Walker APSR 1966

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A Critique of the Elitist Theory of DemocracyAuthor(s): Jack L. WalkerSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 1966), pp. 285-295Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953356 .Accessed: 28/08/2011 13:58

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h e merican

olit ical Science R e v i e w

VOL. LX JUNE, 1966 NO. 2

A CRITIQUE OF THE ELITIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

JACK L. WALKERThe University of Michigan

During the last thirty years, there have beennumerous attempts to revise or reconstitutethe classical theory of democracy: thefamiliar doctrine of popular rule, patternedafter the New England town meeting, whichasserts that public policy should result fromextensive, informed discussion and debate.' Byextending general participation in decision-making the classical theorists hoped to increasethe citizen's awareness of his moral and socialresponsibilities, reduce the danger of tyranny,and improve the quality of government. Public

officials, acting as agents of the public at large,would then carry out the broad policies de-cided upon by majority vote in popularassemblies.

Although it is seldom made clear just whichof the classical democratic theorists is beingreferred to, contemporary criticism has focusedprimarily on the descriptive elements of thetheory, on its basic conceptions of citizenship,representation and decision-making.2 The con-

I For discussions of the meaning of the classical

theory of democracy see: George Sabine, TheTwo Democratic Traditions, The PhilosophicalReview, 61 (1952), 451-474; and his A History ofPolitical Theory (New York, 1958), especiallychs. 31 and 32. Also see J. Roland Pennock,Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (NewYork, 1950); and Sheldon Wolin, Politics andVision (Boston, 1960), especially chs. 9 and 10.

2 Criticism of the descriptive accuracy of theclassical theory has been widespread in recentyears. The best statement of the basic objectionsusually made is Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism,

Socialism and Democracy (New York, 1942), PartIV. See also Bernard Bereison et al., Voting(Chicago, 1954), chapter 14; articles by LouisHartz and Samuel Beer in W. N. Chambers andR. H. Salisbury (eds.), Democracy in the Mid-20th

cept of an active, informed, democraticcitizenry, the most distinctive feature of thetraditional theory, is the principal object ofattack. On empirical grounds it is argued thatvery few such people can be found in Westernsocieties. Public policy is not the expressionof the common good as conceived of by thecitizenry after widespread discussion andcompromise. This description of policy makingis held to be dangerously naive because itoverlooks the role of demagogic leadership,mass psychology, group coercion, and the in-

fluence of those who control concentratedeconomic power. In short, classical democratictheory is held to be unrealistic; first becauseit employs conceptions of the nature of manand the operation of society which are utopian,and second because it does not provideadequate, operational definitions of its keyconcepts.

Since contemporary scholars have found theclassical theory of democracy inadequate, a

revisionist movement has developed, muchas it has among contemporary Marxists, seek-

ing to reconstitute the theory and bring itinto closer correspondence with the latest find-ings of empirical research. One major restate-ment, called the elitist theory of democracy

Century (St. Louis, 1960); Seymour Martin Lip-set, Political M1an (New York, 1960); RobertDahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago,1956), and Who Governs? (New Haven, 1961),especially pp. 223-325; V. 0. Key, Public Opinionand American Democracy (New York, 1961), espe-

cially Part VI; Lester W. Milbrath, Political Par-ticipation (Chicago, 1965), especially Chapter VI;and for a general summary of the position: HenryMayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory.(New York, 1960).

285


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286 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

by Seymour Martin Lipset,3 is now employedin many contemporary books and articles onAmerican politics and political behavior and isfast becoming part of the conventional wisdomof political science.

The adequacy of the elitist theory of democ-racy, both as a set of political norms and as aguide to empirical research, is open to seriousquestion. It has two major shortcomings: first,in their quest for realism, the revisionists havefundamentally changed the normative signifi-cance of democracy, rendering it a more con-servative doctrine in the process; second, thegeneral acceptance of the elitist theory by con-temporary political scientists has led them toneglect almost completely some profoundlyimportant developments in American society.

I. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE

ELITIST THEORY

At the heart of the elitist theory is a clearpresumption of the average citizen's inadequa-cies. As a consequence, democratic systemsmust rely on the widsom, loyalty and skill oftheir political leaders, not on the population atlarge. The political system is divided into twogroups: the elite, or the political entrepre-neurs, 4 who possess ideological commitmentsand manipulative skills; and the citizens at large,

the masses, or the apolitical clay ,5 of the sys-tem, a much larger class of passive, inertfollowers who have little knowledge of publicaffairs and even less interest. The factor thatdistinguishes democratic and authoritariansystems, according to this view, is the provisionfor limited, peaceful competition among mem-bers of the elite for the formal positions ofleadership within the system. As JosephSchumpeter summarized the theory; thedemocratic method is that institutional ar-rangement for arriving at political decisions in

which individuals acquire the power to decideby means of a competitive struggle for thepeople's vote. 6

Democracy is thus conceived primarily inprocedural terms; it is seen as a method ofmaking decisions which insures efficiency in ad-ministration and policy making and yet re-quires some measure of responsiveness to popu-lar opinion on the part of the ruling elites. Theaverage citizen still has some measure of effec-tive political power under this system, even

3 Introduction by Lipset to the Collier Bookspaperback edition of Robert Michel's, PoliticalParties (New York, 1962), p. 33.

4The phrase is Dahl's in Who Governs?, p. 227.6 Ibid., p. 225.6 Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269.

though he does not initiate policy, because ofhis right to vote (if he chooses) in regularlyscheduled elections. The political leaders, in aneffort to gain support at the polls, will shapepublic policy to fit the citizens' desires. By an-ticipating public reaction the elite grants thecitizenry a form of indirect access to publicpolicy making, without the creation of anykind of formal institutions and even in the ab-sence of any direct communication. A fewcitizens who are non-voters, and who for somereason have no influential contact with voters,have no indirect influence. Most citizens, how-ever, possess a moderate degree of indirect in-fluence, for elected officials keep the real orimagined preferences of constituents constantlyin mind in deciding what policies to adopt or

reject. ' An ambiguity is created here becauseobviously leaders sometimes create opinions aswell as respond to them, but since the leadersare constantly being challenged by rivals seek-ing to gain the allegiance of the masses it isassumed that the individual citizen will receiveinformation from several conflicting sources,making it extremely difficult for any one groupto engineer consent by manipulating publicopinion. As Lipset puts it: Representation isneither simply a means of political adjustmentto social pressures nor an instrument of manip-

ulation. It involves both functions, since thepurpose of representation is to locate the com-binations of relationships between parties andsocial bases which make possible the operationof efficient government. '

There has been extensive research and specu-lation about the prerequisites for a democraticsystem of this kind. There is general agreementthat a well developed social pluralism and anextensive system of voluntary groups or associ-ations is needed, along with a prevailing senseof psychological security, widespread educa-

tion and limited disparities of wealth. Theremust be no arbitrary barriers to political partic-ipation, and enough people must participatein the governmental process so that politicalleaders compete for the support of a large andmore or less representative cross section of thepopulation. 9

Elitist theory departs markedly from theclassical tradition at this point. Traditionally itwas assumed that the most important prereq-uisite for a stable democracy was general agree-ment among the politically active (those who

vote) on certain fundamental policies and basic

7Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 164.8 Lipset, Introduction to Michels, op. cit., p. 34.9 Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics,

Economics and Welfare (New York, 1953), p. 309.


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A CRITIQUE OF THE ELITIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 287

values, and widespread acceptance of demo-cratic procedures and restraints on politicalactivity. Political leaders would not violate thebasic consensus, or democratic mold, if theywished to be successful in gaining their objec-tives, because once these fundamental restraints

were broken the otherwise passive public wouldbecome aroused and would organize against theoffending leaders. Elitist theorists argue insteadthat agreement on democratic values amongthe intervening structure of elites, the veryelements which had been seen earlier as poten-tial threats to democracy, is the main bulwarkagainst a breakdown in constitutionalism.Writing in 1959 David Truman discards hisnotion of potential groups, a variation of thetraditional doctrine of consensus, and calls in-stead for a consensus of elites, a determina-

tion on the part of the leaders of political par-ties, labor unions, trade associations and othervoluntary associations to defend the funda-mental procedures of democracy in order toprotect their own positions and the basic struc-ture of society itself from the threat of an irre-sponsible demagogue.10 V.0. Key, in his PublicOpinion and the American Democracy, concludesthat the critical element for the health of ademocratic order consists in the beliefs, stan-dards, and competence of those who constitutethe influential, the opinion-leaders, the polit-

ical activists in the order. Similarly, RobertDahl concludes in his study of New Haven thatthe skillful, active political leaders in the sys-tem are the true democratic legitimists. ''2Since democratic procedures regulate their con-flicts and protect their privileged positions inthe system the leaders can be counted on to de-fend the democratic creed even if a majorityof the voters might prefer some other set ofprocedures. 3

10 David Truman, The American System in

Crisis, Political Science Quarterly, (December,1959), pp. 481-497. See also a perceptive critiqueof Truman's change of attitude in Peter Bach-rach, Elite Consensus and Democracy, TheJournal of Politics, 24 (1962), 439-452.

11Key, op. cit., p. 558. See also Key's PublicOpinion and the Decay of Democracy, TheVirginia Quarterly Review, 37 (1961), 481-494.

12 Dahl's position on this issue seems to haveundergone a transformation somewhat similar toTruman's. Compare Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit.,Chapter 11 with Dahl, Who Governs?, Books IV,

V, VI.13 Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 311-325. It is im-

portant to note that these conclusions about thecrucial function of an elite consensus in democ-racy were based on little empirical evidence.

It has also been suggested by several elitisttheorists that democracies have good reason tofear increased political participation. Theyargue that a successful (that is, stable) demo-cratic system depends on widespread apathyand general political incompetence.'4 The ideal

of democratic participation is thus transformedinto a noble lie designed chiefly to insure asense of responsibility among political leaders.As Lester Milbrath puts it:

... it is important to continue moral admonish-ment for citizens to become active in politics, notbecause we want or expect great masses of themto become active, but rather because the admon-ishment helps keep the system open and sustainsa belief in the right of all to participate, which isan important norm governing the behavior ofpolitical elites.'5

If the uninformed masses participate in largenumbers, democratic self-restraint will breakdown and peaceful competition among theelites, the central element in the elitist theory,will become impossible.

The principal aim of the critics whose views

Truman, Key and Dahl seem to rely most heavilyon Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, andCivil Liberties (New York, 1955), a study based onnational opinion surveys which was concerned

with only one issue (McCarthyism) and did not in-vestigate the relationship between the expressedopinions of its subjects and their behavior understress; and James Prothro and Charles Grigg,

Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases ofAgreement and Disagreement, Journal of Poli-tics, 22 (1960), 276-294, a study of attitudes intwo small cities. More recently, however, HerbertMcClosky has produced more convincing data inhis Consensus and Ideology in AmericanPolitics, this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 361-382. Onpage 377 McClosky concludes that widespread

agreement on procedural norms is not a prerequi-site to the success of a democratic system: Con-sensus may strengthen democratic viability, butits absence in an otherwise stable society need notbe fatal, or even particularly damaging. Mc-Closky's conclusions are called into question bydata presented by Samuel Eldersveld, PoliticalParties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago, 1964),pp. 183-219; and Edmond Constantini, Intra-party Attitude Conflict: Democratic PartyLeadership in California, Western PoliticalQuarterly, 16 (1963), 956-972.

14See Bernard Berelson, et al., op. cit., Chapter14; Lipset, op. cit., pp. 14-16; W. H. Morris-

Jones, In Defense of Apathy, Political Studies,II (1954), 25-37.

15 Milbrath, op. cit., p. 152.


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we are examining has been to make the theoryof democracy more realistic, to bring it intocloser correspondence with empirical reality.They are convinced that the classical theorydoes not account for much of the real ma-

chinery '6 by which the system operates, andthey have expressed concern about the possiblespread among Americans of either unwarrantedanxiety or cynical disillusionment over thecondition of democracy. But it is difficult totransform a utopian theory into a realistic ac-count of political behavior without changingthe theory's normative foundations. By revis-ing the theory to bring it into closer correspon-dence with reality, the elitist theorists havetransformed democracy from a radical into aconservative political doctrine, stripping away

its distinctive emphasis on popular politicalactivity so that it no longer serves as a set ofideals toward which society ought to be striv-ing.'7

The most distinctive feature, and the prin-cipal orienting value, of classical democratictheory was its emphasis on individual partic-ipation in the development of public policy. Bytaking part in the affairs of his society thecitizen would gain in knowledge and under-

16 Louis Hartz, Democracy: Image and

Reality, in Chambers and Salisbury (eds.), op.cit., p. 26.

17 Several articles have recently appeared whichattack the elitist theory on normative grounds.The best and most insightful is Lane Davis, TheCost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements ofDemocracy, Western Political Quarterly, 17(1964), 37-46. Also see: Graeme Duncan andSteven Lukes, The New Democracy, PoliticalStudies, 11 (1963), 156-177; Steven W. Rousseasand James Farganis, American Politics and theEnd of Ideology, British Journal of Sociology, 14

(1963) 347-360; and Christian Bay, Politicsand Pseudopolitics, this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 39-51. The subject is also treated in: Henry Kariel,The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford,1961), Chapters 9 and 11; T. B. Bottomore, Elitesand Society (London, 1964), 108-110; RobertPresthus, Men at the Top (New York, 1964),3-47; and Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich andBert Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (NewYork) (1964), 93-99, 524-532. For an insightfulcritique of the work of Dahl and Mills, con-ceived of as opposing ideological positions see:William E. Connolly, Responsible Political Ide-ology: Implications of the Sociology of Knowledgefor Political Inquiry, (unpublished doctoral dis-sertation, University of Michigan, 1965), pp. 18-39. This section of this article depends heavily onLane Davis' analysis.

standing, develop a deeper sense of social re-sponsibility, and broaden his perspectivebeyond the narrow confines of his private life.Although the classical theorists accepted thebasic framework of Lockean democracy, with

its emphasis on limited government, they werenot primarily concerned with the policies whichmight be produced in a democracy; above allelse they were concerned with human develop-ment, the opportunities which existed in politicalactivity to realize the untapped potentials ofmen and to create the foundations of a genuinehuman community. In the words of JohnStuart Mill:

. . . the most important point of excellence whichany form of government can possess is to promotethe virtue and intelligence of the people them-selves. The first question in respect to any poli-tical institutions is how far they tend to foster inthe members of the community the various de-sirable qualities, . . . moral, intellectual, andactive.18

In the elitist version of the theory, however,emphasis has shifted to the needs and functionsof the system as a whole; there is no longer adirect concern with human development. Thecentral question is not how to design a politicalsystem which stimulates greater individual

participation and enhances the moral develop-ment of its citizens, but how to combine a sub-stantial degree of popular participation with asystem of power capable of governing effectivelyand coherently? '9

The elitist theory allows the citizen only apassive role as an object of political activity; heexerts influence on policy making only by ren-dering judgements after the fact in nationalelections. The safety of contemporary democ-racy lies in the high-minded sense of responsi-bility of its leaders, the only elements of society

who are actively striving to discover and im-plement the common good. The citizens areleft to judge a world they never made, andthus to become a genteel counter-part of themobs which sporadically unseated aristocraticgovernments in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. 20

The contemporary version of democratictheory has, it seems, lost much of the vitalforce, the radical thrust of the classical theory.The elitist theorists, in trying to develop a

18 John StuartMill,

Considerations onRepre-sentative Government (New York, 1862), pp. 39-40.

19 Samuel Beer, New Structures of Democ-racy: Britain and America, in Chambers andSalisbury (eds.), op. cit., p. 46.

20 Davis, Op. Cit., p. 45.


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theory which takes account of the way thepolitical system actually operates, have changedthe principal orienting values of democracy.The heart of the classical theory was its justifi-cation of broad participation in the publicaffairs of the community; the aim was the pro-duction of citizens who were capable enoughand responsible enough to play this role. Theclassical theory was not meant to describe anyexisting system of government; it was an out-line, a set of prescriptions for the ideal politywhich men should strive to create. The elitisttheorists, in their quest for realism, havechanged this distinctive prescriptive element indemocratic theory; they have substituted sta-bility and efficiency as the prime goals of de-mocracy. If these revisions are accepted, thedanger arises that in striving to develop morereliable explanations of political behavior, polit-ical scientists will also become sophisticatedapologists for the existing political order.Robert Lane, in concluding his study of thepolitical ideologies of fifteen common men inan Eastern city, observes that they lack autopian vision, a well-defined sense of socialjustice that would allow them to stand in judge-ment on their society and its institutions.21 Tosome degree, the men of Eastport share thisdisability with much of the American academicelite.

II. THE ELITIST THEORY AS A

GUIDE FOR RESEARCH

The shortcomings of the elitist theory arenot confined to its normative implications.Serious questions also arise concerning its de-scriptive accuracy and its utility as a guide toempirical research. The most unsatisfactoryelement in the theory is its concept of the pas-sive, apolitical, common man who pays alle-giance to his governors and to the sideshow ofpolitics while remaining primarily concerned

with his private life, evenings of television withhis family, or the demands of his job. Occa-sionally, when the average citizen finds hisprimary goals threatened by the actions or in-actions of government, he may strive vigor-ously to influence the course of public policy,but Homo Civicus as Dahl calls him, is not,by nature, a political animal. 22

21 Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York,1962), p. 475. See also Donald Stokes' commentson the same topic in Popular Evaluations ofGovernment: An Empirical Assessment, inHarlan Cleveland and Harold Lasswell (eds.),Ethics and Bigness (Published by the Conferenceon Science, Philosophy and Religion in their rela-tion to the Democratic Way of Life, 1962), p. 72.

22 Dahl, Who Governs?, pp. 225.

It was the acceptance of this concept that ledthe elitist theorists to reject the traditionalnotion of consensus. It became implausible toargue that the citizenry is watchful and jealousof the great democratic values while at the sametime suggesting that they are uninvolved, un-informed and apathetic. Widespread apathyalso is said to contribute to democratic stabilityby insuring that the disagreements that ariseduring campaigns and elections will not involvelarge numbers of people or plunge the societyinto violent disorders or civil war.

No one can deny that there is widespreadpolitical apathy among many sectors of theAmerican public. But it is important to askwhy this is so and not simply to explain howthis phenomenon contributes to the smoothfunctioning of the system. Of course, thecitizens' passivity might stem from their satis-faction with the operation of the political sys-tem, and thus they would naturally becomearoused only if they perceived a threat to thesystem. Dahl, for one, argues that the politicalsystem operates largely through inertia,tradition or habitual responses. It remainsstable because only a few key issues are theobjects of controversy at any one time, the restof public policy having been settled and estab-lished in past controversies which are now allbut forgotten. Similarly, Nelson Polsby arguesthat it is fallacious to assume that the quiescentcitizens in a community, especially those in thelower income groups, have grievances unlessthey actually express them. To do so is toarbitrarily assign upper- and middle-classvalues to all actors in the community. 23

But it is hard to believe, in these days ofprotest demonstrations, of Black Muslins andthe Deacons of Defense and Justice, that themood of cynical apathy toward politics whichaffects so many American Negroes is an indica-tion of their satisfaction with the political sys-tem, and with the weak, essentially meaninglessalternatives it usually presents to them. Toassume that apathy is a sign of satisfaction inthis case is to overlook the tragic history of theNegroes in America and the system of violentrepression long used to deny them any en-trance into the regular channels of democraticdecision-making.

Students of race relations have concludedthat hostile attitudes toward a racial group donot nessarily lead to hostile actions, and ami-cable feelings do not ensure amicable actions.Instead, it is the social demands of the situa-tion, particularly when supported by accepted

23 Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Polit-ical Theory (New Haven, 1963), p. 117.


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authority figures, which are the effective deter-minants of individual action.... 24 This in-sight might apply to other areas besides racerelations. It suggests that a society's politicalculture, the general perceptions about the na-

ture of authority and the prevailing expecta-tions of significant reference groups, might be amajor influence on the political behavior of theaverage citizen regardless of his own feelings ofsatisfaction or hostility. There have been siz-able shifts in rates of political participationthroughout American history which suggeststhat these rates are not rigidly determined. Arecent analysis indicates that rates of voterparticipation are now lower than they were inthe Nineteenth Century even though the pop-ulation is now much better educated and the

facilities for communication much betterdeveloped.25 Other studies indicate that thereare marked differences in the political milieu oftowns and cities which lead citizens of one areato exhibit much more cynicism and distrust ofthe political system than others.26 Although thestudies showed no corresponding changes infeelings of political competence, cynical atti-tudes might inhibit many forms of participa-tion and thus induce apathy.

Political apathy obviously has many sources.It may stem from feelings of personal inade-quacy, from a fear of endangering importantpersonal relationships, or from a lack of interestin the issues; but it may also have its roots inthe society's institutional structure, in theweakness or absence of group stimulation orsupport, in the positive opposition of elementswithin the political system to wider participa-tion; in the absence, in other words, of appro-priate spurs to action, or the presence of tangi-

24 Herbert Blumer, Recent research [on racerelations in the] United States of America,International Social Science Bulletin (UNESCO),10 (1958), p. 432. Similar arguments concerningthe relationship of beliefs and action can befound in J. D. Lohman and D. C. Reitzes, De-liberately Organized Groups and Racial Be-havior, American Sociological Review, 19 (1954),342-344; and in Earl Raab (ed.), American RaceRelations Today (Garden City, 1962).

26 Walter Dean Burnham, The ChangingShape of the American Political Universe, thisREVIEW, 59 (1965), 7-28.

26 Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein andStanley Pearl, Political Cynicism: Measure-ment and Meaning, The Journal of Politics 23(1961), 477-506; and Edgar Litt, PoliticalCynicism and Political Futility, The Journal ofPolitics, 25 (1963) 312-323.

ble deterrents.27 Before the causes of apathy canbe established with confidence much moreattention must be directed to the role of themass media. How are the perceptions of in-dividual citizens affected by the version of

reality they receive, either directly or indirectly,from television, the national wire services, andthe public schools28-and how do these per-ceptions affect their motivations? Politicalscientists have also largely neglected to studythe use of both legitimate and illegitimate sanc-tions and private intimidation to gain politicalends. How do the activities of the police,29social workers, or elements of organized crimeaffect the desires and the opportunities availablefor individual political participation?

Certainly the apparent calm of American

politics is not matched by our general sociallife, which is marked by high crime rates,numerous fads and crazes, and much inter-group tension.30 One recent study showed thatduring the civil rights protests in Atlanta,Georgia, and Cambridge, Maryland, crimerates in the Negro communities dropped sub-stantially.3 A finding of this kind suggests thatthere is some connection between these tworealms of social conflict and that both mayserve as outlets for individual distress andfrustration. High crime (or suicide) rates andlow rates of voting may very well be related;

27 For a brief survey of findings on this sub-ject, see Milbrath, op. cit.; and for a clear, briefsummary, see: Morris Rosenburg, Some Deter-minants of Political Apathy, Public OpinionQuarterly. 18 (1954-55), 349-366. Also see DavidApter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York,1964), especially chapters by Converse andWolfinger, et al.

28 A major study of the influence of secondaryschools on political attitudes is underway at theUniversity of Michigan under the direction of M.Kent Jennings.

29 An extensive investigation of the role of thepolice and the courts in city politics is being con-ducted at Harvard University by James Q. Wil-son.

30 It is very difficult to compare crime rates orother indications of social disorganization in theUnited States with those in other countries. For adiscussion of some of the difficulties see: UNESCO1963 Report on the World Social Situation (NewYork, 1963).

31 Fredric Solomon, Walter L. Walker, GarrettO'Connor and Jacob Fishman, Civil Rights Ac-tivity and Reduction of Crime Among Negroes,Archives of General Psychiatry, 12 (March, 1965),227-236.


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the former may represent leakage from thepolitical system.32

Once we admit that the society is not based ona widespread consensus, we must look at ourloosely organized, decentralized political par-

ties in a different light. It may be that the par-ties have developed in this way precisely be-cause no broad consensus exists. In a fragmentedsociety which contains numerous geographic,religious and racial conflicts, the successfulpolitican has been the man adept at negotia-tion and bargaining, the man best able to playthese numerous animosities off against eachother, and thereby build ad hoc coalitions ofsupport for specific programs. Success at thisdelicate business of coalition building dependson achieving some basis for communication

among the leaders of otherwise antagonisticgroups and finding a formula for compromise.To create these circumstances sharp conflictsmust be avoided; highly controversial, poten-tially explosive issues shunned. Controversy isshifted to other issues or the public authoritiessimply refuse to deal with the question, claim-ing that they have no legitimate jurisdiction inthe case or burying it quietly in some committeeroom or bureaucratic pigeonhole.33

In other words, one of the chief characteris-tics of our political system has been its success

in suppressing and controlling internal conflict.But the avoidance of conflict, the suppressionof strife, is not necessarily the creation of satis-faction or consensus. The citizens may remainquiescent, the political system might retain itsstability, but significant differences of opinionremain, numerous conflicts are unresolved andmany desires go unfulfilled. The frustrationsresulting from such deprivations can createconflict in other, non-political realms. Fads,religious revivals, or wild, anomie riots such as

32For an excellent study of the Black Muslims

which portrays the movement as a non-politicaloutlet for the frustration and bitterness felt bymany American Negroes see the study by anAfrican scholar: E. V. Essien-Udom, Black Na-tionalism: A Search for an Identity in America(Chicago, 1962).

33 Herbert Agar makes a similar analysis andargues for the retention of the system in ThePrice of Union, (Boston, 1950). On page 689 hestates:

The lesson which Americans learned [from the Civil War] was

useful: in a large federal nation, when a problem is passionatelyfelt, and is discussed in terms of morals, each party may dividewithin itself, against itself. And if the parties divide, the nationmay divide; for the parties, with their enjoyable pursuit ofpower, are a unifying influence. Wise men, therefore, may seekto dodge such problems as long as possible. And the easiest wayto dodge them is for both parties to take both sides.

those which occurred in the Negro ghettos ofseveral large American cities during the summersof 1964 and 1965, phenomena not directly re-lated to the achievement of any clearly con-ceived political goals, may be touched off by

unresolved tensions left untended by the soci-ety's political leaders.

The American political system is highly com-plex, with conflicting jurisdictions and numer-ous checks and balances. A large commitmentin time and energy must be made, even by awell-educated citizen, to keep informed of theissues and personalities in all levels of govern-ment. Most citizens are not able or willing topay this kind of cost to gain the informationnecessary for effective political participation.This may be especially true in a political sys-

tem in which weak or unclear alternatives areusually presented to the electorate. For mostcitizens the world of politics is remote, be-wildering, and meaningless, having no directrelation to daily concerns about jobs or familylife. Many citizens have desires or frustrationswith which public agencies might be expectedto deal, but they usually remain unaware ofpossible solutions to their problems in thepublic sphere. This group within our politicalsystem are citizens only from the legal point ofview. If a high degree of social solidarity and

sense of community are necessary for true dem-ocratic participation, then these marginalmen are not really citizens of the state. Thepolity has not been extended to include them.34

For the elitist theorist widespread apathy ismerely a fact of political life, something to beanticipated, a prerequisite for democratic sta-bility. But for the classical democrat politicalapathy is an object of intense concern becausethe overriding moral purpose of the classicaltheory is to expand the boundaries of the polit-ical community and build the foundations for

human understanding through participation bythe citizens in the affairs of their government.

III. LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

While most elitist theorists are agreed inconceiving of the average citizen as politicallypassive and uncreative, there seems to be a dif-ference of opinion (or at least of emphasis) overthe likelihood of some irrational, anti-demo-cratic outburst from the society's common men.Dahl does not dwell on this possibility. Heseemingly conceives of homo civicus, the aver-

34For a study of several important factors af-fecting the degree of participation in Americanpolitics see: E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960), especiallychs. 5 and 6.


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age citizen, as a man who consciously choosesto avoid politics and to devote himself to thepleasures and problems of his job and family:

Typically, as a source of direct gratificationspolitical activity will appear to homo civicus as lessattractive than a host of other activities; and, as astrategy to achieve his gratifications indirectlypolitical action will seem considerably less efficientthan working at his job, earning more money,taking out insurance, joining a club, planning avacation, moving to another neighborhood orcity, or coping with an uncertain future in mani-fold other ways.35

Lipset, on the other hand, seems much moreconcerned with the danger that the commonman might suddenly enter the political system,

smashing democratic institutions in the process,as part of an irrational, authoritarian politicalforce. He sees profoundly anti-democratictendencies in lower class groups, 36 and he hasbeen frequently concerned in his work withHitler, McCarthy and other demagogic leaderswho have led anti-democratic mass movements.

Although there are obviously some importantdifferences of opinion and emphasis concerningthe political capacities of average citizens andthe relative security of democratic institutions,the elitist theorists agree on the crucial im-

portance of leadership in insuring both thesafety and viability of representative govern-ment. This set of basic assumptions serves as afoundation for their explanation of change andinnovation in American politics, a process inwhich they feel creative leadership plays thecentral role.

Running throughout the work of thesewriters is a vision of the professional politi-cian as hero, much as he is pictured in MaxWeber's essay, Politics as a Vocation. Dahl'sMayor Lee, Edward Banfield's Mayor Daley,

Richard Neustadt's ideal occupant of theWhite House all possess great skill and drive,and are engaged in the delicate art of persua-sion and coalition building. They are activelymoving the society forward toward their owngoals, according to their own special vision. Allof them possess the pre-eminent qualities ofWeber's ideal-type politician: passion, a feel-ing of responsibility, and a sense of propor-tion. 37 As in Schumpeter's analysis of capital-ism, the primary source of change and innova-tion in the political system is the political

35Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 224.36 Lipset, op. cit., p. 121.37 Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.),

From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York,1946), p. 115.

entrepreneur ; only such a leader can breakthrough the inherent conservatism of organiza-tions and shake the masses from their habitualpassivity.

It is obvious that political leaders (especially

chief executives) have played a very importantrole in American politics, but it is also clear thatthe American system's large degree of internalbargaining, the lack of many strong hierarchicalcontrols and its numerous checks and balances,both constitutional and political, place power-ful constraints on the behavior of political exec-utives. American presidents, governors andmayors usually find themselves caught in a webof cross pressures which prevent them frommaking bold departures in policy or firmlyattaching themselves to either side of a con-

troversy. The agenda of controversy, the list ofquestions which are recognized by the activeparticipants in politics as legitimate subjects ofattention and concern, is very hard to change.

Just as it can be argued that the commoncitizens have a form of indirect influence, so itcan also be argued that the top leaders of otherinstitutions in the society, such as the businesscommunity, possess indirect influence as well.As Banfield suggests in his study of Chicago,the top business leaders have great potentialpower: if the twenty or thirty wealthiest men

in Chicago acted as one and put all theirwealth into the fight, they could easily destroyor capture the machine. 38 The skillful politi-cian, following Carl Friedrich's rule of antici-pated reactions, 39 is unlikely to make pro-posals which would unite the business com-munity against him. The aspiring politicianlearns early in his career, by absorbing thefolklore which circulates among the politicallyactive, which issues can and cannot be ex-ploited successfully. It is this constellation ofinfluences and anticipated reactions, the

peculiar mobilization of bias in the commu-nity, fortified by a general consensus of elites,that determines the agenda of controversy.40The American political system, above all

38 Edward Banfield, Political Influence (NewYork, 1961), p. 290.

39 Carl Friedrich, Constitutional Government andPolitics (New York, 1939), pp. 17-18.

40 This point is made persuasively by PeterBachrach and Morton Baratz, The Two Faces of

Power, this REVIEW, 56 (1962), 947-952. Alsosee their Decisions and Nondecisions: AnAnalytical Framework, this REVIEW, 57 (1963),632-642; and Thomas J. Anton, Power, Plural-ism and Local Politics, Administrative Quarterly,7 (1963), 425-457.


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others, seems to be especially designed to frus-trate the creative leader.

But as rigid and inflexible as it is, the politi-cal system does produce new policies; new pro-grams and schemes are approved; even basic

procedural changes are made from time totime. Of course, each major shift in publicpolicy has a great many causes. The elitisttheory of democracy looks for the principalsource of innovation in the competition amongrival leaders and the clever maneuvering ofpolitical entrepreneurs, which is, in its view, themost distinctive aspect of a democratic system.Because so many political scientists have wornthe theoretical blinders of the elitist theory,however, we have overlooked the importance ofbroadly based social movements, arising from

the public at large, as powerful agents of inno-vation and change.The primary concerns of the elitist theorists

have been the maintenance of democratic sta-bility, the preservation of democratic proce-dures, and the creation of machinery whichwould produce efficient administration and co-herent public policies. With these goals inmind, social movements (if they have beenstudied at all) have usually been pictured asthreats to democracy, as manifestations of

political extremism. Lipset asserts that such

movements typically appeal to the disgruntledand the psychologically homeless, to the personalfailures, the socially isolated, the economicallyinsecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, andauthoritarian persons at every level of the so-ciety. 4' Movements of this kind throw thepolitical system out of gear and disrupt themechanisms designed to maintain due process;if the elites were overwhelmed by such forces,democracy would be destroyed. This narrow,antagonistic view of social movements stemsfrom the elitist theorists' suspicion of the polit-

ical capacities of the common citizens,42 their41 Lipset, op. cit., p. 178.42 Ruth Searles and J. Allen Williams, in a

study of Negro students who took part in the sit-in demonstrations, found no evidence that theywere authoritarian or posed threats to democracy.

Far from being alienated, the students appearto be committed to the society and its middleclass leaders : Negro College Students' Par-ticipation in Sit-ins, Social Forces, 40 (1962), p.219. For other studies of this particular socialmovement see: Robert Coles, Social Struggleand Weariness, Psychiatry, 27 (1964), 305-315;and three articles by Fredric Solomon and JacobFishman; Perspectives on Student Sit-in Move-ment, American Journal of Ortho-psychiatry, 33(1963), 872-882; Action and Identity Formation

fear of instability and their failure to recognizethe elements of rigidity and constraint existingin the political system. But if one holds thatview and at the same time recognizes the ten-dency of the prevailing political system to

frustrate strong leaders, it becomes difficult toexplain how significant innovations in publicpolicy, such as the social security system, theWagner Act, the Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950, or the Civil Rights Bill of 1964,ever came about.

During the last century American society hasspawned numerous social movements, some ofwhich have made extensive demands on thepolitical system, while others have been highlyesoteric, mystical, and apolitical. These move-ments arise because some form of social disloca-

tion or widespread sense of frustration existswithin the society. But dissatisfaction alone isnot a sufficient cause; it must be coupled withthe necessary resources and the existence ofpotential leadership which can motivate agroup to take action designed to change theoffending circumstances.43 Often such move-ments erupt along the margins of the politicalsystem, and they sometimes serve the purposeof encouraging political and social mobiliza-tion, of widening the boundaries of the polity.44

in First Student Sit-in Demonstration. Journalof Social Issues, 20 (1964), 36-45; and Psycho-social Meaning of Nonviolence in Student CivilRights Activities, Psychiatry, 27 (1964) 91-99.Also see the October, 1964 issue of The Journal ofSocial Issues, entitled Youth and Social Ac-tion, edited by Fredric Solomon and JacobFishman; and Jack L. Walker, Protest and Nego-tiation: A Case Study of Negro Leaders in Atlanta,Georgia, Midwest Journal of Political Science, 7(1963), 99-124.

43 Sociologists usually study social movements

under the rubric of collective behavior. For gen-eral treatments see: Herbert Blumer, CollectiveBehavior in J. B. Gittler (ed.), Review ofSociology (New York, 1957); Rudolph Heberle,Social Movements, (New York, 1951); LewisKillian, Social Movements in Robert Faris(ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago,1964); Charles King, Social Movements in theUnited States (New York, 1956); Karl Lang andGladys Lang, Collective Dynamics (New York,1961); Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior(New York, 1963); Ralph Turner and LewisKillian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1957). For a brief historical sketch of someAmerican social movements see: Thomas Greer,American Social Reform Movements: Their Pat-tern Since 1865 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1946).

44 For a book which investigates social move-


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Through movements such as the Negroes'drive for civil rights, or the Midwestern farmers'crusade for fair prices in the 1890's, the KuKlux Klan, or the radical right movementsof the 1960's, pre-political people who havenot yet found, or only begun to find, a specificlanguage in which to express their aspirationsabout the world 46 are given new orientation,confidence, knowledge, sources of informationand leadership.

Social movements also serve, in Rudolf He-berle's words, as the creators and carriers ofpublic opinion. 46 By confronting the politicalauthorities, or by locking themselves in peace-ful-or violent47-conflict with some otherelement of the society, social movements pro-voke trials of strength between contending

forces or ideas. Those trials of economic, politi-cal or moral strength take place in the court ofpublic opinion and sometimes place enormousstrain on democratic institutions and even thesocial fabric itself. But through such trials, astumultuous as they may sometimes be, theagenda of controversy, the list of acceptable,

key issues may be changed. In an effort toconciliate and mediate, the political leadersfashion new legislation, create unique regula-tory bodies and strive to establish channels ofcommunication and accommodation among the

combatants.Of course, members of the political elite may

ments which have served this function amongItalian peasants see: E. J. Hobsbawn, PrimitiveRebels (Manchester, 1959). See also: VittorioLanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed (NewYork, 1963) for a study of the relationship ofMessianic Cults and revolutionary movementson five continents; and George Rude, The Crowdin History (New York, 1964) for a study of popu-lar uprisings in England and France from 1730-

1848.45 Hobsbawn, op. cit., p. 2.46 Heberle, op. cit., pp. 417-418.47 American political scientists have not been

sufficiently concerned with the role of violence inthe governmental process. Among all the articlespublished in The American Political Science Re-view between 1906 and 1963, there was only onewhose title contained the word violence, onlyone with the word coercive (it concerned In-dia), and none with the word force. During thesame period there were forty-nine articles on

governmental reorganization and twenty-four oncivil service reform, See Kenneth Janda (ed.),Cumulative Index to The American PoliticalScience Review (Evanston, 1964). Efforts to re-trieve this situation have begun in: Harry Eck-stein (ed.), Internal War (New York, 1964).

respond to the movement by resisting it, driv-ing it underground or destroying it; they maytry to co-opt the movement's leaders by grant-ing them privileges or by accepting parts of itsprogram, or even by making the leaders part ofthe established elite; they may surrender to themovement, losing control of their offices in thepolitical system in the process. The nature ofthe political leader's response is probably aprime determinant of the tactics the movementwill adopt, the kind of leadership that ariseswithin it, and the ideological appeals it develops.Other factors might determine the response ofthe leadership, such as the existence of com-peting social movements with conflicting de-mands, the resources available to the politicalleaders to satisfy the demands of the move-ment, the social status of the participants inthe movement, the presence of competing setsof leaders claiming to represent the same move-ment, and many other elements peculiar toeach particular situation. In this process socialmovements may be highly disruptive and someinstitutions may be completely destroyed; thestory does not always have a happy ending.But one major consequence (function, if youwill) of social movements is to break society'slog jams, to prevent ossification in the po-litical system, to prompt and justify major in-

novations in social policy and economic or-ganization.48

This relationship of challenge and responsebetween the established political system andsocial movements has gone without much sys-tematic study by political scientists. Sociolo-gists have been concerned with social move-ments, but they have directed most of theirattention to the causes of the movements, their

natural history, and the relationship betweenleaders and followers within them.49 Historianshave produced many case studies of social

movements but little in the way of systematic48 Lewis Coser has discussed the role of con-

flict in provoking social change in his The Func-tions of Social Conflict (Glencoe: 1956); and inhis Social Conflict and the Theory of SocialChange British Journal of Sociology, 9 (1957)197-207. See also Irving Louis Horowitz, Con-sensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A SociologicalInventory, Social Forces, 41 (1962), 177-188.

49 For an insightful and stimulating example,see Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade (Urbana,

1963), which makesan

excellentanalysis of the

causes of the Temperance movement andchanges in its leadership but makes only briefmention of the movement's impact on the gov-ernment and the responses of political leaders toits efforts.


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explanation.50 This would seem to be a fruitfularea for investigation by political scientists.But this research is not likely to appear unlesswe revise our concept of the masses as politicallyinert, apathetic and bound by habitual re-sponses. We must also shift our emphasis fromtheories which conceive of the social structurein terms of a functionally integrated systemheld in equilibrium by certain patterned andrecurrent processes, to theories which placegreater emphasis on the role of coercion andconstraint in the political system and whichconcentrate on the influences within societywhich produce the forces that maintain it inan unending process of change. 51 The greatestcontribution of Marx to the understanding ofsociety was his realization that internal conflictis a major source of change and innovation.One need not accept his metaphysical assump-tions to appreciate this important insight.

IV. CONCLUSION

In a society undergoing massive social change,fresh theoretical perspectives are essential.Political theorists are charged with the respon-sibility of constantly reformulating the dogmasof the past so that democratic theory remainsrelevant to the stormy realities of TwentiethCentury American society with its sprawlingurban centers, its innumerable social conflicts,and its enormous bureaucratic hierarchies.

In restating the classical theory, however,contemporary political scientists have stripped

50 John Higham is somewhat of an exception ofthis generalization. See his Strangers in the Land:Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 (NewYork, 1963). Also see his: Another Look atNativism, Catholic Historical Review, 44 (1958),147-158; and his The Cult of the 'AmericanConsensus': Homogenizing Our History. Com-mentary (February, 1959), p. 159.

51 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict inIndustrial Society (Stanford, 1959), p. 159.

democracy of much of its radical elan and havediluted its utopian vision, thus rendering it in-adequate as a guide to the future. The elitisttheorists generally accept the prevailing distri-bution of status in the society (with exceptionsusually made for the American Negro), and findit not only compatible with political freedombut even ... a condition of it. 52 They placegreat emphasis on the limitations of the aver-age citizen and are suspicious of schemes whichmight encourage greater participation in publicaffairs. Accordingly, they put their trust in thewisdom and energy of an active, responsibleelite.

Besides these normative shortcomings theelitist theory has served as an inadequate guideto empirical research, providing an unconvinc-ing explanation of widespread political apathy

in American society and leading political sci-entists to ignore manifestations of discontentnot directly related to the political system.Few studies have been conducted of the use offorce, or informal, illegitimate coercion in theAmerican polticial system, and little attentionhas been directed to the great social movementswhich have marked American society in thelast one hundred years.

If political science is to be relevant to soci-ety's pressing needs and urgent problems, pro-fessional students of politics must broaden

their perspectives and become aware of newproblems which are in need of scientific investi-gation. They must examine the norms thatguide their efforts and guard against the dangerof uncritically accepting the values of the goingsystem in the name of scientific objectivity.Political scientists must strive for heightenedawareness and self-knowledge; they must avoidrigid presumptions which diminish their vision,destroy their capacities for criticism, and blindthem to some of the most significant social andpolitical developments of our time.

52 Sabine, The Two Democratic Traditions,op. cit., p. 459.

Walker APSR 1966

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