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CHAPTER 2.Wagner Dodge Retreats in

Mann Gulch"What the hell is the boss doing, lighting another fire in front"of u.'i?"

W... .' AGNER DODGE WAS facing the moment, the decisionof a lifetime. A fast-moving forest-and-grass fire was

about to overrun him and the fifteen firefighters under hiscommand. Less than two hours earlier they had sky-jumpedinto a fiery gulch in Montana. Now an enormous wall of Harnewas racing at them up the tinder-dry ravine. They knew theywere running for their lives, and Dodge knew their time 'N3.5running out. ,

Dodge's mind, still remarkably in c" llG:ol,was also conclud-

:>;i11g;i$~~be:3.B~:hjs,91~l}'ka91l!n.lUst;_reached.a~oint of no exit.--, '.' . -'; , r .' '; "". ". ". .

He estlmatee that ill a mere runety seconds the codlagratlOn.would overtakehim and the crew.If he .couldstill discovera wayout or invent someway to survivewithin, it would make the-dif-:-ference between miraculous escape or catastrophic failure,between savinghimself and his fifteen men or losing all.

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A Fire in Mann Gulch

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LOCATED IN A rugged area of central Montana, Mann Gulchrons into the Missouri River in ~.region named Gates of thej'yfcHmtainsin 1805 by the famed noi.tlTwest explorer I\kri-

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THE LEADERSHIP MOMENT

R. Wagner Dodge (clutching a handkerchief)

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11

wether Lewis. In such inaccessible areas, fire is always a worry,hut on August 5, 1949, the danger was greater than usual. Bylate summer, central Montana was so bone dry that the U.S.Forest Service put the £::<.:p0tential at 74 on 'a scale of 100.

Tw~n~~,five miles, t?~q:~, ,$.P~F-!?-J"tl~~en;1,,,!~~:£~~~gJ~~£~,~9fq:y;:;: ,temperat:\1ie:fot':th'e'day'of 97 'degTees" Fameiiheit: 'A smallthundershower moving through the area offered momentaryrespite. But the storm also meant lightning, and lightning oftenmeans fire.

By 2:30 P.M.,a crew had loaded onto a C-47 at the smoke-jumper base in Missoula. Thirty-three-year-old R. WagnerDodge was the crew chief. A man of few words, he had foughtmany fires during his nine years in the business, and he wasdeservedly the team boss for the technical expertise he broughtto the attack. The fifteen men who checked their parachutes"

VVtzgnerUodgeKetrearsm lYlU7m \J'U'UJ) '-

f""I

':1

;,\ji!:.""'"

, Mann Gukh and Missouri River, August 20, 1949 ':ti

and climbed on b0ard with him wet:eyoung, eager,conditione<\-'~" ",.,:::They:hadbeenfightttigJii'~s all ~er'an.:dwere:readyf()l""

one. Some were college students who had volunteered'for tJi~;~"":01

summer; others were career firefighters. Several were \V,'orJ4,~War n veterans. . . ,.. ~1

Among those who took their seats for the twenty-minute trip.~to Mann Gulch were Robert Sallee, underage for the work a~l'~seventeen, and Walter Rumsey. The outfit also included Davi4:~Navon, a fonner first Jieutenant in the IOlst Airborne Divisionl!who had parachuted into Bastogne, Belgium, during the 1944,German counteroffensive, and William J. Hellman, who On1yj

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a month earlier had parachuted onto the Ellipse between th~1}.,

THE L t- ,\ D I-, R S HIP 1'v[0 MEN T

Rohm Sal//'e and rValw"Rumsey

\V';ite House and the \Nashington Monument. The men under

Dodge's command hailed from _Massachusetts and Montana,New York and North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.

As the aircraft circled twice around Mann Gulch, Dodge and

spotter Earl e(1 ,:::~.-<;couteda safe landing zone. The meR wereL.:i~ed d()w~~,0uE!=he plane was bouncing abQutjn the turbu-Jence, an early hint of what W;1'Sto come. Manyoftheni felt halfsick, and one, too nauseous to jump, opted to return to Missoula.

On Dodge's signal, the others leapt out the open door, targetinga landing zone high on the upper left side of the ravine, markedas point 1 in Figure 2.1.

Dodge and his crew hit the ground at 4:10 P.M.and by 5:00had gathered their chmes, loaded their packs, and shoulderedtheir shovels. Dodge suggested that his men take some food;md drink before moving out. In fire jumpe;s' parlance, it was a"u::n o'clock fire" on the other side of the gulch-one they

f Wagner Dodge Ret1'eatJ in Mann Gulch

.~~

The Mann Gulchfire, August 5, 1949

would fig!.1raii :light :md expect to hav~ under contro~ by 10,A.M.the:next day. August fires often begin laie-in theaftemoon .as lightning rumbles through, and most of them are smallenough to be contained by the following morning. The menknew that a brief rest now would probably be their last until thejob was done.

This day, though, they were moving without several requisiteitems, including a map and radio. The map was falsely believedto be in the hands of a firefighter already in the area, and theradio had been destroyed when an equipment parachute failedto deploy" Still, on Dodge's orders they moved down the gulchsingle file, confidently prepared to confront the blaze.

THE LEADERSHIP MOMENT

,,",c

..,, Fire at jwnp time

Rescue Gulch

FIGURE 2.1 WAGNER DODGE IN MANN GULCH, AUGUST 5,1949

The firefighter alreadyin the area linked up with Dodge andhis crew, but the full complement of sixteen men was a teamonly in the loosest sense. The men had all undergone a three-week training program earlier in the summer,and they had beendisciplined to work together, react quickly, and (ollow theircOID.illander's.l~ad. But Dodge had to exercise his command

"-'mtb6'utccli.e:~W1iQi1ty::Qf"p:Wit~cli.iIL:$V:~11:_m<:?~~diffip~I!t.,'pe' .;.,

. was an unknown quantity to many of the men under him.Severalhad worked with him before; all knew of him. But theyhad never worked together as a single group, under Dodge oranyone else, and Dodge himself was not even sure of all theirnames. Under U.S. Forest Service policy, it is the amount ofrest, not the amount of camaraderie, that determines how menare assembled for a day's jump group. Those with the longestrespite since their last fire ar~ the first to go. A hardened set ofindividuals this group was; a hardened combat platoon it wasnot.

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U7agner Dodge Retreats in Mann Gulch

Three Terrible Discoveries

As DODGE APPROACHEDthe fire line, he told his men to waitin the center of the gulch (point 2) while he moved ahead toscout within a hundred feet of the front. It was during that time,at point 3, that he made the first of three terrible discoveries ofthe day. Here he found that the blaze was far more dangerousthan he had guessed from aerial reconnaissance. A ground windwas coming across the river and over the ridge, at twenty toforty miles an hour, whipping the flames up and blowing themdown his path. A vigorous wind is an oxygen supply, nai.;lre'sgiant bellows. Alarmed,. he retreated to the rest spot andinstructed his men to head for the mouth of the gorge. He him-self retreated further back to the landing zone to retrieve somefood he had forgotten, leaving his men to move down the gulchwithout him.

Dodge's instructions were logical. The fire was more threat-ening than expected, but safety would be assured if he couldplace his crew between the fire and the river. Should the fireforce them into the river, so be it: they would swim out someyards, stay low to avoid smoke, and, once the fire swept by,climb back onshore. The Missouri River was Dodge's insur-ance.1

..A.sthe men moved down the gulch without Dodge in the

le~d, the fi~e&S'h.t~1'£.})~camedivigedin two. As much as five.hl.lndredfe'et separafedthe two Slibgroups, neither of which wasquite sure where the other was. Twenty minutes later, at about5:4°, Dodge finally regrouped his men and resumed the lead,moving them further toward the mouth of the gulch. Here hemade a second, more terrible discovery (point 4): the windswere swirling around the flaming ridge, sweeping burningbranches and glowing embers into the air and across the frontof the gulch. In the few minutes since their arrival in the gulch,fiery eddies had closed the escape route. Dodge's alarm bells--all of them-were sounding.

THE LEADERSHIP MOMENT r Wagner Dodge Retreats in Mann Gulch

At SA5, Dodge reversed course, saying nothing to his men,but they surely knew why, since they too had seen the wind-whipped smoke across the gulch's mouth in front of them. AT 5:55, DODGE abruptly stopped, lit a match from a match-The crew kicked into a run up the left-hand side of the gulch. book he carried, and threw it into the prairie grass in front of\Vithin minutes, Dodge passed word down the line that all him (point 6). His fire, almost instantly a widening circle of

equipment-packs, saws, axes, shovels-was to be discarded and' i flame,burned fast. Bythe normal measuresof firefighting,whatthat they must move as fast as they possibly could (point 5)' !Ie

l

Dodge lit appeared to be a "backfire"-one intended to burn off

knew, and they must have known, that what had been a routme . enough fuel in a limited strip to prevent the real fire fromjump into a ten o'clock fire was now becoming a dash for their i advancing.And indeed he would be asked,at a subsequentgov-live;. ! ernment inves~gation into the eventS of August 5, why he had

It is hard to imagine what could be worse than what Dodge r chosen this moment of extreme urgency to light such a backfire.and his men had already encounfered in their short time in In response, Dodge would assert that this' was not and could notMann Gulch. Less than an hour had passed since they had have been a backfire: with less than a minute remaining until

stashed their parach~tes and confidently set out.

to do their job.

I.

he was engulfed by flames, a backfire would not have cleared

But Dodge, at the hea<;lof the line, made his third and most ter- enough grass to stop anything. Why, then, had he paused torifying discovery of the day just a few minutes later. ,light the fire? The answer seemed both impossibleand simple:

A forest fire rarely moves at more than four or fivemiles an I he had lit the fire in order to take refuge inside it.hour, an advance that smoke jumpers can always outrun. But \ As the ring of his new fire spread, it cleared a small area of allMann Gulch was part of a transitional zone-an area where flammable substances. It was not much of a safety zone, but itmountains yield to plains and forest timber to prairie grass- would have to tIo. He jumped over the blazing ring, moved toand as the men fled from the fire, the forest gave way to itS smoldering center, wrapped a wet cloth around his face,

shoulder-high grass, dense, dry, and ready to explode. pressed himself close to the ground, and waited. As he-nad'The Plains Indians feared a prairie grass fire almost as much anticipated, the surging fire wall rounded both sides of his small

as anvthing. Theylrnew that the worst couldnot be outrun, and. "'. ,.- ~.... '. - circl~, leapt over the top, but found nothing to ignite wher~ ben~wD()dg~::kn~wjt,:to~';~s.~~,s.ti~;~~t.~,~J:y?s.~~~!~Jgg:~~~":'~:'::~~;':.",\/.,~"" " ,'~,;,4~Y:riiQ}i,~pJ,~~~Wit4i.t.i;:#~,9-~b?~~~;f!.qi,1t;}>~W'dacmg~uIHliK"

estimatedthat as'fastashe and'hismencouldmoveupwhatwas ' ridge;andleavinghim unscathedin his tiny asylum.Be stood~h'now becoming a,grassy slope, the towering wall of fire would brushed off the ash, and found he was no worse for wear. Hemovefaster.Within a minuteor two,Dodgeestimated,perhaps hadliterallyburneda hole in the ragingfire. " ,

sooner,he and his menwouldbe overtakenbyflames. ' Buthe hadnot forgottenhis crew.Just beforehislightingof '

The roar was deafening. Sap in scattered trees was super- the escapefire,Robert Salleeand Walter Rumseyhad been sec-hearing and exploding. Smoke, embers, and ashes swirled in all ond and third in a line of sprinting men that stretched behinddirections. The apparent options offered Dodge no escape: Dodge many dozen yards down the hill. Like the other fire-stand and be fat~llyburned; turn and be fatallyburned; run and fighters, Sallee and Rumsey h~d left the aircraft when Dodgebe fatally burned. said "Jump," they had moved toward the mouth of the gulch

when he said "Go," and they had dashed uphill when he said"Run." Now, as Sallee and Rumsey 'stumbled on a stopped

J

The Solution

THE LEADERSHIP MOMENT

Dodge, they saw their boss motioning them to come inside anexpanding ring of fire. "This way!" he shouted. Though Salleeand Rumsey could not hear Dodge in the deafening inferno,they could see what he wanted from his frantic waving. Theyalso saw an enormous fire wall at their ba<;k,and it was about to

overwhelm both them and Dodge's circle.

The Fatal End

SALLEE AND R~};\1SEYgJanced 3t Dodge but kept going,rounding his fire circle, mounting the ridge to their left, andmoving down the other side into what is ironically called"Rescue Gulch." Fires do not stop at the ridge tops; they onlyslow momentarily. The Mann Gulch fire swept into RescueGulch as well, but Sallee and Rumsey chanced upon their ownoasis, a strip of stone without vegetation, a rockslide someseventy-five feet wide that had denied purchase to grass andtrees alike (point 7). They too squeezed toward the middle, the

'~ fire raced down both sides, and a few minutes later, suffering,-+,from neither bums nor smoke, they worked their way back, toward Mann Gulch.

The remaining thirteen men also rushed by Dodge and hiswidening circle of flame. Dodge heard one man say, as heglanced at the escape scheme, "To hell with that, I'm getting out

C',"': f 1.Zr':'in:'.cJJt~ :.-, h ,,', c.., d L: h" , '

ft '" ;::}~-,:'-'1.:"',~':'c,j" <-

:::;":::':;'(j ~n~t~.":bauci«i'W'Q.,~us-e ..~ll,g..:~r,~p:a ,er,:,~p~~~g'PY:,Q9.tl,ge, ';"

lookedbackand later estimated that most of the men had passedwithin twenty to fifty feet of Dodge, just outside the burningring. After that, however, their stars were not propitious: thethirteen chanced upon no bare spots. As Dodge had anticipat-ed, they were quickly overtaken by the prairie grass fire theycould not outrun (point 8).

Unscathed, Dodge, Sallee,and Rumseygathered and went insearch of the others. Several of the men surviveda few hours,but all were fatally burned, most not far from where they hadstarted less than an hour before. They had left their ,landingzone at about 5:00 that afternoon. The hands on the watch of

WagnerDodgeRetreatsin Mann Gulch

James O. Harrison were melted into the dial at 5:56. It was theworst fire-fighting disaster in Forest Service history and wouldremain so for forty;five years, until fourteen men and womenwere killed on July 6, 1994, on Storm King Mountain nearGlenwood Springs, Colorado, combating a vicious wind-drivengrass fire that also suddenly engulfed them.

A Credibility Spiral

LEADFRSHIPIS 1. product of both today's ,!('.jOHSand yeslCi- ,day's groundwork. The fatal combination that emerged inMann Gulch was partly what Dodge did or did not do onAugust 5, but also partly what he did or did not do well beforethe smoke jumpers ever climbed aboard the aircraft. We willfirst review his decisions in the air and on the ground in thegulch and later turn to what he might have done earlier in thesummer to prepare for that fateful August afternoon.

First is the question of why Sallee, Rumsey, and the otherthirteen smoke jumpers refused to join Dodge inside his circle

of fire. It was, :rfter all, an immediate solution, a lifesaving solu-tion, a communicatedsolution. ,

Sallee later reported, "I saw him bend over and light a firewith a match. I thought, with the fire almost on our back,. ~,;,-the hell is the boss doing, lighting another fi!e in fr()nl (.)' us?"

'H~:,:",::;;,:'::$~:ee::':w:as,dose!:to:,'RUin$ey;,'and he expiessed'a 'conClusion' reache'd by both: "We thought he must have gone nuts." Yet

they had, it must be recalled, dutifully followed all of Dodge'searlier instructions. When he had said to plunge out the opendoor of the airplane, they had done so; when he had moved

them toward the mouth of the gulch, they had gone; when he

had said to drop their equipment and run for their lives, theyhad obeyed. Why had his authority suddenly failed him?

One explanation-that the trailing crew members did not seeor understand Dodge's frantic waving-may apply to some. Bmthe two survivors said that they could see Dodge and what heintended, and Dodge himself reported that he had seen 1110s10:

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THE LEADERSHIP IvIOI\tENT

~i,c hrefighrers come near enough to his circle of fire to see hiso;lgnals.

A more plausible explanation is that by this point Dodge hadsimply lost much of his credibility. A leader's credibility can bedefined as the authority to make binding decisions based on arecord of having made them well before. Dodge was crew chief

hy virtue of the latter. But in less than an hour, his credibilityhad been shattered. His decision on where to land had placedthe men behind a dangerous fire. They had marched toward it,;:he:. ;7lGveGaround it, and finally rared from it The ~ccumu-\ation of erroneous decisions finally made his latest action-the

lifesavmg one-too dubious to accept. Dodge's credibility hadcollapsed; worse, he had not yet realized it.

By unplication: If you have made several problematic deci-sIons in a row, be prepared to have your leadership ques-tioned. It may be a moment of personal trial, a point when(he cooperation of others is most needed but least forthcom-mg.

Missteps and Few Words

EXACERBATINGDODGE'S DOWNWARDcredibility spiral were.Nn small missteps, too minor to draw much no:ice ~~t the time

bu t argllably big enough. to .accelerat~;*e~o~s,pil1;-t.\r~1;~:\Yhep:,-Dodge returned to tl--ledrop site at the upper end of lviannGulch to retrieve his food, he sent his crew on without him fora few minutes, relinquishing his leadership. Thus he momen-

tarily commanded the battle from behind the lines, not thefront. In pondering why the generals in World War I so often

displayed incompetence in command, Peter Drucker turned tothe explanation offered by his own high school history teacher," wuunded veteran of the Great War: "J3.ecause not enough gen-cl<-,-b\'.ere blled; they stayed way behind the lines and let oth-u"' '-~~.'lhe f!ghting and dving.""L L .-

';':'_"'-id, \\rbt:!1 Dodge toid hi'_:men to drop their shovels and

I

H'flWler DodgeRetreats in Mann Gulch

axes, he was asking them to give up a large part of what definedthem as a crew under his command; he was, in other words,ordering his soldiers to shed their uniforms.

In both instances, Dodge's actions made sound logisticalsense. The first permitted a more rapid movement toward thesafety of the Missouri River; the second allowed a more rapidmovement away from the accelerating blaze. Yet both chippedaway at Dodge's credibility when he most needed it later. Asolution lay not necessarily in avoiding such actions', for in thisinstance it j<:hard to im:lgi~e n;}t 0rdering the equipment dis-posal, but in a persuasive communication of why he acted thus.

But probably most damaging to Dodge's credibility was amanagement style that fostered little two-way communication.Wagner Dodge was a boss of few words, a person who neitherexpected much information from his people nor gave much inreturn. As the men flew over Mann Gulch, sixteen pairs of eyesand ears were gathering information on the conditions below,and some might have guessed that the swirling smoke and airturbulence signaled dangerous ground conditions. Yet Dodgerelied on only a single pair of eyes, his own. Similarly, in mov-ing toward the fire, then around it, and finally away from it, o~-ers reached their own assessment of the best way out. Yet in nocase did Dodge ask for their appraisal. He h']d ~ diverse humaninformation system at his disposal but rr.ose.to avail hi!l1selfof

..:_p:ol.1e-pfit.,Jmagine, by-wayof.-analogy/achief' exeCujii~.wIldnever asks his salespeople what they are hearing from their cus-tomers or a hospital president who fails to ask his nurses whatthey are learning from their patients. ,

At the same time, Dodge also gave little information. He didnot share his appraisals, barely explained his actions, scarcelyeven communicated his growing alarm. "Dodge has a charac-teristic in him," Rumsey would later tell the Board of Review."It is hard to tell what he is thinking." "When Dodge sent hiscrew members toward the mouth of the gulch after the briefreconnaissance of the fire, he instructed them to move out ofthe "thick reproduction" because it was a "death trap," Sallee

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55

THE LEADERSHll-' MOMENT

later reparted. But atherwise he dispensed little infarmatian,and Rumsey and Sallee abserved that he did not even laak par-ticularly warried. When he suddenly reversed caurse near themauth af the gulch and the crew was maving uphill, Navan, thefarmer paratraaper, was still taking snapshats. Dadge testifiedat the hearing that he had nat c~mmunicated directly with hismen fram the time he retreated far his faad until he ardered

them to. drap all their equipment.Near the end, as the crew was avertaken by crisis and panic,

circumstances permittee! littl.e disr~t<:"i('\n.Bnt 1lI'until that time,cammunicatian had been feasible. \;Vithaut revealing his think-ing when it cauld be shared, Dadge denied his crew members,especially thase nat familiar with him, an appartunity to. appre-ciate the quality af his mind. They had no. ather way af knaw-ing, except by reputatian, whether his decisians were ratianal o.rimpulsive, calculated 0.1'impetuaus. Later, when the quality afhis mind did display itself in a brilliant inventian-the escapefire-his thinking was still taa much af a cipher to thase whasetrust he urgently required.

By implication: If yau want trust and campliance when theneed far them cannat be fully explained, explain yaurselfearly. If yau need infarmatian an which yau must saan act,ask far it soan. Being a persan rJfte"W'y,.'vrdsmay'be fine in a

.,.'.:technicaL:pasirionp;~'\it.:it:is '~":pres~dptipl~,far;:: di~~st~F ,in;.a.. .pasitia~l af leadership.' ...,

Other Escape Fires

WAGNER DODGE COULD never have anticipated the specificeventS in Mann Gulch. Yet it is instructive to.ask what he mighthave dane in June and July to. prepare far them, nat knawingprecisely what lay ahead but anticipating the passibility thatflawless actian and effective leader~hip were likely to. be essen-tial far'whatever came along,

Dadge masterminded ;, winninp, id,.>~ithat cauld have s,1Vcd

U11,gm'rDo(~'!;('Harmts ill Alann Gttkb

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the entjre enterprise. The Board af Review concluded l'" ".1

of his men would have survived if they had "heedeu ! -,",-'

efforts to get them to go. into. the escape fire area." But \\ '", .hi

innovation was ready far use, nabady believed it could SU'-l, ,"

And Dadge's escape fire was a genuine innovation \,'f;n~

Americans an the Great Plains had invented the concept :1,-'(~n-tury earlier, and since the Mann Gulch disaster it has become ;,

standard lifesaving measure in the afficial survival repcrt(\JreBut before r949, the Farest Service did nat train its -;11;in. '. r; 1 \.111mpel'S In ~ettmg t:'sc~?e .:1'::::;, ..1IiO C/l f ,jgust 5, i CJ-j.().;](11in Mann Gulch had ever heard ofthe tactic.

"Vhy was it that Dadge was the anly member of his SIXleci'-man force to. invent the escape fire? All faund themselves jn rhe

same tightening vise, all saw that their time was almost l1p.,Jlldesperately saught a way out. Yet only Dadge seeming" h;Hi'he'capacity to.discaver the lifesaving salutian. \-\'hen asked hu\\ "thad came an the idea of the escape fire, he replied. !r list

seemed the lagical thing to. do."

1\va explanatians for the failure af simultaneous im'cntJul'

came to. mind, bath painting to. what Dadge might have doneearlier in the summer. First, he was an autacrat, an instructIOn

giver, and ance in the gulch there might have been no othen"ayto. lead. But with eadier appartp...ities to.meld a team and maIda culture, he might have enc()l~:':~ged~ach member to learn hem'lOJea.ch his;oWI1fuagments.atid"ffiake his O\Vl1decisians. Thh bnat to. say that fastering individual discretian is the same as

allawing discretianary directian. The challenge for Dodge '''asto. instill individual judgment while aligning it around commonpurpose. Empowering team members to. reach their own deci-sians that will simultaneausly pull the team in the same direc-tion is no easy task. It is (] learned capacity Dadge would h:!\chad to have cultivated well betore August 5.

A secand explanation again refers to. Dodge's styll~,,'j ,I m,~i:of Fc\vwords, He had fought fires far nine years ,~!I(;h:.,; il"a '.Tew foreman since 1945. Some on his ereII' h:'c' "'.n',. 1 ",

fires for kss than three manths. Sa]]ee and RlUJ1SC},", 11;;r

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'l H E LEA D E R S HIP \\ 0 MEN T

InlZ their hrst smoke: jump. Dodge's mind held memories ofhundreds of fire, soil, forest, and wind conditions he had seen,do/,ens of strategIes he knew to have worked, and some he had-;<:e:1bil. It was this repository of practical experience that hadi-.:dto his promotion to crew chief-and it was this storehousehe had at the ready when he realized that he and his crew had'but a moment to rescue themselves'. UnfortUnately, though, itwas his database alone. Dodge might have shared his wisdomearlier, telling and retelling the amazing. sometimes curious,n\(,:lsional1y disastr0l1s stories of hi.; fires of the past. Second-hand accounts \..<1nnever fully substitUte for the personal sea-

soning of years on the front line, but they can furnish a diverseset of prior conditions against which to test the present. Inbeing tight with words, Dodge denied his men the benefit of hisnine years of experience.

The value of downward communication is amply confirmed

II) ,my number of stUdies. Research on flight crew performance,iuring cockpit simulations, for instance, has revealed dlat lead-<:'1"Suf higher-performance cockpit crews share more plans, offermorc prediccions, describe more options, sound more warnings,and provide more explanations..\

By implication: If you expect those who work for you toexercise their own judgulf:nt:, pi",}\ri.dethem with the decision-

I naking experience now., if YOt1.count0.0.thew. to. ~n~erstand(he conditions as best they can, share your past experiencewith them now. If your leadership depends on theirs, devolv-

ing responsibility and sharing stories is a foundation uponwhich it will reside. Thinking strategically when confrontedwith a crisis or challenge is a learned skill that requires sus-tained seasoning.

The Leader's Airy'

\ ..; ,\ THO.~GHl experiment, a "what if" analysis, ask yourselfv:h"t -'Nouldhave happen(:d if Sanee or Rumsey had followed

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H'llgner Dodge RetTeats in l'vlann Gulch

Dodge's blandishments. Or suppose Dodge had cultivated aloyal ally or second in command whose faiili was virtuallyunshakable. If Sallee, ilie next in line as ilie crew raced up iliegulch, had been that ally and had entered the circle of fire, oili-ers almost certainly would have followed as well. The premise issimple: Everybody is crazy from time to time, but it is rare thattwo people are at the same moment. This was one of me dis-coveries of ilie famous experiment by Solomon Asch: If every-body around you says that line A is longer than line B whenme objective fact is obviously the opposite, you will <.:avein.But if you helvejust one other doubter, just one naysayer whobreaks the mold, you are emboldened to break it too. If Sallee,as the loyal ally, had joined Dodge, omers would have beenmore likely to be lured into the escape circle, and we might wellhave never heard of a fire in Mann Gulch.

By implication:If you have difficult decisions to make andinsufficient time to explain them, a key to implementationmay be loyal allies who are sure to execute mem throughthick or thin.. Establishing mose allies now is ilie only way toensure that their support will be at the ready when needed,and it will sometimes be needed when it is far too late to becreated.

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'. :. ..' ..." Panic an.d:Peijorfnilnce .

SOME OF DODGE'S crew members might have rushed by himand his lifesaving fire less from a rational calculus and more outof sheer panic. Sallee and Rumsey mought Dodge must becrazy to be starting a new fire. But omers, by the time meyneared Dodge's fire, were surely being driven by terror, and insuch a state rational judgment is an early casualty. Psychologiststell us that panic sets in when the mind succumbs to stress andfails to take in new information about a du'eatening event, orfails for similar reasons to take advantage of prior experiencegermane to the threat. Either way, it is hard to imagine that

THE LEADERSHIP l\.IOMENT

'--,II Performance

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FIGURE 2.1. PANIC AND PEHFORI,tANCE

Panic point

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the thirteen men behind Sallee and Rumsey, those whose backswere even closer to the raging flames, \vere not overwhelmedwith fear.

As panic short-circuits the mind, our mental processors grindto a halt. Then, unable to reach an informed judgment on whatto do next, we reach into our memories for what worked well

before. A psychologist's label for this is "reversion to last learnedbehavior." If we manufacture mainframe computers but themarbt is sinking and our Cred1l0TSand investors are demand-

: -,"'ihgmore; 'leesndo"~gairrwh~~ has::been:key.to,.QJJr:s'g.~9~S1)jnth.e...past: making mainframes. Sirnilady, if we have a wall of flamebehind us, running from it-a successful strategy in the past-would seem to make good sense now. Anybody near a ragingbonfire knows to back off; anybody caught in a building fireknows to rush out. Yet in this instance what made perfect sensein the past would prove disastrous in the present.

Panic overwhelms smart decision making, but it is also truethat modest levels of stress can improve ~t. This is the curvilin-ear relationship between stress and performance, as shown inFigure 2'.'2.To the left of the panic point, the adrenaline feed

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"J1/{/gncrDodge Retreats in JJmm G'ulch

r- FIGURE ~.~- PERFOR.\1:~~E 0; FIRE DEPAR;~1ENT C~':P~~I~S

AND LIEUTENANTS U:-WER NORMAL AND HIGH-STRESS(FIRE COMBAT) CONDITIONS

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concentrates the mind, mobilizes energies, and eliminates dis-

tractions. To the right of the panic point, however, we no longerthink so clearly, too overwhelmed by stress to reason or caleu-late.4

This can explain the firefighters' flight past Dodge, but howis that Dodge was able to keep such a cool head when otherscould not? An explanation comes £Tom a study of urban fire-fighters, those who ride trucks rather than jump aircraft to reacha blaze. Focused on dep2rtmellt captains and Jieutenants, the$t1.Id.y_r.ey.~led,that>,th~..:.performanceof experienced officers

improves under high uncertainty and stress, while the perfor-mance of inexperienced officers declines (see Figure 2.3).'

This helps us understand why Dodge's experienced intellect

invented the escape fire while others were focused only on flight.It is also a reminder again that experience is a critical foundation

of leadership. A warning is contained therein as weIl: Ivlodestlystressful periods can enhance productivity-we all know of man-

agers who are forever fostering minor crises to get tl1ingsdone.But highly stressful periods 'l;'orsen the performance of inexpe-rienced people if they are pressed beyond their panic POil1L

. U'agnerDodgeRetTeatsin Mann Gukh

Building a team with its own culture and cohesion bringsanother key advantage. For well-formed, highly committedgroups, the panic point is shifted far to the right. As sttess inten-sifies, their performance curve continues to rise well after oth-ers' have plummeted. They can endure extraordinary threats-with an equanimity that individuals and poorly developedgroups could never bear. French Resistance cells challenging theGennan occupiers during World War II were a case in point,

UNDER FOREST SER,VICEpolicy, Dodge took command of a as were the Allied fighting units that landed on the beaches ofjust-assembled crew as he cltmbed on board the aircraft. While C-rerman-heldNormandy.

. iliismightappearoddto thosewhoworkin anageofdedicated Or considerone of the most famousmilitaryattacksof all,teamwork, the just-in-time assemblage ensured each pers?n , George E. Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. After the Union armymaximal rest time between events. It als~ ens~ed admm- h~d stalemated. the Confederate forces during two days ofistrative flexibility, since crew dispatches vaned WIth the scope pItched battle In July 1863, Robert E. Lee readied his rebelof each fire and could range from two men to several planeloads. forces for one final, decisive blow against the Union center. It

Managerial careers are filled with comparable events. Like was to be a daunting task. Twelve thousand troops under Pick-Dodge, you have probably found yourself more than ~nce ett's command were to march across an open !nile of farmland.assigned to oversee a group of people with whom you are lIttle They would have artillery support, but they would also befamiliar and within which acquaintanceship is equally scarce. assaulting a well-fortified Union line behind a stone wall on an

You have just been promoted, rotated, relocated, or otherwise extended ridge: General James Longstteet, ordered by Lee toreassigned, and those who now report to you may predate you execute the attack, was convinced of impending failure. Theby no more than days. You are a church minister who has taken thousands of combat veterans of Virginia and North Carolinaover a congregation with an ever-changing membership, a fast- who were assembling to mount the attack could see it !nightfood manager who has mken over a franchise with an ever- well be their last. Yet In full ~ew of Union cannons and ip.fantry,,.,1~'\ ''''njD 'r~lT ,orkfor.ce .' "ill:.maVJ;>e,.a, sos;~er,

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over a t~am who~eplay~~s are as'unf:inulra:rto"6il[anom:e'r:as--- .' , . .charge ended in bitter defeat, with all but one of his thirty-two

they are to you. regimental and field officers killed or wounded and half hisSeen through today's lens, Dodge would have surely pre- troops down or gone. But the men of the Army of Northern

ferred it otherwise. Building a self-contained, mutually reliant Virginia, loyal to their regimental commanders and comrades,team is one of the proven ways of delivering optimal perf or- went unflinchingly into the devastating fire. Collectively, theymance under duress. But it requires months, even years to did what neither individuals nor less well-fonned teams could

dev~lop the culture and cohesion that are the engines ~f sut~ ever do.work-team performance. Given the seasonal na~re of hISbU~I-ness, the best Dodge might have done, had polley allowed It,was to form a dedicated team in June within which he couldhave built some unity by AUgust.6

THE LEADERSHIP MOMENT

By implication: In periods of anxiety and stress, it is yourleast experienced associates who will reach the panic zonefirst. Providing newcomers with as much early. training andmentoring as possible is one way of moving their panic pointwell to the right when the heat is on.

Culture and Cohesion

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By implication: If your organization is facing a period ofuncertainty, change, or stress, now is the time to build astrong culture with good lines of interior communication,

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THE LEADERSHIP 1'1,) ill E N T

mutual understanding, and shared "bligation. A clear senSe ofcommon purpose 'and a well-formed cunar3derie are essen-tial ingredients to ensure that your \.eam, your organiz<JtJon.or your company will perform to iT', utmost when it is mostneeded.

Our actions today may make the difference between successor failure tomorrow. The challenge is to anticipate what prob-lems lie ahead and what preparatory steps are required now tomeet them later. Enabling all to mal<.e inf0rmed decisioTl<::,informing all to understand your decisions, and organizing aiito discipline their decisions are among the enduring legacies ofWagner Dodge's fifty-six-minute struggle for survival in MannGulch.

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