h e o t h e r i s r e n d e r e d
a n o n y m o u s a n d b e c o m e s Othe r , w h e n l a n g u a g e itself speaks ) ,
t h e expe r i ence of this n o t h i n g des t roys itself as an expe r i ence
a n d exposes a passivi ty tha t in fact c o m m a n d s a re tu rn to the
I N I R . O D U C T I O N 3
inexhaus t i b l e , u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , and u n c a n n y passion I must be.
W h e n the re i s n o t h i n g , we a re t ry ing to say, t he r e i s a l r e a d y
no longe r n o t h i n g . Nih i l i sm i s n o t the f ina l res t ing p lace for
h u m a n be ing . W i t h nihi l i sm's g loba l c o m p l e t i o n i n t h e f o r m
of the spectacle , A g a m b e n argues specifically, there is still s ome
t h i n g to be de s t royed w i t h a n o n c o n s e r v a t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n t h a t
wil l a l ter eve ry th ing wh i l e c h a n g i n g n o t a t h i n g . I f y o u l ike,
w e (bu t th is " w e " does n o t n a m e us—i t i s the no t -ye t w h o w e
still m u s t be) m u s t des t roy in a rad ica l m o v e m e n t t h a t leaves
n o t h i n g t o be r e s to r ed , n o t h i n g t o be r e d e e m e d . We m u s t seize
d e s t r u c t i o n as obsessively as pass ivi ty des t roys , by fail ing to
c o m p l e t e the w o r k o f d e s t r u c t i o n .
E a c h of the wr i t e r s we shall d iscuss in w h a t fo l lows re
t u r n s obsess ively t o the p a r a d o x w e have desc r ibed ( some
w h a t t o o rapid ly , n o d o u b t ) a s r ad ica l passivity. T h e y h a v e
rad ica l i zed the i r p a r t i c u l a r discipl ines t o the p o i n t w h e r e w e
c a n n o longe r assoc ia te w h a t they say w i t h a n y t h i n g l ike w h a t
w o u l d c o m m o n l y fall u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s " e t h i c s , " " a e s t h e t
i c s , " o r " p o l i t i c s . " Fo r each , these ca tegor ies a re a l w a y s al
r eady t h e t r ace of a general or a potential r e l a t i on t h a t a n y
p a r t i c u l a r discipl ine only res t r ic t s . T h u s each s p e a k s a lan
g u a g e at once famil iar a n d a l i ena t ing . Each says very little, if
we m e a n by th is t h a t e ach fails to p r o d u c e a c o r p u s of t h o u g h t
w e m a y d e b a t e a m o n g s t ourse lves . T h e r e a re n o p r o s a n d c o n s
wi th r ega rd t o t h e w o r k s w e shall d i scuss . T h e r e wi l l h a v e
been , however , the r e p e a t e d e x p o s u r e t o imposs ib i l i ty t h a t w e
may t a k e to be an i r reduc ib le expe r i ence o f an i n t i m a c y e m p t y
of itself, a n d as fragile as it is repe t i t ive .
In o u r f i rs t c h a p t e r we wil l fo l low Levinas ' s ana lys is of the
a r t w o r k as t h a t w h o s e (enigmat ic) be ing is precisely its iner
t ia , or its inabi l i ty to en te r t h e r o b u s t p re sen t . We wil l t h e n
a rgue that the w e a k n e s s o r i m p o t e n c e " e x h i b i t e d " in t h e a r t
w o r k opens, not a w o r l d , b u t a general e th ics a n d pol i t ics .
I he a r t w o r k "lets g o " of the object and thus interrupts the
w o r k of subjectivity. T h e w o r k ol art is purely and s imply an
i m a g e , a n d an image e ludes all a t t e m p t s to g r a sp it.
In o u r second chap te r , we will a r g u e t h a t Levinas 's e th ics
is imag ina ry . T h a t is, l ike an i m a g e , Autrui will a l w a y s have
r e m a i n e d unava i l ab l e to a n y p re sen t a n d , l ike a fissure in be
ing , will p r o v o k e an infinite r a p p o r t t h a t will o v e r w h e l m the
subjec t in a f lood of responsibi l i ty . (This responsibi l i ty , h o w
ever, l ike j ea lousy in P rous t , wil l no longer r e semble w h a t i s
c o m m o n l y m e a n t b y t h e t e rm. ) Levinas w o u l d p r o b a b l y dis
agree w i t h o u r r e a d i n g since w e will c l a im t h a t t h a t w h i c h
incessan t ly e s c a p e s — A u t r u i — i s an a l ter i ty t h a t t h e moi itself
is. We wil l a r g u e t h a t t h e g e r m of Levinas 's Autrement qu'être
ou au-delà de l'essence—substitution—is a r ad ica l identif ica
t i o n o f t h e self w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t e v a c u a t e s t h e self o f
s a m e n e s s , stabil i ty, a n d self-certainty. In b e c o m i n g r e spons ib l e
fo r - the-Other , t h e self e n c o u n t e r s an incessance t h a t r e sembles
B l a n c h o t i a n dy ing a n d A g a m b e n ' s capac i ty t o " n o t n o t - b e . "
It becomes an image, in s h o r t , b u t no longe r an imag e of itself.
I t b e c o m e s an image of n o t h i n g , o f no o n e . I t b e c o m e s t h e
a n o n y m i t y t h a t , in fact, Autrui a l r eady is. H e n c e t h e p a r a d o x
of an ident i f ica t ion w i t h no o n e t h a t i s the thesis o f o u r s econd
chap te r .
I n o u r t h i r d chap te r , we e x a m i n e Blancho t ' s n o t i o n o f an
i m a g i n a r y t h a t p recedes the rea l , p recedes the objec t . In pa r
t icular , we will be a t t en t ive to an i m a g i n a r y l a n g u a g e o r an
incessan t m u r m u r t h a t m u s t be s i lenced i n o r d e r for t h e w o r d
t o " w o r k . " T h i s m u r m u r i s poe t i c l a n g u a g e : l a n g u a g e t h a t
h a s b e c o m e a n i m a g e o f l a n g u a g e , a n i m a g e o f n e g a t i o n .
" O l d e r " t h a n the Hege l i an nega t ive i s a s i m u l a t e d l a n g u a g e
t h a t p o e t r y c a n n o t b u t speak . T h a t w h i c h p o e t r y each t i m e
says wil l be n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the e m p t y to ta l i ty o f l a n g u a g e
itself. Before a n y t h i n g is c o m m u n i c a t e d , c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself
is i ommunii a ted. When someone gestures to me, for e x a m p l e ,
h o w do 1 k n o w thai there is an a t t empt to c o m m u n i c a t e even
il the person speaks a foreign tongue? A m u t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n
precedes any dit (said) . This c o m m u n i c a t i o n is u n s p o k e n b u t
i r reduc ib le . I t is an image of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t p recedes a n y
message . L a n g u a g e t h a t precedes. i tself , o r t h a t " b e g i n s " i n
r epe t i t ion , i s poe t ry , a n d th is p r eempt ive " s p e a k i n g " be longs
t o no subject ive i n t en t i on t o say a n y t h i n g . O l d e r t h a n t h e s u b
ject, i t i s a l a n g u a g e s p o k e n by no o n e , or by an a n o n y m o u s
" s o m e o n e " (Blanchot ' s il, " h e , " the N e u t e r ) , w h o c a n n o t speak
in the first p e r s o n . U n a b l e n o t to c o m m u n i c a t e , th is a n o n y m
ity c a n n o t cease " h i s " say ing just as i t i s u n a b l e to mani fes t
"h imsel f" in a n y s t a t e m e n t , for " h e " i s on ly insofar a s , a n d
for a s l o n g as , " h e " speaks . Co inc id ing so perfectly w i t h " h i m
self," " h e " jus t as perfect ly escapes "h imsel f" or i s ou t s i de
"h imsel f . " " H e " (or " S o m e o n e , " for i t i s a l w a y s a n o t h e r ) i s
perfect ly i n l a n g u a g e . U n a b l e to t u r n a r o u n d a n d g r a s p h i m
self in a ref lect ion w i t h o u t los ing himself aga in , th is " S o m e
o n e ' s " on ly be ing is t h a t repet i t ive Lev inas ian dire (saying)
t h a t u n s a y s itself. I t i s o u r thesis in this c h a p t e r t h a t t h e Blan
c h o t i a n w r i t e r i s the o n e w h o i s " c a p a b l e " o f this inabi l i ty to
cease to speak . Refus ing all se l f -presence, th is a n o n y m i t y nev
er the less i s a h o l l o w i n g o u t t h a t m a k e s poss ib le all p r e sence ,
all w o r k , a n d all t h i n k i n g . " S o m e o n e , " in sho r t , i s l a n g u a g e
itself. " S o m e o n e ' s " be ing is so u t te r ly a b s o r b e d in l a n g u a g e
w i t h o u t a n y res idue t h a t t he r e i s no longer a n y o n e left to save
o r mani fes t .
I n th i s way , t h r o u g h B l a n c h o t , w e c o m e t o A g a m b e n ' s
n o t i o n of a c o m m u n i t y - t o - c o m e t h a t i s a l r eady " i n " l a n g u a g e
a n d t h a t i s no longer g r a s p a b l e a s sacrificed, r ecogn ized , a n d
identif ied. Cen t r a l to A g a m b e n ' s r e c e n t w o r k i s the n o t i o n o f
c o m p l e t e be ing - in - l anguage w i t h o u t a n y res idue . W e believe
therefore t h a t his w o r k unfolds f rom Blanchot ' s la communauté
inavouable, although Agamben seems to wani i<> deny t ins, in
Agamben's terms, the Bianchotian writer would be s o m e o n e
w h o c a n n o t no t speak and w h o has b e c o m e c a p a b l e o f this
i m p o t e n c e (like a l i terary Glenn G o u l d , to use A g a m b e n ' s o w n
e x a m p l e ) . B l ancho t (or " B l a n c h o t " ) i s comple te ly a b s o r b e d in
l a n g u a g e , is an image of himself, b u t as he is comple te ly a b
s o r b e d in l a n g u a g e , he i s ou t s i de himself a n d i s t h u s an imag e
of no o n e . " B l a n c h o t " i s the n a m e of an infinite d i spe rs ion :
l a n g u a g e itself as a p u r e potentia, or as the e m p t i n e s s or p u r e
ex te r io r i ty t h a t i s n o t a " b e y o n d " b u t i n s t ead an e te rna l re
t u r n t o a never -hav ing-been o r an e x t r e m e y o u t h . A g a m b e n
sugges ts t h a t o u r e r a — t h e era o f t h e i m a g e , o f the spec tac le ,
of t h e e v a c u a t i o n of all beliefs a n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , i ndeed , of
the Rea l itself—offers us this r e t u r n to a neve r -hav ing-been as
an e t e rna l las t h o p e . T h e essence of t h e Spectacle (like t h e
logic of the i m a g e we e x a m i n e in o u r first c h a p t e r ) i s to s u b
t r a c t o r even insist on the absence o f t h e object , a n d t h u s im
m e d i a t e l y t o d e p a r t f rom s imple r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . To be su re ,
we c a n still seek in the image for t h a t o f w h i c h we a re c h e a t e d
(as m a n y of my s tuden t s often t ry to find in p ro fess iona l w r e s
t l ing s o m e of the rea l i ty o f G r e c o - R o m a n wres t l i ng so t h a t
they c a n m a k e o f H u l k H o g a n the deg raded image o f an O l y m
pic c h a m p i o n ) , b u t we c a n a l so cease t o do th i s . We c a n let t he
p res t ige of t h a t w h i c h is r ep re sen t ed (the m o d e l ) d issolve in
t h e i m a g e .
A n y c o m m e n t a r y on the wr i t i ngs o f Lev inas , B l a n c h o t ,
a n d A g a m b e n will be difficult, because each wr i t e s in such a
w a y t h a t o u r p o w e r t o r e a d i s neu t r a l i zed a n d d i spe rsed . E a c h
of these t h i n k e r s wr i t e s in such a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is
i n t e r rup t ed , a n d any formal p re sen ta t ion of their t h o u g h t , such
as o u r s h e r e , i s ceaselessly p o s t p o n e d . To p u t i t m o s t b lunt ly ,
t hey r e p e a t themse lves endlessly. (This i s pa r t i cu l a r ly t r u e of
Lev inas a n d B lancho t , w h o r e p e a t each other as wel l as e c h o
themselves.) Foi each oi them, Striving to say the u n s a y a b l e ,
wr i t i ng is a communicat ion thai interrupts itself a n d c o m e s
back to itself in a suspens ion that will p recede n o t h i n g a n d
t h u s refuse the present . The no t ion of rad ica l su spens ion is
no t merely a theore t ica l nicety. It is t he very wnpower of t h e
l anguage of poet ry . Radica l suspens ion o p e n s us to a h o l l o w
interval o f n o n s a l v a g e a b l e t ime t h a t i s b o t h w i t h o u t c o n t i n u
a t i on a n d a l so w i t h o u t cessa t ion . I t will have been a t ime t h a t
d e p a r t s f rom the r o b u s t t ime o f g e o m e t r i c c h r o n o l o g y .
W e b r i n g t o g e t h e r a n d ove r l ap th ree t h inke r s he re t o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t e ach a r t i cu la tes a n e x t r e m e passivity, e x p r o p r i a
t i on , d e - n u c l e a t i o n , or neu t ra l i ty t h a t is p a r a d o x i c a l l y consti
tutive of t h e self, t h e i m a g e , or the c o m m u n i t y . To be su re ,
o t h e r t h i n k e r s have d e v o t e d themse lves to v a r i o u s vers ions o f
radica l passivity. Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze, Luce Irigaray,
Ph i l ippe L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , a n d J e a n - L u c N a n c y a r e a m o n g
t h o s e w h o h a v e f a sh ioned the i r o w n vers ions o f the e n i g m a .
Beyond these m o r e recent th inke r s there a re , o f cour se , He ideg
ger 's t h i n k i n g of f in i tude , Nie tzsche ' s t h o u g h t of t h e E t e rna l
R e t u r n , a n d even , in a ce r ta in sense, Kan t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
Transcenden ta l Imag ina t ion (as we shall e x a m i n e in ou r chap te r
o n A g a m b e n ) . N o d o u b t w e a re forget t ing still o t h e r s , b u t this
on ly a t t es t s to t h e fact t h a t t he r e c a n be no h is tor ic iz ing o f
w h a t is precisely a p o i n t of d i spe rs ion : the s ingular i ty of an
en igma t h a t " s a v e s " mult ipl ic i ty such t h a t even the t e r m "en ig
m a " (wh ich w e b o r r o w f rom Levinas) m u s t b e s u b m i t t e d t o
its d i s p l a c e m e n t in a series of o t h e r t e r m s such as dissemina
tion, desistance, differance, point d'autrui, a n d still o the r s t h a t
a r e a s wel l k n o w n . H e n c e the res t lessness , i m p o s i t i o n , super-
i m p o s i t i o n , d ispar i ty , c o n t e s t a t i o n , conflict , a n d ob l i quenes s
t h a t (de)cons t i tu tes this p o p u l a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s . " P h i l o s o p h y
i s p h i l o s o p h e r s in an in tersubjec t ive ' i n t r i g u e ' t h a t n o b o d y
reso lves , wh i l e n o b o d y is a l l o w e d a lapse of a t t e n t i o n or a
lack <>l rigor,"' Levinas tells us. In this sense, each <>| these th inker ' s d i scourses is an "each time" ol the en igma itself since
the e n i g m a of de -nuc lea t ion is the very t ak ing-p lace of c o m -
mun ica t i v i t y itself, a s we w a n t t o show. A lways the " s a m e "
e n i g m a , c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y i s on ly as t r ace or i t e ra t ion w i t h o u t
identi ty. Th i s p o p u l a t i o n o f t h inke r s t hen , f rom w h i c h we have
p l u c k e d th ree , i s a c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t c o m m o n a l i t y , w i t h o u t
s u b s t a n c e o r essence.
I f we focus on these th ree t h i n k e r s in par t icu la r , i t i s n o t to
focus on a n y pa r t i cu l a r e th ics , l i t e ra tu re , o r pol i t ics , b u t in
s t ead t o a p p r o a c h t h a t w h i c h i n each t ex t t o u c h e s o n a n y e th
ics, l i t e ra tu re , o r pol i t ics wha teve r , a n d w h i c h each w r i t e r ex
poses in diverse w a y s . We c o u l d , p e r h a p s , have w r i t t e n exc lu
sively on Heidegger , or Heidegger w i th K a n t (of the Kantbuch),
or N i e t z s c h e (wi th a n d aga ins t H e i d e g g e r ) , since th is p o p u l a
t i o n ( m o r e o r less) schemat izes t h e abyss we t o d a y inher i t a n d
e x p e r i e n c e c o n s t a n t l y i n o u r t h i n k i n g . I n s t ead , w e conf ine
ourse lves t o t h i n k e r s w h o confine themse lves t o p r o b l e m s t r a
d i t iona l ly " s e c o n d a r y " to f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y (even if, in
fact , Lev inas wishes to ins t i tu te e th ics as "first p h i l o s o p h y " ) .
In each case , these " s e c o n d a r y " conce rns b e c o m e very s t r ange ,
unfamil iar , n o t to say imaginary (i .e., p r o p e r l y b e l o n g i n g to
no c a t e g o r y a t al l) . Each t h i n k e r we e x a m i n e here i s a s t r ange
specialist w h o s e a t t en t ion to ethical , literary, a n d poli t ical p r o b
lems h a s led h i m in to an obscu re r e l a t ion w i t h l a n g u a g e itself
a n d m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s w i th t ime. Each opens his discipline o n t o
a d i m e n s i o n in w h i c h l a n g u a g e b e c o m e s i m a g i n a r y ( a n o n y
m o u s , s p o k e n b y n o one ) , a n d i n w h i c h t ime d iverges f rom t h e
S ta te - t ime of c h r o n o l o g i c a l p rog re s s , increase , a n d i m p r o v e
m e n t to w h i c h capi ta l i s t m o d e r n i t y compul s ive ly sacrifices it
self. To p u t i t succinct ly: We are m o d e r n to t h e e x t e n t t h a t we
are sick w i t h c o n t i n u o u s , fleeting, a n d g e o m e t r i c t i m e , a n d w e
are O t h e r to t h e ex t en t t h a t we a r e — i n a nu tshe l l—fin i te . But
the expei ien< e ol finitude, ol pHtnordictl t empora l i ty , is, as we
k n o w from Heidegger, rigorously u n r e a c h a b l e . We are pre-
< isely not equal t o i t . It is the passion of the Ou t s ide , as Blanchot
might say. But the O u t s i d e is n o t the Beyond a n d so , simplify
ing th ings , we will say t h a t we are in te res ted in Levinas to t h e
e x t e n t t h a t he fails to reveal or ins t i tu te an e thical Beyond ; we
are in teres ted in B l ancho t to the e x t e n t t h a t he involves us in
this incessan t l imi t ing t h a t is the very pa s s ion of the (not) Be
y o n d (le pas au-delà); a n d we are in te res ted in A g a m b e n i n so
far as he m a k e s of this a m b i g u o u s l imit an inescapab le a n d
u n e x c l u d a b l e " b e l o n g i n g . " M o r e n a r r o w l y , w e a re in te res t ed
in a B l a n c h o t i a n " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h " t h a t p recedes access to
a n y a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h a t i s to say, we a r e in te res ted in an
an ter ior i ty t ha t in forms the Levinasian éthique, t he Blancho t i an
littéraire, a n d the A g a m b e n i a n Quodlibet ens.
B e g i n n i n g w i t h L e v i n a s ' s 1 9 4 8 e s say " R é a l i t é e t s o n
o m b r e , " w e p r o c e e d t o s h o w h o w aspec ts o f t h a t ana lys i s in
f o r m b o t h his o w n n o t i o n o f a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t
p r ecedes egology, a n d a lso in fo rms Blancho t ' s n o t i o n s o f wr i t
ing a n d the imag ina ry . We then will r ead B lancho t ' s L'arrêt de
mort as a w o r k " s t r u c t u r e d " by n o n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d
s t ruggle (or, i f y o u wil l , " s t r u c t u r e d " by f ini tude) . F r o m the re
we ana lyze A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene in l ight of H e i
degger ' s r e a d i n g o f K a n t i a n s c h e m a t i s m in o r d e r t o s h o w an
affinity b e t w e e n i t a n d the B l a n c h o t i a n i m a g i n a r y t h a t , in t h e
e n d , we c la im is the very " p l a c e " of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a n d its
r ad ica l passivi ty.
W e a r e a r g u i n g t h a t t h e p o i n t t o w h i c h each t h i n k e r w e
e x a m i n e leads us is t h e p o i n t of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y as such, in
sofar as this p o i n t is in itself an i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a
t i o n . T h a t is to say, c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y pulverizes d i s cour se . I t
gives n o t h i n g to be t h o u g h t ; i t gives no message to w h i c h we
migh t listen but , in effect, says: there is (il y a). C o m m u n i c a t i v i t y
as such—when- ii'h,it is c o m m u n i c a t e d is noi ou t s ide ii but
ins tead bur ies l anguage in itsell is poetry, the or ig inal and
abso lu t e s ingular i ty of w h a t does no t cease to t ake place. Com
munication, t h e n , i s the p u r e f o r m of t h e s e p a r a t i o n of
communica t iv i ty from itself, or, in a w o r d , (chronological) t ime .
Poet ry , however , is an expe r i ence of t ime t h a t is rad ica l ly dis
c o n t i n u o u s . I t is t he t ime of fu tur i ty t h a t does n o t lie in a
fu tu re e i ther r e m o t e o r ju s t a r o u n d the corner , b u t r a t h e r i n
t h e infinitive " t o " of the " t o c o m e " (or à venir) to w h i c h we
shall refer n u m e r o u s t imes t h r o u g h o u t th is b o o k . In poe t ry ,
t h a t w h i c h s p e a k s i s the very " t o " o f " t o s p e a k . " Poe t ry says
t h e p u r e there, o r the p u r e possibi l i ty of a n y r e l a t ion w h a t
ever, a n d i t is on ly to the pu re there t h a t we ("proper ly ," f ini tely)
be long ; b u t w e be long such t h a t n o res idue r ema ins u p o n w h i c h
w e m a y reflect, n o res idue o r p l ea t t h a t w o u l d a l l o w u s t h e
abi l i ty to g r a s p a n d a u t o - o r i g i n a t e ourse lves . E m p t y of itself,
o r different in itself, we " o r i g i n a t e , " t h u s , in t h e incessan t r e p
e t i t ion of t h e there. T h i s wil l be the "o r ig ina l e x p e r i e n c e " of
w h i c h B lancho t speaks in L'espace littéraire.
The Language of Poetry
Merveilleuse hypocrite! Car elle aime la folie qu'elle
surveille.
— L e v i n a s
Poe t ry is l a n g u a g e t h a t m a k e s itself felt l ike the
b o d i e s o f l iars a n d i m p o s t o r s t h a t b r u s h up aga ins t u s da i ly on
t h e s t reet . A c c o r d i n g to Lev inas , t he l a n g u a g e o f p o e t r y d o e s
n o t " n a m e a species w h o s e genus i s refer red to by t h e w o r d
a r t . " 2 I f Pau l C e l a n "sees no difference b e t w e e n a p o e m a n d a
h a n d s h a k e , " 3 i t i s because poe t ry , r e f rac to ry to t h e ca tegor ies
ol thought, is thingish, like anothei body, or like the words we speak at a Mineral. Those dying, w o r d s weigh like th ings in
o u r mouths because ihey are no longer able to refer to a n y
th ing real . The l anguage of poe t ry is the very w e a k n e s s of
m e a n i n g t ha t r ema ins w h e n the real i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m o u r
p o w e r s . Th i s funereal l anguage we ighs in my m o u t h as a t h i n g
and is offered to o the r s as a useless gift because i t c a n no longer
d i s a p p e a r in to the l a b o r o f refer r ing . In t h e l u g u b r i o u s a t m o
sphe re o f the funera l , w o r d s a re t h a t w h i c h m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t
w i th a p r o f o u n d l y pa r a lyzed t ime . No longer ab le to refer,
l a n g u a g e i s impe rcep t i b ly t r a n s f o r m e d because i t beg ins to
r e semble itself. U n a b l e to reveal o r aver, w o r d s a re los t be
t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d s h o w i n g , b e t w e e n say ing a n d seeing, a n d
they d e p a r t f rom the s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d n e s s o f i n t en t iona l i t y as
if lu red by a n o t h e r dest iny. Insofar as I c a n n o t s epa ra t e myself
f rom these w o r d s t h a t l inger o n m y t o n g u e — w o r d s t h a t a re
n o longe r m y o w n since they have defected f rom m y m e a n i n g -
t o - s a y — t h e y involve me in t h a t o t h e r des t iny o f w h i c h they
a r e a l r e a d y a p a r t .
Recent ly , in a te levis ion newscas t , we s a w the s to ry of an
e lder ly w o m a n w h o s e h u s b a n d h a d pa s sed a w a y o n t h e floor
of the i r h o m e . She p l aced a b l a n k e t over the b o d y a n d he re
m a i n e d t h e r e , as i f u n d e r the b l a n k e t , for a n u m b e r of yea r s
unt i l a social w o r k e r d i scovered the " b i z a r r e " s i t ua t i on . T h e
w o m a n h a d c o n t i n u e d t o live, i n the m e a n t i m e , m o r e o r less
as she h a d before , a s bes t she c o u l d , given t h e so l i tude a n d
fai l ing s t r eng th of a d v a n c e d age . Appa ren t l y , she never den i ed
to herself t h a t he r h u s b a n d w a s d e a d (as d id t h e d u c h e s s o f
M a r l b o r o , w h o h a d a s t a tue m a d e o f he r la te h u s b a n d Wil l
i a m C o n g r e v e , a n d sea ted i t a t t he d inne r t a b l e , w h e r e she
w o u l d conve r se w i t h i t a s i f t h e g r e a t d r a m a t i s t h a d s o m e h o w
surv ived his o w n d e a t h ) . T h e social w o r k e r w h o c o m m e n t e d
on t h e s i t ua t ion he h a d d i scovered said , po ignan t ly , t h a t t h e r e
w a s obvious ly great affection here. 01 the most demanding
k i n d , we m u s t a d d . For hers is not a disturbing love. It is n o t
Isolde 's or Sa lome ' s love. H e r s , we m u s t imag ine , is a m o s t
i r r e p a r a b l e , p r o f a n e , a n d abso lu t e ly i m p o v e r i s h e d love ( to
b o r r o w s o m e t e r m s f rom A g a m b e n t h a t seem to be long in th is
c o n t e x t ) : love for he r h u s b a n d , for t h e u n r e d e e m e d , u n b u r i e d ,
over ly p r e s e n t b o d y her h u s b a n d w a s , a n d w a s n o t . She d id
n o t , i t s eems , l ong for the w i t h d r a w n be ing he r h u s b a n d h a d
been , b u t ins tead r e m a i n e d faithful t o t h e d e a t h her h u s b a n d
c o u l d n o t a c c o m p l i s h . Th i s c o u l d on ly h a v e led her a s t r ay in
he r m a d n e s s (if we m u s t call i t t h a t ) , s ca t t e r ing her affect ion
e v e r y w h e r e i n the h o u s e because her h u s b a n d c o u l d no longe r
o c c u p y his p rope r place. We imagine t h a t she m u s t have enjoyed
a n e l emen ta l in t imacy, p r o f o u n d a n d w i t h o u t qual i f ica t ions .
T h e pecu l i a r i n t imacy a n d in tens i ty t h a t t r ad i t i ona l ly be
l o n g to l i t e r a tu re a re a f ide l i ty to a m b i g u i t y t h a t sca t te r s int i
m a c y eve rywhere , mul t ip ly ing i t to infinity, l ike the snowf lakes
t h a t fell d o w n u p o n B r e k h o u n o v a s h e lay d o w n u p o n N i k i t a ,
in t h e ta le f rom Tols toy of w h i c h B lan ch o t i s so f o n d . 4 In th is
s t u d y we w o u l d like to say very l i t t le. We w o u l d prefer t o be
l ike t h e e lder ly w o m a n w h o d id very little for he r h u s b a n d
u p o n his demise . She mere ly p l aced a b l a n k e t over h i m . We
w o u l d mere ly w a n t t o n o t e t h a t i n the i m a g e , i n the n a r r a t i v e ,
in the o ther p e r s o n — a s i t were , " in pa ren thes i s " (or in q u o t a
t i o n m a r k s ) or, if y o u prefer, under erasure (because t h e p a r e n
theses a re invisible a n d c a n n o t be a d m i t t e d i n t o t h e n a r r a t i v e
p rope r , ye t i n t r o d u c e in to t h e s tory an e lement t h a t i s felt w i t h
o u t be ing a c k n o w l e d g e d , like an a p h o n i c voice t h a t says " k e e p
me i n m i n d b u t do n o t t h i n k a b o u t m e " ) — o n e en te r s a m a z e
o f r u m o r a n d i n n u e n d o as i f one ' s p o w e r to r e a d , to see, a n d
t o tell h a d b e c o m e defect ive, aor i s t , m e t a m o r p h o s e d , a n d su
p e r e r o g a t o r y .
( ) N E
The Allegory of Being
Image
Levinas begins his 1 9 4 8 essay on a r t , " L a réal i té e t
s o n o m b r e , " s imply e n o u g h . A s e v e r y o n e k n o w s , t h e a r t i s t
subs t i t u t e s an i m a g e for a c o n c e p t . Un in t e r e s t ed in t h e intel l i
gibili ty of t h e object , t he ar t is t does n o t m a i n t a i n a real re la t ion
sh ip w i t h the objec t by k n o w i n g it, g r a s p i n g it, a n d p u t t i n g i t
to w o r k . By subs t i t u t i ng an image for the c o n c e p t , all rea l
r e l a t i ons w i t h t h e object a re neu t r a l i zed . Ar t i s t ic " d i s i n t e r e s t "
i s jus t th is b l indness to c o n c e p t s , Lev inas says . T h e ar t i s t ic
gaze neu t ra l i zes v is ion a n d p e r c e p t i o n . I t is n o t an ac t . I t is a
n o n c o n c e r n i n g , n o n k n o w i n g gaze . I t does n o t c ross a d i s t ance
i n o r d e r t o g r a s p a n object a s does t h e h a n d t h a t l a b o r s o r t h e
consc iousnes s t h a t seizes the t h i n g in an ac t of r e c o g n i t i o n .
T h e simple, e lementary subst i tu t ion of the image for the c o n c e p t
inver t s all directionality, all consc ious "a iming-a t . " T h e image
t h a t t h e a r t i s t subs t i tu tes for the c o n c e p t i s n o t a n o t h e r objec t
a n d does n o t b e h a v e like an objec t . In eve ryday life, in every
d a y c o m m e r c e wi th th ings , the seized object t ends to d i sappea r
3 3
into its usefulness, its fun< tion, its familiarity. A11 arrests ilii.s
movement ol recognition and industry. In art, that which van
ishes into utility and k n o w l e d g e r e a p p e a r s ou ts ide its useful
ness , ou t s ide all real r e l a t ions , in a space strictly u n c r o s s a b l e ,
infinitely fragile, on ly p r o x i m a l l y there at al l , as if its exis t
ence h a d been p a r a l y z e d , or as i f t h e objec t led a p h a n t o m
exis tence para l le l to its t r u t h .
T h e image is f undamen ta l l y or essential ly pass ive . I t e ludes
all a t t e m p t s to seize i t because i t occupies e m p t y space . An
i m a g e , qu i t e simply, i s n o t h i n g . O u r r e l a t i on w i t h t h e imag e
" m a r k s a h o l d over us r a t h e r t h a n o u r ini t ia t ive [ m a r q u e une
empr i s e sur n o u s , p l u t ô t q u e n o t r e i n i t i a t i ve ] , " 1 Lev inas says .
T h e i m a g e c o n t r a s t s w i th c o n c e p t s or, m o r e precisely, i t i s t h e
very even t o f c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h c o n c e p t s . Precisely to t h e ex
t e n t t h a t I do n o t ac t o n , k n o w , o r t h i n k t h e t h i n g in its c o n
cep t , t h e r e i s an invers ion of my eve ryday r e l a t i onsh ip w i t h
t h e ob jec t , a n d subject ivi ty i s p u s h e d to an e x t r e m e po l e o f
passivi ty. U n a b l e to seize an i m a g e , I pa r t i c ipa t e in its imag i
n a r y d i m e n s i o n . Th i s passivi ty c a n be obse rved , Levinas p o i n t s
ou t , in mus ic , dance , a n d mag ic . 2 To this list we m a y a d d t r ance ,
hys ter ica l possess ion , a n d h y p n o t i c sugges t ion . In s h o r t , t h e
i m a g e inspi res a n d i t i s just t he imag e t h a t insp i res , n o t the
ob jec t it r e p r e s e n t s . Precisely when there is nothing and just
insofar as there is nothing, the image exercises its impotent
power. R h y t h m a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n a re the " e x c e p t i o n a l s t ruc
t u r e of aes the t ic ex is tence [la s t ruc tu re excep t ione l l e de l 'exis
tence e s t h é t i q u e ] " a n d are a lso the w a y " t h e poe t i c o r d e r af
fects us [ l ' o rd re p o é t i q u e n o u s a f fec te ] . " 3 Th i s i n v o l v e m e n t ,
i m p o r t a n t l y , i s n o t " b e y o n d " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t is , t o t h e c o n
t ra ry , t h e p r o f o u n d i nvo lvemen t of the subject in its o w n r e p
r e s e n t a t i ons . P r o f o u n d because their " e n t r y i n t o us i s o n e w i t h
o u r e n t r y i n t o t h e m [en t ren t e n n o u s o u n o u s e n t r o n s e n e u x ,
peu i m p o r t e ] , " a n d therefore " in this r h y t h m the re i s no longer
a oneseli I >m a son ol passage from oneseli to anonymity [dans
le rythme il n'y a plus de SOI, mais c o n i m c un passage de soi a
I'anonymat | . ' M
The pa r t i c ipa t ion itself is an u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o v e m e n t .
In aes the t ic ex is tence the re is an ind is t inc t ion b e t w e e n w h o is
possessed o r affected a n d t h a t w h i c h possesses o r affects .
Levinas no t e s in pass ing t h a t this s imul tane i ty of possess ion
a n d d i spossess ion h a s a ro le in ecstat ic r i tes . Aes the t i c exis t
ence involves us in an ind i s t inc t ion of " s a m e " a n d " o t h e r . " I t
is t h u s a t ru ly u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o m e n t (but n o t a " b e y o n d " )
w h e r e i n the dens i ty of being in its " h e r e " is i n v a d e d by a " n o
w h e r e , " a " n o t h i n g . " R h y t h m c a n n o t be objectified; i t c a n
on ly be d r a m a t i z e d , e n a c t e d , suffered. I t i s e x p e r i e n c e d as
i nd i s t i nc t ion , a s myself-as-other . U n a b l e to h a n g on to its free
d o m , t h e subjec t expe r i ences an ex te r io r i ty in w h i c h i t c a n n o t
b u t m i s t a k e itself for ano the r . T h a t is, t h e subjec t ceases to
expe r i ence itself as itself. Total ly a b s o r b e d in the scene , c o n
sc iousness , h a v i n g n o t h i n g to a im at , b e c o m e s supe re roga to ry ,
as does the body , for, a t once ac to r a n d spec ta tor , t he b o d y i s
t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o sensa t ions b e l o n g i n g t o n o o n e , o r be long
ing t o a n a n o n y m o u s S o m e o n e w h o s e o r g a n s o f p e r c e p t i o n
h a v e defected . H e n c e the fear of t h e ar t i s t ic mi l ieu t h a t i s a t
tes ted to in t h e n e r v o u s anx ie ty so m a n y peop l e feel in t h e
c r o w d e d c o n c e r t hal l o r the a u g u s t m u s e u m .
An i m a g e , Levinas says , i s essent ial ly mus ica l insofar as i t
de t aches itself f rom t h e object a s does s o u n d f rom t h a t w h i c h
m a k e s the s o u n d . 5 I n the aes the t ic expe r i ence , th is d e t a c h m e n t
i s an essent ia l a t m o s p h e r e . In fact, however , th is a t m o s p h e r e
i s e v e r y w h e r e b e c a u s e images a re e v e r y w h e r e . I n d e e d , t h e
w h o l e w o r l d w e a r s o n its face its o w n i m a g e a n d w e a re t h u s
p e r m i t t e d to t h i n k a d i m e n s i o n of aes the t ic p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t
i s gene ra l a n d n o t res t r ic ted to t h e mov ie t h e a t e r o r c o n c e r t
ha l l . T h i s genera l d i m e n s i o n o f p r o f o u n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n w o u l d ,
then, subtend consciousness and industry at every moment,
Industrial language necessarily fails to tell of this i nvo lvemen t ,
for this p r o f o u n d pa r t i c ipa t ion defects from "every m o m e n t "
of subjectivity (i.e., of init iative a n d p o w e r ) . T h e d e c o n c e p t u a l -
i za t ion of rea l i ty t h a t a r t real izes res t r ic ted ly is, in fact, a gen
era l ized i m p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t lies " b e l o w " all k n o w i n g . I f y o u
l ike, an ecs ta t ic r i te s h a d o w s all cogn i t i on . W h e r e be ing- in-
t h e - w o r l d involves ex is tence in c o n c e p t s a n d t r u t h , ecs ta t ic
s ensa t i ons d e p a r t f rom each m o m e n t o f be ing - in - the -wor ld
a n d involve us in a d i s i n c a r n a t i o n of t h e rea l s imply because
of t h e i m a g e (the n o n o b j e c t , o r the music) t h a t i s on the face
of all t h a t i s in t h e w o r l d . Benea th or bes ide one ' s c o n c e p t u a l
c o m m e r c e w i t h the w o r l d the re r e m a i n s a r h y t h m i c pa r t i c i pa
t i o n w h o s e i m m e d i a c y dr ives o u t all t h o u g h t . Aes the t i c exis t
ence , in shor t , is perpetual ly suggestive, affirmative, influential ,
i m p e r s o n a l , a n d i m m e m o r i a l . I t is as i f in t h e rea l itself a b a n d
of Sirens h a d a l w a y s cal led to us , as in B lancho t ' s re te l l ing of
t h e f a b u l o u s ep i sode f rom H o m e r . 6
A r t real izes t h e p a r a d o x o f i m m e d i a c y — t h e p a r a d o x o f
an i m m e d i a c y t h a t dr ives o u t all m e d i a t i o n a n d , essent ia l ly
empty , dr ives o u t itself a n d i s t h u s ou t s ide m e m o r y . Dis incar -
n a t e a n d i m p e r s o n a l , aes the t ic ex is tence c a n n o t en t e r i n t o a n y
p r e s e n t (or i t " d i e s " w h e n fo rced t o , a s d o t h e S i rens i n
B lancho t ' s essay) . I t i s t h u s in to l e rab le to t h o u g h t . N o t t h e
m i n u t e s t sliver o f reflection or t e m p o r a l lag m a k e s r o o m for
subject ive ini t ia t ive o r ac t ion . T h e mus ic lover no d o u b t feels
g r e a t p a s s i o n as she l is tens to a be loved piece , b u t i t i s n o t
c e r t a i n t h a t she feels herself in the pa s s ion . Pa radox ica l ly , im
m e d i a c y unh inges me f rom myself. T h e p r o x i m i t y o f a r t t o
m a g i c a n d t r a n c e ind ica tes a t ra jec tory w h e r e i n t h e subjec t
expe r i ences a fa in t ing a w a y of self a l together , a n d an e x p o
su re to ex ter ior i ty . T h e b o d y h a s a m e m b r a n e , a sk in , b u t the
self d o e s n o t . T h e " m a g i c a l " conve r s ion o f the ob jec t i n t o an
image , a nonobje< t, • th ing , tr iggers the immediacy oi pas
s iona te invo lvemen t . While re ta in ing the form, co lo r s , s o u n d ,
and o the r qual i t ies ol the object , the image , in effect, "d r ive s
the object out o f the wor ld [chasser les obje ts du m o n d e ] " a n d
t h u s " b r e a k s up r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [briser l a r e p r é s e n t a t i o n ] " 7
because the image s u b t r a c t s the object t o be r ep re sen t ed f r o m
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e i m a g e d i s inca rna t e s t h e rea l , b u t th is
is so only because the real is a l w a y s a l r eady a p p r o a c h e d by its
image : " T h e w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d , w i t h its e l e m e n t a r y a n d in
te l lectual ly e l a b o r a t e d g ivens , c a n t o u c h us musical ly , c a n b e
c o m e an i m a g e [L 'ensemble de n o t r e m o n d e , avec ses d o n n é e s
e t é l é m e n t a i r e s e t i n t e l l e c t u e l l e m e n t é l a b o r é e s , p e u t n o u s
t o u c h e r m u s i c a l e m e n t , deveni r i m a g e ] . " 8 A r t i n gene ra l r ea l
izes th is la tency a n d pe rpe tua l ly effaces the difference b e t w e e n
t h e real a n d t h e imag ina ry , n a t u r e a n d mimes i s . " L a réa l i té e t
s o n o m b r e " i s t h u s a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the i m p o r t a n t r ecen t
w o r k d o n e b y Ph i l ippe L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e o n r a d i c a l , o r n o n -
P la ton ic (i .e. , n o n r e s t r i c t e d , t h a t is to say, general) m i m e s i s . 9
Duality
A sign direct ly refers to its object , b u t an i m a g e
r e sembles i t . 1 0 A n i m a g e resembles a n objec t , b u t r e s e m b l a n c e
i s n o t t h e resu l t o f a c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t w o r e a l m s : t h e real
a n d t h e imag ina ry . Th i s is a key p o i n t for Levinas in th i s essay.
A u d i e n c e s w h o r e s p o n d to a film by i m m e d i a t e l y c o m p a r i n g
i t to s o m e real i ty of ten r e s p o n d energet ica l ly a n d aggress ively
as i f t hey w e r e be ing c h e a t e d of rea l i ty a n d on ly t h e p r o p e r
c o m p a r i s o n c o u l d r e s to re t h e real t o itself a n d keep t h e t w o
r e a l m s s e p a r a t e . In j e o p a r d y i s t h e p r o p e r difference b e t w e e n
t h e m . But r e s e m b l a n c e is n o t the e n d resu l t of a c o m p a r i s o n .
I t i s t h a t w h i c h e n g e n d e r s t h e i m a g e in t h e first p lace . R e s e m
b l a n c e beg ins in t h e real itself:
I 1ère is a person w h o is wli.il lie is; bill he does nol
m a k e us forget , does not a b s o r b , cover over entirely
the objects he ho lds a n d the w a y he ho lds t h e m , his
ges tu res , l imbs , gaze, t h o u g h t , sk in , w h i c h escape f rom
u n d e r the iden t i ty of his s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h like a t o r n
sack is u n a b l e to c o n t a i n t h e m . [ . . . ] T h e r e is t h e n a
dua l i ty in this p e r s o n , th is t h i n g , a dua l i ty in its be ing .
It is w h a t i t is a n d it is a s t r ange r to itself, a n d t he re is
a re la t ionship be tween these t w o m o m e n t s . We will say
the th ing is itself and is its image. A n d t ha t this r e l a t ion
sh ip b e t w e e n the t h i n g a n d its i m a g e i s r e s e m b l a n c e .
[Voici une p e r s o n n e qu i es t ce qu 'e l l e est ; ma i s elle ne
fait p a s oublier , n ' a b s o r b e p a s , ne r ecouvre pas en t iè re
m e n t les obje ts qu 'e l l e t i en t e t la m a n i è r e d o n t elle les
t i en t , ses ges tes , ses m e m b r e s , son r e g a r d , sa pensée ,
sa p e a u , qu i s ' é c h a p p e n t de sous l ' ident i té de sa s u b
s t ance , i n c a p a b l e , c o m m e un sac t r o u é , de les conten i r .
[ . . . ] Il y a d o n c cet te p e r s o n n e , d a n s cet te chose u n e
dua l i t é , une dua l i t é d a n s s o n ê t re . Elle est ce qu ' e l l e est
et elle est é t r a n g è r e à e l le -même et il y a un r a p p o r t
e n t r e ces d e u x m o m e n t s . N o u s d i r o n s q u e l a c h o s e est
e l le -même et son image . Et que ce r a p p o r t en t re la chose
e t son i m a g e est la r e s s e m b l a n c e . ] 1 1
A p e r s o n or a t h i n g resembles itself a n d the r e s e m b l a n c e is
a l r e a d y its " o t h e r " des t iny: t o w a r d the i m a g e . Th i s m o v e m e n t
of r e s e m b l a n c e is o b s c u r e . O n e c a n n o t imag ine a t h i n g r e sem
b l ing itself. O n e s imply imag ines the t h i n g , o f c o u r s e . T h i s
a t t es t s to t h e s imu l t ane i ty o f its be ing a n d its a p p e a r i n g . T h a t
w h i c h a p p e a r s , however , i s d e t a c h a b l e f rom t h e t h i n g a n d c a n
e n d o u t s i d e t h e th ing on a v i d e o t a p e or in a m u s e u m . T h a t a
t h i n g is i m a g i n a b l e , t h a t i t is sensible , gives i t a n o t h e r des t iny
apart from its truth (from its identity), li i s a s ii thai which is
imaginable were a l w a y s already left behind by the thing. Inso
far as a t h ing resembles itself, it d e p a r t s from itself a n d c a n be
q u o t e d , or placed in pa ren thes i s , in an image . An image c a p
tu res and immobi l i zes this (invisible, un imag inab le ) m o v e m e n t
of a thing-resembling- i tself . A r t c a p t u r e s t h a t w h i c h t r u t h
sheds , leaves a b a n d o n e d , leaks . Art, Levinas tells us summar i ly ,
" le ts go of t h e p rey for t h e s h a d o w [ l ' a r t lache d o n e la p r o i e
p o u r P o m b r e ] . " 1 2 W e a re none the le s s en t i t l ed t o ask : W h a t
w a s t h e prey? W h a t was lost?
T h e a n s w e r to this ques t ion i s a m b i g u o u s . T h e r e is, Levinas
says , a dua l i ty in be ing , a n o n t r u t h or a defect ion f r o m t r u t h
t h a t i s s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h t r u t h . S i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h being it
self, a t h ing r e sembles itself, or flees itself. G i o r g i o A g a m b e n
u n d e r s t a n d s th is to m e a n t h a t a t h i n g is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y itself
and its qua l i t i e s w i t h o u t be ing the s a m e t h i n g as its q u a l i t i e s . 1 3
A t h i n g , A g a m b e n says , i s n o t its qua l i t i e s , i s n o t ident ica l to
its qua l i t i es , b u t a t t h e s a m e t ime i t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its
qua l i t i es . We shall r e t u r n to this del ica te p o i n t i n o u r c h a p t e r
on A g a m b e n . (Let u s n o t e for n o w , however , t h a t B l a n c h o t
r e a d s t h e s a m e a m b i g u i t y t h r o u g h the u n c a n n i n e s s o f t h e ca
d a v e r . 1 4 H e p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e dea r d e p a r t e d i s n o t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n the c a d a v e r t h a t lies in s ta te . Yet the d e p a r t e d i s ce r ta in ly
n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g a s the co rpse , i s n o t ident ica l w i t h t h e c a d a
ver. T h e dea r d e p a r t e d o n e is g o n e , precisely. Yet, in t h e co rpse ,
t h e d e p a r t e d c o m e s to r e semble herself, or even , returns to
herself as he r r e s e m b l a n c e , wh i l e a t t h e s a m e t ime a b s e n t i n g
herself. T h e r e is a so r t of e ro s ion at w o r k he re t h a t is s t r ict ly
s p e a k i n g u n t h i n k a b l e . I t is n o t a case of qual i t ies c l ing ing to
s o m e s u b s t a n c e , sub -base , o r f u n d a m e n t . I t i s r a t h e r t h e case
t h a t r e s e m b l a n c e m o v e s t o r ep lace the rea l , t h a t ident i ty seems
to be " c o n s t i t u t e d " by r e s e m b l a n c e or qual i t ies w i t h o u t being
t h o s e qua l i t i es o r t h a t r e semblance . )
Levinas finds, therefore, thai that which is strange, ob
scure (bul in no way ineffable), and lends itsell to art and to
m y t h is th is : Being-such-as- i t - is , the real in its t r u t h , is a l r eady
offered t o , or is in, t he imag ina ry . T h e be ing - in - the - imag ina ry
of t h e real is a k i n d of o r ig ina ry exo t i c i sm. It is t he s t r u c t u r e
of the sensible as such . T h e sensible c h a r a c t e r of the t h i n g , its
qual i t ies (red, h a r d , s o n o r o u s , a r o m a t i c ) , m a k e i t i m a g i n a b l e ,
a n d the t r u t h o f the t h i n g i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its be ing i m a g
inab le as such . T h e rea l , be ing , t r u t h , i s t he p lace w h e r e t h e
i m a g i n a r y t a k e s p lace . T h a t w h i c h i s " l o s t , " the " p r e y " t h a t
a r t " le ts go of" is, qu i te simply, the very even t of the imag i
n a r y — a n even t t h a t c a n n o t be i m a g i n e d , an even t t h e real i s
a l r e a d y invo lved in. (By the way , this is t h e t o r m e n t of t h e
Blancho t i an wr i te r : he loses the m o s t desired m o m e n t , t he event
o f poe t i c l a n g u a g e itself. He i s t o r m e n t e d by t h e p r e s e n c e / a b
sence in t h e image of t h a t w h i c h is u n i m a g i n a b l e . In s h o r t , t he
rea l as-it-is i s a l w a y s a l r eady b e c o m i n g an i m a g e , an u n t r u t h . )
Being is d u a l . It is s i m u l t a n e o u s w i th itself. I r r educ ib ly
a m b i g u o u s , i t is w i t h d r a w n f rom itself in its very sensibil i ty.
N o n t r u t h is the sensible c h a r a c t e r of the t h ing . Insofar as a
be ing r e sembles itself i t is sensible , b u t its sensibil i ty is an o b
scure essence or fugitivity t h a t " d i s i n c a r n a t e s " be ing . I see a
t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t through it. ( T h u s , Levinas says t h a t t h e
i m a g e i s the a l legory of be ing , a p o i n t to w h i c h we shal l r e t u r n
short ly.) T h e d i s i n c a r n a t i o n of be ing is the very in tens i ty a n d
essent ia l s t r angeness of a r t . But a r t has its o w n aggress ivi ty as
we l l . In a r t , t h e sensible does n o t mere ly d e p a r t f r o m t h e rea l .
I t " i n s i s t s " on the absence of the object . Splashes of color ,
s o u n d , a n d bits o f foreign m a t t e r " o c c u p y [the object 's] p l ace
fully to m a r k its r e m o v a l , a s t h o u g h t h e r ep re sen t ed objec t
d ied , w e r e d e g r a d e d , w e r e d i s i n c a r n a t e d in its o w n reflection
[occupen t en t i è r emen t s a p lace p o u r m a r q u e r son é lo ignemen t ,
c o m m e si l 'objet r eprésen té m o u r a i t , se d é g r a d a i t , se dés incar -
nait d ans son p rop re reflet \ . n i i The massive presence ol a corpse-
w r i n g s so m a n y tears from us because it occupies fully a n d
wi th excessive c o m p l e t e n e s s the place of the d e p a r t e d loved
o n e . T h e real is itself and i t escapes itself. A r t does n o t mere ly
reflect th is evas ion ; i t b r ings i t o u t a n d c o m p l e t e s it. I t in tens i
fies i t by c o m p l e t i n g it , by q u o t i n g it, by subs t i t u t i ng for t h e
t r u t h of the t h i n g its i m a g e — a s i f i t w a s indifferent to t h e
rea l i ty of t h e t h i n g , or as i f the rea l i ty of t h e t h i n g c o u n t e d for
n o t h i n g . Ar t p laces in p a r e n t h e s i s the fugitivity of t h e rea l , its
ambigu i ty , a n d c i r cumscr ibes a " d i m e n s i o n of evas ion [une
d i m e n s i o n d ' é v a s i o n ] . " 1 6 Insofar as i t does th i s , i t i n t r o d u c e s
in to the w o r l d the a t m o s p h e r e of t ha t t e m p o r a l interval Levinas
cal ls Ventretemps.
To s u m u p : Insofar as a be ing resembles itself ( a p a r t f r o m
being itself, t h a t is, a p a r t f rom the t r u t h p r o p e r to its be ing ,
i.e., its presence) it is sensible a n d this sensibili ty is its n o n t r u t h ,
i ts s h a d o w . T h e image does n o t p recede the r e s e m b l i n g . T h e
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of space in the image i s t h e r e s e m b l a n c e t h a t
" e n g e n d e r s t h e image [engendre l ' i m a g e ] . " 1 7 A t h i n g c a n pa r
t i c ipa te in its t r u th or in its be ing , b u t para l le l to th is a t h i n g
d e p a r t s f rom itself in an emiss ion t h a t i s p h a n t a s m i c a n d i s
n o t ident ica l w i t h t r u t h . T h e quas i ex is tence o f th is p h a n t a s m
is a " s e m b l a n c e of ex is t ing [ semblan t d ' e x i s t e r ] " or a n o n t r u t h
w i t h o u t b e i n g . 1 8 (In the c h a p t e r o n G io rg io A g a m b e n , w e shall
s h o w t h a t t h e I ta l ian p h i l o s o p h e r m a k e s o f th is p h a n t a s m a
p u r e r e t u r n t o be ing , b u t t o be ing pure ly p r o f a n e d , t h a t is,
s t r i p p e d of all ineffabili ty a n d identi ty.)
The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork
We h a v e seen t h a t an i m a g e i s mus i ca l , t h a t i t i s
r h y t h m i c , b u t in the last ana lys is , i t is p las t ic , a s t a tue , a " s t o p
p a g e of t ime , or r a the r its delay b e h i n d itself [un a r rê t du t e m p s
ou plutôi son retard sur lui même]." 1 9 The un ie thai seems (<>
be i n t r o d u c e d in to the arl ol novels, plays, and c inema can in
no w a y " s h a t t e r the fixity of the image | n ' éb r an l e pas la f ixi té
de l ' i m a g e ] . " 2 0 J u s t a s M o n a Lisa's smile will never b r o a d e n ,
so wil l H a m l e t e te rna l ly agree to m e e t w i t h the g h o s t t h a t says
i t is h is fa ther ' s , a n d so e te rna l ly wil l K a n e suffer the loss of
his family, his pol i t ica l a m b i t i o n s , his e m p i r e , a n d his m a r
r iages . T h e w o r k of a r t will forever be a r res t ed in the t a sk of
a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h e w o r k of be ing . I t will forever defect f r o m
the t i m e p r o p e r t o be ing . Ce l lu lo id a n d p a p e r will o f c o u r s e
decay, b u t as an image t h e a r t w o r k wil l be forever fixed en
l'entretemps, a n d this fatali ty is the cent ra l conce rn of Levinas 's
essay on a r t .
A r t i s an i n s t a n t t h a t " e n d u r e s w i t h o u t a fu ture [dure sans
a v e n i r ] " 2 1 a n d even w i t h o u t a d u r a t i o n . Fo r a r t i s an i m a g e
a n d an image is, i f we m a y say th i s , rigorously u n c e r t a i n . I t
d o e s n o t even o c c u p y space . An imag e i s an " i m p e r s o n a l a n d
a n o n y m o u s instant [instant impersonne l et a n o n y m e ] . " 2 2 T h e r e
i s t h u s s o m e t h i n g dead ly in t h e p u p p e t r y t h a t i s a r t . U n a b l e to
force itself i n t o the p r e s e n t a n d a s s u m e a fu ture , a r t i s t h e
i n t r u s i o n o f d e a t h i n t o the famil iar w o r l d . T h e t e m p o r a l i t y
a r t real izes , Levinas says , i s t he t e m p o r a l i t y of n i g h t m a r e . Like
t h e z7 y a, t he i n s t an t of fixity t h a t is the even t of a r t s t r ips
f r e e d o m of its p o w e r to a s s u m e t h e p r e sen t m o m e n t . A r t i s
n o t the repl ica of a t ime t h a t has been s u s p e n d e d ha l fway
t h r o u g h its c o n t i n u a t i o n a n d a b a n d o n e d as ha l f -comple ted like
a b r idge t h a t s t ops in m i d s p a n . As Levinas h a s been s h o w i n g
us , a r t i s t h a t w h i c h , in t h e genera l e c o n o m y of be ing , defects
f r o m t h e p resen t . I t i s t h a t p a r t of be ing t h a t incessant ly m o v e s
to i ts en deçà, its " i n t e r s t i c e , " as if each m o m e n t of ( c h r o n o
logical) t ime were s imul taneous ly a m o m e n t of fate. Th i s shou ld
r e m i n d us of a p o i n t t h a t is i m p o r t a n t to Levinas ' s w o r k as a
w h o l e . He conce ives of t ime as a series of i n s t a n t s s u t u r e d
together bul infinitely fragile, a lways sha l lowed by the possi
bility ol congealing into an image and thus ol w i t h d r a w i n g
from o u r p o w e r s . ' '
Being is d u a l . I t d o u b l e s up and resembles itself, a n d t h e
t empora l i t y of a r t is ca rved o u t of this repe t i t ion . It is in th is
w a y t h a t the real itself solicits the ar t i s t , s ince i t i s a l w a y s
a l r e a d y invo lved in its o w n s h a d o w a n d t h u s i s a l r eady vul
ne r ab l e to t h e t e m p o r a l modi f ica t ion t h a t i s t h e i m a g e , t h e
n a r r a t i v e , t h e h is tory . An ar t i s t i s a p e r s o n w h o is fasc ina ted
by t h e p las t ic i ty o f the rea l . He o r she i s o n e w h o , a s B l a n c h o t
says , " l ives t h e even t a s an image [vivre un é v é n e m e n t en im
a g e ] , " 2 4 t h a t is, w h o exper iences t h e even t insofar as i t i s al
ready an i m a g e (or a l r e a d y resembles itself a n d is d e t a c h e d
f rom t h e rea l ) . Lev inas p u t s i t th is w a y : "Life solicits t h e n o v
elist w h e n i t seems to h i m as i f i t w e r e a l r eady s o m e t h i n g o u t
of a b o o k [La vie sollicite le r o m a n c i e r q u a n d elle lui a p p a r a î t
c o m m e s i elle so r t a i t déjà d ' u n l i v r e ] . " 2 5 Th i s m e a n s t h a t t h e r e
i s a l r e a d y s o m e t h i n g artificial a b o u t the rea l , s o m e t h i n g aes
the t i c , u n c a n n y , p las t ic—if y o u l ike , s o m e t h i n g fake . Life i s
a l w a y s very near ly a nove l , an i m a g e , a c o r p s e . P u t differently,
t h e r ea l i s a l w a y s vu lne r ab l e to t h e s t o p p a g e o f t i m e — t o t h e
i m a g e of f ini tude—that i t w e a r s on its face. Insofar as th i s
p e r s o n resembles herself, she is infinitely v u l n e r a b l e , infinitely
fragile, as an image is fragile. A s t r ange w e a k n e s s p e r v a d e s
he r t h a t we c a n n o t g r a s p , a b leed ing we c a n n o t s t a n c h . She i s
n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g as her r e s e m b l a n c e to herself, b u t she i s
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n it . H u m a n rea l i ty i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
th i s infinite vulnerabi l i ty , inequali ty-in-i tself , or dif ference- in-
itself. It is as if t he face of th ings w e r e a n o t h e r body , a b o d y
" m a d e up of" fragility a n d t h a t t akes the p lace o f p e r s o n a l
p r e sence . We m a y w i s h to say t h a t th is i s an infinite vu lner
ab i l i t y t o d e a t h . H o w e v e r , t h e o n t o l o g i c a l s ign i f i ca t ion i s
d o u b l e d by t h e fugitivity of the i m a g e : a derel ic t t i m e u n a b l e
to become present and that insists on the absence <>l being,
b u t a s it absence ilsell had been immobilized in its a p p r o a c h
a n d c o u l d no t even achieve the absence the image so d r a m a t i
cal ly insists o n .
Levinas goes on to say in th is essay t h a t a r t i s " t h e uncer
t a i n t y of [ t ime's] c o n t i n u a t i o n [ l ' incer t i tude de sa c o n t i n u a
t i o n ] , " 2 6 t he possibi l i ty t h a t t i m e c a n s t o p . Th i s an x i e ty a t t es t s
to a d i m e n s i o n of t ime t h a t peels itself a w a y f rom c h r o n o l o g y
a s t h o u g h "a w h o l e set o f facts w a s a l r eady i m m o b i l i z e d a n d
f o r m e d a series [ c o m m e si t o u t e une sui te de faits s ' i m m o b i l
i sa ient e t f o r m a i e n t s é r i e ] . " 2 7 T h e real , a t its surfaces , on its
face, offers itself to a r t as i f i t w a s a l r eady p las t ic . T h e a r t i s t
p a r t i c i p a t e s solely in the s h a d o w d i m e n s i o n . T h e very int i
m a c y a n d in tens i ty o f a r t a re its a t t en t iveness t o w h a t a p p e a r s ,
t o w h a t i s a t t he sur face , t o t h a t w h i c h incessant ly c o m e s t o
t h e s u r f a c e — r e s e m b l a n c e . I t is at he r surfaces t h a t a p e r s o n is
nea r ly petr if ied, nea r ly c a p t u r e d (bu t i t i s he re t h a t she is a l so
essent ia l ly fugit ive, for the image flees the p r e sen t ) . T h i s inces
s a n t c o m i n g to the surface i s t h e o b s c u r i t y of the t ime of dy
ing , as Lev inas p r o c e e d s to m a k e clear. T h e t ime of dy ing i s
n o t t h e c ross sect ion of a c o n t i n u u m . Ins t ead , " T h e t i m e of
dying itself c a n n o t give itself t he o t h e r s h o r e . W h a t is u n i q u e
a n d p o i g n a n t in this i n s t an t i s d u e to t h e fact t h a t i t c a n n o t
p a s s . In dying, t h e h o r i z o n of the fu ture is g iven , b u t t h e fu
t u r e as p r o m i s e of a n e w p resen t is refused; o n e is in the inter
va l , forever an interval [Le t e m p s - m ê m e du mourir ne p e u t
p a s se d o n n e r l ' au t r e r ive. Ce q u e cet i n s t a n t a d ' u n i q u e e t de
p o i g n a n t t ien t au fait de ne pas p o u v o i r passer. D a n s le mourir,
l ' h o r i z o n de l ' aveni r est d o n n é e , m a i s , l ' aveni r en t a n t q u e
p r o m e s s e du p r é sen t n o u v e a u est r e fusé—on est d a n s l ' inter
val le , à j a m a i s i n t e r v a l l e . ] . " 2 8 Th i s dying, Lev inas says , " i s t h e
g r e a t obses s ion of the ar t is t ' s w o r l d [la g r a n d e obsess ion du
m o n d e a r t i s t e ] . " 2 9 A n in s t an t o f t ime m a y n o t h a v e a n o t h e r
shore . It may be sul i i ied inlo time's I'i'iilirlfinj/s, ou t s ide any
continuum, and s t o p just short ol the present . It is as if l iving
t une were s imu l t aneous ly su tu red in to a plast ic series, a cease
less interval d e p a r t i n g from any cont inu i ty . Or i t is as if be ing-
as-it-is, in its t r u t h , were also i r reparably cons igned to n o n t r u t h ,
to i m m o b i l i z a t i o n in the i m a g e — b u r i e d al ive, as in Poe . Ar t
real izes the poss ib i l i ty t h a t l iving be ing c a n a l w a y s be expe r i
enced as an i m a g e , as un l iv ing , as a l w a y s a l r eady pe t r i f ied—
as i f qua l i t i es c l ung to n o t h i n g a t all.
The Space of Art
Art i s then someth ing horr ib le , " someth ing i n h u m a n
a n d m o n s t r o u s [quelque chose d ' i n h u m a i n e t de m o n s t r u e u x ] " 3 0
b e c a u s e i t i s p o w e r l e s s , because i t c a n n o t go b e y o n d , because
i t c a n n o t even end . Ar t i s rad ica l passivity. I t " s h o w s " this
pass iv i ty in t h e s t o p p a g e of t ime en deçà du temps. Its va lue to
c iv i l iza t ion is a m b i g u o u s since i t is u t te r ly foreign to the w o r l d
of in i t ia t ive . I t s h o w s t h e w o r l d the obscu r i t y of fate n o t as an
e l s ewhere t h a t c o m e s f rom b e y o n d to in te rvene i n the p r e sen t ,
b u t a s the very face the w o r l d w e a r s . A r t a ccompl i she s th is
feat by w a y of i r responsibi l i ty . O u t s i d e all labor , a r t b e c k o n s
to us as i f all life c o u l d e n d up in m y t h , in plast ici ty, in t h e
" r h y t h m of a real i ty w h i c h solicits on ly its a d m i s s i o n i n t o a
b o o k or a p a i n t i n g [le r h y t h m e d ' u n e réal i té qu i ne sollicite
q u e son a d m i s s i o n d a n s un livre ou d a n s un t a b l e a u ] . " 3 1 I t i s
as if a r t c o u l d rep lace the bu i ld ing up of a h a b i t a t , a w o r l d ,
t he e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just ice , g o v e r n m e n t s , t he ci ty itself. Ult i
m a t e l y " h o r r i b l e , " a r t none the l e s s b e c k o n s to u s i n t h e s a m e
w a y t h a t a r h y t h m is i r resis t ibly engag ing .
Levinas c o n c l u d e s , the re fo re , t h a t a r t , aes the t ic ex i s tence ,
r h y t h m , s i m u l t a n e o u s possess ion a n d d i spossess ion , a n d i r re
spons ib i l i ty a r e a p a r t of life a n d have a p l ace , " b u t on ly a
place , in l imn.m happiness [mais une place seulement—dans
le b o n h e u r de l'homme]." 1 1 ( Iriticism, insofar as it approaches
t he ar t i s t ic event as such , r e in t roduces the i n h u m a n i t y of a r t
b a c k i n t o the w o r l d . As we have seen, this will n o t involve a
c o m p a r i s o n of the a r t w o r k to s o m e reali ty. I t involves t r e a t i n g
t h e a r t w o r k as a m y t h : " [TJhis i m m o b i l e s t a tue has to be p u t
in m o v e m e n t a n d m a d e to speak [cette s t a tue i m m o b i l e , i l f au t
la m e t t r e en m o u v e m e n t e t la faire p a r l e r ] . " 3 3 I t involves , in
s h o r t , i n t e r r u p t i n g m y t h a n d i n t eg ra t i ng t h a t w h i c h i s exces
sively c losed to l a n g u a g e back i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e f r o m w h i c h i t
d e f e c t e d . 3 4 M y t h is the source of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h , for i t is,
a s the m o m e n t o f r e semblance , the d i s tance the real t akes f rom
itself—its a m b i g u i t y a n d dual i ty . A r t i s an invers ion of c re
a t i o n . 3 5 I t p r e sen t s t o t h e w o r l d t h e vu lne rab i l i ty o f c o n g e a l
ing i n t o an i m a g e t h a t all c r e a t i o n i s p r e y t o , a n d p h i l o s o p h y
a n d cr i t ic ism c a n ally themse lves w i t h c r ea t ion on ly by " s k i p
p i n g o v e r t h e i n t e r v a l s o f t h e m e a n w h i l e [en s a u t a n t les
in terval les de l ' e n t r e t e m p s ] . " 3 6 In effect, th is m e a n s t h a t ph i
l o s o p h y a n d cri t icism c a n on ly begin by " f o r g e t t i n g " a r t .
For, l ike an ido l , Levinas says , an a r t w o r k i s " s t u p i d . " 3 7
W e m u s t a d d t h a t every ar t is t since P y g m a l i o n h a s k n o w n th i s .
A r t is a c a r i c a t u r e of life, n o t ano the r , bet ter , life. T h e a r t w o r k
c a n n o t a s s u m e or t a k e on life. I t overf lows life on all s ides ,
l ike w a t e r w i t h o u t a con ta ine r . U n a b l e to a t t a i n t h e p r e s e n t
m o m e n t , t h e a r t w o r k spills all t he a s p i r a t i o n s t h e a r t i s t bui l t
i n t o it. A r t c a n only e m p t y itself of all t he ar t is t ' s efforts .
T h e e l e m e n t a r y p r o c e d u r e o f a r t i s to subs t i t u t e an image
for a c o n c e p t . But the a r t i s t c a n n o t be said to a im a t the image
per se as a goa l . Ar t (except in adver t i s ing) does n o t w i s h to
l imit itself to an i m a g e , h o w e v e r perfect o r beaut i fu l . N e i t h e r
d o e s the a r t i s t a i m a t an elusive essence n o r ineffability, a s do
p h i l o s o p h y a n d cr i t ic ism. A r t a ims t o r e m a i n i n c o n t a c t w i t h
t h a t w h i c h is "unmade in its own image [défait selon son im
age]" as Blanchot pu is u . ' " An remains m contac t wi th that
which is infinitely vulnerable to disincarnation—that w h i c h is
nei ther itself in its t r u th nor in its image (its d o u b l e , or its
o t h e r fate). T h e subs t i t u t i on of the imag e for t h e c o n c e p t i s
on ly the first s t ep , for w h e n the image has succeeded in d r iv
ing the objec t o u t o f ex i s tence , w h a t r ema ins? W h a t i s the
image w h e n i t i s no longer an image of . . . ? N e i t h e r t h e t h i n g
n o r its d o u b l e , t h e a r t w o r k i s a t once the t r ace of no o r ig in . I f
a r t " le ts go of t he prey for the s h a d o w , " a n d i f t h e " insecur i ty
of a be ing t h a t h a s a p r e s e n t i m e n t of its fate is t h e g rea t obses
s ion of the ar t is t ' s w o r l d , " th is i s because a r t m a i n t a i n s c o n
t ac t w i t h the i m a g i n a r y space left e m p t y of all s u b s t a n c e a n d
i n h a b i t e d by no o n e — t h e space t h a t be ing spills o u t i n t o , be
side itself. In th is space (Blanchot ' s l'espace littéraire), t h e real
i s a l r eady i m a g i n a r y a n d d e t a c h e d f rom its t r u t h , i ts ident i ty .
In th is space , the plast ic i ty o f m a t t e r no longe r refers to t h e
s u b s t a n c e t o w h i c h qual i t ies cl ing b u t t o the a r r e s t ed d e a t h
t h a t i s t h e r i g o r o u s i m m o b i l i t y of the s t a tue . I t i s a m b i g u o u s
space a n d i t i s t h e m o s t subt le of bod i e s , for i t i s ne i the r s u b
s t ance n o r imag e b u t r a t h e r the l i qu ida t i on o f t h e e l emen ta l
d i s t ance t h a t s epa ra t e s the t w o . Th i s space be longs ne i the r t o
a r t n o r t o ph i lo sophy , ne i the r t o t h e imag e n o r t o t h e c o n c e p t .
In c o n t r a s t to the ph i lo sophe r , t h e ar t i s t i s al l ied w i t h t h e very
w e a k n e s s o f space itself: c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r sheer c o m m u n i c a -
t i v i t y—the p u r e " t h e r e i s " (il y a). (B lancho t , in o u r o p i n i o n ,
h a s g o n e fur ther t h a n any o t h e r w r i t e r i n o u r t imes t o w a r d
m a k i n g th is space " s p e a k . " )
" Ine r t ma t t e r , " Levinas says , " a l r e a d y refers to a s u b s t a n c e
to w h i c h its qual i t ies cl ing. In a s t a tue , m a t t e r k n o w s t h e d e a t h
of idols [La ma t i è re iner t se réfère déjà u n e subs t ance à laquel le
s ' a c c r o c h e n t ses qua l i t és . D a n s la s t a t u e , la m a t i è r e c o n n a î t la
m o r t d e l ' i d o l e ] . " 3 9 T h i s m e a n s t h a t i n a r t m a t t e r wi l l e n c o u n
ter the inversion of creat ion t ha t is l'entretemps. In the invers ion ,
apart from the inertia <>i mattet and already withdrawn from
t he thing-for-us, there is the for no-one that characterizes the
N e u t e r . N e u t r a l wi th respect to what is, a r t , which subs t i t u t e s
the i m a g e for the c o n c e p t , " p r e s e n t s " the sheer that there is,
or an t e r i o r i t y as such . Th i s i s the a t m o s p h e r e of a r t a n d th is
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n i s u n m e d i a t e d a n d i m m e d i a t e , a n d t h u s e ludes
all cogn i t i on a n d all m e m o r y . T h e a r t w o r k is a t h ing - fo r -no-
o n e , a n d i t t h u s induces f rom us invo lvement s t h a t do n o t
o r i g ina t e in o u r in i t ia t ive . T h i s a l l ows B l a n c h o t to say t h a t
" t h e i m a g e i s i n t i m a t e because i t m a k e s of o u r i n t i m a c y an
ex t e r i o r p o w e r t h a t we s u b m i t t o pass ively [ in t ime est l ' image
p a r c e qu'el le fait de no t re intimité une puissance extér ieure q u e
n o u s sub i s sons p a s s i v e m e n t ] . " 4 0 T h e sheer that there is, or t h e
il y a, is u n g r a s p a b l e . It e ludes every p r e sen t ye t it is t h a t w i t h
o u t w h i c h t he re will never have been a n y poss ib i l i ty a s such .
A r t d o e s n o t mere ly p r e sen t , a s Levinas s t resses , t he poss ib i l
ity t h a t t i m e c a n s t o p . I t a l so , m o r e affirmatively, p r e sen t s
possibility itself as t h a t w h i c h e ludes every th ing—poss ib i l i ty
as (the) no th ing , as immedia te . W h i c h a m o u n t s to saying t h a t
n o t h i n g , or the n o t h i n g , i s the f o r m of a n y poss ib le r e l a t i o n .
P resen ted as a r r e s t ed , the a t m o s p h e r e o f a r t p r e sen t s t h e
r e t u r n o f t h a t w h i c h c a n never be e x c l u d e d b u t w h i c h , a t t he
s a m e t ime , exc ludes every th ing . In the space of l i t e ra ture qua l i
t ies c l ing t o n o t h i n g , t o no be ing . S o m e t h i n g e ludes c o g n i t i o n ,
b u t m a k e s itself felt (if obscure ly) as t h a t w h i c h is never " i t
self," t h a t w h i c h i s only " s u g g e s t e d . " S o m e t h i n g c o m e s b u t
r e m a i n s a r r e s t ed in its " m e a n w h i l e . " Fo r B l a n c h o t th is wi l l be
t h e t ime of wr i t ing . I t i s u n c o m m o n , unclassif iable, a n d a n o n y
m o u s , l ike an infinite m u r m u r , as F o u c a u l t p u t s i t . 4 ' I t i s w r i t
ing t h a t c a n n o t e n d itself a n d i s con t inua l ly ou t s i de itself l ike
a t h i n g a m o n g th ings . An e n o r m i t y w i t h o u t p r o p o r t i o n , i t i s
t h e very sc ra t ch ing s o u n d w e hear, f rom s o m e w h e r e , w h e n w e
w r i t e these t h ings .
The Profane
For both Lévinas and Blanchot , t he a r t i s t ne i the r
c rea tes n o r reveals . That w h i c h the p h i l o s o p h e r fixes in t h e
e te rn i ty of the c o n c e p t , a r t a r res ts in the in te rva l of t h e i m a g e .
W h e r e a s p h i l o s o p h y offers u s the th ing t o k n o w a n d use , a r t
real izes a w i t h d r a w a l f rom p o w e r a n d even , m o r e s t rongly , a
w i t h d r a w a l f r o m the p resen t . Aes the t ic ex is tence is a l apse in
o u r abi l i ty t o mob i l i ze t ime . T h e i n t ima te poss ibi l i ty t h a t t ime
can s t o p is t h e poss ib i l i ty of be ing del ivered to a t ime w i t h o u t
u s , w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t — i m p e r s o n a l a n d n e u t r a l . T h i s i s s imu
la ted t ime , a s i m u l a t i o n of ex is t ing or an ex is tence ou t s i de
in i t ia t ive . I t i s n o t the p r o m i s e of a n e w b e g i n n i n g a n d i t d o e s
n o t c a r ry us to a beyond of be ing (ethical or o t h e r w i s e ) . I t
on ly s u b t r a c t s us f rom ourse lves .
In La comunità che viene, G i o r g i o A g a m b e n wil l say t h a t
t h e w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d h a s been t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an i m a g e , a
spec tac le . T h i s i s the s t a r t i ng p o i n t for his pol i t ics . He wil l say
t h a t t h e w o r l d h a s c o m e to r e semble itself comple te ly , to ta l ly ,
a n d t h u s h a s s e p a r a t e d h u m a n agency f rom its t r a d i t i o n a l ini
t ia t ive . T h a t i s t o say, the w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d c a n n o w be
e x p e r i e n c e d a s a n i m a g e a n d w e a re n o longer ab le t o expe r i
ence ourse lves in t h e w o r l d , for its space is n o w imag ina ry .
H e n c e , A g a m b e n ' s in teres t in the e x p r o p r i a t i o n of expe r i ence
a n d his a t t e m p t s to rescue f rom th is ma la i se a r ad i ca l poss ib i l
ity he calls p u r e be ing - in - l anguage . H i s pol i t ics i s an a t t e m p t
t o a p p r o p r i a t e th is e x p r o p r i a t i o n (or th is i m p o t e n c e ou t s i de
a n y ini t iat ive) n o t a s a n o t h e r p o w e r , b u t a s an u n p o w e r t h a t i s
a n a m b i g u o u s capac i ty for i r reparab i l i ty . H e wil l a sk t h a t w e
cease to seek in the i m a g i n a r y for t h a t w h i c h the i m a g i n a r y
s u s p e n d s — i d e n t i t y — a n d ins t ead t h a t w e re jo in o u r " o l d e s t "
expe r i ence : t h e sheer p ro fan i ty that there is. T h e sheer il y a is
w i t h o u t c l a m o r a n d w i t h o u t p a t h o s . I t w o u l d b e e x p e r i e n c e d
w h e n there is nothing i<> expei ience as in aesthetic existent e,
precisely. In his ana lyses <>l a i l , I i v i n a s br ings oui art's " ab i l
i t y " to conse rve this expe r i ence , a n d in Blanchot we ca tch a
g l impse i n t o a life ou t s i de in i t ia t ive .
F o r all t h ree w r i t e r s , t he sheer that there is t h a t every im
age h a r b o r s i s o u r s e p a r a t i o n f rom a n y p a r t i c u l a r expe r i ence ,
b u t i t does n o t p r o m i s e a c o n c r e t e fu ture to w h i c h we m a y
re la te ourse lves . Neve r the l e s s , a r t r e m a i n s o u r man i fes t o r i en
t a t i o n t o w a r d s it. Refus ing all g r a s p , a r t " s a y s " t h a t t ime o u t
side t h e s y n c h r o n y of t h e p r e sen t c a n n o t but be los t , t h a t i t i s
n o n c o n s e c u t i v e , d i s c o n t i n u o u s , a r re s t ing . I f y o u l ike, a r t — t h e
p u r e f o r m of a n y poss ib le r e l a t ion , o r an t e r i o r i t y a s s u c h — i s
a l so t h e p u r e fo rm o f s e p a r a t i o n ( f rom the p e r s o n a l a n d t h e
subjec t ive) . T h a t i s to say, a r t i s n o t on ly t h e p r e s e n t i m e n t of
fa te , i t i s a l so another d e a t h f r o m w h i c h we c a n n o t s e p a r a t e
ourse lves a n d w h i c h we c a n n o t finish, n o t even in d e a t h . I t i s
a loss we c a n n o t let go of, b u t t h a t does n o t h o l d us in it .
F o r the Levinas o f " L a réal i té e t son o m b r e , " the s i t ua t i on
of a r t in the genera l e c o n o m y of be ing is l imi ted because i t
l acks the pe rspec t ive of t h e O t h e r (Autrui) t h a t b r e a k s up t h e
spell o f a r t a n d a w a k e n s us to responsibi l i ty . But we wil l w a n t
to s h o w , in o u r n e x t chap te r , t h a t the r e l a t i on w i t h Autrui i s
a m b i g u o u s a n d , i f we m a y say so , imag inary .
T W O
Lcvinas's Ethics
today it is art that inherits, before our very eyes, the
delirious role and character of the religious. Today it is art
that gnaws at and transforms us.
—Bataille
Like a Nessus Tunic my skin would be.
—Levinas
An Ambiguous Rapport
As i f in r e s p o n s e to G e o r g e s Batai l le ( w h o m , to
my k n o w l e d g e , he neve r cites) E m m a n u e l Lev inas h a s a t
t e m p t e d to define e thics as the pr ivi leged site of de l i r i um in
o u r c u l t u r e . H i s g r ea t b o o k Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
l'essence defines t h e r a p p o r t w i t h Autrui as the " seed of folly
[grain de fo l i e ] " in the sou l . 1 W i t h inc reas ing c o m p l e x i t y a n d
d e t e r m i n a t i o n he h a s a t t e m p t e d to a r t i cu la t e a r e spons ib i l i ty
i ha t realizes in t h e e x t r e m e an a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e cer ta in t ies
a n d imper i a l i sms o f t h e self. S t r ange r t h a n a r t w o u l d be t h e
i m m e m o r i a l r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O the r . As i f to a n s w e r Batai l le 's
11 e q u e n t c o m p l a i n t t h a t , in spi te of K a n t , we still c a n n o t i m a g
ine an e thics t h a t i s n o t " c o m m i t t e d , " Levinas h a s desc r ibed
his e th ics as " fo r - the -o the r [pour l'autre]," b u t " for n o t h i n g
Ipour rien]-"1 in s h o r t , a sovere ign e th ics . Eth ica l o b l i g a t i o n
w o u l d be , for Levinas , u n c o n t a i n a b l e , a n d inexorab ly betrayed
by m o r a l s a n d l aws . I t w o u l d be , in fact, ins tabi l i ty itself: t he
instabil i ty of the n a k e d re la t ion to the Other . For, w i t h Batai l le ,
31
Levinas lakes as his s t a r t ing point the impossibility oi indil
ference to the O t h e r — t o the mortality <>l the other person—
as the p lace (or n o n p l a c e [non-lieu]) w h e r e the self is e x p o s e d
a n d lacerated. His version of Bataille's famous l'expérience in
térieur is mauvaise conscience: " the inferiority of non- in ten t iona l
c o n s c i o u s n e s s [ l ' i n t é r i o r i t é de l a c o n s c i e n c e n o n - i n t e n t i o -
n e l l e ] . " 3 Ins is t ing, w i t h Batai l le , t h a t the d e m a n d for an e th ics
c a n n o t be s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n y t h i n g else, all o f Levinas ' s w o r k
a i m s a t a r e l a t ion to the O t h e r (Autrui) " o l d e r " t h a n t h e " r e
l a t ion to t h e self (egology) a n d the r e l a t ion to the w o r l d (cos
m o l o g y ) . " 4 T h i s o l a m i c r e l a t i on , he insists , i s o n e of r e spons i
bility, and i t sub tends and in te r rup ts the relat ion so dispir i t ingly
desc r ibed by F r e u d a n d o the r s as homo lupus homini.
Let us n o t e s t r a igh t away , for i t wil l gu ide o u r en t i re r e a d
ing of Lev inas , t h a t as this re la t ion i s " o l d e r " t h a n t h e self a n d
t h e w o r l d , th is O t h e r will have a l w a y s a l r eady sunk in to im-
memor ia l i t y , p r io r t o a n y m e m o r y o r r ep res s ion . T h e "rela
t i o n " t h e n wil l n o t involve t w o t e r m s , t h e self a n d t h e o ther .
T h e r e l a t i on will be " o l d e r " t h a n a n y self. Th i s a n t e r i o r i t y
wil l be , for Lev inas , a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d a g o o d n e s s w i t h o u t
m e a s u r e t h a t (de )s t ruc tu res the self as a r e l a t i on w i t h a never-
p r e sen t O the r . We a d d , the re fo re , t h a t a n y re la t ion t h a t the I
establ ishes w i th an o the r subject will only be t ray the pu re anter
ior i ty t h a t , in Levinas 's t h o u g h t , imper ious ly orders me to t h e
O the r . F u r t h e r m o r e , w e m u s t n o t e t h a t , a s i m m e m o r i a l , th is
a n t e r i o r r e la t ion c a n only be be t r ayed , a n d the re fo re a n y rela
t ion to a n o t h e r r ema ins pa radox ica l ly faithful to the Levinas ian
éthique. H e n c e , Levinas offers no c r i t ique of a n y ex is t ing e th
ics o r m o r a l s , n o r does he p r o p o s e m a x i m s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h
we m u s t act . All o f Levinas 's t h o u g h t g rav i t a t e s t o w a r d th is
obsessive re la t ion t h a t refracts all ac tua l re la t ions , h o l d i n g each
i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t i m m e m o r i a l re la t ion w h i c h e a c h c a n n o t b u t
be t ray . H i s e th ics , in sho r t , is essentially a m b i g u o u s .
I I \ I I I A S S I I M M
lo be su re , this is no ethics thai wou ld be recognized as
such by K. 1111 or Mil l . In a sense, we can say t ha t in fact the re
is no l e v i n a s i a n e th ics , as it can be said t ha t the re is no ph i
losophy oi I teidegger, s ince each is " f o u n d e d " on an abys s , a
"forgetting." Like the re la t ion wi th Being, the r e l a t ion w i t h
the O t h e r is w i t h o u t an object , an a im , or a p u r p o s e . It is a
re la t ion t h a t d r a in s consc iousness of in ten t iona l i ty , a n d i t is in
this re la t ion t h a t Levinas w o u l d p lace the d i spossess ion of self
t ha t defines c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a s such a n d t h e o p e n i n g b e y o n d
the confines o f a n y k n o w i n g . T h e r e l a t ion w i t h t h e O t h e r (un
like the He idegger i an re la t ion to Being) is n o t a p r e c o m p r e h e n -
s ion , bu t a b r e a k u p of a n y c o m p r e h e n s i o n .
We will n o t be p i t t ing Levinas aga ins t Batail le on t h e ques
t ion of a r t (which , as we k n o w , is of l imited interes t to Levinas)
versus e th ics . W h a t m a t t e r s to each of t h e m , in spi te o f the i r
qu i t e c o n s i d e r a b l e differences, i s t h e s ingular r e l a t i on w i t h the
o t h e r p e r s o n a s t h a t w h i c h i s t h e m o s t fragile a n d the m o s t
e x p o s e d . I t i s a r e l a t i on t h a t w i t h d r a w s f rom o u r p o w e r s — a
re l a t ion t o o fragile even to qual ify as a p r o p e r expe r i ence .
(This r e l a t i on , in fact, echoes t h e re la t ion w i t h the i m a g e we
have d iscussed e l sewhere in this b o o k . ) I t i s imposs ib l e , in o u r
o p i n i o n , n o t to be fasc ina ted by Levinas ' s w o r k , by his re len t
less focus on a re la t ion t h a t exceeds p o w e r a n d t h a t i s on ly
" p o s s i b l e " a s imposs ib l e , be t r ayed , o r f ict ioned, because w h a t
Lev inas r u n s u p aga ins t , aga in a n d aga in , w i t h a n d aga in s t
Heidegger , is th is (as flatly s t a t ed by M i k k e l Borch - Jacobsen ) :
" T h e r e is no e th ics , n o r m o r a l s , of f ini tude [Il n ' y a p a s d '
' é t h i q u e ' , p a s de ' m o r a l e ' de l a f i n i t u d e ] . " 5 W h a t h a p p e n s i n
Lev inas , w h a t passes u n d e r the word e th ics , i s no e thics pe r
se, no re la t ion as such . W h a t h a p p e n s i s a r e l a t i on t h a t i s no
r e l a t i o n , t h a t c a n n o t b u t be be t r ayed , a n d by w h i c h I c a n n o t
b u t be obl iga ted , because the "es sence" of the re la t ion to Autrui
is au-delà de l'essence—is be t r aya l "itself," or is t h a t w h i c h
I W D
undermines and ho l lows out all real relations. This is precisely
h o w the o the r person obligates me: for this other person is
without relation, is a l one a n d m o r t a l , is a l r eady b e y o n d my
p o w e r s a n d , the re fo re , I , t o o , am w i t h o u t r e la t ion . H e n c e my
anx ie ty , a n d h e n c e t h e " r e s t l e s s n e s s " in t h e self o f w h i c h
Levinas s o of ten s p e a k s . W h a t " b i n d s " m e t o the o t h e r p e r s o n
i s the nonrelation to t h e Othe r , t he n o t h i n g or n o - r e l a t i o n t h a t
I , myself, am. My skin , a N e s s u s t un i c .
We are desc r ib ing , t h e n , an e thics of be t r aya l . But be t r aya l
o f w h a t ? Of n o t h i n g . Of no r e l a t i on . Bet rayal o f t h a t r e l a t i on
t h a t c a n on ly b e b e t r a y e d . Be t raya l o f t h a t " n o e t h i c s " t h a t
f in i tude is. For I am t h a t f ini tude t h a t defines a n d the re fo re
escapes m e . T h a t i s w h a t m a k e s e th ica l i n t en t iona l i t y an ex
p o s u r e . T h e r e i s no rea l izab le r e l a t ion t o t h e o t h e r t h a t w o u l d
be e th ica l t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h . T h e r e will on ly have been a
f ic t ioned, imag ined re l a t ion—frag i l e as an imag e is fragile,
u n g r a s p a b l e , unpossess ib le—a real i ty m a d e up o f n o t h i n g n e s s .
O u t s i d e a n y par t i cu la r , defined re la t ion to the o ther , t he r e i s
th is e x p o s u r e t o " n o re la t ion a t a l l " t h a t i s an obsess ion w i t h
Autrui a n d t h a t bo th o r ien t s a n d escapes m e . In the e n d th is
r e l a t ion is f ini tude itself; b u t i t is r ead by Levinas as s o m e t h i n g
l ike e th ics .
No One Other
D i a c h r o n y i s t h e re fusa l o f c o n j u n c t i o n , t h e n o n -
to t a l i zab l e , a n d , in this sense, infinite. But in t h e re
spons ib i l i ty for the o ther , for a n o t h e r f r e e d o m , the
negat iv i ty of this ana rchy , this refusal of t h e p re sen t ,
o f a p p e a r i n g , o f the i m m e m o r i a l , c o m m a n d s me a n d
o r d a i n s m e t o the other , t o the f i r s t o n e o n t h e scene ,
a n d m a k e s m e a p p r o a c h h i m , m a k e s m e his ne ighbor .
I I \ I I J ;\ s s I I I I I ( S .» .">
Ii diverges from nothingness as well as from be ing. It
provokes t ins responsibility against my will , t h a t is,
by substituting me for the o the r as a hos tage . All my
inwardness is invested in the form of a desp i t e -me , for-
a not her. Despi te me for a n o t h e r is s ignif icat ion p a r
excel lence . And it is the sense of the "onesel f ," t h a t
u i usative that der ives f rom no n o m i n a t i v e ; it is t h e
very l a d of finding myself whi le losing myself.
11 a d i a c h r o n i e , c 'est le refus de la c o n j o n c t i o n , le n o n -
to ta l i sab le et , en ce sens préc is , Infini. M a i s d a n s la
r esponsab i l i t é p o u r A u t r u i — p o u r une a u t r e l i b e r t é —
la négat iv i té de cet te a n a r c h i e , de ce refus o p p o s é au
p re sen t ,—à l ' a p p a r a î t r e — d e l ' i m m é m o r i a l , m e c o m
m a n d e e t m ' o r d o n n e à A u t r u i , au p r e m i e r v e n u , e t
m ' a p p r o c h e de lui , me le r e n d p r o c h a i n — s ' é c a r t e a insi
d u n é a n t c o m m e d e l ' ê t re , p r o v o q u a n t c o n t r e m o n gré
i et te responsabi l i t é , c 'es t -à-dire me s u b s t i t u a n t c o m m e
( >tage à Au t ru i . T o u t e m o n in t imi té s ' investi t en c o n t r e -
inon-g ré—pour -un-au t r e . M a l g r é mo i , p o u r - u n - a u t r e —
v( >ilà la signification par excellence et le sens du so i -même,
du se—accusatif ne dé r ivan t d ' a u c u n nomina t i f—le fait
m ê m e de se r e t r o u v e r en se p e r d a n t . ] 6
Radica l d i a c h r o n y (or d i a c h r o n y w i t h o u t a n y s y n c h r o n y )
i Hi i w s us to a p p r o a c h the an ter ior i ty or refus oppose au present
thai defines Levinas 's e th ics . We m a y c o m p a r e th is to impe r i -
i I U S superegoic guil t , b u t the invo lvemen t descr ibed a b o v e does
11« it der ive f rom my pe r sona l a n d repressed h i s to ry of des i res .
I >i.u h r o n y t h a t e ludes all s y n c h r o n y is ins tead the t r ace of t h e
I >ther in me , bu t " o l d e r " t h a n the moi. Th i s is c lear ly no e th -
|< | I migh t ever u n d e r s t a n d or t heo r i ze , for it is a b o v e me a n d
Dl ior to me . I am " i t s " e c h o . I t o r d e r s me a n d I do n o t even
obey it. M o r e precisely, I am ordered, I am oriented, I iim
schemat i zed such that I am obligated to the lirst o t h e r 1 can
f ind. O n e m a y say, b e y o n d Freud and near to I leidegger, t h a t
i t t h r o w s me , -jects m e , or casts me before the o ther a n d o the r s .
Th i s e th ics , t h e n , i s " o l d e r " t h a n my self a n d i t i s d i s p r o
p o r t i o n a t e to my p o w e r s . It is forever s t r ange . I shal l never
h a v e t h e m e a s u r e o f i t n o r equa l its d e m a n d . N o m o r a l i t y c a n
c o n t a i n this " o t h e r w i s e " t h a n me a n d there fore all my m o r a l
ity is in q u e s t i o n . It d e m a n d s a N i e t z s c h e a n af f i rmat ion: a
g o i n g - u n d e r or an Untergeworfenbeit ( to c o m b i n e N i e t z s c h e
w i t h H e i d e g g e r for a m o m e n t ) t h a t will be my sub- jec t ion to
Autrui. Th i s sub-ject , to be su re , i s n o t t h e m o d e r n C a r t e s i a n
subjec t de l inea ted by He idegger , 7 b u t is ins tead a r ad i ca l n a -
scence t ha t w i t h d r a w s from essence a n d is ex t rac ted from being.
Th i s subjec t ion goes "all t he w a y to the l augh te r t h a t refuses
l a n g u a g e [ ju squ ' au r i re qui refuse Ie l a n g a g e ] . " 8
Eth ics , for Lev inas , i s a c o m m a n d t h a t c a n n o t be reca l led ,
t h a t i s o l a m i c , fo rgo t t en . I t i s t he forget t ing t h a t h o l d s me
h o s t a g e t o t h e O t h e r a n d t h a t c o n s t r a i n s m e b e y o n d m y p o w
ers a n d my ini t ia t ive . Th i s fo rge t t ing i s b e y o n d me for the
s imple r e a s o n t h a t i t i s n o t in my p o w e r to forget (no o n e i s
" a b l e " to forget ; forge t t ing is precisely a lapse in o u r abi l i ty to
r e m e m b e r ) . T h u s , f o r g e t t i n g t a k e s m e o u t s i d e ego i ty . I t
denuc l ea t e s the ego , s t r ipp ing i t n u d e . I am or ig ina l ly a t h i rd -
p e r s o n neute r w h o m / forget (because forgett ing, ou t s ide egoity,
is a fo rge t t ing of the one who forgets ; t h e " s u b j e c t " of the
forget t ing r ema ins a lways a n o n y m o u s a n d i s t h u s p reeminen t ly
fo rge t t ab le ) . My re l a t ion to the O t h e r p r i o r to my self is , a s i t
w e r e , c o n t r a c t e d by this o n e w h o i s fo rgo t t en , a n d w h o for
ge ts . A n d t h e r e l a t ion he (the a n o n y m o u s il, t h e N e u t e r ) c o n
t r ac t s i s l ikewise fo rgo t t en , a l o n g w i th the O t h e r .
I t cal ls then f rom my preh is to ry , f rom before my or ig in ,
f rom a n i m m e m o r i a l t ime w h e n I , i n m y " e x t r e m e y o u t h , " a m
I I V I N A S ' S I I I I I I '.
not yei present, Il Calls and il is / / , i.e., no one tha t can be
I- m iu 11 an ( )| her beyond my p o w e r s ol iileiil ilical ion. T h e r e
in! e h (or, //) is thai from which I cannot distinguish myself.
The very a n o n y m i t y ol Autrui is w h a t is so c o m m a n d i n g , so
Imperious, so c o n f o u n d i n g . Precisely no one c o m m a n d s m e ,
no one a i all , and therefore no one f rom w h o m I can s epa ra t e
myself. N o t h i n g ob l iga tes me a n d therefore I c a n n o t d i s t ance
mysell from o b l i g a t i o n — f o r I am it. I am o r d e r e d , I am ob l i
q u e d , m shor t : / am Autrui. It is b e y o n d my p o w e r to d is t in
guish myself from this a n o n y m i t y a n d t h u s the ident i f ica t ion—
the election or the subs t i t u t ion—wi l l a l ready have t a k e n p lace .
Il is / w h o cal ls , t h a t is to say, no one other.9
You see, respons ib i l i ty for Levinas is just th is u n p o w e r of
Identif ication p r io r t o myself, p r io r t o any des i re , t o a n y m o -
live or in teres t , to any empi r i c gui l t . For Levinas I am on ly
Insofar as I am other, on ly insofar as I am ident i f ied/subst i -
tuted for this o ther , th is no o n e , this no o n e o the r t h a n I . H e n c e
I lie e n i g m a , the " k n o t [ n œ u d ] " in ipseity t ha t p h i l o s o p h y is
forced to t h i n k . 1 0 T h e O t h e r obsesses me because I am t h a t
Other , w h o i s no o n e , no other , no one o t h e r t h a n my self
/ / ell . As Levinas p u t s it: " [ T ] h e psyche in the soul is the o t h e r
m me , a m a l a d y of ident i ty , b o t h accused a n d self, t h e s a m e
lor the other , t h e s a m e by t h e o t h e r [le p sych i sme de l ' âme ,
« est l ' au t re en m o i ; m a l a d i e de l ' i den t i t é—accusée et soi, le
même p o u r l ' au t r e , m ê m e p a r l ' a u t r e ] . " 1 1
Fthics , in Levinas 's sense , is the very event of the self. It
(ethics, the self) h a p p e n s to m e , as m e . T h e self (a lways al-
icady involved w i t h the O t h e r ) c o m e s t o m e f rom a n ou t s i de
all I he m o r e ex te r io r in t h a t it p recedes a n y inter ior i ty . A ver-
t ig inous in te rpe l l a t ion fo rms the en igma t i c " k n o t " t h a t i s the
.eli or the ipse. Radica l ly o u t s i d e , p r io r to any ins ide , th is
Identif ication, this trauma, is just as radical ly " f o r g o t t e n . " Yet,
II is me: in m e / b e y o n d m e . I incarnate t h a t w h i c h calls me to
.Ì n
myself. That is why Lévinas can say thai ethics "is the b r e a k u p
of t h e o r ig inary unity of t r anscenden ta l a p p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t is,
i t is t he b e y o n d of expe r i ence [c 'est l ' éc l a t ement de l 'un i té
o r ig ina i re de P a p e r c e p t i o n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e — c ' e s t - à - d i r e l ' au -
delà de l ' e x p é r i e n c e ] . " 1 2 1 a m , a s i t w e r e , cons t i t u t iona l ly u n
able n o t to a n o n y m o u s l y i n c a r n a t e al teri ty, a n d he re , in a
s t r ange way, an ethics is i n s c r i b e d — a n d exscribed. T h e self is
respons ib i l i ty i n c a r n a t e . T h e very a n o n y m i t y of a l te r i ty—its
n o t h i n g n e s s , if y o u wi l l—is the impossibility of my indiffer
ence to it. All t he ego 's p o w e r s of (oedipal ) ident i f ica t ion a n d
c o m p r e h e n s i o n are s h a d o w e d by this a n t e r i o r u n p o w e r .
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Lev inas de
scr ibes a subject ivi ty t h a t precisely w i t h d r a w s f rom a u t o m a n i
festat ion, a n d he character izes this w i t h d r a w a l — o r , as he migh t
say, th is h u m i l i t y — a s the very autrement qu'être t h a t e thics
" i s . " T h e Lev inas ian subject e ludes t h a t w h i c h i s essent ia l t o
subject ivi ty: self-certain p resence to self in e i ther its C a r t e s i o -
H e i d e g g e r i a n con f inemen t to ( a u t o ) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 1 3 o r its r e
t r e n c h m e n t , after M i c h e l Henry , a s a u t o a f f e c t i o n . 1 4 Th i s nove l
subjec t of Levinas 's w i t h d r a w s , t h e n , f rom the very c o n c e p t of
subject ivi ty i n t o an e n i g m a t h a t m a k e s t h e r e t e n t i o n o f the
w o r d a b u s i v e . T h a t w h i c h is, for Lev inas , hypokeimenon,
unde r ly ing , o r sub- jacen t i s t h a t w h i c h en te r s in to no p r e sen t
a t all a n d is t h u s b e y o n d specu la t ion . A s t r ange subject . An
ima ge of the subject , o n e is t e m p t e d to say. A s t r ange subjec t
s t r ange to itself since i t i s a lways on the " h i t h e r s i d e " of r ep re
s e n t a t i o n , b u t n o t pure ly a n d s imply absen t . I t i s its ave r s ion
to l ight . I t i s " a n e x t r e m e shynes s , " as Levinas says s o m e
w h e r e . O u t s i d e a n y c o n c e p t of it, i t i s e x p o s e d , v u l n e r a b l e ,
n a k e d . It is who I am a n d it is no t , or n o t s imply, my vulner
abi l i ty t o d i s a p p e a r a n c e — t o d e a t h , t o my inabi l i ty t o be t he re
a n y m o r e . Th i s subject , as Levinas never t i res of te l l ing us , is
n o t des t ined to appear , a n d i s foreign to a n y " p l a c e in t h e
I I V I IN A S S I ' I I I I i . s
.mi " ii is p . H alyzed: always already no longer able to be there
a n y m o r e . It is, as Levinas tells us (in w o r d s tha t should r emind
US ol his descr ip t ion oi the work of a r t ) , a "dea th - l i ke pass iv-
iiv [une passivi té à m o r t | . " l s I t " i s " n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n th i s
M I I r ender o f man i f e s t a t i on . T h e O t h e r occupies its p lace fully,
insis t ing on the subject 's r e m o v a l f rom its o w n m a n i f e s t a t i o n .
For Levinas , the self is "a deposing of the ego, less than
m >il>ing as uniqueness {dé-position du Moi, le moins que rien
COmtne unicité]."16 A c c o r d i n g to Levinas , I have a l w a y s al-
ready a b a n d o n e d all for-myselfness. I do n o t first es tab l i sh for
myself a p lace in the sun a n d t h e n , as a m o n a d i c A r c h i m e d e a n
po in t , fall in w i t h o t h e r s in one w a y or ano the r . Subject ivi ty
here is n o t h i n g b u t a p r i m o r d i a l de lay b e h i n d the O the r . T h i s
is absolute pass ivi ty (i.e., n o t re la t ive to a n y activity, b u t p a s
sivity abso lu t i zed as o t h e r t h a n , o r o v e r w h e l m i n g , t h e differ
ence be tween act ive a n d pass ive) .
T h e W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c a l sub jec t , t h e n , a c c o r d i n g t o
Levinas , h a d been incor rec t ly c o n c e p t u a l i z e d . I t w a s never
m e a n t t o c o m e t o p re sence , a n d the re fo re i t w a s m e a n t en
tirely for t h e O t h e r w h o shall e ternal ly p recede it. T h e subjec t
w o u l d b e forever d e v o t e d t o a n ob l iga t ion t h a t w o u l d forever
exceed it, s ince this ob l iga t i on w o u l d define the infer ior i ty i t
is. The crisis in to w h i c h m o d e r n i t y h a d fallen, the crisis of the
absence o f f o u n d a t i o n s , t he discovery t h a t there w a s no g r o u n d
b e n e a t h o u r feet, w a s no crisis a t al l . I t w a s the be la ted d iscov
ery of a beneficence t h a t h a d e n r a p t u r e d us b e y o n d ourse lves .
( )ur very inabi l i ty to " u n i t e all t h e facu l t i es" a n d to p r e sen t
ourse lves to ourse lves in the full l ight of a k n o w i n g w a s , in
fact, a "go lden o p p o r t u n i t y " to o v e r t u r n all t h ink ing t h a t or igi
na tes subject ivi ty in a u t o m a n i f e s t a t i o n or a u t o a f f e c t i o n . 1 7
T h e ph i l o soph i ca l obsess ion w i t h the subject b r o u g h t us ,
despi te ourselves a n d despite our anguish , face-to-face, n o t w i t h
ourse lves , b u t w i t h a n a l ter i ty t h a t w o u l d infinitely p o s t p o n e
autonomy. An extreme humility and an unprecedented ethics
h a d ru ined the g r a n d epoch of the Subject and its maniacal
s t r iv ing after itself. O n l y the l anguage of ethics w o u l d be equal
to th is abyss in to w h i c h the h u m a n sciences had fallen. Even
t h e l a n g u a g e of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , w h i c h p r o m i s e d a C o p e r n i -
c a n r e v o l u t i o n t ha t w o u l d u n d e r m i n e all t h i n k i n g f o u n d e d in
a C a r t e s i a n Cogito, h a d s l ipped i n t o m y t h a n d h a d r e m a i n e d
i m p r i s o n e d by a classical s c h e m a of t h e subject . As N a n c y
a n d L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e (and la ter Borch - Jacobsen) h a v e m a d e
clear, t he ego's s h a d o w r e m a i n e d , in psychoana lys i s f rom Freud
t o L a c a n , a n o t h e r ego b e h i n d the ego , a n d b e l o w the subject
t h e r e l u r k e d a n o t h e r sub jec t—of des i re (or even, of a desire to
be a s u b j e c t ) . 1 8 O n l y the l a n g u a g e of e thics w o u l d be ab le to
say t h a t t h a t w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y w a s u n a b l e t o p r e s e n t t o itself
w a s n o t m e a n t t o be p r e s e n t e d a t al l . T h e n e w ethical subjec t
w o u l d r e m a i n offstage, in t h e s h a d o w s , en deqa du temps, a n d
w o u l d suffer affectively all t h a t t h e ego w o u l d c o n t r a c t in all
its a d v e n t u r e s in the w o r l d . E th ica l subject ivi ty is infinite vu l
nerabi l i ty . T h e absence of f o u n d a t i o n w a s in fact a l r e a d y a
r a p p o r t . T h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a n e x p o s u r e t o t h e O t h e r in ter
r u p t i n g a n y beg inn ing . Aga ins t all o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d pre ju
d ices , t he subject w a s n o t a g r o u n d a t all . I t w a s u n p o w e r a n d
w e a k n e s s , a n d this is the case for a s imple a n d even b a n a l
r e a s o n : the self does n o t fo rm itself. I t h a s no abi l i ty a t all
un t i l t he o t h e r a n d o t h e r s in te rvene a n d b r ing i t i n t o exis t
ence . T h e self i s an a b s o l u t e dependency , a n d its d e p e n d e n c y
is an i n e x h a u s t i b l e potentia.
The Self
T h e oneself c a n n o t fo rm itself; i t i s a l r e a d y fo rmed
w i t h an a b s o l u t e passivity. In th is sense i t i s t h e v ic t im
I I V I N A S ' S I I I I I * S
ol a persecution that paralyses any a s s u m p t i o n that
i mild awaken il so thai il wou ld posit itself for-itself.
I his passivity is thai ol an a t t a c h m e n t that has a l r eady
been m a d e , as something i rreversibly pas t , p r io r to all
memory and recall . I t w a s m a d e in an i r r écupé rab l e
n ine which the p resen t , r ep resen ted in recal l , does n o t
e q u a l , in a t ime of b i r th or c r ea t i on , of w h i c h n a t u r e
or c r e a t i o n r e t a i n s a t r a c e , u n c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o a
memory .
[Le s o i - m ê m e ne p e u t p a s se faire, i l est déjà fait de
pa s s iv i t é a b s o l u e , e t , d a n s c e s e n s , v i c t i m e d ' u n e
persécu t ion p a r a l y s a n t t o u t e a s s u m p t i o n qui p o u r r a i t
s'éveiller en lui p o u r le pose r pour soi , pass iv i té de
l ' a t t a c h e m e n t déjà n o u é e c o m m e i r r é v e r s i b l e m e n t
passée , en deçà de t o u t e m é m o i r e , de t o u t r a p p e l .
N o u é e d a n s un t e m p s i r r é c u p é r a b l e q u e l e p r é s e n t ,
r ep résen té d a n s l e r a p p e l n ' éga le p a s , d a n s un t e m p s
de la naissance ou de la c réa t ion d o n t n a t u r e ou c réa tu re
g a r d e une t r a c e , inconver t ib le en s o u v e n i r . ] 1 9
The self, enigmat ica l ly , " su f fe r s " itself. It is a w o u n d t h a t
does not heal. Before myself, p r ior to any desire to be , an te r io r
lo any objectivity, to any d i s t ance or any t ime—li te ra l ly ex
nihilo—the self h a p p e n s to m e . T h e self, t h e ipse , t h e who t h a t
I am (as o p p o s e d to the w h a t ) is formed. I t is m a d e , f a sh ioned ,
bego t t en , wi l led, f ict ioned. Us ing the l a n g u a g e of Lev inas , i t is
w< i imded a n d pe r secu ted . T h e O t h e r h a s access to me before I
d o . In-myself, I am a w e a k n e s s a n d a dependency . A supp le
ment , in De r r ida ' s sense, is r e q u i r e d for me to be a s o m e o n e
and thus the subject c a n n o t be t h o u g h t ou t s ide différance. T h e
l u p p l e m e n t i s a t r a u m a t h a t p recedes the c o n s t i t u t e d ego a n d
therefore p recedes all m e m o r y a n d r ep res s ion . A " f o r g e t t i n g "
precedes all remembering and .1 contact with the outside pre
cedes all interiority. The ego proper—the formed, h o u n d e d ,
hea l thy , a r t i cu la t ed iden t i ty—is no t its o w n . I t receives itself
f rom w i t h o u t itself (in every sense) . A n t e r i o r to be ing - fo rmed ,
i t is n o t . I t is und i f fe ren t ia ted , p u r e e x t e r i o r i t y — n o t even t h e
f r a g m e n t a t i o n of an u n k n o w n e m b o d i m e n t . I t is It—no o n e ,
n o t h i n g . Its self i s b o r r o w e d , ea t en , a b s o r b e d f rom o t h e r s . Its
self proper is n o t its o w n , for in-itself it is a " n o n - q u i d d i t y , no
o n e , c lo thed in pure ly b o r r o w e d being , w h i c h m a k e s i t a n a m e
less s i ngu la r i t y by c o n f e r r i n g on i t a ro l e [ n o n - q u i d d i t é —
p e r s o n n e — r e v ê t u e d ' u n ê t re de p u r e m p r u n t , qui m a s q u e s a
s ingu la r i t é sans n o m en lui c o n f é r a n t un r ô l e ] . " 2 0 T h e oneself
itself i s no o n e (s ingular a n d undi f fe ren t ia ted) w h o i s s o m e
o n e (a self, b u t a b o r r o w e d or s to len o n e — a s o m e o n e O t h e r
w h o for t h a t r e a s o n s inks i n t o i m m e m o r i a l i t y i n the p re -h i s -
t o r y of the subject ) . Autrement qu'être is the be ing - fo rmed , or
the vu lne rab i l i ty to the Othe r , " o l d e r " t h a n the ego a n d al
w a y s jus t p r i o r to a n y self-presence. Being-crea ted i s the in
c a r n a t i o n t h a t is the self. T h e self does n o t identify, i t is iden
tified w i t h an ident i f icat ion t h a t r e m a i n s a l w a y s jus t a n t e r i o r
to t h e self. T h e self does n o t cons i s t of t h a t to w h i c h i t agrees
(as C. S. Peirce a rgues ) . It consis ts of its abso lu t e ly pass ive
be ing - fo rmed w h i c h m a k e s poss ib le its ( a m b i g u o u s ) abi l i ty to
identify w i t h o the r s a n d a lso t o imi ta te t h e m .
I t is by w a y of this " k n o t " in subject ivi ty t h a t Levinas is
ab le to speak the l a n g u a g e of e thics a n d say t h a t t h e subject i s
i n c a r n a t e d as e th ica l , w h e t h e r we like i t or n o t . Subject ivi ty is
r espons ib i l i ty - fo r - the -o ther a n d the O t h e r i s invo lved in s u b
jectivity like a p lay of l imits . T h r o u g h this stricto sensu un
th inkab le en igma , he can say t h a t the h u m a n is no t a t all wolfish
b u t is, f r o m t h e beg inn ing , fo r - the-o ther because its self c o m e s
from t he o t h e r w h o t h u s r o b s t h e subject of all for-itselfness.
(Keep this i n m i n d a s we c o n c l u d e the c h a p t e r on A g a m b e n ,
L E V I N A S s I I I I I 1 S I )
for Ins poli t ics a lso relies on a p r imord ia l " thef t . " ) W h a t " r e
m a i n s " of me a l te r this t r a u m a is an excep t iona l ob l iga t ion to
the O t h e r w h o m 1, in fact, i nca rna t e . O n l y a b r u s q u e resen t
m e n t aga ins t the very mot i f of p r i m o r d i a l passivi ty c o u l d p o s
sibly ignore w h a t is in fact a c o m m o n p l a c e of h u m a n exis t
ence . No o n e i s b o r n in to the w o r l d f rom o u t o f one ' s o w n
self.
T h i s e n i g m a t i c b i r th , i n c a r n a t i o n , a n d i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h
o t h e r s p r io r to myself, th is ver t ig inous ident i f icat ion, a c c o u n t s
for, a m o n g o t h e r t h ings , t he insis tence of a n a r c h y in all hu
m a n in tersubjec t iv i ty a n d a lso the h y p e r b o l o g i c t h a t gove rns
the ego 's supe rego ic gui l t . T h a t is, since i t is precisely " m y
self" t h a t I o w e to the O t h e r and o t h e r s , only complete be ing-
for - the -o ther (or, as Levinas s o m e t i m e s calls it, " m a t e r n i t y " )
c a n a n s w e r to t h e d e m a n d " i n s i d e " me . But a s i t will a l w a y s
be / w h o am f o r - t h e - o t h e r , a r e m a i n d e r or t r a c e of for-
myselfness i s u n e r a d i c a b l e , no m a t t e r h o w nob le o r "self less"
I t ry to b e . H e n c e , " t h e m o r e just I a m , the m o r e gui l ty I am
[plus je suis jus te—plus je suis c o u p a b l e ] . " 2 1 In his way , Levinas
h a s d e c o n s t r u c t e d t h e m y s t e r i o u s a u t h o r i t y o f F r e u d i a n
supe rego ic gui l t by p lac ing i t ou t s ide its my th ic oed ipa l t r i an -
g u l a t i o n . I t i s n o t s o m e f igure , s o m e p e r s o n , f rom the subject 's
p a s t t h a t h a s in te rna l ly m o d e l e d a n d modif ied the subjec t .
Levinas ian Autrui will never have been identified yet will never
be w i t h o u t ident i ty , for I am Autrui myself, a n d ou t s ide th is
ident i f ica t ion , I am N O T H I N G . N o t even des i re . A n d the re
fore , I a m , in myself, a n x i o u s l y unf igurable a n d a n - a r c h i c .
Strangely, pa radox ica l ly , b u t perfect ly r igorous ly , my very self
i s b e y o n d m e , i s w i t h o u t essence , i s o t h e r w i s e t h a n (my) be
ing. T h e self is faire: b o r n , b e g o t t e n , i n c a r n a t e d - a s - m o d e l e d ,
c o p i e d , e c h o e d , r epea t ed . A n a n o n y m o u s mimes i s p recedes
a n d p e r m a n e n t l y e rodes all identi ty. My be ing i s n o t my o w n .
It is be ing-possessed , be ing-cas t (in bo th senses: like a die is
t h r o w n , anil as it cast into sonic role in a drama). Usui)', the
l a n g u a g e of Heidegger , we w o u l d say that, lor Levinas , Mit-
sein is rigorously cor re la t ive wi th Da-sein a n d Da-sein's a n x i
ety (which s u b t e n d s all its on t i c affects) is precisely its los tness
in das Man s ince, ou t s i de its los tness , it is n o t h i n g .
I am h a u n t e d , a l t e r ed—but by no o n e , no father, no mother .
I am h a u n t e d by no one o the r t h a n myself. Th i s i s my un
g r o u n d e d , abyssa l , endless passivity. My self c o m e s to me a s
the very event of my be ing a n d the re fore , as cas t , I am ex
p o s e d t o , a n d p e r m e a t e d by, al teri ty. M i s s i n g f rom m e , t h e
ho le in my be ing t h a t Hege lo -Ko jevean psychoana lys i s after
L a c a n insists o n , is no t , as is said, my self. T h e self is Other,
n o t l ack ing . W h a t is " l a c k i n g , " i f t h a t i s the w o r d for it , i s t he
for-itselfness p r o p e r to the self. T h e self is an o t h e r (je est un
autre) a n d there fore is never for-itself, b u t is "despite-i tself-
fo r -ano the r . "
We m a y recognize in this f o r m i d a b l e e n i g m a t h e insp i ra
t i o n for M i k k e l B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ' s i n c e s s a n t c o r r e c t i o n o f
F reud ' s n o t i o n of p r i m a r y ident i f icat ion. In The Freudian Sub
ject, B o r c h - j a c o b s e n is ab le to p o i n t o u t , by ident i fying i n n u
m e r a b l e a p o r i a s in F reud ' s logic a n d ana lyses , t h a t , desp i te
the s t u b b o r n l y held n o t i o n of an a b s o l u t e N a r c i s s u s , t h e r e i s
no subjec t prior to " i t s " ident i f ica t ions . T h e ego itself t h e n
w o u l d be b o t h a n d ne i ther itself a n d other , or, as B o r c h - J a c o b -
sen so nicely p u t s it, w o u l d be a point d'autrui: a h y p n o t i c a n d
s o m n a m b u l i s t i c c o n t r a c t i o n o f o t h e r n e s s i n t o s a m e n e s s . 2 2
H e n c e m y undec idab i l i ty w i t h regard t o myse l f—my deb t s a n d
my gui l t , my p a r a n o i a a n d my endless r ivalr ies w i t h o t h e r s .
B o r c h - j a c o b s e n i s able to s h o w t h a t t h a t a t w h i c h p s y c h o
ana lys i s a i m e d — t h e ind iv idua l , t he e g o — w a s w i t h o u t a self
o f its o w n , w a s " w i t h o u t q u a l i t i e s . " 2 3 T h e ego h a d n o be ing o f
its o w n a n d this led B o r c h - j a c o b s e n to lead F r e u d ine luc tab ly
f rom ind iv idua l to social psychology. For I t ( the id, t he un -
I I V I N A S ' S E I 11 I I S
consc ious ) began to resemble n o t h i n g so m u c h as a c r o w d , a
p r imord i a l a n a r c h i c b a n d . T h e id, hav ing no be ing of its o w n ,
like the c r o w d or h o r d e , i s a l w a y s a l r eady in-itself ou t s ide -
itself. It is formlessness "itself" a n d it is a t h r e a t of formless
ness , a t h r e a t of the d i s so lu t ion of the social b o n d .
W h a t B o r c h - j a c o b s e n c o n c l u d e s , o r forces F r e u d t o c o n
c l u d e , is t h a t I t ( the id, t he unconsc ious ) is n o t a n o t h e r subjec t
(of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) b u r i e d i n r e p r e s s i o n a n d s p e a k i n g i n
h i e r o g l y p h s , b u t i s i n s t ead n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e n a s c e n t
i ncomple t i on a n d the or iginal passivi ty of the ego itself. H e n c e
fo r th , he c o n c l u d e s , t he re c o u l d be no r i g o r o u s F r e u d i a n dis
t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ind iv idua l a n d social psychology , b e t w e e n
S a m e a n d Othe r . To use the l a n g u a g e o f Lev inas , t h e n o n p l a c e
(non-lieu) w h e r e I e n c o u n t e r the O t h e r (Autrui) in a p a s t im
m e m o r i a l , ou t s i de c o n c e p t s , is precisely myself itself.
T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t the O t h e r h a s been r e d u c e d t o
t h e S a m e . W h a t Levinas a rgues , a n d w h a t B o r c h - j a c o b s e n
br i l l iant ly exp lo i t s in his r ead ing of F r e u d , is t h a t t h e S a m e is
no longe r itself. I t i s " in q u e s t i o n . " Levinas h a s a l l o w e d us to
r e a d t h e S a m e as p u r e rad ica l e x p o s u r e to al teri ty, a s infil
t r a t e d by alterity. In his i n t roduc t i on to Borch-Jacobsen ' s b o o k ,
F ranco i s R o u s t a n g says, concisely, t h a t subject ivi ty i s radica l ly
a l t e red a n d " is never itself e x c e p t because i t i s a l t e red , be
c a u s e i t is o t h e r to itself, because i t is its o w n other , a l t h o u g h
i t i s never ab le to r ep resen t t h a t o t h e r to i tse l f ." 2 4 A n d this wil l
forever p r ecede all its dia lect ical a d v e n t u r e s . O u t s i d e its b i r th ,
i t is n o t an i m m a n e n c e invisible to itself (as in a Hege l ian fo rmu
la t ion) . T h e self i s no one , no th ing—al ready both wi th and wi th
o u t r a p p o r t w i th the Other . As supplemented , the self is s c h e m a
t ized , o r d e r e d , ca tegor ized as fo r - the-o ther or as (the) rapport
itself. But , th is r a p p o r t is a c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h no o n e since
t h e O t h e r is i n c a r n a t e d in t h e self, as t h e self. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e
r a p p o r t r e m a i n s . I t is never repressed . I t is imag ina ry .
So, il Levinas has given us a n y t h i n g to think u is this: there
i s no sociality, no c o m m u n i t y , no c o m m u n i c a t i o n , no d i a logue
n o r dialect ic t h a t is unaffected by a n o t h i n g n e s s , an a n o n y m
ity, a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d hence a d i s p r o p o r t i o n , a p a n i c , a res t
lessness or a de l i r ium at the h e a r t of w h i c h the re is a subjec t in
une passivité à mort.
Impasse
As a resu l t of its o r i g ina ry passivity, of its be ing
f o r m e d , the self is de layed " b e h i n d " itself. But , as i t is n o t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n its passivity, we m u s t conce ive of the self as de lay
itself, o r — t i m e . Like the w o r k of a r t , t h e t e m p o r a l i t y of the
self is w i t h o u t a p resen t . As m o d e l e d or d o u b l e d or e c h o e d
f rom t h e Othe r , t he self is " o r i g i n a l l y " a r ecu r r ence to self.
T h e de lay is , in t h e l a n g u a g e of e th ics , an o r ig ina ry politesse,
or an "af ter y o u , sir." T h e self i s be la ted , beh ind the O t h e r
a n d a n s w e r i n g to the O t h e r w h o p recedes it. Ex n ih i lo I r e
s p o n d to the O t h e r before even h e a r i n g t h e Othe r , before rec
ogn iz ing the O t h e r as o ther . I am t h u s ind i s t i ngu i shab le f rom
t h a t O the r .
In spi te o f w h a t Levinas says he re a n d t h e r e , t h e r e c a n be
no reve la t ion o f this " h i t h e r s i de" o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e p a s
sivity a n d vu lnerab i l i ty Levinas insists on a re o t h e r t h a n I ,
o t h e r t h a n s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s in my p o w e r to a c c o m p l i s h . I c a n
no m o r e f o r m my self t h a n I c a n forget my self. L ike forget
t ing , be ing - fo rmed is a lapse in power . Th i s l aps ing is t h e radi
cal d i a c h r o n y of w h i c h we h a v e a l r eady s p o k e n : d i a c h r o n y
w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n y or, t o say t h e s a m e th ing , d i a c h r o n y a s
p e r p e t u a l defect ion f rom the p resen t . T h e self as th is de lay is
sub jec ted t o the O t h e r a n d t h u s c a n n o t resist be ing-a l t e red
s ince i t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n be ing-a l te red . Subject ivi ty (be ing
l i v l N A s ' s E T H I C S
Subjected to the Other) is a d iv id ing ol the past from the fu ture
bin wi thou t pass ing in to a present . Subjectivity, in Levinas ' s
sense , i s t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f rom " b e t w e e n " pas t a n d fu
t u r e . I t i s t ime w i t h o u t a n y " n o w " p o i n t , i f t h a t is i m a g i n a b l e .
Ins tead of a " n o w " p o i n t t he r e is a point d'autrui—a p o i n t of
ins tabi l i ty a n d d i s so lu t ion . Subjectivity, in th is sense , i s t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f the difference b e t w e e n Same a n d O the r , t he
b r e a k d o w n of intersubject ivi ty , a n d a p r o x i m i t y to the O t h e r
ou t s i de of, or e v a c u a t e d of, any p resence . T h e imposs ib i l i ty of
indifference we s p o k e of earl ier is the fact t h a t , in a real case ,
w e c a n n o t d o u b t t h a t a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s i n p a i n ( to b o r r o w
f rom Wi t tgens te in ' s w o r k for a m o m e n t ) . I t is a fact t h a t gives
no i n f o r m a t i o n , no c o n t e n t , no ethical f o rmu la . I t i s an affect,
b u t an affect w i t h o u t a self, for I am t he o t h e r f rom w h o s e
suffering I c a n n o t d i s t ance myself by d o u b t i n g . But I do n o t
identify w i t h t h a t sufferer as s o m e o n e in par t icu lar . I identify,
very m u c h to the con t r a ry , insofar as the sufferer is not o the r -
t h a n - I , is not a l ter ego . T h a t is, I identify insofar as t h e o t h e r
i s precisely no o n e in par t icu la r , i s b e y o n d himself a n d is n o t
e q u a l to his suffering. / identify with the other precisely to the
extent that the other is anonymous, and thus I identify with
no one. I t is on ly w i t h g rea t difficulty t h a t we c a n say, w i t h
Lev inas , t h a t an " e t h i c s " or a " h i t h e r s i d e " i s revea led he re ,
t h a t a respons ib i l i ty or an ob l iga t i on i s b o r n he r e . We c a n jus t
as easily say t h a t n o t h i n g i s revea led here . T h a t w h i c h the
sufferer a n d I share or have in c o m m o n — o u r " c o m m o n sub
ject ivi ty" as Bataille pu ts i t (or ou r be ing- in -common, as N a n c y
says)—is precisely N O T H I N G . N o b o n d . N o ethics. N o mora l s .
A n d i t is precisely to N O T H I N G tha t I c a n n o t r ema in indif
ferent. T h e other, the sufferer, can d rag m e , despite myself, i n to
t h a t N O T H I N G t h a t w e " s h a r e . " T h e affect t h e n , w o u l d be ,
as B l a n c h o t p u t s it, an " e x p e r i e n c e of n o n e x p e r i e n c e , " o r an
I 11 1 \ \ T '
i ncomple t e exper ience , or an exper ience <>l the n o n c o m p l e t i o n
t h a t I myself a m , t h a t the self is.
Fo r Levinas , this i ncomple t enes s is myse l f—or is given to
m e a s t h a t w h i c h s ingular izes m e a n d calls m e t o myself a n d
to my responsibi l i ty . I t cal ls m e , in the e n d , to " t h e m a t i z a t i o n ,
t h o u g h t , h i s t o r y , a n d i n s c r i p t i o n [ t h é m a t i s a t i o n , p e n s é e ,
h i s to i re e t é c r i t u r e ] . " 2 5 In o t h e r w o r d s , l ike the self, w i t h the
self, as t he self, ethics is born ex n ih i lo—from its o w n absence.
Ethics is b o r n from the absence of any p rope r subjective re la
t ion . I t i s b o r n from anxiety. F r o m finitude. The re is N O T H I N G
t h a t f o u n d s the social o r d e r a n d t h a t i s the incessan t m u r m u r
ing I " h e a r " cal l ing me o u t of n o t h i n g to be s o m e o n e . Eth ics i s
n o t h i n g a n d hence i t i s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e , ve r t ig inous , a n d a n x
ious . Th i s n o t h i n g m u r m u r s t o m e t h r o u g h the O t h e r f rom
w h o m I am u n a b l e t o d i s t inguish myself a n d th is b l ind r a p
p o r t reveals ( w i t h o u t reveal ing) a fo r - the -o the r - fo r -no th ing ,
or a g ra tu i ty , an absurd i ty , or an insane laughter , t h a t lacer
a tes the for-itself a n d exposes i t t o n o t h i n g , t o d e a t h — t o t h a t
a b s o l u t e pass iv i ty I sha re w i t h the o ther . For, I am t h a t O t h e r
w h o i s t h e n no o n e o t h e r o r no o t h e r t h a n myself. Insofar a s I
am ident i fying w i th no o n e , I t o o am no o n e . T h u s , / am n o t
e th ica l , J do n o t subs t i t u t e . T h e imposs ib i l i ty of indifference
in the scene of suffering is a lso an inabi l i ty to say I .
T h e event o f ethics t h a t h a p p e n s to me i s a l so the inter
r u p t i o n of e th ics . I c a n no m o r e reveal or r ep re sen t th is e th ics
t h a n I c a n i m a g i n e myself d e a d or a b s e n t f rom myself. E th ics ,
t he r e s p o n s e to a n o t h e r in p a i n , i s a r epe t i t i on of my b i r t h — a
r epe t i t i on of t h a t r epe t i t i on t h a t I am, of the e c h o the self is.
Lev inas i an e thics is the " p r e s e n t a t i o n " of myself to myself as
repet i t ion (i.e., as unpresentable) . T h e impasse we wish to de
scribe, then , is my becoming self or my coming to myself as repet i
t ion or recurrence . T h e subject is no th ing outs ide of its r e t u r n to
I. !•• v i I N A s • s I I I I I I s
itself. The subjecl is radical ly no one , is imaginary , is " c l o t h e d
in purely borrowed be ing , " or is g iven, as L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e
says of Da-sein, " t h e gift of n o t h i n g . " 2 6 T h e subject is w i t h o u t
qua l i t ies , b l a n k , a n d t h u s infinitely uns t ab le . A t the s a m e t ime ,
as no o n e , the subjec t i s deeply p a n i c k e d , p a r a n o i d , a m a n of
c r o w d s , a t h o m e n o w h e r e — f o r the O t h e r has s tolen h i m f rom
himself a t b i r th . I am a n d I am n o t w h o I a m . In sho r t , we
c o m e very c lose he re to m a d n e s s , o r s o m e t h i n g like m a d n e s s .
Ethics will h a v e been b o r n w h e r e i t w a s d issolved: in p r i
m a l (a)social i ty w h e r e " each one i s the o t h e r a n d no o n e i s
himself ," as He idegge r descr ibes das Man. In a sense , Levinas
w i shes to say t h a t this i s o u r " p r o p e r " s ta te : " P a r a d o x i c a l l y i t
i s q u a alienus—foreigner a n d o t h e r — t h a t m a n is n o t a l ien
a t ed [ P a r a d o x a l e m e n t , c 'est en t a n t q u ' a l i e n u s — é t r a n g e r e t
a u t r e — q u e l ' h o m m e n ' es t pas a l i é n é ] . " 2 7 F o r Lev inas , be ing i s
be ing-cas t , be ing-enro l l ed , b e i n g - d r a m a t i z e d . Being is (s imul
t aneous ly ) " o t h e r w i s e t h a n be ing . " Being-cast i s i n sp i r a t ion
by t h e o t h e r a n d delay b e h i n d the p resen t : a d i ach rony . Be
t w e e n Geworfenheit a n d Verfallenheit is be ing-cas t , be ing -
f o r m e d , be ing- f ic ted—the ( imaginary) space of l i t e ra tu re , in
o t h e r w o r d s . Geworfenheit a n d Verfallenheit are, t he re fo re ,
s t r ict ly co r re l a t ive . T h e r e i s no c h r o n o l o g y , no fall f rom grace
i n t o t h r o w n n e s s (or, i n to a r t i cu l a t ion ) . My " fa l l enness" in to
t h e " t h e y " i s t he revela t ion of t h e null i ty I a m . T h u s , be ing-
cas t , in a ce r t a in sense, p recedes b o t h fal lenness a n d t h r o w n
n e s s . I t " t h r o w s " m e i n t o t h r o w n n e s s , o r a r t i c u l a t e s i t .
Fa l lenness i s a l w a y s a l r eady a r t i cu l a t ed as t h r o w n n e s s .
But " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g " i s n o t , o r n o t strictly, e th ica l .
I t is a lso the suspens ion of e th ics . T h e r e is no " s c e n e " of enig
m a t i c r a p p o r t t h a t can be d i sp layed before us. Da-sein a n d
t h e Lev inas ian subject do n o t s imply " fa l l , " they a re vert igi
n o u s l y a r t i cu la t ed , s ingled o u t , a n d elected.
Ethique
T h e real i ty of the o t h e r pe r son , of Autrui, is, as
Levinas says of Prous t ' s A lbe r t ine , m a d e up of t ime , of eva
nescence , i f you l ike—of n o t h i n g n e s s . T h a t w h i c h is o t h e r in
the o t h e r p e r s o n i s o the rnes s "itself": the rad ica l t e m p o r a l i t y
of a d i a c h r o n y w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n i c h o r i z o n , or, in a w o r d ,
dying. Autrui is cons t i t u t ed as a n d by t h a t w h i c h only escapes .
Because of th i s , n o t in spi te of it, we c o m e to be invo lved w i t h
the o the r in t imate ly as o ther , ou t s ide of any concep t or t h o u g h t
of t h e other .
In t h e wr i t i ngs of E m m a n u e l Levinas the l a n g u a g e of e th
ics h a s c o m e to des igna te (one i s t e m p t e d to say, h a s c o m e to
the rescue of) a singular, coun te run ive r sa l , n o n i n t e n t i o n a l ( tha t
i s to say, a imless , pu rpose less , nonconsc ious ) re la t ion w i th a n d
r e s p o n s e to the o t h e r p e r s o n as o t h e r (and n o t as a l te r ego ,
a n o t h e r vers ion of the s a m e , nor , for t h a t mat te r , as a self at
all) . T h i s s t r ange ethics (and i t is qu i t e precisely s t r a n g e — i t is
a s ingu la r r e la t ion , u n i q u e , un recogn izab l e , a n d , l ike t h e re
sul t of a dice t h r o w , does n o t re la te to o t h e r re la t ions) is rea l
ized as a " s u b s t i t u t i o n of me for the o t h e r s [ subs t i tu t ion de
m o i a u x a u t r e s ] , " 2 8 a n d i t c a n on ly be inc luded in a n y m o r a l
ity, pol i t ics , or c o m m u n i t y wha t eve r as excluded (or, as Levinas
p u t s it, a s " b e t r a y e d " ) . Th i s m e a n s t h a t a n y p r o p e r r e l a t ion
sh ip w i t h a n o t h e r a l r eady be t rays w h a t i s "e s sen t i a l ly" a r a p
p o r t w i thou t essence o r an impropr ie ty t ha t precedes a n d m a k e s
poss ib le (whi le a t t h e s a m e t i m e m a k i n g ques t i onab l e ) a n y
r e l a t i o n s h i p w h a t e v e r . T h a t w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s e t h i c s , for
Lev inas , i s t he " l o s s " of p r o p r i e t y — o r its absence , or its p r e s
ence -a s -be t r ayed . I t is a loss t h a t p recedes t he re be ing any
t h i n g to lose, or i t is a r e la t ion " w i t h " loss t h a t suggests the
very poss ibi l i ty a n y re la t ion wha tever . In a n y case , i t i s i m p o s
sible t o say s imply a n d unequ ivoca l ly t h a t w h i c h Levinas h a s
L É V I N A S ' S E T H I C S 5 1
given US K» think, tli.it which any ethics ou t s ide essence de
m a n d s .
G i o r g i o A g a m b e n p u t s i t this w a y :
T h e fact t h a t m u s t c o n s t i t u t e the p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e
for a n y d i scour se on ethics i s t h a t the re is no essence ,
no h i s to r ica l o r sp i r i tua l v o c a t i o n , no b io logica l des
t iny t h a t h u m a n s m u s t enac t o r real ize . T h a t i s t h e
only r e a s o n w h y s o m e t h i n g like e thics c a n exis t , be
cause i t i s c lear t h a t i f h u m a n s w e r e to be this or t h a t
s u b s t a n c e , th is o r t h a t dest iny, no e thical expe r i ence
w o u l d be p o s s i b l e — t h e r e w o u l d on ly be t a sks t o be
d o n e .
[Il f a t to da cui deve p a r t i r e ogn i d i scor so sul l 'e t ica è
che l ' u o m o n o n è ne ha da essere o da rea l izzare a l c u n a
essenza , a l c u n a vocaz ione s tor ica o sp i r i tua le , a l cun
d e s t i n o b i o l o g i c o . So lo p e r q u e s t o q u a l c o s a c o m e
un ' e t i ca p u ò esis tere: po iché è c h i a r o che se l ' u o m o
fosse o avesse da essere ques ta o quel la sos tanza , q u e s t o
o que l de s t i no , n o n vi s a r ebbe a l c u n a esper ienza et ica
poss ib le—vi s a r e b b e r o solo c o m p i t i da r e a l i z z a r e . ] 2 9
T h e " p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e " here is in fact t h e absence of
a n y t h i n g t h a t w o u l d cons t i t u t e a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , w h i c h i s
w h y ethics wil l a l w a y s have been , a s A g a m b e n p u t s it, " s o m e
t h i n g like e th i c s . " T h e r e will be s o m e t h i n g like e thics because
t he re wil l be no e th ics proper. T h e "e th ica l e x p e r i e n c e , " to be
poss ib le a t al l , p r e s u p p o s e s no essence n o r a n y des t iny t h a t
w o u l d have this o r t h a t de s igna t i on . T h a t i s to say, t h e " e t h i
cal e x p e r i e n c e , " ou t s ide essence , will be an expe r i ence of an
i m p r o p e r , i ncohe ren t , i n d e t e r m i n a t e ob l iga t i on . O u t s i d e a n y
p r o p e r o r a u t h e n t i c r e la t ion to t h e o ther , t he very p resence o f
the o t h e r person will he d ra ined oi s u b s t a n c e , and the subject
will f ind itself in a s ingular re la t ion to the O t h e r w i t h o u t m e a
su re o r c o m p a r i s o n . A t the l imit o f a n y c o m m u n i t y o r a n y
r e l a t ion wha teve r , Levinas wishes to reveal a p r o x i m i t y t h a t
c a n n o t be m a d e presen t , b u t t h a t I c a n n o t d ivorce myself f rom.
T h e e th ics Levinas h a s i n m i n d i s o n e t h a t " h a p p e n s " t o m e
w h e n a n o t h e r p e r s o n loses his o r he r p r o p e r r e l a t ion t o h i m -
or herself. Th i s e ros ion of p re sence cons t i t u t e s an even t (or,
bet ter , is t he event of the e m p t y i n g o u t of all p resence) t h a t
" d e n u c l e a t e s " the self (moi), a n d t h u s the r e l a t i onsh ip p r o p e r
w i t h the o t h e r p e r s o n slips in to a ver t igo , an i n d u c e m e n t , a
p r o v o c a t i o n , or a s u g g e s t i o n — s o m e t h i n g like an e th ica l ob l i
g a t i o n , b u t on ly imprecisely, loosely. In fact i t is imposs ib l e to
cha rac t e r i z e w h a t " h a p p e n s " he re a n d i t i s on ly a m b i g u o u s l y
t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of ethics i s " e q u a l t o , " or i s the m e a n i n g of,
th is e r o s i o n . 3 0 I t i s Levinas 's p ro jec t to s h o w t h a t all h u m a n
r e l a t i ons a re a l w a y s t h r e a t e n e d by an e v a c u a t i o n o f p re sence ,
a n d he insists on o u r e thical ob l iga t i on to " t h e n e x t o n e I
m e e t , " t h e n e x t one o n t h e s t ree t I h a p p e n t o r u n i n t o . W h a t
Lev inas w a n t s to say is t h a t h u m a n life is in r a p p o r t w i t h a
general i m p r o p r i e t y t h a t suggests b o t h a n a r c h y and c o m m u
nity, b o t h s tabi l i ty and instabil i ty. T h a t is to say, a c c o r d i n g to
Lev inas , t he r e is a r e l a t ion in r e l a t ion to w h i c h I am a l w a y s
a l r eady in r e l a t i on , or in r e l a t ion to w h i c h I am abso lu t e ly
pass ive . Th i s passivi ty is a r e sponse to the O t h e r — b e y o n d h i m -
or he r se l f—tha t I c o m e to be r e spons ib le for. But, a n d th is is
s t r a n g e , r e spons ib le for nothing ( t ha t is to say, not necessar i ly
r e spons ib l e t o r e s to re the o t h e r t o p ropr i e ty , for t h a t w o u l d
p r e s u p p o s e s o m e c o m m o n essence or des t iny) . I t i s a r e spons i
bil i ty p r o p r i e t y c a n n o t satisfy.
We r e t u r n aga in a n d aga in t o this fragile a n d indef inable
r e l a t i on w i t h Autrui as that from which I cannot distinguish
myself. Beyond or o t h e r w i s e t h a n d o u b t or cer ta in ty , th is sin-
i i v i N A s • s I i M 11 s
gular relation ( resembl ing ethics and r ende r ing ethics a r e sem
blance to itself, that is, denuc lea t ing it of essence) is a n a r c h y —
the c o m i n g (apar t ) o f any c o m m u n i t y wha tever . I t h a p p e n s to
us w h e n , for e x a m p l e , a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s in pa in , or for t h a t
mat te r , in ecstasy. I t h a p p e n s w h e n a n o t h e r p e r s o n is dep r ived
of t h e d igni ty of t h e self, as w h e n d e a t h a p p r o a c h e s , or as
w h e n s o m e o n e forgets himself in pas s ion . Dispossessed of self,
ou t s i de oneself, t he o t h e r p e r s o n is, i f we m a y say th i s , p o s
sessed by d i spossess ion , or by a n o n y m i t y . In the gr ips of p a i n
o r p a s s i o n t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , no longer h i m - o r herself, i s no
longer self-possessed a n d s o m e t h i n g i r r epa rab l e h a p p e n s . T h i s
o c c u r r e d , a s w e k n o w , t o Batai l le , w h o b e c a m e s o obsessed
w i t h the f a m o u s p h o t o g r a p h o f a m a n w h o w a s be ing flayed
a n d d i s m e m b e r e d whi le be ing kep t consc ious w i th o p i u m . T h e
exp re s s ion on the sufferer 's face, Batai l le says , w a s " a t o n c e
e c s t a t i c ( ? ) a n d i n t o l e r a b l e . " 3 1 T h e o t h e r p e r s o n b e c a m e
u n s i m p l e : ne i the r s imply l iving n o r d e a d , ne i the r in pa in n o r
in ec s t a sy—became , we m a y say, c o m m u n i c a t i o n be tween these
p o l e s — n o longer a self bu t c o m m u n i c a t i o n "itself." T h i s event
o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n m a y h a p p e n t o u s w h e n s o m e o n e (like o n e
of the g l a m o r o u s p e o p l e f r o m the film Paris Is Burning) is
e n g a g e d in t h e p ro jec t o f pass ing f rom m a l e to female , o r t h e
reverse . T h e r e the o t h e r p e r s o n passes b e y o n d mere i m i t a t i o n
of female (or male) a n d a p p r o a c h e s , n o t a th i rd sex , b u t the
c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n the sexes t h a t m a k e s t h a t w h i c h i s
called gender possible, whi le calling i t in to ques t ion . In these
ex t ravagan t cases, the o ther person becomes radically dis-placed,
seems to b e l o n g n o w h e r e , seems to have lost a w o r l d , a n d
becomes , as Levinas puts it, " n a k e d beyond n u d i t y " because this
" s o m e o n e " will have exceeded any localizable con t ex t s . W h e n
th is h a p p e n s , all p r o p e r r e l a t ions t o the o t h e r a r e s u s p e n d e d
a n d t h e r e is, before a n y t h i n g else, a fasc ina t ion . T h i s fascina
t i o n or obsess ion is the " s u b s t a n c e " of Levinas 's e t h i c s . 3 2
) ' I I W ( >
With a Blanchot ian accent, I.evinas had given us to under
s t a n d t h a t , before i t i s a n y t h i n g else, o u r re la t ion wi th the
o t h e r p e r s o n is an i n v o l u n t a r y fasc ina t ion . Autrui is a r r e s t ing
a n d p a r a l y z i n g . We can be o v e r c o m e by, o r expe r i ence , an
a r r e s t ing fasc ina t ion w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n w h o h a s " p a s s e d
b e y o n d " wh i l e r e m a i n i n g he r e . I t i s a fasc ina t ion w i t h t h a t
w h i c h p re sen t s itself as ou t s ide i tself—as d r a i n e d of all real i ty,
a s t h r e a t e n e d o r a l r eady c o n t a m i n a t e d by absence , b u t in such
a w a y t h a t p resence a n d absence cease to be the p r o p e r t e r m s
for t h e Othe r . T h e o t h e r p e r s o n , ou t s ide a n y s imple p r e sen t a
t i o n , i s " b e y o n d " whi le r e m a i n i n g he re , before m e ; b u t th i s
" h e r e " is no longer a p resence , i t is, as i t w e r e , de layed b e h i n d
itself, or is yet to c o m e . It is the wrcpresence of communica t iv i ty .
T h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s t h r e a t e n e d w i t h b e c o m i n g a spec t ac l e—a
rea l i ty m a d e up of n o t h i n g n e s s (as, for e x a m p l e , in p rofes
s ional wres t l i ng , w h e r e the spectac le c o m e s f rom t h e d r a i n i n g
a w a y o f all " r e a l " wres t l ing a n d c o m p e t i t i o n ) . T h e face- to-
face r a p p o r t f rom Totality and Infinity is such a spec t acu l a r
r e l a t i on . T h e r e , t he o t h e r p e r s o n , as visage, i s p r e s e n t e d as
m a d e up o f t h a t pass ing a w a y t h a t does n o t pass : t ime . (In
p ro fes s iona l wres t l i ng , all rea l i ty h a v i n g been d r a i n e d away ,
s o m e t h i n g yet r e m a i n s to be seen. T h a t w h i c h i s a r r e s t ing i s
a l w a y s t h a t w h i c h r e m a i n s to be seen wh i l e all i s a l r eady in
f ron t of m e , b u t as i f yet to come. ) Beyond a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i on
to self, a spec tac le c o m e s to a r res t a n d p a r a l y z e us : t h a t to
w h i c h the re i s no p r o p e r r e s p o n s e . A n d t h e para lys i s we feel i s
a pa ra lys i s of the subject. Batai l le p r o b a b l y k n e w th is be t t e r
t h a n a n y o n e : "A m a n al ive, w h o sees a f e l l o w -man die , c a n
survive only beside himself'[s'il vo i t son semblab le mour i r , un
v i v a n t ne pet i t p lus subsis ter que hors de soi]."33
O n e d o e s n o t mere ly obse rve a scene he r e . For, w h e n t h e
o t h e r p e r s o n is d r a i n e d of all s u b s t a n c e , w h e n his rea l i ty is
th is e ros ion , w h e n Autrui faces us l ike " t h e n e x t o n e I m e e t "
i, r. V i IN /\ 3 a i ' i i l i * i
(like a s t ranger , in o the r w o r d s ) , (hen the b o r d e r s be tween
s tage a n d a u d i e n c e a re s u s p e n d e d a n d w e a re " i n v o l v e d , "
" e l ec t ed , " " s i n g u l a r i z e d . " T h e para lys is of the subject i s an
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e r a p p o r t w i t h the o t h e r pe r son . W i t h this i s car
ried a w a y all p r o p e r difference be tween Same a n d Other . T h e r e
i s an ident i f icat ion of the Same w i t h the O t h e r t h a t denuc lea tes
the S a m e o f s a m e n e s s a n d r e n d e r s t h e o t h e r p e r s o n all t h e
m o r e O t h e r in t h a t I am the s a m e as he ( w h o , none the l e s s ,
r e m a i n s o t h e r t h a n I , o t h e r t han a n y o n e ) . Th i s i s an i n t imacy
m o r e p r o f o u n d t h a n s y m p a t h y o r e m p a t h y , w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e
a s tabi l i ty in the S a m e w h o can identify w i t h the other . W h a t
h a p p e n s in Lev inas ian p r o x i m i t y is an inabi l i ty or a n o n i n t e n -
t iona l i ty t h a t seizes us f rom the inside. Th i s loss of p r o p r i e t y
is c o n t a g i o u s . It is sha r ed like a c o m m u n a l ecstasy.
A n o n y m o u s identif icat ion is n o t a k n o w l e d g e t h a t I t o o
c a n d ie , o r t h a t I t o o can have my g e n d e r t r a n s f o r m e d . I t i s an
expe r i ence of a n o n y m i t y (an exper ience in the absence of the re
be ing a n y o n e the re to have the exper ience) . I t i s t h e expe r i
ence of be ing already d e a d . A n o n y m o u s ident i f ica t ion is a
pa ra lys i s t h a t subjects me to a l ter i ty "desp i t e myself ," a n d
th is is t h e very s t ruc tu re of subject ivi ty for Levinas : desp i te -
oneself-for-an other .
I t i s precisely th is s ingular r e sponse or " r e l a t i o n " — p a r a
lyzing a n d a n o n y m o u s , " d e s p i t e - m e " — t h a t Levinas seeks t o
a p p r o p r i a t e to the l a n g u a g e o f e th ics . He wishes to define e th
ics a s an a n o n y m o u s i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h al ter i ty t h a t cal ls for
a n d dissolves all p r o p e r r e l a t i ons w i t h the o t h e r p e r s o n , a n d i t
" p o s e s p r o b l e m s i f o n e i s n o t to a b a n d o n oneself to v io lence .
I t calls for c o m p a r i s o n , m e a s u r e , k n o w i n g , l aws , i n s t i t u t i ons—
just ice |a m o i n s de s ' a b a n d o n n e r a la v io lence , pose des p r o b
l ems . Elle en appel le a lo rs a la c o m p a r a i s o n , a la m e s u r e , au
savoir , a u x lois , a u x i n s t i t u t i o n s — a l a j u s t i c e ] . " 3 4 T h a t i s t o
say, ou t s ide p u r e a n d s imple a b a n d o n m e n t to v io lence , to a
I [obbes ian w a r ol .ill againsl all, there must be s o m e t h i n g l ike
k n o w i n g , laws , just ice, a n d so for th—al l o f w h i c h m u s t re
m a i n ques t i onab l e a n d re ta in wi th in themselves a call for the i r
r e v a l u a t i o n . T h e r e i s no e th ics p rope r , pe r se, o r a s such a n y
w h e r e in Levinas 's w o r k s . But nei ther is there a p u r e a n d s imple
absence of e th ics . T h e call o f t h e O t h e r will never cease to
p lace an i n c o h e r e n t d e m a n d in the soul o f the subjec t to w h i c h
no r e s p o n s e i s a d e q u a t e (by def ini t ion, for n o t h i n g c a n be a d
e q u a t e to the i n c o h e r e n t ) . H i s e th ics , the re fore , is, a s he says ,
an " o b s e s s i o n . " Every r e s p o n s e t o t h e other , every r e s t o r a t i o n
t o the gene ra l , will be t r ay the d e m a n d . But a t t h e s a m e t i m e ,
each be t r aya l will be a n e w re la t ion w i t h the o t h e r a n d t h u s
e th ics wil l m i m e o r " c o n f o r m " t o mimes i s , t o t h e i m p r o p e r
"i tself ." T h e r e will be no r e a c h i n g e th ics , no t e a c h i n g it , no
in s t i t u t ing it . T h e r e will be ins tead the s low e m p t y i n g o u t o f
a n y d e t e r m i n a t e re la t ion wha t soeve r , a n d this e m p t y i n g o u t
will a r t i cu l a t e by e x h a u s t i o n a n d exc lus ion t h e s ingu la r "i t
self." Th i s does n o t m e a n t h a t ethics i s a n y re la t ion a t al l . A n y
r e l a t i o n a t all w o u l d r e m a i n jus t t h a t — i n d i f f e r e n t — w e r e i t
n o t for t h e pecu l ia r g rav i ty of mimes is : t h a t to w h i c h no re la
t i o n ( a n d no l anguage) i s a d e q u a t e .
Levinas ' s e th ics , if i t is e th ics , wil l be an expe r i ence of th is
imposs ib i l i ty : t h e r e i s no re la t ion t h a t i s e i ther inside or o u t
side the ob l iga t i on to r e s p o n d to the O t h e r t h a t i s n o t a l so a
s u b s t i t u t i o n of me for the other . Subs t i t u t i on , in Lev inas , is
t h e very m e a s u r e of a measure l e s s w e a k n e s s : f in i tude. T h a t i s
to say, t he r e i s no h u m a n re la t ion t h a t does n o t c i r cumsc r ibe a
loss t h a t passes w i t h o u t pass ing away . T h a t loss i s insc r ibed
in, o r a s , t he face o f the o the r p e r s o n w h o faces me f rom be
y o n d himself a n d t h e r e b y ob l iga tes t h a t I am ca l led on t o be
s u b s t i t u t e d for h im who cannot substitute for himself, a n d
w h o i s a b a n d o n e d to an infinite vu lnerab i l i ty t h a t i t i s b e y o n d
his p o w e r t o e q u a l ( a b a n d o n e d b e y o n d even a n y v io lence t h a t
may he d o n e to him) like the man t o r t u r e d to d e a t h in C h i n a
w h o so obsessed Batai l le . In t h e face of t h e o ther , in the spec
tacle t ha t is an image los ing its re ference , is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of t h e imposs ib i l i ty of f in i tude: t h e Othe r , precisely, c a n n o t be
himself. Autrui c a n n o t be himself a n d there fore I am ca l led to
b e f o r - h i m . H e i s n o t e q u a l t o himself , b y d e f i n i t i o n , a s
H e i d e g g e r h a s so imp lacab ly s h o w n . T h a t i s h o w i t i s w i t h t h e
o t h e r p e r s o n , a n d t h a t i s w h y h e obsesses m e . H e i s w e a k ,
i m p o v e r i s h e d , h o m e l e s s , g lo r ious . . . T h a t is w h a t affects me
b e y o n d c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n a n d b e y o n d d e s c r i p t i o n . Even t h e
homeless a re n o t equa l to their home le s snes s—they are a l w a y s
w o r s e off o r o t h e r w i s e affected t h a n o t h e r s (or they t h e m
selves) c a n say they a re . T h o s e w h o suffer c a n n o t g r a s p the i r
suffer ing, even i f they tell us of it. On t h e " h i t h e r s i d e " of all
t ha t is said, an infinite vulnerabil i ty obsesses us beyond measu re .
E th i c s , as Levinas defines it , i s r i go rous ly co r r e l a t i ve w i t h
f in i tude . T h e para lys i s of the subject i s the infinite vu lne rab i l
ity t h a t i s f in i tude—its o p e n n e s s to a n y re la t ion w h a t e v e r (just
or unjust , responsible or no t ) . A n d , there is no ethics of f in i tude.
T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g like a sugges t ion , a m u r m u r t h a t ob l iges
us a n d c o n s t r a i n s us to s o m e t h i n g like e thics . S o m e t h i n g , h o w
ever, t h a t will a l w a y s h a v e " d u p e d " us in t h e sense o f o u r
h a v i n g been t a k e n in by a d u b i o u s scheme in spi te of o u r bes t
(or w o r s t ) i n t e n t i o n s . S o m e t h i n g will a l w a y s h a v e d r a g g e d us
a g a i n s t o u r wil l in to a ver t igo f r o m w h i c h on ly a n a m e l e s s
a n d affectless voice will speak , l ike t h e n a r r a t i v e voice f r o m
B l a n c h o t . 3 5
Death
T h e space o f r ad ica l e th i c s—a re l a t ion w i t h o t h e r s
t ha t precedes egology—is deeply, even definitively, a m b i g u o u s .
As a m b i g u o u s , i t is neu t r a l a n d neu t ra l i z ing . I t is as m u c h a
space of dea th and dying, o i l in i tudc , literature, and m a d n e s s ,
as i t is of e th ics . F in i tude is given at b i r th by the O t h e r w h o m
I forget b u t to w h o m I o w e the f ini tude I a m . I am i g n o r a n t of
my b i r th as I am of my d e a t h , since these define a n d the re fo re
e scape m e , or involve me in a l imit over w h i c h I exerc ise no
c o n t r o l . I t i s (the) O the r ( s ) w h o i n v o l v e ( s ) 3 6 m e in these l imits
t h a t define m e . O n l y by an a b u s e o f l a n g u a g e , however , c a n
th is space be a p p r o p r i a t e d to the l a n g u a g e of e th ics ; for t h e
space o f i n c a r n a t i o n a n d d e a t h i s s ingu la r a n d i n c o m p a r a b l e .
I t be longs to no o n e . I t i s p r o p e r l y ne i the r e th ica l n o r aes
the t i c . I t i s no m o r e the f i r s t sign of e thics (an e x t r e m e h u m i l
ity before the o the r ) t h a n of h is t r ionics ( the abi l i ty to p l ay all
t h e ro les w i t h an icy d e t a c h m e n t ) , o r of m a d n e s s (a d i sposses
s ion of self a n d a r epossess ion by w h o k n o w s w h a t forces o r
d e m o n s ) . I nca rna t ion i s i r reducibly undec idab le , unoccup i ab l e ,
a n d u n p r e s e n t a b l e . But this i s a lso the space of exis tence w h i c h
is , a s N a n c y says , "offered by no o n e to no o n e . " I t i s offered,
b u t i t i s a l w a y s a l r eady lost or s u r r e n d e r e d because i t be longs
t o n o o n e . I t is , N a n c y says , " s h a r e d , " b u t on ly a s t h a t w h i c h
e ludes all s h a r i n g . 3 7 T h e r e can be no t r a n s c e n d i n g th is space ,
since i t is u n e q u a l or insufficient to itself. There fore , as B lancho t
r e m i n d s us :
I t d o e s n o t fol low, however , t h a t the c o m m u n i t y i s the
s imple p u t t i n g in c o m m o n , ins ide the l imits i t w o u l d
p r o p o s e for itself, of a sha r ed will to be severa l , a lbe i t
t o do n o t h i n g , t h a t i s t o say, t o do n o t h i n g else t h a n
m a i n t a i n t h e sha r ing o f ' s o m e t h i n g ' w h i c h , precisely,
seems a l w a y s a l r eady to have e luded the poss ib i l i ty o f
be ing c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t of a sha r ing : speech , s i lence.
[La c o m m u n a u t é n ' e s t p a s p o u r a u t a n t l a s imple mise
en c o m m u n , d a n s les l imites qu 'e l le se t r ace ra i t , d ' u n e
i i: v i N A s • s i i 111 > 5
vo lon té pa r t agée d 'ê t re a p lus ieurs , fût-ce p o u r ne r ien
faire, c 'es t -à-di re ne rien faire d ' a u t r e que de m a i n t e n i r
le p a r t a g e de ' q u e l q u e c h o s e ' qui p r éc i s émen t semble
s 'ê t re t o u j o u r s déjà s o u s t r a i t à la poss ib i l i t é d ' ê t r e
cons idé ré c o m m e p a r t à un p a r t a g e : p a r o l e , s i l ence . ] 3 8
T h i s s p a c e , w i t h o u t o r b e y o n d e s s e n c e (au-delà d e
l'essence), th is b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n t h a t ¿5 on ly as " o t h e r w i s e
t h a n b e i n g , " is, for Lev inas , t h e p lace of a respons ib i l i ty t h a t
p laces me in q u e s t i o n , for on ly the re , ou t s ide essence , can I
m e e t t h e o t h e r a s o t h e r t h a n other- I . T h e a m b i g u i t y o f th i s
space is s h a r e a b l e on ly as con tes t ed , as i n -ques t i on (hence , i t
i s t he space n o t on ly of responsibi l i ty , b u t a lso of r iva l ry a n d
jea lousy) . D e a t h is insc r ibed here as wel l . I t i s t h e space of t h e
f in i tude , we m u s t say, in spi te of Levinas ' s p r o f o u n d ave r s ion
t o f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y a n d Batail le 's i m p a t i e n c e w i t h H e i
degger ' s " s l a v i s h " d e v o t i o n to ph i lo sophy . I t i s f in i tude as t h a t
o b l i g a t i o n - t o - b e t h a t I c a n n o t ever mee t , for i t defines me a n d
i s t h u s b e y o n d me as the i nescapab le voice of consc ience t h a t
cal ls Da-sein to itself by p u t t i n g i t in q u e s t i o n . I t is an im
p r o p e r space , be long ing to no o n e , a n d i s given to Da-sein,
b u t on ly on c o n d i t i o n t h a t Da-sein i s rad ica l ly no o n e .
Undi f fe ren t i a t ed space is a space of u n p o w e r , of ana rchy .
I t i s w h e r e the re i s e x p o s u r e to e x p o s u r e . In th is space , t h e
o t h e r p e r s o n , en ro l l ed as this o r t h a t m e m b e r of socie ty (or
p a r t o f s o m e w h o l e ) , i s d e p r o p r i a t e d a n d c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h
th is space i t se l f—beyond a n y self. H e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s
a p p r o a c h e d b y a n u n p o w e r over w h i c h h e can exercise n o
m a s t e r y a n d for w h i c h his ro le does n o t p r e p a r e h i m . Levinas
says , " t h e face is e x p o s e d , m e n a c e d , as i f invi t ing us to an ac t
o f v io lence fie visage est e x p o s é , m e n a c é c o m m e n o u s inv i t an t
à un acte de v i o l e n c e ] . " 3 9 T h e en t i re l ace ra ted b o d y of t h e
m a n t o r t u r e d i n C h i n a , w h o s e p h o t o g r a p h s Batai l le h a d seen,
w a s a visage in the Lcvinasian sense. I lis mut i l a t ion exci tes a
p a s s i o n for further mutilation, even as it exci tes a p a s s io n a t e
revu ls ion . In this space of c o n t e s t a t i o n — o f rivalry, of jealousy,
of t o r t u r e , of d e a t h — t h e o t h e r p e r s o n loses himself a n d "of
fe r s" t o me an o p e n i n g i n t o this space . T h e O t h e r i s subjec t t o
a w i t h d r a w a l over w h i c h the re i s no c o n t r o l a n d of w h i c h
the re i s no k n o w l e d g e . At the s a m e t i m e , he begins to lose his
ab i l i ty - to -d ie , his definitive m o r t a l potentia, his " o w n m o s t "
possibi l i ty . He begins to lose t h e poss ib i l i ty t h a t defines h i m as
Da-sein. T h i s possibi l i ty , H e i d e g g e r tells us , once rea l ized is,
h e n c e , no longe r poss ib le a n d Da-sein, once rea l ized in its be
ing , loses itself abso lu te ly because i t is no longe r able to d ie . I t
i s to t h a t definitive power le s sness t h a t I r e s p o n d . Th i s m a y be
the beg inn ing of an e th ics , bu t i t w o u l d be a fatal o n e because
I am n o t ab le to d i s t inguish myself f rom t h a t power l e s snes s .
T h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s no longer ab le to forestal l t h e a p p r o a c h o f
d e a t h — a pa ra lys i s t h a t , in spite of his l a n g u a g e , defines H e i
degger ' s Entschlossenheit as a r ad i ca l passivi ty. It is to th is
pass iv i ty t h a t exposes b e y o n d n u d i t y t h a t I r e s p o n d , a n d for
w h i c h I am re spons ib l e . In its a p p r o a c h (as the poss ib i l i ty - to -
die t h a t i s a l r eady an inabi l i ty- to-cease-dying) , f ini tude escapes
f rom " b e t w e e n " us , a n d hence , there is a ver t ig inous (or a n o n y
m o u s ) con tac t . I identify w i t h this O t h e r nonin ten t iona l ly , p r io r
to a n y dec is ion , for the re i s no one to identify w i t h a n d n o t h
ing to i n t end . T h e r e i s an e m p t y ident i f icat ion " d e s p i t e m y
self" t h a t i n t e r r u p t s my " a s for m e . "
T h e r e s p o n s e i s p r i o r to consc iousness a n d i t d issolves t h e
socia l b o n d , since I identify w i th the O t h e r w h o i s no o n e a t
a l l , is a l r eady b e y o n d t h e socia l . O u t s i d e my self, I am t h a t
O t h e r w h o , p a r a l y z e d a n d dy ing , i s already no longe r ab le to
be t h e r e a n y m o r e . T h e O t h e r a n d I sha re th is dy ing ou t s i de
ourse lves t h a t b o t h t o u c h e s a n d sepa ra te s us . R e s o l u t e n e s s
(Entschlossenheit) escapes me a n d is a l r eady a r e s p o n s e to t h e
I I v I N A ' . ' . I I I I I I a (> i
( ) ther w h o presents (my) death i<> me by reveal ing it n o t to be
my d e a t h , no r his, no r a n y o n e ' s . I am ob l iga ted to be for- the-
other , to die in his p lace , in t h a t space w h e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n
i s a p p r o a c h e d by an u n p o w e r t h a t a p p r o a c h e s me a n d f r o m
w h i c h I have no p o w e r to s epa ra t e myself. Th i s i s n o t a c o m
m u n i o n , n o r an e x c h a n g e of p laces . I t i s t he co r ros ive a n d
s o b e r i n g r ecogn i t i on t h a t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o t ab le t o die
his own d e a t h . T h a t is w h a t is so terr ib le a b o u t t h e final hour .
T h e so l i tude o f dy ing m u s t be s h a r e d . 4 0 1 die for - the-o ther a n d
i n his p lace because the o t h e r c a n n o t . H e r e m a i n s , t o t h e e n d ,
u n c a n n i l y al ive, r e m a i n s u n a b l e t o cease t o die , a n d su r r en
ders the o w n - m o s t n e s s ( the possibi l i ty to die) t h a t defines h i m .
D e a t h i s i m p e r s o n a l . T h a t i s w h y I m u s t be the re for h i m , w i t h
h i m . I am cal led to a c c o m p l i s h w h a t he c a n n o t a c c o m p l i s h
himself. I m u s t subs t i tu t e for h i m this abi l i ty to die t h a t / a m .
I am t h a t s u p p l e m e n t he d e m a n d s , ob l iges , in o r d e r to be, in
o r d e r to r e m a i n poss ib le . H o w e v e r , I offer h i m w h a t i s n o t my
o w n , w h a t I c a n n o t offer, w h a t I am u n a b l e to give . H e n c e we
en te r a dea th l i ke pass ivi ty (une passivité à mort) together . T h i s
imposs ib l e o b l i g a t i o n a n d imposs ib le r e l a t ion does n o t define
me as t r ag i c . I t exposes me to the rad ica l inability t h a t I must
t,e—that t h a t to w h i c h I am ethical ly ob l iga t ed i s b e y o n d m e ,
b e y o n d my power . I identify w i t h t h e o t h e r insofar as he i s no
o n e , i s b e y o n d himself, a n d there fore I t o o am b e y o n d , am no
o n e , no ipse—am myself a l r eady u n a b l e to die . To subs t i t u t e ,
to s u p p l e m e n t for the other , is to d ie , like t h e other , as O the r .
J u s t as the o t h e r m u s t die a d e a t h n o t his o w n , so t o o I m u s t
die an o the r ' s d e a t h . Subs t i t u t i on , the " g e r m " o f Levinas ' s
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,^ is n o t accompl i shed
e x c e p t b e y o n d m e , ou t s ide m e , desp i t e -me- for -ano ther . Sub
s t i tu t ing for t h e other , I d ie , t h u s a c c o m p l i s h i n g w h a t t h e o t h e r
c a n n o t . But dy ing for- the-other , I r e m a i n u n a b l e to die my
o w n d e a t h . I die a w a y f rom myself. D e a t h is i m p e r s o n a l ; i t
be longs lo no one . I lenee, eve ryone dies an ( ) thcr 's d e a t h , no o n e his o w n .
T h e e th ics of subs t i t u t i on i s b e t r a y e d by an in te rna l l imit .
I t is an impasse . I leave the scene . I a b a n d o n a n d be t r ay the
O t h e r w h o calls t o me . W h a t r e m a i n s i s t h e call f rom n o o n e
to no o n e . A call to w h i c h no e th ics , no ob l iga t i on , i s ad
e q u a t e . T h e r e l a t ion to the Othe r , like f in i tude itself, i s b e y o n d
my g r a s p . Levinas ' s e th ics i s h a u n t e d by f in i tude , t h e very
f ini tude t h a t suggests an e th ics . T h e call of f ini tude—lacerat
ing m e , e x p o s i n g m e , en ro l l ing m e , obsess ing m e — s a y s n o t h
ing. I t is t h a t other d e a t h t h a t d ispossesses me of myself.
Yet I must be th is ex is tence , th is finitude, w h i c h is offered
by no o n e to no o n e . I am n o t h i n g — n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h a t
be ing-offered , t h a t s u p p l e m e n t , o r t h a t subs t i t u t i on t h a t I c a n
n o t a c c o m p l i s h . I am O t h e r — t h a t is, no o n e , no ipse. I am
on ly a s subs t i t u t ed . T h a t i s w h y I am a l w a y s the f i r s t p e r s o n
accused , the f i r s t p e r s o n r e spons ib l e . M y fasc ina ted a t t en t ive -
ness t o t h e O t h e r i s t h e b r e a k u p o f m y unity. T h e r e l a t i o n t o
t h e O t h e r i s s ingular , u n i q u e , n o n g e n e r a l i z a b l e . T h e r e i s no
e th ics as such , no e thics itself. Or , th is e thics is s t r u c t u r e d like
improp r i e ty , a n d t h e Lev inas ian subjec t i s n o t h i n g b u t its infi
n i te unf in ished vulnerabi l i ty .
Levinas and Heidegger
If Levinas 's e thics is an e l a b o r a t e de sc r ip t i on of
f i n i t u d e , t hen s o m e t h i n g a b o u t f i n i t u d e — i t s p r i m o r d i a l t e m
pora l i ty , its d i ach rony , its a lways-ou ts ide- i t se l fness—sugges t s
to Lev inas an e th ics . T i m e itself means e thics to Levinas . Da-
sein—that be ing t h a t does n o t have its be ing , t h a t i s a l w a y s in
ques t i on , t h a t i s t h e " p u r e abyss o f presence in t h e p r e s e n t " 4 2 —
sugges ts to Lev inas , poss ib ly to us as wel l , s o m e k i n d of e th
ics. I f be ing on ly " i s " in its pass ing , or in its be ing-a l t e red , or
being-cas t , and il I hi sein is Mit-einandersein, then , le t t ing go
ol anxie ty a b o u t lostness (as bata i l le r e c o m m e n d e d ) , i t we l
c o m e s the Othe r . Ethics w o u l d be sugges ted , as i f h y p n o t i
cally, by t h e call of finitude, if finitude is u n d e r s t o o d to be
r igorous ly a r t i cu l a t ed as Mit-einandersein.
T h e space we s h a r e / e x p o s e i s the space of an ins tabi l i ty
t h a t c a n n o t be c o m m a n d e d . I t is the space of a r ad ica l c o n t e s
t a t i on o f d i scourses t h a t c a n n o t be r igorous ly d i s t ingu i shed
f rom each other . I t is, i f y o u l ike, t he space of l anguage itself,
of w r i t i n g before the letter, as D e r r i d a says , or of le dire, as
Levinas prefers . Insofar a s Levinas 's t ex t c o m e s to d o u b l e H e i
degger ' s (diachronie a n d Zeit, anarchie a n d das Man, le sujet
a n d Da-sein, responsabilité a n d Gewissenheit, a n d so for th)
his w o r k a m o u n t s to a vas t p r o t e s t aga ins t w h a t H e i d e g g e r
could m e a n , a p r o t e s t aga ins t the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of f ini tude to
" f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . " In an essay on L y o t a r d , L a c o u e -
L a b a r t h e says, "I have a lot of t r oub l e n o t seeing in Heidegger ' s
' b e i n g ' , if it is still be ing , a n d if it is He idegger ' s be ing , t h e
s a m e t h i n g as (if no t its very possibi l i ty) Levinas 's ' t he o the r
wise t h a n be ing ' . O r a s a n e m p t y t r a n s c e n d e n c e . " 4 3
T h a t is, by ac t ing as a c o m p e t i t o r to H e i d e g g e r a n d to
f u n d a m e n t a l on to logy , Levinas h a s e x p o s e d a n d exp lo i t ed a n
a n - a r c h i c r a p p o r t a n d has a t t e m p t e d t o u n d e r m i n e Heidegger ,
w h o w r o t e n o e th ics . W h o w r o t e n o e th ics for the very g o o d
r e a s o n t h a t t he r e i s n o t h i n g a d e q u a t e o r e q u a l t o f i n i tude ,
n o t h i n g " o t h e r w i s e " t h a n f in i tude . Levinas i s H e i d e g g e r in
F r e n c h , b u t this can u n d e r m i n e He idegge r in G e r m a n . In very
different w a y s , Bataille a n d Levinas each echo Heidegger . Each
says w h a t He idegge r wil l n o t say because i t i s u n s a y a b l e . Fo r
Lev inas , t he re i s no m e a n i n g in the fact t h a t t he r e i s no e thics
of f initude. By r epea t ing He idegger in t e r m s of e th ics , Lev inas
gives u s n o t h i n g t o t h ink , n o t h i n g t o k n o w b e y o n d th is sug
ges t ion : w h y did f i n i t ude n o t suggest an e thics t o He idegger?
We do not suggest that Levinas pu i s his own text in ques
t ion in o r d e r to pu t Heidegger ' s t ex t in question. We suggest
t h a t the e thics t h a t g n a w s a t a n d t ransf igures Levinas i s an
i n v o l u n t a r y d r a m a t i z a t i o n o f be ing- in -ques t ion . We a re sug
ges t ing t h a t f ini tude itself is infinitely sugges t ib le . I t c a n n o t
b u t suggest a " b e y o n d " or an "o the rwi se t h a n be ing ." Levinas 's
e th ics , in its way, un leashes this sugges t ion .
T II R E E
Blanchot, L'arrêt de mort, and the Image of Literature
Artists are replicants who have found the secret of their
obsolescence.
—Massumi
Writing
W r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t of w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Yet wr i t
ing says , each t ime , c lear ly a n d unobt rus ive ly , there is. I t says
th is if on ly to deny it: there is n o t . . . W r i t i n g affirms exis t
e n c e — t h e t h i n g itself, t h e r e a l — b u t on ly by t a k i n g its p l ace .
W r i t i n g t akes t h e p lace of the real in o r d e r to say it . I t i n t r u d e s
itself b e t w e e n us a n d the real i ty of w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Still, o u t
side of w r i t i n g (before it, p r i o r to it) w h a t h a s real ly t a k e n
place? W h a t h a p p e n e d ? Wr i t i ng w o u l d l ike t o say th is t h i n g ,
b u t as i t sets o u t to do this i t is immediate ly infected by a fore ign-
ness t h a t w e a k e n s i t immeasu rab ly . Ins tead of say ing the t h ing ,
i t says (or even , l ike the w o r k of a r t in Lev inas , i t insists on) its
absence by p r e sen t i ng itself in t h e p lace of t h a t to w h i c h i t
w o u l d like to refer. But , w h a t is w r i t i n g itself (ou t s ide of, or
jus t s h o r t of, its referr ing to the th ing)? A n d d id we n o t beg in
th i s p a r a g r a p h b y say ing t h a t w r i t i n g says , n o t a b s e n c e , b u t
existence, there is? We should have said: Writing tears itself apart
from the moment it begins to speak. But w h o can say this?
Let us go further.
W h a t i f ex is tence ¿5 on ly a s a b s e n c e , a n d m o r e precisely,
65
as t ha t absence that wr i t ing says , affirms, a n d " p r e s e n t s " ? Or ,
to say the same th ing aga in , w h a t i f ex is tence ( the rea l , t h e
t h i n g itself) is a l ready t h e saying of absence, in s h o r t , wr i t
i n g — t h e very wr i t ing w h o s e p resence insists u p o n the absence
of t h e real? In t h a t case w r i t i n g w o u l d be the very t a k i n g -
p lace of (doub le genit ive) ex is tence : w r i t i n g t akes the p lace of
ex i s tence a n d exis tence t akes p lace a s w r i t i n g (but n o t — a n d
let us be clear a b o u t th is , for i t is a t e m p t a t i o n to w h i c h Levinas
says aes the t ic exis tence i s p r o n e — a s pure ly a n d s imply f o r m e d
o r n a r r a t e d ) . T h a t w h i c h h a p p e n s o u t s i d e t h e t ex t t akes p l ace
as w r i t i n g b u t i s n o t r e -p re sen ted i n t h e t ex t . We c o u l d say
t h a t w r i t i n g i s t h e very h a p p e n i n g o f an o u t s i d e t h a t r e m a i n s
in the t ex t , b u t on ly as a s i lence, l ike t h e voix narrative of
w h i c h B lancho t s p e a k s . 1 We c o u l d a l so say t h a t w r i t i n g "for
g e t s " itself a n d t h a t th is has u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s ; si lence af
f irms itself in w r i t i n g w i t h o u t h a v i n g the s t r eng th to say itself.
I n o u r first c h a p t e r we s a w h o w in a r t t he c r e p u s c u l a r
p a r o x y s m a l i t y o f n a k e d m a t t e r s u d d e n l y m a k e s a n o b s c u r e
" a p p e a r a n c e . " Levinas s h o w s this to us in his e v a l u a t i o n of
a r t f rom b o t h " L a réal i té e t s o n o m b r e " a n d t h e sec t ion f rom
Existence and Existents w h o s e t i t le quie t ly s u m s up t h e u n i q u e
a t m o s p h e r e he f inds in a r t : "Ex i s t ence w i t h o u t a W o r l d [Ex
is tence sans M o n d e ] . " 2 H e m a k e s i t c lear i n t h e l a te r w o r k
t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f m a t t e r t h a t in teres ts h i m i s n o t s o m e stuff
t h a t i s u t te r ly re f rac tory to m i n d , b u t i s i n s t ead t h a t m a t t e r
w h i c h c a n only a p p e a r i n p o e t r y (bu t nameless ly a n d w i t h o u t
a n y ob jec t iv i ty ) . 3 He refers to t h a t aspec t o f m a t t e r w h i c h i s
l i be ra t ed w h e n , via a r t , o u r r e l a t ions w i t h the w o r l d (wi th
usefulness a n d w o r k ) a re neu t ra l i zed . As we have seen in o u r
f i rs t chap te r , th i s n e u t r a l i z a t i o n is the very even t of a r t a n d i t
i m m e r s e s us in an a t m o s p h e r e w h e r e space is w i t h o u t a h o r i
z o n , w h e r e " [ n ] a k e d e l emen t s , s imple a n d a b s o l u t e [É léments
n u s , s imples e t a b s o l u s ] " de t ach themse lves f rom th ings a n d
are "cast towards us like c h u n k s that have weigh t in t h e m
selves [se jettent sur n o u s des choses c o m m e des m o r c e a u x qu i
s ' i m p o s e n t pa r e u x - m ê m e s ] . " 4 I m p o r t a n t l y , this c h a o t i c m a t
ter i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n t h a t m a t t e r w h i c h i s "def ined by m e c h a
nistic laws w h i c h w r i n g o u t its w h o l e essence a n d r e n d e r i t
intel l igible [définie p a r les lois mécan i s t e s qu i en épu i s a i en t e t
la r e n d a i e n t i n t e l l i g ib l e ] . " 5 I t is no t , however , t h e s a m e thing
as th i s inter-essed ma t te r . I t i s n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g as m a t t e r
t h a t is f o r m e d , t h a t is s o m e item t h a t rests in a se t t ing , a w o r l d ,
a n d t h a t is, as Heidegger p u t s it, zuhandensein. Aesthet ic ma t t e r
i s n o t des t ined to the h a n d , t o the subject , o r t o a n y user c o m
muni ty . I t i s ins t ead m a t t e r des t ined only to appear, a n d on ly
i n poe t ry , b u t w i t h o u t be ing n a m e d .
Bu t th i s o t h e r des t iny o r o t h e r a spec t to m a t t e r i s n o t a
n e w q u a l i t y t h a t a r t d i scovers (and w o u l d , the reby , c o n t r i b u t e
to t h e intell igibil i ty of the w o r l d ) . I t i s n o t a qua l i ty t h a t w o u l d
be poe t ry ' s offering to science a n d ph i losophy , cu l tu re a n d
psychology. T h a t w h i c h a r t d iscovers , o r uncove r s , o r lays b a r e
wil l n o t be f o u n d u n d e r a n y encyc loped ic subjec t h e a d i n g . To
p u t i t very s imply : a r t i s useless mat te r . I t i s m a d e up of useless
m a t t e r a n d uselessness i s n o t o n e of ma t t e r ' s qua l i t i es . (It is,
A g a m b e n w o u l d say, s o m e t h i n g like a " h a l o [ a u r e o l a ] . " ) 6 We
m a y say, however , t h a t uselessness i s o n e of ma t t e r ' s " p o s s i
b i l i t ies ." But w h a t does th is m e a n , a n d w h a t does i t m e a n t h a t
on ly in a r t does this "poss ib i l i t y" a p p e a r as such? D o e s i t m e a n
t h a t a r t real izes t h e poss ibi l i ty o f uselessness a n d p u t s i t t o
w o r k ( a n d t h e r e b y b e t r a y s it)?
In his essay "Charac t e r i s t i c s of the W o r k of A r t , " B l ancho t
says (in t e r m s t h a t a re close to b o t h Levinas a n d He idegger )
t h a t "if t he scu lp to r uses s tone a n d i f t he r o a d bu i lde r a lso
uses s tone , the first uses i t in a w a y t ha t i t is n o t used, c o n s u m e d ,
n e g a t e d by u sage , b u t aff i rmed, r evea led in i ts obscur i ty , as a
r o a d t h a t l eads on ly to itself [si le s cu lp t eu r se ser t de la p ie r re
I I I I \ I I
et si le c a n t o n n i e r aussi se sert de la p ier re , le p remier l 'utilise
de telle sor te qu 'e l l e n ' e s t p a s uti l isée, c o n s o m m é e , niée p a r
l ' usage , ma i s affirmée, révélée d a n s son obscu r i t é , c h e m i n qu i
n e c o n d u i t q u ' à elle m ê m e ] . " 7 T h e a r t w o r k , l ead ing t h e s t o n e ,
as i t w e r e , back to itself ( b u t d id i t ever leave itself?) " m a k e s
w h a t d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e ob jec t a p p e a r [fait a p p a r a î t r e ce qu i
d i s p a r a î t d a n s l ' o b j e t ] . " 8 I t i s m a t e r i a l t h a t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o t h e
objec t , a n d " t h e m o r e t h e ma te r i a l i s a p p r o p r i a t e — t h e m o r e i t
nears no th ingness [plus la m a t i è r e { . . . } es t a p p r o p r i é e , p lus
elle se fait p r o c h e de r i e n ] . " 9 But in the a r t w o r k th is m a t t e r i s
p r e se rved . " T h e s t a tue glorifies the m a r b l e , " B l a n c h o t says ,
e c h o i n g b o t h Lev inas a n d He idegge r , a n d t h e a r t w o r k "is
e m i n e n t l y that of w h i c h it is made [est é m i n e m m e n t ce dont
elle est faite]."]0 H o w e v e r ,
T h e p a i n t i n g i s n o t m a d e f rom m a t e r i a l i ng red ien t s
a d d e d to a c a n v a s ; i t is t he p resence of this ma t t e r ,
w h i c h w i t h o u t i t w o u l d r ema in h i d d e n t o us . A n d t h e
p o e m l ikewise i s n o t m a d e w i t h ideas , o r w i t h w o r d s ,
i t i s t h e p o i n t f rom w h i c h w o r d s begin t o b e c o m e the i r
a p p e a r a n c e , a n d the elemental depth u p o n w h i c h th is
a p p e a r a n c e i s o p e n e d wh i l e a t t h e s a m e t i m e i t c loses .
[Le t a b l e a u n ' es t p a s fait à pa r t i r de la toi le et avec des
ing réd ien t s maté r ie l s , i l est la p résence de ce t te m a t i è r e
q u i s ans lui n o u s res te ra i t c achée . E t l e p o è m e e n c o r e
n ' e s t p a s fait avec des idées, n i avec des m o t s , m a i s i l
e s t ce à p a r t i r de q u o i les m o t s d e v i e n n e n t l e u r
a p p a r e n c e et la profondeur élémentaire su r l aque l le
ce t t e a p p a r e n c e est o u v e r t e e t c e p e n d a n t se r e f e r m e . ] 1 1
T h e w o r k o f a r t r equ i res ma te r i a l s jus t l ike ob jec t s d o .
Plas t ic , ink , c a n v a s , a n d m a r b l e a r e necessary t o a r t , a n d m a r
ier can be used in such .1 way that it vanishes in to its uses. But
art uses m a i l e r such that it is wwused, w o r k l e s s , idle, useless.
Art s imply causes the m a r b l e t o " a p p e a r , " n o t t o d i s a p p e a r
into use. In poet ry l ikewise, w o r d s , de tached from referentiality,
s u d d e n l y m a k e a ma te r i a l a p p e a r a n c e . I t is t he a p p e a r a n c e of
m a t t e r t h a t is, eminent ly , w h a t the w o r k of a r t i s m a d e of. N o t
m a t t e r in its th ing ly reali ty, b u t in its a p p e a r i n g as such. N o t
th ing l iness , b u t t h e image of mat te r . I m a g i n a r y ma t t e r , i f y o u
prefer. I t i s u n e m p l o y e d mat te r , o r t h a t a spec t of m a t t e r t h a t
r e m a i n s a l w a y s p r io r to its be ing m a t e r i a l for th is o r t h a t . A r t
¿5 u n u s e d , u n e m p l o y e d , a n d idle mat te r . Ar t , in s h o r t , is t h e
image of mat te r . I c a n d i s m a n t l e the t emple a n d bu i ld a r o a d
w i t h t h e m a r b l e , b u t I c a n n o t d i s m a n t l e the image t he t e m p l e
e m i n e n t l y is. I c a n cas t cel lu loid in to the fire b u t I c a n n o t m a
n i p u l a t e t h e m o t i o n p ic tu re itself. I c a n n o t even t o u c h it .
I t a p p e a r s . I t d i s a p p e a r s . At t h e s a m e t ime . For, th i s i m a g e
of m a t t e r t h a t p recedes its d i s a p p e a r a n c e in to the ob jec t ( the
t h i n g t h a t sett les i n t o t h e famil iar h o r i z o n s of t h e w o r l d ) i s
n o t in t u r n the ma te r i a l for a pe r cep t i on . T h a t i s w h y B l a n c h o t
says t ha t the so-called elemental dep th i s " o p e n e d " bu t " a t the
same t ime i t c loses ." Levinas says tha t "pa radox ica l as i t m a y
seem, pa in t ing is a struggle wi th sight [si p a r a d o x a l que cela
puisse para î t re , la peinture est une lutte avec la v i s ion]" for " s igh t
seeks to d r a w o u t of the l ight be ings i n t eg ra t ed i n t o a w h o l e
[elle che rche à a r r a c h e r à la lumiè re les ê t res in tégrés d a n s un
e n s e m b l e ] . " 1 2 I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r — m a t t e r t h a t i s its o w n image
a n d t h a t on ly a p p e a r s i n p o e t r y (bu t r e m a i n s unseen , u n o b
served, unperceived, silent)—is ma t t e r as such, in its ipseity or
origin. ( W h a t is ipseity if n o t origin, anteriority, someth ing as
itself, as such, pr ior to its predicat ive involvements in the wor ld?)
Uselessness , we have sa id , i s n o t a qual i ty . I t will n o t be
f o u n d in a n y list o f qual i t ies t h a t w o u l d d i s t ingu ish mat te r .
Yet, i t i s on ly as useless t h a t m a t t e r is m a d e to a p p e a r as such ,
as i t se l f—unformed , unth ingly , a n d u n i l l u m i n a t e d . Useless,
aes the t ic ma t t e r i s ne i ther g r a p h i c n o r acous t i c . To be s u r e , in
the t emp le m a r b l e i s revea led as u n e m p l o y e d m a t t e r a n d i t
c a n appear , to the i n d u s t r i o u s engineer , as ma te r i a l for a r o a d
(especially since the g o d s have l o n g since fled t h e t e m p l e a n d
r e p l i c a n t t emp le s m a d e o f o t h e r m a t e r i a l s exist e l s ewhe re a s
m u s e u m pieces, t h u s r ender ing the ba re existence of this t emple
super f luous ) . Th i s i s jus t t he p o i n t . No o n e sees t he useless-
ness of mat te r . O n e sees ma te r i a l for th is or t h a t . M a t e r i a l i t y
itself h a r b o r s itself in its o w n visibility. T h a t is its obscur i ty . In
i ts use lessness , u n c l o t h e d by f o r m s , i t w i t h d r a w s f rom p e r c e p
t i o n . W h e n the gods h a v e fled the t e m p l e a n d w h e n even the i r
flight h a s been fo rgo t t en , B l ancho t says in this essay, t h e n t h e
t e m p l e is no longer a t e m p l e a n d i t r e t u r n s to itself, w i t h o u t
ever h a v i n g d e p a r t e d f rom itself, in i ts sheer, o b s c u r e , a n d
u n p e r c e i v e d p resence . I t r e t u r n s to ma te r i a l i t y itself, i ts o r i
g in , w i t h o u t any p r o p e r n a m e o r p lace i n the w o r l d . M a t e r i a l
ity (or aes the t i c , o r i m a g i n a r y m a t t e r ) i s t h e n a m e given to
m a t t e r itself—that s t r ange b o d y w h i c h h a s no p r o p e r n a m e
s ince its p re sence r e m a i n s unperce ived . Insofa r as i t h a s no
p u r p o s e a n d serves n o p u r p o s e , a r t affirms th i s name le s snes s :
t h e very fact of the il y a, as Levinas s a y s . 1 3 It is an a f f i rmat ion
t h a t d e f o r m s all w r i t i n g a n d t h a t m a k e s o f all w r i t i n g an e r o
s ion o f t h a t p r o p r i e t y w h i c h p laces the th ings o f the w o r l d
w i t h i n o u r g r a s p . Such d e f o r m e d w r i t i n g w o u l d b e p o e t r y : t h e
very difference or d ivergence of t h e visible f r o m t h e invis ible .
In the r e n o w n e d passage t h a t immed ia t e ly fo l lows "Ex i s t
ence w i t h o u t a W o r l d , " Levinas descr ibes "ex i s t ence w i t h o u t
e x i s t e n t s " (wh ich a m o u n t s t o the s a m e th ing , s ince ex i s t en t s ,
o r be ings , b e l o n g to a w o r l d ) . He says :
Let us i m a g i n e all be ings , t h ings , a n d p e r s o n s , rever t
ing t o n o t h i n g n e s s . O n e c a n n o t p u t this r e t u r n t o n o t h -
B I A N ( I I 0 I
ingness ou t s ide ol all events . But wha t ol this n o t h i n g
ness itsell? S o m e t h i n g w o u l d h a p p e n , i f on ly t h e n igh t
a n d si lence of n o t h i n g n e s s . T h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y of th is
' s o m e t h i n g is h a p p e n i n g ' is n o t the i n d e t e r m i n a c y of a
subjec t a n d does n o t refer to a subs t an t i ve . Like t h e
thi rd person p r o n o u n in the impersonal form of the verb,
i t designates no t the uncertainly k n o w n a u t h o r of t h e
ac t i on , b u t the cha rac te r i s t i c o f this ac t ion itself w h i c h
s o m e h o w h a s n o au thor . Th i s i m p e r s o n a l , a n o n y m o u s ,
ye t i n e x t i n g u i s h a b l e " c o n s u m m a t i o n " o f be ing , w h i c h
m u r m u r s in the d e p t h s of n o t h i n g n e s s itself we shall
des igna te by the t e r m there is. T h e there is, i n a s m u c h
as i t resis ts p e r s o n a l fo rm, is ' b e ing in gene ra l . '
[ I m a g i n o n s l e r e t o u r au n é a n t de t o u s les ê t res : c h o s e s
e t p e r s o n n e s . I l est imposs ib le de p lacer ce r e t o u r au
n é a n t en d e h o r s de t o u t é v é n e m e n t . M a i s c e n é a n t lui-
m ê m e ? Q u e l q u e c h o s e se passe , fût-ce la nu i t e t la si
lence du n é a n t . L ' i ndé t e rmina t i on de ce ' q u e l q u e c h o s e
se p a s s e , ' n ' e s t p a s l ' i n d é t e r m i n a t i o n du sujet , ne se
ré fè re p a s à un subs t an t i f . Elle d é s i g n e c o m m e le
p r o n o m d e l a t r o i s i è m e p e r s o n n e d a n s l a f o r m e
impersonne l le du verbe , n o n po in t un au teu r ma l c o n n u
de l ' a c t i on , m a i s l e c a r a c t è r e de ce t te ac t i on e l l e -même
q u i , e n q u e l q u e m a t i è r e , n ' a p a s d ' a u t e u r , q u i es t
a n o n y m e . C e t t e ' c o n s o m m a t i o n ' i m p e r s o n n e l l e ,
a n o n y m e , m a i s i n e x t i n g u i b l e d e l ' ê t r e , ce l l e q u i
m u r m u r e au fond du n é a n t l u i - m ê m e , n o u s l a f ixons
p a r le t e r m e d ' i l y a. Mil y a, d a n s s o n refus de p r e n d r e
u n e f o r m e pe r sonne l l e , es t 1 ' ' ê t re en g é n é r a l ' . ] 1 4
T h i s c r epuscu l a r event i s t h e wr i t e r ' s m o s t q u o t i d i a n mi -
i . As we s a w in o u r first chap te r , a r t i s t s w o r k w i t h i m a g e s .
T h e y w o r k wi th that w h i c h resists w o r k a n d which ba lks a t
p e r s o n a l fo rm. T h e y w o r k wi th in t h e i m a g i n a r y mil ieu t h a t
p recedes the w o r l d a n d its in te res t s , a mil ieu w h e r e no o n e
p r o p e r l y be longs . In his f a m o u s essay " T w o Vers ions o f t h e
I m a g i n a r y , " B l ancho t a sks :
Bu t w h a t i s t h e image? W h e n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g , t h e
i m a g e f inds in th is n o t h i n g its necessa ry c o n d i t i o n , b u t
t he r e i t d i s a p p e a r s . T h e image needs the neu t ra l i ty a n d
t h e f ad ing o f the w o r l d ; i t w a n t s eve ry th ing to r e t u r n
to the indifferent deep w h e r e n o t h i n g i s aff i rmed; i t
t ends t o w a r d the i n t imacy o f w h a t still subsis ts in t h e
vo id .
[Mais qu 'es t -ce que l ' image? Q u a n d i l n 'y a r ien, l ' image
t r o u v e l à sa c o n d i t i o n , m a i s y d i s p a r a î t . L ' i m a g e
d e m a n d e la neu t ra l i t é e t l ' e f facement du m o n d e , elle
veu t q u e t o u t r en t r e d a n s l e fond indifférent où r ien ne
s 'affirme, elle t e n d à l ' in t imi té de ce qu i subs is te en
c o r e d a n s l e v i d e . ] 1 5
I n f o r m u l a t i o n s t h a t have b e c o m e s o famil iar t o u s , w e
m a y say t h a t t h e i m a g e , a r t , o r p o e t r y ( insofar a s p o e t r y be
gins on ly w h e n w o r d s b e c o m e the i r o w n image) i s t h e p r e s
ence o f absence , t h e imposs ib i l i ty t h a t n o t h i n g n e s s (or d e a t h )
b e p r e s e n t i n p e r s o n . Or , w e m a y say t h a t w h e n e v e r y t h i n g
d i sappea r s , d i s appea rance itself " a p p e a r s . " These fo rmula t ions
r e m a i n helpful on ly insofar a s we r e m a i n a t t en t ive t o the i r
obscur i ty , for they do n o t clarify the n o t i o n o f an " e l e m e n t a l
d e p t h " t h a t B l a n c h o t involves u s in. I t r e m a i n s o u r t a s k t o
t h i n k t h a t i t is in l a n g u a g e , in w r i t i ng , t h a t n a k e d ex i s tence is
t o u c h e d , n o t in the w o r l d (in w h i c h I con t i nua l l y h ide f r o m
my e x p o s u r e a n d c a n flee my responsib i l i t ies like J o n a h ) . But
r. i A I N i i i i i i / .1
at the s a m e t u n e , there is n o t h i n g o t h e r t han the w o r l d , n o t h
ing beyond it, or only the no th ing . Wri t ing says , each t ime ,
there is (nothing else, more, or beyond). An O r p h i c g lance
can de tach from the t h i n g of the w o r l d its p red ica tes , its k n o w -
abili ty, its fea tures a n d d i s t ingu ish ing m a r k s , its h i s to ry a n d
its f o r m — n o n e o f w h i c h a r e o t h e r t h a n i t a n d all o f w h i c h
t o u c h u p o n its ipseity. A n d i t is t he re , in this d e t a c h m e n t , " b e
side itself," as an o r ig ina ry image , t h a t the t h i n g t akes p lace .
A r t " s h o w s " th i s . T h e d e t a c h m e n t i s i ts " e a c h t i m e " — a sin
gular , a r t i cu l a t ed ins t an t , a fatal a n d dy ing i n s t a n t u n a b l e to
give itself its e n d . W r i t i n g gives th is to us as such; b u t we c a n
n o t g r a s p th i s "g i f t , " for i t is no - th ing- l ike . I t is h o w i t is. By
t h e s a m e t o k e n , the be ing of w r i t i n g itself i s "bes ide itself" in
poe t ry .
Ex is tence (or Being) t akes p lace in poe t ry , n o t in the w o r l d
(whe re i t is d i s s e m i n a t e d in th ings ) , because p o e t r y is w i t h o u t
a w o r l d a n d w i t h o u t ex i s t en t s (or be ings) . But t h e r e i s n o t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n t h e w o r l d . L a n g u a g e i s t h e say ing of th is fatality. I t
r e t u r n s ex is tence to "itself" (never hav ing left itself) jus t a s , a t
t h e e n d o f its i t inerary , t h e t e m p l e ( the W o r k ) r e t u r n s to it
self—to t h a t w h i c h i t a l r e a d y no longer w a s . Th i s i s its p u r e
e x p o s u r e t o i r reparabi l i ty , a s G i o r g i o A g a m b e n w o u l d say a n d
as we shall d iscuss in o u r n e x t chapte r . T h e secret o f its o b s o
lescence i s th is " a l r e a d y no l o n g e r " t h a t descr ibes its o r ig in .
A l r e a d y no longe r a t h i n g , ne i ther m e a n t n o r s h o w n , its be ing
i s its be ing- toward- i t se l f , t o w a r d its d e a t h , t h a t a t e ach in
s t a n t a r res t s its b e i n g - t o w a r d , l ike the superf lui ty of an in
s t a n t t h a t m u s t e n d u r e its no longe r h a v i n g t i m e . T h i s i s l ike
wise t h e essence of H e i d e g g e r i a n f in i tude : a t each i n s t a n t o n e
h a s a l r e a d y r u n o u t of t ime a n d death is possible (bu t t he r e is
no longer a n y t ime d u r i n g w h i c h o r in w h i c h to d ie , a s B lancho t
inflects i t ) . T h e u n c a n n y p resence o r pers i s tence o f t h e c o r p s e ,
o r t h e w o r k o f a r t , real izes this e n i g m a .
Wri t ing , then , exposes or "exscribes" 1 6 a cer ta in res i s tan t
mate r ia l i ty of wh ich we can only say " the re is." W h e n we
speak of ipseity or o r ig in , as we do a b o v e , we are ind ica t ing
a n a b s o l u t e p a s t , i m m e m o r i a l l y p a s t ( s ince i t w a s n e v e r
p r e sen t ) , a n d its on ly " l i f e " is in its pers i s tence in t h e i m a g e of
t h e t h ings o f the w o r l d , b u t w i t h o u t its p r o p e r l y " b e l o n g i n g "
t o t h e w o r l d a n d t h e w o r l d ' s p e r s o n a l f o r m s . T h e t e m p l e t h a t
r e t u r n s to its o r ig in , to i ts mater ia l i ty , to itself, a l so d i s a p p e a r s
in to itself a n d b e c o m e s its o w n u n n a m a b l e i m a g e , reckless
a n d u n g r a s p a b l e . / cannot touch the earth, for I am it, in an
uncontrollable identification whose intimacy is its dispersion.
T h e a r t i s t c a n n o t r each mater ia l i ty , for ma te r i a l i ty exc ludes
au tho r i ty . T h e very life of mate r ia l i ty is its u n c a n n y pers is
tence in t h e w o r k of a r t (or the corpse) a n d its d i s a p p e a r a n c e
i n t o t h ings t h a t res t i n the h o r i z o n s o f the w o r l d . T h u s we
m u s t n o t env i s ion a n i n d e p e n d e n t , g l o r i o u s , a n d p u r e p r e -
p red ica t ive life. W e m u s t t h i n k s o m e " i t " t h a t r e m a i n s a l w a y s ,
as i t w e r e , " b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e s . " U n s a i d each t i m e , i ts life i s
on ly its t r ans la tab i l i ty , its e x p o s u r e to be ing sa id . I t i s m a d e
up solely of ve r s ions . Its life is in t h a t v ib r a t i on w h i c h m a k e s
i t s ensa t iona l a n d leaves i t a l w a y s a t t h e t ip of my t o n g u e .
A g a m b e n defines i t a s " p u r e l y l inguist ic e x i s t e n c e " a n d o n e
t h a t , a l w a y s s l i p p i n g f r o m m y t o n g u e , r e m a i n s s t r i c t l y
u n f o r m u l a i c , b u t i s eminen t ly r e fo rmula i c ( and w h o s e only
life i s i ts r e f o r m u l a t i o n s , or its t r aces , as D e r r i d a a n d Lev inas
w o u l d say.)
I n th is w a y w e c o m e very c lose t o t h e o ld p r o b l e m o f
s c h e m a t i s m f rom Kan t ' s Critique of Pure Reason a n d to t h e
m y s t e r i o u s " a r t concea l ed i n t h e d e p t h s o f t h e h u m a n s o u l . " 1 7
Recal l t h a t the s c h e m a p rov ides an imag e for a c o n c e p t a n d
t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n of the s chema is called s c h e m a t i s m . N o w , a
s c h e m a i s n o t an image a n d s c h e m a t i s m i s n o t i m a g i n a t i o n ,
bu t they are happi ly i e la ted . The schema " s h a r e s " wi th t h e
image s o m e cha rac t e r i s t i c , bu t th is sha r ed cha rac te r i s t i c h a s
its own nature. It is ne i ther a s imple aspec t (a " th i s h e r e " ) n o r
a r e p r o d u c t i o n (of an a b s e n t " th i s h e r e " ) . T h e s h a r e d c h a r a c
ter is t ic is ca l led , by Heidegger , in defau l t of a p r o p e r n a m e of
i ts o w n , a schema-image.™ T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is t h e i m a g e of
a c o n c e p t , an image of t h o u g h t , a n d i t is t h a t by v i r tue of
w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r c a n no longer be jus t a n y t h i n g a t all , a n d
b e c o m e s ins tead o n e a m o n g m a n y l ike it . T h i s i s the essence
o f h u m a n inte l l igence: t h e s u b s u m p t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r s u n d e r
universals. By means of the schema-image, the part icular becomes ,
in s h o r t , an " e x a m p l e of . . ." I m p o r t a n t l y , in b e c o m i n g an
example , the par t icular relinquishes its prelinguistic indé te rmina
t i o n a n d acqu i r e s all i t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s because , as an e x a m p l e ,
it need not appear as in fact it actually does appear. T h i s l ib
e r a t i o n f r o m ac tua l i ty is necessary for i t to be s u b s u m e d u n
de r the un iversa l . As an e x a m p l e , it is necessarily contingent
( t h a t is, i t m u s t be ab le to a p p e a r o t h e r w i s e t h a n in fact i t d o e s
a p p e a r o r i t c o u l d n o t be r ecogn ized a s w h a t i t is) . T h e r e is ,
t h e n , no actual s c h e m a - i m a g e . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a pos
sible p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e " r u l e " of p r e s e n t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d by
t h e s c h e m a . I t i s an a n t e r i o r profile i n t o such a t h i n g (bu t t he r e
i s no such th ing) as a gene ra l f o r m of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e ,
a house- in -genera l . T h e s chema- image is a r ep re sen ta t ion (Vor-
stellung) t h a t m u s t p r ecede a n y a c t u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s i s
t h e " a r t " h i d d e n d e e p in o u r sou l s . I t i s t h e " p r o d u c t i o n " o f
t h a t w h i c h is, a s W i l l i a m J . R i c h a r d s o n says , " n o t t h e m a t i z e d
a t a l l , " 1 9 o r o f t h a t w h i c h is , A g a m b e n wil l say, ne i ther univer
sal n o r p a r t i c u l a r . 2 0 T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a potentia, or, as
A g a m b e n says , a " h a l o . " 2 1 It is t h e p a r t i c u l a r with all its predi
cates, no o n e o f w h i c h o r no c o m b i n a t i o n o f w h i c h , h o w e v e r ,
d i s t ingu i shes i t as w h a t i t is. I t is n o t , He idegge r r eminds us , a
descript ion that enumerates a list <>f characteristics. The mind
d o e s n o t w o r k from a n imag ina ry inventory . N o pa r t i cu l a r
t h i n g c a n c la im to be the only poss ib le e x a m p l e . We will r e
t u r n t o K a n t i a n s c h e m a t i s m w h e n , i n o u r n e x t chap te r , w e
d iscuss A g a m b e n ' s pol i t ics . W e b r i n g i t u p n o w t o i nd ica t e t h e
r ad ica l d i r ec t ion a n d o r i e n t a t i o n o f B lancho t i an t h o u g h t t o
w a r d t h e " e l emen ta l d e p t h s , " a n d t h e icy imag e t h a t p recedes
t h e rea l a n d t h a t the rea l s inks b a c k i n t o i n t h e a r t w o r k , t h e
p o e m , t h e récit.
W e c a n see he re t h a t t h e s o u r c e o f a n y d e t e r m i n a t e i m a g e ,
objec t , o r for t h a t ma t te r , a n y h i s to ry o r n a r r a t i v e (any " th i s
h e r e " or a n y a b s e n t " th i s h e r e " ) , i s a " r u l e - i m a g e " t h a t i s n o t
b o u n d to a n y definitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e ru l e - image i s im
pe rcep t ib l e a n d i t van i shes i n t o its " w o r k " of free c o n s t r u c
t i o n (Freibilden). It is a b s e n t / p r e s e n t in a n y definit ive a c t u a l
ity or i mage e x p o s i n g t h a t i t em to all its poss ibi l i t ies , a n d i t is
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n th is e m p t y to ta l i ty t h a t r e m a i n s e m p t y be
cause i t i s never ac tua l i zed or env i s ioned . I t is, in t h e w o r d s of
A g a m b e n o n c e m o r e , the pure heing-in-language of the non-
linguistic (l'essere-nel-linguaggio del nonlinguistico) , 2 2 N e i t h e r
an a s p e c t n o r a r e p r o d u c t i o n , t h i s end less ly p r o l i f e r a t i n g
" d e p t h ' s " on ly essence is its ex is tence in r e f o r m u l a t i o n s — b e
ing n a m e d b u t r e m a i n i n g si lent , ou t s ide the t ex t " i n " t h e t ex t .
T h i s m e a n s t h a t its life is only e x t e n d e d a n d its e n d is only
p o s t p o n e d or r ep r i eved as i t i s e a c h t ime (re)said. T h i s i s w h y
the a n o n y m o u s n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort insists t h a t " t h e
t r u t h will be t o ld , eve ry th ing of i m p o r t a n c e will be t o ld . But
n o t eve ry th ing h a s h a p p e n e d yet [la véri té sera d i te , t o u t ce
q u i s 'est passé d ' i m p o r t a n t sera dit . M a i s t o u t ne s 'est p a s
e n c o r e p a s s é ] , " because "[ i] t m a y be t h a t all these w o r d s a r e a
c u r t a i n b e h i n d w h i c h w h a t h a p p e n e d will never s t o p h a p p e n
ing [Il se peu t que t o u s ces m o t s soient un r ideau der r iè re lequel
ce qu i s 'est j oué ne cessera p lus de se j o u e r ] . " 2 3
IS I A I N l . I I < > I
Proximity
T h e c h a n c e o f r e g a r d i n g t h e w o r l d , o r a n o t h e r
pe r son , from the imposs ib le perspect ive of an infinite d i s t ance ,
or a glacial r e m o t e n e s s , is at t he h e a r t of B lancho t ' s récits a n d
his wr i t i ngs on aes the t i cs , a n d i t i s a l so t h e kerne l of Levinas ' s
éthique (which we m i g h t jus t as well g r o w a c c u s t o m e d to cal l
ing " i m a g i n a r y " in B lancho t ' s sense, because i t is an e th ics
t h a t resists pe r sona l a n d famil iar fo rm) . In fact, to fo l low up
o n t h e r e m a r k s w e m a d e o n Lev inas i n o u r s econd chap te r , w e
m a y keep i n m i n d a s w e r ead B l a n c h o t t h a t t h e aes the t ic d is
t a n c e o r O r p h i c g lance t h a t s o obsesses B lancho t ' s n a r r a t o r s
is, in Levinas ' s t ex t , identified as an infinite responsibi l i ty , or
even an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e c o m p u l s i o n t o be for- the-other , w h i c h
c a n neve r b e satisfied o r used u p . T h i s respons ib i l i ty o p e n s
o n t o a t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h " t h a t t h e O t h e r (Autrui) " p r e
s e n t s " in a visage (or an aspec t , or i m a g e , in t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
sense) t ha t escapes c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n just a s does
t h e " m a t e r i a l i t y " o f w h i c h we speak in the f i r s t sec t ion of th i s
chap te r . F u r t h e r m o r e , th is t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h , " o r th is
t i m e t h a t is en deçà du temps ( the t ime of the " a l r e a d y no
l o n g e r " ) , f rom w h i c h Autrui incessant ly emerges as visage, is
a lso the t ime of " s u b s t i t u t i o n " or complete be ing-for - the-o ther
t h a t f igures as Levinas's m o s t s t r iking a n d m o s t difficult no t i on .
T h i s infinite d i s t ance or glacia l r e m o t e n e s s i s a l so an ex
t r e m e c loseness , c o n t a c t , or proximity in the sense deve loped
at l eng th by Levinas in his Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
l'essence. It " l i v e s " in consc iousnes s as a trace or a pe r s i s t en t
thought t h a t c a n n o t b e t h e m a t i z e d a n d t h a t h a u n t s t h e n a r r a
t o r in t h e s econd divis ion of L'arrêt de mort. T h e o x y m o r o n i c
c o n j u n c t i o n o r d i s junc t ion o f these t w o m o m e n t s — c l o s e n e s s
a n d d i s t ance—is i n t ended to ind ica te a h e t e r o n o m y , or, i f y o u
prefer, a hypocr i t i ca l s c h e m a t h a t is , we m a y say, t o o " w e a k "
to be resolved in s imple images or a n n o u n c e d in t h e m e s . Us
ing B lancho t i an l anguage , we c a n say t h a t p r o x i m i t y neutral
izes space by neu t ra l i z ing the fixity of p resence . As it will be
s p o k e n of he re , p r o x i m i t y i s fore ign to (or i s n o t ident i f iable
in) images o r t h o u g h t . (The s t ra teg ic func t ion o f t h e o x y m o
r o n in all o f B l ancho t a n d L e v i n a s — n o t to m e n t i o n Batai l le ,
N a n c y , L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , a n d even , s o m e t i m e s , H e i d e g g e r —
is prec ise ly to fa t igue a n d freeze t h o u g h t i n t o a su spens ion en
deca d ia lec t ics . T h e " l o g i c " of t h e o x y m o r o n is t h e logic of
the Blanchot ian image , w h i c h , de tach ing the th ings of the w o r l d
f rom thei r i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d , exposes t h e m t o " t h e m
se lves" p r i o r t o the i r m u n d a n e i nves tmen t s . T h e o x y m o r o n
i nd i ca t e s a s c h e m a - i m a g e — a t e r m t h a t is, of c o u r s e , itself
o x y m o r o n i c — o r a n " i m a g e " o f t h o u g h t t h a t neu t ra l i zes t h a t
t h o u g h t ' s th inkabi l i ty . T h e o x y m o r o n i s an i m a g e o f w h a t r e
m a i n s w h e n a t h o u g h t — o r an i m a g e — c a n n o t be a b s o r b e d i n t o
d i s c o u r s e . T h e o x y m o r o n i s a hypocr i t i ca l s c h e m a t h a t d e
t a c h e s t h o u g h t f rom its p o w e r t o c o m p r e h e n d . )
N o w , the d i s t ance referred to he re i s n o t the d i s t ance c o n
sc iousness t a k e s f rom itself in the p o w e r of its for-itselfness by
w h i c h i t m a i n t a i n s itself in its f r eedom a n d a u t o n o m y , as Hege l
t e aches . T h e d i s t ance referred to here is repulsive: i t is t h e
d i s t ance consc iousnes s t akes f rom w h a t is never itself, f rom
w h a t c a n b e desc r ibed a s a b s o l u t e v i ca r iousnes s a n d f r o m
w h o s e a n - a r c h i c kiss the ego is expe l led i n t o itself in a p r o x
imi ty t h a t c a n n o t b e c o m e t r a n s p a r e n t t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s . P r o x
imi ty is a su rp lu s b e y o n d consc iousness ' s abi l i ty to t h e m a t i z e ;
it is a consc iousnes s t h a t is a l w a y s " l o s t , " forgetful of itself, or
t r a p p e d in a delay b e h i n d itself, as Levinas says , because i t
c a n n o t b r i n g i n t o t h e p r e sen t in a Vorstellung (a " p l a c i n g b e
fo r e " ) t h a t w h i c h affects i t . 2 4 I t " f o r g e t s " t o b r i n g t h a t w h i c h
affects i t i n t o a p r e s e n t because i t h a s no m e m o r y of it . Be
c a u s e of th is r e n d e z v o u s en deca t he p re sen t , consc iousnes s
never returns altogether to itself. In a formulation t h a t will
not su rp r i se psychoanalysis, consc iousnes s (the ego) is n o t
ent i rely famil iar to itself because it " i n c l u d e s " in it an a l te r i ty
i t never i n t e n d e d .
T h e infected consc iousness is n o t the / t h a t magis te r ia l ly
d i s t ances itself f r o m t h e w o r l d o r f rom a n o t h e r p e r s o n . T h e
B lancho t i an n a r r a t o r is n o t a p layer in a g a m e of r e l a t i ons . He
(a lways " h e , " il, o r " i t , " a l w a y s , even to the n a r r a t o r , " t h e
n a r r a t o r " ) is i n s t ead invo lved in a s e p a r a t i o n of t i m e f r o m
t ime a n d space f rom space t h a t o p e n s o n t o w r i t i n g because
w r i t i n g is t h e very a p p r o a c h of obscur i ty . As J w r i t e , he (il)
d i s t ances himself wh i l e r e m a i n i n g near , u n a b l e t o a n n e x t h e
space of a p r e s e n t f rom w h i c h or in w h i c h to w r i t e . J c a n n o t
w r i t e w i t h o u t th i s a f f i rmat ion o f d i s t anc ing t h a t d o e s n o t be
l o n g to th is t ime a n d this p lace in w h i c h I wr i t e . But th is i s
a l so t h e f o r m u l a for egois t e n j o y m e n t — t h e e n j o y m e n t of a
ce r t a in h o l i d a y f r o m t h e self.
Fo r e x a m p l e , o n e d a y I m a y r e t u r n h o m e w i t h a s t r ange
des i re to m o v e to a n o t h e r a p a r t m e n t a n d , after a few w e e k s , I
m a y d o jus t t h a t . But t h e n I m a y w i s h t o m o v e t o ye t a n o t h e r
a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h e n yet ano the r , a n d a n o t h e r , a n d s o o n a n d
so o n — u n t i l I am no longe r ab le to " r e t u r n " " h o m e . " I m a y
even , l ike t h e n a r r a t o r in {'arret de mort, m a i n t a i n t h r ee or
four flats a t t h e s a m e t i m e . 2 5 W h a t c a n c o m p e l s o m e o n e t o
m a i n t a i n several a p a r t m e n t s a t o n c e , s ince h e o r she c a n n o t
i n h a b i t t h e m all s imu l t aneous ly?
I m a y give in to th is m a d impu l se because in a n y o n e of
my a p a r t m e n t s I c o u l d enjoy my a b s e n c e f r o m i t a s we l l , a n d
a t t h e s a m e t ime . T h a t is, I c o u l d enjoy the fact t h a t I need n o t
sleep he re w h e r e I am in fact ac tua l ly lying d o w n for t h e n igh t .
I c o u l d ge t u p , d ress , a n d r e m o v e myself to a n y o n e o f my
o t h e r flats. Each o f these o t h e r s ( and t he re need n o t be any
t h i n g special a b o u t t h e m ) s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h o u s e s m y absence ,
shel te r ing , for as long as I ^.m afford them, ano the r , slightly
different , version ol this one thai I am in. Each o n e of t h e m
says t o m e : C o m e . Th i s w o u l d h e very p l ea san t . N o w a n d
t h e n , I m a y even ignore all of my flats a n d r en t o u t a ho te l
r o o m for a n i g h t o r t w o . Or I m a y s p e n d an en t i re n igh t w a n
de r ing the s treets w i t h o u t s leeping a n y w h e r e , pas s ing , s o m e
t imes , in f ront of o n e of my a p a r t m e n t s w h e r e I wil l h a v e left
on t h e l ight a n d t h e te levis ion set in o r d e r to s a v o r all t h e
m o r e t h e poss ib i l i ty of be ing the re . You see, I w o u l d b e l o n g in
a n y o n e a p a r t m e n t on ly by v i r tue of be long ing in each of t h e
o t h e r s . (Is th is n o t t h e p l ea su re b igamis t s seek o u t a n d enjoy?)
E a c h o f these v a r i o u s flats w o u l d h o u s e an a n t i c i p a t i o n o f me
a n d w o u l d w e l c o m e m e ins ide . N o d o u b t , t h e n a r r a t o r o f
L'arrêt de mort s o u g h t o u t a n d en joyed this p l e a s u r e b o r n of
indec i s ion , a n d even jea lous ly g u a r d e d it. ( W h e n , in his a b
sence , a little girl s ta res i n t o a r o o m he r en t s in a h o u s e w h e r e
o t h e r s a re a l r eady living, the n a r r a t o r b e c o m e s fu r ious . He i s
fur ious because , gaz ing a t his ab sence , she t a k e s his p l ace a n d
he r gaze p r ecedes a n d inhab i t s his r o o m , c o n t a m i n a t i n g his
o w n p r e s e n c e / a b s e n c e . ) 2 6
By vir tue of r ema in ing pleased wi th the possibi l i ty of fleeing
f rom flat to flat, the n a r r a t o r f inds himself impl ica ted in a w o r l d
o f flats a n d in va in w o u l d he seek o u t the prec ise m o m e n t he
b e c a m e so impl i ca ted . By v i r tue of t a k i n g p l easu re in the p o s
sibil i ty o f his flight f rom r o o m to r o o m , t h e n a r r a t o r enc loses
himself in h imsel f a n d he enjoys t h e s e p a r a t i o n of subjectivity.
T h e e n j o y m e n t i s precisely t h a t each " h e r e " i s a l so an "e lse
w h e r e . " I t i s n o t the p resence of this r o o m in its a c t u a l pa r
t i cu la r i ty t h a t c o n t e n t s h i m , b u t his s a v o r i n g o f i ts p r o x i m i t y
t o e a c h o t h e r r o o m h e r en t s o u t . T h a t w h i c h h e enjoys i s n o t
p r e sen t , i s n o t c o n s u m e d or used u p , n o t even par t ia l ly . Th i s i s
the on ly w a y the flat he is in c a n t ru ly " m a t e r i a l i z e . " This
a p a r t m e n t i s en joyab le on ly insofar as i t i s e x e m p l a r y of a n y
of his othei apartments. Any this a p a n ment is, if you l ike, t he
schema-image ol all the o the r s a n d it is en joyable only insofar
as it " t o u c h e s " all ol t h e m . Sleeping t o n i g h t so c o n t e n t e d l y in
this flat, he is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e m b r a c e d by all t h e o t h e r s . Sepa
ra ted f rom its p a r t i c u l a r i t y — f r o m its i nd iv idua l , ident i f iable
ex i s tence a t th is o r t h a t a d d r e s s in the c i ty—it d o e s n o t t h e n
b e c o m e insipidly ideal or universa l . Ins tead , its " l i fe , " its " m a
ter ia l i ty ," i s on ly in i ts p rox imi ty . N e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r n o r un i
versa l , i t i s a l r e a d y no longe r an objec t o f consc iousnes s . T h i s
k i n d o f p l easu re d e p a r t s f rom any cogni t ive r e l a t ion t h e nar
r a t o r m a i n t a i n s w i t h a n y pa r t i cu l a r flat. T h e n a r r a t o r i s in
a n y o n e r o o m on ly via a d i s t ance f r o m / c o n t a c t w i t h all t he
o t h e r s he r en t s o u t . He i s in th is r o o m t h a t i s this r o o m o n l y
by v i r tue of its s imilar i t ies to/differences f rom all t h e o t h e r s .
T h i s r o o m " i n c l u d e s " the o t h e r s in it, a n d in th is r o o m , he i s
t h e e c h o o f h imsel f in a n y o f the o t h e r r o o m s . In th is r o o m , as
Lev inas says , t he ego i s " l ike t h e e c h o of a s o u n d t h a t w o u l d
p r ecede the r e s o n a n c e o f th is s o u n d [ c o m m e l ' écho d ' u n son ,
qu i p r écéde ra i t l a r é s o n n a n c e de ce s o n ] . " 2 7
T h e I w h o signs all the r en ta l a g r e e m e n t s a n d t h e checks
to p a y for these flats every m o n t h i s e x c l u d e d f rom t h e p lea
sure o f ego i sm. T h e subject c a n s a v o r th i s i m m e n s e p l e a s u r e ,
b u t on ly f rom an i m m e n s e d i s t ance , as if, as B l a n c h o t says , i t
w e r e s e p a r a t e d by a p la te of glass f rom w h a t i t never the less
en joys , for i t c a n on ly h a v e a d e g r a d e d image or c o n c e p t i o n of
t h a t w h i c h i t en joys . T h e / i s e x c l u d e d f rom p r o x i m i t y a n d
egois t e n j o y m e n t in w h i c h i t i s never the less imp l i ca t ed , b u t
o n l y a t a glacial r e m o v e because t h a t w h i c h the ego en joys , i s
t o u c h e d by, i s in, r e m a i n s inconce ivab le to i n t en t i ona l c o n
sc iousness . T h a t w h i c h i s des i red , s o u g h t o u t , a n d en joyed
p r o x i m a l l y — i n s h o r t the p lace of jouissance—is precisely the
divergence of the particular from the universal. Or , t h e diver
gence of t h e image f rom t h e c o n c e p t . I t i s a d ivergence t h a t
each t unc is s ingular ami exclus ive . Unperce ived , u n i n t e n d e d ,
acc iden ta l , e r r o n e o u s , this d ivergence is the very i n c a r n a t i o n
of the ma te r i a l i ty o f mat ter . Th i s r o o m tha t the n a r r a t o r en
joys is on ly insofar as it is "bes ide itself," t o u c h i n g all its p o s
sibil i t ies.
Such e n j o y m e n t is n o t a t all an e leva ted feeling or a spe
cial sensi t ivi ty to s o m e qua l i t y or a spec t of th is flat in its pa r
t icular i ty . T h e n a r r a t o r c a n n o t identify o r conce ive o f w h a t i s
en joyed . T h e en joymen t , in fact, i s perfect ly negl igible . I t h a s
no digni ty. T h a t i s w h y this ego i sm i s s u p p o r t e d o r r ecogn ized
by t h e subject on ly as a s h a d o w , an unfami l i a r i ty " t o o c l o s e , "
o r a p r o x i m i t y t h a t o v e r w h e l m s self-presence. T h e ego i sm of
th is p l ea su re is "in-itself ," i s s ingu la r a n d a n o n y m o u s , a n d i t
r e m a i n s " in itself" insofar as i t is w i t h o u t se l f - recogni t ion ,
w i t h o u t a p l ea t of ref lect ion, a n d is repuls ive to in ten t iona l i ty .
(The n a r r a t o r ' s fury a t t he little girl w h o spies on h i m in his
absence i s d i rec ted t o t h e fact t h a t she " s a w " h i m w h e n he
w a s " n o t himself ," w h e n he w a s n o t there, jus t as i f she h a d
seen his very egois t p l e a s u r e — w h i c h he himself i s f o r b i d d e n
to " s e e . " W h a t the little v o y e u r saw, in fact, w a s a m o m e n t of
e x t r e m e in t imacy , w h i c h the n a r r a t o r c a n on ly c o n v e y t o the
girl 's m o t h e r i n c o n v e n t i o n a l a n d b a n a l t e r m s : he said t h a t she
h a d spied on h i m w h e n he w a s i n his r o o m w i t h a w o m a n . But
i t w a s in fact t h e p resence o f his absence t h a t he w a s " w i t h "
a n d t h a t the little girl s eemed to be fasc ina ted by.)
To be perfect ly perverse a b o u t it, all o f " t he se t h i n g s " t h a t
" h a p p e n e d to [ the n a r r a t o r ] i n 1 9 3 8 [ces é v é n e m e n t s me s o n t
a r r ivés en 1 9 3 8 ] " 2 8 a r e perfect ly negl igible , u n w o r t h y o f c o m
m e n t a r y , o f n a r r a t i o n . T h e n a r r a t o r does n o t c o m m e n t o n
events o f ser ious publ ic a n d his tor ic consequence t h a t o c c u r r e d
a t a r o u n d th is d a t e a n d t h a t " o c c u p i e d [the n a r r a t o r ' s ] a t t e n
t ion all t he t ime [ m ' o n t occupé t o u s les j o u r s ] , " 2 9 because t h o s e
even t s , he tells us , a re " r o t t i n g away , the i r s to ry i s d e a d , a n d
the hours a n d the life which were then | h i s | a re d e a d t o o
[pourissent, leur histoire est m o r t e , et m o r t e s aussi ces h e u r s
et cet te vie qui a lo rs o n t été les m i e n n e s ] . " ' 0 He r e c o u n t s in
s tead events t h a t , w e m u s t p r e s u m e , a r e n o t (yet) d e a d a n d
t ha t d id no t occupy his a t t e n t i o n a t the t ime . T h e t h ings he
r e c o u n t s d o n o t b e l o n g t o " t h e still p l e a s a n t s h a d o w o f
yes te rday ' s w o r l d [ l ' o m b r e d u m o n d d 'h ie r p la î t e n c o r e ] , " 3 1
b u t ins tead a re th ings t h a t a re n o t l imi ted t o t h e pa s t a n d t h a t
c o n t i n u e t o a t t r a c t h i m even a s h e a t t e m p t s " t o p u t a n e n d t o
it all [met t re fin à t o u t c e l a ] " in wr i t i ng the récit?1
W h a t t h e n a r r a t o r r e c o u n t s , a n d w o u l d like t o e n d , a re
t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t d i s t r ac t ed h i m : his seeing s o m e o n e a g a i n
w h o m h e h a d fo rgo t t en even ex is ted , his mu l t ip l e dwe l l ings ,
t he s t r ange a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e f luc tua t ions in his ( a lways p r e
ca r ious ) hea l th a n d m o o d s (ne i ther o f w h i c h he t a k e s very
ser ious ly) , o d d e n c o u n t e r s w i t h n e i g h b o r s , c o m i n g s a n d g o
ings in a n d o u t o f r o o m s he a n d o t h e r s en te r by m i s t a k e , a n d
his r e l a t i ons w i t h t w o w o m e n (J. a n d N a t h a l i e ) ne i t he r o f
w h o m h e h a s a n y i n t en t i on o f m a r r y i n g (even t h o u g h h e p r o
poses t o o n e o f t h e m ) . N o n e o f these th ings h a d a n y t h i n g t o
do w i t h his i m p o r t a n t a n d c o n s e q u e n t i a l w o r k a s a j ou rna l i s t
a t t h e t ime o f the M u n i c h crisis . T h e s e t h ings he r e c o u n t s a re
some t imes immense ly p l easu rab le , some t imes a n n o y i n g , s o m e
t imes g r a v e , a n d i f he i s n o w (after e igh t yea r s a n d n u m e r o u s
a t t e m p t s ) able to w r i t e of t h e m , i t i s because he sees t h a t they
c o n c e r n on ly himself . 3 3
W h i l e t h e events o f the w a r years a re d e a d , these i nconse
q u e n t i a l h a p p e n i n g s h a v e m a n a g e d t o live o n a n d r e m a i n
u n d e a d a n d u n r e c o r d e d by v i r tue of the i r insignif icance. By
v i r tue of the i r insignif icance, they escape h is tor ica l sc ru t iny
a n d w o r m the i r w a y lackada is ica l ly in to t h e t ime o f his wr i t
ing . But they are n o t i m p o r t a n t t o w r i t e a b o u t n o w , either.
T h e y a re w h a t t h e j ou rna l i s t d id n o t w r i t e a b o u t a t t h e t i m e
because they wen- inessential events , <>i secondary i m p o r t a n c e ,
m e r e everyday life. They were a l ready s u p p l e m e n t a r y to the
t ime of the c o m i n g war. Unlike the M u n i c h crisis, seeing S imone
aga in after he h a d fo rgo t t en she even exis ted is a mere t r i f le—
i t h a p p e n e d w h e n n o t h i n g m u c h else w a s h a p p e n i n g . But in a
ce r t a in sense , these eve ryday events a re pure ly h i s to r ic . T h e y
a re h i s to ry p u r g e d of h i s to r ic even t s , or, t he eve ryday as t h e
p u r e poss ibi l i ty o f h is tory . I m p o r t a n t l y , for t h e p u r p o s e of
a p p r o a c h i n g Blanchot ' s aesthet ics , we m u s t recognize t h a t these
e v e r y d a y even ts already possess the characteristics of writing
and of the image. T h e y a re of s econda ry , inessen t ia l , n o n -
p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e , t h u s they a l r eady o p e n the space o f w r i t
ing. T h e y a re w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n n o t h i n g h a p p e n s , j u s t a s
w r i t i n g on ly h a p p e n s w h e n n o t h i n g h a p p e n s . T h e events t h a t
he wr i t e s of, a n d wishes to be r id of, a r e , f rom t h e first, sec
ondary. T h e y re la te to n o t h i n g of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e . I f he
d id n o t d a t e t h e récit for us a n d m e n t i o n the M u n i c h cris is ,
w o u l d we k n o w t h a t t h e t ime f rame o f t h e n a r r a t i v e i s t h e eve
o f W o r l d W a r T w o ? T h e " t h i n g s " the n a r r a t o r wr i t e s o f w e r e ,
f rom the ou t se t , " t r a c e s " i n the sense m a d e so wel l k n o w n by
D e r r i d a a n d Lev inas .
In his essay " L a réal i té e t son o m b r e , " Levinas tells us t h a t
life solici ts t h e novel i s t w h e n i t a p p e a r s to t a k e t h e f o r m of a
n o v e l . 3 4 (We need on ly recal l t he n a r r a t o r f rom À la Recher
che du Temps Perdu, w h o is a s t o n i s h e d to r e a d a n e w s p a p e r
a c c o u n t o f a m u r d e r t h a t seems to h i m to be t o r n f rom the
p a g e s o f Dos toyevsky . He t h e n c o m e s t o the r ea l i za t ion t h a t ,
of c o u r s e , D o s t o y e v s k y ' s i n sp i r a t ion w a s precisely t h e s a m e : a
n e w s p a p e r a c c o u n t o f a m u r d e r t h a t seemed to be t o r n f r o m
t h e pages o f a novel t h a t he w o u l d t h e n sit d o w n to w r i t e . ) 3 5
Blancho t , however , never, n o t even in his essays , wr i t e s a t t h e
level o f f o rm . He wr i t e s f r agmen t s , a n d he even wr i t e s frag-
menta r i ly a b o u t f ragmentary wri t ing . I t i s n o t fo rm tha t solici ts
Ins n a r r a t o r s . A m o r e obscu re d e m a n d solicits his a t t e n t i o n .
A n a n i o r p h i c , (he f ragment ' s only life is its s e p a r a t i o n f r o m
any w h o l e , any na r r a t i ve , any history. I t c a n n o t be p u t in p lace
a n d there fore d e m a n d s f rom the wr i t e r s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
fo rm. I t d e m a n d s d e s t r u c t i o n . I t d e m a n d s , a s we say a t t h e
o u t s e t of this chap te r , t h a t writing tear itself apart from the
moment it begins to speak:
W r i t i n g i s n o t des t ined to leave t r aces , bu t to e rase , by
t r aces , all t r aces , to d i s appea r in the f r agmen ta ry space
o f w r i t i n g m o r e definitively t h a n o n e d i s a p p e a r s in t h e
t o m b , o r aga in , t o des t roy, t o des t roy invisibly, w i t h
o u t t h e u p r o a r o f d e s t r u c t i o n .
[Écrire n 'est pas dest iné à laisser des t races , ma i s à effa
cer, pa r les traces, toutes traces, à disparaître dans l 'espace
f ragmenta i re de l 'écr i ture , p lus déf ini t ivement que d a n s
la t o m b e on ne d i spa ra î t , ou encore à dé t ru i r e , dé t ru i re
inv i s ib lement , s ans le v a c a r m e de la d e s t r u c t i o n . ] 3 6
All t h e " t h i n g s " t h a t " h a p p e n " in L'arrêt de mort a r e frag
m e n t s , pieces of no w h o l e s , s e p a r a t i o n s in defiance of p r e s
ences . T h a t i s w h a t gives th is a n d his o t h e r récits t he i r pecu
liar a t m o s p h e r e , their " n e w thrill [frisson n o u v e a u ] , " as Levinas
says of t h e m . 3 7 Someone enters by mis take in to a n o t h e r person ' s
r o o m a n d this has u n t o l d consequences because n o t h i n g a b o u t
it , o r t h e t u r m o i l i t causes , a d d s up to a n y t h i n g c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
N o t h i n g o f w h a t the n a r r a t o r despera te ly w a n t s t o say a n d b e
r id of wil l resolve itself in to images , t h o u g h t , c o m m e n t a r y ,
scenes , n a r r a t i v e , or, to s u m i t u p , text. N o t h i n g of w h a t he
w a n t s t o say c a n be p r o p e r l y reflected. In the end , t h a t w h i c h
he w a n t s ( the t r u t h , o f cou r se ) , he says , "is n o t c o n t a i n e d in
these facts . I c a n imag ine supp re s s ing these p a r t i c u l a r o n e s .
But il they did not h a p p e n , 01 others h a p p e n e d in their p lace ,
a n d a n s w e r i n g the s u m m o n s oi the all powerful af f i rmat ion
w h i c h i s un i t ed w i t h m e , they t a k e on the s a m e m e a n i n g a n d
t h e s to ry is the s a m e [n 'es t pas d a n s ces faits. Les faits e u x -
m ê m e s , je puis rêver de les suppr imer . M a i s , s'ils n ' o n t p a s eu
lieu, d ' a u t r e s , à leur p lace , a r r iven t et , à l ' appel de l 'aff i rmation
t o u t e - p u i s s a n t e qui est unie à m o i , ils p r e n n e n t le m ê m e sens
et l 'h is to i re est la m ê m e ] . " 3 8 T h a t is w h y L'arrêt de mort is n o t
a mas te r fu l a t t e m p t to recol lect facts a n d images t h a t a t t h e
t ime seemed negligible b u t t h a t n o w he lp us to env is ion 1 9 3 8
m o r e r ichly a n d m o r e accura te ly . L'arrêt de mort is n o t a re
c o u n t i n g at all. T h e récit gives us a un frisson nouveau be
cause i t is cu r ious ly a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l y alive.
I f t h e n a r r a t o r i s ab le to supp re s s ce r t a in facts a n d a l l o w
o t h e r s to r ep l ace t h e m i t i s because he wr i t e s w i t h o u t a n y f ina l
o r a u t h e n t i c j u d g m e n t . Ei ther this fact o r t h a t o n e c a n " t e l l "
t h e s to ry a n d t h e s to ry will r e m a i n " t h e s a m e " because " w h a t
h a p p e n e d " is a u t o n y m i c . I t i s precisely the res i s tance to deter
m i n a t e f o r m . T h e n a r r a t o r s t ruggles aga ins t , a n d a l so uni tes
w i t h , th is a n a m o r p h i a as i f s u m m o n e d . We are t o ld , in a p o s t
scr ip t (or a su rp lu s t h a t w a s p resen t a t t h e e n d of t h e 1 9 4 8
ve r s ion o f t h e t ex t , de le ted in t h e s econd ed i t ion in 1 9 7 1 , a n d
then r e a t t a c h e d for Lydia Davis ' s beaut i ful Engl i sh t r ans l a
t ion in 1 9 7 8 ) t h a t i f we can " i m a g i n e " the h a n d t h a t wr i t e s
t h e s to ry t h e n r e a d i n g will b e c o m e for us "a se r ious t a s k . " 3 9
Ser ious because the h a n d t h a t wr i t es the sen tences i s d e a d ,
absen t . M o r e absen t even t h a n the e n t o m b e d L a z a r u s (as Blan-
c h o t wr i t e s e l s e w h e r e ) 4 0 w h o m w e can only i m a g i n e a s l iving
a n d n o t as he real ly is.
L'arrêt de mort does n o t a w a i t r eade r ly i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . It
d o e s n o t p rese rve or e n t o m b a d i scourse the r e a d e r i s ob l iged
to l ibe ra te . I t i s itself the very space of d ive rgence . M o s t b a -
nally, i t is t he d ivergence of r e ade r a n d wri ter . In a sense , h o w -
IV I / \ I N 1 I I l > I
ever, luiili readet and wri ter are on the same side, whi le di
verging from both oi them is the wr i t i ng , as Steven Shav i ro
has noted. 4 1 Each oi the inc idents w r i t t e n of in L'arrêt de
mort—J.'s d e a t h , r e tu rn to life, a n d " s e c o n d " d e a t h ; the b o m b
ing o f Paris a n d the n a r r a t o r ' s t a k i n g shel ter w i t h N a t h a l i e
a n d p r o p o s i n g m a r r i a g e to her in a frenzied a n d foreign lan
g u a g e ; the r e t u r n of S i m o n e — e a c h of these inc iden ts is o u t
side the o t h e r s a n d each i s m e m o r a b l e on ly insofar as each
de t aches itself f rom a n y t ime f rame. T h e th ings w r i t t e n a b o u t
in th is récit wil l n o t f o r m a na r r a t i ve . E a c h inc iden t is an inter
r u p t i o n of s o m e t h i n g else. In th is sense they d i spense w i t h t h e
a u t h o r a n d p u s h h i m t o the s a m e side a s t h e r eade r w h o s e
inabi l i ty t o c o n n e c t t h e even ts t o ld o f e c h o t h e a u t h o r ' s o w n
i m p o t e n c e . H e n c e , L'arrêt de mort is n o t a W o r k . It is , as
B l a n c h o t p u t s it , désœuvrement. I t is w n w o r k e d , idle , a n d in
this r ega rd Blanchot ' s aesthetics squares perfectly w i th Levinas 's
ana lys i s of a r t . L'arrêt de mort is work - l e s s . It is an i m i t a t i o n
of t h o u g h t , a s e m b l a n c e of be ing , a n d it is w r i t t e n in a s imu
la ted l a n g u a g e (i.e., a l a n g u a g e t h a t does n o t c o m m u n i c a t e
b u t t h a t s imu l t aneous ly s h o w s a n d concea l s ; w o r d s a p p e a r o n
t h e p a g e on ly t o s ink b a c k in to the i r o w n i m a g e , s o t h a t t h e
difference b e t w e e n be ing a n d a p p e a r i n g i s e r a sed ) .
T h e t ex t we s tudy he re does n o t p rese rve a n y t h i n g . I t i s
i n t e n d e d t o be des t ruc t ive : " t o e rase , by t r aces , all t r a c e s . " 4 2
We wil l n o t be ab le t o conce ive o f w h a t " t h r i l l s " u s a s we r e a d
B lancho t . H i s récit i s n o t w h a t used to be cal led a " p l u r a l "
t ex t . I t does n o t offer itself to a var ie ty of r e a d i n g s , no o n e of
w h i c h w o u l d b e a u t h e n t i c a n d dec idab l e , leaving the r e a d e r
adr i f t i n p l ay fu lnes s . 4 3 I n s t ead , t h e t ex t " p e r f o r m s " its o w n
d i s a p p e a r a n c e . I t " p u t s an end to i t a l l " in w r i t i n g , b u t by
p u t t i n g t h e e n d in w r i t i n g i t r e m a i n s w i t h o u t an e n d the nar
r a t o r c o u l d p u t b e h i n d h im a n d l imit t o t h e pas t . T h e récit
t h u s d i s a p p e a r s by seeking another e n d — a n e n d ye t to c o m e
in a t ime not yet. L'arrêt de mort is the "place" oi the absence
of a p r o p e r e n d , and i t ho lds this place like an echo t ha t p re
cedes the s o u n d i t r e s o u n d s . T h a t is to say, in r e a d i n g t h e
B l a n c h o t i a n récit, we hea r the r eve rbe ra t i on of a s o u n d n o t
ye t h e a r d , f rom a t ime b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e t ex t i s a l
r e a d y an e c h o of a s o u n d (a speak ing , a wr i t ing) to c o m e , b u t
t h a t will never be p r e sen t because i t will itself e c h o t h e e c h o
t h e t e x t a l r e a d y is. N o t a p lu ra l t ex t , L'arrêt de mort is a t e x t
e m p t i e d of all p re sence a n d , w h a t i s m o r e , i t v io lent ly emp t i e s
t ime of all presence . Pu t m o r e s imply a n d m o r e abrupt ly , L'arrêt
de mort de s t roys t ime . T h e p a s t — t h e th ings t h a t h a p p e n e d to
t h e n a r r a t o r i n 1 9 3 8 — a r e n o t offered t o t h e reader , t o t h e
p re sen t , b u t ins tead offered to a fu tur i ty w h o s e c o m i n g o u r
r e a d i n g a l r e a d y echoes . T h e récit i s abso lu te ly indifferent to
" m y t i m e , " " m y d e a t h . " I t sk ips ove r the p r e sen t m o m e n t .
T h a t w h i c h " t h r i l l s " u s t h e n , w h e n w e r e a d B lancho t , i s
t h e d ive rgence a n d d i s junc t ion o f p a s t a n d fu ture . Pas t a n d
fu tu re a re u n h i n g e d because t he re i s no p r e s e n t t o i n su re c o n
t inui ty . (It is, in its way , p r o f o u n d l y pol i t ica l l i t e ra tu re . T h e
e v a c u a t i o n o f the p r e s e n t r e n d e r s t h e fu ture t ru ly f u t u r a l —
i.e., a r ad ica l ly unce r t a in , b u t a l r e a d y t o o near, futuri ty.) T h e
thr i l l i s t h e thr i l l of p rox imi ty . T h e t ex t I r ead is w i t h d r a w n
f r o m my p resence . I t is, a s i t w e r e , b e h i n d glass : t o o c lose a n d
a l so glacial ly indifferent to m e , to my t ime . As I r e a d , I e x p e
r ience t h e t i m e of the absence of t ime , t ime w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t .
E t e r n a l l y c a r e s s e d by fu tur i ty , th i s t i m e wil l n e v e r (have)
en te r (ed) the p r e s e n t because i t will a l w a y s h a v e r e m a i n e d en
deçà du temps.
T h e f ragments the tex t records do no t—le t us be clear a b o u t
t h i s — a w a i t a t ime to c o m e in w h i c h they wil l be s e w n i n t o a
W h o l e , a W o r k . L'arrêt de mort does n o t a w a i t i ts w e l c o m e
i n t o a c o m m u n i t y , c u l t u r e , c ivi l izat ion, or even a l i t e r a tu re .
T h e indifference the t ex t s h o w s to the p r e sen t tells u s t h a t t h e
l ime il a wail s is ihe l ime oi I he forgetting oi l ime , of indiffer
ence lo l une . Il is m this sense that the B lancho t i an t ex t is so
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y rad ica l . His wr i t i ng addresses a t ime o u t s i d e
ini t ia t ive. But this t ime to c o m e — a t ime w h e n t i m e i s fo rgo t
t en—is n o t a c h r o n o l o g i c a l e p o c h after my d e a t h . T h e t i m e
a w a i t e d i s a l w a y s h a p p e n i n g in everyday events t h a t f r a g m e n t
a n d sepa ra te themselves f rom a W h o l e , like the events of L'arrêt
de mort t h a t " c o u l d have h a p p e n e d at a m u c h ear l ie r t i m e
[car t o u t a pu r e m o n t e r à un m o m e n t b ien p lus a n c i e n ] . " 4 4 To
a w a i t t h i s t i m e is to a w a i t fo rge t t i ng (l'attente l'oubli) as
B l ancho t so succinct ly p u t i t in o n e of his m a n y r e m a r k a b l e
t i t les . But fo rge t t ing is n o t a p u n c t u a l even t . I t does n o t p r o p
erly a r r ive a t all . H a v i n g no d u r a t i o n , i t i s over before i t be
g ins , a n d i t c loses in on itself a n d sepa ra t e s itself f rom t ime as
a c h r o n o l o g i c a l flow. Fo rge t t i ng defects f rom t ime a n d f r o m
ini t ia t ive . W h e n t h e t ime of fo rge t t ing c o m e s i t will s imu l t a
neous ly h a v e been fo rgo t t en a n d so t o o wil l h a v e been forgot
t en its a n t i c i p a t i o n .
Let us n o t e t h a t in a d d i t i o n to a thr i l l , L'arrêt de mort is
a l so t h e site of e x t r a o r d i n a r y s t ruggles : J. 's s t ruggle aga in s t
d e a t h , t h e n a r r a t o r ' s s t ruggle t o w r i t e t h e t e x t after several
a t t e m p t s , his s t ruggle w i t h a n d aga ins t t h e " t h o u g h t " t o w h i c h
he gives "a l l [his] s t r eng th [ toute ma f o r c e ] , " 4 5 a n d his s t ruggle
to m a i n t a i n a r e l a t i onsh ip w i t h a w o m a n of w h o m , he says ,
very seriously, " I can say t h a t by ge t t ing involved w i t h N a t h a l i e
I w a s h a r d l y ge t t i ng i nvo lved w i t h a n y o n e [je ne me liais
p r e s q u e avec p e r s o n n e ] . " 4 6 But let u s a l so n o t e the n a r r a t o r ' s
c u r i o u s inabi l i ty t o d e t e r m i n e the facts t h a t w o u l d p r o p e r l y
r e p r e s e n t these s t ruggles . We have a l r e a d y d iscussed t h e a n a -
m o r p h i a of the " s to ry . " Let us n o w cons ide r this in l ight of
t h e n a r r a t o r ' s w o r l d l y i n v o l v e m e n t s .
In a ce r t a in sense , t h e n a r r a t o r seems co ld a n d indif ferent
t o his ro le a s t h e n a r r a t o r w h o w o u l d jud ic ious ly select t h o s e
deta i l s and that l anguage winch can fully app rec i a t e the val-
i ance of J. 's fight to live, as well as the relat ion be tween the
even ts he recites a n d the t imes in wh ich they occur (i.e., t he
eve o f the w a r t h a t n o d o u b t affected t h e m all , n o t t o m e n t i o n
all t he w o r l d ou t s ide the smal l circle o f c h a r a c t e r s we r e a d of
in this récit). N o r does the n a r r a t o r t a k e the t ime to exp l a in
w h a t the first sect ion of the récit has to do w i t h the s econd .
Fur the r , t h e n a r r a t o r seems indif ferent t o his o w n hea l th a n d ,
w h e n he wr i t e s o f J. 's final h o u r s a n d her e x t r a o r d i n a r y cour
age , he r e t a ins a cer ta in journa l i s t i c a loofness t h a t is, a t t h e
very least , d i s a r m i n g .
All t h i s , in fact , i s an effect o f a n a m o r p h i a . W h a t we r e a d
he re is n o t a w h o l e . I t is n o t a s to ry o/"J's c o u r a g e , t h e war , h is
life, or a n y t h i n g else. T h e ent i re récit r e m a i n s a t t h e t h r e s h o l d
of a s tory. T h e n a r r a t o r s tops s h o r t of p r e s e n t i n g s o m e I t t h a t
the s to ry w o u l d be a b o u t . All t h a t he wr i t e s i s jus t a n t e r i o r to
t h e s tory, jus t en deçà t h e story. A n d yet he tells us eve ry th ing ,
a s he p r o m i s e s t o do on the o p e n i n g page . He tells u s every
t h i n g because eve ry th ing i s ou t s ide t h e story. N o t h i n g o f w h a t
he w a n t e d t o say w a s ever p r o p e r l y fo rmed . I t w a s s u d d e n ,
acc iden ta l a n d m o v i n g because i t w a s unp repa red - fo r , unful
filled, a n d failed. A n d i t i s precisely the fai lure of the s to ry a n d
t h e w e a k n e s s o f l a n g u a g e to say i t t h a t c o n t i n u a l l y e x p o s e s
h i m to it, t o these u n p r e p a r e d - f o r even ts t h a t a l t e red h i m be
y o n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n . W h e n B l a n c h o t w r i t e s o n K a f k a , h e
m e n t i o n s Kafka ' s l ifelong se l f - rec r imina t ions , h is e th ica l c r i
ses, his confess ions of fai lure , a n d his c h r o n i c i ndec i s ivenes s . 4 7
B l a n c h o t p o i n t s o u t , however , t h a t i t i s poss ib le to flee one ' s
respons ib i l i t i es by fleeing into t he w o r l d , i n to one ' s ro le as a
m a n o f t h e w o r l d : d i p l o m a t , b u r e a u c r a t , j ou rna l i s t , un ivers i ty
professor , o r h u s b a n d . Even t h o s e w h o m o s t zea lous ly a n d
energet ical ly p u r s u e nob le pol i t ical a n d ethical ends c a n " h i d e "
l ike J o n a h . But Kafka ' s indecis iveness a n d fai lure w e r e neces
sary lor linn to w i n e and to remain face-to-face wi th his re
sponsib i l i t ies , which he saw clearly. To wr i te w a s to live w i t h
his t o r m e n t ami to affirm i t to the po in t of laughter , jus t as t h e
n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort lives wi th a n d loves t h e " t h o u g h t "
t h a t " l ives a n d acts like a p e r s o n even if i t isn ' t exac t ly l ike
o n e [n 'es t p a s t o u t à fait une p e r s o n n e , m ê m e si elle agi t e t vit
c o m m e e l l e ] . " 4 8
At the e n d of the récit, N a t h a l i e tears a p a r t t h e p re t enses
she a n d the n a r r a t o r lived u n d e r in the de l i r ious days t h a t
fo l lowed t h e ins incere p r o m i s e o f m a r r i a g e he m a d e to he r in
t h e M e t r o a s Par is w a s b o m b e d . D u r i n g t h a t t ime , the n a r r a
t o r w a s s t rong ly m o v e d by g rea t e m o t i o n a n d affection for
N a t h a l i e . He felt a " l imi t less impa t i ence to spend t ime [ impa
t ience sans l imite d ' u n t e m p s c o m m u n ] " w i t h her a n d he i s
c e r t a in she felt an e x t r e m e a t t r a c t i o n to h im as w e l l . 4 9 But of
t h a t p a s s i o n he asks :
— w h a t does i t m e a n ? A n d the w o r d ecstasy? W h o h a s
e x p e r i e n c e d the m o s t in tense feeling? O n l y I h a v e , a n d
I k n o w t h a t i t is t he m o s t glacial of all , because i t h a s
t r i u m p h e d over an i m m e n s e defeat , a n d i s even n o w
t r i u m p h i n g over it, a n d a t e ach in s t an t , a n d a l w a y s , so
t h a t t ime no longer exists for it.
[quel est son sens? Et le m o t délire? Q u i c o n n a î t le
s e n t i m e n t le p lus g r a n d ? M o i seul , e t je sais qu ' i l est le
p lus g lacé , car i l a t r i o m p h é d ' u n e i m m e n s e défa i te , e t
m a i n t e n a n t e n c o r e i l en t r i o m p h e et à c h a q u e i n s t a n t
e t t o u j o u r s , de s o r t e q u e p o u r lui i l n ' y a p l u s de
t e m p s . ] 5 0
T h e n a r r a t o r felt m o v e d to live w i t h N a t h a l i e , b u t she de
finitively d i s r u p t e d his e n t h u s i a s m a n d " w a n t e d t o t ea r a p a r t
wi th a / c a l o n s hand the pretenses [they] were living under
[n 'a i t rien voulu de p lus que déchirer , d ' une main ja louse , les
a p p a r e n c e s d a n s lesquelles n o u s v i v o n s ] , " a n d recall h im to
his " p l a c e [ l i e u ] . " 5 ' She t hen h a s a p las te r cas t of her h e a d a n d
h a n d s m a d e for h i m . T h a t i s to say, she offers h im her e t e rna l
d e a t h , a gift (as Levinas 's ana lys is of d e a t h shows) t h a t she
herself will never expe r i ence , will never c ross over i n t o . She
offers h i m as his " p l a c e " the t ime of her dy ing a n d its glaciality,
w h i c h is a l w a y s the m o s t p a s s i o n a t e feeling of all s ince i t ex
c ludes the one -who-d i e s f rom it. She offers h im a t ime in w h i c h
she is a l r e a d y r e m o v e d f rom the w o r l d . I f t he B l a n c h o t i a n
n a r r a t o r c o m e s ac ross to us as a loof a n d d e t a c h e d i t i s b e
cause he i s no longer himself. T h e n a r r a t o r i s affected by a n
o t h e r t ime in w h i c h he i s ab sen t , as we shall see m o r e defini
tively in o u r n e x t sec t ion .
To wr i t e of these th ings i s to r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d of t h e
w o r l d a n d to live w i t h o u t f o r m — i n t h e absence o f the B o o k ,
as B l a n c h o t p u t s it. I t i s to r e m a i n a t t he t h r e s h o l d of lan
g u a g e , of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . N o t a t all a refusal of r e spons ib i l
ity, w r i t i n g uni tes wi th it, refusing to f lee its e x o r b i t a n c e . Wr i t
ing i s the i m i t a t i o n of t h o u g h t , t he s imu la t i on of a c t i o n , a n d
the c o n t i n u a l e x p o s u r e to responsibi l i ty , t h a t i s to say, to the
O t h e r . W r i t i n g is B lanchot ' s e thics a n d his pol i t ics . I t is f o rm
less w r i t i n g , however . I t i s rad ica l ly a m b i g u o u s a n d i t un i tes
w i t h this ambigu i ty . Try to s u m m a r i z e B lancho t ' s essays . T a k e
L'espace littéraire for e x a m p l e . T h e t i t le of the b o o k a n d t h e
essays in i t c o u l d h a r d l y be b r o a d e r in scope a n d m o r e i ncon
clusive , verg ing on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b u t w i t h o u t " p r o d u c i n g " a
" r e a d i n g . " But this i s precisely the s t ruggle aga ins t the B o o k ,
the refusal of t h e p resen t . It is a s t ruggle t h a t t akes p lace as a
m e t i c u l o u s indifference to a given c o m m u n i t y . E m p t i e d of all
d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t e n t s , B lanchot ' s w o r k l e s s w o r k s a re a l r e a d y
t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t ime to c o m e , a b o o k to c o m e (le livre à
H I , / \ I N » . I I l ) I ' 1
Venir), when I une is no longer anchored in the p resen t , in c o n
tinuity. This lune will have been a top i c . W h e n w i t h d r a w a l
in to the w o r l d will have been forgot ten , one ' s r e la t ion to p l ace ,
t o roo tedness , o r to h o m e will have been r u p t u r e d by the h y p o
crit ical con t inu i ty of p r o x i m i t y t h a t ne i ther uni tes in to a w h o l e
n o r sca t te r s i n to d is t inct p a r t s , b u t ins tead exposes o n e to all
t he o t h e r s such t h a t a n y one i s an e c h o o f each , a n d n o n e i s
o r ig ina l .
But i s th is n o t jus t a n o t h e r role in t he w o r l d ? H o w is i t n o t
jus t a n o t h e r ve r s ion of t h e p o e t as consc ience of his t imes? A
consc ience w i t h o u t c o n t e n t s , i f y o u l ike, or con ten t l e s sness as
consc i ence , o r a s t h e p u r e poss ib i l i ty o f consc ience (or e v e n —
w h y n o t ? — G e w i s s e n - h a b e n - w o l l e n ) , b u t a consc ience n o n e
the less , a n d t h u s ass ign ing the p o e t a ro le in g iven socie ty
w h e t h e r or n o t he or she likes it. P e r h a p s this i s t h e case , b u t
t h e r e i s no r o o m in t h e w o r l d for h i m o r her w h o , w r i t i n g ,
refuses t h e w o r l d . N o r i s t he r e a n y r o o m ou t s ide t h e w o r l d .
H e n c e , there is wr i t ing , w h i c h is nei ther/nor. Ne i the r conscience
n o r i ts lack .
En deca du temps
T h e t ime of the " m e a n w h i l e " (I'entretemps), w h i c h
we b r o u g h t o u t i n o u r d i scuss ion o f Levinas ' s aes the t ics a n d
e th ics , i s of obsess ive i m p o r t a n c e to B lancho t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s
o n a r t a n d c o m m u n i t y . T h e t ime o f t h e " m e a n w h i l e " i s t h e
t i m e " p r e s e r v e d " in the w o r k of a r t (Lévinas) , t h e t ime of
w r i t i n g a n d the t ime o f dy ing (Blancho t ) , a n d a l so , we t h i n k ,
t h e t ime of la comunità che viene ( A g a m b e n ) . In his d i scus
s ion o f T i a n a n m e n , A g a m b e n obse rves t h a t the d e m o n s t r a
t o r s m a d e few conc re t e d e m a n d s o f the g o v e r n m e n t a n d these
w e r e read i ly g r a n t e d . 5 2 H e po in t s o u t t h a t t h e s t u d e n t s d id n o t
a c t i n o p e n c o n f r o n t a t i o n t o , o r c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h , t h e s ta te
over recognizable issues. Instead, Agamben says: "The nov
elty of the coining politics is that it will no longer he ¡1 struggle
for the conquest and control of the State, hut a struggle be
tween the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmount
able disjunction between whatever singularity and the State
organization [Poiché il fatto nuovo della politica che viene è
che essa non sarà più lotta per la conquista o il controllo dello
stato, ma lotta fra lo stato e il non-stato (l'umanità), disgiun
zione incolmabile delle singolarità qualunque e dell'organiz
zazione statale]."" (We will t ake up A g a m b e n ' s poli t ics at m o r e
l eng th i n o u r n e x t chap te r , b u t w e w a n t t o say i n a d v a n c e t h a t
he seems to be desc r ib ing a pol i t ics w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n a t e c o n
t en t s , a n d a s u s p e n s i o n of pol i t ica l t ime as i t is o r g a n i z e d by
the S ta te . In this i n t e r r u p t i o n , we g l impse a t ime à venir, b e
y o n d , or, en degà S ta te - t ime . In T i a n a n m e n S q u a r e A g a m b e n
g l impsed an image , in B lancho t ' s sense; an imag e t h a t , in ef
fect, d e s t r o y e d S ta te - t ime , a n d this i s w h y the d e m o n s t r a t i o n
w a s s o mass ive ly c r u s h e d a n d yet h a s c o n t i n u e d t o h a u n t t h e
Sta te ever since.)
T h e r e i s a n o t i o n we w a n t to b r i n g o u t in th i s sec t ion of
o u r s tudy t h a t i s essent ia l to A g a m b e n ' s t h o u g h t b u t i s an t i c i
p a t e d in m a n y pages of w r i t i n g by B lancho t . I t i s t he n o t i o n of
an a b s o l u t e d i s junc t ion . " P r e s e r v e d " in t h e w o r k o f a r t (or
t h e i con , as Lévinas prefers to call t he a r t w o r k ) , t he r e i s t h e
t ime of w r i t i n g or t h e t ime of dy ing t h a t " d o e s n o t let itself be
s i t ua t ed or aff irmed in r e l a t ion to life [ne se laisse s i tuer ou
affirmer d a n s u n r a p p o r t d e v i e ] , " a n d t h a t " d o e s n o t local ize
itself as an event , n o r does i t last in the w a y of a t e m p o r a l
b e c o m i n g ; dy ing does n o t last , does n o t e n d , a n d , p r o l o n g i n g
itself in d e a t h , t ea r s this a w a y f rom the s ta te of a t h i n g in
w h i c h i t w o u l d like to res t peaceful ly [ne se local ise p a s d a n s
un é v é n e m e n t , ni ne d u r e à la faeton d ' u n deven i r t e m p o r e l :
m o u r i r ne d u r e p a s , ne se t e rmine p a s et , se p r o l o n g e a n t d a n s
l.i mort, arrache celle-ci a I'fitat de chose ou elle voudrait se
pacifier]."5 4 Even death does not b r ing an end to dy ing (which
is why all suicides, however beautiful , fail to a t ta in their sough t -
after finale). That d e a t h does n o t c o m p l e t e the m o v e m e n t of
dy ing d i s t u rb s the often t o o facilely u n d e r s t o o d n o t i o n o f h u
m a n f ini tude: t h e e q u a t i o n o f d e a t h w i t h res t a n d p e a c e . Fa r
f rom se t t ing a l imit to dy ing , d e a t h magnif ies its i n c o m p l e t i o n ,
p lac ing it, as i t w e r e , u n d e r glass . Like the t ime of w r i t i n g a n d
o f the i m a g e , i t never achieves the p r e sen t m o m e n t . " I t c a n n o t
give itself t he o the r shore [ne p e u t pas se d o n n e r l ' au t re r i v e ] , " 5 5
Levinas says . T h e t ime o f w r i t i n g a n d the t ime of dy ing dis
r u p t the c o n t i n u i t y o f t ime by dis jo ining pas t a n d fu ture . R a d i
cally p o i g n a n t , I'entretemps is rad ica l ly u n c e r t a i n , r ad ica l ly
unfo reseeab le t ime .
T h e t ime of w r i t i n g a n d the t ime of dy ing a re t h e t ime of
r ad ica l d ivergence o f p a s t f rom fu ture . T h e y a re d i s c o n t i n u
o u s t i m e . T h e t ime of dy ing i s o p e n to a t ime t h a t will never
h a v e been , since i t will n o t have passed t h r o u g h a p resen t .
T h i s t i m e , w h i c h is an o p e n n e s s o n t o a t ime w i t h o u t a p r e sen t ,
i s b o t h t o o r e m o t e a n d t o o near . Void o f d u r a t i o n , th i s d i scon
t i n u o u s t ime h o l l o w s itself o u t , e rases , or exscr ibes itself. I am
n o t comple t e ly sensible or c o n s c i o u s of it. Ra the r , th is d i scon
t inu i ty o r r ad ica l u n c e r t a i n t y ins inua tes itself i n t o c o n t i n u o u s
t i m e a n d i s smugg led i n t o consc iousnes s u n a w a r e s , just as a
ski l led seducer c a n i n a u g u r a t e a s e d u c t i o n in even t h e m o s t
b a n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h o u t once be t r ay ing his o r he r in ten
t i o n s . As s h o u l d be all t o o o b v i o u s , we speak he re o f s o m e
t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y sub t le . In fact, th is vo id - t ime is t h e very
h o l l o w i n g o u t o f t ime t h a t m a k e s c o n t i n u i t y poss ib le in t h e
f i r s t p lace . I t i s l ike an e m p t y speech or an i m a g i n a r y conver
s a t i o n t h a t p recedes all in te rsubjec t ive r e l a t i ons . U n a b l e a s we
a re to speak of it, i t is never the less affirmed in all s p e a k i n g .
Vo id - t ime is i m a g i n a r y t ime . In Lev inas i t is t he t i m e of t h e
dire t h a t precedes (.'very dit and tha t is not entirely absorbed
i n t o a n y dit. In the w o r k of a r t , the t ime of wr i t i ng r e sona t e s ,
j u s t as t h e s t a t u e s q u e c o r p s e magnif ies the t ime of dy ing .
If d e a t h is, or if t he d e a d a re , abso lu te ly mas te r fu l , i t is
b e c a u s e o n e sees in i t t he absence of a n y p lace in the w o r l d .
T h e d e a d r e m a i n there, r e m a i n pe rcep t ib l e , yes , b u t on ly i n so
far as t hey r igo rous ly resis t a n y r e l a t ion to life, to con t inu i ty .
T h e y refuse to " d e p a r t , " a s life s p e a k s o f t h e m , a n d t h e eld
erly w o m a n we s p o k e o f i n o u r i n t r o d u c t i o n m u s t h a v e h a d
an infinite r e spec t for th is res i s tance her h u s b a n d man i f e s t ed .
O n e sees in the d e a d , as in the w o r k of a r t , an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e
d i s junc t ion . O n e c o m e s face-to-face w i t h Ventretemps: a t i m e
" w i t h o u t m e " a n d b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e r i tes t h a t sur
r o u n d the d e a d are i n t e n d e d , like p h i l o s o p h y a n d cr i t ic i sm, t o
" s k i p o v e r " this e m p t y in te rva l a n d m a k e o f d e a t h an e v e n t i n
life a n d w i t h i n the c o n t i n u i t y life r e g a r d s itself as . But n o t h i n g
c o u l d be m o r e fragile t h a n th is con t inu i ty . F o r p r e c e d i n g i t
( and p re se rved a n d exh ib i t ed in the cadave r ) i s t h e p a r o d y of
c o n t i n u i t y t h a t is t h e t ime of dy ing . I t is a p a r o d y of e t e rna l
life. In this sense, o u r r e l a t i onsh ip w i t h t h e c a d a v e r is a p a r o d y
o f in ter subjectivity. W h a t i s a l w a y s d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t o u r re la
t i o n w i t h t h e d e a d i s t h a t th is r e l a t ion e x p o s e s an a l w a y s p r i o r
r e l a t i on t h a t i s never consc ious ly inc luded in o u r l iving rela
t i ons w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n . E x p o s e d in t h e co rpse i s t h e t i m e
o f dy ing t h a t si lently inver ts o u r c o n s c i o u s r e l a t i ons . T h e d e a d
e x p o s e a s c a n d a l o u s d i scon t inu i ty t h a t p recedes c o n t i n u o u s
t i m e . O u r r e l a t i on w i t h the d e a d necessar i ly con f ron t s u s w i t h
d i s c o n t i n u i t y p a r excel lence: a t ime w i t h o u t a p r e sen t , en deca
du temps, r e m a i n i n g a l w a y s at t h e t h r e s h o l d of l iving, d u r a
t i o n a l t ime .
T h e w o r k o f a r t , l ikewise , exh ib i t s th is " h i t h e r s i d e " o f
t ime t h a t Lévinas says i s " i n t o l e r a b l e to t h o u g h t [ in to le rab le à
l a p e n s é e ] . " 5 6 W e m u s t n o t b e t e m p t e d t o t h i n k t h a t Lév inas
and Blanchot have uncovered a new mode ol t h o u g h t , or a
new category, or an intuition hi therto unat tes ted to in phi los
ophy. To be sure, all of Levinas's concern wi th an autrement
qu'être refers (obl iquely) to this en deçà, a n d we m u s t t h i n k
a b o u t his éthique in l ight of th is . Likewise , all of B lancho t ' s
e n i g m a s c o m m u n i c a t e w i th this " h i t h e r s i de" a s wel l . But nei
ther Levinas (in spite of appearances) no r Blanchot has con
structed any th ing like a corpus of t h o u g h t ou t of a "discovery."
Ne i the r of t h e m m a k e a con t r ibu t ion to arts a n d letters in a n y
c o n v e n t i o n a l sense , a n d this m a k e s a n y r e a d i n g o f t h e m u n
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y difficult a s wel l . In o u r o w n wr i t i ng to this
p o i n t we h a v e been d r a w n i n t o t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f a n y ex
plication du texte. We ourse lves some t imes w r i t e ob l ique ly
a n d o x y m o r o n i c a l l y , as do Levinas a n d B lancho t . T h e expli
cation we i n t e n d e d r e m a i n s s ta l led, a n d is still n o t p a r t of a n y
p r o p e r l y cr i t ical c o n t e x t . In fact, we have been r epea t ed ly re
pulsed by Blancho t ' s w o r k , u n a b l e to b r i n g to l ight t h e " s p a c e
o f l i t e r a t u r e " he descr ibes so wel l . For no m a t t e r w h e r e o n e
tr ies t o p lace B l a n c h o t — w i t h Hege l , w i th N i e t z s c h e , w i t h H e i
degger, F r e u d , Kafka , o r even L e v i n a s — h e v a n i s h e s . 5 7 T h i s
r e a d e r t h u s i s exi led: no longer a n d n o t yet exp l i ca t ing , no
longer a n d n o t ye t r e a d i n g . We expe r i ence , in spi te o f mu l t ip l e
p r e c a u t i o n s , a r e m a r k a b l e failure a t the h e a r t of any a p p r o a c h
to t h e B l a n c h o t i a n œuvre. Yet i t i s in o u r fai lure t h a t we " e n
c o u n t e r " t h e w o r k (and th i s i s w h a t wi l l e t e rna l ly justify
Shav i ro ' s r e a d i n g of B l ancho t in t e r m s of affect a n d m e t a m o r
p h o s i s ) . 5 8 Fa i lu re i s a n a m o r p h i c a n d eve ryone w h o fa i ls—at
any th ing—st rugg le s aga ins t the m y r i a d of c h a n c e , un i t ing w i t h
i t l ike an accompl i ce one sur rep t i t ious ly lives w i t h . Fa i lu re
o p e n s the space o f l i t e ra tu re because failure has m a n y r e a s o n s
w h e n on ly o n e w o u l d suffice.
Still, th is is on ly a pa r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n . To r e a d B lancho t ' s
récits o r his essays i s to have to c o m e r epea t ed ly to e x t r e m e
p o i n t s o f uncer ta in ty , po in t s w h e r e one really docs no t k n o w
w h a t to say a n d w h e r e one is a priori depr ived of any m e a n s
to say a n y t h i n g . These m o m e n t s o f en igma a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n
a r e so n u m e r o u s i n Blancho t ' s w o r k t h a t we m u s t say they a re
t h e very " s u b s t a n c e " of it. Unce r t a in ty or amb igu i t y a re p o i n t s
a t w h i c h an encoun te r , a r e a d i n g , a d i scourse , c a n begin to
t a k e p lace a n d w h e r e the w o r d s t h a t will speak i t c a n t ru ly
begin to be found because they c o m e f rom n o w h e r e . T h e y
c o m e f rom the a m b i g u i t y o f an impercep t ib l e m e t a m o r p h o s i s
such t h a t h a v i n g n o t h i n g to say a n d no m e a n s to say i t itself
begins a d i scourse . T h i s i s w h a t " h a p p e n s " in B l a n c h o t be
cause all his t ex t s a re Sirenic , in t h e sense he himself descr ibes
in his essay on the f a m o u s ep i sode f rom H o m e r . So a l lu r ing ,
B lancho t ' s t ex t s r e m a i n a m b i g u o u s , void o f c o n t e n t , hes i t an t ,
a n d of an u n c e r t a i n s t a tus (are they poet ic? ph i l o soph i c? cr i t i
ca l?) . O n e c a n a p p r o a c h t h e m , t o be su re , i n t h e m a n n e r o f
Ulysses , by s t r a p p i n g oneself to t h e s t u r d y m a s t o f H e g e l ,
He idegger , Kojéve, o r w h o m e v e r . O n e c a n a lso spa re o t h e r s
a n y p e r c e p t i o n of h im a t all by n o t t e a c h i n g h i m (because he i s
" u n t e a c h a b l e " ) . He i s a "diff icul t" wri ter . Q u i t e . For, w h a t
B l a ncho t reveals in his tex ts is the very a t t r ac t iveness of l i tera
t u r e as such, a r t a n d w r i t i n g as such, t h o u g h t as such. W h o
c a n resis t th is a l lure? W h o w o u l d n o t , l ike O r p h e u s i n He l l ,
w a n t t o en t e r t h e space o f l i t e ra tu re a n d w r e s t f r o m i t t h e
f o r m a n d f igure of t h a t w h i c h has so affected one? I t i s n o t
l i t e ra ture , ph i losophy , or l i terary cri t icism t h a t B lancho t wr i t e s ,
b u t their infinite attractiveness. N o t l i t e ra tu re , b u t its image;
n o t a t ex t , b u t a récit; n o t t h o u g h t , b u t its s i m u l a c r u m . The
Blanchotian text is the shimmering and pure appearance of
literature. I t is p o e t r y as p u r e a p p e a r a n c e , p u r e seeming , p u r e
a m b i g u i t y . N e i t h e r l i t e ra ture n o r t h o u g h t a s i t i s n o w t h o u g h t
of, b u t as it is to c o m e , vo id of p resence in a t i m e a venir. A n d
so i t i s futile a n d fatal to a t t e m p t an exp l i ca t ion of B l a n c h o t —
Il I A N < . 1 I O I
yet w i thou t the attempt one will never c o m e to the m o m e n t of
unce r t a in ty that i s s imul taneous ly , a n d n o t by ana logy , t h e
t ime of dy ing a n d its e x t r a o r d i n a r y a n d s tupefying a t t r ac t i ve
ness . For t h e co rpse , m a k e no m i s t a k e , is attractive par excel
lence, even as it r epu l ses .
W h e n t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort, t h r o u g h the force
o f his love a n d des i re , b r ings J . b a c k f rom t h e d e a d , we r e a d
t h a t her eyes " o p e n e d ab rup t ly a n d they o p e n e d to reveal some
t h i n g te r r ib le w h i c h I will n o t t a lk a b o u t , t he m o s t t e r r ib le
l ook a l iving be ing c a n receive [ b r u s q u e m e n t elles s ' ouv r i r en t ,
e t elles s ' ouv r i r en t sur q u e l q u e chose de te r r ib le d o n t je ne
pa r l e r a i p a s , sur le r e g a r d le p lus te r r ib le q u ' u n ê t re v ivan t
pu isse r e c e v o i r ] . " 5 9 Like O r p h e u s , the n a r r a t o r h a s g o n e in to
He l l t o f ind his be loved a n d he has l o o k e d a t he r face- to-face.
J. 's eyes l o o k a t t h e n a r r a t o r f rom d e a t h . Eyes t h a t w o u l d l o o k
a t u s f r o m d e a t h a l l ow us to c o m e face-to-face w i t h d e a t h in
p e r s o n . I t i s of c o u r s e a c o m m o n p l a c e t h a t o n e c lose t h e eyes
o f t h e deceased so t h a t they do n o t cruel ly c o n t i n u e to gaze , t o
sea rch o u t for s o m e t h i n g to see; for this d e a d g a z e — p u r e l y
indif ferent , b l a n k , a n d super f luous— i s a gaze nevertheless. In
t h e face o f t h e d e a d a n d in the w o r k o f a r t (wh ich h a s its o w n
b lankness ) one i s faced w i t h the e te rna l , t he e n d l e s s — n o t d e a t h
a s a b s e n t , b u t d e a t h a s the absence o f a n o t h e r sho re a n d w i t h
o u t a n y p lace in life. To close t h e eyelids of t h e d e a d i s to
p r e t e n d t h a t t h e d e a d sleep i n peace . But h u m a n eyes d o n o t
s leep. Even in sleep they pa the t i ca l ly search b e h i n d c losed eye
lids for s o m e t h i n g to see. H u m a n eyes a n d the i r gaze do n o t
merely , as Sar t re t eaches , resist my a p p r o p r i a t i o n . T h e y resist
a n y p r o p e r re la t ion to life a t all. T h e y are a l r eady little co rpses .
T h e n a r r a t o r c o u l d revive J. , b u t he i s p o w e r l e s s to resusc i t a te
he r eyes , w h i c h are a l w a y s a l r e a d y " b e y o n d " — f r o m b e y o n d
a n d va in ly sea rch ing for a b e y o n d .
In the a r res t ed , s tupefied gaze of t h e d e a d o n e sees t h e
image of a gaze . O n e secs an imag ina ry seeing. O n e secs a
gaze t h a t is the gaze of no o n e . (And t ha t is why, in the m y t h ,
Eur id ice van ishes w h e n O r p h e u s l o o k s a t her, o r a t he r g a z e —
for he r s is the gaze of no o n e , t h e gaze of the dead . ) T h e r e is a
d o u b l e o p e n i n g of J. 's eyes ( they " o p e n e d a b r u p t l y a n d they
o p e n e d t o revea l [ b r u s q u e m e n t el les s ' o u v r i r e n t , e t e l les
s ' ouvr i r en t s u r ] " ) , because the re m u s t be a d e a d , b l a n k , a n o n y
m o u s gaze t h a t h o l l o w s itself o u t a n d c rea tes a space for see
ing. I t w a s t h a t b l a n k gaze t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r c o n f r o n t e d in J. 's
eyes . It w a s a gaze t h a t r e sembled J. 's b u t t h a t was not hers,
was not anyone's. T h e eyes t h a t l o o k e d l ike J . ' s , for a m o
m e n t , be longed t o n o o n e . A t t h a t m o m e n t , J . b e c a m e he r
o w n d o u b l e , he r o w n i m a g e , a n d i t w a s t h e i m a g e o f J . t h a t
s t a r ed a t t h e n a r r a t o r w i t h an i m a g i n a r y s ta re . I t w a s t h e i m
age of J. , yes , b u t J . herself w a s a b r u p t l y eyeless. T h e eyes t h a t
s t a r e d w e r e n o t hers a n d i t w a s t h o s e a n o n y m o u s eyes t h a t
s t a r e d a t t h e n a r r a t o r as he l o o k e d i n t o a face w i t h no eyes: a
face he loved a n d h a d b r o u g h t back f rom Hel l .
T h e i m a g e of a gaze p r e c e d e d J. 's g lance a t t he n a r r a t o r
a n d J. 's image p r e c e d e d her r e t u r n to life. I t w a s an i m a g e
te r r ib le a n d u n n a m a b l e , o r a n " a b s e n t a b s e n c e , " a s F o u c a u l t
p u t s i t . 6 0 In o t h e r w o r d s , a r e s e m b l a n c e p r e c e d e d the a c t u a l
a n d t hen d i s a p p e a r e d i n t o Hel l a s J . r e t u r n e d to life. But the
l iving J . ( the o t h e r subject , to use the c r u d e l a n g u a g e of t h e
p h i l o s o p h e r s ) i s n o t t h e w o m a n the n a r r a t o r s o u g h t , for J . ,
r e t u r n e d to life, r e t u r n e d a t the s a m e t ime to m o r t a l i t y a n d , i n
fact , a few days later, t he n a r r a t o r he lps he r to d i e . 6 1 T h a t
w h i c h p r e c e d e d J . — h e r i m a g e a n d its i m a g i n a r y g a z e — w a s
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y her pa s t (herself d e a d , o r " a l r e a d y n o m o r e
t h a n a s t a tue [déjà p lus q u ' u n e s t a t u e ] , " t h e n a r r a t o r s a y s ) 6 2
a n d her fu tu re (aga in , herself d e a d a few days la te r ) . T h a t
w h i c h p r e c e d e d J . — t h e te r r ib le r e s e m b l a n c e — w a s w i t h o u t a
p r e s e n t , w i t h o u t be ing , a n d bo re n o r e l a t ion t o t h e p re sen t . I n
thai m o m e n t o l a b s o l u t e uncer ta in ty , the O u t s i d e w a s t h e r e ,
dea th w a s there o p e n , i m p o t e n t , a n d w i t h o u t in t imacy. T h e
n a r r a t o r w a s gree ted by the gaze he w a s d r a w n to a n d s o u g h t
for. I t w a s indifferent to h im , to his p resence , a n d i t c o n d e m n e d
him to d e a t h because it l o o k e d at h i m as if he was already no
longer there. Yes, the n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort does find J . ,
t h e J . he s o u g h t , in He l l . But he on ly mee t s her w h o d i s r e g a r d s
h i m . He m e e t s he r a s she is: d e a d a n d w i t h o u t h i m , o u t s i d e
h i m utter ly.
T h e n a r r a t o r i s n o t a w a r e o f th is s t r angeness a t t h e t i m e ,
for t h e even t i s t o o prec ise a n d t o o i m p e r s o n a l even to be
a c k n o w l e d g e d . He says , "[I]f I h a d s h u d d e r e d a t t h a t i n s t a n t ,
a n d i f I h a d been afra id , eve ry th ing w o u l d h a v e been lost , b u t
my t e n d e r n e s s w a s so g r e a t t h a t I d i d n ' t even t h i n k a b o u t t h e
s t r angenes s o f w h a t w a s h a p p e n i n g , w h i c h cer ta in ly s eemed
t o m e a l t oge the r n a t u r a l because o f t h a t infinite m o v e m e n t
w h i c h d r e w me t o w a r d her [si à cet i n s t a n t j ' a v a i s frémi, e t s i
j ' ava i s é p r o u v é de l a peur, t o u t eû t été p e r d u , ma i s ma tendresse
é ta i t s i g r a n d e q u e j e n ' e u s m ê m e p a s une pensée p o u r l e c a r a c
tè re s ingul ier de ce qu i se passa i t , qu i me p a r u t c e r t a i n e m e n t
t o u t à fait n a t u r e l , à cause de ce m o u v e m e n t infini qu i me
p o r t a i t à sa r e n c o n t r e ] . " 6 3 T h e "infini te m o v e m e n t " he s p e a k s
of, t h e He l l i n t o w h i c h J. h a d s l ipped , is Ventretemps: a c ross
ing t h a t is infinite, a r re s t ed , l ike a (step no t ) b e y o n d or le pas
au-delà (as B l a n c h o t so nea t ly says in the t i t le of a n o t h e r of
h is w o r k s t h a t s h o u l d p e r h a p s be r e a d as a c l andes t ine c o m
p a n i o n to L'arrêt de mort).
I t i s i m p o r t a n t for us to cons ide r the prec i s ion of the even t
for t h e s e p r e c i s e m o m e n t s m a k e u p t h e " s u b s t a n c e " o f
B lancho t ' s wr i t i ngs . T h e s e m o m e n t s , o r m o v e m e n t s , o r spaces
a r e prec ise a n d a n a m o r p h i c insofar a s they c a n n o t be i n t e r r o
g a t e d , o r even p rope r ly expe r i enced o r n a r r a t e d . T h e O u t s i d e
of w h i c h we speak in the scene(s) of J. 's dea th ( s ) i s n o t ou t s i de
of an in ter ior i ty (the narrator's or the reader's). II we and nu
m e r o u s o t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s so frequently invoke t o p o g r a p h y ,
i t is on ly i m m e d i a t e l y to c o n t e s t it. L'entretemps m u s t be
t h o u g h t o f p rox ima l ly , in the sense we have a l r eady d iscussed .
T h a t w h i c h h a p p e n s t o the n a r r a t o r does n o t , a s w e see, in
sp i re m e m o r a b l e images or dazz l ing p r o s e . T h e t o n e of L'arrêt
de mort is, i f a n y t h i n g , d i s t an t , b u t w i t h t h a t d i s t ance t h a t
B l ancho t h a s f o u n d a t t h e h e a r t o f i n t imacy a n d pass ion . W h a t
r e m a i n s a t t r ac t ive to the n a r r a t o r i s r e n d e r e d in o u t l i n e only,
in profi le on ly (as is le visage in Levinas) . Barely pe rcep t ib l e
scenes a n d f igures a p p e a r (or a p p e a r on ly obl iquely , or appear
to a p p e a r ) t h r o u g h o u t all of B lancho t ' s w o r k s . (Le pas au-
delà a l so c o n t a i n s scenes of d e a t h , c o n v e r s a t i o n s , a n d "cha r
a c t e r s " even m o r e sparse ly d r a w n t h a n those in L'arrêt de
mort.) W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s a l w a y s " b e t w e e n " (or in p a r e n t h e
ses) w h a t m i g h t b e cal led ac t ions o r even t s . W h a t m a t t e r s a n d
w h a t affects u s a s r e a d e r s , a n d w h a t affects B lancho t ' s n a r r a
t o r s in all his récits, a r e even ts t h a t t a k e p lace o u t s i d e a n y
cha rac t e r ' s in i t ia t ive or i n t e n t i o n . T h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de
mort i s ab le to wr i t e a n d to t ry to p u t an e n d to these even ts
b e c a u s e , he says , they c o n c e r n on ly h i m . Yet t h a t w h i c h i s
on ly h is , t h a t w h i c h be longs w i t h i n his o w n in t imacy , i s o p e n
to s t r a n g e r s , to r e a d e r s . Few, i f any, w o r k s in this c e n t u r y (or
ever p e r h a p s ) cause the r eade r to feel m o r e acu te ly t h a t he o r
she i s intruding on s o m e o n e else's p r ivacy t h a n do the w o r k s
of B l a n c h o t . Th i s is i ndeed p a r t of the i r " t h r i l l . " I t is as i f o n e
h a d e n t e r e d a p r o h i b i t e d space o r h a d s t e p p e d u n i n v i t e d i n t o
s o m e o n e else's a p a r t m e n t .
T h e c u r i o u s effect he re is o n e of a t r a n s g r e s s i o n of in t i
m a c y : w i t n e s s i n g t h a t w h i c h d o e s n ' t c o n c e r n o n e . T h e s e
" t h i n g s " t h a t h a p p e n e d t o s o m e o n e i n 1 9 3 8 a re a t t r ac t ive p r e
cisely insofar as they c o n c e r n on ly t h a t s o m e o n e . I t i s l ike t h e
thri l l of goss ip . T h e s e th ings a t t r a c t me precisely insofar as I
Cannol relaie tO them. And if I can " i m a g i n e (he h a n d t h a t
wr i tes them," 6' 1 I will only find myself face-to-face wi th a g a z e
t h a t does n o t r ega rd m e , t h a t d ispenses w i t h m e . Fo r t h a t i s
the " p r i c e " of t r ansg re s s ion : / am neglec ted . R e a d i n g t hen
b e c o m e s une tâche sérieuse because l'entretemps subs t i tu t e s
itself for a n d s imula tes—insis ts on the absence of—the p resen t .
To be sure, in all a r t as we have seen, the " m e a n w h i l e " replaces
t h e p resen t , t h e i m a g e subs t i tu tes itself for the c o n c e p t . In
B lancho t , th is e n i g m a i s f o r e g r o u n d e d . By " t h i n n i n g o u t " im
ages , scenes , cha rac t e r s , ac t ions , a n d l anguage the B iancho t i an
t e x t a p p r o a c h e s the i m a g i n a r y as such—where t he re a re no
images , w h e r e n o t h i n g crystallizes in to definite fo rms or f igures ,
a n d w h e r e t h e t ime of r e a d i n g i s a lso the t ime of w r i t i n g a n d
t h e t ime o f dy ing . We reach the s h a d o w of the w o r l d w h e r e
in i t ia t ive a n d ac t i on a re a l r e a d y no longer poss ib le . T h a t i s t o
say, r e a d i n g c o m e s to d o u b l e the p a t h o s of dy ing . I t d o u b l e s
t h e inabi l i ty to en te r i n t o the p r e sen t a n d the imposs ib i l i ty o f
f inding a n y p r o p e r p lace in the w o r l d . I t i s t he t ime of r ad ica l
i n c o m p l e t i o n a n d of work l e s snes s .
If, as we say, our relat ion w i th the dead is a p a r o d y of inter-
subject ivi ty, i t is because it is an i m a g i n a r y r e l a t ion : a r e l a t i on
w i t h no o n e . But i t i s a r e l a t ion none the l e s s , a n d o n e t h a t does
n o t t e r m i n a t e o u r r e l a t ions w i t h t h e one w h o the d e a d p e r s o n
w a s . I t i s a r e la t ion w i t h o u t r e l a t i on , b u t i t " p r e s e r v e s " a n d
exh ib i t s t h a t v a c a n t t ime en deçà du temps t h a t a l w a y s p r e
cedes the l iving t ime of h u m a n in ter subjectivity. I t i s p a r o d i e
in t h e sense t h a t i t i s a r e l a t ion w i t h the o t h e r t h a t t o u c h e s h i m
o u t s i d e his subject ivi ty in the t ime of dy ing t h a t the o ther will
never c o m e to the end of. It is no t a t ime or a re la t ion t h a t I am
ever consc ious of in my dealings wi th o the r s . It is t h u s a relat ion
over w h i c h I can exercise no mas te ry whatsoever .
T h e infinite m o v e m e n t t o w a r d , o r rendezvous wi th , Levi-
nas ' s Autrui i s l ikewise e te rna l ly p a r a l y z e d a n d w i t h o u t an
o u t c o m e , as is o u r re la t ion with the artwork. It is, if you like
( and as Lévinas w o u l d prefer) , a m o v e m e n t t o w a r d an O u t
s ide t h a t i s only ever r ebegun in a n y c o n s c i o u s u n d e r t a k i n g
w i t h o t h e r s in t h e w o r l d . I t i s a t ime or a m o v e m e n t " w i t h o u t
m e , " a n d its i n t imacy i s precisely its d i s r ega rd of m e . T h e en
c o u n t e r w i t h Autrui i s e m p t i e d b o t h of myself a n d t h e o ther ,
as i f I w e r e obl iged , as t h e " p r i c e " of this in t imacy , to forget
b o t h myself a n d the other . We h a v e a l ready t a k e n up th is issue
in o u r c h a p t e r on Lév inas . In its i n t imacy a n d a n o n y m i t y , a s
B l a n c h o t so match less ly expresses i t t h r o u g h o u t L'arrêt de
mort, we m u s t be a t t en t ive to t h a t w h i c h p recedes all l iving
r e l a t ions a n d to t h a t w h i c h , as i t i s a n o n y m o u s , i s imag ina ry .
T h i s justifies, we t h i n k , o u r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the Lev inas i an
éthique as imag ina ry .
I m m e m o r i a l l y p a r a l y z e d , i n t e r r u p t e d , he s i t an t , c o y (all
these t e r m s will have to do for n o w ) this en deçà, or le dire, or
Image , or Imag ina ry is just as immemor ia l l y forgot ten , ignored ,
o v e r l o o k e d , a n d d i spensed w i t h as i nconsequen t i a l . In o n e o f
his essays on Blanchot , " T h e Servant a n d H e r M a s t e r , " Lévinas
s p e a k s o f this " f o r g e t t i n g " as t h a t w h i c h res to res d i a c h r o n y
t o t ime b y t u r n i n g " a w a y f rom t h e p a s t i n s t a n t [ d é t o u r n e d e
l ' i n s t an t p a s s é ] . " 6 5 But , impor t an t l y , d i a c h r o n y i s n o t a d u r a
t i on . I t has ne i ther " p r e t e n t i o n no r r e t e n t i o n , " as Lévinas says,
g o o d s t u d e n t t h a t he i s o f H u s s e r l . 6 6 ( W h e n , here a n d t h e r e —
in Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence for i n s t a n c e —
Lév inas s p e a k s of diachronie, he m e a n s t h e " m e a n w h i l e " t h a t
we h a v e been d iscuss ing in this chapter . ) H o w e v e r , t h a t w h i c h
t u r n s a w a y f rom t h e p a s t a l so " a b i d e s i n w o r d s [ d e m e u r e e n
u n e p a r o l e ] " 6 7 a n d w h e n they b e c o m e " a t t e n t i v e t o the i r c o n
d i t i o n , w o r d s c o m e t o a s t o p a n d t u r n i n t o p i l l a r s o f sa l t
[penchés su r leur c o n d i t i o n , les m o t s s ' a r r ê t en t en s t a tues de
s e l ] . " 6 8
Poet ry , i nc lud ing t h e p o e t r y o f B l ancho t , c a n " b e t r a y it-
sell , b e c o m e engulfed in o rde r and t ake on the a p p e a r a n c e of
a cu l tu ra l p r o d u c t |se t r ah i r e t s ' englout i r d a n s l ' o rd re p o u r se
m o n t r e r p r o d u i t cul ture l | " a n d poetry , o f c o u r s e , c a n be " a p
p l auded a n d r e w a r d e d , so ld , b o u g h t [applaudi e t p r i m é , v e n d u ,
a c h e t é ] , " a n d so o n . 6 9 Th i s i s because , Levinas says , p o e t r y
surfaces a t a precise i n s t a n t b e t w e e n k n o w l e d g e a n d c u l t u r e ,
b e t w e e n seeing a n d s a y i n g . 7 0 F o r t h a t very r e a s o n , h e a r g u e s ,
t h e t w o " p i n c e r s " a r e never qu i t e c l o s e d — " l e m o m e n t e n t r e
le vo i r e t l e d i r e où les m â c h o i r e s res ten t , e n t r ' o u v e r t e s . " 7 1
T h e a r t w o r k i s t h e res i s tance to the i r ever c o m p l e t e l y c los ing .
L ikewise , we t h i n k , the re la t ion w i t h Autrui t h a t Lev inas cal ls
ethics is an obscure resistance to the closing of ont ic categories .
T h e p o i n t we are ge t t ing to in this c h a p t e r i s th is p o i n t o f
r e s i s t ance , th is i n t e r m i n a b l e para lys i s t h a t m a k e s u p t h e " s u b
s t a n c e " of B lancho t ' s œuvre a n d is, we m a y say, t h e I m a g e of
a n O u t s i d e , a n d a n O t h e r t o the ca tegor i e s o f t h o u g h t o r o f
t h e S ta te . T h e a r t w o r k , t h e B l a n c h o t i a n récit, T i a n a n m e n , a n d
Lev inas i an responsabilité a r e d i scon t inu i t i e s a n d d i s junc t ions .
A g a m b e n , a s we shall see, t h o r o u g h l y exp lo i t s th is i n t e r m i
n a b l e fai lure (or, a s he will p u t it, th is " p o w e r to n o t n o t - b e
[po te r n o n n o n - e s s e r e ] " ) 7 2 i n his wr i t ings on the " c o m i n g c o m
m u n i t y . " W h a t w e have t r ied t o b r ing o u t o f t h e s h a d o w s i n
o u r c h a p t e r on B lancho t i s t h e sense t h a t the t ime of c o n t i n u
ity a n d in tersubject iv i ty (as we pers is t in cal l ing it) is r ad ica l ly
u n d e r m i n e d a n d h o l l o w e d o u t by a " f o r g e t t i n g , " o r a p r o
f o u n d " p a s t " intolérable à la pensée.
The Image and Ipseity of Art
We have seen t h a t t h e t ra jec to ry of B l a n c h o t i a n
a n d Lev inas i an aes thet ics is t o w a r d an t e r io r i t y as such. N o t a
p r i m o r d i a l s ta te -of - th ings , n o r a fluid a n d i n c o h e r e n t m a s s of
d a t a a w a i t i n g o rgan i zed i m p r e s s i o n , b u t i n s t ead t h e sub t l e ty
of imag ina ry ma t t e r (like le dire that overflows every le dit)
w h o s e des t iny is ne i the r subject ive nor object ive . In the d isen
gaged , m o r e - t h a n - p a s s i v e a n d o t h e r w i s e - t h a n - w o r l d l y w o r k
of a r t (as in the c a d a v e r ) , th is an t e r io r i t y i s " f r o z e n " a n d " p r e
s e r v e d " as an icon . Yet i t r e m a i n s unpe rce ived a n d si lent , l ike
t h e voix narrative, b ecause it is n o t the ma te r i a l for a p e r c e p
t i on . Th i s an te r io r i ty en deçà du temps is n o t des t ined for t h e
l ight of day , b u t n e i t h e r i s i t t h e day ' s s imp le o b v e r s e . In
B lancho t ' s t e r m s , it is t he autre nuit.73
W h e n B lancho t a sks o f t h e w o r k o f a r t , " W h a t h a s a l w a y s
e luded its l a n g u a g e [qu 'es t -ce qu i s 'est t o u j o u r s d é r o b é à s o n
l a n g a g e ] ? " a n d a n s w e r s , "Itself"; w h e n he says t h a t a r t " is
a l w a y s a n t e r i o r to w h a t i t speaks o f a n d to itself [est t o u j o u r s
p lus a n t é r i e u r q u e ce d o n t i l pa r l e e t p l u s a n t é r i e u r q u e lui-
m ê m e ] , " 7 4 he i s re fer r ing to an t e r io r i t y insofar as a r t i s t h a t
w h i c h resists its o w n unvei l ing a n d t h u s e ludes the vice-gr ip
of seeing a n d saying. For, t he voix narrative is the ta le itself,
t h e w o r k of a r t itself, p r i o r to its n a r r a t i v e " c o n t e n t s . " T h i s i s
n o t so very s t r ange . All of the rea l i ty of a r t (like all of t h e
rea l i ty of t h e self, as we h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d ) 7 5 i s b o r r o w e d
f rom ou t s i de it: f rom ma te r i a l s , clay, m a r b l e , p i g m e n t , a n d
life itself, w h i c h s o m e t i m e s a p p e a r s to the ar t i s t to be a l r e a d y
aes the t ica l ly a t t r ac t ive . Ar t i s mimes i s , a c c o r d i n g to o n e of
the West ' s o ldes t def ini t ions . Ar t , qu i t e simply, h a s no self, no
ipse, to be revea led . T h a t is t h e secret of i ts an te r io r i ty , i ts
" o t h e r n i g h t . " Its itselfness is always to come. T h i s is t h e se
cre t of its i nexhaus t ib l e resources . M i m e s i s c a n n o t be revea led .
If t h e w o r k of a r t e ludes itself, a n d never speaks itself in i ts
own l a n g u a g e , it is because a r t is precisely selfless. It is w i t h
o u t a n y t h i n g t h a t w o u l d b e p r o p e r t o it . P r io r t o its " c o n
t e n t s , " t h e w o r k of a r t is a p u r e image of itself, an imag e of
n o t h i n g . By the m o s t e l emen ta ry logic we m u s t c o n c l u d e w i t h
B l a n c h o t a n d Levinas t h a t a r t itself— m imes i s—is n o t h i n g .
N o t h i n g o the r than its mimetic r a p p o r t wi th w h a t i t i s n o t —
the real . Art i s reali ty 's s h a d o w — t h a t wh ich van ishes w h e n
any light is shed on it.
T h e a r t w o r k i s n o t an object . I t i s p u r e r a p p o r t , p u r e c o m
m u n i c a t i o n , p u r e pa s s ion . As B lancho t so obl ig ingly p u t s it:
" I t is as i f a secret l a w r e q u i r e d of t h e w o r k t h a t i t a l w a y s be
c o n c e a l e d i n w h a t i t s h o w s a n d t h a t i t on ly s h o w w h a t m u s t
r e m a i n concea l ed a n d t h a t finally i t on ly s h o w s w h a t m u s t
s tay h i d d e n by concea l i ng i t [ C o m m e s i une loi secrète ex igea i t
d'elle qu 'e l le soit t ou jour s cachée en ce qu 'el le m o n t r e , e t qu 'e l le
ne m o n t r e aussi q u e ce qui do i t res te r caché e t ne le m o n t r e ,
enfin, q u ' e n l e d i s s i m u l a n t ] . " 7 6 T h e w o r k o f a r t " r e v e a l s " i ts
o w n h i d d e n n e s s , i t " s h o w s " its o w n absence f r o m all s h o w
ing , i t " s a y s " its o w n si lence, a n d so for th . Before t h e w o r k of
a r t c o m m u n i c a t e s a n y t h i n g (the g o d s , e.g.) i t c o m m u n i c a t e s
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t i s on ly after t h a t to w h i c h t h e w o r k of a r t
refers i s fo rgo t t en (i.e., t h e g o d s w h o have fled a n d w h o s e
flight t o o h a s been fo rgo t ten) t h a t th is e n i g m a beg ins t o m a k e
itself felt, begins to d r a w nea r to its "o r ig ina l e x p e r i e n c e . "
T h i s v a n i s h i n g p o i n t i s w h a t B l a n c h o t i s ge t t ing a t w h e n he
a sks : " W h a t will b e c o m e n o w o f a r t , n o w t h a t t h e G o d s a n d
even their absence are gone , a n d n o w tha t men 's presence offers
no s u p p o r t [Ne p o u v a n t plus p rendre a p p u i sur les d ieux , n i
m ê m e sur l 'absence des dieux; ne p o u v a n t s 'appuyer sur l ' h o m m e
présent qui ne lui appar t ient plus {...} que va devenir l 'œuvre ?] " 7 7
A fasc ina t ing q u e s t i o n . I t i s a t th is p o i n t t h a t the w o r k of a r t
t ru ly finds its c o n d i t i o n , its " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h s . " I t b e c o m e s a
p u r e i m a g e of itself, a n d i t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o itself, i n t o its t i m e .
Inexhaus t ib ly c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h w h a t i t i s n o t , t he w o r k
of a r t r e sembles , a g a i n , n o t h i n g so m u c h as a c a d a v e r w h o s e
very ma te r i a l i t y i s the e r a su re of the b o r d e r b e t w e e n p resence
a n d absence , life a n d d e a t h , d i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e t u r n , i m a g e
a n d real i ty (for the cadave r ' s en t i re real i ty i s t h a t i t i s an i m a g e
of itself). Like the co rpse , the wo rk ol art is incapab le of its
" n o w , " i ncapab le of be ing itself, i ncapab le of r each ing or a t
t a i n ing its be ing , w h i c h a l w a y s slips b e y o n d i t w h e r e i t c a n n o t
s t ep . Like t h e co rpse , t h e w o r k of a r t i s t he very imag e of a
s t r ange incapac i ty s imply to be. Like the dea r d e p a r t e d , t h e
w o r k of a r t c a n n o t d i s a p p e a r i n t o i ts own d i s a p p e a r a n c e , its
own e n d . T h i s i m p o t e n c e , however , i s its " o w n m o s t " expe r i
ence of "itself." T h a t is, i t c a n on ly expe r i ence "itself" in its
o ther , as o ther . I t c a n on ly expe r i ence itself as o t h e r t h a n itself;
i t is on ly itself as o t h e r t h a n itself. I t c a n on ly c o m m u n i c a t e , in
s h o r t . A r t is no soone r itself t h a n i t is a l r eady petrified i n t o a
s t a t u e , an icon , a p u p p e t , a toy. "She w h o w a s o n c e a b s o l u t e l y
alive w a s n o w no m o r e t h a n a s t a tue [Elle n ' é t a i t déjà p lus
q u ' u n e s t a t u e , elle a b s o l u m e n t v i v a n t e ] , " B lancho t ' s n a r r a t o r
says o f J . a t he r d e a t h . 7 8 No s o o n e r does she die t h a n she be
c o m e s o t h e r t h a n herself, other than anyone—totally a n o n y
m o u s . Like t h e cadaver , t h e w o r k of a r t itself Is t h e i m a g e of
an image. I t i s an i m a g i n a r y i m a g e , to be su re , a n d o n e t h a t
n o b o d y recogn izes , b u t i t i s an imag e none the l e s s a n d o n e
t h a t i s t h a t i s a l w a y s " o l d e r " t h a n t h a t of w h i c h i t i s t he im
a g e . I n th i s w a y w e c a n u n d e r s t a n d p e r h a p s m o r e c lea r ly
B lancho t ' s " o t h e r v e r s i o n " o f the i m a g i n a r y :
To expe r i ence an event as an image i s n o t to free o n e
self of t h a t event , to d issocia te oneself f rom it, as as
ser ted by t h e es thet ic vers ion of the imag e a n d t h e se
r ene ideal of classical a r t , b u t ne i ther is i t to engage
oneself w i t h i t t h r o u g h a free d i m e n s i o n : i t is to let
oneself be t a k e n by it, to go f rom the r eg ion of t h e
rea l , w h e r e we ho ld ourse lves a t a d i s tance f rom th ings
the be t te r t o use t h e m , t o t h a t o t h e r r eg ion w h e r e d is
t a n c e h o l d s us , th is d i s t ance w h i c h i s n o w un l iv ing ,
unava i lab le d e p t h , an inapprec iable r emoteness b e c o m e
in s o m e sense the sovereign and last p o w e r of th ings .
This m o v e m e n t implies infinite degrees . T h u s p s y c h o
analys is says t h a t the image , far f rom lead ing us o u t
side of th ings a n d m a k i n g us live in t h e m o d e of g r a t u
i tous fantasy, seems to su r r ende r us p r o f o u n d l y to our
selves. T h e image i s i n t ima te because i t m a k e s o u r in
t i m a c y a n ex te r io r p o w e r t h a t w e passively s u b m i t t o :
ou t s i de of us , in the b a c k w a r d m o t i o n of the w o r l d
t h a t the image p r o v o k e s , the d e p t h o f o u r pas s ion t rai ls
a l o n g , a s t r ay a n d br i l l ian t .
[Vivre un é v é n e m e n t en i m a g e , ce n ' e s t p a s se dégage r
de cet é v é n e m e n t , s 'en désintéresser , c o m m e le v o u
d r a i e n t le vers ion e s thé t ique de l ' image e t l ' idéal serein
de l ' a r t c lass ique , ma i s ce n ' e s t n o n p lus s'y engage r
p a r u n e déc is ion l ibre : c 'es t s'y laisser p r e n d r e , pas se r
de la r ég ion du réel , où n o u s n o u s t e n o n s à d i s t ance
des choses p o u r m i e u x en disposer , à ce t te au t r e r ég ion
où l a d i s t ance n o u s t ien t , ce t te d i s t ance qu i est a lo r s
p r o f o n d e u r n o n v i v a n t e , i n d i s p o n i b l e , l o i n t a i n
i napp réc i ab l e d e v e n u e c o m m e l a pu i s sance s o u v e r a i n e
e t de rn i è re des choses . Ce m o u v e m e n t i m p l i q u e des
degrés infinis. La p sychana ly se di t a insi q u e l ' image ,
loin de n o u s laisser h o r s de cause e t de n o u s faire vivre
su r le m o d e de la fantais ie g r a tu i t e , semble n o u s l ivrer
p r o f o n d é m e n t à n o u s - m ê m e s , in t ime est l ' image , pa rce
qu 'e l l e fait de n o t r e in t imi té u n e pu i s sance ex té r i eu re
q u e n o u s sub i s sons pas s ivemen t : e n d e h o r s d e n o u s ,
d a n s l e recul du m o n d e qu 'e l le p r o v o q u e , t r a îne , égarée
e t b r i l l an te , l a p r o f o n d e u r de n o s p a s s i o n s . ] 7 9
" O l d e r " t h a n the serene classical ve rs ion o f t h e image t h a t
g u a r a n t e e s d i s t ance , i s t h a t w h i c h i s n o t t o be a n d t h a t w h i c h
is no t to b e c o m e either. T h e work ol an is the image of that
w h i c h is never to be, never to b e c o m e — t h a t which is ever on
t h e h i the r side of t ime (en deca du temps). Eternally Mona
Lisa will be about to smile. E te rna l ly de layed p r i o r to be ing/
b e c o m i n g , she is the d e g r a d e d image of the e te rna l . N o t a t ime
less s ta t ic f o rm , b u t a fragment of a never to be continued and
completed whole. In the co rpse , in the w o r k of a r t , we see
( w i t h o u t perceiving) t h a t w h i c h images itself. I t i s n o t a n o t h e r
i m a g e , a s we learn f rom B lancho t , b u t a n o t h e r vers ion o f the
s a m e image . It is a r e t u r n of the imag e to itself, p r i o r to its
be ing an image of . . . T h e " o t h e r " vers ion of t h e i m a g i n a r y is
its e te rna l r e t u r n to itself, t o the s a m e i m a g e . No s o o n e r i s the
a r t w o r k finished t h a n i t i s a r r e s t ed , o t h e r t h a n itself, or, to say
the s a m e t h i n g , the " s a m e " as itself in its very alteri ty. In th i s
a r r e s t ed t ime the re i s no " n o w " in w h i c h the a r t w o r k c a n
b e c o m e . I t i s t h e r epe t i t i on of t h e rea l , a n d r epe t i t i on is w i t h
o u t a p r e sen t .
Every s t a tue , every cadaver , every p u p p e t , toy, o r a r t i f ac t—
i n d e e d , every t h i n g a n d every p e r s o n w h o falls, i f on ly for a
m o m e n t , ou t s i de u t i l i t y—re tu rns t o a n inconce ivab le imag e
vo id of e i ther subject or object . Th i s i s the " l a s t p o w e r of
t h i n g s . " T h e y inver t t he " m o t i o n o f t h e w o r l d " a n d " r e t u r n
us to o u r s e l v e s , " b u t t o ourse lves insofar a s t he r e i s no o n e to
r e t u r n t o , no society o f ident i t ies in w h i c h we c a n r ecogn ize
our se lves . In th is " o t h e r " imag ina ry , subject a n d objec t d i s a p
p e a r a s such , a s o b - p o s e d a n d d i s t anced . W h a t r e m a i n s i s p u r e
-jection (or t h r o w n n e s s ) , l ike Nie tzsche ' s (or Heidegger ' s ) d ice .
A r t ( the ta le , t he voix narrative) is t he " f o r g e t t i n g " of s u b
ject a n d ob jec t a n d is in fact the i r r ad i ca l ident i f ica t ion , fu
s ion , o r deseg rega t ion . Expe r i enc ing t h e even t as an i m a g e i s
an expe r i ence in w h i c h the objec t i s d i s a v o w e d as such , as
object o p p o s e d to us in a Vorstellung ( a "p lac ing before") , a n d
t h u s i t " r e t u r n s " the subject to itself pr ior to its op-pos i t ion ing .
In this way, the "experience" Blanchot refers to m u s t be p r i o r
to Kantian experience and w o u l d refer to t he pure position of
the subject. To expe r i ence the even t as an i m a g e , t h e n , is n o t
to expe r i ence an object (since the object d i s a p p e a r s i n t o it
self), b u t to expe r i ence t h e self as t he p u r e pass iv i ty of pos i
t i on , or, " t h e r e n e s s . " I t i s t h u s p r io r to a n y expe r i ence of t h e
w o r l d , a n d i t i m m e d i a t e l y closes in on itself w i t h o u t a t r a ce . I t
c loses because t h e subjec t c a n " fee l " on ly its o w n in t r ins ica l ly
e m p t y recept ivi ty. I t is, as i t w e r e , t h e s h a d o w of t h e recep t iv
ity t h a t , u n i t i n g w i t h spon tane i ty , forges the p r o p e r l y K a n t i a n
expe r i ence . In the l a n g u a g e of Lev inas , i t i s an e x t r e m e pass iv
ity t h a t c a n n o t s imply be o p p o s e d to activity, because i t i s t h e
pass iv i ty w h o s e only " q u a l i t y " i s infinite recept iv i ty or m a l
leabili ty. It is t he pass ivi ty of absolute instabi l i ty . T h a t is to
say, th is expe r i ence closes in on itself a n d leaves no t r ace be
c a u s e i t i s never even o p e n e d . In a b s o l u t e passivi ty, in i ts p u r e
pos i t i on p r i o r t o a n y o b - o r sub- jec t ion , t h e " s u b j e c t " (or shal l
we say, t h e " c o m m u n i c a t a n t " ? ) i s w h a t i t i s n o t , a n d i s n o t
w h a t i t is. T h e r e is, qu i t e s imply, no c o n t a i n i n g the essent ia l
ambigu i ty , o r the "essent ia l s o l i t u d e " 8 0 o f c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y .
T h e space o f l i t e ra tu re—or , a s we can n o w say, t h e space
of abso lu t e pass ivi ty or c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y — i s the th ick , c r e p u s
cular, a n d pa roxysmat i c material i ty of t h o u g h t t ha t th ickens i n t o
a " t h i n g " ( the " t h i n g " we c a n say, t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt
de mort " l ives w i t h " ) . 8 1 It is t h e e r a s u r e of t h e subjec t -ob jec t
h y p h e n , t h e e ros ion of mas te ry , t h e e ro s ion of t h a t d i s tance
w h i c h a l lows us to ho ld the w o r l d a t a dis tance. For B l a n c h o t ,
as for Der r ida of "before the letter," the n a m e of this m o v e m e n t
i s w r i t i n g : t h e p a r a d o x i c a l " s t r e n g t h " o f an i n e x h a u s t i b l e im
p o t e n c e . Of th is space we c a n on ly say t h a t i t i s . . . , t h e r e i s .
. . , il y a. If w r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t of w h i c h it s p e a k s it is
because wr i t i ng—whose "original exper ience" a r t a p p r o a c h e s —
i s t h e obscur i ty , o r the forge t t ing , a n t e r i o r to a n y m e m o r y .
To us , art r ema ins " c o n s t a n t l y invisible [ c o n s t a m m e n t in
v i s ib l e ] , " S 2 h idden , en deck, and an autre unit. But we are d r a w n
to i t none the le s s . W h e n the ob jec t i s d o u b l e d a n d neu t ra l i zed
in t h e i m a g e , w h e n the image w i t h d r a w s the objec t f rom the
w o r l d , a n d w h e n the objec t d i s a p p e a r s in to its o w n i m a g e —
t h e n i t exerc ises its f asc ina t ion , its " p o w e r l e s s p o w e r . " Wr i t
ing i s the c o m i n g of an i m p o t e n c e t h a t neu t ra l i zes subject iv i ty
b y neu t ra l i z ing t h e objec t . " I , " a s B l an ch o t says, b e c o m e " h e "
[il, t h e N e u t e r ] . In this d o u b l e d space , th is s h a d o w of t h e rea l ,
I cease to be sub-ject a n d b e c o m e " h e " w h o i s " h i s " r a p p o r t
w i t h t h a t w h i c h h o l d s " h i m " in its spel l . For, in t h e space o f
l i t e r a tu re , I am t h a t " h e " to w h o m I e te rna l ly r e t u r n in th i s
t imeless t ime of r epe t i t i on a n d i n c o m p l e t i o n . I am " h e " in
w h o m I do n o t recognize myself. Yet, I am n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
" h i s " r e t u r n , " h i s " i m m e m o r i a l a n d e te rna l r e t u r n . A n d " h e "
i s i m a g i n a r y — p u r e p a s s i o n , p u r e r a p p o r t , p u r e c o m m u n i c a
t i o n . I am " h e " w h o I am no t , for " h e " i s n o t ( a n d never wi l l
be) w h o " h e " is.
Th i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t the a r t w o r k h a r b i n g e r s m y d e a t h .
It m e a n s t h a t an Httlife, an arrested d e a t h , a pa r a lyzed force ,
h o l l o w s o u t the t ime o f d u r a t i o n a n d r e m a i n s m y invis ible ,
h i d d e n i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h a t i m e of r ad i ca l i n c o m p l e t i o n . T h e
a r t w o r k d o e s n o t h a r b i n g e r d e a t h , i t i s my i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h
d e a t h a l ready. All o f B lancho t ' s w o r k b o r d e r s on th is " o t h e r
n i g h t " a n d i s ca r r i ed a l o n g in its infinite m o v e m e n t . N o t a t
t h e e n d of a w o r l d l y i t inerary, bu t at every i n s t an t , t h e t ime en
dega du temps d i s a p p e a r s in to itself, e rases itself, exscribes
itself. T h i s m o v e m e n t c a n n o t be unvei led , n o t b e c a u s e i t i s
bas ica l ly w i t h d r a w n a n d absen t , b u t because i t d o e s n o t b e
l o n g to the l ight at all . I t is t he t ime of il—always a l r eady
fab r i ca ted , f ict ioned, w o r k e d over, a n d , as such , i t is irrecuper-
able t ime .
W r i t i n g , t h e n , i s t h e very m o v e m e n t t h a t forgets "i tself ,"
e rases "itself," fOl il is w i thou t any self. Not s imply w i t h
d r a w n from all p resence , this t ime of w r i t i n g is, in t h e l an
g u a g e of A g a m b e n , an imaginary youth t h a t never-has-been
a n d t h a t r e - m o v e s itself each t ime . I t i s t h a t w h o s e "self" i s i ts
r e -mova l . To s u m i t u p , t hen , w r i t i n g — o r a r t , w h i c h c a n d o u b l e
up a n d p rese rve every t h i n g t h a t p re sen t s itself to us— i s for
ge t t ing . But it is n o t a fo rge t t ing of a n y thing. It is a fo rge t t ing
t h a t p r ecedes eidet ic ev idence/a forge t t ing i m m e m o r i a l l y for
g o t t e n / n o t even a b s e n t / a l w a y s a l r eady fo rgo t t en /a p e r p e t u a l
lack of v is ion t h a t p r ecedes all seeing a n d say ing / . . .
B l a n c h o t i a n aes the t ics leads us t o , a n d i s c o n s t a n t l y in
v a d e d by, an an t e r io r i t y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i th p resence , a " h i t h e r
s i d e " t h a t i s a n t e r i o r to objectivity. I t i s t h e " l a s t p o w e r of
t h i n g s " to exercise a si lent a n d forgo t ten fasc ina t ion t h a t o p e n s
t h e space of l i t e ra tu re , a space e v a c u a t e d of subject a n d o b
ject , a n d t h u s a space of r ad ica l ident i f ica t ion a n d affectivity.
T h e w o r k of a r t , like the cadaver , before i t r ep resen t s a n y t h i n g
(o r scene , o r d r a m a , o r p e r s o n ) , f i r s t o f all c o m m u n i c a t e s c o m
m u n i c a t i o n itself, o r be ing- in - re l a t ion . Insofa r as I am evacu
a t e d of subjectivity, I am th is be ing- in - re la t ion itself, myself.
O l d e r t h a n a n y specu la t i on is this obsession. If B l ancho t de
scr ibes th is as an " o t h e r v e r s i o n " of the imag ina ry , i t i s on ly
b e c a u s e t h e r e i s no w o r d for it . I t i s n o t des i re , b u t o b s e s
s i o n — a n in - fo rming t h a t p r ecedes a n y objec t o r i n f o r m a t i o n .
I t i s a d e p e n d e n c y t h a t p recedes a n y p syche t h a t w o u l d be
d e p e n d e n t . T h e r e i s no subject i n th is " s p a c e " b u t i n s t ead an
infinite d e p e n d e n c y , mal leabi l i ty , suggestibi l i ty, o r p u r e p a s
sivity o f pos i t i on t h a t wil l be ever a n t e r i o r to a n y p r e s e n t .
Pr ior to subject and ob jec t—and this is crucial to Levinasian
e t h i c s — t h e r e is a v io lent affect, i n t ru s ion , or m o r e - t h a n - i n t i -
m a c y t h a t i s invis ible , u n d e t e c t a b l e , i ne rad icab le , a n d i r r educ
ible. I t is an " o t h e r " beginning outs ide any origin. I t is n e u t e r —
" t h e r e i s . " It is a region in wh ich the O t h e r is not only o t h e r
t h a n I b u t a l so o t h e r t h a n he or she . P ro found ly u n p r e s e n t a b l e ,
th i s r eg ion in - forms m e p r i o r t o a n y ac tua l c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r
d i s t ance . In every image t he re is a l r eady t h a t w h i c h I ( " I " ) am,
myself. T h e w r i t e r i s he w h o s p e a k s wh i l e entirely t r a v e r s e d
a n d t rans f ixed by t h e other t h a t he ¿5, t h e " h e " w h o i s neve r
a n y o n e — n e v e r a n y o n e o t h e r t h a n I , myself, b u t w i t h o u t m e .
F O U R
Agamben and the Political Neuter
Anonymity and Belonging
We lea rn f rom B lancho t t h a t t o w r i t e i s t o pa s s
f r o m " I " to " H e , " /'/, t h e Neu te r . T h e N e u t e r i s t h e space o f
l i t e r a tu re (an i m a g i n a r y space en deçà du temps), w h i c h is
i n t e rminab le , incessant , a n d perpetual ly n o n c o n t e m p o r a r y . T h e
n e u t e r i s the t ime of i nac t ion a n d no ini t ia t ive . I t i s t he s h a d o w
of t i m e , of t h e rea l , of my h a n d , B l a n c h o t says , as i t g r ips the
p e n a n d wr i t e s these w o r d s . T h e w r i t e r w o u l d l ike t o exp res s
himself w i t h w o r d s , b u t he f i nds on ly the i r s h a d o w , the i r sheer
a p p e a r a n c e , a n d n o t h i n g b e y o n d . T h e wri ter , l ik ing i t o r n o t ,
w r i t e s a n i m a g i n a r y l a n g u a g e t h a t h e c a n n o t p u t t o w o r k a n d
to w h i c h he c a n n o t give life. T h e wr i t e r c a n "be l ieve he i s
a s se r t ing himself in l a n g u a g e , b u t w h a t he i s asse r t ing i s c o m
plete ly w i t h o u t a self [peut c ro i re qu ' i l s 'affirme en ce l angage ,
m a i s ce qu ' i l affirme est t o u t à fait p r ivé de s o i ] " a n d " h e c a n
never aga in exp res s himself a n d he c a n n o t a p p e a l t o y o u ei
ther , n o r let a n y o n e else speak [il ne peu t p lus j amais s ' expr imer
e t i l ne p e u t p a s d a v a n t a g e en appe le r à t o i , n i e n c o r e d o n n e r
115
la pa ro l e à a u t r u i ] . " 1 In the neu t ra l i z ing space <>l l i t e ra ture , he
loses t h e p o w e r to say " I , " a n d lie finds he c a n n o t "g ive life to
c h a r a c t e r s w h o s e f reedom w o u l d be g u a r a n t e e d by his cre
at ive force [donner vie à des pe r sonnages d o n t sa force créat r ice
g a r a n t i r a i t l a l i b e r t é ] . " 2 To wr i t e , t o en te r the Neu te r , " is to
a r r a n g e l anguage u n d e r fasc ina t ion , a n d , t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e ,
i n l a n g u a g e , t o r e m a i n i n c o n t a c t w i t h the a b s o l u t e mi l ieu ,
w h e r e t h e t h i n g b e c o m e s a n i m a g e aga in , w h e r e the i m a g e ,
w h i c h h a d been a l lus ion to a figure, b e c o m e s an a l lus ion to
w h a t is w i t h o u t figure [ . . . ] w h e n the re is no w o r l d yet [c 'est
d i spose r le l angage sous fasc inat ion et, p a r lui, en lui, d e m e u r e r
en c o n t a c t avec le mil ieu a b s o l u , là où la c h o s e r edev ien t i m
age , où l ' image , d ' a l lus ion à une figure, dev ien t a l lus ion à ce
qui est sans figure et { . . . ) q u a n d il n 'y a p a s e n c o r e de
m o n d e ] . " 3
Thi s o b s c u r e r eg ion , ske t ched o u t in " T h e Essent ia l Soli
t u d e " ( a n d in m a n y , i f n o t al l , of B lancho t ' s o t h e r essays) i s
the r eg ion of the i l y a: "[AJlien to r eve la t ion , n o t even b e
c a u s e i t i s rad ica l ly d a r k , b u t because i t t r a n s f o r m s eve ry th ing
t h a t has access to it, even l ight , in to a n o n y m o u s a n d imper
sona l be ing , the N o t - t r u e , the N o t - r e a l a n d yet a l w a y s t he re
[ é t r anger à t o u t e r évé la t ion , n i m ê m e p a r c e qu ' e l l e se ra i t r a d i
c a l e m e n t o b s c u r e , m a i s p a r c e qu 'e l le t r a n s f o r m e t o u t ce qu i a
access à elle m ê m e la lumiè re , en l 'ê tre a n o n y m e i m p e r s o n n e l ,
le N o n - v r a i , le Non- r ée l e t c e p e n d a n t tou jours l à ] . " 4 (We shou ld
n o t e t h a t th is desc r ip t ion o f Blanchot ' s c o u l d easily have been
w r i t t e n by Levinas . ) To w r i t e i s t o be " p o s s e s s e d " by a n o n y m
ity, to be seized by i t a n d infini tesimally r e t a r d e d . T h i s " m i
l i eu" i s a b s o l u t e because i t does n o t refer to a n y p lace in t h e
w o r l d . I t ab-so lves itself f rom the rea l , a n d is an absence of
inside or ou t s ide . To wr i t e is to lose oneself in this reg ion w h e r e
t he re i s n o t h i n g to be revealed , expressed , m e a n t , o r s h o w n ,
b e c a u s e n o t h i n g is even h i d d e n . I t i s t he r eg ion of ambigu i ty ,
abandoned by referent es, emptied of subject and ob jec t—where
all is such as u is. Irreparably so.
T h e wri ter , t hen , i s " p o s s e s s e d " by no o n e , by t h e a n o n y
m o u s . He c a n n o t n a r r a t e himself, because he i s no o n e ; he i s
Quelqu'un, S o m e o n e b u t no one in p a r t i c u l a r — d a s Man. T h e
B l a n c h o t i a n w r i t e r i s n o t A n n a O . w h o w a s " p o s s e s s e d " b y
" a n o t h e r m e " such t h a t n o ex te r io r i za t ion o f this o t h e r w a s
ever poss ib le for her in the m o d e of n a r r a t i v e , as F r e u d ( and
L a c a n ) w i s h e d , because she w a s herself t h e d e m o n w h o p o s
sessed her . 5 W r i t i n g is n o t a case of hys te r ia . T h e hys ter ic is
n o t H o m e r , w h o c o u l d pass f r o m first t o t h i rd p e r s o n , f r o m
p u r e to d r a m a t i c diegesis . T h e d i scourse o f the hys te r i c , a s o f
a n y mu l t i p l e -pe r sona l i t y pa t i en t , is n o t a mixed mode.6 To
w r i t e i s n o t t o pass f r o m " I " t o another " I . " I t i s t o p a s s f r o m
" I " to to the neu t r a l i z a t i on of all ident i t ies , o f all " P s . "
W r i t i n g i s n o t h y p n o t i c or ven t r i loqu ized speech . I t i s n o t t h e
somnambu l i s t i c discourse o f s o m e o n e rav ished by a n o t h e r e g o . 7
Pla to ' s Ion w a s n o t demon ica l ly possessed . But P l a to s a w in
Ion t h e image o f m a d n e s s , an i m a g e o f r ad ica l d e p r o p r i a t i o n .
F u r t h e r m o r e , w e learn f rom Ph i l ippe L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e 8 t h a t
P l a t o " c a u g h t a g l impse of" a n d " r e d u c e d to a l i t e ra ry p r o b
l e m " t h e very " t e r r o r i z i n g " poss ib i l i ty t h a t d i s c o u r s e itself
c o n t a i n s , or ¿5, the very poss ibi l i ty of a general m imes i s , a
general ins tabi l i ty t h a t is in fact pos i t ive a n d p o w e r f u l espe
cially i n t h o s e fables , o r " o l d w i v e s ' t a l e s , " t h a t h a v e n o a u
thor , no g u a r a n t o r s o m e w h e r e in the w o r l d to a n s w e r for the i r
veracity. These "pa radox ica l ly au tho r i t a t i ve" fables, as Lacoue -
L a b a r t h e descr ibes t h e m , a re b e g u n i n t h e m o d e " i t i s s a i d "
a n d exis t , t he re fo re , ent i re ly w i t h i n d i scourse itself. T h e y a r e ,
in fact, e x e m p l a r y of all au tho r i t y . T h u s P l a to s o u g h t to r id
d i scour se o f this ins tabi l i ty a n d t e n d e n c y t o w a r d s H o m e r i c i s m
by t a rge t i ng poe t s a n d m a k i n g t h e m respons ib le for t h e ve rac
ity of d i scourses they only re-ci te . In fact , however , d i s cou r se
is th is impur i ty , this hes i ta t ion between "Ps." 1 )iscourse is neu
tral w i th regard to its p ropr ie ty . T h e r e is a na tu ra l a m b i g u i t y
in d i scourse wi th r ega rd to au thor i ty , a n d to speak , o r to wr i t e ,
i s first to pass to this equivocali ty. T h e r e is no f inal way, m e t h o d ,
o r t e c h n i q u e t h a t c a n r id d i scour se of its essential ambigu i ty .
To w r i t e i s to pass to this pure ly l inguist ic space w h e r e I am
p r i o r to myself, w h e r e s p e a k i n g i s the p u r e pas s ion of speak
ing-be ing itself, d e p r o p r i a t e d o f ail ident i ty a n d n e a r to m a d
ness , i f n o t a l r e a d y its image .
To w r i t e , o r to speak , i s to en te r in to t h a t w h i c h , in itself,
p recedes itself. I t i s to be s t r i pped of all ident i ty a n d to be
c o m e a p u r e image (of no o n e ) — u n a b l e a n y m o r e to be , o r n o t
to be . I t i s to b e c o m e , n o t a n o t h e r p e r s o n a , b u t i n s t ead the
p u r e pas s ion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h e r e pas s ion i s c o m m u n i
c a t i o n a n d w h e r e my iden t i ty i s th i s p a s s i o n a t e , ve r t ig inous
" n o o n e " w h o c a n n o t a n s w e r for w h a t i s wr i t t en . T h i s space
i s the p u r e an te r io r i ty or pu re reserve f rom w h i c h all a r t c o m e s .
I t i s un l ivab le , u n e n d u r a b l e (i.e., i t h a s no d u r a t i o n ) a n d i t i s
t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f rom a n y ac tua l s t a t e o f affairs. W r i t
ing is a petrified t r anscendence , an event t h a t is n o t even p o t e n
tially accompl i shab le . I t i s a lways " b e t w e e n , " or " m e a n w h i l e . "
To pass to i l i s to pass to " h e " w h o car r ies o u t an infinite
m o v e m e n t ("infinite d e g r e e s , " B lancho t s ays ) . 9 W r i t i n g m o v e s
us t o w a r d t h a t w h i c h i s a lways in-itself, t h a t w h i c h d e p e n d s
on no c o n d i t i o n since i t i s al ien to all ac tual i ty , in i t ia t ive , a n d
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t .
We h a v e seen in p rev ious c h a p t e r s t h a t the w o r k o f a r t
i m m e d i a t e l y de taches itself f rom the c o n d i t i o n s ( the ma te r i a l s
a n d t h e a c t u a l h is tor ica l states-of-affairs) t h a t i t s p r a n g f rom.
We s a w as wel l in L'arrêt de mort t h a t , at t h e i n s t a n t of he r
d e a t h , J . b e c a m e no longer herself, no longer a n y o n e . A t t h e
i n s t a n t o f he r d e a t h she exh ib i t ed t h a t " s h e " w h o i s q u a s i -
e t e rna l ly p re se rved in-herself, a l w a y s a t t h e l ips o f t h e a c t u a l
w i thou t evei attaining it. At the instant of her d e a t h , J. no
longer depends on all thai she w a s , yet she is n o n e - o t h e r t h a n
"all tha i she w a s . " She b e c o m e s , in t h a t sense , all t h a t i s s u b
t r ac t ed f rom her.
L ikewise , the w o r k of a r t a t t a in s a s t r ange i n d e p e n d e n c e
f rom all t h a t w e n t i n t o i t . I t no longer bea r s a n y d e p e n d e n c e
on a n y real c o n d i t i o n s a n d , f rom the " s t a r t " o f its " l i f e" (as
an a r t w o r k ) , i t s epa ra t e s itself f rom the w o r l d so t h a t i t be
c o m e s a p u r e r e s e m b l a n c e r e sembl ing n o t h i n g . I t b e c o m e s in-
itselfness. W h e n I l o o k at a p a i n t i n g or w h e n I r ead a nove l , I
perce ive w i t h o u t perce iv ing a n y t h i n g . I am affected w i t h o u t
f inding myself in a n y p a r t i c u l a r s ta te o f m i n d . T h e w o r k of
a r t , a s we h a v e sa id , i s m a d e up o f imag ina ry , f a b u l o u s m a t t e r
t h a t i s i nd i s t ingu i shab le f rom the sensa t ions i t evokes . Imag i
n a r y ma t t e r i s sensa t iona l because i t c a n n o t be d issocia ted f rom
s e n s a t i o n itself (i .e. , s ensa t ion before i t is a sensa t ion o / s o m e -
t h i n g ) . T h e w o r k o f a r t i s n o t h i n g bu t f abu lous , imag ina ry ,
s ensa t i ona l m a t t e r — m a t t e r e m p t i e d o f t h e space i t w o u l d oc
c u p y a n d t h a t , " s imp le a n d a b s o l u t e , " hur l s itself t o w a r d s u s . 1 0
I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r confuses m a t t e r a n d sensa t ion such t h a t sen
sa t i on b e c o m e s ex te r io r i ty a n d t akes on its o w n life i n d e p e n
d e n t of a n y sensum. In t h e w o r k of a r t t he r e is no longer a n y
reference to subjec t a n d objec t , a n d sensa t ion itself i s b o r n in
the l i be r a t i on of m a t t e r f rom objectal i ty . I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r i s
i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h objec ta l i ty a n d i s the very t h i c k e n i n g
o f the h y p h e n t h a t separa tes / l inks subjec t -objec t . W h e n m a t
ter no longer adhe re s t o an objec t , i t s u d d e n l y " a p p e a r s . " Bu t
as i t " a p p e a r s " as no object o r no fo rm , i t i m m e d i a t e l y d i s a p
p e a r s . T h a t is, i t does n o t en te r i n t o a n y pe r cep t i on , b u t r a t h e r
i t beg ins (or rebegins) an infinite c o n t e s t a t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n .
Levinas has s h o w n us t h a t " p a i n t i n g is a struggle w i t h s i g h t . " 1 1
T h i s s t ruggle is the r e t u r n of t h e dynamis of s ensa t ion itself,
before sensa t ion en te r s i n t o a n y expe r i ence (in t h e K a n t i a n
sense) . The s t ruggle Levinas refers to is .1 pure affection—as
pass ive as it is d y n a m i c , as d y n a m i c as it is p a s s io n a t e . Ar t
t e n d s t o w a r d this infinite, pers i s ten t m o v e m e n t t h a t i s the af
fect ion of s ensa t ion by t h e i m a g i n a r y mater ia l i ty i t itself is.
Sensa t ion itself, or p u r e pa s s ion , is neu t r a l . I t is t he ex te r io r i ty
o f o u r m o s t p a s s i o n a t e inferiori ty, a s we shall d iscuss m o r e
t h o r o u g h l y later in this chapte r .
O u r r a p p o r t w i t h t h e a r t w o r k , a s w i t h t h e cadaver , i s n o t
m a d e up o f m e m o r i e s b u t o f the s u d d e n e r u p t i o n o f t h e i m m e
m o r i a l — a r a p p o r t t h a t i s con t i nua l l y s u b t r a c t e d f rom all a c
t ua l , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s ta tes one m a y h a v e en joyed w i t h t h e
depa r t ed o r wi th tha t w h i c h the a r t w o r k p r i m a facie r ep resen t s .
T h a t is to say, we en te r i n to a r a p p o r t t h a t is autonomous a n d
w h o s e r e l a t ion to all l ived a n d m e m o r i a l exper iences o r s ta tes
o f m i n d i s a l w a y s equ ivoca l . T h i s r a p p o r t , w h i c h t h e a r t w o r k
p r o v o k e s , i s t he becoming -equ ivoca l o f m e m o r y a n d p e r c e p
t i on . I t i s t he b e c o m i n g - e q u i v o c a l or b e c o m i n g - f a b u l o u s of
the rea l . T h e r a p p o r t i s a u t o n o m o u s because i t h a s no subject
or ob jec t . It is a b s o l u t e . It is n o t a r a p p o r t with a n y thing
(o the r t h a n its o w n obsessive " se l f " ) . H e n c e i t i s t he m o s t u n
ce r t a in o f r a p p o r t s a n d the m o s t pers i s ten t , since i t c a n n o t be
a b s o r b e d in to a n y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e o r a c c o m p l i s h e d . I t c a n
n o t be p u t b e h i n d us because i t i s a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e n o n t h i n g
t h a t s h i m m e r s " b e s i d e " the t h i n g in a space e m p t y of space . I t
c a n n o t be possessed a n d p u t t o w o r k in the service o f a n y
t a s k , b u t i t c a n be a f f i rmed—mus t be a f f i rmed—obl ique ly , for
i t i s w i t h o u t a n y self or identi ty. Every a r t w o r k is an o b l i q u e
a f f i rmat ion of this r a p p o r t t h a t resists def ini t ion.
W h a t i f th i s neu t r a l i z ing s p a c e , as c lose as poss ib l e to
m a d n e s s (if n o t its very poss ibi l i ty a n d b e g i n n i n g ) — t h i s space
t h a t d i scour se itself o p e n s up a n d m a i n t a i n s a n d t h a t l i tera
t u r e pu re ly a n d s imply a f f i rms—wha t i f th is space e m p t i e d of
all ident i t ies w e r e a l r e a d y a c o m m u n i t y ? I t w o u l d be a s t r ange
community, 1 >ui a t ommunity nevertheless. What il that which
r ema ins invisible ami unperce ived w a s in fact t ha t w h i c h in
a n y c o m m u n i t y escapes i t such t h a t o n e a l w a y s a l r e a d y " b e
l o n g s " t o a n y c o m m u n i t y w h a t e v e r w i t h o u t , however , be long
ing based on any represen tab le cond i t ion? W h a t w o u l d i t m e a n
to b e l o n g to a c o m m u n i t y pu re ly a n o n y m o u s l y ? To b e l o n g to
a c o m m u n i t y before it is a c o m m u n i t y of. . . ( this or t h a t ,
m e n , G o d ' s c r ea tu re s , etc.)? A c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t a n y essence
o r a n y p r e c o n d i t i o n s o f be long ing? G i o r g i o A g a m b e n profiles
for us such a c o m m u n i t y in his r e m a r k a b l e b o o k La comunità
che viene. He descr ibes a c o m m u n i t y to w h i c h o n e is ca l led by
v i r tue o f p u r e " b e i n g ca l led [ l ' e s s e r -de t t o ] " : t h e " p r o p e r t y
[ p r o p r i e t à ] , " he says " t h a t es tabl ishes all poss ib le b e l o n g i n g
[che fonda tu t t e le possibi l i a p p a r t e n e n z e ] . " Th i s " p r o p e r t y "
he tells u s , i s " p u r e l y l inguis t ic b e i n g [ l 'essere p u r a m e n t e
l i ngu i s t i co ] . "
Whatever!
T h e " s p a c e " o r s t r u c t u r e o f A g a m b e n ' s b o o k i s
crazy, sl ightly d r u n k (even as the t h i n k i n g in i t i s precise a n d
de l i ca te ) . E a c h of its brief t h r e e or four p a g e sec t ions , frag
m e n t s , o r pane l s (like i n c o m i c b o o k s ) a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k t h e
s a m e t h o u g h t u n d e r va r ious n a m e s : "Quodlibet ens," " E x
a m p l e , " " E a s e , " " M a n n e r , " " H a l o , " "Shekinah," "Bar t l eby , "
"Principium Individuations, " " I m a g e , " Heidegger 's as, the thus,
a n d the rather, a m o n g still o t h e r s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t to r e a d each
sec t ion o r p a n e l a s s u p e r i m p o s e d on t h e o t h e r s o r a s i f e a c h
s imu l t aneous ly occup ied the s a m e space (or pe rpe tua l ly e m p t y
thought) such t h a t each is a new, d i s p a r a t e pe rspec t ive b u t of
n o l a n d s c a p e o r a r g u m e n t . W e m a y descr ibe t h e b o o k a s e ru
d i te , or as a ph i lo soph ica l serendipi ty , b u t t h a t seems bes ide
the p o i n t , for i t is as i f these pane l s c a m e from e l sewhere t h a n
one mind or one thinker . T h e work, i! a n y t h i n g , is variously
e rud i t e , as i f A g a m b e n himself (and we k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t
h i m persona l ly) were a c razy a u t o - d i c t a t w h o s e poly vocal e ru
diti on a l w a y s t h r e a t e n e d to t r a n s f o r m h im in to a mul t ip l e -
pe r s ona l i t y case . But we insist t h a t the sense o f a l m o s t c o m i
cal e rud i t i on i s qu i te to the po in t . He i s n o t obsessed so m u c h
w i t h an ideé fixe b u t w i t h an Idea t h a t pe rpe tua l l y i n f i x e s
t h o u g h t , s o t h a t t h o u g h t s themse lves b e c o m e p u r e pe r spec
t ives , o r images o f t h o u g h t , w i t h o u t f o r m i n g a n y o n e f igu re .
We m a y w i s h to c o m p a r e La comunità che viene to a
Ba l thus s t ree t scene w h e r e each of t h e c h a r a c t e r s in the s t ree t
quie t ly occupies its o w n space a n d goes a b o u t its bus iness b u t
w h e r e each seems to be l o o k i n g in to or m o v i n g in to different
spaces so t h a t , a s we look a t t h e c a n v a s , o u r gaze i s petr if ied.
O u r gaze looks in to no o n e space , b u t r a the r i s t r ans fe r red
f r o m v a r i o u s space t o v a r i o u s space , each t angen t i a l t o t h e
o ther , b u t n o t organica l ly r e l a t ed . In this way, each c h a r a c t e r
b e c o m e s s imple , serene , ab so lu t e , a n d is possessed by a s t r ange
d e t a c h m e n t . O u r gaze i s n o t mere ly pass ive a n d c o n t e m p l a
t ive . I t c a n n o t b u t get involved since i t c a n n o t even f ind w h a t
w o u l d be cal led the space of t h e c a n v a s . O u r eye i s d r a w n into
t h e c a n v a s , w h o s e " s p a c e " i s miss ing , a n d w h i c h itself, t h e n ,
b e c o m e s an e n o r m o u s eye s ta r ing a t us w i t h a gaze e m p t i e d of
s ight . Th i s i s Bal thus ' s t e c h n i q u e a n d i t w a s f i rs t no t i ced , as
far a s we c a n tell , by A n t o n i n A r t a u d , w h o c o n t r a s t s i t t o
t r o m p e l ' oe i l . 1 2 Ins tead o f d u p i n g us i n t o bel ieving t h a t s o m e
t h i n g rea l i s t he r e t h a t i s n o t t h e r e , Ba l thus o v e r c o m e s o r over
w h e l m s the d i s t anced pass iv i ty of c o n t e m p l a t i o n by petrifying
t h e rea l . He accompl i shes this by b r e a k i n g up perspec t ive i n t o
f r agment s (of no wholes ) thus giving his c h a r a c t e r s the s p h i n x
l ike qua l i ty t h a t A r t a u d no t iced in his review. O n e c a n o b
serve the s a m e t h i n g a m o n g ch i ld ren w h o a re each fasc ina ted
by, a n d to ta l ly involved in p lay ing w i t h , t h e s a m e objects b u t
each in he. 01 I HI o w n comple te ly s ingular way. To the a d u l t
w h o wat t lies, i Ins t ends to petrify the object a n d m a k e of i t an
image o f itself. A n y o n e w h o has h a d to t end m o r e t h a n t w o
ch i ld ren a t o n c e i s a w a r e of the b r e a k u p of p e r c e p t i o n i n t o
radical pe r spec t iv i sm a n d rad ica l ly p lu ra l i zed s ignif icat ions.
O u r perspec t ive i s a perspec t ive on t h a t w h i c h h a s r e t u r n e d to
its o r ig ina ry image a n d is w i t h o u t f igure , as i f o u r p e r c e p t i o n
w e r e t e m p o r a r i l y b l i nded . We are no longer ab le t o see an
image o f th is o r t h a t , a n d o u r pe rcep t ion i s o v e r w h e l m e d a n d
pu lve r ized by p u r e pe r spec t iv i sm.
A g a m b e n ' s f r agmen t s , o r pane l s , a re all c o m m e n t a r i e s , he
tells us , on an old me taphys i ca l p r o b l e m : the r e l a t ion b e t w e e n
essence a n d ex i s tence , quid est a n d quod est.n E a c h f r a g m e n t
r e t h i n k s this p r o b l e m (which i s t h e p r o b l e m of intel l igibil i ty
itself) a n e w , offers a n o t h e r perspect ive on the p r o b l e m , a n d in
e a c h case seeks to l iquefy t h e n o t i o n of essence as s tab le a n d
s tabi l iz ing , p roper , erect , a n d unifying. In s t ead of an esse, he
a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k a " m o s t c o m m o n " o r the m o s t c o m m o n . He
a t t e m p t s to t h ink the W h a t e v e r or Quodlibet (qualunque or
quelconque), w h i c h , his t r a n s l a t o r c a u t i o n s us , refers n o t to
t h e genera l o r the par t i cu la r , t he gener ic o r t h e i nd iv idua l , b u t
to t h e " s i n g u l a r " in the sense in w h i c h Deleuze a n d B a d i o u
use t h e t e r m . 1 4 T h e c o m m o n a l i t y A g a m b e n r e p e a t e d l y a p
p r o a c h e s in his f r agment s b o t h involves us in a " b e l o n g i n g "
a n d a l so depr ives us of a n y r ep re sen t ab l e c o n d i t i o n of b e l o n g
ing . F o r t h e W h a t e v e r i s jus t t h a t — w h a t e v e r !
T h e r e i s n o t h i n g m y s t e r i o u s , m a g i c a l , o r ineffable a b o u t
the W h a t e v e r . I t i s as c o m m o n as c a n be . I t i s t he m o s t c o m
m o n . I t i s n o t r e p r e s e n t a b l e or t h e m e t i z a b l e , n o t b e c a u s e i t i s
w i t h d r a w n , si lent , nega t ive , or r e m o v e d , b u t because it is too
common. I t is n o t even h i d d e n , a n d i t offers n o t h i n g to be
t h o u g h t , c o n t e m p l a t e d , o r w o r r i e d a b o u t . T h o u g h t need n o t
seek after it , for i t is a l r eady in every t h o u g h t a n d in every
r ep re sen t a t i on . Ii is not .1 gener ic " g i v e n " thai we can a l w a y s
f a l l back o n , no r a bana l b a c k g r o u n d for any poss ible c o m
m u n i t y such as " W e ' r e all h u m a n , " or "I t 's a small w o r l d , " or
" T o each his o w n a s l o n g a s i t d o e s n ' t h u r t a n y o n e e l se . " T h e
m o s t c o m m o n , like t h e i l y a in Levinas a n d Blancho t , is w h a t
needs t o be r epea ted ly a p p r o a c h e d a n d e x p o s e d , for the m o s t
c o m m o n i s on ly in its a p p r o a c h , its e x p o s u r e , its " c o m i n g . "
To a p p r o a c h the W h a t e v e r i s t o a p p r o a c h an ever -e lsewhere
t h a t i s n o t a b s e n t , an ever-here t h a t i s n o t p re sen t . Qualunque
is t he neu t r a l i z a t i on of iden t i ty t h a t is in every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
w h i l e r e m a i n i n g n o n c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
I t is on ly g l impsed in profi le , or in the s h a d o w s of a p e r c e p
t ion or a feeling.
W h a t e v e r be ing is n o t a subject , bypokeimenon, or s u b
s t ance t h a t under l ies all its p red ica t e s a n d i s w h a t e v e r r e m a i n s
w h e n all its qual i t ies a re r e m o v e d . I t is n o t a l imit t h a t g r o u n d s
intell igibili ty. W h a t e v e r be ing is be ing such t h a t all its p r e d i
ca tes un l imi t i t infinitely, u n g r o u n d or l ibera te i t infinitely.
W h a t e v e r be ing is be ing t h a t f inds itself in its un l imi t ing . "Al l
its p r e d i c a t e s " wnde te rmine w h a t e v e r be ing , un rave l it, a n d
e x p o s e i t such t h a t w h a t e v e r be ing c a n only t r a n s c e n d t o w a r d
itself infinitely, t o w a r d itself such as i t i s—an e m p t y to ta l i ty
t h a t "all its p red ica tes" (de)consti tute and (de)limit. W h a t e v e r
be ing is be ing w h o s e Being is pe rpe tua l ly de layed , r e t a r d e d ,
or a p p r o a c h e d , for "a l l its p r e d i c a t e s " is n o t a poss ib i l i ty for
w h a t e v e r be ing . Ra the r , i t i s an imposs ib i l i ty t h a t con t i nua l l y
s h i m m e r s bes ide it, in an e m p t y i m a g i n a r y space " r e s e r v e d "
for i t b u t never occup ied .
T h i s does n o t m e a n t h a t w h a t e v e r be ing str ives majes t i
cally t o w a r d all t h a t i t can be , t o w a r d a U t o p i a n self t h a t sh im
m e r s in an inaccessible h o r i z o n l ight ing up a p a t h t o w a r d s an
ideal i d e n t i t y . Ins tead , s o m e t h i n g qui te different h a p p e n s . Since
"a l l its p r e d i c a t e s " is not a p r ed i ca t e of w h a t e v e r be ing , a n y
particulai o u r 0! those predicates ( be ing -mascu l ine , be ing-
A m e r i c a n , e.g.) exposes a relat ion b e t w e e n a real be ing a n d
an empty to tal i ty , a n o n t h i n g , or n o t h i n g t h a t r ende r s th is r ea l
be ing a whateverness. T h i s does n o t d r a i n w h a t e v e r be ing
b lood less a n d m a k e it, l ike Sar t re ' s ego, p u r e a n d s imple t r a n
s c e n d e n c e . 1 5 I t m e a n s t h a t w h a t e v e r be ing i s a p u r e a n d e m p t y
relation to language, to p r e d i c a t i o n , such t h a t on ly in l an
g u a g e is w h a t e v e r be ing as i t is, yet w i t h o u t be ing defined o n c e
a n d for all: n o t being its p red ica t e s b u t being-called ( this or
t h a t , " A m e r i c a n , " " m a s c u l i n e , " e.g.). W h a t e v e r be ing i s n o t
its qua l i t i es . I t is its e x p o s u r e to all its qual i t ies t h a t e ach pa r
t i cu la r qua l i t y resays or re-cal ls . T h e exis tence of w h a t e v e r
be ing is pure ly l inguis t ic , pu re ly be ing-ca l led . T h u s i t is in l an
g u a g e t h a t w h a t e v e r be ing f inds itself, suffers itself, t o u c h e s
itself in the p u r e pa s s ion of be ing-cal led . I t is itself as an e m p t y
to t a l i t y t h a t enve lops its rea l ex is tence as th is or t h a t .
T h i s e m p t y to ta l i ty is n o t a p u r e a n d s imple vo id . I t is a
n o t h i n g o r an e m p t y space t h a t i s a d d e d t o , o r s u p p l e m e n t s ,
a n y be ing wha t soeve r . I t i s a never p r e sen t s u p p l e m e n t w i t h
o u t w h i c h no be ing c o u l d be w h a t i t is. A n y p a r t i c u l a r be ing i s
a l so " w h a t e v e r i s ca l led . . . " A n y p a r t i c u l a r be ing o f c o u r s e
be longs to s o m e genus o f s o m e species such t h a t i t c a n be
identif ied as w h a t i t in fact i s a n d c a n be e x p e r i e n c e d as such .
B u t — a n d this i s A g a m b e n ' s ins igh t—i t " b e l o n g s " to the ge
n u s as an example of it, as an image or s c h e m a - i m a g e of a n y
such m e m b e r of t h a t g e n u s . It is this p a r t i c u l a r and i t is an
example of w h a t e v e r is cal led this or t h a t par t i cu la r . It is th i s
p a r t i c u l a r (house , e.g.) and i t serves for, or s t a n d s in t h e p lace
of, whatever is-called ( " h o u s e , " e.g.) . As such it e x p o s e s its
s ingular i ty , its w h a t e v e r n e s s . I t occup ies its o w n , a n d s imul t a
neous ly t h e empty , p lace of t h e e x a m p l e . I t is a p a r t i c u l a r a n d
it is so-called. It is itself (idem) a n d it is w h a t e v e r be ing . T h i s
is its s econd life, its s econd n a t u r e , A g a m b e n says . Insofar as
it is-called, it is ne i ther shown nor m e a n t , is nei ther this pa r
t i cu la r no r an insipid general i ty . Il only fills the e m p t y space
of the " w h a t e v e r is cal led . . ." As cal led, as n a m e d , as an
e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t t h e m a t i z e d a t all . Necessar i ly , the e x a m p l e
(or t h e s chema- image ) is t h a t in l a n g u a g e for w h i c h t he re is no
n a m e . I t is t he pure be ing - in - l anguage of the non l ingu i s t i c , t h e
u n n a m a b l e ( tha t is, t h e n o n u n i v e r s a l t h a t i s n o t a pa r t i cu la r ,
e i the r ) . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e i s t h e imag e of no ( represen tab le )
f igure. We will learn from o u r ana lys is of K a n t la ter in th is
c h a p t e r t h a t an objec t is itself only insofar as it need not ap
pear as in fact it actually does appear. As such , as an e x a m p l e ,
it is " g i v e n " all its possibili t ies as an e m p t y total i ty (a nonfigure)
t h a t c h a n g e s n o t h i n g bu t t h e sense o f t h e ac tua l . As an ex
a m p l e , a th ing is " the event of an ou ts ide [I'evento di un fuori],"
A g a m b e n says , by w h i c h i t h a s access to itself (ipse), to " i t s
face, its eidos [il s u o v o l t o , il suo eidos]" (italics in o r i g i n a l ) . 1 6
As exempla ry , a be ing is n o t defined by qual i t ies e x c e p t
first by pas s ing t h r o u g h being-ca l led , by p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e
space of ne i the r the p a r t i c u l a r n o r the un iversa l . A l t h o u g h a
s u c h - a n d - s u c h will be a pa r t i cu l a r case , i t is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t i t
m u s t serve for all o the r s of the s a m e type , a n d t h u s i t occup ies
the e m p t y p lace of w h a t e v e r b e i n g — a space t h a t i s p u r e l y lin
guis t ic a n d in w h i c h i t c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h o t h e r s ingular i t ies
u n b o u n d b y a n y i d e n t i t y . I t i s s t r i c t l y b e i n g - c a l l e d , a n
u n n a m a b l e w i th in a n y d e n o m i n a t i o n t h a t i t m a y be given. T h a t
is: it is a pure anteriority or infinite shortage of presence that
radically calls its identity into question. It is hence c u t off f rom
a n y real c o m m u n i t y a n d yet i t is the m o s t - c o m m o n . It is "what
ever is-called ..."
W h a t e v e r be ing is n o t a je ne sais quoi, an o b s c u r e qua l i ty
no o n e c a n p u t the i r f inger o n . I t i s t h e t h i n g with all its p r e d i
ca tes t h a t undefine or de l imi t it. Quodlibet ens is t he t h i n g
ipse, b u t on ly insofar as i t " t r a n s c e n d s t o w a r d itself" in the
empty spa< 6 ol the e x a m p l e . This empty total i ty unrave l s it of
ident i ty a n d singulai r/.es it or " u n m a k e s it a c c o r d i n g to its
i m a g e , " as Blanchot w o u l d say . 1 7 I t is t he th ing w i t h all its
re la t ions , all its qua l i t ies . In the space of the e x a m p l e , the t h i n g
i s "al l its r e l a t i o n s " a n d "a l l its qua l i t i e s . " To b o r r o w f r o m
o n e of A g a m b e n ' s o w n e x a m p l e s , 1 8 th is letter p t h a t I m a k e
he re i s itself n o t because i t be longs to an ideal p - f o r m b u t
because i t be longs a m o n g , or b o r d e r s o n , all t h e v a r i o u s dif
ferences a n d id iosyncras ies in i n n u m e r a b l e vers ions of p . T h e
p h a s ident i ty insofar as i t be longs to an a l p h a b e t i c g e n u s , of
c o u r s e , b u t i t i s r ecogn izab le as w h a t i t is on ly as e n g e n d e r e d
by a t h o u s a n d id iosyncras ies t h a t hab i tua l l y r e n d e r i t legible.
I n this w a y c o m m o n a n d p rope r b e c o m e indis t inguishable f rom
each other . T h e t h o u s a n d id iosyncras ies descr ibe a n e m p t y
i n t e r w o r l d w i th in w h i c h w h a t i s cal led p m o v e s freely a n d
a c c o r d i n g t o its o w n m a n n e r . T h e e m p t y to ta l i ty o f " i t s " id io
syncras ies a re n o t its p r o p e r t i e s b u t its i m p r o p r i e t i e s — i t s h a
b i tua l resistance to p ropr ie ty , w h i c h in fact constitutes its rec
ogn izab le a p p e a r a n c e on the page . T h i s i s its s econd n a t u r e ,
i ts s ingular i ty . T h u s A g a m b e n s h o w s us s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s n o t
e s t ab l i shed once a n d for all , e ternal ly, b u t t h a t w h i c h i s a l
w a y s I'entretemps, de l ayed or c o m i n g a m o n g s t " a n infinite
series of m o d a l va r i a t i ons [una serie infinita di osc i l laz ioni
m o d a l i ] . " 1 9 Each ind iv idua l p o p e n s o n t o an exempla r i ty , a
s ingular i ty , t h a t i s its o sc i l l a t ions—a v ica r ious space w h e r e
each ind iv idua l p subs t i tu tes itself for each o t h e r poss ib le p
such t h a t this p a r t i c u l a r p is i n c a r n a t e d as s ubs t i t u t ed .
I n th is a n d i n m a n y o t h e r w a y s , A g a m b e n descr ibes c o m
m u n i t y such t h a t each be ing occup ies a p a r t i c u l a r p lace t h a t i s
r ad ica l ly in q u e s t i o n as i t o p e n s o n t o a n o t h e r space w h e r e
each be ing i s a lways a l ready subs t i tu t ed for a n o t h e r be ing w h o
i s in an a l w a y s o t h e r p lace . In t h a t " o t h e r " space , "bes ide
itself," as exemplary, it communica tes wi th all o ther singulari t ies.
T h i s is not an actualized c o m m u n i t y . No in fo rma t ion is passed
a long in any real c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e c o m m u n i t y c o m m u n i
ca tes only its be long ing to the m o s t - c o m m o n . In the e x a m p l e ,
s ingu la r be ing is " e x p r o p r i a t e d of all ident i ty ( e sp ropr i a t e di
t u t t e l e i d e n t i t à ] " 2 0 a n d a b a n d o n e d t o p u r e a n d s imple be
long ing . (It is n o t as myself, b u t as s ingular , as other, t h a t I am
e x p o s e d t o the o ther . " I , " i n s h o r t , t o r e t u r n t o t h e l a n g u a g e
o f B lancho t , b e c o m e s H e , il, Neu te r . T h e mul t ip le c o m m o n
space desc r ibed by A g a m b e n r e m a i n s , i n my o p i n i o n , c lose to
B l a n c h o t i a n aes the t ics , in spi te of A g a m b e n ' s r e s e r v a t i o n s . ) 2 1
In A g a m b e n ' s pol i t ics , t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n of iden t i ty a n d
t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n — t o d a y so inescapab le—of the real i n to its
im age p r o v i d e u s w i th a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d o p p o r t u n i t y t o a p
p r o p r i a t e t h e m o s t - c o m m o n a n d t o expe r i ence the fact t h a t
one speaks.12 T h i s w o u l d a l so be t h e very a p p r o p r i a t i o n of (or
by) a n o n y m i t y t h a t a n i m a t e s all o f B lancho t ' s n a r r a t o r s a n d i t
perfect ly descr ibes Blancho t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s on wr i t i ng a n d the
space of l i t e ra tu re . For, w h e n one s peaks , no o n e (no t he n o r
she , n o t th is o n e n o r t h a t one ) speaks . O n e b e c o m e s w h a t e v e r
o r w h o m e v e r speaker , o n e b e c o m e s speak ing -be ing a s s u c h ,
a n d n o t a m o r e - or less-qualified speaker . Indeed , o n e is de -
p r o p r i a t e d of all d e t e r m i n a t e qual i t ies a n d o n e en te r s t h e en
t i re space o f d i scourse , such t h a t the o n e w h o speaks c a n n o t
be a sce r t a ined o r identified, b u t c i rcu la tes w i t h i n d i s cou r se
itself. As p u r e speak ing -be ing , I speak w i t h o u t a n y o n e ' s be ing
ab le t o t r ace m y w o r d s b a c k t o m e a n d h o l d m e a c c o u n t a b l e
for t h e m , even if I s t a n d s m a c k in f ront of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ,
b e c a u s e t h e experience of speak ing -be ing does n o t refer to a
self t h a t I w o u l d be . As speak ing -be ing , u n a b l e to refer to a n y
reali ty, I w o u l d speak w i t h o u t hav ing a n y basis for s p e a k i n g ,
a n y r e a s o n to open my m o u t h . M o r e o v e r , I w o u l d speak w i t h
o u t h a v i n g a n y t h i n g t o c o m m u n i c a t e . M y speech w o u l d c a r r y
n o i n f o r m a t i o n i n t e n d e d t o i n fo rm a n o t h e r speaker , a n o t h e r
a k , n IM w i u / \ i l l ' i i i i l ' i i i I I I C A I N E U T E R
identity. W h e n I ' .peak, no identi ty w o u l d speak a n d I w o u l d
speak an imaginary, ab so lu t e l anguage . I w o u l d be s p e a k i n g
from the place o l the O t h e r w h o w o u l d r e m a i n a l w a y s else
w h e r e . As s u c h , I w o u l d a p p r o a c h t h e o t h e r as other, o u t s i d e
any ident i ty , for I w o u l d n o t be the subject of any d i scour se .
" O l d e r " t h a n a n y communique w o u l d be th is r a p p o r t w i t h
t h e O t h e r o u t s i d e intersubject ivi ty , a n d comple t e ly l inguis t ic
be ing w o u l d " c o m e " to us like a l ong supp re s sed remin i scence
or like a long- suppressed pass ion . C o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d t h e n
b e un i t ed w i t h th is p a s s i o n a t e r a p p o r t , o r fo r - the -o the r -ness ,
in a speech t h a t says n o t h i n g , reveals n o t h i n g , a n d t h a t is as a
foreign l a n g u a g e w i t h i n one ' s na t ive t o n g u e (as t h e n a r r a t o r
of L'arrèt de mort expe r i ences ) . 2 3 Th i s rad ica l c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y
w o u l d " p o s s e s s " us a n d o p e n a space t h a t i s no t -ye t co lon ized
by t h e S ta te .
Community
T h e fate a n d des t iny of a c o m m u n i t y ( h u m a n be
ing) t h a t does n o t have its or igin in itself a n d c a n n o t f ind its
or ig in ou t s i de itself excep t in s i lence, t r agedy , or a l i e n a t i o n —
in s h o r t , a negative g r o u n d — i s the subject of A g a m b e n ' s m e d i
t a t i on in his ear l ier b o o k Language and Death: The Place of
Negativity {Il linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
della negatività].14 In t h a t b o o k , he a t t e m p t s to a p p r o a c h an
expe r i ence of l a n g u a g e t h a t does n o t res t on a nega t ive foun
d a t i o n a n d he does n o t f i nd t h a t expe r i ence in e i ther p h i l o s o
p h y o r poe t ry . Each o f t hose t r a d i t i o n s a lso t r aces t h e h u m a n
voice t h rough language, but each f inds only ineffability, s i lence,
mystery , sacred a c t i o n , o r t h e t r ag ic d iv is ion o f ex i s tence a n d
essence , a n d the abso lu t e fear of the H e g e l i a n t h r e a t of the
N e g a t i v e t h a t magica l ly t r a n s f o r m s N o t h i n g n e s s in to Being.
T h a t i s t o say, ne i ther p h i l o s o p h y n o r p o e t r y i s ab le t o g r a s p
the t ak ing-p lace <>l l anguage winch wou ld he the t ak ing-p lace
of the h u m a n ( insofar as h u m a n being is speak ing-be ing) such
t h a t h u m a n be ing w o u l d then be capable of l anguage , seize
t h e facul ty for l a n g u a g e , a n d un i te i t w i th his f initude as a
c o m p l e t e d f o u n d a t i o n . But , A g a m b e n says , h u m a n be ing , i n
fact , does not have a voice—a n a t u r e , an e s s e n c e — n o t even a
ba s i ca l l y r e m o v e d , s i l en t , o r n e g a t i v e vo ice (or Voice , a s
A g a m b e n chr i s tens i t) . In s h o r t , t he re is no or ig ina l vouloir
dire, a n d th i s , a las , has des t ined h u m a n be ing to a h i s to ry a n d
a S ta te (which we n o w inher i t in the f o r m of C a p i t a l ) . T h u s ,
w i t h N i e t z s c h e , A g a m b e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t the Voice m u s t d i e . 2 5
But w h a t is l anguage w i t h o u t a Voice, w i t h o u t a Sigetics?16
W h a t i s a l a n g u a g e t h a t does n o t say perfectly a n d prese rve in
itself an U n s a y a b l e , an Ineffable, a M y s t e r y ? W h a t , in s h o r t ,
i s a l a n g u a g e t h a t does n o t c o n d e m n h u m a n be ing to a S ta te ,
a Sacer, a des t iny? W h a t is a l a n g u a g e t h a t so i m p o v e r i s h e s
h u m a n be ing t h a t the " e x t r e m e l y null ifying unvei l ing [es t r emo
s v e l a m e n t o n u l l i f i c a n t e ] " 2 7 t h a t w e t o d a y expe r i ence w o u l d
ac tua l ly offer us a hope? A h o p e n o t for an e x t r e m e H a v i n g -
b e e n t h a t , i n t h e H e g e l i a n A b s o l u t e o r t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n
Ereignis, c o u l d be seized a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d , b u t a h o p e for a
N e v e r - h a v i n g - b e e n , an e x t r e m e y o u t h o r an a b s o l u t e infancy
such t h a t h u m a n be ing w o u l d n o t yet h a v e been b o r n ! 2 8 Such
a b e i n g — w h o never h a s b e e n — w o u l d speak a l a n g u a g e t h a t
d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e w o r k , m e a n i n g , o r a r t i cu l a t i on . Such a
be ing , never h a v i n g been , w o u l d be imaginary, in t h a t " o t h e r "
ve r s ion B l a n c h o t defines for us , a n d such a l a n g u a g e w o u l d be
a m b i g u o u s , since i t w o u l d a n d w o u l d n o t be t h e voice o f h u
m a n be ing . I t w o u l d no longer refer b a c k to a self h u m a n
be ing w o u l d be.
A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k
b e y o n d t h e " m a g i c a l " p o w e r o f the nega t ive . I t a t t e m p t s t o
t h i n k an expe r i ence of l a n g u a g e itself, t r a n s p a r e n t to itself,
such thai the Von e the division ol n a t u r e and cu l tu r e , d e n o
ta t ion and signification, s h o w i n g and tell ing, e.g.—is abo l i shed
w i thou t a t r ace . La comunità che viene is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k
habit, o u r " s e c o n d n a t u r e , " in such a w a y t h a t i t is n o t seized,
b u t t e n d s t o w a r d itself, t o w a r d t r anspa rency . A g a m b e n ' s b o o k
is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k l a n g u a g e as ipse a n d n o t idem: l a n g u a g e
ou t s i de ident i ty , o r l anguage a s t h a t w h i c h has no ident i ty , no
essence . In d o i n g th is , A g a m b e n is a t t e m p t i n g to t h i n k t h a t , i f
i t i s t he essence of h u m a n be ing to ex i s t—Heidegge r ' s m o s t
difficult t h o u g h t — t h e n i t is in l a n g u a g e , w h i c h h a s no essence ,
t h a t h u m a n be ing b e c o m e s c a p a b l e of th is . Such a l a n g u a g e is
mere ly the " trite w o r d s t h a t we have [le trite p a r o l e che abbia-
mo}."29 All of his b o o k is an a t t emp t to get " b e t w e e n " exis tence
a n d essence i n t o a p a r a o n o m a s t i c i n t e r w o r l d t h a t t r a n s c e n d s
on ly t o w a r d itself a n d does n o t refer b a c k to an a n t e r i o r rea l
ity t h a t w o u l d r e m a i n ineffable a n d u n s a y a b l e , n o r t o w a r d a
f ict i t ious signif icat ion t h a t w o u l d ann ih i l a t e t h e real a n d u n
veil i t as essential ly N o t h i n g . Th i s i n t e rwor ld is p o p u l a t e d w i t h
be ings w h o s e be ing is on ly in-language.
T h o u g h t , he tells us , t r ad i t i ona l ly w a n t s t o t h i n k e i ther
t h e ex is tence o r t h e essence. A g a m b e n w a n t s t o t h i n k the i r
m u t u a l imp l i ca t i on , t h e e ros ion of the i r difference, in the a n -
a m o r p h i c " s p a c e " b e t w e e n " t h e n a m e d t h i n g a n d its be ing-
n a m e d , b e t w e e n the n a m e a n d its reference t o the t h ing : be
t w e e n , t h a t is, t h e n a m e ' r o s e ' insofar as i t signifies t h e rose
a n d t h e rose insofar as i t i s signified by the n a m e ' r o s e ' . " 3 0
T h i s de l ica te in terval is the p u r e e x p o s u r e of this to that (quod
to quid), ex i s tence to essence , such t h a t the i r m u t u a l impl ica
t i o n is t h e p u r e thusness of the be ing , t h e ipseity of t h e ens. He
f inds in o u r e ra an u n p r e c e d e n t e d o p p o r t u n i t y to seize t h e
thus: t he p u r e be ing- in - language of the non l ingu is t i c . N o t p u r e
be ing (ousias tes ousias, substantia sine qualitate) b u t p u r e
being-in-language. T h e p u r e re la t ion t h a t i s ne i ther d e n o t e d
n o r m e a n t , nei ther s h o w n nor said. Ne i the r the sub j ec t—the
p u r e re la t ionless be ing that can only be s h o w n and not s a i d —
n o r t h a t w h i c h i s sa id of the t h i n g in t h e p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t the
perfect ly exposed be ing t h a t is a l w a y s a l ready in l a n g u a g e ,
a l w a y s a l r e a d y h o l l o w e d o u t b y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s " b e
t w e e n " i s n o t the t h i n g in its n o n r e l a t i o n a l d e n o t a t e d n e s s , n o r
t h e t h i n g in its ident i ty (its m e a n i n g ) . I t is t he t h i n g itself (ipse).
N o t p u r e being, b u t be ing-such: the be ing-such, A g a m b e n says ,
o f t h e " a s " in the q u e s t i o n , " w h a t i s be ing a s b e i n g ? " N o t ,
t he re fo re , pre l inguis t ic subs t ance , n o r a n y said , b u t t h a t w h i c h
" e x i s t s " on ly a s a l w a y s a l r e a d y h o l l o w e d o u t by r e p r e s e n t a
t i on . Such be ings p o p u l a t e A g a m b e n ' s " c o m i n g c o m m u n i t y . "
I t m a y be helpful he re to t h i n k o f t h a t w o n d e r f u l p o p u l a
t i o n w h o s e ex is tence i s pure ly p las t ic : t h e H o l l y w o o d c h a r a c
te r actor . T h e s e a re ac to r s w h o s e n a m e s m a y be k n o w n to u s
( T h e l m a Rit ter , El isha C o o k Jr., Wa l t e r B rennan ) b u t m u c h
m o r e of ten t h a n n o t they r e m a i n u n k n o w n a n d f o r g o t t e n ,
bu r i ed in t h e c red i t s a t t h e e n d of the film as we w a l k o u t o f
t h e t hea t e r o r p u s h the r e w i n d b u t t o n . Yet they a re ever so
famil iar a n d ever so versat i le , a p p e a r i n g year after year in m o v
ies a n d o n T V s h o w s , i n Wes te rns , N o i r s , h i s to r ica l d r a m a s ,
b io-p ics , w a r p ic tu res , b e d r o o m farces a n d ac t i on p o t b o i l e r s .
C h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a re abso lu te ly famil iar t o us b u t they never
possess " s t a r qua l i ty . " T h e y never get bi l l ing a b o v e t h e t i t le o r
even on t h e m a r q u e e a t all, a n d they never s ta r i n the i r o w n
te levis ion series o r even costar . T h e y a re n o t L o n Chaney , w h o
w o r k e d so t irelessly a t t h e a r t of self-disguise t h a t he b e c a m e a
H o l l y w o o d legend a n d even h a d a film m a d e a b o u t h i m star
r i ng J a m e s Cagney . Ins tead , these c h a r a c t e r a c t o r s we h a v e i n
m i n d never w o r k h a r d t o disguise themse lves o r t o d issolve
i n t o a ro le as in " m e t h o d " ac t ing . To the c o n t r a r y , t hey p lay
the i r v a r i o u s roles in m u c h the s a m e way , film after f i lm, yea r
after year, d e c a d e after decade . T h e y are a c t o r s w h o b e c o m e
ii M N IVI i n N l\ IN I i l I I I r v i I I I I I A I IN I I I I r I I ) I
so I.mull II because theit reality is entirely m a d e up of the i r
va r ious roles such that their m a n n e r i s m s , hab i t s , l ooks , vocal
tona l i t i e s , and ges tu res all b e c o m e characteristic a n d as famil
iar as the ac to r s themse lves r e m a i n unfamil iar to us . T h e s e a re
a c t o r s , in s h o r t , w h o show us the i r a n o n y m i t y a n d w e , in t u r n ,
qu i t e a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e c o m e abso lu te ly indifferent t o t h e m .
T h e y a l w a y s play " t y p e s " a n d they a re n o t h i n g a p a r t f rom
the types t hey play. T h e y remain so u n k n o w n to us n o t be
cause they h ide an essence , bu t because they are comple t e ly
e x p o s e d . (If y o u ever t r o u b l e yourself to search t h r o u g h the
credi t s for such an ac to r ' s n a m e i t i s p r o b a b l y on ly because
y o u s u d d e n l y real ize y o u ' v e been seeing h i m or her for yea r s
without realizing it, a n d this has n o t h i n g to do w i t h the i r hav
ing g iven a pa r t i cu l a r ly s t u n n i n g pe r fo rmance . ) T h e r e is n o t h
ing ineffable a b o u t these ac to r s . T h e r e i s no res idue of g rea t
ness , gen ius , o r even t a l en t t h a t cl ings to their a p p e a r a n c e on
the screen. T h e y are a void in the mids t of the w h o l e ensemb le
o f a c t o r s b r o u g h t t oge the r for t h e p ic tu re . We b e c o m e accus
t o m e d t o seeing t h e m , yet w e k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e m via
b i o g r a p h i e s , cu l t s , t a b l o i d s , t a lk s h o w s , o r a w a r d s c e r e m o
nies . We k n o w t h e m on ly a s images a n d we see t h e m on ly a s
i m a g e s , t h a t is, as a l legories of themse lves . E a c h ro le is an
o t h e r al legory.
T h e s e m a r v e l o u s ac to r s a re the re fo re s ingular i t ies . T h e y
c a n n o t be d i s t ingu i shed as s tars n o r identified w i t h a pa r t i cu
lar ro le (for each role they play is an echo of all t h e o the r s—al l
m o r e o r less t h e same) a n d they seem perfectly a t ease w i t h
" t h e m s e l v e s . " We can a p p r e c i a t e the s tar o r g l a m o u r qua l i ty
of G r a c e Kelly 's p resence on t h e screen a n d t h e g rea tness (if
n o t the genius) o f L a u r e n c e Olivier ' s t a l e n t — s o m e e x t r a o r d i
n a r y o r e x t r a c i n e m a t i c " e s s e n c e " — b u t c h a r a c t e r a c to r s a r e
comple t e ly a b s o r b e d in to t h e ce l lu lo id , t he stock, t h e s te reo
types they p lay so perfectly. T h e y a re " t y p e s " a n d they h a v e
a s s u m e d themselves as such. The character a c to r c anno t In-
identified wi th any pa r t i cu la r role hut nei ther do they e v o k e
n o r exp res s a n y t h i n g o t h e r than the role . T h e y have a p u r e
re la t ion t o c i n e m a .
T h e expe r i ence of the c h a r a c t e r actor , t hen , i s the expe r i
ence of p u r e be ing- in - language—an exper ience , Blanchot cou ld
say, of t h e even t as an i m a g e , t h a t i s to say, as n o t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n its qual i t ies bu t such t h a t these qual i t ies cl ing to no rea l
ity, no ident i ty , a n d refer on ly to themse lves . Levinas r e m i n d s
us t h a t real i ty i s a l r eady its o w n such event . We h a b i t u a l l y see
a t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t t h r o u g h it. Reali ty, he h a s t o ld us , is
d u a l — i t is itself in its t r u t h (idem) a n d in its image , " l ike a
t o r n sack t h a t spills its c o n t e n t s . " 3 1 Very similarly, A g a m b e n
wr i t e s :
I t is as if t he fo rm, the knowab i l i t y , t he fea tures of
every ent i ty were de tached f rom it, n o t as a n o t h e r th ing ,
b u t as an intentio, an ange l , an image . T h e m o d e of
be ing of this intentio is ne i the r s imple ex is tence n o r
t r a n s c e n d e n c e ; it is a p a r a e x i s t e n c e or a p a r a t r a n s c e n -
dence t h a t dwel ls beside the t h i n g (in all t h e senses of
the prefix ' p a r a - ' ) , so close t h a t i t almost merges w i th
it, g iv ing it a h a l o . I t is n o t the ident i ty of t h e t h i n g
a n d ye t i t is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the t h i n g (it is none-
other).
[È c o m e se la f o r m a , la conosc ib i l i t à , la fa t tezza di
ogn i en te s i s taccasse da esso , n o n c o m e u n ' a l t r a cosa ,
ma c o m e uWintentio, un ange lo , u n ' i m m a g i n e . I l m o d o
di essere di ques ta intentio n o n è u n a semplice esistenza
né u n a t r a s c e n d e n z a : è u n a p a r a e s i s t e n z a o u n a
p a r a t r a s c e n d e n z a , che d i m o r a a f ianco al la cosa (in
tu t t i i sensi della p r epos i z ione para), cos i a fianco da
a * i a ivi is r in a in p i 11 i r i ) i i t t i Al N E U T E R I 3 5
confondersi quasi i o n essa, d a nimbarla. Essa non e
I'identita de l la cosa e, tuttavia, n o n e a l t r o (e non altro)
che questa.] 1 2
Thi s image , event , s ingular i ty , a l legory of itself, or Idea
(as A g a m b e n u n d e r s t a n d s i t ) 3 3 i s be ing such-as- i t - i s , its n o n e -
o t h e r n e s s , or its n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s . As a cha rac te r -ac to r , t he
ac to r becomes his o r her o w n image. C h a r a c t e r ac to rs a re c a p a
ble o f the i r n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s such t h a t , w i t h o u t a n y r e s idue ,
they ne i the r be t r ay an essence n o r a s u b s t a n c e they " r e a l l y "
a r e , n o r d o they identify themse lves w i t h a n y o n e ro l e , b u t
r a t h e r m o v e freely, happ i ly , i m p e r c e p t i b l y a n d i r r e p a r a b l y
w i th in the p a r a o n o m a s t i c in te rzone of thusness . They are n o t h
ing o t h e r t h a n the i r types , m a n n e r i s m s , a n d ges tu res , a n d yet
they are not these qua l i t i es . T h e y h a v e a s s u m e d the i r m a n n e r
o f be ing imprope r ly , habi tua l ly , w i t h o u t a s s u m i n g th is o r t h a t
qua l i t y as definitive of the i r ident i ty . T h e y a re nicely insouc i
a n t , o r cynica l , o r hypocr i t i ca l w i t h r e g a r d t o i m a g e a n d rea l
ity. T h e y d o n o t s t ruggle t o h o l d t h e t w o r e a l m s a p a r t , b u t
r a t h e r a l l ow the t w o r ea lms t o impl ica te each o ther . T h e y a re
themse lves the e ros ion o f t h e d i s t ance t h a t w o u l d p r o p e r l y
d i s t ingu i sh t h e real f rom the image . T h e y are n o t possessed by
" a n o t h e r m e " b u t ins tead a re n e u t r a l w i t h r ega rd t o ident i ty
because a s suming one 's no t -o therwiseness m e a n s a s suming t h a t
w h i c h does n o t refer b a c k to a self, an " I , " t h a t o n e w o u l d
t ru ly be . C h a r a c t e r a c to r s a re a t ease w i t h the i r m a n n e r o f
be ing . In this way , the c h a r a c t e r a c t o r r e m a i n s r i go rous ly un i
dent i f iable ( and n o t s imply bur ied in t h e c red i t s a t t h e e n d of
t h e f i l m , s ince t o w h o m w o u l d th is o r t h a t p r o p e r n a m e refer,
a n y w a y ) ? Un l ike s ta r p resence , c h a r a c t e r ac t ing " s h o w s " a
n o n p a r t i c u l a r p resence : a d e a d p resence t h a t seems to be long
to no p a r t i c u l a r film i t h a p p e n s to t u r n up in.
In the space of the " t y p e , " t h e h a b i t u a l , or, as B l ancho t
could say, the- "everyday," the definitive is engulfed and lost
a n d , even m o r e d i sa s t rous , the unity of space is sha t t e red , since
these " t y p e s " c o m m u n i c a t e wi th each o the r w i t h o u t fo rming
an o rgan i c c o m m u n i t y or a unicity. T h e y " f o r m " a mot ley .
T h a t is, these cha rac t e r s do n o t c o m e toge the r w i th in a unicity,
b u t r a t h e r exis t side by side as f r agmen t s . T h e space of char
ac te r a c t o r s dissolves the un i ty o f space , a n d the g l a m o r o u s
p resence of the G r e a t Star ( H u m p h r e y Boga r t in Casablanca,
J o s e p h C o t t o n in The Third Man) is a l w a y s in d a n g e r of be ing
d r o w n e d by these mul t ip l e a n d s ingu la r indifferences t o s tar
d o m a n d even to " a c t i n g . " As in a Ba l thus s t ree t scene , each
c h a r a c t e r ac to r occupies his o r her o w n scinti l lat ing a n d un ique
space t h a t t h r e a t e n s t o dissolve the n a r r a t i v e i n t o an infinite
series o f i n d e t e r m i n a t e a n d c h a o t i c poss ibi l i t ies . In the i r w a y s ,
c h a r a c t e r ac to r s c o m m u n i c a t e des t ruc t ion : the r ad ica l de s t ruc -
t iveness of a nonco l lec t ive , noniden t i f i ab le c o m m u n i t y . T h e y
are each the possibil i ty of still appearing w h e n there is no longer
a n y o n e t o be , n o i m m a n e n c e a n d n o iden t i ty t o b e l o n g t o .
C h a r a c t e r - a c t o r s a re e m p l o y e d b y H o l l y w o o d t o r e p r e
sent t h e bus iness a n d h u m of eve ryday life. T h e y are p a i d to
r e p r e s e n t w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n n o t h i n g h a p p e n s : eve rydayness .
Wa i t e r s a n d wa i t r e s ses , c a b d r i v e r s , c o o k s , pe t t y c r o o k s , o rd i
n a r y GIs , m u s i c i a n s , s e rvan t s , s h o p k e e p e r s , secre ta r ies , b u
r e a u c r a t s , a n d s tool p igeons : these roles c o m p r i s e a " p e t t y
b o u r g e o i s i e " in the H o l l y w o o d social e c o n o m y . N e i t h e r ex
t r a s n o r cos t a r s , t he c h a r a c t e r ac to r i s forever " b e t w e e n " these
t w o po les . T h e y a re n o t p a r t of a m o b , a t h e a t e r a u d i e n c e , a
s t ree t c r o w d ; n o r a re they s t r e w n , b l o o d y a n d m o t i o n l e s s , o n
a n y of coun t l e s s make-be l i eve bat t lef ields. N e i t h e r a re they
ever l eads , n o r h e r o e s . Be longing to ne i the r class they a r e , in
effect, w i t h d r a w n f rom all classes a n d they are t h e poss ib i l i ty
o f d i s so lu t i on t h a t t h r e a t e n s b o t h the ind iv idua l p o w e r o f t h e
h e r o or t h e leader and also t h e p o w e r of the col lect ive ( w h o
either gravitate toward the he ro , or w h o , ac t ing as o n e , t h e m
selves constitute a p o w e r ) . C h a r a c t e r ac t ing is the p o w e r l e s s
possibi l i ty ol d i s so lu t ion , of ne i ther /nor , of a n o n y m i t y , t h a t
t h r e a t e n s all m e m b e r s of all c lasses . ( O n The Tonight Show
with Johnny Carson, G e n e H a c k m a n once a n x i o u s l y c o m
pla ined t h a t he w a s b e c o m i n g a cha rac te r actor. J o h n n y quickly
r ea s su red h i m t h a t t h a t c o u l d n ' t b e t r u e , because h e h a d re
cent ly w o n an A c a d e m y A w a r d for Best Actor.)
In m i n o r roles a n d as bit p l aye r s , c h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a l w a y s
a p p e a r a s r e p r o d u c e d . W h e n they t u r n u p o n t h e screen o u r
gaze a t t h e m is pu re ly superficial , u n b u r d e n e d of t h e d r a m a of
ident i f ica t ion t h a t t h e g l a m o u r of the s tar evokes . Character
actors do not challenge us to see. T h e y offer o u r gaze t h a t
w h i c h r e m a i n s t o be seen w h e n the re i s n o t h i n g to see a n d o u r
gaze is a l w a y s satisfied by t h e m , by the i r indef ini teness , by
the i r soft u n c e r t a i n p re sence . T h e s e a c t o r s m a n a g e to be iden
tified ne i the r w i t h the i r rea l n a m e s n o r w i t h a n y n a m e they
m a y be g iven in a f i lm. T h e y are t h e u n s t a b l e shifters in c in
e m a t i c g r a m m a r . A l w a y s " h e " o r " s h e , " a l w a y s " t h e o n e w h o
we jus t s a w in . . . , " a l w a y s the i r n e x t and p r ev ious ro les , t hey
a r e p u r e e c h o e s of ident i ty , man i f e s t a t i ons of insignif icance.
W h e n we see t h e m aga in on the screen , i n yet a n o t h e r f i lm o r
TV s h o w (for they a r e a l w a y s a n d only seen repeatedly, never
for a first t ime) they are seen precisely as s o m e o n e I r ecogn ize
b u t h a d fo rgo t t en even ex is ted . But f rom w h e r e do I r ecogn ize
t h e m ? I t i s difficult to say because they a re n o t identif ied w i t h
a n y one picture o r TV show. ( N o one goes to the c inema to see
an A k i m Tamiroff or a Queen ie Smith f i lm.) T h u s they h a p p e n
to appear , here and there , n o w and then , as events of re -cogni
t ion , repet i t ion, and difference. Radically depropr i a t ed of iden
ti ty (right in front of our eyes!), radically " i m a g e d , " radically
s tereotyped, they are just as radically " c a p a b l e " of their d e p r o -
p r i a t i o n . T h e y are " c a p a b l e " o f impropr i e ty , insignif icance,
insubs tan t ia l i ty . They do not appropriate their qua l i t i es as
rad ica l ly idcnt if icatory of themselves. Ins tead , they a r c , in-
themse lves , t he p u r e " t a k i n g - p l a c e " of those qua l i t i es : an ac
t o r = x, so r t of. T h a t is the secret of their l ightness a n d the i r
a lways familiar b u t insubs tan t i a l " l i fe ." Whi le Jackie Gleason ' s
obes i ty identified h i m a n d m a r k e d b o t h his c o m i c a n d d r a
m a t i c ro les w i t h an u n c o m f o r t a b l e p a t h o s , i n Sydney G r e e n -
s t ree t obes i ty is b o r n e superficially a n d s tereotypical ly , l ike a
s imple p lay of l ight a n d s h a d o w .
Object = x
If The Coming Community is, as A g a m b e n says , a
c o m m e n t a r y on sec t ion 9 of Being and Time a n d on p r o p o s i
t i o n 6 . 4 4 of Wi t tgens t e in ' s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,34
i t i s a lso , in o u r op in ion , t ho rough ly precedented by Heidegger ' s
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics a n d in p a r t i c u l a r t h e
ana lys i s of w h a t he cons ide r s to be the " k e r n e l " of t h e Cri
tique of Pure Reason, the T r a n s c e n d e n t a l S c h e m a . 3 5 In th is
ana lys i s , He idegge r s h o w s t h a t a t t he h e a r t o f object iv i ty t he r e
is a n o n t h i n g , a n o n b e i n g , a nonempi r i ca l a n d u n i n t e n d e d " m e
d i u m , " or, as K a n t calls it, an Ob jec t = x w h e r e the " p o w e r "
of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n (Einbildungskraft) b e c o m e s
e q u i v o c a l : equa l ly act ive a n d pass ive, o r p e r h a p s p u r e l y p a s
s i o n a t e . 3 6 T h e O b j e c t = x , we shall see, is t he essent ial ly ob jec
t ive o r ex t e r io r c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t i s m o s t i n t i m a t e o r inter ior .
I t i s an a l w a y s a n t e r i o r p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t t r a n s f o r m s in te r ior -
ity i n t o , a s B l ancho t w o u l d say, " a n ex te r io r force t h a t we
s u b m i t to p a s s i v e l y . " 3 7 We shall see t h a t every empi r i ca l i n tu
i t ion (every " a p p e a r a n c e " ) i s h a u n t e d by an a spec t r a l p re sen
t a t ion , or pure image , tha t realizes the possibili ty of the absence
of the object, bu t t ha t remains nevertheless a r a p p o r t w i t h the
s a m e objec t . T h i s o t h e r r e la t ion i s n o n p e r s o n a l o r even , be t t e r
s t a led , the i ( v CM luston from the pe r sona l . I n the w o r k o f a r t ,
as in the c o r p s e (where wha t a p p e a r s insists u p o n the absence
and inaccessibil i ty of t h a t which is r ep re sen ted ) , th is " o t h e r "
re la t ion m a k e s itself obscure ly felt. Impor t an t l y , th is " o t h e r "
re la t ion is a re la t ion to the same t h ing , a r e l a t ion w i t h t h a t
s h a d o w " b e h i n d " a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e
t h i n g itself. In s h o r t , we shall s h o w t h a t one a l w a y s h a s a
r e l a t ion w i t h a n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s , or i r reparabi l i ty , an t eced
e n t to all d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i ons . But t h a t " o t h e r " r a p p o r t i s a
r a p p o r t w i t h no objec t . I t i s a r a p p o r t w i t h n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
t h e self i t se l f—but ou t s i de of, a n d ex te r io r t o , itself.
A c c o r d i n g t o W i l l i a m R i c h a r d s o n (from w h o s e a d m i r a b l y
c lear s u m m a r y of the Kantbuch we will b o r r o w heavi ly in
w h a t follows) the key to Heidegger 's s tudy of the First Critique
i s his r e p e a t e d ins is tence on the f in i tude of h u m a n k n o w i n g . 3 8
T h e h u m a n k n o w e r does n o t c rea te the b e i n g - t o - b e - k n o w n .
T h a t w h i c h is k n o w n is a l w a y s object ive in cha rac te r , i s o u t
side the k n o w e r , a n d i s n o t the knower . As f in i t e , h u m a n k n o w
ing m u s t beg in in i n tu i t i on , s ensa t ion , r ecep t ion , affect, p a s
sivity. T h e " p a s s i v e " side of k n o w i n g i s on to log ica l ly a n t e r i o r
a n d p r imary . But for K a n t , as i s well k n o w n , recept iv i ty i s n o t
sufficient for k n o w l e d g e . T h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a sin
gu la r m u s t be d e t e r m i n e d to be such or such . As d e t e r m i n e d ,
the immed ia t e ly in tu i t ed is t hen r e -p resen ted as w h a t i t is in
genera l , in light of universality. Th i s side of k n o w i n g is t h o u g h t .
I t i s ac t ive a n d " s p o n t a n e o u s . " F r o m the r a w d a t a o f in tu i t ion
t h e c o n t e n t s o f universa l i ty a r e c o n s t r u c t e d a n d r e -p re sen ted .
T h o u g h t , in gene ra l , as R i c h a r d s o n p u t s it, is a p r e s e n t a t i o n
(in concep t s ) of a p r e s e n t a t i o n (an in tu i t i on ) , a n d it is even
m o r e f in i te t h a n in tu i t ion , since i t i s on to log ica l ly d e p e n d e n t
o n " r a w d a t a . " O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h o u g h t i s " m o r e " p resen-
ta t ive t h a n in tu i t i on since i t p rov ides a uni ty t h a t ho lds g o o d
for m o r e t h a n o n e par t icu lar . H u m a n k n o w i n g i s the in t imacy
of these p ro found ly diverse s lopes: passive and mul t ip le intu
i t ion , a n d act ive a n d unifying t h o u g h t . Kant ' s task i s to m a k e
clear h o w they can poss ibly be synthes ized . We not ice s t ra ight
a w a y t h a t , a l t h o u g h d iverse , t he t w o sides have s o m e t h i n g in
c o m m o n : each p resen t s , a n d w e k n o w t h a t i n K a n t the p o w e r
of p r e sen t a t i on in genera l be longs to the t r anscenden t a l imag i
n a t i o n as i t func t ions in the mys te ry of schemat iz ing .
But w h a t c a n be k n o w n ? Kan t ' s a n s w e r i s f a m o u s . We
k n o w only the be ing- tha t -appears , an ob-ject ob -posed (Gegen-
stand) to a knower . We k n o w a p p e a r a n c e s a n d , crucial ly, an
a p p e a r a n c e " c a n be n o t h i n g by itself, ou t s i de o u r m o d e o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " 3 9 H o w e v e r , k n o w i n g i s n o t on t ica l ly c rea t ive .
W e d o n o t c rea te t h a t w h i c h w e k n o w . T h e r e i s a n essent ia l
d i s t ance b e t w e e n the k n o w e r a n d the k n o w n because the finite
k n o w e r does n o t c r ea t e t h e b e i n g - t o - b e - k n o w n . A h u m a n
k n o w e r i s n o t G o d . Dis t inc t f rom finite k n o w i n g , an infinite
k n o w e r does n o t k n o w objects a t all. G o d k n o w s t h e Ent-
stand, t he e-ject (i.e., t he t h i n g insofar as i t t ake s its or ig in in
G o d ) . 4 0 G o d does n o t k n o w t h i n g s - t h a t - a p p e a r (i.e., objects)
b u t th ings as they a r e , as such , in - themse lves (an sich). Infinite
k n o w i n g i s the re fore n o t s o m u c h be t te r t h a n h u m a n k n o w
ing ( t han perspec t iv i sm) as i t is p r o f o u n d l y different , because
no objects a re even given to G o d to be k n o w n . To p u t i t differ
ently, un l ike t h e finite knower , G o d does n o t have to an t ic i
p a t e a b e i n g - t o - b e - k n o w n , since G o d is its or ig in . Fini te k n o w
ing, in c o n t r a s t , i s essential ly t e m p o r a l , an t i c ipa to ry , a h e a d -
of-itself. T h e Ent-stand is p r o f o u n d l y inaccess ib le to finite
k n o w i n g . If t h e Ent-stand is " b e h i n d " a p p e a r a n c e s th is does
n o t m e a n t h a t i t dimly, cont inua l ly , obl iquely , a n d d i s to r t ed ly
faces the infer ior h u m a n knower . It is not knowable at all.
(For t h e o n t o l o g y of Sein und Zeit, H e i d e g g e r says it is c o n
cealed [verdeckt].) T h e Ent-stand is s imply n o t an objec t a n d
hence i s n o t ava i lab le to be k n o w n . I m p o r t a n t l y , however , t h e
A < i A M ii i ii \ M 11 i 11 I i' 11 i i I I ( A I N E U T E R
i'.ni stand is I he same th ing as the th ing tha t a p p e a r s . It is t he
s a m e th ing as ihe object : " [T ]he thing-in-i tself i s n o t a n o t h e r
object but a n o t h e r aspec t (rcspectus) of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h
r ega rd to the same object."41 T h e Ent-stand is the s a m e essent
as the object . Insofar as the Ent-stand s t a n d s o u t f rom G o d , i t
appears as o b - p o s e d to the finite knower . Indeed , insofar as
the t h i n g a p p e a r s a t all , i t insists u p o n an essent ia l n o n k n o w l -
edge (or " h i d d e n n e s s " as He idegge r prefers to t h i n k of i t ) . Fo r
the Ent-stand is a l t oge the r ( and no t jus t par t ia l ly) inaccess ible
to h u m a n k n o w i n g . O u r r e l a t ion to the Ent-stand i s n o t a
r e la t ion of k n o w l e d g e a t all. Fini te k n o w i n g — b e g i n n i n g f rom
f in i tude , i n tu i t i on , recept ivi ty , pa s s iv i t y—does n o t give us ac
cess to th ings- in- themselves . Never the less , t h a t w h i c h i s k n o w n
( the ob jec t , the t h i n g t h a t appea r s ) i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e
Ent-stand. K a n t , of c o u r s e , in t h e First Critique, is c o n c e r n e d
less w i t h be ings per se t h a n w i t h o u r w a y o f k n o w i n g t h e m as
ob jec ts . He c o n c e r n s himself w i t h inves t iga t ing a n d defining
the a pr ior i s t ruc tu re s by w h i c h a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h t h a t w h i c h
s t ands o u t f rom G o d a p p e a r s a n d i s accessible t o h u m a n k n o w
ing as object ive a n d o b - p o s e d . Such k n o w i n g w o u l d t h e n si
m u l t a n e o u s l y be a b a r r i n g of access to t h e Ent-stand. He is
n o t s o m u c h c o n c e r n e d w i th m u t u a l p resence a n d self-pres
ence , o r " o n t i c c o m p o r t m e n t " ( the p resence o f objec ts t o s u b
jects) , as he i s in te res ted in t h a t a n t e r i o r s t r u c t u r e t h a t m a k e s
t h e c o m p o r t m e n t poss ib le , because , a s he says , "[ i ]n t h e w o r l d
o f sense , h o w e v e r deep ly we e n q u i r e i n t o its ob jec t s , we have
t o d o w i t h n o t h i n g b u t a p p e a r a n c e s . " 4 2
By Kan t ' s a c c o u n t , t h e n , h u m a n k n o w i n g will cons t i t u t e
only t h a t w h i c h m a k e s beings i n t o objec ts a n d a l l ows us e x p e
r ience t h e m such t h a t t h a t w h i c h so cons t i t u t e s objec ts wil l
a l so c o n s t i t u t e expe r i ence . O u r e n c o u n t e r w i t h be ings will n o t
c r ea t e beings no r seize t h e m a s G o d does a n d k n o w t h e m a s
t hey a re in - themselves . A n t e r i o r (a pr ior i ) access is a " fash-
i o n i n g , " a "making," an "instituting" oi things-as-objects.
A n t e r i o r c o n t a c t w i l l c o m b i n e the I w o s i d e s o f k n o w i n g , in tu
i t ion a n d t h o u g h t , i n to a unity. A n d since, for Kan t , th is is a
" p o w e r " o f the k n o w e r , i t will c o m e from t h e k n o w e r a n d
t h u s m u s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y fash ion , m a k e , ins t i tu te , a n d e x p e
r ience itself. In sho r t , t h a t w h i c h 06-jectifies a lso swb-jectifies.
N e i t h e r in tu i t ion a lone n o r t h o u g h t a lone can do this a n d c la im
to be t h e " f o u n d a t i o n . " E a c h , t a k e n independen t ly , i s a l w a y s
p r i o r to a n y expe r i ence (i.e., is pure).
Pr ior to all expe r i ence , the i m m e d i a t e , recept ive e n c o u n
ter w i t h a s ingula r resul ts in t w o types of p r e s e n t a t i o n s : space
a n d t ime . Space a n d t ime are in tu i t ed b u t a re n o t ob jec ts . T h e y
a r e n o t expl ic i t ly a p p r e h e n d e d . Clear ly , t he re fo re , t h a t w h i c h
p u r e in tu i t ion in tu i t s m u s t c o m e f rom in tu i t ion itself. N o n -
objec t s , space a n d t i m e (ou te r a n d inner ) a re n o t k n o w a b l e .
I n tu i t i ng t h e m , i n tu i t i on i s hence n o t affected by a n y objec t . I t
is affected by t h a t w h i c h i t gives to itself. S o m e t h i n g is i n tu
i ted , b u t n o t an objec t . I t i s n o t n o t h i n g a t all , b u t ne i the r i s i t
a n y t h i n g t h e m a t i c . H e i d e g g e r says s imply t h a t in its p u r e p a s
sivity, i n tu i t i on in tu i t s itself. T h a t i s , in tu i t ion i s t h a t w h i c h i t
i n tu i t s . I t gives itself t h a t w h i c h i t i s ab le to in tu i t . Space a n d
t ime a r e n o t " o u t s i d e " i n t u i t i o n . I n t u i t i o n i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y
in t h a t w h i c h i t receives. Space a n d t i m e , in s h o r t , a re p u r e
images .
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p u r e t h o u g h t , p r i o r t o all e x p e r i e n c e ,
i s t h e d i sce rn ing of a un i ty t h a t m o r e t h a n o n e ind iv idua l p o s
sesses in c o m m o n : a c o n c e p t . But p u r e c o n c e p t s (causal i ty ,
e.g.) have no empi r i ca l c o n t e n t (which led H u m e , o f c o u r s e ,
t o d e n y the i r rea l i ty) . For K a n t , t he p u r e c o n c e p t (or " n o
t i o n " ) is s imply a func t ion of unif icat ion itself. T h e " c o n t e n t s "
o f p u r e c o n c e p t s a re " r u l e s " (i.e., n o t empi r i ca l i n tu i t ions ) .
T h e s e rules a re n o t a p r o d u c t of reflection b u t a r e t h e very
w o r k i n g of reflection. T h e ru le i s an a n t e c e d e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n
ol unity thai gu ides the concep t . As p u r e , t he ru les c o n s t i t u t e
thai which they rule . They " d i s a p p e a r " in to t h a t w h i c h they
rule a n d a re n o t h i n g ou t s ide their w o r k . T h e y inscr ibe t h e m
selves in a s o m c t h i n g - t o - b e - r u l e d (i.e., a s o m e t h i n g - t o - b e - u n i
fied). T h e to ta l i ty of these rules is the ca tegor ies . A c a t e g o r y is
a w a y a rule ru les , a n d the U n d e r s t a n d i n g is s imply t h e c losed
to ta l i ty o f t h e w a y s by w h i c h intui t ive d a t a c a n be unified,
inscr ibed, ru led . T h e Vet-stand is a " p o w e r of r u l e s " or a p o w e r
o f w a y s o r m a n n e r s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , since every
ac t of k n o w i n g impl ies a consc iousness , t he pure c o n c e p t is
t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a un i ty a n d impl ies a pure se l f -conscious
ness . T h u s , for K a n t , all c o n c e p t u a l uni t ies have t h e c h a r a c t e r
o f an " I t h i n k . " Th i s " I t h i n k " i s a t h i n k i n g a n d n o t s imply an
ac t ; it is a " p o w e r " (a potentia) he cal ls transcendental apper
ception. T h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n is n o t an ac t t h a t
c o m e s a n d goes b u t a potentia t h a t r e m a i n s in reserve even as
i t w o r k s . I t i s a s t ab le uni ty w i t h o u t w h i c h t he re w o u l d be no
k n o w l e d g e , for t he r e w o u l d b e n o c o m m o n p o i n t t o serve for
m u l t i p l e d a t a . T h u s the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e
g r o u n d of the poss ibi l i ty of the ca tegor ies .
N o w , since the p rope r ly K a n t i a n exper ience m u s t be made,
t he r e m u s t be a p o w e r t h a t un i tes p u r e in tu i t ion a n d p u r e
t h o u g h t such t h a t a k n o w e r can expe r i ence an objec t . Since
b o t h in tu i t ion a n d t h o u g h t present, He idegge r wil l l o o k for
the i r r o o t i n w h a t they sha re a n d , a s w a s sa id earlier, t h e fac
ul ty of p r e s e n t a t i o n in genera l is the i m a g i n a t i o n . Einbildungs-
kraft is precisely and only the abi l i ty to " f a s h i o n , " " i m a g e , "
" i n s t i t u t e , " " e s t a b l i s h , " " se t u p , " e tc . T h i s Kraft i s n o t an
establ ished fact bu t a con t inua l p rocess— the process of sharing
that which pure intuition and pure thought have in common.
T h e i m a g i n a t i o n in tegra tes the r a w d a t a o f p u r e i n tu i t i on w i t h
t h e syntheses of c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . T h i s p roces s i s an act ivi ty
called schematizing, and it is an activity t ha t is at once sensible
a n d inte l lectual ; n is a fusing nl sensa t ion with in te l lec t ion. By-
m e a n s of the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l (or imag ina ry ) s c h e m a , the th ing
is ab le to a p p e a r as an object a n d be exper ienced as w h a t i t is.
I t is Kan t ' s f a m o u s
th i rd th ing w h i c h i s h o m o g e n o u s on the one h a n d w i th
t h e ca tegory , a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d w i t h a p p e a r a n c e ,
a n d w h i c h m a k e s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e fo rmer t o t h e
la t ter poss ib le . T h i s m e d i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m u s t be
p u r e , t h a t is, vo id of all empi r i ca l c o n t e n t , a n d ye t a t
t he s a m e t ime whi le i t m u s t in o n e respec t be intellec
tual, it m u s t in a n o t h e r be sensible. Such a r ep re sen t a
t ion is the transcendental schema.43
W i t h r ega rd t o empir ica l concep t s , t he s c h e m a " p r o d u c e s "
or " p r e s c r i b e s " a n o n t h e m a t i c view, or, as H e i d e g g e r cal ls it , a
schema-image,44 such t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r c a n a p p e a r as w h a t
i t i s w i t h o u t be ing conf ined to a n y of the ac tua l pa r t i cu la r i t i e s
o f its a p p e a r a n c e . A g a m b e n , qu i t e a p p r o p r i a t e l y , cal ls th is an
" e x a m p l e . " 4 5 W e c a n ha rd ly d o be t te r t h a n Wi l l i am R i c h a r d
son ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f h o w the s c h e m a - i m a g e w o r k s :
Across t h e s treet is a h o u s e . I k n o w it to be a h o u s e ,
for i t i s p r e sen t ed to me by an ac t of k n o w l e d g e . By
r e a s o n of this p r e s e n t a t i o n , the h o u s e offers me a v iew
of itself as an ind iv idua l ex is t ing objec t e n c o u n t e r e d
in my expe r i ence , b u t m o r e t h a n t h a t , i t offers a v i ew
of w h a t a h o u s e (any house) l ooks l ike. T h i s d o e s n o t
m e a n , o f cou r se , t h a t the h o u s e has no indiv idual i ty ,
b u t on ly t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o its o w n ind iv idua l i ty t h e
h o u s e as p r e sen t ed offers a v iew of w h a t a h o u s e can
l o o k l ike, sc. t he " h o w " of a n y h o u s e a t all . I t o p e n s
up for me a sphe re [Umkreis] of poss ib le h o u s e s . To
be Slire, One Ol these possibil i t ies has been ac tua l i zed
by the house dial I see, but it need no t have been s o . 4 6
With R i c h a r d s o n , we m u s t e m p h a s i z e the " c a n " he re , for
it ind ica tes a potentia a n d an act ivi ty by w h i c h a t h i n g is able
to a p p e a r as w h a t i t i s (i.e., to " reveal itself," in H e i d e g g e r i a n
l anguage ) . I m p o r t a n t l y for R i c h a r d s o n , K a n t , Heidegger , a n d
A g a m b e n , th is p re - sc r ip t ion or " ru l e - fo r - a -house" is n o t a de
t e r m i n a t e c a t a l o g of charac te r i s t i cs p r o p e r to a h o u s e . I t is, in
R i c h a r d s o n ' s w o r d s , a "full sketch [Auszeichen] of the total
ity of w h a t is m e a n t by such a t h i n g as ' h o u s e ' " ( emphas i s
m i n e ) . 4 7 T h i s " v i e w " by w h i c h a t h i n g can a p p e a r as w h a t i t i s
ca l led is, in A g a m b e n ' s ana lys i s , " p u r e l y l inguis t i c" : "[T]he
name, insofar as it names a thing, is nothing but the thing,
insofar as it is named by the name [il nome, in quanto nomina
una cosa, e non altro che la cosa in quanto e nominata dal
nome]."4i F u r t h e r m o r e , R i c h a r d s o n a d d s , " t h e view of w h i c h
we a re s p e a k i n g he re i s a s such ne i ther the i m m e d i a t e (empir i
cal) i n tu i t ion of an a c t u a l s ingular object (for i t c o n n o t e s a
g e n u i n e p lu ra l i ty ) , n o r a v iew of t h e c o n c e p t itself in its unity.
T h e v iew we a re s p e a k i n g o f i s n o t t h e m a t i z e d a t a l l . " 4 9
T h a t is to say, in the l a n g u a g e of A g a m b e n :
N e i t h e r pa r t i cu l a r n o r un iversa l , t h e e x a m p l e is a sin
gu la r ob jec t t h a t p re sen t s itself as such , t h a t shows its
s ingular i ty . . . . E x e m p l a r y is w h a t is n o t defined by
a n y p rope r ty , excep t by be ing cal led. N o t be ing red ,
b u t being-called-red; n o t be ing J a c o b b u t being-called-
J a c o b defines the e x a m p l e . H e n c e its ambigu i ty , jus t
w h e n one has dec ided to t a k e i t real ly seriously.
[Né p a r t i c o l a r e né un ive rsa le , l ' e sempio é un ogge t t o
s ingolare che , per cosi d i re , si dà a vedere c o m e ta le ,
monstra la sua sua singolarità. . . . Esemplare è ciò che
n o n è definito da a lcuna p rop r i e t à , t r a n n e l'esser-detto.
N o n l 'esser-rosso, ma l ' esser -de t to- rosso; non l'esser-
J a k o b , ma Pesser - t ie t to -Jakob definisce l ' e sempio . Di
qui la sua amb igu i t à , n o n a p p e n a s i decida di p r ende r lo
v e r a m e n t e sul s e r i o . ] 5 0
In s h o r t , t he Kan t i an s c h e m a - i m a g e defines the " w h a t e v e r -
i s -ca l l edness" t h a t A g a m b e n exp lo i t s so ingenious ly in his La
comunità che viene. But we m u s t go fur ther still a n d r e t u r n to
He idegge r ' s Kantbuch.
By w a y of the s c h e m a , the un i ty of the empi r i ca l c o n c e p t
( the w o r d ) is referred to the in tu i t ed p lura l i ty of possibi l i t ies i t
unifies w i t h o u t , however , be ing res t r ic ted to a n y o n e o r a n y
set of t h e m . In c o n t r a s t to th is , pure i n t u i t i o n — t i m e — i s al
ready unified. It is ins tead the p u r e c o n c e p t s ( the ca tegor ies )
t h a t a re m a n y . T h e s c h e m a t i s m o f the ca tegor ies m u s t , t he r e
fore , r e q u i r e special k inds of s c h e m a t a or s c h e m a t a of a cha r
ac te r different f rom t h o s e of empi r ica l i n tu i t i on . As t h e p u r e
in tu i t ion of t ime is the p r e s e n t a t i o n of any objec t , t he sche
m a t a m u s t uni te the categories to t ime so t h a t onto logica l p red i
ca tes m a y be app l i cab le to objec ts in general. T h a t is, t he p r o
f o u n d un i ty o f t i m e m u s t be v u l n e r a b l e to v a r i o u s modes
( " w a y s " ) of p r e s e n t a t i o n whi le r e m a i n i n g one t i m e (for, "a l l
t imes a re o n e t i m e " ) . R i c h a r d s o n r e m i n d s us t h a t th is i s the
m o s t difficult a n d a m b i g u o u s a s p e c t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s en t i r e
ana lys is of the Critique of Pure Reason. D o e s he w a n t to say
both t h a t t ime is t h e r o o t of the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n
a n d t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n i s t h e r o o t o f t ime?
R i c h a r d s o n exp la ins i t as fo l lows: s ince t ime is a l r eady un i
f ied , the s chema ta (the " p o w e r " to unify) have n o t h i n g to unify.
But as t ime is already unified, it is a lways a l r e a d y schema t i zed ,
or i s the (pure) i m a ge of any s c h e m a wha t soeve r . T i m e is t h e
Ad A M HI 1 N A N D I 11 I I ' i i I I l l ( At N E U T E R
very scheme < >l the S( hema image and as the s c h e m a t a a r e sev
e ra l , each i s already temporalized. T h u s the s c h e m a t a "de te r
mine t ime" (or, a r t i cu la te it) and t ime in - forms t h a t w h i c h it is
a r t i cu l a t ed by. T i m e , a s unified, " m a k e s p o s s i b l e " t h a t w h i c h
a r t i cu la tes i t a n d t i m e is only as a r t i cu l a t ed (i.e., fused w i t h
ca tegor i e s such t h a t on to log ica l p red ica tes c a n be app l i ed to
any object w h a t e v e r ) . T h a t i s to say, qui te obviously, t ha t t h ink
ing in t e r m s of f o r m a n d c o n t e n t i s i n a d e q u a t e to c a p t u r e th is
c o n u n d r u m of act ivi ty a n d passivity. (But in th is w a y we r each
a n o t h e r a spec t of A g a m b e n ' s analys is t h a t , in the e n d , will
b r i n g h i m close to Blanchot ' s n o t i o n of the i m a g e , a n d of la
communauté inavouable insofar as each p red ica t e s his ana ly
sis on a general w e a k e n i n g of m u t u a l presences . )
N o w , i f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s c h e m a t a m a k e poss ib le t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n o f on to log ica l ca tegor ies to " a n y be ing w h a t e v e r , "
t h e n w e m u s t l o o k in to t h e on to log i ca l s t a tus o f th is " w h a t
ever," for it is precisely t he onto logica l ly known. In shor t , what
is an objec t in general}
Kan t ' s a n s w e r i s s imple a n d d i s a r m i n g . I t isn ' t a n y t h i n g :
N o w we are i n a pos i t i on to d e t e r m i n e m o r e a d
equa te ly o u r c o n c e p t of an object in genera l . All o u r
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s have , a s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , the i r objec t ,
a n d c a n in t u r n b e c o m e objects o f o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a
t i o n s . A p p e a r a n c e s a re t h e sole objec ts w h i c h c a n be
g iven to us immedia te ly , a n d t h a t i n t h e m w h i c h re
lates i m m e d i a t e l y to the ob jec t i s ca l led i n tu i t i on . But
these a p p e a r a n c e s a re n o t th ings - in - themse lves ; they
are on ly r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , w h i c h in t u r n have the i r o b
j ec t—an objec t w h i c h c a n n o t itself be in tu i t ed by us ,
a n d w h i c h may, the re fo re , b e n a m e d the n o n - e m p i r i
ca l , t h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ob jec t = x.
T h e p u r e c o n c e p t o f this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ob jec t ,
which in reality throughout till our knowledge is al
ways one and the same, is w h a t a lone can confer u p o n
all o u r empi r ica l c o n c e p t s in genera l re la t ions to an
objec t , t h a t is, an object ive real i ty ." (Lat ter e m p h a s i s
m i n e ) 5 1
Heidegger will say t h a t the mys te r ious object = x is a " s o m e
t h i n g o f w h i c h we k n o w n o t h i n g . " 5 2 As an object i n gene ra l ,
the x is no t any par t icu la r object a n d , like the Umkreis " h o u s e , "
i t is n o t d e t e r m i n a b l e . It is t he Umkreis of any poss ib le objec t .
I t is t he so-cal led objec t , or a n y objec t pure ly insofar as i t is
cal led an object . I t is w h a t all objects sha re , b u t i t is in-itself a
n o - t h i n g , n o n b e i n g , n o n o b j e c t . I t is, in A g a m b e n ' s l a n g u a g e
aga in , " t h e p u r e be ing - in - l anguage of the non - l i ngu i s t i c . " I t i s
t h a t w h i c h , in a n y objec t , objectifies it, env is ions i t as such , as
an objec t . T h e ob jec t - in -genera l i s pu re ly imag ina ry , because
i t i s s chema t i zed p a r excel lence , yet i t i s t h a t w h i c h is n o t p r e
sen ted in a n y p r e s e n t a t i o n . In effect, to b o r r o w f rom L y o t a r d :
i t is the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the u n p r e s e n t a b l e . H e i d e g g e r wil l call
i t a " p u r e h o r i z o n " wi th in w h i c h a n y object c a n be r e n d e r e d
p r e s e n t - t o - u s . K a n t will say i t i s a " p u r e c o r r e l a t e " to t r a n
scenden t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n insofar as i t is a un i ty w a i t i n g for
s o m e t h i n g to unify, a like t h a t p recedes a n y t h i n g to l iken. In
t h a t sense i t i s more object ive t h a n a n y object , m o r e be ing
t h a n a n y be ing , so t h a t He idegge r will be ab le to rechr i s t en i t
as Being. In "Brief iiber den H u m a n i s m u s " he says (in my
o w n t r a n s l a t i o n , w h i c h I leave c rude ly l i teral in o r d e r to e m
phas i ze the p o i n t ) : " T h u s Being i s be ing-er t h a n a n y be ing
[G le i chwoh l ist das Sein se iender als jegliches s e i e n d e ] . " 5 3 Fur
ther, a c c o r d i n g to R i c h a r d s o n , He idegger will identify the t r a n
scenden t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as his Da-sein.54
T h e ob jec t = x is n o t a be ing , n o t an ob jec t , hence its re la-
t\ I i i\ IVI I \ I IN l\ IN I ' I I I I | - 1 I I I I I I ; \ I IN I I I I I K I ' I '
t ion to the k n o w n will not be cognitive. It is not p re sen t . It is
more t han present; m o r e present t h a n any p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t is
the sheer 'Van a p p e a r " o f any a p p e a r a n c e wha tever . N o t a b
solutely n o t h i n g at all , n o r jus t a n y t h i n g at all, it is the dis
junction of something and nothing. " T h i s = x , " K a n t says , " i s
on ly the c o n c e p t of a b s o l u t e pos i t i on , n o t itself a self-subsist
ing objec t b u t on ly an idea o f r e la t ion , to pos i t an objec t cor
r e s p o n d i n g to the f o r m of i n t u i t i o n . " 5 5 Alien to all s u b s t a n c e
(i.e., n o t " se l f - subs i s t ing" ) , the object = x is fragility itself.
E m p t y of all c o n t e n t , t h e x is the sheer " t h a t the re i s " (il y a, es
gibt) s o m e t h i n g r a t h e r t h a n n o t h i n g , just as Da-sein, or t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n (or, unified a p p e r c e p t i o n ) , is t he
sheer " t h a t the re i s " s o m e o n e r a t h e r t h a n n o o n e . Infinitely
fragile, t he x is a r che - re l a t ion , a r che -ob l iga t ion t h a t t he r e be
such a t h i n g as i m a g i n a t i o n ( fo rming , p r e s e n t a t i o n ) itself, or
a n y syn- itself. Similarly, Da-sein is t he being of the " t h e r e , "
or, t h e p u r e pos i t i on of the self. Da-sein is t h e being of the
a r c h e - p r e s e n t a t i o n " = x . "
T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n , needless to say, i s a m b i g u o u s . N o t h i n g ,
or the N o t h i n g , is p resen ted . N o t h i n g is " b e y o n d " it, no th ing -
in-itself ar ises ghos t l ike b e y o n d the object ively k n o w n . T h e x ,
t h e sheer p r e s e n t a t i o n , i s s u s p e n d e d , de layed , r e t a r d e d , inter
r u p t e d — c o m i n g b u t n e v e r a r r i v i n g . T h e e s s e n t i a l d i s t a n c e
be tween the k n o w e r a n d t ha t wh ich i s the preeminent ly o n t o -
logically k n o w n erodes in such a w a y t ha t the t w o sides c a n n o t
b u t fuse t o g e t h e r . 5 6 " P r e s e n t e d " i s the r e t u r n , we c a n say, w i t h
B l a n c h o t a n d N i e t z s c h e , o f w h a t d o e s n o t c o m e b a c k ( in to
a n y p re sen t ) . N o t h i n g definitive i s p re sen ted . N o f i g u r e , n o
o u t l i n e , n o border , n o t h i n g f r amed . W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s (only)
t h a t the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n feels itself ob l iged to (or
c o n s t r a i n e d to) present. T h a t is to say, i t feels itself, a n d t h u s
s u b m i t s to itself, as if it c a m e f rom ou t s i de itself—as if it was
itself an exterior force. Th i s au to /he teroaf fec t ion is p ro found ly
t e m p o r a l , moreover , in the sense of an e x t r e m e tens(e)- ion, or
an t i c ipa t i on . (We m u s t recall f rom the p reced ing analys is t h a t ,
u n l i k e G o d ' s k n o w i n g , h u m a n k n o w i n g i s t e m p o r a l . ) T h e
" p o w e r " of Einbildungskraft is he re fused w i t h an essent ia l
i m p o t e n c e . T h e object = x shares w i t h the Entstand t he char
acter is t ic of u n k n o w a b i l i t y , bu t , as a p r e s e n t a t i o n in extremis,
i t t u r n s a w a y f rom G o d b a c k t o w a r d objec ts , b a c k t o w a r d its
c u s t o m a r y pover ty . T h e object = x is t h e i r r epa rab le cons ign
m e n t to t h ings , to objec ts , to p rofan i ty , b u t on ly via a d e t o u r
t h r o u g h the N o t h i n g , t h r o u g h nonbe ing . A g a m b e n says, " [T jhe
h u m a n i s t h e o n e t h a t , be ing o p e n to t h e non - th ing - l i ke , is, for
th is very r e a s o n , i r r e p a r a b l y c o n s i g n e d to th ings [{Puomo},
e s s e n d o a p e r t o a l n o n - c o s a l e , e , u n i c a m e n t e p e r q u e s t o ,
c o n s e g n a t o i r r e p a r a b i l m e n t e alle c o s e ] . " 5 7
W e d o n o t then , s u d d e n l y a n d unexpec ted ly , c o n f r o n t t h e
thing-in-i tself , t h e sacred t h i n g , the Entstand as it is d i rec t ly
offered f r o m o u t o f the M o s t Ineffable. To the con t r a ry , we
s u d d e n l y a n d u n e x p e c t e d l y c o n f r o n t n o t h i n g , n o n b e i n g , t h a t
is to say, ourselves: ourselves as the no-thing "itself." T h a t
w h i c h all t h a t is h a s in c o m m o n is n o - t h i n g . We c o n f r o n t a
l imit w i t h o u t ever c o n f r o n t i n g it, for the l imit w a s n o t h i n g ,
w a s a l w a y s a l r eady " i n " th ings , e rased i n its a p p r o a c h a n d
s u s p e n d e d en deca du temps like a p a r a l y z e d a n d p a r a l y z i n g
force . Fo r t h a t w h i c h i s p r e sen t ed i s t h e sheer " t h e r e , " a n d
th is p u r e " t h e r e " i s the p u r e pos i t i on o f the K a n t i a n " s u b j e c t "
(wh ich we shal l i n t e r r o g a t e in the n e x t sect ion of th is c h a p t e r )
or t h e k n o w e r , the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e Da-sein.
I m p o r t a n t l y , for Agarnben ' s en t i re en te rp r i se since Lan
guage and Death, t he (wha tever ) ob jec t = x is b o t h t h e p o i n t
of s u b t r a c t i o n f rom all l anguage , all ident i ty , all p ropr i e ty , a n d
a l so the p o i n t of i m m e r s i o n in l anguage - in -gene ra l or, s imply,
t h e sheer fact t h a t one speaks:
Whatevsi does noi therefore mean only (in the w o r d s
ol Alain Badiou) ' s ub t r ac t ed from the a u t h o r i t y of lan
guage w i t h o u t any possible d e n o m i n a t i o n , ind i sce rn
ible ' ; i t m e a n s m o r e exact ly t h a t w h i c h , h o l d i n g itself
in s imple h o m o n y m y , in p u r e being-cal led , is precisely
a n d on ly for th is r e a s o n u n n a m a b l e : the be ing- in- lan-
g u a g e of the non- l ingu is t i c .
[Qualunque n o n significa qu ind i s o l t a n t o (nelle p a r o l e
d i B a d i o u ) : ' s o t t r a t t o a l l ' au to r i t à della l ingua , senza
n o m i n a z i o n e poss ib le , indiscernible ' ; esso significa, p iù
p r e c i s a m e n t e : c i ò c h e , t e n e n d o s i i n u n a s e m p l i c e
o m o n i m i a , nel p u r o esser-det to , a p p u n t o e so l t an to per
q u e s t o è i n n o m i n a b i l e : l ' esser-nel- l inguaggio del n o n -
l i ngu i s t i co . ] 5 8
H e m a k e s t h e i m m e d i a t e a d d e n d u m t o Badiou i n o r d e r t o
insu re t h a t we do n o t t ry to see in this prestntation-in-extremis
a nega t ive p r e s e n t a t i o n , N e g a t i v e Being, or nega t ive theo logy .
T h e object = x is t he very t u r n i n g a w a y f rom the sacred for i t
is t h e p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h ings , of objects (i.e., of t h a t w h i c h
is never p r e s e n t e d to G o d ) . If y o u l ike, t h e x " s h o w s " the
ungod l ine s s of the w o r l d . I t s h o w s t h e i r r epa rab le p r o f a n i t y
of the w o r l d . Via this pa r a lyzed p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e w o r l d i s p re
sen ted precisely such as i t is. A p p e a r a n c e s concea l (only the)
n o t h i n g . N o p r o p e r n a t u r e i s revea led t o us , n o c o m i n g - f r o m -
out-of-Ineffabi l i ty is unvei led . In Agarnben ' s l a n g u a g e aga in ,
on ly the i r reduc ib le " t h u s n e s s " of th ings i s revea led . T h o u g h t ,
t h e n , before i t t h i n k s a n y th ing , i s ab le to t h ink (or i s n o t ab le
n o t to th ink ) p u r e profan i ty , or p u r e o r d i n a r i n e s s , as its only
e x t r a o n t i c t h o u g h t .
Th i s m e a n s then tha t (pure) t h o u g h t is naïveté pa r excel
lence. Turn ing at once to objects, it has always already forgotten
God. I r reducibly lost among things, though) pure being-in-
l anguage—is a b a n d o n e d , undes t ined , sc rupulous ly tbingis l i .
T h o u g h t i s c o n s t r a i n e d to t h ink n o t h i n g beyond objec ts . T h i s
i s its " e x t r e m e y o u t h " — t o have a l w a y s a l r eady e v a c u a t e d it
self of all latency. T h o u g h t is or ig ina l ly pure ly e x p o s e d , pu re ly
p r e s e n t e d , pu re ly there, a n d it is " a b l e " to ho ld itself jus t en
deçà du temps, or I'entretemps, p r io r to its " w o r k " of f igura
t i on . T h o u g h t , in sho r t , before i t i s c a p t u r e d in t h e w o r l d ,
" t h i n k s " the p lace of a r t , l'espace littéraire. I t is " a b l e " to
t h i n k , before t he r e is a n y thing, " r e l a t i o n in g e n e r a l " in t h e
p u r e " t h e r e , " or // y a. Th i s " a b i l i t y " is a passivity. It is a p u r e
p a s s i o n . A pas s ion , however , t h a t is never p resen t like a s t a t e -
o f -mind . I t i s t he pu re f inding-myself- there , or be ing- the- the re .
I t c a n n o t n o t be - the - the re ( w i t h o u t pure ly a n d s imply ceas ing
to be) . T h a t i s to say, for a p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t , p u r e l y e x p o s e d
to all its possibi l i t ies (all its predica tes ) i t is u n d e s t i n e d to a n y
o n e o r a n y set o f t h e m . But this pa ra lyzed m o m e n t does n o t
b e l o n g to a pa s t , a " w a s . " Da-sein, or the K a n t i a n " s u b j e c t , "
is i ts there incessant ly, w i t h o u t , however , be ing ab le to b r i n g
itself before itself. I t is, as He idegge r says , " a h e a d of itself."
In a ce r ta in sense, we c o u l d say t h a t i t i s t h e very " w o r k "
o f w h a t e v e r be ing precisely to u n w o r k a n d u n d e t e r m i n e itself
by h o l d i n g itself in "per fec t h o m o n y m i t y . " At least , A g a m b e n
w o u l d h a v e u s t h i n k so , a n d i n his o w n w a y h e re la tes w h a t
ever beings, " t r icksters or fakes, assistants or ' t oons [tricksters o
p e r d i g i o r n o , a iu tan t i o toons]"59 (italics a n d Engl ish in or ig i
nal) to t h e B l a n c h o t i a n wri ter , as we have a l r eady d iscussed in
o u r p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . W h e n " e x p r o p r i a t e d o f all ident i ty , so
as to a p p r o p r i a t e be long ing itself [ e sp ropr i a t e d i t u t t e l e iden
t i tà , p e r a p p r o p r i a r s i d e l l ' a p p a r t e n e n z a s t e s s a ] , " 6 0 w h a t e v e r
be ing , l ike the wri ter , is sub t r ac t ed f rom all ( representable)
commona l i ty , all identifiable communi ty , a n d b e c o m e s radical ly
" c a p a b l e " of instability, fragili ty—that is, re la t ion- in-genera l .
, 1 v , M 1 )1 I . I M \ I I I 1 I I I I I l M I I I » A I IN fi H 1 fi H I 3 3
Willi the expropriation ol .ill " c o n t e n t s , " all " l a t ency , " this
pure relation is obs( urely felt. The w o r k of a r t , as Lévinas h a s
s h o w n , realizes such a d e t a c h m e n t f rom c o n d i t i o n s . I t real izes
sheer a p p e a r a n c e . Radical ly unseizable , a r t realizes the e x t r e m e
poss ibi l i ty of another re la t ion t h a t A g a m b e n his tor ic izes in
his La comunità che viene. H i s " c o m i n g " c o m m u n i t y is n o t h
ing o t h e r t h a n t h e sheer, i m m a n e n t poss ib i l i ty o f be ing- in - l an -
g u a g e insofar as l a n g u a g e offers neut ra l i ty , a n o n y m i t y , indif
ference w i t h r e g a r d to identi ty. I t offers the speake r t h e " a b i l
i t y " t o n o longe r say " I , " jus t a s B l an ch o t h a s w r i t t e n . 6 1
O u r e ra , wr i t e s A g a m b e n , i s o n e in w h i c h all rea l i ty h a s
been t rans formed in to its image. G l a m o r o u s a n d al ienat ing, the
spectacle h a s total ized itself a n d forever separa ted h u m a n life
f r o m t h e poss ib i l i ty o f a p r e s u p p o s e d c o m m o n G o o d . O u r
" n a t u r e " — t h e fact t h a t w e s p e a k — h a s been e x p r o p r i a t e d a n d
c o m m o d i f i e d a n d n o t h i n g o f G o d , n o t h i n g o f the sac red , h a d
been revea led in th is " e x t r e m e l y null i fying unvei l ing [ e s t r emo
s v e l a m e n t o n u l l i f i c a n t e ] . " 6 2 I n o u r e ra , c o m m u n i c a t i o n occu
pies its o w n " a u t o n o m o u s sphe re [sfera a u t o n o m a ] " 6 3 (Bau-
dri l lard 's "hyper rea l i ty" ) . T h e " w o r d " — t h e " p o w e r " t o reveal
any th ing w h a t s o e v e r — h a s acquired its o w n mater ia l i ty a n d has
become a commodi ty . Language , the M o s t C o m m o n , has been
t a k e n f r o m us a n d h a s revealed on ly the n o t h i n g n e s s o f all
t h i n g s . Yet a h o p e a n d an in t e rven t ion r e m a i n poss ib le for u s .
To begin w i t h , l ived expe r i ence has long since been dis
t a n c e d in a d v a n c e a n d h o l l o w e d o u t by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . (It w a s
W a l t e r Ben jamin w h o no t i ced t h o s e t ou r i s t s , s t a n d i n g w i t h
the i r c a m e r a s in f ront of g r ea t w o r k s of a r t , p r e se rv ing an
expe r i ence they w o u l d never have . ) T h i s m e a n s t h a t the Spec
tac le ( r ep re sen ta t ion in genera l ) i s t h e p u r e f o r m of s e p a r a
t i o n : " [ W ] h e n the real w o r l d h a s been t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n
i m a g e a n d images b e c o m e real , t h e p rac t i ca l p o w e r o f h u m a n s
is s e p a r a t e d f rom itself a n d p re sen t ed as a w o r l d u n t o itself
I J ' I I ( ) I I K
[dove il m o n d o reale si è t r a s f o r m a t o in u n ' i r n m a g i n e e le
i m m a g i n i d i v e n t a n t o reali , la p o t e n z a prat ica dell'uomo si dis-
t acca da se stessa e si p ré sen ta c o m e un m o n d o a s e ] . " 6 4 T h i s
mondo a sé h a s been c a p t u r e d a n d r egu la t ed by a compe t i t i ve
m e d i a c r a c y t h a t n o w m a n i p u l a t e s a n d con t ro l s t h e p e r c e p t i o n
a n d the m e m o r y o f t h e c o m m u n i t y . H u m a n s , hence fo r th , a re
s e p a r a t e d f rom their M o s t C o m m o n — l a n g u a g e , Logos. Fur
t h e r m o r e , A g a m b e n a rgues , th is m a m m o t h , magni f icen t ex
p r o p r i a t i o n h a s e m p t i e d t h e w o r l d o f all beliefs, t r a d i t i o n s ,
c o n t e n t s , la tency, a n d sac redness a n d h a s r ep l aced t h e m w i t h
p r o d u c t s . I t h a s revea led the n o t h i n g n e s s of all t h ings (i.e., i t
h a s revea led t h a t w h a t w a s " h i d d e n " i n all t h i n g s — " b e h i n d
a p p e a r a n c e s " — w a s on ly the suscept ib i l i ty of all t h ings to be
c o m i n g the i r o w n i m a g e , the i r o w n a p p e a r a n c e . W h a t w a s
" h i d d e n " w a s n o t s o m e essence, b u t sheer spectral i ty.)
T h a t w h i c h h a s b e e n e x p r o p r i a t e d f r o m h u m a n s n o w
c o m e s b a c k t o t h e m c o m m o d i f i e d , w o r k e d over a n d reva lu -
a t e d by t h e m e d i a because language is dead and has become
its own image. O u r l inguis t ic " n a t u r e " c o m e s b a c k to us in
ve r t ed : a s a r t , a s u n n a t u r a l , a s n o t - o u r s . In its " w o r k " o f e m p
ty ing o u t beliefs a n d t r a d i t i o n s , l a n g u a g e itself r e m a i n s never
the less h i d d e n a n d s e p a r a t e d f rom us .
F o r th i s very r e a s o n , A g a m b e n a rgues , i t i s n o w poss ib le
for u s to expe r i ence l anguage i t se l f—not th is o r t h a t c o n t e n t
o f l a n g u a g e , n o t th is o r t h a t t r ue o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t t h e
sheer fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " L a n g u a g e — t h a t w h i c h u n v e i l s —
r e m a i n s i n o u r e ra , still veiled. W h a t r e m a i n s unseen a n d u n
e x p e r i e n c e d i s t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n , e m p t i e d of all c o n t e n t ,
" is a b l e " to c o m m u n i c a t e itself. T h e s ink ing i n t o nul l i ty of the
r ea l c o m m u n i c a t e s no message , no dest iny, n o t h i n g sac red . I t
c o m m u n i c a t e s o n l y t h e fragil i ty o f b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n . T h i s
m e a n s t h a t i t c o m m u n i c a t e s obsessively, incessant ly , a n d ex
clusively the impossibility of exclusion. Th i s is A g a m b e n ' s " les
s o n " loi US Snd hil quasi difference from Blanchot. M o r e "pos i
t ively" than Blanchot, hi' says t ha t the c o m m u n i t y of t h o s e
w h o have n o c o m m o n , r ep resen tab le c o m m o n a l i t y i s t h e re
t u r n of n o n e x c l u s i o n . Its e te rna l r e t u r n .
In o u r e r a , t h e n , i t i s no longer the sacred d e a d w h o revea l
c o m m u n i t y to us as we ga the r t oge the r in a single (decom
p o s i n g t h r o n g . 6 5 I t i s t h e real itself t h a t n o w incessant ly d i e s —
in its i m a g e , its co rp se , in l a n g u a g e itself. Expe r i ence is l o n g
since d e a d . T h e r e i s (only) (the) n o t h i n g left to e x p e r i e n c e —
ourse lves , in s h o r t . O n l y t h o s e " c a p a b l e " o f such an expe r i
ence wil l en te r A g a m b e n ' s c o m m u n i t y che viene u n h a r m e d .
T h e pol i t ica l t a sk t h a t r e m a i n s i s de s t ruc t i on . T h e a p p e a r a n c e
of the autonomy of the media t ized spectacle m u s t be des t royed .
Like the sacred , a n d like the Sigetic Voice , t h e c o m m o d i t y /
spec tac le m u s t be u she red to the g rave : " [ T ] o l ink t o g e t h e r
i m a g e a n d b o d y in a space w h e r e they c a n no longe r be sepa
r a t e d , a n d t h u s to forge the w h a t e v e r body , w h o s e physis i s
r e s e m b l a n c e — t h i s i s t h e g o o d t h a t h u m a n i t y m u s t l ea rn t o
w r e s t f r o m c o m m o d i t i e s i n t h e i r d e c l i n e [ c o m p e n e t r a r e
i m m a g i n e e c o r p o in u n o spaz io in cui essi n o n p o s s a n o essere
p i ù s e p a r a t i e o t t e n e r e c o s i i n e s so f o r g i a t o q u e l c o r p o
q u a l u n q u e , la cui physis è la somig l i anza , q u e s t o è il b e n e che
l ' u m a n i t à deve saper s t r a p p a r e alla m e r c e a l t r a m o n t o ] . " 6 6
Politics
F a r f r o m l a m e n t i n g t h e loss o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e
w e a k e n i n g o f m u t u a l p resence a n d self p re sence , t h e e x p r o
p r i a t i o n o f o u r l inguist ic n a t u r e , a n d o u r c o n s e q u e n t a l ien
a t i o n (adrif t i n h y p e r s p a c e , Baud r i l l a rd w o u l d say) , A g a m b e n
asks us to w e l c o m e it. We m u s t w e l c o m e i t because th is a l ien
a t i o n a lone c a n " r e s t o r e " u s t o ourse lves , t o ourse lves insofar
as we a re originally e x p r o p r i a t e d of l a n g u a g e a n d expe r i ence .
Being-expropr i a t ed is human being. That is to say, at the end
of the e ra of Cap i ta l and its magnificent c o n c e n t r a t i o n in the
Spectacle , the being t ha t r e tu rns a n d the c o m m u n i t y t ha t c o m e s
i s t h e o n e p a r a d o x i c a l l y " c o n s t i t u t e d " or " i n s t i t u t e d " by ex
p r o p r i a t i o n . I t is t h e be ing w h o s e real i ty is pure ly l inguis t ic
a n d (para t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . Th i s be ing , this c o m m u n i t y , h a s n o
be ing p r o p e r to i t excep t for its ( p a r a ) t r a n s c e n d e n t a l bo rde r
ing on all its poss ibi l i t ies . Such a be ing is fragile, u n s t a b l e (an
a rch ic , as Levinas w o u l d s ay )— t he pure possibility of any re
lation whatever. It is a be ing c o n s t i t u t e d by e x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d
a l so , s imul taneous ly , by the imposs ib i l i ty of exc lus ion because
i t incessant ly b o r d e r s on all its possibi l i t ies . W i t h o u t des t iny
a n d w i t h o u t essence, the c o m m u n i t y t h a t r e t u r n s i s o n e never
p r e s e n t in t h e f i r s t p l ace . Presubject ive in t h e p r o p e r sense ,
th is c o m m u n i t y is qualunque! Infinitely vu lne rab le , d e p e n d e n t
on t h e s u p p l e m e n t , we will have been offered, i n t h e e n d , t h e
poss ib i l i ty t o a p p r o p r i a t e o u r e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, by " h o l d
ing ourse lves in s imple h o m o n y m i t y . "
In o u r ana lys is o f K a n t , we h a v e seen t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n
d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t g r a s p a n objec t . T h e sole " c o n
t e n t " of i ts k n o w i n g is a l w a y s the " s a m e , " t h e objec t = x: "A
s o m e t h i n g o f w h i c h w e can k n o w n o t h i n g , " H e i d e g g e r says .
D e p r i v e d o f a n y ac tua l objec t , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n
c a n on ly " t h i n k " a p u r e " t h e r e " o r a " p u r e p o s i t i o n " t h a t , in
fact , i t itself is. D e p r i v e d of even in te l lec tual c o n t e n t (or in te l
lec tual i n t u i t i o n — s o m e t h i n g K a n t never a d m i t s i n t o his p h i
l o s o p h y ) , th is "perfect ly con ten t l ess r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , " he says ,
C a n n o t even be cal led a c o n c e p t i o n , b u t mere ly a c o n
sc iousness w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s all c o n c e p t i o n s . By th is
I , o r It , w h o o r w h i c h t h i n k s , n o t h i n g m o r e i s r e p r e
sen ted t h a n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject of t h o u g h t = x,
w h i c h i s cogn ized only by m e a n s of t h o u g h t s t h a t a r e
/ M i n M n i I N A I N 11 i 11 r r i M i i i i /\ i I N I I I I E n i -i /
predil ai i! | , ami ol vvliu h, apar t I rom these , we c a n n o t
form the least c o n c e p t i o n . Hence we are ob l iged to go
r o u n d this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in a p e r p e t u a l circle, inas
m u c h a s we m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r t o f r ame
a n y j u d g m e n t r espec t ing it. A n d this inconven ience we
find i t imposs ib le to r id ourselves of, because consc ious
ness in itself is n o t so m u c h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o v e r n
ing a p a r t i c u l a r object as a fo rm of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in
gene ra l . . . . 6 7
Like t h e object = x, t he subject = x is i nconce ivab le o u t
side its p r e d i c a t i o n s . I t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its p r e d i c a t i o n s ,
ye t i t is n o t pu re ly a n d s imply its p r e d i c a t i o n s . T h e subjec t = x
is " l i k e " t h e objec t = x to the e x t e n t of be ing l ikeness itself,
(i.e., a l w a y s t h e S a m e , l ikeness or r e s e m b l a n c e is its physis). I t
i s a p u r e r e s e m b l a n c e r e sembl ing n o t h i n g , no th ing , no objec t .
A m e r e x , t h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l sub jec t i s n o t k n o w a b l e or
expe r i enceab l e in itself. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n is a
n o t h i n g t h a t c a n g r a s p n o t h i n g . I t i s t h a t w h i c h m a k e s p o s
sible expe r i ence , b u t i t itself i s s u b t r a c t e d f rom a n y expe r i
ence . We m u s t n o t e Kan t ' s r e luc t ance to identify i t definitively.
I t is, exact ly, a consc iousnes s : I , H e , She, or It. A l w a y s t h e
S a m e , i t has no ident i ty . I t is a l w a y s the S a m e x , t h e S a m e
n o t h i n g . T h a t w h i c h uni tes i n tu i t i on a n d m a k e s expe r i ence
" m i n e " i s w i t h o u t any identif iable self. At t h e h e a r t of K a n t i a n
jemeinigkeit, t h e n , is an ine l imina tab le s t r angeness . " M i n e -
n e s s " i s an in t imacy ex te r io r to myself. Th i s s t r ange r c a n n o t
be e x c l u d e d , for " w e m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r to f r ame
a n y j u d g m e n t r espec t ing i t . " T h e p u r e I is x , It: t o o w e a k to
g r a s p itself or k n o w itself in its own expe r i ence of itself. I ts
un i t y is pu re ly thought, b u t n o t objectif ied, a n d h e n c e i t r e
m a i n s u n r e c o g n i z e d . In f r aming itself i t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e ludes
i ts o w n g r a s p . I t is a p a r e n t h e s i s t h a t inc ludes all b u t itself. As
e n f r a m e d , it is e m p t y oí itseli and is thus the p m e border or
l imit be tween bo th pu re senselessness and supcrsensor i ty , on
the o n e h a n d , a n d c h a o t i c s ensa t ion , on the other . In this way,
we r e e n c o u n t e r the p a r a d o x o f t ime t h a t in- forms t h a t w h i c h
a r t i cu la tes i t ( the ca t egor i e s , e.g.) such t h a t there is no t ime
t h a t i s n o t a l w a y s a l r eady a r t i cu l a t ed a n d a lso no c a t e g o r y
t h a t i s n o t a l w a y s a l r e a d y t e m p o r a l i z e d .
F o r K a n t , t h e p u r e c o n t e n t l e s s " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n I , " t h e
Umkreis o r t h e " I t h i n k " t h a t a c c o m p a n i e s all r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
a n d m a k e s t h e m m i n e , r e m a i n s u n e x a m i n a b l e a n d i s p u r e l y
a n d s imply named a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " s u b j e c t " — t h e p u r e s u b
ject of the v e r b , in sho r t , a text. But by w h a t m a g i c does K a n t
identify the t r anscenden t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as the " I " of language}
In an ear l ier b o o k , Infancy and History: Essays on the
Destruction of Experience [Infamia e storia: Distruzione dell'
esperienza e origine della storia], A g a r a b e n calls o u r a t t e n t i o n
to H a m a n n ' s m e t a c r i t i q u e of Kan t ' s Critique of Pure Reason.
H a m a n n asks : h o w p u r e i s Pu re R e a s o n ? As we l ea rn f r o m
A g a m b e n ' s r e susc i t a t ion o f the a r g u m e n t , for K a n t the p u r e
g e o m e t r i c uni ty o f the " t h e r e " seems jus t n a t u r a l l y to b e l o n g
t o l a n g u a g e , s o t h a t " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n d l inguis t ic seem t o
m e r g e [ t r a scenden ta l e e l ingüís t ico s e m b r a n o c o n f o n d e r s i ] . " 6 8
I t w a s H a m a n n , a c c o r d i n g t o A g a m b e n , w h o f i r s t sugges ted
t h e necessi ty o f c o n t a m i n a t i n g K a n t i a n p u r i t y by e x a m i n i n g
its h i d d e n (or, Lacan m i g h t say, its " f o r g o t t e n " ) r e l a t i o n to
l a n g u a g e . He says i t s imply a n d d r ama t i ca l l y : " R e a s o n i s l an
g u a g e , logos. Th i s i s the m a r r o w b o n e a t w h i c h I shal l g n a w
unt i l I die o f i t . " 6 9 F r o m H a m a n n ' s i n tu i t i on , A g a m b e n t a k e s
us d i rec t ly to the n o t i o n , e l a b o r a t e d by Benvenis te , t h a t i t i s in
a n d t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e t h a t the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subjec t i s ins t i
tu ted . W i t h impressive simplicity, Benveniste declares , " H e w h o
says e g o i s e g o . " 7 0 P r ior to any expe r i ence , t r a n s c e n d i n g a n y
empi r i ca l expe r i ence , is the saying of " I . " T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
subjecl is nol a pun- unity umly ing itself. It is the e n u n c i a t o r . 7 1
That which Kant described as subject = x needed to be supp le
men ted and r e t h o u g h t as the one w h o says " I . " Kan t ' s subjec t
= x, to be a subject, h a d to speak (itself). But th i s leaves us
w i t h a ques t i on : if it is n o t (yet) a subject (unti l it e n u n c i a t e s
itself), w h a t o r w h o m d id K a n t ca tch a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g l impse
of?
T h e p u r e " t h e r e " o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n offers
n o cha rac te r i s t i c t h a t w o u l d m a k e i t mine, m y " I . " T h e p u r e
be ing- there i s n o t ava i lab le to any subject , b u t to a m e r e " t h e r e
m u s t b e s o m e o n e " (and , moreover , s o m e o n e ex-scr ibed , s o m e
o n e w h o loses t h e power to say " I " ) . T h i s p u r e pos i t i on cer
ta in ly d o e s n o t real ize the i m m e d i a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f " m y
self," b u t in fact real izes t h e absence of "myself ," as we h a v e
a l r e a d y n o t e d . W h a t i s m o r e , the sheer poss ibi l i ty in gene ra l
of a n y s p a t i o t e m p o r a l r e l a t ion i s rad ica l ly a n d or ig inar i ly in
accessible t o any subject . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n —
I , H e , She , o r I t—is n o t a s u p r a c o n c e p t t h a t inc ludes all " P s "
u n d e r its u m b r e l l a . I t is n o t a c o n c e p t at all . N o r a s u p r a g e n u s ,
n o r a set of all sets. It is precisely the r igorous impossibil i ty of
a n y such concept , of any supersensory generality. Total ly devo id
of all c o n t e n t , of all expe r i ence , ye t n o t abso lu t e ly n o t h i n g a t
all , th is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n is the Same as Heidegger ' s
Da-sein w h o s e " w h o " i s a l w a y s in q u e s t i o n . 7 2 I t c a n n o t e x p e
r ience itself as itself a n d it is t he very eclipse of au toa f fec t ion .
Rad ica l l y s u s p e n d e d , t h e Da-sein, be ing - the - the re , is jus t as
r ad ica l ly d i s inher i t ed . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n , the p u r e
" t h e r e , " (de)const i tu tes the " I " t h a t ins t i tutes itself i n l anguage
by i n t e r r u p t i n g i t i nces san t ly—by pa ra lyz ing a n d neu t r a l i z ing
it. Kan t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n h a d to be s u p p l e m e n t e d
by l a n g u a g e in o r d e r to ins t i tu te an " I , " a subject . T h a t w h i c h
a c c o m p a n i e s all m y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d m a k e s t h e m m i n e h a s
t o say " I . " But t o w h o m , o r t o w h a t reali ty, wil l th i s " I " refer?
Benvenis te answers, rigorously, "To something very singular,
w h i c h is exclusively l inguist ic: / refers to the act of individual
discourse in which it is ut tered and it designates its speaker
t h e real i ty i t evokes is the rea l i ty of d i s c o u r s e . " 7 1
T h e fleeting a n d p u r e " I " t h a t K a n t a t t e m p t e d t o pos i t i n
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n w a s never a n y w h e r e b u t in lan
g u a g e . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, in the end , w a s to h a v e
been m a d e up of w o r d s . T h e Umkreis w a s l a n g u a g e . I t w a s
the re fo re l a n g u a g e t h a t s to le f rom me all my expe r i ences ab
o v o . / w a s never a n y w h e r e b u t in my saying " I . " T h e subjec t
w a s s p o k e n , u t t e red : H e w h o said " I . " All exper ience , i n shor t ,
w a s a l w a y s a l r e a d y speech . There is no prelinguistic subject,
no dumb experience, and no transcendence otherwise than in
language. T h e subject is pu re ly l inguist ic be ing .
W h a t K a n t c a u g h t a g l impse of, t he re fo re , w a s n o t a t all
t r a n s c e n d e n t , b u t n o t - y e t t r a n s c e n d e n c e , n o t - y e t l a n g u a g e .
W h a t K a n t c a u g h t a g l i m p s e o f w a s a n i m p o t e n c e o r a n
o r i g i n a r y dependence on l a n g u a g e . W h a t K a n t ske t ched o u t
for us w a s a no t -ye t subject , a H e , She, or It t h a t has yet to
s p e a k a n d i s the re fore not pu re ly a n d s imply e m b e d d e d in
l a n g u a g e . He c a u g h t a g l impse of t h a t w h i c h m u s t enter l an
g u a g e a n d w h o s e i m p o t e n c e i s its i m p o t e n t " p o w e r " to think
(bu t n o t t o c i r cumsc r ibe , o r l imit) its " m u s t s p e a k . " T h a t i s t o
say, K a n t descr ibes for us , in l ight of Benvenis te , in l ight of
l a n g u a g e , or, m o r e simply, in l ight of Light itself, t h a t w h i c h
h a s no Voice , i s given no Voice, b u t m u s t a p p r o p r i a t e l an
g u a g e none the l e s s in o r d e r to be itself. T h a t is to say, i t must
appropriate that which will expropriate it of all "mineness."
" O l d e r " t h a n subject ivi ty i s t h a t w h i c h , i n h u m a n be ing , p r e
c e d e s l a n g u a g e . N o t a " w o r d l e s s " e x p e r i e n c e , s ac r ed a n d
m y s t e r i o u s , b u t the exper ience of l a n g u a g e itself.
I t i s n o t ou t s i de l a n g u a g e , b u t a t its l imit t h a t A g a m b e n
seeks to p r o v o k e a pol i t ics . T h e c o m i n g be ing i s n o t a n o t h e r
version ol the iubje< t, no t a new foundation, no r a p u r e a n d
s imple absence ol foundation. C o m i n g being is the be ing t h a t
en te r s l a n g u a g e a n d w h o s e " t r a n s c e n d e n c e " i s its c o m p l e t e
a b s o r p t i o n , w i t h o u t r e s idue , in l a n g u a g e . I t i s t h e be ing w h o s e
Being i s its b o r d e r i n g on l a n g u a g e , on "a l l its p r e d i c a t e s . " You
see, t he r e i s in fact an exper ience t h a t " r e m a i n s " w h e n all
expe r i ence h a s been e x p r o p r i a t e d . T h a t expe r i ence i s t h e ex
pe r i ence of e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, or l a n g u a g e , for l a n g u a g e is
t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n of all pa r t i cu l a r exper iences a n d i s t h e sheer
poss ib i l i ty o f a n y p a r t i c u l a r expe r i ence . N o t th is o r t h a t c o n
t en t o f l a n g u a g e , n o t th is o r t h a t t r u e o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t
t h e sheer a n d fragile fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " T h e c o m i n g be
ing wil l be " c a p a b l e " o f its a b s o r p t i o n , w i t h o u t r ema inde r , in
l a n g u a g e . I t will a t t h e s a m e t ime " r e t a i n " th is " c a p a b i l i t y "
(or potentia) a n d t h i n k l a n g u a g e as such . B o t h ac t ive a n d p a s
sive wil l fuse in to a single pas s ion . Such a be ing wil l r e m a i n
" c a p a b l e " of its passivi ty. I t wil l a l w a y s t h i n k , n o t itself (in its
iden t i ty t h a t l a n g u a g e s imu l t aneous ly offers a n d w i t h d r a w s )
b u t t h e S a m e — a l w a y s t h e S a m e expe r i ence o f e x p r o p r i a t i o n
a n d a l i ena t i on as o r ig ina l .
Because I am able to en te r l a n g u a g e ( and t he re is n o t h i n g
else for h u m a n be ing to en te r ) , I am also ab le to t h i n k th i s
ent ry . I am able to t h i n k the r e t u r n o f l a n g u a g e to l a n g u a g e .
Such t h i n k i n g involves , a s B l a n c h o t h a s r epea ted ly s h o w n , " a
loss o f the p o w e r t o say T , " a n d t h u s a n i m m e r s i o n i n fasci
n a t i o n a n d a c o n t a c t w i t h a n a b s o l u t e mi l ieu . N o longe r t o b e
ab le to say " I " i s t o t h i n k t h e S a m e (no o n e , a n y o n e , t h e
N e u t e r ) . T h e reg ion of A g a m b e n ' s pol i t ics i s t h e r eg ion of
B lancho t ' s "Essen t ia l S o l i t u d e " 7 4 — e m p t i e d o f subjec t a n d o b
ject a n d rad ica l ly i m p e r s o n a l like T h o m a s ' s e n c o u n t e r in t h e
first c h a p t e r of Thomas L'obscur t h a t Levinas ce l eb ra t ed as so
fine a de sc r ip t i on of the il y a.75 F o r if t h e en t ry i n t o l a n g u a g e
es tab l i shes all poss ib le be long ing or r e l a t ion - in -gene ra l ( t ha t
w h i c h , in sho r t , hears u p o n any poli t ics o r any t l h i e s w h a t
ever ) , i t s imu l t aneous ly a p p r o p r i a t e s us of any pa r t i cu l a r rela
t i o n , pol i t ics , or e thics . A n d t h u s pol i t ics is exposed. Any par
t i cu la r pol i t ics , or a n y pol i t ics as usua l , as we cynical ly say (as
i f i t w e r e an a u t o n o m o u s sphe re c losed to us) , i s on ly pol i t ics
so-called (as we m u s t l ea rn to say i f we are to en te r i t a n d
de s t roy its p h a n t a s m i c a u t o n o m y ) .
T h a t w h i c h i s offered us i s a l w a y s t h e Same : n o t an es
sence , a sh in ing p a t h , n o r a dest iny, b u t the sheer poss ib i l i ty
of r e l a t i on in general—a dice t h r o w . A n y p a r t i c u l a r pol i t ic or
e th ic is a p o i n t of c o n t a c t w i t h an a b s o l u t e mil ieu e m p t y of all
de t e rminacy . A n y p a r t i c u l a r pol i t ics is a lso the face, t h e eidos,
of " a n y r e l a t i on a t a l l . " W i t h the n o t i o n o f r ad ica l pass iv i ty
we h a v e a t t e m p t e d t h r o u g h o u t th is b o o k to descr ibe a general
r a p p o r t o r a n i m a g i n a r y d i m e n s i o n w h e r e w e h a v e neve r been
b u t t o w h i c h w e a re e x p o s e d p r i o r t o o u r subject ive in ten
t i o n s . T h e u n c a n n y " a b i l i t y " t o t h i n k this r a p p o r t i s the " a b i l
i t y " t o t h i n k t h a t w h i c h a l w a y s c o m e s . N o t the m a s s e s , n o r
t h e h o r d e , n o r the wo lves , a n d n o t the h e r o , n o r t h e ind i
v idua l , n o r the survivor . T h e mot ley.
Notes
Introduction
1 . E m m a n u e l L é v i n a s , " P h i l o s o p h y a n d A w a k e n i n g , " t r a n s .
M a r y Q u a i n t a n c e , i n Who Comes After the Subject?, e d . E d u a r d o
C a d a v a , P e t e r C o n n o r , a n d J e a n - L u c N a n c y ( N e w Y o r k : R o u t l e d g e ,
1 9 9 1 ) , p . 2 1 5 .
2 . E m m a n u e l L é v i n a s , " T h e S e r v a n t a n d H e r M a s t e r , " t r a n s .
M i c h a e l H o l l a n d , i n The Lévinas Reader, e d . S e à n H a n d ( C a m b r i d g e :
B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 8 9 ) , p . 1 5 9 n . 3 .
3 . E m m a n u e l L é v i n a s , " B e i n g a n d t h e O t h e r : O n P a u l C e l a n , "
t r a n s . S t e p h e n M e l v i l l e , Chicago Review 2 9 , n o s . 1 6 - 2 1 ( w i n t e r
1 9 7 8 ) : 1 6 .
4 . M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , " T h e O u t s i d e , t h e N i g h t , " t r a n s . A n n
S m o c k , i n The Space of Literature ( L i n c o l n : U n i v e r s i t y o f N e b r a s k a
P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 1 6 4 - 6 7 ; i d e m , " L a d e h o r s , l a n u i t , " i n L'espace Littéraire, I d é e s se r . ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 5 5 ) , p p . 2 2 0 - 2 2 .
Chapter One. The Allegory of Being
1 . E m m a n u e l L é v i n a s , " R e a l i t y a n d I t s S h a d o w , " t r a n s .
A l p h o n s o L i n g i s , i n H a n d , e d . , Lévinas Reader, p . 1 3 3 ; i d e m , " L a
1 6 3
rèaIite et son ombre ," Les Temps Modernes 4, no, 38 (November 1948): 774.
2. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. I 33; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 775 .
3. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 132; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 774.
4. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 133; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," pp. 7 7 4 - 7 5 .
5. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," pp . 133-34; idem, "La
réalité et son ombre ," p. 775 .
6. Maurice Blanchot, "The Song of the Sirens," trans. Lydia
Davis, in The Gaze of Orpheus, ed. P. Adams Sitney (Barrytown,
N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1981), pp. 105-13; idem, "Le chant des Si-
rènes," in Le livreà venir, Idées ser. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) ,pp. 9-19.
7. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 134; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 777.
8. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 134; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 776.
9. This is hardly the place to summarize Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe's carefully nuanced work on the question of mimesis. We
only wish to note that he studies various attempts to restrict, reduce,
ignore, or decide on mimesis, and he characterizes each of these
attempts as profoundly political or moral gestures. See especially his
"Typography," t rans. Eduardo Cadava, "Diderot : Pa radox and
Mimesis," trans. Jane Popp, and "Transcendence Ends in Politics,"
t rans. Peter Caws, in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed.
Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989);
see as well idem, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the
Political, t rans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
10. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," pp. 134 -35 ; idem, "La
réalité et son ombre ," p. 777.
11 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre , " p. 778.
12. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 141 ; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre , " p. 786.
13 . Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, t rans. Michael
I I . u d ì , I In m y ( lui <>l Bounds s e i . (Minneapolis: University of Min
nesota Press, I 99 I), pp. 97-98 . La comunità che viene (Torino: Giulio
Einaudi Editore, 1990), pp. 69 -70 .
14. Maurice Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans.
Lydia Davis, in Sitney, éd., Gaze of Orpheus, pp . 8 2 - 8 5 ; idem, "The
Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Lit
erature , pp . 2 5 7 - 6 0 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l ' imaginaire," in
L'espace littéraire , pp . 346 -49 .
15. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p .136; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 779 .
16. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 141 ; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 787.
17. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre , " p. 778.
18. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 7 8 1 .
19. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 782.
20 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 783 -84 .
2 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 138; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 782.
22 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 138; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 782 (emphasis mine).
2 3 . On this point see Jacques Derrida, "At this very moment in
this work here I am," t rans . Ruben Berezdivin, in Re-Reading
Lévinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 11 -48 ; see also John Llewelyn,
"Lévinas, Derrida and Others Vis-à-vis," in The Provocation of
Lévinas, ed. Rober t Bernasconi and David Wood (New York:
Routledge, 1988), pp. 153 -54 .
24 . Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
2 6 1 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l ' imaginaire," p. 352.
2 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 784.
26. Lévinas, "Reality anil l i s Shadow," p. 140; i d e m , " l a réalité
et son ombre ," p. 785 .
27 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 784.
2 8 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 786.
29 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 785.
30. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 141 ; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 786.
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 141-42 ; idem, "La
réalité et son ombre ," p .787.
32. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre , " p. 788.
33 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 788.
34. The notion of an "interruption of myth" that Lévinas puts
forward here has recently been developed in an essay by Jean-Luc
Nancy entitled "Myth Interrupted," trans. Peter Connor, in The In
operative Community, ed. Peter Connor, Theory and History of Lit
erature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp.
4 3 - 7 0 ; and also in an essay on Paul Celan by Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe entitled "Catas t rophe," trans. Andrea Tarnowski, in Word
Traces: Readings of Paul Celan, ed. Aris Fioretos (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 130-56 .
35 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 132; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 773: "[A]rt does not belong to the order of revela
tion. Nor does it belong to that of creation, which moves in just the
opposite direction [l'art n 'appart ient pas à l 'ordre de la révélation.
Ni , d'ailleurs, à celui de la création dont le mouvement se poursuit
dans un sens exactement inverse]."
36 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre , " p. 788.
37. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 7 8 1 .
38 . Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, " I he [\VO Versions ol d i e Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
262; i d e m , " L e s d e u x v e r s i o n s d e l ' imaginaire," p. 350 (italics in
original).
39. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 141 ; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre , " p. 786.
40. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
262 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l 'imaginaire," p. 352.
4 1 . Michel Foucault, "Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from
Outside," trans. Brian Massumi, in Foucault/Blanchot (New York:
Zone Books, 1987), p. 17.
Chapter Two. Levinas's Ethics
1. Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Es
sence, t rans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Mart inus Nijhoff, 1981),
p. 191 n. 3; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (The
Hague: Mar t inus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 86 n. 3.
2. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, pp . 50 ,
136-40 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, pp . 64 ,
1 7 4 - 7 9 (italics in original).
3. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Bad Conscience and the Inexorable,"
t rans. Richard A. Cohen, in Face to Face with Lévinas, ed. Richard
A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp .
3 6 - 4 0 ; idem, "La mauvaise conscience et l ' inexorable" in De Dieu
qui vient à l'idée (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 2 5 8 - 6 5 .
4. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas,"
t rans. Richard Kearney, in Face to Face with Lévinas, p. 2 1 .
5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "Écoute ," Poésie 35 (1986): 110.
6. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 1 1 ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 14.
7. Mart in Heidegger, Nihilism, vol. 4 of Nietzsche, t rans. Frank
A Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row,
1982), pp. 9 6 - 1 1 8 .
8. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 8; idem,
Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 10.
9. It should be clear even from our analysis so far thai the lan
guage of Levinas translates nicely into the I Iciclcggerian German of
Sein und Lett. This paragraph and the entire discussion of alterity
echoes Heidegger's Ruf (Anruf, Aufruf) and his Schuldigsein. At the
end of this chapter, we will take up the question of Levinas's affinity
(and aversion) to Heidegger.
10. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 2 5 ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 32.
11 . Levinas, Otherivise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 69;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 86.
12. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 148;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 189.
13. Heidegger, Nihilism, pp . 102-10 .
14. Two impressive books by Michel Henry take up this thesis:
The Essence of Manifestation, t rans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague:
Mar t inus Nijhoff, 1973) and Généalogie de la psychanalyse (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1985); but see also Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen's insightful summary and critique of the argument, "The
Unconscious Nonetheless," trans. Douglas Brick, in The Emotional
Tie (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp . 123 -54 .
15. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 124;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 159.
16. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 58 ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 75 (italics in
original).
17. Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," p. 2 8 .
18. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "The Freudian Subject: From Poli
tics to Ethics," trans. Richard Miller and X. P. Callahan, in Emo
tional Tie, pp . 1 5 - 2 1 ; on this point see also Jean Luc-Nancy and
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Title of the Letter, t rans. François
Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1992).
19. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 3 2 - 3 3 .
20 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 106;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 135.
21 . | evinos, < Hhârwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 112;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 143 .
22 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Unconscious Nonetheless," pp . 150,
197 n. 4 5 ; see also Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject,
t rans. Catherine Porter (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1988), p. 26ff.
2 3 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Freudian Subject," p. 26 .
24 . François Roustang, foreword, t rans. Catherine Porter, to
Borch-Jacobsen, Freudian Subject, p. ix.
2 5 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 16;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 20 .
26 . Lacoue-Labarthe, "Diderot: Paradox and Mimesis," p . 259 .
27 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 59;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 76.
2 8 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 114;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 146.
29 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 4 3 ; idem, La comunità
che viene , p. 30.
30. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
35: " N o language other than ethics could be equal to the paradox
which phenomenological description enters when, starting with the
disclosure, the appearing of a neighbor, it reads it in its trace, which
orders the face according to a diachrony which cannot be synchro
nized in representation;" idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
l'essence, p. 120 n. 35: "Aucun langage autre qu'éthique n'est à même
d'égaler le paradoxe où entre la description phénoménologique qui,
par tant du dévoilement du prochain, de son apparaître, le lit dans sa
trace qui l 'ordonne visage selon une diachronie non-synchronisable
dans le représentation."
3 1 . Georges Bataille, The Tears of Eros, t rans. Peter Connor (San
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989), p. 206ff.
32. Much of this discussion of Levinas's ethics (and much of my
understanding of Blanchot) owes its inspiration to two sensitive ar
ticles by William Flesch: "Proximity and Power: Shakespearean and
Dramat ic Space," Theater Journal 39, no. 3 (October 1987); idem,
"Posthumous Sadness," unpublished paper.
I i. Qu< iicd h y Maurice Blam hoi m The Unallowable < cm ina
nity, trans. Picric Jons (BarrytOWfl, N.Y.: Station I [ill Press, I VSS),
p. 9; idem, La communauté inavouable (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit,
1983), p. 21 (italics in original).
34. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
3 3 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 116 n. 3 3 . In
this quiet note Levinas more or less admits that the olamic rapport
with the Other is anything but equaled by the language of ethics; the
rapport , in fact, is a problem for ethics to solve.
35 . Maurice Blanchot, "The Narrative Voice," trans. Lydia Davis,
in Sitney, ed., Gaze of Orpheus, pp . 133-44 ; idem, "The Narrat ive
Voice," trans. Susan Hanson , in The Infinite Conversation, Theory
and History of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minne
sota Press, 1993) , pp . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La voix na r r a t i ve , " in
L'entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), pp. 4 2 1 - 3 7 .
36. This Other (Autrui), is, as we have been stressing, neither
this one nor that one, neither an individual nor a group or crowd,
but instead a singularity whose radical indifferentiation is the other
of any representable difference.
37. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Of Being- in-Common," t r ans . James
Creech, in Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp . 1-12.
38 . Blanchot, Unavowable Community, p. 8; idem, La commun
auté inavouable, p. 19.
39. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, t rans. Richard A.
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982), p. 86; idem,
Éthique et infini (Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard et Radio France,
1982), p . 80.
40 . B l ancho t , Unavowable Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La
communauté inavouable, p. 24 .
4 1 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
1; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 125 n. 1.
4 2 . Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "History and Mimesis," trans.
Eduardo Cadava , in Looking After Nietzsche, ed. Laurence A.
Ricklels (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 229 .
'It Quoted bj lacques Derrida m "Introduction: Desistance," trans. ( Li i s 11 > i ) 11 e i lynsk, in Lacouc-Labarthe, typography, p. 2 3 .
Chapter Three. Blanchot, L'arrêt de mort, and
the Image of Literature
1. Blanchot, "The Narrat ive Voice," trans. Davis, pp . 133 -44 ;
idem, "The Narrative Voice," trans. Hanson, pp. 379-87 ; idem, "La
voix narrative," pp. 4 2 1 - 3 7 .
2. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, t rans. Alphonso
Lingis (The Flague: Mart inus Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 52 -64 ; idem, De
l'existence à l'existant (Paris: Vrin, 1981), pp. 8 1 - 1 0 5 .
3. Levinas, Existence and Existents, pp . 5 6 - 5 7 ; idem, De
l'existence à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
4. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 91 . 5. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
6. A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp . 5 3 - 5 8 ; idem, La
comunità che viene, pp . 3 6 - 3 9 .
7. Maurice Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art ,"
t rans . Ann Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 224 ; idem, "Les
caractères de l 'œuvre d 'ar t ," in L'espace littéraire, p. 297 .
8. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l 'œuvre d 'art ," p. 297 .
9. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art ," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d 'ar t ," p. 296 .
10. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 223 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l 'œuvre d 'ar t ," p. 296 .
1 1 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 223 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d 'ar t ," p. 297 .
12. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 90.
13 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 92 .
14. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence à l'existant, pp . 93 -94 .
15. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
79; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
254 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l ' imaginaire," p. 3 4 1 .
16. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Of Being- in-Common," t rans . James
Creech, in Miami Theory Collective, ed., Community at Loose Ends,
p. 2 .
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, t rans. N o r m a n
Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin 's Press, 1965), p. 183 .
18. Mar t in Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
t rans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1962), pp . 102-6 .
19. William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger: Through Phenom
enology to Thought (The Hague: Mart inus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 132.
20 . Agamben, Coming Community, pp . 1-2; idem, La comunità
che viene, pp . 3-4 .
2 1 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, p p . 5 3 - 5 6 ; idem, La
comunità che viene, pp . 5 3 - 5 8 .
22 . A gamben, Coming Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 52.
2 3 . Maur i ce Blanchot , Death Sentence, t r ans . Lydia Davis
(Barrytown, N Y : Station Hill Press, 1978), p. 3 1 ; idem, L'arrêt de
mort (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 54.
24. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, pp . 8 1 -
9; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, pp . 1 0 2 - 1 3 .
2 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 54; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
88.
26 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 5 4 - 5 5 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort,
p. 89.
27 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. I l l ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 141 .
2 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7.
29 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
( I . Blani hot, D$ath S,•nlrin<\ p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
32. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7.
33 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 8.
34. Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 784.
35. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, t rans. C. K.
Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: Random House ,
1981), 3:802.
36. Maur ice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, t rans . Lycette
Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 50;
idem, Le pas au-delà (Paris: Gallimard 1973), p. 72 .
37. Levinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 153; idem, "La
servante et son maître ," in Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier: Fata
Morgana , 1975), p . 34.
38 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
126.
39. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 81 .
40. Maurice Blanchot, "Reading," t rans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze
of Orpheus, pp . 94-96 ; idem, "Reading," trans. Ann Smock, in Space
of Literature, pp . 194-96 ; idem, "Lire," in L'espace littéraire, pp .
2 5 6 - 5 8 .
4 1 . Steven Shaviro, Passion and Excess: Blanchot, Bataille, and
Literary Theory (Tallahassee: The Florida State University Press,
1990), pp . 1 4 2 - 4 3 . 42 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 50; idem, Le pas au-delà, p.
72.
4 3 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, pp . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
44 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
126. 4 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, 127.
46 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 80; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
127.
47 . Maurice Blanchot, "Kafka and the Work's Demand ," trans.
Ann Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 5 7 - 8 3 ; idem, "Kafka et
l'exigence de l 'œuvre," in L'espace littéraire, pp . 5 9 - 9 8 .
76.
30. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 76 .
76.
48. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mori, p, 68. I evinflS, "The Sci vani and I 1er Master," p. 155; idem, "La
servante el sun maître," p. 37.
69. Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
servante et son maître ," p. 40.
70. Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
servante et son maitre," p. 40.
7 1 . Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 40 .
72. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 104; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 77.
73 . Blanchot, "The Outside, the Night ," p. 163-70 ; idem, "La
dehors, la nuit ," pp . 2 1 3 - 2 4 .
74. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art ," pp . 232 ;
idem, "Les caractères de l 'œuvre d 'ar t ," pp . 310.
75 . Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104
and 106; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, pp . 1 3 2 -
33 and 135.
76. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," pp . 2 3 2 - 3 3 ;
idem, "Les caractères de l 'œuvre d 'art ," p. 310.
77 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 233 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l 'œuvre d 'ar t ," p. 3 1 1 . 78 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
35 .
79. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, pp .
2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l ' imaginaire," p. 352.
80. "The dead present is the impossibility of realizing a pres
ence—an impossibility that is present, that is there as that which
doubles every present, the shadow of the present, which the present
carries and hides in itself. When I am alone, in this present, I am not
alone, but am already returning to myself in the form of Someone.
Someone is there, when I am alone. [Le présent mort est l'impossibilité
de réaliser une présence, impossibilité qui est présente, qui est là
comme ce qui double tout présent, l 'ombre du présent, que celui-ci
por te et dissimule en lui. Quand je suis seul, je ne suis pas seul, mais,
dans ce présent, je reviens déjà à moi sous la forme de Quelqu 'un.
49 . Blanchot, Deaï/j Sentence, p. 72; idem, / /arre/ de mort, p. 115.
50. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 72; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 116.
5 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 126.
52. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità che viene, p. 58 .
53 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 58 .
54. Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 93 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p. 129.
55 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité et son ombre ," p. 785 .
56. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 199 n.
2 1 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 191 n. 2 1 .
57. R Adams Sitney makes this observation in his afterword to
Blanchot, Gaze of Orpheus, p. 171 .
58 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, pp . 142-70 .
59. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 30 .
60. Foucault, "Maurice Blanchot," p. 39.
6 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 30; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 5 2 - 5 3 .
62 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 35.
6 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 36 .
64. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 81 .
65 . Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 155; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 37.
66 . Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 155; idem, "La
servante et son maître ," p. 37.
67. Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 155; idem, "La
servante et son maître ," p. 37.
55 .
Quelqu 'un est là, où je suis seul.]" Maurice Blanchot, "The Essen
tial Solitude," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze <>/ Orpheus, p. 74; idem,
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Literature,
p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude essentielle," in L'espace littéraire, p. 27 .
81 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mort, pp . 5 5 - 5 6 .
82. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 232; idem, "Les caractères de l 'œuvre d 'ar t ," p. 310.
Chapter Four. Agamben and the Political Neuter
1. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem,
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, pp. 2 6 - 2 7 ; idem, "La soli
tude essentielle," p. 2 1 .
2. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 27; idem, "La solitude essentielle," p. 17.
3. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 77; idem,
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 33; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," pp. 2 7 - 2 8 .
4. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 74; idem,
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p. 24.
5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis," trans.
Angela Brewer and X. P. Callahan, in Emotional Tie, p. 50.
6. On the relation between analysis, hysteria and narrat ive modes see ibid., p. 184 n. 14.
7. Ibid., pp. 4 9 - 6 2 .
8. Lacoue-Labarthe, "Typography," p. 133.
9. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
88; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
262 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l ' imaginaire," p. 352.
10. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence à l'existant, p. 90.
11 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence à l'existant, p. 90 .
12. Antonin Artaud, "Exposition Balthus à la Gallerie Pierre," La Nouvelle Revue français 22 , no. 248 (May 1934): 8 9 9 - 9 0 .
13 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 62 .
14. Translator's note in Agamben, Corning Community, p. 107.
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest
Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
16. Agamben, Corning Community, pp . 6 6 - 6 7 ; idem, La comu
nità che viene, pp . 4 5 - 4 6 .
17. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," p. 85 ; idem,
"The Two Versions of the Imaginary," p. 260; idem, "Les deux ver
sions de l ' imaginaire," p. 350.
18 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, p p . 1 9 - 2 0 ; i dem, La
comunità che viene, pp . 1 5 - 1 6 . 19. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 19; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 15. 20 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 11 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, pp . 8-9. 2 1 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 85; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 58
2 2 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, p p . 7 9 - 8 3 ; idem, La
comunità che viene, pp . 5 3 - 5 7 . Let us emphasize yet again the neu
trality of this "one" who speaks. It is not simply the experience that
J speak, but rather that the "I speak" is neutralized such that it is
experienced as an anonymous entry into language. As it enters lan
guage, the individual identity " I " is overwhelmed and carried away
by language, or, more simply, by speaking.
2 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, pp . 6 1 - 6 3 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort,
p p . 9 9 - 1 0 3 .
24. Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Nega
tivity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt , Theory and History
of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991 ),
pp . 8 4 - 9 8 ; idem, 17 linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
della negatività (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1982), pp. 1 0 4 - 2 3 .
2 5 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, p p . 9 4 - 9 5 ; idem, Il
linguaggio e la morte, pp . 118 -20 .
26. Agamben, Language and Death, pp, 63 65; idem, // ////
guaggio e la morte, pp. 79-8 I.
27 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, comunità
che viene, p. 56.
2 8 . Agamben , Language and Death, pp . 9 6 - 1 0 6 ; idem, 77
linguaggio e la morte, pp . 121-33 . Proper attention to this highly
important book would require its own chapter. We simply wish to
retain from this book Agamben's drive to think community (human
being) outside negativity, negative presentation, or negative theol
ogy. He is critical of Blanchot's La communauté inavouable for re
taining too negative a language. It is a part of our effort here to
show that what Blanchot will describe as an "inability to say I ,"
Agamben will describe as an "ability to not say I." That is, his La
comunità che viene answers the promise of an "infancy of the hu
m a n " that concludes 77 linguaggio e la morte by nuancing Blanchotian
anonymity toward a latent, ambiguous, and radical potential.
29 . Agamben, Language and Death, p. 94; idem, 27 linguaggio e
la morte, p. 118 (italics in original).
30. Agamben, Coming Community, pp . 9 6 - 9 7 . (According to a
private conversation with Agemben's translator, the parenthetical
passage from which this quotation is taken appears only in the French
and English editions of the text.)
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité
et son ombre ," p. 777.
32. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 101 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 73 (italics in original).
33 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, p p . 7 6 - 7 7 ; idem, La
comunità che viene, pp. 5 1 - 5 2 . Agamben understands the Idea as
that "ha lo , " or supplement, or pre-scriptive image, that para-exists
in the empty space of "all its predicates." Like Lévinas and Blanchot,
he understands the concept to refer to being as it is grasped in its
intelligibility within the horizons of a world.
34. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 62.
35 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp . 1 0 2 -
)6, Ibid., p. 1 1 3 Lb
37. I'.I.IIK hot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, " H i e Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, pp .
2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de 1'imaginaire," 356.
38 . Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 107ff., in the pages that follow
we will reproduce the architecture of Richardson's summary of the
Kantbuch, highlighting those aspects that intersect with our interest
in Agamben, and departing from Richardson only to quote either
Heidegger's or Kant's own words in order to more rigorously specify
the notions that interest us.
39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 269 .
40. Fleidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 36 n.
17. 4 1 . Ibid., p. 37 (italics in original). 42 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 84.
4 3 . Ibid., p . 181 .
44. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp . 1 0 2 -
6 [italics in original].
45 . Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 9-12; idem, La comunità
che viene, pp . 7—9. 46 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 131 . 47 . Ibid., p . 131 .
48 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 77; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 52 (italics in original). 49 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 132.
50. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 10; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 8 (italics in original). 5 1 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 137.
52. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 127.
53 . Mart in Heidegger, "Brief iiber den Humanismus ," in Weg-
marken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 359.
54. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 152.
55 . Immanuel Kant, Opus postbumum, trans. Eckart Forster and
Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.
172. 56. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 154. 6.
57. Agamben, < 'otning < Community, p. 103; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 75.
58 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 52 [italics in originai].
59. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 11; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 9.
60. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 11 ; idem, L<2 comunità
che viene, pp . 8-9.
6 1 . Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem,
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 26; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p. 17.
62 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 3 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
64. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 79; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 53 .
65 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Freudian Subject," p. 35 .
66. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 50; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 35 .
67 . Quoted by Giorgio Agamben in Infancy and History: Es
says on the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London:
Verso, 1993) , pp . 3 1 - 3 2 ; idem, Infanzia e storia: Distruzione
dell'esperienza e origine della storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore,
1978), p 27 .
68 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 44; idem, Infanzia e storia,
p p . 4 1 - 4 2 .
69. Quoted in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 44 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 1 .
70. Quo ted in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 5 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 3 .
7 1 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem, Infanzia e storia,
p p . 4 3 - 4 4 .
72. Mar t in Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarr ie
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp .
149 -219 .
73, Quoted In Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 44.
74 Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, pp. 6 3 - / / ;
idem, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, pp. 2 1 - 3 4 ; idem, "La
solitude essentielle," pp . 13 -32 .
75 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 63 n. 7; idem, De
l'existence à l'existant, p. 103 n. 1.
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Index
Agamben, Giorgio: La communità che viene (The Corning Community), 9, 29, 93-94, 121-62; // linguaggio e la morte (Language and Death), 129-31, 178n. 28; Infanzia e storia (Infancy and History), 158-62
an-archic, 43, 63, 78, 156 anarchy, 34, 43, 52-53, 59 Artaud, Antonin, 122-23 artwork, 3-4, 65, 93-99, 103-4,
118-21; as image, 4, 13-30, 66-70, 76, 106-14
Autrui (Other), xii, 1-2, 4, 8, 30-64, 77,104-5,114, 170n. 36
Badiou, Alain, 123, 151 Balthus, 122-23,136 Bataille, Georges, 31-33, 47, 5 3 -
54, 57, 59-60, 63, 78 being-in-language, 1, 29, 76, 131—
32,134, 148, 153
Benjamin, Walter, 153-54 Benveniste, Emile, 158-60 Blanchot, Maurice: L'Arrêt de mort
(Death Sentence), x, xiv, 9, 76-93, 99-106,111,118-19, 129; L'Attente L'Oubli (Awaiting Oblivion), xiv, 89; "Les caractères de l'œvre de l'art" ("Characteristics of the Work of Art"), 67-70; Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas (The One Who Was Standing Apart From Me), xi; La Communauté inavouble (The Unavowable Community), 5-6; "Les Deux Versions de l'imaginaire" ("Two Versions of the Imaginary"), 72; L'Espace littéraire (The Space of Literature), 10, 92; Le Pas au-delà (The Step Not Beyond), 101-2; "Pour l'amitié," xi; "La Solitude
189
Blanchot, Maurice (continued)', essentielle" ("The Essential Solitude"), 115-17, 161; Thomas L'Obscur (Thomas the Obscure), 161
Bogart, Humphrey, 136 Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel, 33, 40,
44-45, 168n. 14 Brennan, Walter, 132
Cagney, James, 132 Casablanca, 136 Celan, Paul, 10-11 Chaney, Lon, 132 character actors, 132-38 Congreve, William, 11-12 Cook, Elisha, Jr., 132 Cotton, Joseph, 136
Da-Sein, 2, 44, 49, 59-64, 148-52, 159
Davis, Lydia, x, 86 death. See dying (and death) Deleuze, Gilles, 123 Derrida, Jacques, 41 , 63, 74, 84,
111
désœvrement (work-less), 87 diachronie (diachrony), 34-36, 46 -
47, 49-50, 63,104 dying (and death), 4, 24-25, 57 -
64, 92-103
ego. See self en deçà du temps (hither side of
time), 25, 40, 77,88,93-106, 110,112, 115,150,152. See also I'entretemps
Ventretemps (meanwhile, between-time), 22-25, 27, 93-106,127, 152. See also en deçà du temps
ethics (éthique), xii, 3, 8, 31-64, 77, 97, 104-5,113
EXLITENCT, 2, SN, <,S 6 6 , 70-74;
aetthi in , i'i 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 0 , (><>
finitude, 8- 9, I! $4, 56-64, 73 Flesch, William, I69n. 32 Foucault, Michel, 100 Freud, Sigmund, xi-xiv, 32, 36, 40,
43-46, 97, 117
Gleason, Jackie, 138 God, 140-42, 150, 151-53 Greenstreet, Sydney, 138
Hackman, Gene, 137 Hamann, Johann Georg, 158 Hegel, G. W. F., 44, 78, 97-98,
129-30
Heidegger, Martin, 2, 9, 33, 36, 38, 44, 49, 60, 67-68, 75-76, 78, 97-98, 111, 130-31, 168n. 9; "Brief über den Humanismus," 148; and ethics, 62-64; Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 138-52, 156-62
Henry, Michel, 38, 168n. 14 Hill, Leslie, ix Hulk Hogan, 6 Hume, David, x, 142 Husserl, Edmund, 104
identification, 4, 37-40, 42^18, 55 il (He, the Neuter), 5, 36, 79 ,112 -
14,115-19 il y a (there is), 9, 27-30, 65, 70-
73, 111, 116-17,124,149, 152, 161
image, 1-2, 4, 13-17, 78, 84, 104-14,123, 134-35; as resemblance, 17-21; and time, 22-25. See also artwork; schema-image
Imaginary, 2,4, '>, 17, 20-21, 27, 77, 10 I 4, 108-10, 130
immemorial, I (>, 31-37, 42, 45, 74, 104, I 12-13
intersubjectivity, 96,103-5, 129. See also subject (and subjectiv-
•ty) ipseity, 37, 61-62, 69-70, 74, 132
Kafka, Franz, 90-91, 97 Kant, Immanuel, 8-9, 33, 74-76,
111, 119-20, 126; Critique of Pure Reason, 138-52, 156-62
Kelly, Grace, 133 Kojève, Alexandre, 44, 98
Lacan, Jacques, 40, 44,117, 158 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 7, 17,
40 ,49 ,63 ,78 ,117-18 , 164 n. 9, 166n. 34
language: of ethics, 39-40, 42, 46, 55, 58, 169n. 30; and experience, 154-62; in literature and poetry, 4-5, 7, 10-12. See also being-in-language
Levinas, Emmanuel: Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence), 4, 31-64, 77, 97, 104; De l'existence à l'existant (Existence and Existents), 66-67; "Realité et son ombre" ("Reality and Its Shadow"), 9,13-30, 66-67, 84; "La Servante et son maître" ("The Servant and Her Master"), 104-5; Totalité et Infini (Totality and Infinity), 54
love, ix-xiv, 11-12 Lyotard, Jean-François, 63, 148
Marlboro, duchesie of, 11-12 Massumi, Brian, 65 Mill, John Stuart, 33 moi. See self myth, 20, 26, 166n. 34
Nancy, Jean-Luc, 7, 40, 47, 58, 78, 166n. 34
Nessus, 31, 34 Neuter, 28, 36. See also il Nietzsche, Friedrich, xi, 36, 97,
110, 130, 149 Nihilism, 3
Olivier, Laurence, 133 Other. See Autrui oxymoron, 78
Peirce, C. S., 42
Plato, 117 politics, 3, 8, 29, 50, 155-62 potentia, 1-2, 40, 60, 75,143,
145,161 Proust, Marcel, xiv, 4, 50; A la
recherche du temps perdu, 84 proximity, 77-93
responsibility (responsibilite), x, 4, 31-32 ,38 ,48 ,59-62 , 77, 92, 105
rhythm, 14-16, 26 Richardson, William J., 75-76;
Heidegger, 139-55, 179n. 38 Ritter, Thelma, 132 Roustang, Francois, 45
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99, 125 schema-image, 74-76, 138-52 self (moi), 4, 34-46, 52, 60, 8 1 -
82, 106, 111 Shaviro, Steven, x, 87, 97 Smith, Queenie, 137
I y) L I N I I I'. . \
spectacle, 6, 29, 54, 57, L53 S6 Stevens, Wallace, ix-xiv subject (and subjectivity), 1-2, 4-5,
14 ,16 ,36 ,38-42 , 44-49,54, 56, 62,110-14,124, 140-62. See also intersubjectivity
substitution, 4, 37, 48, 50, 56-57, 61-62, 77
Tamiroff, Akim, 137 Third Man, The, 136 Tiananmen, 94, 105
time. S i r dun In tunc; dymj ; (and
death); en deca da temps; Ventretemps; image
Tolstoy, Leo, ix, 12
whatever (qualunque), xii, 94, 121-29, 151, 156
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 47 work-less. See désozvrement writing, 65-76, 79, 84-85, 92,
112-13