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WahhabismFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Wahhabism (Arabic: الوهابية , al­Wahhābiya(h)) is an Islamic doctrine and religious movement founded byMuhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab.[1] It has been variously described as "ultraconservative",[2] "austere",[3]

"fundamentalist",[4] or "puritan(ical)";[5][6] as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheisticworship" (tawhid) by devotees;[7] and as a "deviant sectarian movement",[7] "vile sect"[8] and a distortion ofIslam by its opponents.[3][9] The term Wahhabi(ism) is often used polemically and adherents commonly rejectits use, preferring to be called Salafi or muwahhid.[10][11][12] The movement emphasises the principle oftawhid[13] (the "uniqueness" and "unity" of God).[14] It claims its principal influences to be Ahmad ibn Hanbal(780–855) and Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), both belonging to the Hanbali school,[15] although the extent oftheir actual influence upon the tenets of the movement has been contested.[16][17]

Wahhabism is named after an eighteenth­century preacher and activist, Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab (1703–1792).[18] He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region of Najd,[19] advocating apurging of such widespread Sunni practices as the veneration of saints, the seeking of their intercession, and thevisiting of their tombs, all of which were practiced all over the Islamic world, but which he considered idolatry(shirk), impurities and innovations in Islam (Bid'ah).[20][14] Eventually he formed a pact with a local leaderMuhammad bin Saud offering political obedience and promising that protection and propagation of theWahhabi movement mean "power and glory" and rule of "lands and men."[21]

The alliance between followers of ibn Abd al­Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud's successors (the House ofSaud) proved to be a durable one. The House of Saud continued to maintain its politico­religious alliance withthe Wahhabi sect through the waxing and waning of its own political fortunes over the next 150 years, throughto its eventual proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, and then afterwards, on into moderntimes. Today Ibn Abd Al­Wahhab's teachings are the official, state­sponsored form of Sunni Islam[3][22] inSaudi Arabia.[23] With the help of funding from Saudi petroleum exports[24] (and other factors[25]), themovement underwent "explosive growth" beginning in the 1970s and now has worldwide influence.[3] The USState Department has estimated that over the past four decades Riyadh has invested more than $10bn (£6bn)into charitable foundations in an attempt to replace mainstream Sunni Islam with the harsh intolerance of itsWahhabism.[26]

The "boundaries" of Wahhabism have been called "difficult to pinpoint",[27] but in contemporary usage, theterms Wahhabi and Salafi are often used interchangeably, and they are considered to be movements withdifferent roots that have merged since the 1960s.[28][29][30] However, Wahhabism has also been called "aparticular orientation within Salafism",[31] or an ultra­conservative, Saudi brand of Salafism.[32][33] Estimates ofthe number of adherents to Wahhabism vary, with one source (Mehrdad Izady) giving a figure of fewer than 5million Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf region (compared to 28.5 million Sunnis and 89 million Shia).[23][34]

The majority of mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims worldwide strongly disagree with the interpretation ofWahhabism, and many Muslims would denounce them as a faction or a "vile sect".[8] Islamic scholars,including those from the Al­Azhar University, regularly denounce Wahhabism with terms such as "Satanicfaith".[8] Wahhabism has been accused of being "a source of global terrorism",[35][36] inspiring the ideology ofthe Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),[37] and for causing disunity in Muslim communities by labellingMuslims who disagreed with the Wahhabi definition of monotheism as apostates[38] (takfir) and justifying theirkilling.[39][40][41] It has also been criticized for the destruction of historic shrines of saints, mausoleums, andother Muslim and non­Muslim buildings and artifacts.[42][43][44]

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Contents

1 Definitions and etymology1.1 Definitions1.2 Etymology1.3 Naming controversy: Wahhabis, Muwahhidun, and Salafis1.4 Wahhabis and Salafis

2 History2.1 Muhammad ibn Abd­al­Wahhab2.2 Alliance with the House of Saud2.3 Abdul­Aziz Ibn Saud2.4 Connection with the outside2.5 Growth2.6 Petroleum export era2.7 Afghanistan jihad2.8 "Erosion" of Wahhabism

2.8.1 Grand Mosque seizure2.8.2 1990 Gulf War2.8.3 After 9/11

2.9 Memoirs of Mr. Hempher3 Practices

3.1 Commanding right and forbidding wrong3.2 Appearance3.3 Wahhabiyya mission3.4 Regions

4 Views4.1 Theology4.2 Jurisprudence (fiqh)4.3 Loyalty and disassociation4.4 Politics

5 Population6 Notable leaders7 International influence and propagation

7.1 Explanation for influence7.2 Funding factor7.3 Militant and political Islam

8 Criticism and controversy8.1 Criticism by other Muslims8.2 Initial opposition

8.2.1 Shi'a opposition8.2.2 Sunni opposition

8.3 Non­religious motivations8.4 Wahhabism in the United States8.5 European expansion8.6 Destruction of Islam's early historical sites

9 See also10 Notes11 References12 Further reading13 External links

Definitions and etymology

Definitions

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Some definitions or uses of the term Wahhabi Islam include:

"a corpus of doctrines", and "a set of attitudes and behavior, derived from the teachings of a particularlysevere religious reformist who lived in central Arabia in the mid­eighteenth century" (Gilles Kepel)[45]

"pure Islam" (David Commins, paraphrasing supporters' definition),[9] that does not deviate from Sharialaw in any way and should be called Islam and not Wahhabism. (King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the Kingof the Saudi Arabia)[46]"a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacityfor adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances" (David Commins, paraphrasing opponents'definition)[9]"a conservative reform movement ... the creed upon which the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded,and [which] has influenced Islamic movements worldwide" (Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslimworld)[47]"a sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar" with footholds in "India, Africa, and elsewhere", with a"steadfastly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the tradition of Ibn Hanbal" (Cyril Glasse)[13]an "eighteenth­century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society","founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab" (Oxford Dictionary of Islam).[48]originally a "literal revivification" of Islamic principles that ignored the spiritual side of Islam, that "roseon the wings of enthusiasm аnd longing and then sank down into the lowlands of pharisaic self­righteousness" after gaining power and losing its "longing and humility" (Muhammad Asad)[49]"a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for power­sharing purposes", but cannot be calleda sect because "It has no special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of religion thatdiffer from the main body of Sunni Islam" (Abdallah Al Obeid, the former dean of the Islamic Universityof Medina and member of the Saudi Consultative Council)[27]"the true salafist movement". Starting out as a theological reform movement, it had "the goal of calling(da'wa) people to restore the 'real' meaning of tawhid (oneness of God or monotheism) and to disregardand deconstruct 'traditional' disciplines and practices that evolved in Islamic history such as theology andjurisprudence and the traditions of visiting tombs and shrines of venerated individuals." (AhmadMoussalli)[50]a term used by opponents of Salafism in hopes of besmirching that movement by suggesting foreigninfluence and "conjuring up images of Saudi Arabia". The term is "most frequently used in countrieswhere Salafis are a small minority" of the Muslim community but "have made recent inroads" in"converting" the local population to Salafism. (Quintan Wiktorowicz)[10]a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency towardmisogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith" (Natana J.DeLong­Bas)[51]

Etymology

According to Saudi writer Abdul Aziz Qassim and others, it was the Ottomans who "first labelled AbdulWahhab's school of Islam in Saudi Arabia as Wahhabism". The British also adopted it and expanded its use inthe Middle East.[52]

Naming controversy: Wahhabis, Muwahhidun, and Salafis

Wahhabis do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn Abd­Al­Wahhab was averse to the elevation ofscholars and other individuals, including using a person's name to label an Islamic school.[10][39][53]

According to Robert Lacey "the Wahhabis have always disliked the name customarily given to them" andpreferred to be called Muwahhidun (Unitarians).[54] Another preferred term was simply "Muslims" since theircreed is "pure Islam".[55] However, critics complain these terms imply non­Wahhabis are not monotheists orMuslims,[55][56] and the English translation of that term causes confusion with the Christian denomination(Unitarian Universalism).

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Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and/or prefer include ahl al­hadith ("people of hadith"), SalafiDa'wa or al­da'wa ila al­tawhid[57] ("Salafi preaching" or "preaching of monotheism", for the school ratherthan the adherents) or Ahl ul­Sunna wal Jama'a ("people of the tradition of Muhammad and the consensus ofthe Ummah"),[31] Ahl al­Sunnah ("People of the Sunna"),[58] or "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh"(the sheikh being ibn Abdul­Wahhab).[59] Early Salafis referred to themselves simply as "Muslims", believingthe neighboring Ottoman Caliphate was al­dawlah al­kufriyya (a heretical nation) and its self­professed Musliminhabitants actually non­Muslim.[38][60][61][62] The prominent 20th­century Muslim scholar Nasiruddin Albani,who considered himself "of the Salaf," referred to Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab's activities as "Najdida'wah."[63]

Many, such as writer Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term Salafi, maintaining that "one would be hardpressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use 'Wahhabi' in theirtitle, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliarwith Islamic terminology, and even then usage is limited and often appears as 'Salafi/Wahhabi')."[10] A NewYork Times journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the term Wahhabism, "feeling it sets them apart and contradictsthe notion that Islam is a monolithic faith."[64] Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud for example hasattacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist here (Saudi Arabia)" and challenged users of the term tolocate any "deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the teachings of the Quran andProphetic Hadiths".[65][66] Ingrid Mattson argues that, "'Wahhbism' is not a sect. It is a social movement thatbegan 200 years ago to rid Islam of rigid cultural practices that had (been) acquired over the centuries."[67]

On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security and Library of Congress the term is nowcommonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd,[20][68] a region often called the "heartland" ofWahhabism.[69] Journalist Karen House calls Salafi, "a more politically correct term" for Wahhabi.[70]

In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the Christian Quakers,Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors."[54]

Wahhabis and Salafis

Many scholars and critics distinguish between Wahhabi and Salafi. According to American scholar ChristopherM. Blanchard,[71] Wahhabism refers to "a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from SaudiArabia," while Salafiyya is "a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed independently atvarious times and in various places in the Islamic world."[39]

However, many call Wahhabism a more strict, Saudi form of Salafi.[72][73] Wahhabism is the Saudi version ofSalafism, according to Mark Durie, who states Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" in using theirconsiderable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world."[74] AhmadMoussalli tends to agree Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, butnot all salafists are Wahhabis".[50]

Hamid Algar lists three "elements" Wahhabism and Salafism had in common.

1. above all disdain for all developments subsequent to al­Salaf al­Salih (the first two or three generationsof Islam),

2. the rejection of Sufism, and3. the abandonment of consistent adherence to one of the four or five Sunni Madhhabs (schools of fiqh).

And "two important and interrelated features" that distinguished Salafis from the Wahhabis:

1. a reliance on attempts at persuasion rather than coercion in order to rally other Muslims to their cause;and

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2. an informed awareness of the political and socio­economic crises confronting the Muslim world.[75]

Hamid Algar and another critic, Khaled Abou El Fadl, argue Saudi oil­export funding "co­opted" the"symbolism and language of Salafism", during the 1960s and 70s, making them practically indistinguishable bythe 1970s,[76] and now the two ideologies have "melded". Abou El Fadl believes Wahhabism rebranded itself asSalafism knowing it could not "spread in the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.[28]

History

The Wahhabi mission started as a revivalist movement in the remote, arid region of Najd. With the collapse ofthe Ottoman Empire after World War I, the Al Saud dynasty, and with it Wahhabism, spread to the holy cities ofMecca and Medina. After the discovery of petroleum near the Persian Gulf in 1939, it had access to oil exportrevenues, revenue that grew to billions of dollars. This money – spent on books, media, schools, universities,mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for journalists, academics and Islamic scholars – gaveWahhabism a "preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world.[77]

In the country of Wahhabism's founding – and by far the largest and most powerful country where it is the statereligion – Wahhabi ulama gained control over education, law, public morality and religious institutions in the20th century, while permitting as a "trade­off" doctrinally objectionable actions such as the import of moderntechnology and communications, and dealings with non­Muslims, for the sake of the consolidation of the powerof its political guardian, the Al Saud dynasty.[78]

However, in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century several crises worked to erode Wahhabi"credibility" in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim world – the November 1979 seizure of the GrandMosque by militants; the deployment of US troops in Saudi during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq; and the 9/112001 al­Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington.[79]

In each case the Wahhabi establishment was called on to support the dynasty's efforts to suppress religiousdissent – and in each case it did[79] – exposing its dependence on the Saudi dynasty and its often unpopularpolicies.[80][81]

In the West, the end of the Cold War and the anti­communist alliance with conservative, religious Saudi Arabia,and the 9/11 attacks created enormous distrust towards the kingdom and especially its official religion.[82]

Muhammad ibn Abd­al­Wahhab

The founder of Wahhabism, Mohammad ibn Abd­al­Wahhab, was born around 1702­03 in the small oasis townof 'Uyayna in the Najd region, in what is now central Saudi Arabia.[83] He studied in Basra,[84] in what is nowIraq, and possibly Mecca and Medina while there to perform Hajj, before returning to his home town of'Uyayna in 1740. There he worked to spread the call (da'wa) for what he believed was a restoration of truemonotheistic worship (Tawhid).[85]

The "pivotal idea" of Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's teaching was that people who called themselves Muslims but whoparticipated in alleged innovations were not just misguided or committing a sin, but were "outside the pale ofIslam altogether," as were Muslims who disagreed with his definition. [86]

This included not just lax, unlettered, nomadic Bedu, but also Shias and Sunnis such as the Ottomans.[87] Suchinfidels were not to be killed outright, but to be given a chance to repent first.[88] With the support of the rulerof the town – Uthman ibn Mu'ammar – he carried out some of his religious reforms in 'Uyayna, including thedemolition of the tomb of Zayd ibn al­Khattab, one of the Sahaba (companions) of the prophet Muhammad,and the stoning to death of an adulterous woman. However, a more powerful chief (Sulaiman ibn Muhammadibn Ghurayr) pressured Uthman ibn Mu'ammar to expel him from 'Uyayna.

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The First Saudi state 1744–1818

Alliance with the House of Saud

The ruler of nearby town, Muhammad ibn Saud, invited ibn 'Abd al­Wahhab tojoin him, and in 1744 a pact was made between the two. [89] Ibn Saud wouldprotect and propagate the doctrines of the Wahhabi mission, while ibn AbdulWahhab "would support the ruler, supplying him with 'glory and power.' "Whoever championed his message, ibn Abdul Wahhab promised, "will, bymeans of it, rule the lands and men." [21] Ibn Saud would abandon un­Shariataxation of local harvests, and in return God might compensate him with bootyfrom conquest and sharia compliant taxes that would exceed what he gaveup.[90] The alliance between the Wahhabi mission and Al Saud family has"endured for more than two and half centuries," surviving defeat andcollapse.[89][91] The two families have intermarried multiple times over theyears and in today's Saudi Arabia, the minister of religion is always a member of the Al ash­Sheikh family, i.e.,a descendent of Ibn Abdul Wahhab.[92]

According to most sources, Ibn Abd al­Wahhab declared jihad against neighboring tribes, whose practices ofasking saints for their intercession, making pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, he believed to be thework of idolaters/unbelievers.[40][56][88][93]

One academic disputes this. According to Natana DeLong­Bas, Ibn Abd al­Wahhab was restrained in urgingfighting with perceived unbelievers, preferring to preach and persuade rather than attack.[94] [95][96] It was onlyafter the death of Muhammad bin Saud in 1765 that, according to DeLong­Bas, Muhammad bin Saud's son andsuccessor, Abdul­Aziz bin Muhammad, used a "convert or die" approach to expand his domain,[97] and whenWahhabis adopted the takfir ideas of Ibn Taymiyya.[98]

However, various scholars, including Simon Ross Valentine, have strongly rejected such a view of Wahhab,arguing that "the image of Abd’al­Wahhab presented by DeLong­Bas is to be seen for what it is, namely a re­writing of history that flies in the face of historical fact".[99] Conquest expanded through the Arabian Peninsulauntil it conquered Mecca and Medina the early 19th century.[100][101] It was at this time, according to DeLong­Bas, that Wahhabis embraced the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, which allow self­professed Muslim who do not followIslamic law to be declared non­Muslims – to justify their warring and conquering the Muslim Sharifs ofHijaz.[98]

One of their most noteworthy and controversial attacks was on Karbala in 1802. There, according to a Wahhabichronicler `Uthman b. `Abdullah b. Bishr: "The Muslims" – as the Wahhabis referred to themselves, not feelingthe need to distinguish themselves from other Muslims, since they did not believe them to be Muslims –

scaled the walls, entered the city ... and killed the majority of its people in the markets and in theirhomes. [They] destroyed the dome placed over the grave of al­Husayn [and took] whatever theyfound inside the dome and its surroundings ... the grille surrounding the tomb which was encrustedwith emeralds, rubies, and other jewels ... different types of property, weapons, clothing, carpets,gold, silver, precious copies of the Qur'an."[102][103]

After this, the Wahhabis also massacred the male population and enslaved the women and children of thepredominantly Sunni city of Ta'if in Hejaz in 1803.[104]

Saud bin Abdul­Aziz bin Muhammad bin Saud managed to establish his rule over southeastern Syria between1803 and 1812. However, Egyptian forces acting under the Ottoman Empire and led by Ibrahim Pasha, wereeventually successful in counterattacking in a campaign starting from 1811.[105] In 1818 they defeated Al­Saud,

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The Second Saudi state 1850

Ibn Saud, the first king ofSaudi Arabia

leveling the capital Diriyah, executing the Al­Saud emir, exiling the emirate'spolitical and religious leadership,[91][106] and otherwise unsuccessfullyattempted to stamp out not just the House of Saud but the Wahhabi mission aswell.[107]

A second, smaller Saudi state (Emirate of Nejd) lasted from 1819–1891. Itsborders being within Najd, Wahhabism was protected from further Ottoman orEgyptian campaigns by the Najd's isolation, lack of valuable resources, and thatera's limited communication and transportation.[108]

By the 1880s, at least among townsmen if not Bedouin, Wahhabi strict monotheistic doctrine had become thenative religious culture of the Najd.[109]

Abdul­Aziz Ibn Saud

In 1901, Abdul­Aziz Ibn Saud, a fifth generation descendent of Muhammad ibnSaud,[110] began a military campaign that led to the conquest of much of theArabian peninsula and the founding of present­day Saudi Arabia, after the collapseof the Ottoman Empire.[111] The result that safeguarded the vision of Islam­basedon the tenets of Islam as preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab was notbloodless, as 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations were carried outduring its course, according to some estimates.[112][113][114][115]

Under the reign of Abdul­Aziz, "political considerations trumped religiousidealism" favored by pious Wahhabis. His political and military success gave theWahhabi ulama control over religious institutions with jurisdiction overconsiderable territory, and in later years Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of therules and laws concerning social affairs, and shaped the kingdom's judicial andeducational policies.[116] But protests from Wahhabi ulama were overridden when

it came to consolidating power in Hijaz and al­Hasa, avoiding clashes with the great power of the region(Britain), adopting modern technology, establishing a simple governmental administrative framework, orsigning an oil concession with the U.S. [117] The Wahhabi ulama also issued a fatwa affirming that "only theruler could declare a jihad"[118] (a violation of Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's teaching according to DeLong­Bas.[95])

As the realm of Wahhabism expanded under Ibn Saud into areas of Shiite (Al­Hasa, conquered in 1913) andpluralistic Muslim tradition (Hejaz, conquered in 1924–25), Wahhabis pressed for forced conversion of Shiaand an eradication of (what they saw as) idolatry. Ibn Saud sought "a more relaxed approach".[119]

In al­Hasa, efforts to stop the observance of Shia religious holidays and replace teaching and preaching dutiesof Shia clerics with Wahhabi, lasted only a year.[120]

In Mecca and Jeddah (in Hejaz) prohibition of tobacco, alcohol, playing cards and listening to music on thephonograph was looser than in Najd. Over the objections of Wahhabi ulama, Ibn Saud permitted both thedriving of automobiles and the attendance of Shia at hajj.[121]

Enforcement of the commanding right and forbidding wrong, such as enforcing prayer observance andseparation of the sexes, developed a prominent place during the second Saudi emirate, and in 1926 a formalcommittee for enforcement was founded in Mecca.[13][122] [123]

While Wahhabi warriors swore loyalty to monarchs of Al Saud, there was one major rebellion. King Abdul­Aziz put down rebelling Ikhwan – nomadic tribesmen turned Wahhabi warriors who opposed his "introducingsuch innovations as telephones, automobiles, and the telegraph" and his "sending his son to a country of

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The Kingdom of SaudiArabia after unification in1932

unbelievers (Egypt)". [124] Britain had aided Abdul­Aziz, and when the Ikhwan attacked the Britishprotectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait, as a continuation of jihad to expand the Wahhabist realm,Abdul­Aziz struck, killing hundreds before the rebels surrendered in 1929.[125]

Connection with the outside

Before Abdul­Aziz, during most of the second half of the 19th century, there was a strong aversion in Wahhabilands to mixing with "idolaters" (which included most of the Muslim world). Voluntary contact was consideredby Wahhabi clerics to be at least a sin, and if one enjoyed the company of idolaters, and "approved of theirreligion", an act of unbelief.[126] Travel outside the pale of Najd to the Ottoman lands "was tightly controlled, ifnot prohibited altogether".[127]

Over the course of its history, however, Wahhabism has become more accommodating towards the outsideworld.[128] In the late 1800s, Wahhabis found Muslims with at least similar beliefs – first with Ahl­i Hadith inIndia,[129] and later with Islamic revivalists in Arab states (one being Mahmud Sahiri al­Alusi in Baghdad).[130]The revivalists and Wahhabis shared a common interest in Ibn Taymiyya's thought, the permissibility of ijtihad,and the need to purify worship practices of innovation.[131] In the 1920s, Rashid Rida, a pioneer Salafist whoseperiodical al­Manar was widely read in the Muslim world, published an "anthology of Wahhabi treatises," anda work praising the Ibn Saud as "the savior of the Haramayn [the two holy cities] and a practitioner of authenticIslamic rule".[132][133]

In a bid "to join the Muslim mainstream and to erase the reputation of extremesectarianism associated with the Ikhwan," in 1926 Ibn Saud convened a Muslimcongress of representatives of Muslim governments and popularassociations.[134] By the early 1950s, the "pressures" on Ibn Saud of controllingthe regions of Hejaz and al­Hasa – "outside the Wahhabi heartland" – and of"navigating the currents of regional politics" "punctured the seal" between theWahhabi heartland and the "land of idolatry" outside.[135][136]

A major current in regional politics at that time was secular nationalism, which,with Gamal Abdul Nasser, was sweeping the Arab world. To combat it,Wahhabi missionary outreach worked closely with Saudi foreign policyinitiatives. In May 1962, a conference in Mecca organized by Saudis discussedways to combat secularism and socialism. In its wake, the World MuslimLeague was established.[137] To propagate Islam and "repel inimical trends anddogmas", the League opened branch offices around the globe.[138] It developed closer association betweenWahhabis and leading Salafis, and made common cause with the Islamic revivalist Muslim Brotherhood, Ahl­iHadith and the Jamaat­i Islami, combating Sufism and "innovative" popular religious practices[137] andrejecting the West and Western "ways which were so deleterious of Muslim piety and values."[139] Missionarieswere sent to West Africa, where the League funded schools, distributed religious literature, and gavescholarships to attend Saudi religious universities. One result was the Izala Society which fought Sufism inNigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.[140]

An event that had a great effect on Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia[141] was the "infiltration of the transnationalistrevival movement" in the form of thousands of pious, Islamist Arab Muslim Brotherhood refugees from Egyptfollowing Nasser's clampdown on the brotherhood[142] (and also from similar nationalist clampdowns inIraq[143] and Syria[144]), to help staff the new school system of (the largely illiterate) Kingdom.[145]

The Brotherhood's Islamist ideology differed from the more conservative Wahhabism which preached loyalobedience to the king. The Brotherhood dealt in what one author (Robert Lacey) called "change­promotingconcepts" like social justice, and anticolonialism, and gave "a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist"

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to the Wahhabi values Saudi students "had absorbed in childhood". With the Brotherhood's "hands­on, radicalIslam", jihad became a "practical possibility today", not just part of history.[146]

The Brethren were ordered by the Saudi clergy and government not to attempt to proselytize or otherwise getinvolved in religious doctrinal matters within the Kingdom, but nonetheless "took control" of Saudi Arabia'sintellectual life" by publishing books and participating in discussion circles and salons held by princes.[147] Intime they took leading roles in key governmental ministries,[148] and had influence on educationcurriculum.[149] An Islamic university in Medina created in 1961 to train – mostly non­Saudi – proselytizers toWahhabism,[150] became "a haven" for Muslim Brother refugees from Egypt.[151] The Brothers' ideaseventually spread throughout the kingdom and had great effect on Wahhabism – although observers differ as towhether this was by "undermining" it[141][152] or "blending" with it.[153][154]

Growth

In the 1950s and 60s within Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi ulama maintained their hold on religious law courts,and presided over the creation of Islamic universities and a public school system which gave students "a heavydose of religious instruction".[155] Outside of Saudi the Wahhabi ulama became "less combative" toward therest of the Muslim world. In confronting the challenge of the West, Wahhabi doctrine "served well" for manyMuslims as a "platform" and "gained converts beyond the peninsula."[155][156]

A number of reasons have been given for this success. The growth in popularity and strength of both Arabnationalism (although Wahhabis opposed any form of nationalism as an ideology, Saudis were Arabs, and theirenemy the Ottoman caliphate was ethnically Turkish),[25] and Islamic reform (specifically reform by followingthe example of those first three generations of Muslims known as the Salaf);[25] the destruction of the OttomanEmpire which sponsored their most effective critics;[157] the destruction of another rival, the Khilafa in Hejaz,in 1925.[25]

Not least in importance was the money Saudi Arabia earned from exporting oil.[77]

Petroleum export era

The pumping and export of oil from Saudi Arabia started during World War II, and its earnings helped fundreligious activities in the 1950s and 60s. But it was the 1973 oil crisis and quadrupling in the price of oil thatboth increased the kingdom's wealth astronomically and enhanced its prestige by demonstrating its internationalpower as a leader of OPEC. By 1980, Saudi Arabia was earning every three days the income from oil it hadtaken a year to earn before the embargo.[158] Tens of billions of US dollars of this money were spent on books,media, schools, scholarships for students (from primary to post­graduate), fellowships and subsidies to rewardjournalists, academics and Islamic scholars, the building of hundreds of Islamic centers and universities, andover one thousand schools and one thousand mosques.[159][160] [161] During this time, Wahhabism attained whatGilles Kepel called a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."[77]

Afghanistan jihad

The "apex of cooperation" between Wahhabis and Muslim revivalist groups was the Afghan jihad.[162]

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, aMuslim Brother cleric with ties to Saudi religious institutions,[163] issued a fatwa[164] declaring defensive jihadin Afghanistan against the atheist Soviet Union, "fard ayn", a personal (or individual) obligation for allMuslims. The edict was supported by Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti (highest religious scholar), Abd al­Aziz ibnBaz, among others.[165][166]

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Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight theSoviets and their Afghan regime. Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and futurefighters. Somewhere between 12,000 and 25,000 of these volunteers came from Saudi Arabia.[167] Saudi Arabiaand the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided considerable financial support to the jihad ­­ $600million a year by 1982.[168]

By 1989, Soviet troops had withdrawn and within a few years the pro­Soviet regime in Kabul had collapsed.

This Saudi/Wahhabi religious triumph further stood out in the Muslim world because many Muslim­majoritystates (and the PLO) were allied with the Soviet Union and did not support the Afghan jihad.[169] But manyjihad volunteers (most famously Osama bin Laden) returning home to Saudi and elsewhere were oftenradicalized by Islamic militants who were "much more extreme than their Saudi sponsors."[169]

"Erosion" of Wahhabism

Grand Mosque seizure

In 1979, 400–500 Islamist insurgents, using smuggled weapons and supplies, took over the Grand mosque inMecca, called for an overthrow of the monarchy, denounced the Wahhabi ulama as royal puppets, andannounced the arrival of the Mahdi of "end time". The insurgents deviated from Wahhabi doctrine in significantdetails,[170] but were also associated with leading Wahhabi ulama (Abd al­Aziz ibn Baz knew the insurgent'sleader, Juhayman al­Otaybi).[171] Their seizure of Islam's holiest site, the taking hostage of hundreds of hajjpilgrims, and the deaths of hundreds of militants, security forces and hostages caught in crossfire during thetwo­week­long retaking of the mosque, all shocked the Islamic world[172] and did not enhance the prestige ofAl Saud as "custodians" of the mosque.

The incident also damaged all the prestige of the Wahhabi establishment. Saudi leadership sought and receivedWahhabi fatawa to approve the military removal of the insurgents and after that to execute them.[173] ButWahhabi clerics also fell under suspicion for involvement with the insurgents.[174] In part as a consequence,Sahwa clerics influenced by Brethren's ideas were given freer rein. Their ideology was also thought more likelyto compete with the recent Islamic revolutionism/third­worldism of the Iranian Revolution.[174]

Although the insurgents were motivated by religious puritanism, the incident was not followed by a crackdownon other religious purists, but by giving greater power to the ulama and religious conservatives to more strictlyenforce Islamic codes in myriad ways[175] – from the banning of women's images in the media to adding evenmore hours of Islamic studies in school and giving more power and money to the religious police to enforceconservative rules of behaviour.[176][177][178]

1990 Gulf War

In August 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. Concerned that Saddam Hussein might push south and seizeits own oil fields, Saudis requested military support from the US and allowed tens of thousands of US troops tobe based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq.[179]

But what "amounted to seeking infidels' assistance against a Muslim power" was difficult to justify in terms ofWahhabi doctrine.[180][181]

Again Saudi authorities sought and received a fatwa from leading Wahhabi ulama supporting their action. Thefatwa failed to persuade many conservative Muslims and ulama who strongly opposed US presence, includingthe Muslim Brotherhood­supported the Sahwah "Awakening" movement that began pushing for political

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change in the Kingdom.[182] Outside the kingdom, Islamist/Islamic revival groups that had long received aidfrom Saudi and had ties with Wahhabis (Arab jihadists, Pakistani and Afghan Islamists) supported Iraq, notSaudi.[183]

During this time and later, many in the Wahhabi/Salafi movement (such as Osama bin Laden) not only nolonger looked to the Saudi monarch as an emir of Islam, but supported his overthrow, focusing on jihad(Salafist jihadists) against the US and (what they believe are) other enemies of Islam.[184][185] (This movementis sometimes called neo­Wahhabi or neo­salafi.[50][186])

After 9/11

The 2001 9/11 attacks on Saudi's putative ally, the US, that killed almost 3,000 people and caused at least $10billion in property and infrastructure damage,[187] were assumed by many, at least outside the kingdom, to be"an expression of Wahhabism" since the Al­Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and most of the 9/11 hijackers wereSaudi nationals.[188] A backlash in the formerly hospitable US against the kingdom focused on its officialreligion that came to be considered by "some ... a doctrine of terrorism and hate."[82]

Inside the kingdom, Crown Prince Abdullah addressed the country's religious, tribal, business and medialeadership following the attacks in a series of televised gatherings calling for a strategy to correct what hasgone wrong. According to author Robert Lacey, the gatherings and later articles and replies by a top cleric,Abdullah Turki, and two top Al Saud princes, Prince Turki Al­Faisal, Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz, served as anoccasion to sort out who had the ultimate power in the kingdom – the Al Saud dynasty and not the ulema. Itwas declared that it has always been the role of executive rulers in Islamic history to exercise power and the jobof the religious scholars to advise, never to govern.[189]

In 2003–04, Saudi Arabia saw a wave of Al­Qaeda­related suicide bombings, attacks on Non­Muslimforeigners (about 80% of those employed in the Saudi private sector are foreign workers[190] and constituteabout 30% of the country's population[191]), and gun battles between Saudi security forces and militants. Onereaction to the attacks was a trimming back of the Wahhabi establishment's domination of religion and society."National Dialogues" were held that "included Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and professional women."[192]In 2009, as part of what some called an effort to "take on the ulema and reform the clerical establishment",King Abdullah issued a decree that only "officially approved" religious scholars would be allowed to issuefatwas in Saudi Arabia. The king also expanded the Council of Senior Scholars (containing officially approvedreligious scholars) to include scholars from Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence other than the Hanbalimadhab—Shafi'i, Hanafi and Maliki schools.[193]

Relations with the Muslim Brotherhood have deteriorated steadily. After 9/11, the then interior minister PrinceNayef, blamed the Brotherhood for extremism in the kingdom,[194] and he declared it guilty of "betrayal ofpledges and ingratitude" and "the source of all problems in the Islamic world", after it was elected to power inEgypt.[195] In March 2014 the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization".[179]

In April 2016, Saudi Arabia stripped its religious police, who enforce Islamic law on the society and are knownas the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, from their power to follow, chase, stop,question, verify identification or arrest any suspected persons when carrying out duties. They are asked to onlyreport suspicious behaviour to regular police and anti­drug units, who will decide whether to take the matterfurther.[196][197]

Memoirs of Mr. Hempher

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A widely circulated but discredited apocryphal description of the founding of Wahhabism[198][199] known asMemoirs of Mr. Hempher, The British Spy to the Middle East (other titles have been used)[200] alleges that aBritish agent named Hempher was responsible for the creation of Wahhabism. In the "memoir", Hemphercorrupts Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab, manipulating him[201] to preach his new interpretation of Islam forthe purpose of sowing dissension and disunity among Muslims so that "We, the English people, ... may live inwelfare and luxury."[200]

Practices

As a religious revivalist movement that works to bring Muslims back from what it believes are foreignaccretions that have corrupted Islam,[202] and believes that Islam is a complete way of life and so hasprescriptions for all aspects of life, Wahhabism is quite strict in what it considers Islamic behavior. As a result,it has been described as the "strictest form of Sunni Islam".[203]

This does not mean however, that all adherents agree on what is required or forbidden, or that rules have notvaried by area or changed over time. In Saudi Arabia the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi doctrine isvisible in the conformity in dress, public deportment, and public prayer,[204] and makes its presence felt by thewide freedom of action of the "religious police", clerics in mosques, teachers in schools, and judges (who arereligious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.[205]

Commanding right and forbidding wrong

Wahhabism is noted for its policy of "compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe thereligious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers", and for "enforcement of public morals to a degree not foundelsewhere".[206]

While other Muslims might urge abstention from alcohol, modest dress, and salat prayer, for Wahhabis prayer"that is punctual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men."Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco." Notonly is modest dress prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by women (a blackabaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified.[68]

Following the preaching and practice of Abdul Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following ofsharia, an official committee has been empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so­called"religious police")[206][207] in Saudi Arabia – the one country founded with the help of Wahhabi warriors andwhose scholars and pious dominate many aspects of the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforcestrict closing of shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale and consumption ofalcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and other social restrictions.[208]

A large number of practices have been reported forbidden by Saudi Wahhabi officials, preachers or religiouspolice. Practices that have been forbidden as Bida'a (innovation) or shirk and sometimes "punished byflogging" during Wahhabi history include performing or listening to music, dancing, fortune telling, amulets,television programs (unless religious), smoking, playing backgammon, chess, or cards, drawing human oranimal figures, acting in a play or writing fiction (both are considered forms of lying), dissecting cadavers(even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of medical research), recorded music played overtelephones on hold or the sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in thehospital.[114][209][210][211][212][213] Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam includelistening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting tombs (including the tomb ofMuhammad), celebrating mawlid (birthday of the Prophet),[214] the use of ornamentation on or in mosques.[215]

The driving of motor vehicles by women is allowed in every country but Wahhabi­dominated Saudi Arabia[216]

and dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strict Taliban, is discouraged by Wahhabis.[217]

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Wahhabism emphasizes "Thaqafah Islamiyyah" or Islamic culture and the importance of avoiding non­Islamiccultural practices and non­Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,[218][219] on the groundsthat the Sunna forbids imitating non­Muslims.[220] Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimessimply condemned by Wahhabi preachers as unIslamic, include celebrating foreign days (such as Valentine'sDay [221] or Mothers Day[218][220]) shaving, cutting or trimming of beards,[222] giving of flowers,[223] standingup in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs.[212] Wahhabischolars have warned against taking non­Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on theirholidays.[64]

Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists gofurther than the official Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin.Several wahhabis have declared football forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non­Muslim, foreignpractice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the foreign non­Muslim language used inmatches.[224] [225] The Saudi Grand Mufti, on the other hand has declared football permissible (halal). [226]

Senior Wahhabi leaders in Saudi Arabia have determined that Islam forbids the traveling or working outside thehome by a woman without their husband's permission – permission which may be revoked at any time – on thegrounds that the different physiological structures and biological functions of the two sexes mean that each isassigned a distinctive role to play in the family.[227] As mentioned before, Wahhabism also forbids the drivingof motor vehicles by women. Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished with beheading[228] althoughsex out of wedlock is permissible with a slave women (Prince Bandar bin Sultan was the product of "a briefencounter" between his father Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz – the Saudi defense minister for many years – and"his slave, a black servingwoman"),[229] or was before slavery was banned in Saudi Arabia in 1962.[230]

Despite this strictness, senior Wahhabi scholars of Islam in the Saudi kingdom have made exceptions in rulingon what is haram. Foreign non­Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king needed them toconfront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non­Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Movietheaters and driving by women are forbidden, except at the ARAMCO compound in eastern Saudi, populatedby workers for the company that provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made atKAUST are also in effect at ARAMCO.[231]

More general rules of what is permissible have changed over time. Abdul­Aziz Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabidoctrines and practices "in a progressively gentler form" as his early 20th­century conquests expanded his stateinto urban areas, especially the Hejab.[232] After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabiaallowed the use of paper money (in 1951), the abolition of slavery (in 1962), education of females (1964), anduse of television (1965).[230] Music, the sound of which once might have led to summary execution, is nowcommonly heard on Saudi radios. [232] Minarets for mosques and use of funeral markers, which were onceforbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance which was once enforced by flogging, is no longer.[233]

Appearance

The uniformity of dress among men and women in Saudi Arabia (compared to other Muslim countries in theMiddle East) has been called a "striking example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society", and anexample of the Wahhabi belief that "outward appearances and expressions are directly connected to one'sinward state."[215] The "long, white flowing thobe" worn by men of Saudi Arabia has been called the "Wahhabinational dress".[234] Red­and­white checkered or white head scarves known as Ghutrah are worn. In publicwomen are required to wear a black abaya or other black clothing that covers every part of their body otherthan hands and eyes.

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A "badge" of a particularly pious Salafi or Wahhabi man is a robe too short to cover the ankle, an untrimmedbeard,[235] and no cord (Agal) to hold the head scarf in place.[236] The warriors of the Ikhwan Wahhabi religiousmilitia wore a white turban in place of an agal.[237]

Wahhabiyya mission

Wahhabi mission, or Dawah Wahhabiyya, is to spread purified Islam through the world, both Muslim and non­Muslim. [238] Tens of billions of dollars have been spent by the Saudi government and charities on mosques,schools, education materials, scholarships, throughout the world to promote Islam and the Wahhabiinterpretation of it. Tens of thousands of volunteers[167] and several billion dollars also went in support of thejihad against the atheist communist regime governing Muslim Afghanistan.[168]

Regions

Wahhabism originated in the Najd region, and its conservative practices have stronger support there than inregions in the kingdom to the east or west of it.[239][240][241] Glasse credits the softening of some Wahhabidoctrines and practices on the conquest of the Hejaz region "with its more cosmopolitan traditions and thetraffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate".[232]

The only other country "whose native population is Wahhabi and that adheres to the Wahhabi creed", is thesmall gulf monarchy of Qatar,[242][243] whose version of Wahhabism is notably less strict. Unlike Saudi Arabia,Qatar made significant changes in the 1990s. Women are now allowed to drive and travel independently; non­Muslims are permitted to consume alcohol and pork. The country sponsors a film festival, has "world­class artmuseums", hosts Al Jazeera news service, will hold the 2022 football World Cup, and has no religious forcethat polices public morality. Qatari's attribute its different interpretation of Islam to the absence of anindigenous clerical class and autonomous bureaucracy (religious affairs authority, endowments, Grand Mufti),the fact that Qatari rulers do not derive their legitimacy from such a class.[243][244]

Views

Adherents to the Wahhabi movement identify as Sunni Muslims.[245] The primary Wahhabi doctrine isaffirmation of the uniqueness and unity of God (Tawhid),[14][246] and opposition to shirk (violation of tawhid –"the one unforgivable sin", according to Ibn Abd Al­Wahhab).[247] They call for adherence to the beliefs andpractices of the salaf (exemplary early Muslims). They strongly oppose what they consider to be heteredoxdoctrines, particularly those held by the vast majority of Sunnis and Shiites,[248] and practices such as theveneration of Prophets and saints in the Islamic tradition. They emphasize reliance on the literal meaning of theQuran and hadith, rejecting rationalistic theology (kalam). Wahhabism has been associated with the practice oftakfir (labeling Muslims who disagree with their doctrines as apostates). Adherents of Wahhabism arefavourable to derivation of new legal rulings (ijtihad) so long as it is true to the essence of the Quran, Sunnahand understanding of the salaf.[249]

Theology

In theology Wahhabism is closely aligned with the Athari (traditionalist) school, which represents the prevalenttheological position of the Hanbali school of law.[250][251] Athari theology is characterized by reliance on thezahir (apparent or literal) meaning of the Quran and hadith, and opposition to the rational argumentation inmatters of belief favored by Ash'ari and Maturidi theology.[252][253] However, Wahhabism diverges in somepoints of theology from other Athari movements.[254] These include a zealous tendency toward takfir, whichbears a resemblance to the Kharijites.[254][255] Another distinctive feature is a strong opposition tomysticism.[254] Although it is typically attributed to the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah, Jeffry Halverson argues

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that Ibn Taymiyyah only opposed what he saw as Sufi excesses and never mysticism in itself, being himself amember of the Qadiriyyah Sufi order.[254] DeLong­Bas writes that Ibn Abd al­Wahhab did not denounce Sufismor Sufis as a group, but rather attacked specific practices which he saw as inconsistent with the Quran andhadith.[256]

Ibn Abd al­Wahhab considered some beliefs and practices of the Shia to violate the doctrine ofmonotheism.[257] According to DeLong­Bas, in his polemic against the "extremist Rafidah sect of Shiis", hecriticized them for assigning greater authority to their current leaders than to Muhammad in interpreting theQuran and sharia, and for denying the validity of the consensus of the early Muslim community.[257] He alsobelieved that the Shia doctrine of infallibility of the imams constituted associationism with God.[257]

David Commins describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's teaching as being that "Muslims whodisagreed with his definition of monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islamaltogether." This put Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of most Muslims through history whobelieved that the "shahada" profession of faith ("There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") madeone a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and performance of other obligatory ritualsrendered them "a sinner", but "not an unbeliever."

Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one'sstanding as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in oneGod. ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associateanother creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abdal­Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy meninto intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries,including his own brother.[258]

In Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's major work, a small book called Kitab al­Tawhid, he states that worship in Islam islimited to conventional acts of worship such as the five daily prayers (salat); fasting for Ramadan (Sawm); Dua(supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Ist'ana (seeking help), and Istigatha to Allah (seekingbenefits and calling upon Allah alone). Worship beyond this – making du'a or tawassul – are acts of shirk andin violation of the tenets of Tawhid (montheism).[259][260]

Ibn Abd al­Wahahb's justification for considering majority of Muslims of Arabia to be unbelievers, and forwaging war on them, can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans the prophet Muhammad fought"affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performedpilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood couldbe shed and wealth plundered was that "they sacrificed animals to other beings; they sought the help of otherbeings; they swore vows by other beings." Someone who does such things even if their lives are otherwiseexemplary is not a Muslim but an unbeliever (as Ibn Abd al­Wahahb believed). Once such people have receivedthe call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit.[261][262]

This disagreement between Wahhabis and non­Wahhabi Muslims over the definition of worship andmonotheism has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins,[258] although, according toSaudi writer and religious television show host Abdul Aziz Qassim, as of 2014, "there are changes happeningwithin the [Wahhabi] doctrine and among its followers."[46]

According to another source, defining aspects of Wahhabism include a very literal interpretation of the Quranand Sunnah and a tendency to reinforce local practices of the Najd.[263]

Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans forsocio­religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctnessand moral purity", is disputed.[264][265]

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Jurisprudence (fiqh)

Of the four major sources in Sunni fiqh – the Quran, the Sunna, consensus (ijma), and analogical reasoning(qiyas) – Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's writings emphasized the Quran and Sunna. He used ijma only "in conjunctionwith its corroboration of the Quran and hadith"[266] (and giving preference to the ijma of Muhammad'scompanions rather than the ijma of legal specialists after his time), and qiyas only in cases of extremenecessity.[267] He rejected deference to past juridical opinion (taqlid) in favor of independent reasoning(ijtihad), and opposed using local customs.[268] He urged his followers to "return to the primary sources" ofIslam in order "to determine how the Quran and Muhammad dealt with specific situations",[269] when usingijtihad. According to Edward Mortimer, it was imitation of past juridical opinion in the face of clearcontradictory evidence from hadith or Qur'anic text that Ibn Abd al­Wahhab condemned.[270] Natana DeLong­Bas writes that the Wahhabi tendency to consider failure to abide by Islamic law as equivalent to apostasy wasbased on the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya rather than Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's preaching and emerged after thelatter's death.[271]

According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn Abd al­Wahhab himself "produced nounprecedented opinions". The "Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh rules at all,but over aqida, or theological positions".[272] Scholar David Cummings also states that early disputes withother Muslims did not center on fiqh, and that the belief that the distinctive character of Wahhabism stems fromHanbali legal thought is a "myth".[273]

Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. The Encyclopedia ofIslam and the Muslim World maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adherestrictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith".[274] Cyril Glasse's New Encyclopedia of Islam states that"strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school,"[275] and that in doing so theycorrespond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'.[276] [277]According to DeLong­Bas, Ibn Abd al­Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned hisfollowers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider "the opinion of any lawschool to be binding."[278] He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything notexplicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use of analogical reasoning, and taking public interest andjustice into consideration.[278]

Loyalty and disassociation

According to various sources—scholars,[40][279][280] [281] [282][283] former Saudi students, [284] Arabic­speaking/reading teachers who have had access to Saudi text books, [285] and journalists[286] – Ibn `Abd alWahhab and his successors preach that theirs is the one true form of Islam. According to a doctrine known asal­wala` wa al­bara` (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Abd al­Wahhab argued that it was "imperative forMuslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non­Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this"enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non­Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal".[287][288]Even as late as 2003, entire pages in Saudi textbooks were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that allforms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation,[285] although, according to one source (Hamid Algar)Wahhabis have "discreetly concealed" this view from other Muslims outside Saudi Arabia "over theyears".[280][289]

In reply, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied the above allegations", including that "theirgovernment exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education."[290]

Politics

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According to ibn Abdal­Wahhab there are three objectives for Islamic government and society: "to believe inAllah, enjoin good behavior, and forbid wrongdoing." This doctrine has been sustained in missionary literature,sermons, fatwa rulings, and explications of religious doctrine by Wahhabis since the death of ibn Abdal­Wahhab.[68] Ibn Abd al­Wahhab saw a role for the imam, "responsible for religious matters", and the amir, "incharge of political and military issues".[291] (In Saudi history the imam has not been a religious preacher orscholar, but Muhammad ibn Saud[292] and subsequent Saudi rulers.[57][293])

He also taught that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance as a religious obligation from his peopleso long as he leads the community according to the laws of God. A Muslim must present a bayah, or oath ofallegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death.[68][294] Any counsel givento a ruler from community leaders or ulama should be private, not through public acts such as petitions,demonstrations, etc. [295] [296] (This strict obedience can become problematic if a dynastic dispute arises andsomeone rebelling against the ruler succeeds and becomes the ruler, as happened in the late 19th century at theend of the second al­Saud state.[297] Is the successful rebel a ruler to be obeyed, or a usurper?[298])

While this gives the king wide power, respecting shari'a does impose limits, such as giving qadi (Islamicjudges) independence. This means not interfering in their deliberations, but also not codifying laws, followingprecedents or establishing a uniform system of law courts – both of which violate the qadi's independence.[299]

Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, but a movement of "Salafi jihadis" hasdeveloped among those who believe Al Saud has abandoned the laws of God.[184][185] According to ZubairQamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is/wasanother "strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis after the fall of the secondSaudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al­Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the 'Shu’aybi' school".[300]

Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics andgovernment and the importance of dawah (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non­Muslimsbut towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative and do not deal with conceptssuch as social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.[301] IbnAbdul Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and landsand men.' "[21]

Population

One of the more detailed estimates of religious population in the Arabic Gulf is by Mehrdad Izady whoestimates, "using cultural and not confessional criteria", only 4.56 million Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf region,about 4 million from Saudi Arabia, (mostly the Najd), and the rest coming overwhelmingly from the Emiratesand Qatar.[23] Most Sunni Qataris are Wahhabis (46.9% of all Qataris)[23] and 44.8% of Emiratis areWahhabis,[23] 5.7% of Bahrainis are Wahhabis, and 2.2% of Kuwaitis are Wahhabis.[23] They account forroughly 0.5% of the world's Muslim population.[302]

Notable leaders

There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member of Al ash­Sheikh (a descendant of Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example,Abd al­Latif was the son of Abd al­Rahman ibn Hasan.

Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab (1703–1792) was the founder of the Wahhabi movement.[303][304]Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab (1752–1826) was the head ofWahhabism after his father retired from public life in 1773. After the fall of the first Saudi emirate, Abd

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Allah went into exile in Cairo where he died.[303]Sulayman ibn Abd Allah (1780–1818) was a grandson of Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab and author ofan influential treatise that restricted travel to and residing in land of idolaters (i.e. land outside of theWahhabi area).[303]

Abd al­Rahman ibn Hasan (1780–1869) was head of the religious estate in the second Saudi emirate.[303]

Abd al­Latif ibn Abd al­Rahman (1810–1876) Head of religious estate in 1860 and early 1870s.[303]Abd Allah ibn Abd al­Latif Al ash­Sheikh (1848–1921) was the head of religious estate during period ofRashidi rule and the early years of King Abd al­Aziz ibn Saud.[303]Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al ash­Sheikh (1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentiethcentury. He has been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed unrivaledreligious authority."[305]Ghaliyya al­Wahhabiyya was a female military leader who defended Mecca against recapture byOttoman forces.

In more recent times, a couple of Wahhabi clerics have risen to prominence that have no relation to ibn Abd al­Wahhab.

Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (1910–1999), has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism duringhis time.[306]Muhammad ibn al­Uthaymeen (1925–2001), another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, noone "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment" since theirdeaths.[306]

International influence and propagation

Explanation for influence

Khaled Abou El Fadl attributed the appeal of Wahhabism to some Muslims as stemming from

Arab nationalism, which followed the Wahhabi attack on the Ottoman EmpireReformism, which followed a return to Salaf (as­Salaf aṣ­Ṣāliḥ);Destruction of the Hejaz Khilafa in 1925;Control of Mecca and Medina, which gave Wahhabis great influence on Muslim culture and thinking;Oil, which after 1975 allowed Wahhabis to promote their interpretations of Islam using billions from oilexport revenue.[307]

Scholar Gilles Kepel, agrees that the tripling in the price of oil in the mid­1970s and the progressive takeover ofSaudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the IslamicWorld.

... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo againstthe United States, following the Arab­Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, alongwith the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservativeWahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam.Saudi Arabia's impact on Muslims throughout the world was less visible than that of Khomeini]sIran, but the effect was deeper and more enduring. .... it reorganized the religious landscape bypromoting those associations and ulemas who followed its lead, and then, by injecting substantialamounts of money into Islamic interests of all sorts, it won over many more converts. Above all,the Saudis raised a new standard – the virtuous Islamic civilization – as foil for the corruptinginfluence of the West.[77]

Funding factor

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Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100 billion";[308] between $2 and3 billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annual Soviet propaganda budget of $1 billion/year);[309] and "atleast $87 billion" from 1987–2007.[310]

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World,according to journalist Dawood al­Shirian.[311] It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high­level scholarship.[312] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosqueswere built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[313] It rewarded journalists andacademics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and mostinfluential Islamic university.[160] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres anddozens of Muslim academies and schools".[309][314]

This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observerslike Dawood al­Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew,[311] and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called"petro­Islam"[315]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation—or the "gold standard" of Islam—in manyMuslims' minds.[316][317]

Militant and political Islam

According to counter­terrorism scholar Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni extremists perpetrated about 700 terrorattacks killing roughly 7,000 people from 1981–2006.[318] What connection, if any, there is betweenWahhabism and the Jihadi Salafis such as Al­Qaeda who carried out these attacks, is disputed.

Natana De Long­Bas, senior research assistant at the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim­ChristianUnderstanding at Georgetown University, argues:

The militant Islam of Osama bin Laden did not have its origins in the teachings of Ibn Abd­al­Wahhab and was not representative of Wahhabi Islam as it is practiced in contemporary SaudiArabia, yet for the media it came to define Wahhabi Islam during the later years of bin Laden'slifetime. However "unrepresentative" bin Laden's global jihad was of Islam in general andWahhabi Islam in particular, its prominence in headline news took Wahhabi Islam across thespectrum from revival and reform to global jihad.[319]

Noah Feldman distinguishes between what he calls the "deeply conservative" Wahhabis and what he calls the"followers of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s," such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later Al­Qaeda leaderAyman al­Zawahiri. While Saudi Wahhabis were "the largest funders of local Muslim Brotherhood chaptersand other hard­line Islamists" during this time, they opposed jihadi resistance to Muslim governments andassassination of Muslim leaders because of their belief that "the decision to wage jihad lay with the ruler, notthe individual believer".[320]

Karen Armstrong states that Osama bin Laden, like most extremists, followed the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, not"Wahhabism".[321]

More recently the self­declared "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria headed by Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi has beendescribed as both more violent than al­Qaeda and more closely aligned with Wahhabism.

For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are openand clear about their almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. Thegroup circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it

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controls. Videos from the group's territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of anofficial missionary van.[322]

According to scholar Bernard Haykel, "for Al Qaeda, violence is a means to an ends; for ISIS, it is an end initself." Wahhabism is the Islamic State's "closest religious cognate."[322]

The Sunni militant groups worldwide that are associated with the Wahhabi ideology include: Al­Shabaab,Ansar Dine, Al­Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS.

Criticism and controversy

Criticism by other Muslims

Among the criticism, or comments made by critics, of the Wahhabi movement are:

That it is not so much strict and uncompromising as aberrant,[323] going beyond the bounds of Islam in itsrestricted definition of tawhid (monotheism), and much too willing to commit takfir (declare non­Muslimand subject to execution) Muslims it found in violation of Islam[324] (in the second Wahhabi­Saudijihad/conquest of the Arabian peninsula, an estimated 400,000 were killed or wounded according to someestimates[112][113][114][115]);

That bin Saud's agreement to wage jihad to spread Ibn Abdul Wahhab's teachings had more to do withtraditional Najd practice of raiding – "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre" – than withreligion;[325]

That it has no connection to other Islamic revival movements;[326]That unlike other revivalists, its founder Abd ul­Wahhab showed little scholarship – writing little andmaking even less commentary;[327]That its rejection of the "orthodox" belief in saints, which had become a cardinal doctrine in Sunni Islamvery early on,[328][329][330] represents a departure from something which has been an "integral part ofIslam ... for over a millennium."[331][332] In this connection, mainstream Sunni scholars also critique theWahhabi citing of Ibn Taymiyyah as an authority when Ibn Taymiyyah himself adhered to the belief inthe existence of saints;[333]That its contention towards visiting the tombs and shrines of prophets and saints and the seeking of theirintercession, violate tauhid al­'ibada (directing all worship to God alone) has no basis in tradition, inconsensus or in hadith, and that even if it did, it would not be grounds for excluding practitioners ofziyara and tawassul from Islam;[324]That its use of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn al­Qayyim, and even Ibn Taymiyyah's name to support its stance isinappropriate, as it is historically known that all three of these men revered many aspects of Sufism, savethat the latter two critiqued certain practices among the Sufis of their time. Those who criticize thisaspect of Wahhabism often refer to the group's use of Ibn Hanbal's name to be a particularly egregiouserror, arguing that the jurist's love for the relics of Muhammad, for the intercession of the Prophet, andfor the Sufis of his time is well established in Islamic tradition;[334]That historically Wahhabis have had a suspicious willingness to ally itself with non­Muslim powers(specifically America and Britain), and in particular to ignore the encroachments into Muslim territory ofa non­Muslim imperial power (the British) while waging jihad and weakening the Muslim Caliphate ofthe Ottomans;[335][336] andThat Wahhabi strictness in matters of hijab and separation of the sexes has led not to a more pious andvirtuous Saudi Arabia, but to a society showing a very un­Islamic lack of respect towards women.

Initial opposition

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Al­Baqi' mausoleum reportedly containedthe bodies of Hasan ibn Ali (a grandson ofMuhammad) and Fatimah (the daughter ofMuhammad).

The first people to oppose Muhammad Ibn Abd al­Wahhab were his father Abd al­Wahhab and his brotherSalman Ibn Abd al­Wahhab who was an Islamic scholar and qadi. Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's brother wrote a book inrefutation of his brother's new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayingsof the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn `Abd al­Wahhab", also known as: "Al­Sawa`iq al­Ilahiyya fiMadhhab al­Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School").[337]

In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932",[337] Hamadi Redissi provides originalreferences to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (firqa) and outliers (Kharijites) in communicationsbetween Ottomans and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars(muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (Jahala).

Shi'a opposition

In 1801 and 1802, the Saudi Wahhabis under Abdul Aziz ibnMuhammad ibn Saud attacked and captured the holy Shia citiesof Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and destroyed the tombs of Husaynibn Ali who is the grandson of Muhammad, and Ali (Ali bin AbuTalib), the son­in­law of Muhammad (see: Saudi sponsorshipmentioned previously). In 1803 and 1804 the Saudis capturedMecca and Madinah and demolished various tombs of Ahl al­Bayt and Sahabah, ancient monuments, ruins according toWahhabis, they "removed a number of what were seen as sourcesor possible gateways to polytheism or shirk" – such as the tombof Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad. In 1998 the Saudisbulldozed and poured gasoline over the grave of Aminah bintWahb, the mother of Muhammad, causing resentment throughoutthe Muslim World.[338][339][340]

Shi'a Muslims complain that Wahhabis and their teachings are adriving force behind sectarian violence and anti­Shia targetedkillings in many countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan,Bahrain, Yemen. Worldwide Saudi run, sponsored mosques andIslamic schools teach Wahhabi version of the Sunni Islam that labels Shia Muslims, Sufis, Christians, Jews andothers as either apostates or infidels, thus paving a way for armed jihad against them by any means necessarytill their death or submission to the Wahhabi doctrine. Wahhabis consider Shi'ites to be the archenemies ofIslam.[341][342]

Sunni opposition

Wahhabism has been vehemently criticized by many mainstream Sunni Muslims and continues to becondemned by many prominent traditional Sunni scholars for being a "heretical and violent" innovation withinSunni Islam.[8] Among traditional Sunni organizations worldwide that oppose the Wahhabi ideology is the Al­Azhar in Cairo, the faculty of which regularly denounces Wahhabism with terms such as "Satanic faith."[8]Regarding Wahhabism, the renowned Azharite Sunni scholar and intellectual Muhammad Abu Zahra said:"The Wahhabis exaggerated [and bowdlerized] Ibn Taymiyya's positions ... The Wahhabis did not restrainthemselves to proselytism only, but resorted to warmongering against whoever disagreed with them on thegrounds that they were fighting innovation (bid`a), and innovations are an evil that must be fought.... Wheneverthey were able to seize a town or city they would come to the tombs and turn them into ruins and destruction ...and they would destroy whatever mosques were with the tombs also.... Their brutality did not stop there butthey also came to whatever graves were visible and destroyed them also. And when the ruler of the Hijazregions caved in to them they destroyed all the graves of the Companions and razed them to the ground.... Infact, it has been noticed that the Ulema of the Wahhabis consider their own opinions correct and not possiblywrong, while they consider the opinions of others wrong and not possibly correct. More than that, they consider

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Ajyad Fortress of The Ottoman Empirein Makkah Al­Mukkaramah

The historical Ajyad Fortress of the OttomanEmpire above was razed in 2002 to in orderto permit the construction of the Abraj AlBait hotel complex in Mecca below.

Abraj Al­Bait Towers, Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

what others than themselves do in the way of erecting tombs andcircumambulating them, as near to idolatry.... In this respect theyare near the Khawarij who used to declare those who dissentedwith them apostate and fight them as we already mentioned."[343]

In the 18th century, the Hanafi scholar Ibn Abidin declared theWahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab to be amodern­day manifestation of the Kharijites.[344][345] Anotherimportant early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the Sunni juristIbn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted to"Whoever declares that there is no god but God and prays towardMecca," for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not aform of worship but merely calling out to them, and that worshipat graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buriedsaints have the power to determine the course of events. Thesearguments were specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabileader at the time. [346]

The influential Sunni jurist and son of the renowned Moroccanscholar Abdullah al­Ghumari, Abu'l­Fayd Ahmad, staunchlycondemned Wahhabism and attacked it for straying away fromclassical tradition, stating: "And nothing has emerged ... to bringabout earthquakes and discord in the religion like Muhammad ibnAbd al­Wahhab, who was astray and led others astray. Hence hewas the Devil's Horn foretold by the Messenger (upon him beblessings and peace), and he abstained from offering prayer forNajd because of him, and because of the dissensions which wouldflow from his demonic preaching."[347]

The prominent Kuwaiti Sunni Shafi'i jurist Yusuf ibn al­SayyidHashim al­Rifa`i (1932­1999) remained a severe critic ofWahhabism throughout his scholarly life, and penned a famousfifty­seven point critique of the movement, titled Advice to theScholars of Najd. He criticized the followers of the movement forcausing discord among the Sunni community by their labeling allother Sunnis as "pagans," "innovators," and "deviants."[348]

In late 2016, at a conference of over a hundred Sunni thinkers inChechnya, Al­Azhar's current dean, Ahmed el­Tayeb was said to have taken an uncompromising stand againstWahhabism and Islamic terrorism by defining orthodox Sunnism as "the Ash'arites and Muturidis (adherents ofthe theological systems of Imam Abu Mansur al­Maturidi and Imam Abul Hasan al­Ash'ari) ... followers of anyof the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki or Hanbali) and ... also the followers of the Sufism ofImam Junaid al­Baghdadi in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification."[349]

The largest Sunni organization in the world, Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama, opposes Wahhabism,[350] referring toas a fanatical and innovative movement within the tradition of Sunnism.[351]

Malaysia's largest Islamic body, the National Fatwa Council, has described Wahhabism as being against Sunniteachings, Dr Abdul Shukor Husin, chairman of the National Fatwa Council, said Wahhabi followers were fondof declaring Muslims of other schools as apostates merely on the grounds that they did not conform to Wahhabiteachings.[352]

South Asia's Barelvi movement rejects Wahhabi beliefs.[353]

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The Somalia based paramilitary group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a actively battles Wahhabi militants to preventimposition of Wahhabi ideology.[354]

The Lebanon based Al­Ahbash movement uses takfir against Wahhabi and Salafi leaders.[355][356]

The Sufi Islamic Supreme Council of America founded by the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbaniclassify Wahhabism as being extremist and heretical based on Wahhabism's role as a terrorist ideology andlabelling of other Muslims, especially Sufis as polytheists, a practice known as Takfir.[357][358][359][360]

In general, mainstream Sunni Muslims condemn Wahhabism for being a major factor behind the rise of suchgroups as al­Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram, while also inspiring movements such as the Taliban.[361][362][363]

Non­religious motivations

According to at least one critic, the 1744–1745 alliance between Ibn Abdul Wahhab and the tribal chiefMuhammad bin Saud to wage jihad on neighboring allegedly false­Muslims, was a "consecration" by IbnAbdul Wahhab of bin Saud tribe's long standing raids on neighboring oases by "renaming those raids jihad."Part of the Najd's "Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin tribes against one another for control of thescarce resources that could stave off starvation." And a case of substituting fath, "the 'opening' or conquest of avast territory through religious zeal", for the "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre." [325]

Wahhabism in the United States

A study conducted by the NGO Freedom House found Wahhabi publications in mosques in the United States.These publications included statements that Muslims should not only "always oppose" infidels "in every way",but "hate them for their religion … for Allah's sake", that democracy "is responsible for all the horrible wars...the number of wars it started in the 20th century alone is more than 130 wars," and that Shia and certain SunniMuslims were infidels.[364][365] In a response to the report, the Saudi government stated, "[It has] workeddiligently during the last five years to overhaul its education system" but "[o]verhauling an educational systemis a massive undertaking."[366]

A review of the study by the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated[367] Institute for Social Policy and Understanding(ISPU) complained the study cited documents from only a few mosques, arguing most mosques in the U.S. arenot under Wahhabi influence.[368] ISPU comments on the study were not entirely negative however, andconcluded:

American­Muslim leaders must thoroughly scrutinize this study. Despite its limitations, the studyhighlights an ugly undercurrent in modern Islamic discourse that American­Muslims must openlyconfront. However, in the vigor to expose strains of extremism, we must not forget that opendiscussion is the best tool to debunk the extremist literature rather than a suppression of FirstAmendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.[368]

Concern has been expressed over the fact that U.S. university branches, like the Georgetown School of ForeignService and the Northwestern school of Journalism, housed in the wahabbi country of Qatar, are exposed to theextremist propaganda espoused by wahabist imams who preach at the Qatar Foundation mosque in EducationCity. Education City, a large campus where U.S. and European universities reside, hosted a series of religiousprayers and lectures as part of a month­long annual Ramadan program in 2015. The prayers and lectures wereheld at the new lavish mosque in Doha’s Education City, which shares the same campus as prestigious schoolsin the U.S. like Texas A&M and Carnegie Mellon. Among those who attended the lectures was a Saudipreacher who has described the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris as "the sequel to the comedy film of 9/11 "andanother cleric who says, "Jews and their helpers must be destroyed."[369] The mosque in education city has also

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been known to host extremist anti­semetic wahabbi preachers who speak against "Zionist aggressors" in theirsermons and called upon Allah "to count them in number and kill them completely, do not spare a [single] oneof them."[369] There are further allegations which suggest that Qatar sent professors back to America for beingJewish[370] and that students attending American Universities in Qatar are required to dress in a manner that isrespectful to Wahhabism.[371]

European expansion

There has been much concern, expressed in both American and European media and scholarship, over the factthat Wahhabi countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been financing mosques and buying up land all overEurope. Belgium, Ireland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy have all noted the growing influencethat these Wahhabi countries have over territory and religion in Europe.[372]

The concern resonates at a local level in Europe as well. In 2016, the citizens of Brussels, Belgium overturned a2015 decision to build a 600­person mosque next to the Qatari embassy. Fear largely emanates from the factthat Belgian citizens see the mosque as an opportunity for a Wahhabi country to exert control over Muslims inEurope, thus spreading the more extreme sect of Islam.[372]

Several articles have been written that list the Cork Islamic Cultural Center as an example of one of manyproperties throughout Europe, paid for by the Qatari government, in an effort to spread an extreme andintolerant form of Islam known as Wahhabism.[373][374]

The Assalam Mosque is located in Nantes, France was also a source on some controversy. Construction on themosque began in 2009 and was completed in 2012. It is the largest mosque in its region in France. The mosqueis frequently listed among examples of Qatar’s efforts to export Wahhabism, their extreme and often intolerantversion of Islam, throughout Europe.[372][373]

Some of the initiatives of the Cultural Islamic Center Sesto San Giovanni in Italy, funded by Qatar Charity,have also raised concerns due to its ties to Wahhabbism. The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF)said that the mosque has a history of affiliation and cooperation with extremists and terrorists.[375] CATF notesthat Qatar Charity "was named as a major financial conduit for al­Qaeda in judicial proceedings following theattacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania", supported al­Qaeda operatives in Northern Mali, andwas "heavily involved in Syria."[375]

Munich Forum for Islam (MFI), also known as the Center for Islam in Europe­Munich (ZIEM), was anothercontroversial initiative largely financed by the Wahhabi Gulf country of Qatar.[372] In 2013 German activistsfiled a lawsuit in opposition to the construction of the mosque. These activists expressed fear that the Qatarigovernment aimed to build Mosques all over Europe to spread Wahhabism. But the government squashed thelawsuit. In addition to this 2014 ruling, another court ordered an anti­mosque protester to pay a fine fordefaming Islam when the protester claimed that Wahhabi Islam is incompatible with democracy.[376]

The Islamic Cultural Center in Luxembourg was also funded by Qatar in what some note is an attempt by Qatarto spread Wahhabism in Europe.[377]

Destruction of Islam's early historical sites

The Wahhabi teachings disapprove of "veneration of the historical sites associated with early Islam", on thegrounds that "only God should be worshiped" and "that veneration of sites associated with mortals leads toidolatry".[378] However, critics point out that no Muslims venerate buildings or tombs as it is a shirk. Muslimsvisiting the resting places of Ahl al­Bayt or Sahabah still pray to Allah alone while remembering the Prophet'scompanions and family members. Many buildings associated with early Islam, including mazaar, mausoleums

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and other artifacts have been destroyed in Saudi Arabia by Wahhabis from the early 19th century through thepresent day.[42][43] This practice has proved controversial and has received considerable criticism from Sufi andShia Muslims and in the non­Muslim world.

Ironically, despite Wahhabi destruction of many Islamic, non­Islamic, and historical sites associated with thefirst Muslims, Prophet's family, his companions and a strict prohibition of visiting such (including mosques),Saudis renovated the tomb of Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab, turning his birthplace into a major touristattraction and an important place of visitation within the kingdom's modern borders.[379]

Ottoman return ofMecca 1813 afterbeing ousted by

Salafis.

Battle of Medina(1812), Ottoman Armyregains Medina from

Salafis.

Ottoman loyalistsgather against the Arab

Revolt.

Al­Baqi' before thedemolition by king IbnSaud in 1925.[380]

The grave of Aminah;it was destroyed in1998 by the Saudi

Arabian government.

See also

Sufi–Salafi relationsSalafismIslamismMuslim BrotherhoodOttoman–Saudi WarTakfirismShirk (Islam)Bid‘ahWahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global JihadDecline and modernization of the Ottoman Empire

Notes

References

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1. • WAHHABIYYA, a term used to denote (a) the doctrine and (b) the followers of Muhammad b. cAbd al­Wahhab.Brill Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed • Wahhābīyah An eighteenth­century religious revival (tajdīd) and reform (islāh) movement founded in Nejd inSaudi Arabia by the scholar and jurist Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al­Wahhāb (1702/3–1791/2). The Oxford Encyclopediaof the Islamic World • WAHHABIYAH An Islamic renewal group established by Muhammad ibn EAbd al­Wahhab (d. AH 1206/1792CE), the Wahhabıyah continues to the present in the Arabian Peninsula. The term Wahhabı was originally used byopponents of the movement, who charged that it was a new form of Islam, but the name eventually gained wideacceptance. Encyclopedia of Religion 2nd ed (MacMillan) • Ibn ‘Abd al­Wahhab, Muhammad (1703–92) Founder of a revivalist and reformist religious movement centeredin Najd in central Arabia and commonly referred to as the Wahhabiyya or Wahhabis, The Princeton Encyclopeidia ofIslamic Political Thought • Wahhabis Eighteenth­century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society. (The OxfordDictionary of Islam) • MUWAHHIDUN The movement was started by a religious scholar from Najd (Saudi Arabia), Muhammad ibnAbd al­Wahhab (1703–1792), schooled by ulama (Islamic clergy) in what is now Iraq, Iran, and the Hijaz (westernArabia). The Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa (2nd Edition) (MacMillan) • The Wahhabiyya is a conservative reform movement launched in eighteenth­century Arabia by Muhammad b.Abdal­Wahhab (1703–1792).Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world (MacMillan) • Wahhabism (Arabic: Wahhabiyya) Named after its founder, mUhammad ibn abd al­Wahhab (d. 1792), Wahhabismis the most important form of militant Islamic reformism to arise in the Arabian Peninsula. [...] It refers to a set ofdoctrines and practices and to a sectarian movement comprised of those who embrace them. Encyclopedia of Islam,InfoBase • Wahhabism. Wahhabism refers to a conservative interpretation of Islam founded as a revival and reformmovement in eighteenth­century Arabia (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World) • Wahabism An Islamic movement which developed during the eighteenth century in central Arabia, providing arigorous, puritanical interpretation of Sunni teaching. (A Dictionary of Contemporary World History (3 ed.), Oxford) • Wahhābī ISLAMIC MOVEMENT Wahhābī, also spelled Wahābī , any member of the Muslim reform movementfounded by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al­Wahhāb in the 18th century in Najd, central Arabia, and adopted in 1744 by theSaʿūdī family. (Encyclopedia Britannica) • Wahhābīya An ultra­conservative, puritanical Muslim movement adhering to the Ḥanbalite law, although it regardsitself as ghair muqallidīn, non­adherent to parties, but defending truth. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of WorldReligions, Oxford)

2. Mark Juergensmeyer, Wade Clark Roof, eds. (2011). "Wahhabis". Encyclopedia of Global Religion. SAGEPublications. p. 1369.

3. "Analysis Wahhabism". PBS Frontline. Retrieved 13 May 2014. "For more than two centuries, Wahhabism has beenSaudi Arabia's dominant creed. It is an austere form of Sunni Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of theQuran. Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies. Critics saythat Wahhabism's rigidity has led it to misinterpret and distort Islam, pointing to extremists such as Osama bin Ladenand the Taliban. Wahhabism's explosive growth began in the 1970s when Saudi charities started funding Wahhabischools (madrassas) and mosques from Islamabad to Culver City, California."

4. Schwartz, Steven. "Saudi Arabia and the Rise of the Wahhabi Threat". meforum. Retrieved 24 June 2014.5. Kampeas, Ron. "Fundamentalist Wahhabism Comes to U.S.". Belief.net, Associate Press. Retrieved 27 February2014.

6. "Wahhabi". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 2010­12­12.7. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris. p. vi. ISBN 9781845110802.8. Valentine, Simon. Force and Fanaticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 16–17. Retrieved 24 July 2016. "The majorityof mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims worldwide would strongly disagree with the interpretation of Wahhabismoutlined aove. Rather than see Wahhabism as a reform movement, many Muslims would reject it in the strongestterms as firqa, a new faction, a vile sect."

9. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. viv. "While Wahhabism claims torepresent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotessimplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances."

10. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006): p.235, footnote.

11. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). OxfordUniversity Press, USA. pp. 123–24. ISBN 0­19­516991­3. "Wahhabism has become [...] a blanket term for anyIslamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literalinterpretation of the Quran and hadith"

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12. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. ix. "Thus, the mission's devoteescontend that 'Wahhabism' is a misnomer for their efforts to revive correct Islamic belief and practice. Instead of theWahhabi label, they prefer either Salafi, one who follows the ways of the first Muslim ancestors (salaf), ormuwahhid, one who professes God's unity."

13. see also: Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowman & Littlefield, (2001), pp. 469–7214. Esposito 2003, p. 33315. "Wahhabi". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 2010­12­12.16. Christopher Melchert, The Ḥanābila and the Early Sufis, Arabica, T. 48, Fasc. 3 (Brill, 2001).17. James Pavlin (tr.), intro to Ibn Taymiyyah, Epistle on Worship: Risālat al­ʿUbūdiyya (London: Islamic Texts Society,

2015).18. Michael Sells, Professor of the History and Literature of Islam and Comparative Literature, University of Chicago,

Wahhabist Ideology: What It Is And Why It’s A Problem (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/wahhabist­ideology­what­it­is­and­why­its­a­problem_us_585991fce4b014e7c72ed86e). 12 Dec 2016.

19. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 7. ISBN 9780857731357. "TheWahhabi religious reform movement arose in Najd, the vast, thinly populated heart of Central Arabia."

20. "Wahhabi". GlobalSecurity.org. 2005­04­27. Archived from the original on 2005­05­07. Retrieved 2008­05­10.21. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi

Arabia. Viking. pp. 10–11. "the two ... concluded a pact. Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the stern doctrines ofthe Wahhabi mission, which made the Koran the basis of government. In return, Abdul Wahhab would support theruler, supplying him with 'glory and power.' Whoever championed his message, he promised, 'will, by means of it,rule and lands and men.'"

22. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 469. "A sect dominant in Saudi Arabia andQatar, at the beginning of the 19th century it gained footholds in India, Africa, and elsewhere."

23. Izady, Mehrdad (2014) [1999]. "Demography of Religion in the Gulf". Mehrdad Izady.24. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B.Tauris. p. 61. ISBN 9781845112578. ".... the financial

clout of Saudi Arabia [that] had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, followingthe Arab­Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase inwealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strengthin the global expression of Islam."

25. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005), The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, pp. 70–2.26. "What is Wahhabism? The reactionary branch of Islam said to be 'the main source of global terrorism' ". The

Telegraph. Retrieved 2016­12­16.27. Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (August 11, 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". The Washington Post.

Retrieved 21 August 2014.28. Dillon, Michael R. (September 2009). "Wahabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?" (PDF). Naval

Post­Graduate School. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 2 April 2014. "Hamid Algar ... emphasizes the strong influence of theSaudi petrodollar in the propagation of Wahhabism, but also attributes the political situation of the Arab world at thetime as a contributing factor that led to the co­opting of Salafism. ...Khaled Abou El Fadl, ... expresses the opinionthat Wahhabism would not have been able to spread in the modern Muslim world ... it would have to be spread underthe banner of Salafism. This attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was needed as Salafism was a much more'credible paradigm in Islam'; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism. ... The co­opting of Salafism by Wahhabismwas not completed until the 1970s when the Wahhabis stripped away some of their extreme intolerance and co­optedthe symbolism and language of Salafism; making them practically indistinguishable."

29. Stephane Lacroix, Al­Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17210/ISIM_21_Al­Albani­s_Revolutionary_Approach_to_Hadith.pdf?sequence=1). Leiden University's ISIMReview, Spring 2008, #21.

30. (Salafism has been termed a hybridation between the teachings of Ibn Abdul­Wahhab and others which have takenplace since the 1960s) Stephane Lacroix, Al­Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17210/ISIM_21_Al­Albani­s_Revolutionary_Approach_to_Hadith.pdf?sequence=1).Leiden University's ISIM Review, Spring 2008, #21.

31. GlobalSecurity.org Salafi Islam (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam­salafi.htm)32. "Washington Post, For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". Retrieved 13 November 2014.33. John L. Esposito. What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam. Oxford University Press. p. 54.

ISBN 9780199794133.34. Other sources give far lower numbers of Shia though they do not estimate the number of Wahhabi

(15% of KSA is Shia. sources: Saudi Arabia's Shia press for rights (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7959531.stm)| bbc|byAnees al­Qudaihi | 24 March 2009; and Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/publication/10903/shiite_muslims_in_the_middle_east.html)| Author: Lionel Beehner| June 16, 2006; Vali Nasr, Shia Revival, (2006) p. 236)

35. Haider, Murtaza (Jul 22, 2013). "European Parliament identifies Wahabi and Salafi roots of global terrorism".Dawn.com. Retrieved 3 August 2014.

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36. "Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States" (PDF). US GPO. June 26, 2003. "Journalists andexperts, as well as spokespeople of the world, have said that Wahhabism is the source of the overwhelming majorityof terrorist atrocities in today's world, from Morocco to Indonesia, via Israel, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya. Jon Kyl, USSenator for Arizona"

37. Partick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. Verso 2014. p. 638. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. vi. "[T]he pivotal idea in Ibn

Abd al­Wahhab’s teaching determines whether one is a Muslim or an infidel. In his opinion, Muslims who disagreedwith his definition of monotheism were not heretics, that is to say, misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islamaltogether"

39. Blanchard, Christopher M. "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Updated January 24, 2008.Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 12 March 2014.

40. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470. "Ibn `Abd al­Wahhab branded all whodisagreed with him as heretics and apostates, thereby justifying the use of force in imposing his doctrine, and politicalsuzerainty with it, on neighboring tribes. It allowed him to declare holy war (jihad), otherwise legally impossible,against other Muslims. To this end, Ibn `Abd al­Wahhab also taught the use of firearms in place of the sword and thelance, the traditional weapons of the desert."

41. Mouzahem, Haytham (April 20, 2013). "Saudi Wahhabi Sheikh Calls on Iraq's Jihadists to Kill Shiites". Al­Monitor.al­monitor. Retrieved 18 August 2014.

42. Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl (2004). "The Middle East: Cradle of the Muslim World". The Muslim World After9/11. Rand Corporation. p. 103, note 60. ISBN 0­8330­3712­9.

43. Howden, Daniel (August 6, 2005). "The destruction of Mecca: Saudi hardliners are wiping out their own heritage".The Independent. Retrieved 2009­12­21.

44. Finn, Helena Kane (October 8, 2002). "Cultural Terrorism and Wahhabi Islam". Council on Foreign Relations.Retrieved 5 August 2014. "It is the undisputed case that the Taliban justification for this travesty [the destruction ofthe Buddha statues at Bamiyan] can be traced to the Wahhabi indoctrination program prevalent in the Afghan refugeecamps and Saudi­funded Islamic schools (madrasas) in Pakistan that produced the Taliban. ...In Saudi Arabia itself,the destruction has focused on the architectural heritage of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, whereWahhabi religious foundations, with state support, have systematically demolished centuries­old mosques andmausolea, as well as hundreds of traditional Hijazi mansions and palaces."

45. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 157.46. Mahdi, Wael (March 18, 2010). "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". The National. Abu Dhabi

Media. Retrieved 12 June 2014.47. Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. MacMillan Reference. 2004. p. 727.48. Esposito, John L., ed. (2003­05­15). "(entry for Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab)". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam.

Oxford University Press. p. 123. ISBN 9780199757268.49. Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca, ISBN 978­093045279750. Moussalli, Ahmad (January 2009). "Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?" (PDF). Conflicts

Forum Monograph. Retrieved 8 June 2014.51. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). Oxford

University Press, USA. pp. 123–24. ISBN 0­19­516991­3.52. In the US the term "Wahhabi" was used in the 1950s to refer to "puritan Muslims", according to Life magazine. "The

King of Arabia". Life. 31 May 1943. p. 72. ISSN 0024­3019. Retrieved 22 June 2013.53. Bederka, Alan. "Wahhabism and Boko Haram" (PDF). Student Center for African Research and Resolutions.

Retrieved 4 August 2014. "Calling them Wahhabis implies that they learned ideas from a man – Muhammad ibnAbdul Wahhab – instead of the Qur'an and Sunnah the, two great sources of Islam."

54. Lacey, Robert (1981). The Kingdom. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Javonoich. p. 56.55. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 57.

"...the Wahhabis used to label themselves al­Muslimun (the Muslims) or al­Muwahidun (the monotheists), intimatingthat those who did not accept their creed were neither Muslims nor monotheists"

56. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 1–2."Wahhabis themselves prefer the titles al­Muwahhidun or Ahl al­Tauhid, 'the asserters of the divine unity.' Butprecisely this self­awarded title springs from a desire to lay exclusive claim to the principle of tawhid that is afoundation of Islam itself; it implies a dismissal of all other Muslims as tainted by shirk. There is no reason toacquiesce in this assumption of a monopoly, and because the movement in question was ultimately the work of oneman, Muhammad b. abdal­Wahhab it is reasonable as well as conventional to speak of 'Wahhabism' and Wahhabis."

57. Gold, Dore (2003). Hatred's Kingdom (First ed.). Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. p. 21.58. Mark Durie (June 6, 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum.

"Salafis themselves do not like being called Wahhabis, because to them it smacks of idolatry to name their movementafter a recent leader. Instead they prefer to call themselves Ahl al­Sunnah "People of the Sunna"."

59. According to author Abdul Aziz Qassim (source: Mahdi, Wael (March 18, 2010). "There is no such thing asWahabism, Saudi prince says". The National. Abu Dhabi Media. Retrieved 12 June 2014.)

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60. Abou el Fadl, Khalid (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 57."...the Wahhabis used to label themselves al­Muslimun (the Muslims) or al­Muwahidun (the monotheists), intimatingthat those who did not accept their creed were neither Muslims nor monotheists."

61. Wahhabism: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide. Oxford University Press. 2010. p. 3.ISBN 9780199804344.

62. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 469. "Adherents ... prefer to callthemselves Muhwahhidun (Unitarians). However, this name is not often used, as [it] is associated with othercompletely different sects extant and defunct."

63. Qadhi, Dr. Yasir. "On Salafi Islam". Muslim Matters. Muslim Matters. Retrieved 10 March 2015.64. MacFarquhar, Neil (July 12, 2002). "A Few Saudis Defy a Rigid Islam to Debate Their Own Intolerance". New York

Times. Retrieved 4 May 2014. "Wahhabi­inspired xenophobia dominates religious discussion in a way not foundelsewhere in the Islamic world.Bookshops in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, for example, sell a 1,265­page souvenir tome that is a kind of"greatest hits" of fatwas on modern life. It is strewn with rulings on shunning non­Muslims: don't smile at them,don't wish them well on their holidays, don't address them as "friend."A fatwa from Sheik Muhammad bin Othaimeen, whose funeral last year attracted hundreds of thousands of mourners,tackles whether good Muslims can live in infidel lands. The faithful who must live abroad should "harbor enmity andhatred for the infidels and refrain from taking them as friends," it reads in part."

65. "There is no such thing as Wahabism, Saudi prince says". Retrieved 13 November 2014.66. "Saudi Prince Salman: The Term 'Wahhabi' Was Coined by Saudi Arabia's Enemies". Retrieved 13 November 2014.67. Mattson, Ingrid (18 October 2001). "Ingrid Mattson: What is Islam? CNN Interview". Retrieved 23 October 2015.68. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March

2014.69. Riedel, Bruce O. (2011). "Saudi Arabia, Elephant in the Living Room". The Arab Awakening: America and the

Transformation of the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press. p. 160. ISBN 0815722273.70. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 150.

ISBN 0307473287.71. "Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division,"

Congressional Research Service.72. Murphy, Caryle (September 5, 2006). "For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". Washington Post.

"The kind of Islam practiced at Dar­us­Salaam, known as Salafism, once had a significant foothold among areaMuslims, in large part because of an aggressive missionary effort by the government of Saudi Arabia. Salafism andits strict Saudi version, known as Wahhabism, struck a chord with many Muslim immigrants who took a dim view ofthe United States' sexually saturated pop culture and who were ambivalent about participating in a secular politicalsystem."

73. Lewis, Bernard (April 27, 2006). "Islam and the West: A Conversation with Bernard Lewis (transcript)".pewforum.org. Pew. Retrieved 5 August 2014. "There are others, the so­called Salafia. It's run along parallel lines tothe Wahhabis, but they are less violent and less extreme – still violent and extreme but less so than the Wahhabis."

74. Mark Durie (June 6, 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum."What is called Wahhabism – the official religious ideology of the Saudi state – is a form of Salafism. Strictlyspeaking, 'Wahhabism' is not a movement, but a label used mainly by non­Muslims to refer to Saudi Salafism,referencing the name of an influential 18th­century Salafi teacher, Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab. ... The continuingimpact of Salafi dogma in Saudi Arabia means that Saudi leaders are active and diligent in funding and promotingSalafism all around the world. If there is a mosque receiving Saudi funding in your city today, in every likelihood it isa Salafi mosque. Saudi money has also leveraged Salafi teachings through TV stations, websites and publications."

75. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 47.76. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. p. 75.77. Kepel, Gilles (2003). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B. Tauris. pp. 61–62.78. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 208. "Much of Wahhabism's 20th­

century experience has been the story of trade­offs for the sake of consolidating the position of its political guardian.The ulama gained control over education, law, public morality and religious institutions. In return, they only mildlyobjected to the import of modern technology and communications and did not hamper Abd al­Aziz ibn Saud's dealingswith the British, non­Saudi Arabs and Americans."

79. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 156. "The gradual erosion ofWahhabi credibility has been punctuated by three major crises ....[November 1979 seizure of Grand Mosque; [2] Iraqinvasion of Kuwait; [3] 9/11]"

80. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 156. "[Wahhabi clerics] dependenceon the Saudi government disposed leading Wahhabi clerics to support its policies. As political discontent in thekingdom intensified, the Wahhabi establishment found itself in the awkward position of defending and unpopulardynasty."

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81. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 179. "the ulemaoccupy center stage in times of crisis and turn the situation to their own advantage. But the 1980s iteration of thistradition, the religious leaders called upon by the royal family to reestablish moral order were not Wahhabite clericsbut were rather sahwa militants"

82. Long, David E (2005). "Saudi Arabia [review of Wahhabi Islam by Natana DeLong­Bas]". Middle East Journal. 59:316–19. JSTOR 4330135.

83. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2007­01­01). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B.Tauris. p. 17.ISBN 9781845113223.

84. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2007­01­01). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B.Tauris. p. 22.ISBN 9781845113223.

85. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. ix.86. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. xix, x. "Muslims sharply disagree

on this question of definition because the pivotal idea in Ibn Abd al­Wahhab's teaching determines whether one is aMuslim or an infidel. In his opinion, Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not heretics,that is to say, misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether. ... "Most Muslims throughout history have accepted the position that declaring this profession of faith [the shahada]makes one a Muslim. One might or might not regularly perform the other obligatory rituals ... but ... anyshortcomings would render one a sinner, not an unbeliever. Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either aMuslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God. ... any act or statement thatindicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamountto idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practicesthat made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries,including his own brother."

87. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 51."Abd al­Wahhab described the Ottoman caliphate as al­dawlah al­kufriyya (a heretical nation) and claimed thatsupporting or allying oneself with the Ottomans was as grievous a sin as supporting or allying oneself with Christiansor Jews."

88. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 24. "Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab ... insisted that invoking and making vows to holy men indeed constituted major idolatry and that it wasproper to deem as infidels anyone who failed to view such practices as idolatry. ... He then stated that if one admitsthat these practices are major idolatry, then fighting is a duty as part of the prophetic mission to destroy idols. Thus,the idolater who call upon a saint for help must repent, If he does so, his repentance is accepted. If not, he is to bekilled. [source: Ibn Ghannam, Hussien, Tarikh najd. (Cairo 1961) p. 438] ... In the end, the debate ... was not settledby stronger argument but by force majeure through Saudi conquest, carried out in the name of holy war, or jihad."

89. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 18. "In 1744, Muhammad ibn Abdal­Wahhab arrived in al­Dir'iyya .... This was the origin of the pact between religious mission and political power thathas endured for more than two and half centuries, a pact that has survived traumatic defeats and episodes of completecollapse."

90. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 18. "Muhammad ibn Saud declaredhis readiness to back the mission against unbelief and idolatry but insisted ... two conditions. ... Second, that SheikhMuhammad approve of Ibn Saud's taxation of al­Dir'iyya's harvests. The reformer ... replied that God mightcompensate the amir with booty and legitimate taxes greater than the taxes on harvests."

91. English, Jeanette M. (2011). "14". Infidel behind the paradoxical veil. 1 (first ed.). AuthorHouse™. p. 260.ISBN 978­1­4567­2810­6. LCCN 2011900551. Retrieved 2012­04­11. "In the last years of the 18th century, Ibn Saudattempted to seize control of Arabia and its outer lying regions and his heirs spent the next 150 years in this pursuit.This was done at the expense of the overlords of the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the house of Al Saud met withdefeat at the hands of the Ottoman and Egyptian armies, resulting in the burning of Diriyah."

92. Ibrahim, Youssef Michel (August 11, 2002). "The Mideast Threat That's Hard to Define". cfr.org. The WashingtonPost. Retrieved 21 August 2014. "The Saudi minister of religion is always a member of the Al Sheikh family,descendents of Ibn Abdul Wahab. Moreover links between Ibn Abdul Wahab and the house of Saud have been sealedwith multiple marriages."

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93. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March2014. "Muhammad ibn Saud turned his capital, Ad Diriyah, into a center for the study of religion under the guidanceof Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and sent missionaries to teach the reformed religion throughout the peninsula, thegulf, and into Syria and Mesopotamia. Together they began a jihad against the backsliding Muslims of the peninsula.Under the banner of religion and preaching the unity of God and obedience to the just Muslim ruler, the Al Saud by1803 had expanded their dominion across the peninsula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, schools, and theapparatus of state power. So successful was the alliance between the Al ash Shaykh and the Al Saud that even afterthe Ottoman sultan had crushed Wahhabi political authority and had destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Ad Diriyah in1818, the reformed religion remained firmly planted in the settled districts of southern Najd and of Jabal Shammar inthe north. It would become the unifying ideology in the peninsula when the Al Saud rose to power again in the nextcentury."

94. At various times Ibn Abd al­Wahhab either waged not jihad but only qital (fighting) against unbelievers, ... DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: OxfordUniversity Press, USA. p. 203. ISBN 0­19­516991­3.

95. ... did not give his blessing to Ibn Saud's campaign of conquest,DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam:From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, USA. p. 35. ISBN 0­19­516991­3. "Ibn Abd al­Wahhab promised not to interfere with Muhammad Ibn Saud's state consolidation, andMuhammad Ibn Saud promised to uphold Ibn Abd al Wahhab's religious teachings. … [But] there is a marked difference between noninterference in military activities and active support and religiouslegitimation for them. … Rather than actively supporting or promoting this conquest, Ibn Abd al­Wahhab merely'acceded' to it, hoping that Ibn Saud would get his fill of conquest and then focus on more important matter – thosepertaining to religious reform. In fact, as evidence of the lack of religious support this military conquest enjoyed, IbnAbd al­Wahhab left Ibn Saud's company altogether during this campaign, devoting himself instead to spiritual mattersand prayer"

96. DeLong­Bas also maintains that Ibn Abd al­Wahhab waged jihad only in defense against aggressive opponents:DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York:Oxford University Press, USA. p. 38. ISBN 0­19­516991­3. "Opponents of the Wahhabi movement claimed religiousjustification for their military actions by accusing the Wahhabis of ignorance, sorcery and lies … It was only at thispoint – when the Wahhabi community was threatened – that Ibn Abd al­Wahhab finally authorized a jihad as holy warto defend the Wahhabis. However, even this defensive jihad remained limited in scope, as fighting was permitted onlyagainst those who had either attacked or insulted his followers directly."

97. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York:Oxford University Press. p. 245. ISBN 0­19­516991­3.

98. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). New York:Oxford University Press. pp. 247–50. ISBN 0­19­516991­3.

99. Simon Ross Valentine (2015). Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond (First ed.). London:C. Hurst & Co. p. 49. ISBN 978­1849044646.

100. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March2014. "Muhammad ibn Saud turned his capital, Ad Diriyah, into a center for the study of religion under the guidanceof Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and sent missionaries to teach the reformed religion throughout the peninsula, thegulf, and into Syria and Mesopotamia. Together they began a jihad against the backsliding Muslims of the peninsula.Under the banner of religion and preaching the unity of God and obedience to the just Muslim ruler, the Al Saud by1803 had expanded their dominion across the peninsula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, schools, and theapparatus of state power. So successful was the alliance between the Al ash Shaykh and the Al Saud that even afterthe Ottoman sultan had crushed Wahhabi political authority and had destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Ad Diriyah in1818, the reformed religion remained firmly planted in the settled districts of southern Najd and of Jabal Shammar inthe north. It would become the unifying ideology in the peninsula when the Al Saud rose to power again in the nextcentury."

101. Olivier Roy, Antoine Sfeir, ed. (2007). Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism. Columbia University Press.pp. 399–400. "The history of the Al Sa'ud dynasty is, therefore, one of political expansion based on the Wahhabidoctrine. After the conclusion of the pact of 1744, Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, who at the time ruled only the Najd villageof Dir'iya, embarked on the conquest of neighboring settlements, destroying idols and obliging his new subjects tosubmit to Wahhabi Islam."

102. "Wahhabism ­ A Critical Essay". 11 February 2005.103. Khatab, Sayed. Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism: The Theological and Ideological Basis of Al­Qa'ida's

Political Tactics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9789774164996. Retrieved 8 September 2016.104. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 31. ISBN 9780857731357. "... al­

Jabarti reported the 1803 masacre at Ta'if, where Wahhabi forces slaughtered the men and enslaved the women andchildren."

105. Kamal S. Salibi (1998­12­25). The Modern History of Jordan. I.B.Tauris. p. 31. Retrieved 2016­06­08.

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106. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 38. "Ibrahim's ruthless prosecutionof the war, al­Dir'iyya's leveling and the exile of the emirate's political and religious leadership gave the sameimpression to a sojourning European as it did to Arabian Bedouins and townsmen: The Saudi emirate and theWahahbi mission had been crushed once and for all."

107. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 41.108. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 69. "Wahhabism retained hegemony

over Najd's religious life because of the political shelter provided by Saudi power. In turn, the Saudi realm couldmaintain its independence vis­a­vis Istanbul because of physical and technological factors: Its geographical isolation,its lack of valuable resources, the limits of nineteenth­century communications, transportation and militarytechnologies made conquest and pacification too costly for both Cairo and Istanbul. These outside powers decided toleave the Saudis alone so long as they did not revive the first amirate's impulse for expansion through jihad andrefrained from attacking Hijaz, Iraq and Syria."

109. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 69. "Outside of al­Qasim, theRashidis left Wahhabi ulama in place a qadis throughout Najd, including the amirate's capital Ha'il. By the 1880s,generations of Najdi townsmen had lived in a Wahhabi milieu. The strict monotheistic doctrine had been naturalizedas the native religious culture."

110. Lacey, The Kingdom, 1981, p.525111. "Imam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Saud information resource". "Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab sought the

protection of Muhammad bin Saud, in Ad­Dariyah, the home of the House of Saud... ... they had interests incommon, pre­eminently a desire to see all the Arabs of the Peninsula brought back to Islam in its simplest and purestform. In 1744, they therefore took an oath that they would work together to achieve this end."

112. bin Zini Dahlan, Ahmad (1997). futuhat al­Islamiyya ba'd Mudiy al­Futuhat al­Nabawiyya. Beirut: Dar Sidir.pp. 2:234–45.

113. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: a Critical Essay. Islamic Publications International. p. 42.114. Van der Meulen, D. (October 15, 2000). The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud. Routledge. pp. 62–113. ISBN 978­0710306760.115. Simons, Geoff (1998). Saudi Arabia: the Shape of Client Feudalism. Palgrave, UK; MacMillan, US. pp. 151–73.116. Blanchard, Christopher M. "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF). Updated January 24, 2008.

Congressional Research Service. pp. 2–3. Retrieved 4 May 2014. "Since the foundation of the modern kingdom ofSaudi Arabia in 1932, there has been a close relationship between the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi religiousestablishment.3 Wahhabi­trained Bedouin warriors known as the Ikhwan were integral to the Al Saud family'smilitary campaign to reconquer and unify the Arabian peninsula from 1912 until an Ikhwan rebellion was put down byforce in 1930. Thereafter, Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom's religious and politicalestablishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws adopted to govern social affairs in SaudiArabia. Wahhabism also shaped the kingdom's judicial and educational policies. Saudi schoolbooks historically havedenounced teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs, an issue that remains controversial within SaudiArabia and among outside observers."

117. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 102–3. "What we do know is thatIbn Saud hewed to the dynastic tradition of supporting Wahhabi ulama and giving them control over religiousinstitutions. At the same time, he tempered Wahhabi zeal when he felt that it clashed with the demands ofconsolidating power in Hijaz and al­Hasa or the constraints of firmer international boundaries maintained by the era'sdominant power in the region, Great Britain. Simply put, political considerations trumped religious idealism. Thesame principle governed Ibn Saud's approach to adopting modern technology, building a rudimentary administrativeframework and signing the oil concession with the Americans."

118. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 88.119. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. 77. "The Ikhwan pressed for

strict adherence to Wahhabi norms, but Ibn Saud was willing to take a more relaxed approach to matters like smokingtobacco and worship at shrines"

120. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 76–7. "Wahhabi ulama ordered thedemolition of several Shiite mosques and took over teaching and preaching duties at the remaining mosques in orderto convert the population. ... some Shiites emigrated to Bahrain and Iraq. ... The intensive phase of Wahhabi coercionlasted about one year. When ibn Saud decided to curb the Ikhwan, he permitted the shiites to drive away Wahhabipreachers."

121. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 78. "Ibn Saud designated localdignitaries in Mecca and Jeddah to enforce loosely the Wahhabi prohibition of tobacco, alcohol, playing cards and thephonograph. The outcome of this approach was the preservation of a more relaxed atmosphere in Hijaz than in Najd.Standards would stiffen when Ibn Saud arrived for the pilgrimage with a retinue of Wahhabi ulama and then slackenwith his departure. ...[Ibn Saud] even pioneered the use of automobiles to transport pilgrims from Jeddah to Meccaover the objections of Wahhabi ulama who considered them a prohibited innovation. In another sign of Ibn Saud'swillingness to disregard Wahhabi sensibilities, he allowed Shiites to perform the pilgrimage."

122. Cook, Michael (2001). Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge University Press.

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123. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 95. "[the first] documented instanceof a formal committee to enforces the duty dates to 1926, [when the official Saudi newspaper in Mecca published thenews of its establishment]"

124. "The First Ikhwan Rebellion 1927–1928. Wars of the World". Globe University. Retrieved 29 April 2014. "Theyattacked Ibn Sa'ud for introducing such innovations as telephones, automobiles, and the telegraph and for sending hisson to a country of unbelievers (Egypt). Despite Ibn Sa'ud's attempts to mollify the Ikhwan by submitting theiraccusations to the religious scholars ('ulama'), they provoked an international incident by destroying an Iraqi forcethat had violated a neutral zone established by Great Britain and Ibn Sa'ud between Iraq and Arabia (1927–28); theBritish bombed Najd in retaliation."

125. University of Central Arkansas, Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf Region (http://faculty.uca.edu/markm/tpi_narrative_middleeast.htm)

126. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 47–9. "Ibn Atiq considered thefirst category, those who willingly fall in with the idolaters to be infidels. ... Those in the second category are notinfidels but sinners because they stay with idolaters for the sake of wealth or preserving family ties; ... it is a sin,however, to remain in their land even if in one's heart one hates the idolaters. ... Those in the third category are freeof any blame. They openly practise religion or are compelled to reside among idolaters. ... For the rest of thenineteenth century strict enforcement of this aversion to mixing with idolaters – and in Wahhabi terms, most Muslimsfell into that category – would remain the norm of in Wahhabi discourse."

127. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 130.128. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 130.129. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 144. "Ahl­i Hadith scholars and

Wahhabis agreed that Sufis and Shiites were not true believers. The movement also shared with the Wahhabis thatdesire to revive the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and a tendency to express intolerance toward other Muslims (Ahl­iHadith preachers compared Delhi's Muslims to idolaters)."

130. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 134. "Alusi began a campaignagainst ritual innovations in Sufi orders like music, dance and veneration of saints' tombs"

131. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 133.132. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 46. "Rashid

Rida (d. 1935) ... After a visit to the newly conquered Hijaz, he published a work praising the Saudi ruler as thesavior of the Haramayn and a practitioner of authentic Islamic rule and, two years later, an anthology of Wahhabitreatises. [why?] ... the aftermath of World War One saw both the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate and the failure ofSharif Husay to gain either a pan­Arab kingdom or acceptance by Muslim as a candidate for a revived caliphate. It is,then perhaps, not surprising that persons of salafi tendency ... casting around in desperation for a hero, should havebegun to view Ibn Sa'ud with favor and to express sympathy for Wahhabism."

133. However, Rida had some liberal religious ideas and after his death his works were banned in Saudi Arabia.Abou ElFadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 92. "Rida'sliberal ideas and writings were fundamentally inconsistent with Wahhabism, and this is why after Rida's death, theWahhabis regularly condemned and maligned Rida. … the Saudis banned the writings of Rida, successfullypreventing the republication of his work even in Egypt, and generally speaking made his books very difficult tolocate"

134. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 138.135. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 103. "By the early 1950s, Saudi

Arabia was by no means a modern state. ... Nevertheless, the twin pressures of controlling regions outside theWahhabi heartland and navigating the currents of regional politics led him to take steps that punctured the sealbetween the internal land of belief and the outside land of idolatry."

136. see also Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 155.137. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 151–52. "in the 1950s and 1960s,

two dramatic shift in Arab regional and Saudi domestic politics brought Islam to the fore as an element in thekingdom's international relations. ...[1] the polarization of Arab politics between revolutionary (republican,nationalist) regimes and conservative monarchies and, [2] in the domestic realm, the assimilation of politicalideologies sweeping nearby Arab lands."

138. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 49. "It wasin the bosom of this organization, intended to eclipse all other supranational Islamic organizations, that a closerassociation between leading Salafis and Wahhabis came into being. Its constituent council, which met for the firsttime in December 1962, was headed by the then chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al­Shaykh, alineal descendant of Muhammad b. Abd al­Wahhab, and the presidency remains to this day vested in the Saudi chiefmufti. Included among its eight other members were important representatives of the Salafi tendency: Sa'id Ramadan,son­in­law of Hasan al­Banna, ... Maulana Abu l­A'la Maududi ... Maulanda Abu 'l­Hasan Nadvi (d. 2000) of India.In accordance with statute, the head of the league's secretariat has always been a Saudi citizen, the first to occupy thepost being Muhammad Surur al­Sabban."

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139. Robinson, Francis (November 2006). "review of The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia". Journal of the RoyalAsiatic Society. 16: 320–22. doi:10.1017/s1356186306286474. JSTOR 25188657. "Then, the book [The WahhabiMission and Saudi Arabia] widens its focus to embrace the world beyond Arabia and to demonstrate how theWahhabis and Islamic revivalists in the world beyond, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of theAhl­i Hadith and the Jamaat­i Island, found common cause in their rejection of the West and its ways which were sodeleterious of Muslim piety and values."

140. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 153. "The League also sentmissionaries to West Africa, where it funded schools, distributed religious literature and gave scholarships to attendSaudi religious universities. These efforts bore fruit in Nigeria's Muslim northern region with the creation of amovement (the Izala Society) dedicated to wiping out ritual innovations. Essential texts for members of the IzalaSociety are Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab's treatise of God's unity and commentaries by his grandsons."

141. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. 5. "The decision to offerasylum to Muslim Brothers fleeing persecution at the hands of secular Arab regimes was part of an effort toconsolidate the bastion of Islam against atheist currents. No one could have foreseen that the Muslim Brothers wouldsuccessfully spread their ideas in the kingdom and erode Wahhabism's hegemony."

142. "In Depth Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood". 06 Feb 2011. Al Jazeera. Retrieved 29 April 2014. "... targets ofstate repression. When Gamal Abdel Nasser took over Egypt in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood is said to havewelcomed the coup, but this budding relationship did not last. An attempted assassination on Nasser in 1954, blamedby the authorities on elements of the Brotherhood, saw the movement face a crackdown that led to the imprisonmentof Qutb and other members. In 1956, the organisation was repressed and banned and Qutb was executed in 1966.However, it continued to grow, albeit underground."

143. Godlas, Alan. "The Muslim Brotherhood in 'Iraq Until 1991". University of Georgia. Retrieved 12 June 2014.144. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 156. "In the melting

pot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militantsaffiliated with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq –then allies of Moscow."

145. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 144. "Inthe 1960s, when Faisal became king, he championed the creation of public schools across the kingdom for boys—andalso girls. The largely illiterate nation had few qualified teachers, so the government dispatched emissaries abroad,mostly to Egypt and Jordan, to recruit teachers with substantive skills who also were devout Muslims. A hallmark ofKing Faisal's reign was an effort to create an Islamic alliance in the Middle East to counter the Arab nationalism ofEgypt's president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. When Nasser, a nationalist strongman and sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia,turned on his country's conservative Muslim Brotherhood, King Faisal welcomed those religious conservatives intoSaudi Arabia as scholars and teachers, reinforcing the fundamentalist hold on the young Ministry of Education,founded in 1954 under his predecessor and half­brother, King Saud."

146. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for SaudiArabia. Viking. pp. 56–57. "The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salafis and alsoof the dawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamicstates. But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change­promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, andthe equal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the establishment in a style that wasunthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively deferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House ofSaud. It was heady stuff for the young students of Jeddah, taking the Wahhabi values they had absorbed in childhoodand giving them a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist. They had learned of jihad at school as an instantlyromantic concept – part of history. Now they were hearing of its practical possibility today, and they could even makepersonal contact with jihad in the barrel­chested shape of Abdullah Azzam, who gave lectures in both Jeddah andMecca in the early 1980s. The Saudi government had welcomed ideologues like Azzam and Mohammed, the survivingQutub, to the Kingdom as pious reinforcement against the atheistic, Marxist­tinged thinking of their Middle Easternneighborhood. But in the process they were exposing young Saudi hearts and minds to a still more potent virus –hands­on, radical Islam."

147. Kepel, Gilles (2006). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Belknap Press. pp. 173–74. "Within thekingdom itself, the Muslim Brothers obeyed the prohibition on proselytizing to Saudi subjects [but] ... contributed todiscussion circles and frequented the salons held by princes ... Methodically but without fanfare, the Brothers tookcontrol of Saudi Arabia's intellectual life, publishing books that extended their influence among educators andgenerally making themselves politically useful while obeying the orders that kept them away from the pulpits."

148. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 156."Stephane Lacroix, a Saudi expert at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, sums up the battle over education inSaudi Arabia: 'The education system is so controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, it will take 20 years to change – ifat all. Islamists see education as their base so they won't compromise on this.' [source: telephone interview by authorKaren House]"

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149. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 201. "The content analysis revealsboth Wahhabi doctrine and Muslim Brothers themes. In fact, the Muslim Brother imprint on this sample of Saudischoolbooks is striking. Apparently members of the organization secured positions in the Ministry of Education,which they used to propagate their ideas."

150. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 112. "A new Islamic university inMedina was created to train proselytizers and its regulations called for 75% of its students to come from abroad."

151. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 164.152. Commins, David (2006). The WahhaThe Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabiabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.

I.B.Tauris. p. 185. Retrieved 23 October 2015. "David Commins, in The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia...believes that 'the ideology of Osama bin Laden and al­Qaeda is not Wahhabi. It is instead a part of contemporaryjihadist tendency that evolved from the teachings of Sayyid Qutb…in other words; Al­Qaeda belongs to an offshoot oftwenty­first century Muslim revivalist ideology, not Wahhabism.' ... agrees with DeLong­Bas's conclusions that Al­Qaeda's ideology evolved with the introduction of Salafi ideas from Sayyid Qutb and other Muslim Brotherhoodmembers."

153. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (PDF). I.B.Tauris. p. 172. "the pronouncements andactions [of Juhayman, the leader of the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure] indicated that a combustible mix of Wahhabi andmodern Islamic revivalism was brewing in the niches of Saudi mosques. Exactly how and when these elementscombined has not yet been established beyond the common knowledge that Saudi Arabia opened its doors to membersof the Muslim Brothers fleeing repression by secular regimes in Egypt and Syrian in the later 1950s and 1960s Theyspread their ideas by occupying influential positions in educational institutions and circulating their literature."

154. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 157. "In the meltingpot of Arabia during the 1960s, local clerics trained in the Wahhabite tradition joined with activists and militantsaffiliated with the Muslim Brothers who had been exiled from the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq –then allies of Moscow. This blend of traditionalists and modern Islamist militants served the kingdom's interests wellat first, because it countered the threat of a 'progressive', pro­Soviet Islam – the brand preached at Al AzharUniversity in Egypt during the Nasser regime. But eventually this volatile mixture would explode in the Saudis'hands."

155. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 155–56. ""In the 1950s and 60s ....within Saudi Arabia, official religious institutions under Wahhabi control multiplied at the same time that ulamamaintained their hold on religious law courts, presided over the creation of Islamic universities and ensured thatchildren in public schools received a heavy dose of religious instruction."

156. Vogel, Frank E, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000), p. 80157. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 154.158. Lacey, Robert (1981). The Kingdom : Arabia and the House of Sa'ud. Harcourt Brace Javonovich. p. back cover.159. Kepel, Jihad, 2003, p. 72160. Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and

Schuster, 2002 p. 32161. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 234. "A

former US Treasury Department official is quoted by Washington Post reporter David Ottaway in a 2004 article[Ottaway, David The King's Messenger New York: Walker, 2008, p. 185] as estimating that the late king [Fadh] spent'north of $75 billion' in his efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. According to Ottaway, the king boasted on his personalWeb site that he established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, and 2000 schools for Muslimchildren in non­Islamic nations. The late king also launched a publishing center in Medina that by 2000 haddistributed 138 million copies of the Koran worldwide."

162. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 176.163. Azzam was a lecturer at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah and active in the Muslim World League164. Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation after Faith165. Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 2003, p. 145–47166. Aboul‐Enein,, Youssef. "The Late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam's Books" (PDF). dtic.mil. Combating Terrorism Center.

Retrieved 5 June 2014.167. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 174.168. Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel, p. 143169. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by. Harvard University Press. p. 139. "The summit of the

Organization of the Islamic Conference at Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January 1981, which had reached a consensus on theidea of launching a jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine, refused to do the same for Afghanistan.Instead, it confined itself to calling on all Islamic states to cooperate with the UN secretary general in bringing an endto a situation that was 'prejudicial to the Afghan people.'"

170. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 63. "It is important to emphasize,however, that the 1979 rebels were not literally a reincarnation of the Ikhwan and to underscore three distinct featuresof the former: They were millenarians, they rejected the monarchy and they condemned the wahhabi ulama."

171. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 163.

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172. Benjamin, The Age of Sacred Terror (2002) p. 90173. Salame, Ghassan, "Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia", Arab Studies Quarterly, v.ix n. 3 (1987), p.321174. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 179. "in keeping

with a pattern dating back to the alliance between the royal family and tribal clerics, in which the ulema occupy centerstage in times of crisis and turn the situation to their own advantage. But the 1980s iteration of this tradition, thereligious leaders called upon by the royal family to reestablish moral order were not Wahhabite clerics but were rathersahwa militants whose belief system was a hybrid of Salafism and Qutbist thought and whose allegiances lay outsidethe Saudi kingdom."

175. Wright, Sacred Rage, (2001), p. 155176. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi

Arabia. Viking. pp. 49–52.177. Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowman & Littlefield, (2001), pp. 469–72178. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi

Arabia. Viking. p. 48. "'Those old men actually believed that the Mosque disaster was God's punishment to usbecause we were publishing women's photographs in the newspapers,' says a princess, one of Khaled's nieces. 'Theworrying thing is that the king [Khaled] probably believed that as well.' ... Khaled had come to agree with the sheikhs.Foreign influences and bida'a were the problem. The solution to the religious upheaval was simple – more religion."

179. Lacroix, Stéphane. "Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood predicament". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 March 2014.180. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 176. "... Iraq's 2 August 1990

invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's annexation of the oil­rich amirate alarmed Riyadh and Washington, in largemeasure because his intentions were unclear: Did he intend to push south to seize the oil fields in Saudi Arabia'sEastern province."

181. DeLong­Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). USA: OxfordUniversity Press,. p. 269. ISBN 0­19­516991­3. "For the Muslim Saudi monarchy to invite non­Muslim Americantroops to fight against Muslim Iraqi soldiers was a serious violation of Islamic law. An alliance between Muslims andnon Muslims to fight Muslims was also specifically forbidden by the teachings of Ibn Abd al­Wahhab"

182. McCants, William (March 17, 2014). "Islamist Outlaws". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 19 April 2014.183. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B.Tauris. pp. 150, 218, 225–6.184. Husain, Ed (2007). The Islamist: Why I joined Radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left. Penguin

Books. p. 246. "In contemporary Wahhabism there are two broad factions. One is publicly supportive of the House ofSaud, and will endorse any policy decision reached by the Saudi government and provide scriptural justification for it.The second believe that the House of Saud should be forcibly removed and the wahhabi clerics should take charge.Osama bin Laden and al­Qaeda are from the second school."

185. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 220."According to the militants, there were, however, two kinds of salafist, as they defined them. The sheikists hadreplaced the adoration of Allah with the idolatry of the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family attheir head. Their theorist was Abdelaziz bin Baz... the archetypal court ulema (ulama al­balat).... They had to bestriven against and eliminated. Confronted by the sheikist traitors, the jihadist­salafists had a similarly superciliousrespect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, but they combined it with an absolute commitment to jihad,whose number­one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith. The dissident Saudipreachers Hawali and Auda were held in high esteem by this school"

186. Dillon, Michael R. "WAHHABISM: IS IT A FACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL TERRORISM?" (PDF).September 2009. Naval Post­Graduate School. pp. 27–38. Retrieved 2 April 2014.

187. "How much did the September 11 terrorist attack cost America?". 2004. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security.Retrieved April 30, 2014.

188. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 172.189. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi

Arabia. Viking. pp. 234–36. "A few days later another article appeared delivering the same verdict. Prince Talal binAbdul Aziz .. ranked high in the brotherly pecking order .... The sheikhs and ulema had very valuable advice to offer,wrote the prince, but it was no more than that—advice. They should not consider that they were among 'those whogovern.' Dr. Turki's bid for a direct role in Saudi government was firmly slapped down, and the reverend doctor didnot argue back."

190. Coy, Peter (July 16, 2014). "Online Education Targets Saudi Arabia's Labor Problem, Starting With Women".Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 26 September 2014. "Saudi citizens account for two­thirds of employment in thehigh­paying, comfortable public sector, but only one­fifth of employment in the more dynamic private sector,according to the International Monetary Fund (PDF)."

191. "Census shows Kingdom's population at more than 27 million". Saudi Gazette. November 24, 2010.

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192. Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 6. "In 2003–2004, Saudi cities werethe scene of a wave of suicide bombings, killings of westerners and gun battles between Saudi security forces andmilitants. ... members of Al Saud decided it might be time to trim Wahhabism's domination by holding a series ofNational Dialogues that included Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and professional women. At present, the indicationsare not good for true believers in Wahhabi doctrine. But as its history demonstrates, the doctrine has survived crisesbefore."

193. Christopher Boucek (October 27, 2010). "Saudi Fatwa Restrictions and the State­Clerical Relationship". CarnegieEndowment.

194. Rubin, Elizabeth (March 7, 2004). "The Jihadi Who Kept Asking Why". New York Times. Retrieved 22 July 2014."When Saudi intellectuals began worrying aloud that Saudi mosques and schools were fostering hatred of non­Wahhabists among young men, the religious establishment – which ensures that the kingdom follows a strictlypuritanical interpretation of Islamic law – reacted with righteous anger, as if its social authority were under threat.Prince Nayef defended the religious establishment and blamed instead a foreign import – the Muslim Brotherhood,the radical Islamic political organization founded in Egypt in the 1920s – for the kingdom's problems. For years,Saudi Arabia sheltered and embraced the Brotherhood activists, and now, Prince Nayef told the press, theBrotherhood had turned against the Saudis and were destroying the Arab world."

195. Mintz, John; Farah, Douglas (10 September 2004). "In Search of Friends Among The Foes U.S. Hopes to Work WithDiverse Group". The Washington Post. Retrieved 28 November 2012.

196. "Saudi Arabia's religious police ordered to be 'gentle' ". BBC. 13 April 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.197. "Saudi Arabia strips religious police of arrest powers". CNN. CNN. 14 April 2016. Retrieved 8 November 2016.198. Bernard Haykel (27 May 2008). "Middle East Strategy at Harvard, Anti­Wahhabism: a footnote". John M. Olin

Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University. Retrieved 13 November 2014.199. George Packer (May 17, 2004). "Caught in the Crossfire: Will moderate Iraqis embrace democracy or Islamist

radicalism?". The New Yorker.200. "Confessions of a British Spy and British Enmity Against Islam" (PDF) (14) (8 ed.). Waqf Ikhlas Publications. 2001.201. Daniel Pipes (January 1996). "The Saga of "Hempher," Purported British Spy". Daniel Pipes. Retrieved

13 November 2014.202. Lewis, Bernard, The Middle East, p. 333203. "Ramadan in Saudi Arabia". The Economist. 11 June 2016. Retrieved 11 June 2016.204. "Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi Theology". December 1992. Library of Congress Country Studies. Retrieved 17 March

2014. "Wahhabi influence in Saudi Arabia, however, remained tangible in the physical conformity in dress, in publicdeportment, and in public prayer. Most significantly, the Wahhabi Legacy was manifest in the social ethos thatpresumed government responsibility for the collective moral ordering of society, from the behavior of individuals, toinstitutions, to businesses, to the government itself."

205. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed. Macmillan. p. 10. "... religious police, which is feared and reviledboth because of its wide reach and because its members are drawn from the lower classes. Their resentment of therich, combined with their freedom of action, results in a dangerous combination and adds to the hardline religioussocial atmosphere sanctioned by Wahhabi doctrine, which is spread by clerics in the mosques and teachers in theschools, and which guides the verdicts handed down by Wahhabi 'justice' in the courts."

206. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470. "Wahhabism is noted for its policy ofcompelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the fiveprayers, under pain of flogging at one time, and for enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere."

207. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Harvard University Press. p. 158.ISBN 9780674015753. "Ibn Taymiyya and Abdul Wahhab counseled the strictest possible application of sharia in themost minuscule aspects of daily life and the use of coercion on subjects who did not conform to dogma. AsWahhabism began to exert its influence, a religious militia, the mutawaa – bearded men armed with cudgels (andtoday, riding in shiny SUVs) – was organized in Saudi Arabia to close down shops and office at prayer times fivetimes a day."

208. Saudi Arabia's religious police 'contains extremists' (http://www.bbc.com/news/world­middle­east­26030911)| 4February 2014|

209. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. p. 67."Wahhabis regularly flogged the residents of territories under their control for listening to music, shaving theirbeards, wearing silk or gold (this applied to men only), smoking, playing backgammon, chess, or cards, or failing toobserve strict rules of sex segregation; and they destroyed all the shrines and most of the Muslim historicalmonuments found in Arabia."

210. Simons, Geoff (1998). Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 152–59.211. Kostiner, Joseph (1993). The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State. Oxford

University Press. p. 119. ISBN 978­0195074406.212. (from The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, by Khaled Abou El Fadl, Harper San Francisco, 2005 ,

p. 160)213. Tripp, Harvey; Peter North (2003). Culture Shock! Saudi Arabia. Graphic Arts Center Publishing Company. p. 131.

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214. Battram, Robert A. (2010­07­22). Canada in Crisis (2): An Agenda for Survival of the Nation. Trafford. pp. 415–16.ISBN 9781426933936.

215. Sharp, Arthur G. "What's a Wahhabi?". net places. Retrieved 20 March 2014.216. Anderson, Shelly (2013). Falling Off the Edge of the World. Lulu. p. 137. ISBN 9781304059833.217. Roy, Olivier (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. Columbia University Press. p. 239.

ISBN 9780231134996. "The Taliban, despite their similarity to Wahhabis, never destroyed the graves of pirs (holymen) and emphasised dreams as a means of revelation, which is not a Wahhabi trait."

218. Husain, The Islamist, 2007, p. 250219. Afshin Shahi (2013­12­04). The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia. ISBN 9781134653195. "Muhammad

ibn Abd al­Wahhab condemned many traditions, practices and beliefs that were an integral part of the religious andcultural consciousness of the Muslim community."

220. "A special day for mothers: Difference of opinion". Saudi Gazette. "[hadith] 'Whoever imitates or resembles a nation,he is considered among them.'"

221. "Many celebrate Valentine's Day in secret" (http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010021463363) Saudi Gazette.

222. A Saudi Woman Is Threatened After Tweeting About Beards (http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2014/02/a­saudi­woman­tweets­about­beards­and­is­threatened.html)|newyorker.com |February 19, 2014 |Katherine Zoepf

223. Eltahawy, Mona (July 1, 2004). "The Wahhabi war against 'infidels' and flowers". Islam Daily. Retrieved 22 March2014. "... a Saudi friend forwarded me a copy of a fatwa, or religious ruling, issued by senior clerics. The fatwabanned the giving of flowers when visiting the sick in the hospital. The ruling observed: "It is not the habit ofMuslims to offer flowers to the sick in hospital. This is a custom imported from the land of the infidels by thosewhose faith is weak. Therefore it is not permitted to deal with flowers in this way, whether to sell them, buy them oroffer them as gifts.""

224. [Mansour al­Nogaidan, a young preacher in the Sahwah (awakening) movement] Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside theKingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking. p. 122. ".... hecontinued his crusade against what he saw as the hypocrisy of the Wahhabi establishment. A year later, in 1989, heissued a fatwa condemning the World Youth Soccer Cup, which was being held in Saudi Arabia. Soccer was haram(forbidden), in his view, like many sports, ..."

225. [the leader of "The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong" (Juhayman Al­Otaybi)] Lacey, Robert(2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia. Viking.p. 12. "Everywhere Juhayman looked he could detect bidaa – dangerous and regrettable innovations. The Salafi GroupThat Commands Right and Forbids Wrong was originally intended to focus on moral improvement, not on politicalgrievances or reform. But religion is politics and vice versa .... immoral of the government to permit soccermatches,..."

226. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 50. "...one Saudi sheikh issued a fatwa condemning soccer because the Koran, he insisted, forbids Muslim to imitateChristians or Jews. Therefore, using words like foul or penalty kick is forbidden. The country's grand mufti, SheikhAbdul Aziz bin Abdullah al Ashaikh, rejected that fatwa and called on the religious police to track down and prosecuteits author."

227. Brooks, Geraldine (1995). Nine Parts of Desire. Doubleday. p. 161. "[from the religious editor of the Saudi Gazettecirca 1986–1995] There are legal and moral rights that become consequential on marriage. Because of their differentphysiological structures and biological functions, each sex is assigned a role to play in the family ... it is the husbandwho is supposed to provide for the family. If he cannot gain enough to support the family .. both ... may work forgain. However:1. he husband has the right to terminate a wife's working whenever he deems it necessary;2. He has the right to object to any job if he feels that it would expose his wife to any harm, seduction or humiliation;3. The wife has the right to discontinue working whenever she pleases."

228. Death of a Princess, Lacey, The Kingdom, chapter 48229. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom : Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi

Arabia. Viking. p. 75.230. Max Rodenbeck (October 21, 2004). "Unloved in Arabia". New York Review of Books. 51 (16).231. House, Karen Elliott, On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future, Knopf, 2012, p. 9232. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. p. 470. "Wahhabi doctrines and practices were

imposed by the conquests although in a progressively gentler form as more urban areas passed into Saudi control.This was particularly true of the Hejaz, with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which thenew rulers could not afford to alienate. Thus, although the sound of a trumpet calling reveille in Mecca when it wasnewly conquered was enough to cause riot among the Wahhabi soldiers – music was forbidden – such that onlyenergetic intervention on the part of the young Prince Faysal, later King, prevented a massacre, today music flowsfreely over the radio and television."

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233. Glassé, Cyril (January 2003). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira. p. 471. ISBN 9780759101906. "The sign ofchanging times in Saudi Arabia is that the exigencies of the modern world and pragmatism have opened the door toaccepting the legal precedents of the other schools. The Wahhabis consider, or previously considered, many of thepractices of the generations which succeeded the Companions as bid‘ah ... these included the building of minarets(today accepted) and the use of funeral markers."

234. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis. macmillan. p. 5.ISBN 9781403970770. Retrieved 20 August 2014.

235. Lacey (2009). Inside the Kingdom, Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia.Viking. p. 12. "Luxuriant beards were and are the most famous badge of Salafi conviction, based on a traditionalbelief, which some scholars dispute, that the Prophet never trimmed his beard. ... The other badge is a shortenedthobe, because the Prophet did not let his clothes brush the ground."

236. Ambah, Faiza Saleh (June 22, 2007). "An Unprecedented Uproar Over Saudi Religious Police". Washington PostForeign Service. Retrieved 26 September 2014.

237. Rutter, Eldon (September 1998). "The Holy Cities of Arabia". In Michael Wolfe. One Thousand Roads to Mecca:Ten Centuries of Travelers Writing about the ... Grove Press. p. 344. ISBN 9780802135995.

238. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for SaudiArabia. Viking. p. 56. "The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salfis and also of thedawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamicstates."

239. at least one scholar (David Commins), sometimes refers to Wahhabism as the "Najdi reform movement" (p. 41),"Najdi movement" (pp. 141, 146), "Najdi doctrine" (pp. 152, 200–01), and "Najdi mission" (p. 204) in his book(Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 41. "Official Egyptiancorrespondence expressed sectarian hostility to the Najdi reform movement"),Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 141. "Nevertheless, significantdifferences separate the Najdi movement from the modern revivalist agenda because the former stemmed fromMuhammad ibn Ad al­wahhab's distinctive views on doctrine, where as the Muslim Brothers were a reaction againstEuropean domination and cultural invasion.",Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 152. "The Wahhabi leadership ofthe World Muslim League made it an instrument for exporting the Najdi doctrine."

240. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 235."The Eastern Province (home to the oil reserves and to the perennially ill­used and unhappy Shiite minority) and theHejaz (site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with their more open, international outlook) both resent theoverwhelming dominance of religious conservatives from the Najd, home of the Al Saud, at all levels of nationalgovernance."

241. Bradley, John R. (2005). Saudi Arabia Exposed. Macmillan. p. 58. "... Asir, and the tribal population in that region,like the liberals of the Hijaz and the Shiites of the Eastern Province, have always been reluctant partners in the Saudistate. As with the merchants of the Hijaz and al­Jouf, the tribes of Asir have never fully embraced Wahhabi doctrine.Periodic local rebellions, and a low­level struggle to keep alive a regional identity, are both testimony to that ..."

242. 2014 population estimate of 2 million, compared to 30 million for Saudi Arabia.243. Dorsey., James M. "Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia". 2013­09­08. Middle East Online.

Retrieved 28 April 2014. "Qatar, the only other country whose native population is Wahhabi and that adheres to theWahhabi creed."

244. Cole, Juan (2009). Engaging the Muslim World. Macmillan. p. 110. ISBN 9780230620575.245. Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Extremism, by Zubair Qamar, condensed and

edited by ASFA staff246. "Allah". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 2008­05­28.247. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 62248. Kabir, Nahid Afrose (2013­01­01). Young American Muslims: Dynamics of Identity. Edinburgh University Press.

p. 44. ISBN 9780748669936. "Both Wahhabism and Salafism are very much opposed by the vast majority of Sunnisand also by Shiites"

249. Halverson, Jeffry R. (2010). Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash'arism, and PoliticalSunnism. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 71. "Abdul­Wahhab was a proponent of Ijtihad, as were the leading reformers of theSalafi movement in Egypt."

250. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 49 (Quote: "Wahhabism then is justifably characterized as adistinct sectarian movement with its own idiosyncrasies that diverge from other Athari movements. But itnevertheless remains thoroughly Athari in nature.")

251. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 34 (Quote: "The Atharis are often erroneously (butunderstandably) subsumed under the Hanbalite school of law (madhhab). [...] The Hanbalite madhhab [...] largelymaintained the traditionalist or Athari position")

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252. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36 (Quote: For the Atharis, the "clear" (i.e., zahir, apparent, orliteral) meaning of the Qur'an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief,as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden.)

253. Spevack, Aaron (2014). The Archetypal Sunni Scholar: Law, Theology, and Mysticism in the Synthesis of Al­Bajuri.State University of New York Press. p. 44. "Those who opted out of affiliation with the Ash'aris and Maturidis areoften referred to as merely a group of Hanbalis [...] or Atharis, who relied on transmitted as opposed to rationallydeduced sources. Their school is generally associated with an insistence on avoiding the use of rational argumentationin matters of belief, and a reliance solely on transmitted content (Qur'an and Hadith)."

254. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 48­49255. John L. Esposito, Emad El­Din Shahin, ed. (2013). "Islam and power in Saudi Arabia". The Oxford Handbook of

Islam and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 412–13.256. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 84257. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 84­7258. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. x. "Most Muslims throughout

history have accepted the position that declaring this profession of faith [the shahada] makes one a Muslim. Onemight or might not regularly perform the other obligatory rituals .... but .... any shortcomings would render one asinner, not an unbeliever. Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either aMuslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God. ... any act or statement thatindicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamountto idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practicesthat made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries,including his own brother. One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature. ... themain points in the debate [have] stay[ed] the same [since 1740]."

259. Ibn Abd al­Wahhab, Kitab al­Tawhid260. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 69261. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 25.262. Ibn Ghannam,, Hussien (2009). Tarikh najd. Cairo. pp. 467–71, 477.263. "Wahhabi Theology". Saudi Arabia, Library of Congress Country Studies. Library of Congress. December 1992.

"The Wahhabi movement in Najd was unique in two respects: first, the ulama of Najd interpreted the Quran and sunnavery literally and often with a view toward reinforcing parochial Najdi practices;"

264. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 142–43. "It is common for writerson Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab to assert that he sought a social renewal of Arabia, but that characterization isnever given specific substance, unless one considers ritual correctness and moral purity to constitute such renewal.The problem with such generalizations is they encourage facile comparisons with modern revivalist movements, whenin fact Najd's eighteenth­century reformer would have found key elements in Hasan al­Banna's writings utterly alien."

265. Esposito, John L., ed. (2003­05­15). "(entry for Muhammad ibn Abd al­Wahhab)". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam.Oxford University Press. p. 123. ISBN 9780199757268. "plans for socio­religious reform of society were based onthe key doctrine of tawhid"

266. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 97267. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 96268. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 100269. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 107­8270. Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61271. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 247–50272. Vogel, Frank E (2000). Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden. p. 76. "Ibn Abd al­Wahhab

produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as a mujtahid in fiqh [independentthinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da'wa or religious reawakening ... the Wahhabis' bitter differences with otherMuslims were not over fiqh rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions."

273. Commins 2006, p. 12 According to Commins, Kitab al­Tawhid "has nothing to say on Islamic law, which guidesMuslims' everyday lives. This is a crucial point. One of the myths about Wahhabism is that its distinctive characterstems from its affiliation with the supposedly 'conservative' or 'strict' Hanbali legal school. If that were the case, howcould we explain the fact that the earliest opposition to Ibn Abd al­Wahhab came from other Hanbali scholars? Or thata tradition of anti­Wahhabi Hanbalism persisted into the nineteenth century? As an expert on law in Saudi Arabianotes, Ibn Abd al­Wahhab produced no unprecedented opinions and Saudi authorities today regard him not as amujtahid in fiqh [independent thinker in jurisprudence], but rather in da'wa or religious reawakening… The Wahhabis'bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh [jurisprudence] rules at all, but over aqida, or theologicalpositions."

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274. Richard C. Martin, ed. (2004). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. MacMillan Reference. p. 728. "Amongthe innovations condemned by Ibn Abd al­Wahhab was the centuries­long heritage of jurisprudence (fiqh) thatcoalesced into four Sunni schools of law and many schools of Shi'ism. The Wahhabiyya considered themselves thetrue Sunnis and acknowledged their affinity to the Hanbali legal tradition. Yet they rejected all jurisprudence that intheir opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith, even that of Ibn Hambal and hisstudents."

275. Glasse, Cyril (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Islam. AltaMira Press. pp. 469, 470. "The Wahhabis are often said to'belong' to the Hanbali School of Law (madhhab), but strictly speaking, like the Ahl al­Hadith ... they are ghayrmuqallidun ('non­adherents'), and do not see themselves as belonging to any school, any more than the first Muslimgenerations did."

276. Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam Altamira, 2001, p. 407277. see also Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61278. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 112–3279. Moussalli, Ahmad (January 30, 2009). Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy? (PDF). A Conflicts

Forum Monograph. p. 3. "... the Wahhabis – who claim to be the champion of Sunni Islam – perceive the Sunnis ashaving been wrong for over ten centuries and have been living a state of pre­Islamic paganism (jahiliyya [literally,ignorance]) since they moved away from the way of al­salaf. They even accused the majority of orthodox SunniMuslims who were living under the Ottoman caliphate and the caliphate itself of reprehensible innovation (bid‘ah) andunbelief (kufr) because they had been living under a political system that is unknown to al­salaf."

280. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. p. 20. "In1159/1746, the Wahhabi­Saudi state made a formal proclamation of jihad all who did not share their understanding oftauhid, for they counted as non­believers, guilty of shirk and apostasy. It is significant that whenever the term'Muslims' occurs in Uthman b. Abdullah b Bishr's chronicle, `Unwan al­Majd fi Tarikh Najd, it refers exclusively tothe Wahhabis. But the Wahhabi dismissal of all Muslims other than themselves as non­believers is of more thanhistorical significance. Discreetly concealed over the years because of a variety of factors –above all the desire of theSaudi regime to portray itself as a protector of Muslim interests, despite abundant evidence to the contrary – thisattitude of monopolistic rejection continues to inform the attitudes to Muslims held by contemporary Wahhabis andthose under their influence, even when not fully articulated." (p.20)"

281. Ruthven, Malise (1984). Islam in the World. Penguin. p. 282. "Ibn `Abd al Wahhab's fundamentalism .... led to anKhariji­style division of the world into 'us' against 'them', identifying all who failed to conform to Wahhabi tenets as'infidels' liable to attack ...."

282. Dillon, Michael R. (September 2009). "Wahhabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?" (PDF). NAVALPOSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. p. 13. "The intertwining of Saudi political/military power and Wahhabi religiouspower strengthened this legitimacy, as Wahhabism (or Wahhabiyyah) claims to represent the only orthopraxy Islam."

283. Abu Khalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power, 50284. "analyses wahhabism". PBS Frontline. "Wahhabi Muslims believe that their sect is the real true form of Islam, and

that pretty much any other kind of way of practicing Islam is wrong." [according to Ahmed Ali, 'a Shi'a Muslim whogrew up in Saudi Arabia']"

285. Husain, Ed (2007). The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left. Penguin.p. 250. "My Saudi students gave me some of their core texts from university classes. They complained that regardlessof their subject of study, they were compelled to study 'Thaqafah Islamiyyah' (Islamic Culture), .... These books werepublished in 2003 (after a Saudi promise in a post­9/11 world to alter their textbooks) and were used in classroomsacross the country in 2005. I read these texts very closely: entire pages were devoted to explaining to undergraduatesthat all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation. There were prolonged denunciations of nationalism,communism , the West, free mixing of the sexes, observing birthdays, even Mother's Day"

286. Khalid, Ahmad Ali (July 20, 2011). "Petro­Islam' is a nightmare scenario". Wisdom Blow. Retrieved 1 April 2014."Saudi textbooks are filled with references to hate; the Islamic Studies curriculum in the country is simply barbaric.I've experienced first­hand being taught by an Islamic Studies teacher in one of the most prominent private schools inRiyadh, about the dangers of having non­Muslims as friends and about the evil conspiracies hatched by Christians,Jews and Shias."

287. Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. Harper San Francisco. pp. 49,50. "Significantly, Abd al­Wahhab also insisted that it was a sign of spiritual weakness for Muslims to care for or beinterested in non­Muslim beliefs or practices. Pursuant to a doctrine known as al­wala` wa al­bara` (literally, thedoctrine of loyalty and disassociation), Abd al­Wahhab argued that it was imperative for Muslims not to befriend, allythemselves with, or imitate non­Muslims or heretical Muslims. Furthermore, this enmity and hostility of Muslimstoward non­Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal. For example, it was forbidden for a Muslim tobe the first to greet a non­Muslim, and even if a Muslim returned a greeting, a Muslim should never wish a non­Muslim peace."

288. (source conflates Wahhabism and Islam) Bukay, David (Summer 2013). "Islam's Hatred of the Non­Muslim". MiddleEast Quarterly: 11–20. Retrieved 27 June 2015.

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289. see also Amb. Curtin Winsor, Ph.D. (2007­10­22). "Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of SunniTheofascism". Global Politician.

290. Christopher M. Blanchard (January 24, 2008). "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya" (PDF).Congressional Research Service. p. CRS­5. "The Saudi Arabian government has strenuously denied the aboveallegations. Saudi officials continue to assert that Islam is tolerant and peaceful, and they have denied allegations thattheir government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education. In response toallegations of teaching intolerance, the Saudi government has embarked on a campaign of educational reformsdesigned to remove divisive material from curricula and improve teacher performance, although the outcome of thesereforms remains to be seen. Confrontation with religious figures over problematic remarks and activities posespolitical challenges for the Saudi government, because some key Wahhabi clerics support Saudi government efforts tode­legitimize terrorism inside the kingdom and have sponsored or participated in efforts to religiously re­educateformer Saudi combatants."

291. DeLong­Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 34–5292. (note the first four Saudi monarchs have the title Imam) "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: History. Rulers of the first Saudi

state". info.gov.sa. Government of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved 20 August 2014.293. Vogel, Frank E, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden, 2000), p. 207294. House, Karen Elliott (2012). On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future. Knopf. p. 27.

"Not only is the Saudi monarch effectively the religious primate, but the puritanical Wahhabi sect of Islam that herepresents instructs Muslims to be obedient and submissive to their ruler, however imperfect, in pursuit of a perfectlife in paradise. Only if a ruler directly countermands the comhandments of Allah should devout Muslims evenconsider disobeying. 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority amongyou. [surah 4:59]'"

295. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 180. "Ibn Baz submitted amemorandum to apologize for the Letter of Demands' tone and for publishing it at all rather than adhering to thecustomary Wahhabi principle that counsel to a ruler should be private."

296. Abir, Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis. London. pp. 191–94.297. Struggle between designated heir Abdullah and his half brother Saud298. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 62. "For the Wahhabi ulama,

however, the succession struggle raises an unprecedented and knotty issue: namely, which candidate to support. Partof the problem lay in the ulama's tendency to accord allegiance to the ruler, regardless of how he came to power, aslong as he declared support for Wahhabism. But some ulama insisted on a strict juridical view that branded a rebelagainst the legitimate ruler (imam) as a usurper"

299. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 115. "Since believers owe the rulerobedience, he is free to organize government as he sees fit as long as he does not cross that line. While this appears togrant unlimited powers to the ruler, the proviso for respecting shari'a limits is significant, since it includes, inWahhabi doctrine, respect for the independence of qadis in matters within their jurisdiction. Hence, the ruler may notinterfere in their deliberations. Building on this limitation on a ruler's power, the ulama have preserved theirautonomy in the legal sphere by refusing to participate in the codification of law and the formation of a uniformsystem of law courts. ... In matters before religious courts, Vogel found a striking degree of independence wielded byqadis because their mandate is not to follow precedent or implement a uniform code, but to discern the divine rulingin a particular incident."

300. "Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Fanaticism and Terror". AGAINST "ISLAMIC"TERRORISM & ISLAMOPHOBIA.

301. Lacey, Robert (2009). Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for SaudiArabia. Viking. p. 56. "The ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood were similar to those of the Salafis and also of thedawah wahhabiya (Wahhabi mission) – to reestablish the order of Allah and to bring about the perfect Islamic states.But the rhetoric of the Brotherhood dealt in change­promoting concepts like social justice, anticolonialism, and theequal distribution of wealth. Politically they were prepared to challenge the establishment in a style that wasunthinkable to mainstream Wahhabis, who were reflexively defferential to their rulers, and enablers, the House ofSaud."

302. Destined Encounters, Sury Pullat, 2014, p. 203303. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 210.304. Khaled Abou El Fadl (2002), The Place of Tolerance in Islam, p. 8. Beacon Press. ISBN 0807002291.305. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 111.306. Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010). "A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Retrieved 6 May 2014. "First, there is the void

created by the 1999 death of the elder Bin Baz and that of another senior scholar, Muhammad Salih al Uthaymin, twoyears later. Both were regarded as giants in conservative Salafi Islam and are still revered by its adherents. Since theirpassing, no one "has emerged with that degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment," said David DeanCommins, history professor at Dickinson College and author of "The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.""

307. Abou El Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, 2005, pp. 70–72.

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308. documentary The Qur'an aired in the UK, The Qur'an review in The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/arts­entertainment/film­and­tv/tv­radio­reviews/last­nights­tv­the­quran­channel­4­banged­up­five­867474.html)

309. Yahya Birt, an academic who is director of The City Circle, a networking body of young British Muslimprofessionals, quoted in Wahhabism: A deadly scripture (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home­news/wahhabism­a­deadly­scripture­398516.html)| Paul Vallely 01 November 2007

310. Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism (http://www.globalpolitician.com/23661­saudi)| ByAmbassador Curtin Winsor, Ph.D.

311. Dawood al­Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al­Hayat, May 19, 2003312. Abou al Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, HarperSanFrancisco, 2005, pp. 48–64313. Kepel, p. 72314. Coolsaet, Rik. "Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism, Chapter 7". In Rik Coolsaet. Jihadi Terrorism and the

Radicalisation Challenge: European and American. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. "The proliferation of brochures, freequrans and new Islamic centres in Malaga, Madrid, Milat, Mantes­la­Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb,Washington, Chicago, and Toronto; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; the growth ofInternet sites: all of these elements have facilitated access to Wahhabi teachings and the promotion of Wahhabism asthe sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought."

315. Kepel 2002, pp. 69–75316. "Radical Islam in Central Asia". Retrieved 13 November 2014.317. Kuan Yew Lee; Ali Wyne. Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and .. MIT

Press. "But over the last 30­odd years, since the oil crisis and the petrodollars became a major factor in the Muslimworld, the extremists have been proselytizing, building mosques, religious schools where they teach Wahhabism ...sending out preachers, and having conferences. Globalizing, networking. And slowly they have convinced theSoutheast Asian Muslims, and indeed Muslims throughout the world, that the gold standard is Saudi Arabia, that thatis the real good Muslim."

318. Lynch III, Thomas F. (December 29, 2008). "Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism Differences that Matter" (PDF).gsmcneal.com. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. pp. 24–40. Retrieved 22 October 2014.

319. Natana J. Delong­Bas, "Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad", (Oxford University Press:2004), p. 279

320. After Jihad: American and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy by Noah Feldman, New York : Farrar, Straus andGiroux, 2003, p. 47

321. Armstrong, Karen. The label of Catholic terror was never used about the IRA. (https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/11/northernireland.july7) guardian.co.uk

322. Kirkpatrick, David D. (24 September 2014). "ISIS' Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed". newyork times. Retrieved 26 September 2014.

323. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. back cover."Wahhabism, a peculiar interpretation of Islamic doctrine and practice that first arose in mid­eighteenth centuryArabia, is sometimes regarded as simply an extreme or uncompromising form of Sunni Islam. This is incorrect, for atthe very outset the movement was stigmatized as aberrant by the leading Sunni scholars of the day, because it rejectedmany of the traditional beliefs and practices of Sunni Islam and declared permissible warfare against all Muslims thatdisputed Wahhabi teachings."

324. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 33–34. "[Algar lists all these things that involve intercession in prayer, that Wahhabi believe violate the principle of tauhid al­`ibada (directing all worship to God alone)]. all the allegedly deviant practices just listed can, however, be vindicatedwith reference not only to tradition and consensus but also hadith, as has been explained by those numerous scholars,Sunni and Shi'i alike, who have addressed the phenomenon of Wahhabism. Even if that were not the case, and thebelief that ziyara or tawassul is valid and beneficial were to be false, there is no logical reason for condemning thebelief as entailing exclusion from Islam."

325. Kepel, Gilles (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 159. "the allianceconcluded in 1744–1745 between Abdul Wahhab and the tribal chief Muhammad bin Saud, who ruled over the oasisof Diriyya ... in the Nejd, the peninsula's central desert province. (In Arabic, najd is any area where water disappearsinto the sand.) A Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin bribes against one another for control of the scarceresources that could stave off starvation. In exchange for Bin Saud's adherence to the strict dogma of Ibn Taymiyya,Abdul Wahhab offered to consecrate the Saudi tribe's raids on neighboring oases by renaming those raids jihad – holywar to promote, by the sword, Islam's triumph over unbelief. In place of the instinctive fight for survival and appetitefor lucre, Abdul Wahhab substituted fath, the 'opening' or conquest of a vast territory through religious zeal."

326. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 4–5. "Arelated error is to think of Wahhabism as having been from the time of its origin a reform movement that found awidespread and sympathetic echo in the Muslim world, or that it conformed to a general pattern of 'renewal' (tajdid)then underway in the Middle East, in South Asia, in Africa and elsewhere. All those movements were largelydifferent in their nature from Wahhabism, which must be regarded within the specific context of its own time as anexception, an aberration, or at best an anomaly."

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327. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 14–15, 17."in the introduction to his translation to Kitab al­Tauhid, he [Islmail Raji al­Faruqi] had it almost right when, in theintroduction to his translation to Kitab al­Tauhid, he described the book as having 'the appearance of a student'snotes.' It would have been closer to the mark to say that this and many other writings of Abdal­Wahhav were thenotes of a student. ....what might charitably be termed the scholarly output of ... abdal­Wahhab ... All of his worksare extremely slight, in terms of both content and bulk." Algar goes on to suggest that the works have been paddedwith lists of "further issues" and expansion by their editors/translators to make up for their slightness. ...It is true thatsome fairly thick volumes have been published in Saudi Arabia as the collected works of ... Abd al­Wahhab ... butthey are mostly a little more than collections of notes and arrangements of hadith according to certain subjects.""Volumes one, two, and four of this set" ... contain no elucidation or commentary from ... Abd al­Wahhab ... Everymajor figure to inaugurate a significant movement of renewal in Islamic history has been a prolific and influentialwriter, two examples ... Uthman dan Fodio and ... Dihlawi."... Abda al­Wahhab "is not remotely comparable toeither."

328. Christopher Taylor, In the Vicinity of the Righteous (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 5­6329. See John Renard, Friends of God: Islamic Images of Piety, Commitment, and Servanthood (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 2008); Idem., Tales of God Friends: Islamic Hagiography in Translation (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 2009)

330. Jonathan A.C. Brown, "Faithful Dissenters: Sunni Skepticism about the Miracles of Saints," Journal of Sufi Studies 1(2012), p. 123

331. Juan Eduardo Campo, Encyclopedia of Islam (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), p. 600332. See Gibril F. Haddad, Al­Albani and Friends: A Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement (AQSA Publications, 2004),

et passim333. Ibn Taymiyyah, al­Mukhtasar al­Fatawa al­Masriyya, 1980, p. 603: "The miracles of saints are absolutely true and

correct, by the acceptance of all Muslim scholars. And the Qur'an has pointed to it in different places, and the sayingsof the Prophet have mentioned it, and whoever denies the miraculous power of saints are only people who areinnovators and their followers."

334. See Gibril F. Haddad, Al­Albani and Friends: A Concise Guide to the Salafi Movement (AQSA Publications, 2004).335. Schwartz, Stephen (2002). The Two Faces of Islam. Doubleday. p. 79. "During this period [of Wahhab jihad against

the Ottoman Empire] Britain acquired a client in southeast Arabia: Oman, a state with sovereignty over Zanzibar inAfrican and parts of the Iranian and neighboring coasts. Britain also expanded its influence northward into the areanow known as the United Arab Emirates. In the other direction, the British subjugated Aden, on the southern Yemencoast in 1839. Yet remarkably enough, Wahhabi violence was almost never turned against the encroachments of thisaggressive Christian power; the fanatics seemed concerned only with destroying the Ottomans. For this reason, anti­Wahhabi Muslim writers have repeatedly denounced them as a tool of the British ..." (p.79)"

336. Algar, Hamid (2002). Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. pp. 38–9. "Thefirst contact was made in 1865, and British subsidies started to flow into the coffers of the Saudi family, in evergrowing quantity as World War One grew closer. The relationship fully matured during that war. In 1915, the Britishsigned with the Saudi ruler of the day, Abd al­Aziz b. Sa'ud (Ibn Sa'ud); one of those contracts with their underlingsthat were euphemistically known as "treaties of friendship and cooperation". Money was, of course, the principallubricant of friendship and cooperation, and by 1917 the Saudi ruler was receiving 5000 pounds a month ... theBritish also graciously saw fit to confer a knighthood on the champion of Wahhabism .... in 1935, Abd al­Aziz b.Sa'ud was made a Knight of the Order of the Bath.""

337. Kingdom without borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers. Retrieved 2012­09­17.338. The Destruction of Holy Sites in Mecca and Medina (http://www.scribd.com/doc/6999574/Spirit) By Irfan Ahmed in

Islamic Magazine, Issue 1, July 2006339. Nibras Kazimi, A Paladin Gears Up for War (http://www.nysun.com/article/65662?page_no=3), The New York Sun,

November 1, 2007340. John R Bradley, Saudi's Shi'ites walk tightrope (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GC17Ak01.html), Asia

Times, March 17, 2005341. Jan­Erik Lane; Hamadi Redissi; Riyāḍ Ṣaydāwī (2009). Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization

(illustrated ed.). Ashgate Publishing. p. 253. ISBN 9780754674184.342. Mohammad Javad Zarif (September 13, 2016). "Mohammad Javad Zarif: Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism". New

York Times.343. Muhammad Abu Zahra, Tarikh al­Madhahib al­Islamiyya, pp. 235­38344. Ahmad, Ahmad Atif (2009). Islam, Modernity, Violence, and Everyday Life. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 164. Retrieved

9 January 2016.345. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "9/11 and the Muslim Transformation." Taken from September 11 in History: A Watershed

Moment? (https://books.google.com/books?id=m­ZLkRpYQWMC&pg=PA87&dq=khawarij+wahabi&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ncoRUtnsD6HF2QX2o4GgAw&ved=0CD8Q6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=khawarij%20wahabi&f=false), pg. 87.Ed. Mary L. Dudziak. Durham: Duke University Press 2003. ISBN 9780822332428

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346. Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 59. "Abd al­Latif, who wouldbecome the next supreme religious leader ... enumerated the harmful views that Ibn Jirjis openly espoused in Unayza:Supplicating the dead is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, so it is permitted. Worship at graves isnot idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events.Whoever declares that there is no god but God and prays toward Mecca is a believer."

347. Abu'l­Fayd Ahmad ibn Abi Abdallah al­Siddiq al­Ghimmari, Ihya al­Maqbur, pp. 59­60348. al­Sayyid Yusuf al­Rifa`i and al­Sayyid al­Habib `Alawi al­Haddad, Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd,

trans. and notes by G.F. Haddad, lxxxvi p. + 393 p.349. "Islamic conference in Chechnya: Why Sunnis are disassociating themselves from Salafists" (http://www.firstpost.co

m/world/islamic­conference­in­chechnya­why­sunnis­are­disassociating­themselves­from­salafists­2998018.html)Sep, 09 2016 | He stated: “Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’ah are the Ash’arites or Muturidis (adherents of Abu Mansur al­Maturidi's systematic theology which is also identical to Imam Abu Hasan al­Ash'ari’s school of logical thought). Inmatters of belief, they are followers of any of the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shaf’ai, Maliki or Hanbali) andare also the followers of pure Sufism in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification.

350. Latif, Yudi (2008). Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 190.Retrieved 7 March 2017.

351. Latif, Yudi (2008). Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 190.Retrieved 7 March 2017.

352. "Wahhabism out of place in Malaysia, says fatwa council chief". Free Malaysia Today. 2015­03­01. Retrieved2017­01­08.

353. Katz, Stanley (22 September 1998). Philanthropy in the World’s Traditions. Indiana University Press. p. 296.Retrieved 7 March 2017.

354. Mohamed Mohamed (2009­06­08). "Somali rage at grave desecration". BBC News. BBC Somali Service. Retrieved2010­04­01. "Most Somalis are Sufi Muslims, who do not share the strict Saudi Arabian­inspired Wahhabiinterpretation of Islam with the hardline al­Shabab group. They embrace music, dancing and meditation and areappalled at the desecration of the graves.... The umbrella group Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama (Sufi Sects in Somalia) hascondemned the actions of what they call the ideology of modern Wahhabism and the desecrations of graves. They seeWahhabism as foreign and ultimately un­Islamic."

355. Rougier, Bernard. The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from al­Qaeda to ISIS. PrincetonUniversity Press. p. 88. Retrieved 17 July 2016.

356. Policy Studies, Lebanese Center for (1994). "The Beirut Review: A Journal on Lebanon and the Middle East". TheBeirut Review: A Journal on Lebanon and the Middle East (7): 124.

357. Administrator. "Islamic Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation".358. The Islamists Have it Wrong (http://www.meforum.org/14/the­islamists­have­it­wrong) By Abdul Hadi Palazzi

Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2001359. "On Islam and 500 most influential Muslims" (PDF).360. "The Naqshbandiyya Nazimiyya Sufi Order of America: Sufism and Spirituality".361. Armstrong, Karen (14 November 2014). "Wahhabism to ISIS: how Saudi Arabia exported the main source of global

terrorism". newstatesman.com. Retrieved 11 April 2015.362. Butt, Yousaf (20 January 2015). "How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism". The Huffington

Post. Retrieved 11 April 2015.363. Scott Shane (August 25, 2016). "Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters' ". New York Times.

Retrieved September 14, 2016.364. Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques (http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inlin

e_images/Saudi%20Publications%20on%20Hate%20Ideology%20Invade%20American%20Mosques.pdf)365. quotes from a study "based on a year­long study of over two hundred original documents, all disseminated, published

or otherwise generated by the government of Saudi Arabia and collected from more than a dozen mosques in theUnited States". New Report on Saudi Government Publications (https://web.archive.org/web/20061002030100/http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/news/bn2005/bn­2005­01­28.htm) at the Wayback Machine (archived October 2,2006)

366. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism" (PDF). March 2006. Loeffler Tuggey Pauerstein Rosenthal LLP. Retrieved20 March 2014.

367. "Obama Top Muslim Adviser Part Of Two More Organizations Tied to U.S. Muslim Brotherhood". The GlobalMuslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. 1 August 2008. Retrieved 23 May 2016.

368. "Freedom House". International Relations Center. 2007­07­26. Retrieved 2008­05­10.369. Dettmer, Jamie (2015­06­24). "Qatar's Foundation for Hypocrisy". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 2016­04­27.370. Nakano, Hanna. "Houston Community College scales back operation in Qatar". gulfnewsjournal.com. Retrieved

2016­04­27.371. "While U.S. universities see dollar signs in Qatari partnerships, some cry foul". Gulf News Journal. 2015­09­24.

Retrieved 2016­04­27.372. "No Petrodollar Land Grabbing for Qatar in Brussels". Consortium Against Terrorist Finance.

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Further reading

Burckhardt, John Lewis, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys (https://books.google.com/books?id=sDZAAAAAYAAJ), H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830.Valentine, S. R., "Force & Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond", Hurst & Co, London,2015, ISBN 978­1849044646.Imran N. Hosein (1996). 'The Caliphate, the Hejaz and the Saudi­Wahhabi Nation­State' (http://www.imranhosein.org/books/126­the­caliphate­the­hijaz­and­the­saudi­wahabi­nation­state.html). New York:Masjid Darul Qur'an.Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, ISBN 1­889999­13­X.Delong­Bas, Natana J., Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford UniversityPress, ISBN 0­19­516991­3.Holden, David and Johns, Richard, The House of Saud, Pan, 1982, ISBN 0­330­26834­1.Al­Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002, ISBN 0­521­64412­7.De Gaury, Gerald and Stark, Freya, Arabia Phoenix, Kegan Paul International Limited, ISBN 0­7103­0677­6, ISBN 978­0­7103­0677­7.Oliver, Haneef James, The 'Wahhabi' Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link withBin Laden, T.R.O.I.D. Publications, February 2004, ISBN 0­9689058­5­4.Quist, B. Wayne and Drake, David F., Winning the War on Terror: A Triumph of American Values,iUniverse, 2005, ISBN 0­595­67272­8.Malik, S. K. (1986). The Quranic Concept of War (PDF). Himalayan Books. ISBN 81­7002­020­4.Swarup, Ram (1982). Understanding Islam through Hadis. Voice of Dharma. ISBN 0­682­49948­X.Trifkovic, Serge (2006). Defeating Jihad. Regina Orthodox Press, USA. ISBN 1­928653­26­X.Phillips, Melanie (2006). Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within. Encounter books.ISBN 1­59403­144­4.

Commins, David Dean (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1­84885­014­X.Esposito, John (2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0­19­512558­4.Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. trans. Anthony F. Roberts (1st English ed.).Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 0­674­00877­4.Vernochet, Jean­Michel (2013). Les Egarés: Wahhabisme est­il un contre Islam ? (4th French ed.).Alfortville­F: Sigest. ISBN 978­2­917329­62­7.Saint­Prot, Charles. Islam. L'avenir de la tradition entre révolution et occidentalisation (Islam. TheFuture of Tradition between Revolution and Westernization). Paris: Le Rocher, 2008.

External links

373. Kern, Soeren (2012­02­13). "Qatar Financing Wahhabi Islam in France, Italy, Ireland and Spain". Free Republic.Retrieved 2016­04­27.

374. Kern, Soeren (2013­04­02). "Ireland to Build One of Europe's Largest Mosques". Gatestone Institute InternationalPolicy Council. Gatestone Institute. Retrieved 2016­04­27.

375. "Qatar Charity, Pioneer and Master of Terror Finance". Consortium Against Terrorist Finance. 2015­08­09.Retrieved 2016­04­27.

376. "Germany: Silencing the Critics of Munich's Mega­Mosque". Gatestone Institute International Policy Council.Gatestone Institute. 2014­10­28. Retrieved 2016­04­27.

377. Pedersen, Birthe B.; Søndergaard, Britta (2013­03­29). "Desert upstart Qatar reaches out to the world". Center forIslamic Pluralism. Retrieved 2016­04­27.

378. Salah Nasrawi, "Mecca's ancient heritage is under attack – Developments for pilgrims and the strict beliefs of Saudiclerics are encroaching on or eliminating Islam's holy sites in the kingdom" (http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/16/news/adfg­mecca16), Los Angeles Times, September 16, 2007. Retrieved 21 December 2009.

379. Hubbard, Ben (31 May 2015). "Saudis Turn Birthplace of Wahhabism Ideology Into Tourist Spot" – viaNYTimes.com.

380. "History of the Cemetery Of Jannat Al­Baqi".

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"Wahhabism." Oxford Bibliographies Online: Islamic Studies. (http://oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/?wicket:interface=:6:1:::)What Is a Salafi And Is Their Approach Valid? (http://www.islamfortoday.com/keller06.htm)Spero News – Bosnia: Muslims upset by Wahhabi leaders (http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=6540)The Wahhabi Movement (http://www.islamiccentre.org/presentations/wahhabi.pdf)Analysis: Inside Wahhabi Islam (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1571144.stm)Wahhabism: Understanding the roots and role models of Islamic extremism (http://www.sunnah.org/articles/Wahhabiarticleedit.htm)Wahabi Way (http://www.alsunna.org/salaf.htm) (Arabic)Definitive Wahhabi Profile (http://al­adaab.org/salafi2.html)Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology (http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Saudi%20Publications%20on%20Hate%20Ideology%20Invade%20American%20Mosques.pdf)Booknotes interview with Stephen Schwartz on The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud fromTradition to Terror, February 2, 2003 (https://www.c­span.org/video/?173871­1/two­faces­islam)

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