Addendum report – risk to Nuba individuals in SudanPrepared by Maddy CrowtherCompleted 17 October 2019

Methodology

1. I have been asked to produce an addendum to my earlier report completed 27 August 2019, containing new evidence regarding the treatment of individuals of Nuba ethnicity in Sudan since this date. I do so in recognition that I will be cross-examined on both this and my earlier report, as well as that produced in March 2018. 1

2. I understand concerns have been raised about my suitability as an expert witness considering I have not travelled to Khartoum. As noted in my report dated 27 August 2019, in late November and early December 2018 I travelled to South Sudan, including to the Yida refugee settlement just over the border with Sudan, speaking directly to Nuba refugees about the circumstances in South Kordofan, and for their friends and relatives living in other areas of Sudan. My reflections on this trip were offered in Annex VIII of my 27 August 2019 report. In this section I also specifically mention my reasons for not travelling to Khartoum itself, namely that my likelihood of obtaining a visa was limited given an extant and negative profile with the London Sudanese Embassy given the human rights work of the non-governmental organisation which I co-direct, Waging Peace. I fully intend to travel to Khartoum once I judge that I will not personally be at risk, and that individuals or organisations I spoke to while there would not face any undue attention as a result of our meeting.

3. In the production of this report I have had sight of the Home Office’s update on the political situation in Sudan in response to an information request dated October 2019. I comment on it in throughout. I also consulted with other groups, and provided updates unedited and as received in the Annexes. I provide a signed statement of truth at pages 8 and 9.

Update since August

4. In my 27 August 2019 report I mentioned that it was unclear whether the new Sudanese administration would display the political will and consensus needed for the implementation of the monumental tasks outlined in recently signed power-sharing and constitutional deals, themes I was pleased to see highlighted in the Home Office’s document as at paragraph 2.3. Early reports provided to me suggest that progress is insufficient.

5. Concerns continue to centre on the role taken by the military in the process, and particularly of individuals implicated in atrocity crimes under the previous administration. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or ‘Hemetti’ - whose Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are the re-branded Janjaweed responsible for the worst abuses in Darfur at the height of the genocide there; whose forces have fought in South Kordofan; and who served on former President Omar Al-Bashir’s security committee - maintains his position, as does Abdel Fattah al-Bourhan, who held a high rank in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Bashir.

6. But more relevant still is the presence of hundreds and thousands of officials who served under Bashir in the transitional authorities. It remains an open source of tension of what to do with those individuals with affiliations to Bashir’s political party, the National Congress Party (NCP), and who were on the government payroll. Short of a total purge, this administrative apparatus will be maintained. This apparatus was employed by Bashir during his rule to conduct a brutal policy of Arabisation, during which black, African, animist, or other religious expressions of Sudanese culture were suppressed in favour of Arab and Muslim identities. Many Nuba on the ground and within the diaspora see disparaging and racist ideologies as the most pernicious and persisting legacies of the Bashir era – it is still common for jokes to be made about an individual’s blackness, using words like ‘abid’ which means slave. I expanded on this in my March 2018 report and wish to draw your attention to these remarks. It remains the case that an individual will be readily identified as Nuba because of their skin tone; that they will suffer discrimination in equal citizenship, employment, religious freedom, education, healthcare, and housing, especially because of inability to obtain official documentation that entitles them to government

1 Waging Peace, ‘Risk to Nuba individuals in Sudan’, March 2018, accessed online 16.10.19 https://wagingpeace.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/waging-peace-report-for-nuba-country-guidance-case-march-2018.pdf 1

services; and that in addition they will be subject to the unchanged and hostile administrative apparatus of the state.

7. In a clear example of the unchanged nature of the judicial system and its animus against Nuba Christians, criminal charges against eight leaders of the Sudanese Church of Christ (SCOC), which is a primarily Nuban denomination, were confirmed on 7 October 2019, after the case against them was re-opened in July 2019. They stand accused of failing to hand over administrative control to a Bashir era unelected church committee. In a statement, Christian Solidarity Worldwide’s Chief Executive Mervyn Thomas said, “The renewal of this case is emblematic of the judicial harassment of ethnic and religious minorities in Sudan.” 2 It shows that the simple appointment of a fresh Minister with responsibility for guidance and religious endowments is not enough to change an administrative apparatus that still persecutes Nubans.

8. Many similarly point to the lack of action taken on the transitional justice file as evidence of persisting negative attitudes towards both Darfuris and the Nuba. While an investigation committee has been tasked with looking in to the events of 3 June 2019, the date of a massacre at the site of the sit-in in front of army headquarters, this has been criticised for the inclusion of committee members with links to the RSF - itself implicated in this very incident - and for its failure to consider crimes committed since the outbreak of the demonstrations in December 2018, as well as the continued immunity enjoyed by Hemetti himself.3

9. More importantly, no further proposals have been forwarded regarding justice and accountability for historic crimes, including those of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur, and the targeted and indiscriminate aerial bombardment of South Kordofan. Bashir still has a pending arrest warrant at the International Criminal Court, but he is avoiding handover and is instead involved in a domestic court case relating to corruption, and currently residing in the political wing of the notorious Kober prison. Many Darfuri and Nuban groups in particular see the lack of a public discussion on justice and accountability for egregious human rights abuses as abandonment of their cause. From my close work with the British-Sudanese diaspora, whose views mirror and influence those on the ground, I am told that for many this contributes to the impression that the regime is not interested in their past and current suffering and that old racist and persecutory mindsets still hold sway.

10. There was at least initially more hopeful progress on the peace file, especially given the six-month limit for making peace with the armed movements from both Darfur and the Nuba Mountains imposed on the transitional authorities under the terms of their power-sharing deal. On 14 October 2019 negotiations were launched in South Sudan’s capital, Juba, originally including the Sudan People Liberation Movement-North’s (SPLM-N) Abdulaziz Al-Hilu, following the institution of trust-building measures and extended ceasefires. 4 However, on 16 October 2019, Al-Hilu pulled out of the talks, claiming the RSF had attacked civilians, potentially even with a bombing campaign,5 arbitrarily arrested traders and confiscated their goods, ambushed SPLM-N fighters to gain territory, and armed a local Arab tribe against them.6 I include the original Arabic language SPLM-N statement, alongside a rough translation, at Annex I. The talks are also seeing the hold-out of various Darfuri armed groups, included that commanded by Abdulwahid Al Nur, and the demand on behalf of other Darfuri leaders to hold talks in the Emirates. It is simply too early to say whether these rounds of negotiations can be brought back on track, and caution is recommended given we have witnessed similar but ultimately abortive attempts many times before.

2 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, ‘Criminal charges against church leaders confirmed’, 15 October 2019, accessed online 17.10.19 https://www.csw.org.uk/2019/10/15/press/4476/article.htm?fbclid=IwAR37KVQZsn3uXddEzRyxS0A0wnQfIH7U9dLdy1EbWBXV9qm4guaMoLUHifs 3 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sudan’s New Investigation Committee Raises Concerns’, 24 September 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/24/sudans-new-investigation-committee-raises-concerns 4 Al-Jazeera, ‘Talks under way between Sudan transitional government and rebels’, 14 October 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/talks-sudan-transitional-government-rebels-191014115108400.html 5 Voice of Africa, ‘Sudan talks delayed after attacks in Nuba Mountains’, 16 October 2019, accessed online 17.10.19https://www.voanews.com/africa/sudan-talks-delayed-after-attacks-nuba-mountains6 Middle East Eye, ‘Sudanese rebels withdraw from talks, accusing government of attacks’, 16 October 2019, accessed online 16.10.19 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudanese-rebels-withdraw-talks-accusing-government-attacks 2

11. I also view with concern continued violence in South Kordofan before this latest incident, and believe this calls into question the transitional authorities’ true commitment to responsible civilian rule there, and for the region’s displaced. At Annex II US surgeon Dr Tom Catena mentions that the hospital he runs in the region had continued to receive patients from government-controlled areas in recent months. And some say that the nationwide state of emergency (extended for a further three months on 10 October 2019) 7 disproportionately affects the conflict areas. Just recently neighbourhood committees near Dilling in the state claimed that the powers are being used to impose curfew, arbitrary arrests, confiscation of goods, and to curtail freedom of movement through checkpoints.8 There have also been examples of torture following arrest in Dilling, as is the case with Ismail Baleeya, who was tortured for seven hours after a personal dispute between himself and a military official on 21 September 2019.9 Personal rivalries with government militia were also a source of tension in Garada village, where two individuals were killed following a run-in with the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) involving cattle grazing – the PDF officers involved have not been reprimanded or faced consequences.10

12. The most notable absence in the Home Office’s political update report is that at 7.3 (Targeting of Nuba by the state) it fails to mention a recent conflict that has erupted over the use of dangerous chemicals, including mercury and cyanide, during the gold mining process in South Kordofan, resulting in the death of livestock and birds, and injuries, miscarriages, and birth defects sustained by local residents.11 Starting on 5 September residents of Talodi, home to a high proportion of gold mines, started protesting the use of these materials, their sit-in later being joined by nearby town residents as well. One such local mining company, run by the Al-Junaid Industrial Group, is owned by RSF leader Hemetti. There is some evidence that when local leadership tried to investigate or mediate between protesters and the gold companies in the first few weeks of the crisis they were allowed to visit some companies, but the RSF protected the premises of Hemetti’s company. 12 Then on 7 October 2019 the RSF raided Talodi’s gold mines, beating up and detaining individuals, and looting belongings. 13 The response of the Sovereign Council (of which Hemetti is a member) to these incidents was muted, while the cabinet took action to ban the use of toxic chemicals in the mining process. 14 Even a positive interpretation of these events suggests a conflict of interest on the part of Hemetti, but at their worst they suggests a disregard for the lives and wellbeing of Nuba individuals, attitudes that may lead to continued persecution and discrimination of Nuba individuals across Sudan.

13. This fact is also suggested by the continued detention of specifically Nuba political prisoners despite the release of other detainees by the transitional government. The 25 individuals mentioned in paragraph 26 of my 27 August 2019 report remain detained, despite a September 2019 Juba declaration of principles mentioning amnesty and the release of prisoners of war.15 This fact was not included in the Home Office’s report, as at paragraph 5.3.

7 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan extends state of emergency for three months’, 10 October 2019, accessed online 16.10.19 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article68279 8 Radio Dabanga, ‘‘Security forces abusing emergency measures’ in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains’, 10 October 2019, accessed online 16.10.19 https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/security-forces-abusing-emergency-measures-in-sudan-s-nuba-mountains 9 HUDO Centre, ‘Arrest of Ismail by MI in Dilling, Sudan’, 7 October 2019, accessed online 16.10.19 https://hudocentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Arrest-of-Ismail-by-MI-in-Dilling.pdf 10 HUDO Centre, ‘Killing of two civilians by PDF in Nuba Mountains, Sudan’, 3 October 2019, accessed online 16.10.19 https://hudocentre.org/killing-of-two-civilians-by-pdf-in-nuba-mountains-sudan/ 11 Sudan Democracy First Group, ‘Cyanide Plants in South Kordofan State – Human life is a price for gold extraction’, November 2018, accessed online 16.10.19 https://mailchi.mp/democracyfirstgroup/cyanide-plants-in-south-kordofan-state-human-life-is-a-price-for-gold-extraction?e=6edaf1933e 12 HUDO Centre, ‘Potential confrontation between Talodi residents on a sit down demonstration and RSF soldiers in Sudan’, 10 September 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://hudocentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/UA-Talodi-Sit-down-demonstration.pdf and its update dated 17 September 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://hudocentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Update-onTalodi-Sit-in-UA.pdf 13 HUDO Centre, ‘Talodi sit in Update (3)’, 8 October 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://hudocentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Update-3-onTalodi-Sit-in.pdf 14 Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan cabinet outlaws mercury, cyanide in mining, 9 October 2019, accessed online 16.10.19 https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-cabinet-outlaws-mercury-cyanide-in-mining 15 HUDO Centre, ‘Detainees from South Kordufan, Sudan have been in custody for more than eight years’, 13 October 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://hudocentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Update-on-unjustified-prolong-detention.pdf 3

14. I have also heard reports that while the Public Order Laws, the so-called ‘morality laws’, have been suspended in central Khartoum, that they remain enforced in the ‘black belt’ where most Nuba live, specifically in the Al Haj Yousef and Mayo neighbourhoods. Police have been raiding houses accusing them of producing local alcohol called merisa, and confiscating belongings, but without any judicial oversight, as these cases do not reach the courts.16 There has reportedly also been continued action taken against tea sellers in the streets, as discussed in my 27 August 2019 report.

15. Then there remains the fact that the political situation remains incredibly fragile. The unity of bodies like the Sudanese Political Alliance (SPA) and Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) is constantly being tested by historical grievances between parties and positions, especially now that the exigencies of the streets no longer demand constant vigilance against discord. The chance of a military coup within the coming months is now widely being touted.

16. This is especially relevant as old systems of power and patronage have not yet been meaningfully dismantled. Although the feared National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), whose tactics of torture and interrogation are well-known, were formally rebranded into the General Intelligence Services (GIS) and their powers limited to intelligence-gathering, in practice only the special operations team seems to have been offered transfer into the RSF. We simply cannot say with certainty what elements remain, especially given the former opacity of their functions. As quoted in paragraph 34 of my 27 August 2019 report, we especially cannot say with certainty what policies and procedures have been amended with regards to immigration and security practices at airports and other ports of entry into and out of Sudan.

17. Sometimes we do get an insight into the continued repressive behaviour of these forces, however. Reports reached me on 11 October 2019 about an attempt made by security elements to derail a planned journalism meeting.17 It was eventually granted the go-ahead, but this speaks to the potential for continued repression of the media and free expression, even despite public commitments to the same.

18. We can also not take the disappearance of former NISS chief, Salah Gosh, as evidence that he has absented himself from Sudan’s political and security scene. In fact he was recently understood to be meeting with the leadership of the Democratic Unionist Party in Egypt, and there are rumours he plans to live in Uganda. Shadow leadership structures within NISS mean it is highly likely that he continues to pull strings.

19. Add into this mix the presence of personal militia run by most ousted former leaders and it paints a picture of a highly militarised and fragile state. Those whose powers are due to be limited under the terms of a transitionary period are often aggrieved at the process. For instance, just this week elements of West Kordofan’s PDF blocked a major road linking the region to Khartoum in a call for compensation and re-integration efforts. 18 For a country trying to bring public spending, and particularly the military budget, under control, this presents a major security threat. I predict further such actions on behalf of other security bodies in coming weeks, as financial flows to them dwindle.

20. Meanwhile, the pressure from the streets does not seem to be diminishing. In fact a wide-scale protest is being planned for 21 October, the date of ‘Green October’, to mark the date of the 1964 October revolution. This has exposed fault lines between Islamists, former regime officials, and regular demonstrators who all dispute the protest’s leadership and merit, and this may lead to the outbreak of further violence. Recent marches have been met with violence, as recognised in the Home Office report at paragraph 7.1.4 and at 7.2.1, so the behaviour of police and other armed elements towards demonstrators is still of active concern. It is to be recalled that one does not need to be actively protesting to be at risk, anyone in the wrong place at the wrong time can be targeted.

16 Bushra Gamer, director of HUDO Centre, in phone conversation on 16 October 2019.17 Facebook of Tahani Abbas, women’s rights activist and lawyer, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=532974687261747&set=a.172870229938863&type=3&theater 18 Middle East Monitor, ‘Sudan: Fighters block major road, demand integration into official institutions, 15 October 2019, accessed online 15.10.19 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191015-sudan-fighters-block-major-road-demand-integration-into-official-institutions/ 4

Conclusion

21. I stand by the comments and conclusions of my 27 August 2019 report and March 2018 report, that individuals of Nuba ethnicity remain at risk were they to be returned to Sudan. The recent change in government should not be exaggerated, it is simply too early to tell whether early stated commitments to peace and respect for diversity will be respected, and initial progress is discouraging, particularly as the administrative apparatus of the Bashir era remains mostly intact. Popular discontent is growing among the Nuba communities both on the ground and within the diaspora amid fears that the conflict, persecution, discrimination, and Arabisation of the Bashir era will continue while its administrative apparatus and racist ideology remains in force. This affects Nuba communities in South Kordofan, those who have been displaced to Khartoum, and individuals who arrive in the urban area as a result of refused asylum claims.

Annexes

Annex I Original and translation of SPLM-N statement regarding pulling out of peace talks, 16 October 2019

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Translation:

October 16

Statement on government breach to stop hostilities

As the SPLM-N is ready to enter into negotiations with the transitional government on Wednesday, October 16, 2019 - the Sudanese armed forces, with the help of some of the bellybuttons [RSF], have crossed the Galvan areas (Anshouh) with the different eastern route around it, and then forces of support on 15

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October, the road was used by citizens to ambush areas in the liberated areas of Khor Warl, linking the western and eastern regions. They arrested 16 citizens and released 3 citizens. And keep (13) others with their goods.

The masses of the Sudanese people:

* As we have indicated before that 1- The government did not announce the cessation of hostilities on its part, and is therefore conducting such acts of aggression, proving that it is still committed to the military solution to the conflict. 2- The Rapid Support Forces' move to ambush, occupy new positions, block roads, kill, injure, arrest traders, and confiscate their goods and property is an attempt to demonstrate strength that does not help create a favourable negotiating environment. 3- Accordingly, the SPLM-N will not negotiate with the government until it is sure that: 3.1. Issuing a notarized declaration of hostilities by the government.3-2. Immediately release the detained citizens and transfer them to the SPLM authorities.3-3. Immediately withdraw from the areas it has occupied and lift the ambushes it has installed in Khor Warl and other areas.3-4. Conducting a full investigation into the assassination of Sheikh Mohammed Abdel Fadil, Sheikh of Zalataya village. In conclusion, we reaffirm that the SPLM is committed to what it declared in the Juba Declaration to resolve the conflict through negotiation. Ammar Amoun Daldoum

Secretary-general of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/NHead of the negotiation team

Annex IIInput from Dr Tom Catena, US surgeon operating in the Nuba Mountains, via email 16 October 2019

Hi Maddy,

   Nice to hear from you.  I’m currently not in Nuba and will be heading back late next month.  Things had been pretty much the same after Bashir was deposed in April.   There was a sense of optimism that peace would come - especially with the appointment of Hamdok although there was still concern over the continued presence of Hemeti and Burhan.  We’ve started to receive patients from government controlled areas - Amdahalieb, Mehela and others.  Everyone seems to be very tired of the prolonged conflict and lack of chance for development.  However, we’ve just received word that there was an outbreak of fighting somewhere in Nuba perpetrated by government forces (maybe RSF).  Still need to confirm where and who but seems there were some casualties.  As I’m sure you know, the SPLA- N has pulled out of the peace talks which started Monday until this issue gets cleared up.    All of this leads me to believe that it is too early to tell of there will be real change in the Nuba Mountains and for the Nuba in the north.  I think there is too much baggage and too many years of bad blood to allow for any rapid and easy solutions.  I get the feeling sometimes that the optimism is because the people are yearning so badly for peace.  As long as the military council has significant power and the NISS is still intact, it would seem premature to deny asylum for Nuba and other African Sudanese.

I hope this can be of some help to you.  Let me know if you need clarification.I’m really looking forward to getting back to Nuba.

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Thank you for your work.

Peace,Tom

Annex IIIInput from Nuba Mountains Solidarity Abroad group, most major UK Nuba diaspora group, provided via email attachment 15 October 2019

Since the independence of Sudan in 1956, the Nuba people have experienced discrimination and marginalisation from the ruling parties, they are often attacked systematically due to their race and religion. In August 2019, the Nuba people living in the eastern part of Sudan, namely the city of Portsudan, were attacked by their neighbouring tribe Bin Amir who were heavily armed and using live ammunition. The reasons for the attack were purely based on discrimination and racism, these were imposed by the former regime against race and religion. The Nuba people (termed as Zurga) were left with no choice but to defend themselves unarmed, as a result of this conflict, many lives were lost from both sides, many people were injured, and many Nuba people lost their homes due to several fires started by the Bin Amir. It is worth mentioning that such attacks on the Nuba people are common in cities of Sudan. This is based on the Fatwa which was issued in 1987 by the Islamic government against the Nuba people. Hence, tribes from the Arab descendants or the non-Africans are equipped with weapons and are given the right to kill the Nuba people. Unfortunately, the conflict that took place in Algadarif, Kasala and Portsudan have the potential to escalate at any time, to different cities within these three years of the transitional period. This is because the 1987 fatwa is still active and needs to be inactivated. Currently, there is no law or regulation to guarantee security or protection to the Nuba people living in cities, or those living under governmentally controlled areas. Therefore, in order for the situation to be deescalated, a peace agreement that includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement -North (SPLM-N) must be signed, as this is the party that represents the Nuba Mountains. Although the former president Omer Al Bashir was outset in April 2019, his regime remains visible in government security forces. As a result, the current situation for the Nuba people in Sudan remains very critical; they are still susceptible to attacks and killings at anytime. Therefore, before a peace agreement, Which includes SPLM-N, Nuba refugees returning to Sudan will more likely be faced with issues regarding their safety and human rights on issues relating to their ethnicity and religion.

I Maddy Crowther DECLARE THAT:

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1. I understand that my duty in providing written reports and giving evidence is to help the

Tribunal and that this duty overrides any obligation to the party by whom I am engaged or

the person who has paid or is liable to pay me. I confirm that I have complied ad will

continue to comply with my duty.

2. I confirm that I have not entered into any arrangement where the amount or payment of my

fees is in any way dependent on the outcome of the case.

3. I know of no conflict of interest of any kind, other than any which I have disclosed in my

report.

4. I do not consider that any interest which I have disclosed affects my suitability as an expert

witness on any issues on which I have given evidence.

5. I will advise the party by whom I am instructed if, between the date of my report and the

hearing, there is any change in circumstances which affects my answers to points 3 and 4

above.

6. Where possible I have shown the sources of all information I have used.

7. I have exercised reasonable care and skill in order to be accurate and complete in

preparing this report.

8. I have endeavoured to include in my report those matters, of which I have knowledge or if

which I have been made aware, that might adversely affect the validity of my opinion. I have

clearly stated any qualifications to my opinion.

9. I have not, without forming an independent view, included or excluded anything which has

been suggested to me by others, including my instructing lawyers.

10. I will notify those instructing me immediately and confirm in writing if, for any reason, my

existing report requires any correction or qualification.

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11. I understand that;

a. my report will form the evidence to be given under oath or affirmation;

b. Questions may be put to me in writing for the purposes of clarifying my report and that

my answers shall be treated as part of my report and covered by my statement of truth;

c. I am likely to be required to attend the Tribunal to be cross- examined on my report;

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I confirm that I have made clear which facts and matters referred to in this report are within my

own knowledge and which are not. Those that are within my own knowledge I confirm to be true.

The opinions I have expressed represent my true and complete professional opinions on matters

to which they refer.

Signed:

Dated: 17 October 2019

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