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VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Esraa Esmat Mohamed Yagoub

The Role of China in the Rohingya Conflict 2012 -2018

(Kinijos vaidmuo Rohingya konflikte 2012–2018)

Final Master Thesis

Political science study programme, state code 621L20004

Political science study field

Supervisor Dr. Gerda Jakštaitė

Defended Prof. Dr. Šarūnas Liekis

Kaunas, 2019

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT………………………………………………..…………………………………….…….3

SANTRAUKA…………………………………………………………………………………………4

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………...…………… ……………….5

LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS…………………………………………………………...…………6

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………...............................7

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH……………….………...…………..….12

1.1 National Interests from the Prospective of Classical Realism ……………………………….……12

1.1.2 Classification of the State’s national Interests…………………..…………...………..….…13

1.1.3 Instruments for Securing National Interests……………………………………………...…15

1.2 Economic Interests of a Powerful Foreign State………………………..…….……………….….17

1.3 National Interests in the Chinese School of Realism School………………………………….….19

2. MYANMAR GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS AND THE ROHINGYA CONFLICT ………...22

2.1 The Rohingya Conflict: actors, root cause of the conflict, interests………………………………22

2.1.1 The Conflict Escalation in August in 2017…………………………………………………...27

2.2 Reform of Myanmar Political Leadership………………………………………………………...31

2.2.1 Reconciliation with the Political Opposition and Civil Society………………………….…..31

2.2.2. The International Community……………………………………………………………….34

2.3 Myanmar Economic Reform……………………..………………………………………….…....36

2.3.1 The Challenges to Economic Reform…………………...……………………………...……38

3. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN RAKHINE STATE…………...………....…........…………………..39

3.1 The Position of China from Myanmar Reforms………………………………………………….40

3.1.1 China Response to Myanmar Political Reform……………………………………….……40

3.1.2 China Response to Myanmar Economic Reform…………..……………………....………43

3.2 China Engagement in the Rohingya Conflict………………..…………………..………….…...44

3.3 China Investment in Rakhine State………….………….…….…………………..………….…..47

CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………………………………..….….52

LIST OF LITERATURE AND SOURCES……………………………………….…..........................58

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Yagoub E. The Role of China in the Rohingya Conflict 2012 -2018: Final Master Thesis in Political

Science / Supervisor: Dr. Dr. Gerda Jakštaitė; Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Political

Science and Diplomacy, Department of Political Science, Kaunas, 2019. 66 pages.

ABSTRACT

This master thesis analyses the evolving role of the People’s Republic of China toward the

Rohingya Conflict ever since the last conflict escalation in August 2017, the object of this research is

the role of China here means the political behavior and actions of China with the different actors in this

research, the subject of the research is the Rohingya conflict. The first chapter discusses the classical

realism as the theoretical framework of the research because China’s foreign policy is quite pragmatic,

there are concepts which the classical realism adequately explained, so it will give a better

understanding to the behavior of China in this context, such as national interest, struggle for power and

influence. Second chapter discusses the political and economic reforms in Myanmar started in 2011.

Myanmar government reforms and the democratization process its impact on the domestic politics and

international relations, the impact of the reforms on the Rohingya conflict and the future consequence.

Moreover, this chapter covers the challenges that might encounter the economic reforms and the role

of both the western countries and China in these challenges. In order to identify these reforms, one of

the research tasks is to explain Myanmar government reforms and its impact on the Rohingya conflict.

The last chapter discusses the role of China in the Rohingya conflict, two tasks conducted, first to

determine the political role of China and its engagement in the conflict, the second task is to identify

the Chinese investments in Rakhine state and its impact on the conflict dynamics. The chapter has

subsections,

At the end of the research, a conclusion with the findings according to the tasks mentioned above, with

recommendations.

Key words: Classical realism, national interests, intrastate conflict, political reform, human rights.

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Yagoub E, Kinijos vaidmuo Rohingya konflikte 2012–2018. politologijos magistro darbas/ Vadovas:

Dr. Gerda Jakštaitė; Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakulteto

Politologijos katedra, Kaune, 2019. 66 puslapiai

SANTRAUKA

Baigiamajame magistro darbe nagrinėjamas Kinijos Liaudies Respublikos vaidmuo

Rohingya konflikte nuo 2017 m. Rugpjūčio mėn. Paskutinio konflikto eskalavimo, kurio tikslas -

Kinijos vaidmuo - tai politinis Kinijos elgesys ir veiksmai su įvairiais veikėjais šiame tyrime

tyrimo objektas yra „Rohingya“ konfliktas. Pirmajame skyriuje aptariamas klasikinis realizmas,

kaip teorinė tyrimo struktūra, nes Kinijos užsienio politika yra gana pragmatiška, yra koncepcijų,

kurias klasikinis realizmas adekvačiai paaiškino, todėl suteiks geresnį supratimą apie Kinijos

elgesį šiame kontekste, pvz. nacionaliniai interesai, kova už valdžią ir įtaką. Antrajame skyriuje

aptariamos 2011 m. Pradėtos politinės ir ekonominės reformos Mianmare. Mianmaro

vyriausybės reformos ir demokratizacijos procesas daro įtaką vidaus politikai ir tarptautiniams

santykiams, reformų poveikiui Rohingo konfliktui ir būsimoms pasekmėms. Be to, šiame

skyriuje aptariami iššūkiai, su kuriais gali susidurti ekonomikos reformos ir Vakarų šalių bei

Kinijos vaidmuo šiuose iššūkiuose. Siekiant nustatyti šias reformas, viena iš tyrimų užduočių -

paaiškinti Mianmaro vyriausybės reformas ir jos poveikį Rohingo konfliktui.

Paskutiniame skyriuje aptariamas Kinijos vaidmuo Rohingya konflikte, dvi atliktos užduotys,

pirmiausia siekiant nustatyti Kinijos politinį vaidmenį ir jos dalyvavimą konflikte, antra užduotis

- nustatyti Kinijos investicijas į Rakhine valstiją ir jos poveikį konfliktui dinamika. Skyriuje yra

poskyriai,

Tyrimo pabaigoje su išvadomis padarytos išvados pagal pirmiau minėtas užduotis ir

rekomendacijas.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: Klasikinis realizmas, nacionaliniai interesai, konfliktas, politinės reformos,

žmogaus teisės.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARSA- The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army

ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CNPC-China National Petroleum Company

EU- European Union

FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

GDP-Gross Domestic Product

IDPs- Internally Displaced Persons

MIC-Myanmar Investment Commission

NLD - National League for Democracy

R2P- Responsibility to Protect

SIPRI- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UN- United Nations

USDP - Union Solidarity and Development Party

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LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND MAPS

Diagram No.1: Alliances in theory and practice, international interests……………………….…15

Diagram No.2: Asymmetries of power and the tripartite nature of the Rakhine state conflict……27

Diagram No.3: Myanmar arms trade 1990-2016: who sold what?...................................................45

Diagram No.4. Major Foreign Investment in Myanmar by Country as at 31st March 2017…...….46

Map No.1: Map of Myanmar Major Ethnic groups and the Rohingyas in Rakhine State…………25

Map No.2: Routes of the Rohingya refugees by sea and land………………...…………………....29

Map No.3: The Myanmar-China oil and gas as pipelines………………………………………….49

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INTRODUCTION

The Rohingya conflict has been going on for decades even before the establishment of the

state of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. The conflict dated back to the era of the British colony

to India and Burma. Before the British rule between (1824-1948) Arakan state (today is Rakhine state)

was the Kingdom of Mrauk-U in Arakan, the founder Min Saw known also by his Muslim name

Suleiman Shah, ruled Arakan between (1429-1785)1. Arab, Danish, Dutch and Portuguese traders

were among the local inhabitants in Arakan because it was an international trade hub at that time,

which made Arakan very prosperous. Which led the Burmese king Bayinnaung to attempt to invade it

several times.2 After the defeat of the Burmese army against the British India army, Burma ceded

Arakan to the British, in obedience to the peace treaty of Yandabo (February 1826). After the

independence of Burma in January 1948, the country became united and Arakan region became one of

the states, now known as Rakhine state. From 1962–2011 Myanmar was under the cruel military rule,

in which all Burmese were treated ruthlessly. During this period Myanmar has many ethnic conflicts,

led by military insurgents many in Kachin State, Kayah State, Kayin State, Shan State and Rakhine

state where the majority of the Rohingya Muslims live. In 1982 the Burmese government amended the

nationality law and excluded the Rohingya Muslims from the classification of Burma’s ethnic groups

and called them as illegal Bangladeshi migrants and they were stripped from all their civil rights.3 Ever

since that date the Rohingya have been attacked violently over the past years by the Buddhist

community, the security and military forces.

Even after the political transition of Myanmar’s government and political leadership from a Military

system to a democratic government ruled by civilian citizens in 20114, the only category which did not

benefit from the democratization of Myanmar it was the Rohingya Muslim minority, the oppression

and the segregation policy carried on from the government continued, and between 2012 and 2017 the

conflict escalated every now and then, while the government was unwilling to resolve the conflict, the

government defended its position against accusation of human rights and condemnations of the

international community.5

On the other hand, the international community response to the Rohingya conflict was insignificant

and unable to take any tangible solution to at least end the violence towards the Rohingya people,

although the UN Security Council attempt to imposed sanctions on Myanmar, yet China vetoed any

UN resolution against Myanmar. The United States of America imposed economic sanction on Burma

1 Topich, W. Leitich, K. The History of Myanmar, ABC-CLIO, 2013. p.20. 2 Topich, W. Leitich, K. The History of Myanmar, ABC-CLIO, 2013. p.21. 3 Trihartono, A. Myanmar Worsening Rohingya Crisis: A call for Responsibility to Protect and ASEAN’s Response// McLellan, B. Sustainable Future for Human Security: Society, Cities and Governance. Springer 2017. P.5. 4 Pedersen M.B. Myanmar's Democratic Opening the Process and Prospect of Reform, Debating Democratization in Myanmar, institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 14 Apr 2014. pp.19-42, p.20. 5 Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi defends policies towards Rohingya, 22.08.2018, Al Jazeera English News: Found at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-defends-policies-rohingya-180822060114385.html ; Last accessed: 12/11/2018

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in the early 1990’s, but both they lifted in 2016 because of the transformation of Myanmar to pro-

democratic regime.6 The regional organization The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

member states adopted the organization policy of non-interfere in internal affairs, but recently in the

33rd ASEAN summit the chairman’s statement clearly expressed their concern about the humanitarian

crisis in Rakhine state and called Myanmar government to carry out investigation, moreover, the

ASEAN stressed its support to the efforts of the Burmese government, saying “We discussed and

received a briefing from Myanmar on the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State, which is a matter of

concern.”7

China is one of the international and regional actors who is playing enormously influential role in the

Rohingya conflict. The Chinese diplomacy in Myanmar is multi-layered, in the international level,

China as a permanent member state of the UN Security Council has always supported Myanmar and

vetoed any resolution condemned the Burmese government brutal acts against the Rohingya People,

since China imputes the root cause of the conflict to the underdevelopment of Rakhine state which led

to poverty and unemployment of the inhabitants8. In the regional level, China’s struggle for power and

influence in South-East Asia region benefited the poor countries in South-East Asia region from the

Chinese economic and financial assistance, the security and stability of the region is a crucial issue for

China since it has geostrategic goals which are exposed to threats from other Asian countries such as

India and Japan but more importantly by the presence of the American military bases in the region.

Another issue is the trade routes that enforce China to maintain stable relations with other countries in

the region but also persuading China's maritime ambitions and map out new trade routes and sea ports

far from the American influence or dominance. For that reason, China has invested in two mega

projects in Rakhine state, the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone and gas and oil pipelines that cross

from Rakhine to China’s Yunnan province9. Kyaukpyu port is a shortcut to the maritime infrastructure

for China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, additionally, this route will easily transport all cargo shipment

from the western world to China, instead of passing through the Strait of Malacca, the world’s busiest

shipping route.10

6 Executive Order: Termination of Emergency with Respect to the Actions and Policies of the Government of Burma, The U.S Department of the Treasury, 07.10.2016. Found at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/burma_eo_termination.pdf ; Last accessed: 12/11/2018 7Chairman's Statement of the 33rd ASEAN Summit, 13.11.2018. Found at: https://www.asean2018.sg/MFA/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Press-Release-Details/ASEAN_CS_ChairmanStatement ; Last accessed: 12/11/2018 8 Joy, A. Understanding China’s Response to the Rakhine Crisis, Special Report 419. The United States Institute of Peace, February 2018, pp.1-6, p.2. Found at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/02/understanding-chinas-response-rakhine-crisis ; Last accessed: 14/11/2018 9 Joy, A. Understanding China’s Response to the Rakhine Crisis, Special Report 419, The United States Institute of Peace, February 2018, pp.1-6, p.2 Found at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/02/understanding-chinas-response-rakhine-crisis ; Last accessed: 14/11/2018 10 Wong, C. Five things you should know about China-backed port in Myanmar, South China Morning Post, 09.05.2017 Found at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2093581/five-things-you-should-know-about-china-backed-port ; Last accessed: 15/11/2018

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In November 2017 after the crackdown in Rakhine state, China for the first time to interfere directly in

the Rohingya conflict which contradicts with China’s foreign policy of non-interference in countries

internal affairs, however, the Chinese peace proposal is a three-phase peace plan addresses the

conflict’s root cause according to the Chinese prospective, this recent active role of China in the

Rohingya conflict and the drivers for its peace invitation are the research core issues will be under

investigation. Since it is likely that China plays a crucial role in the conflict which leads to new

developments towards the resolution or the re-escalation of the conflict in the future. This research

project investigates the political and economic role of the People’s Republic of China in in the

Rohingya conflict between 2012 and 2018, and how did the role of China has evolved during the past

decades the drivers of the Chinese peace efforts in the Rohingya conflict in the Republic of the Union

of Myanmar.

The main research question will be What are the reasons led China to change its political role in the

Rohingya conflict after the escalation in August 2017?

Novelty and relevance of the topic: Although many scholars studied the Rohingya conflict and

attempts to find a peaceful resolution, yet the conflict continued to escalate. The United State Institute

of Peace (USIP) one of the academic institutes that formed a Senior Study Groups (SSGs) of thirteen

professionals in order to examine China's influence and role in Myanmar’s internal conflicts from

February to June 2018. The institute published a serious of reports and reach papers which have been

used in this research. The study is quite relevant to this Master thesis the research novelty comes from

the that fact that previous studies on the Rohingya conflict only focused on the ethnoreligious conflict

between the Military Junta of Myanmar, the Rohingya people and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation

Army, without deep analysis of the crucial role of China in the UN Security Council and its military

assistance to the Bemuse military and who China’s behavior has changed the conflict dynamics. This

master thesis investigates the behavior and motives of each actor during the period 2012 to 2018. The

topic is relevant in today’s international politics because it investigates the intervention of a foreign

powerful state in an intra-state conflict in order to achieve its national interests.

Research problem: The political role of the People’s Republic of China towards the Rohingya conflict

has changed from non-interference to interference after the conflict escalation in August 2017,

although China adopts the principle of non-interference in other states’ affairs.

Research question: What are the reasons led China to change its political role in the Rohingya

conflict, after the conflict escalation in August 2017?

Object of the research: The reasons of changing China’s role towards the Rohingya Conflict between

2012-2018.

Main goal: To investigate the reasons of the changing political role of China towards the Rohingya

conflict and its relation to China’s interests in Rakhine state.

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Research Tasks: 1. To define the concept of National Interest from the prospective of classical realism

theory.

2. To identify the Chinese national interest in Chinese School of Realism School

3. To introduce the Rohingya conflict actors, root cause of the conflict and the interests.

4. To explain Myanmar government reforms and its impact on the conflict.

5. To determine the political role of China and its engagement in the conflict.

6. To identify the Chinese investments in Rakhine state and its impact on the conflict dynamics.

Hypothesis: The transformation of China’s role towards the Rohingya conflict has evolved due to its

geopolitical and economic interests in Rakhine state.

Methodology: This research mainly relayed on the qualitative methods to analyze the context of the

reviewed literature, analyzing the secondary data in different scientific journals, books, academic

papers, official government documents and statements, reports from the international organizations,

governmental and non-governmental. In the first chapter of the theoretical framework, the methods of

document analysis, comparative study, descriptive method and using scholarly text books to define the

concepts of national interests and the various types according to the classical realism theory applied

herein for the explanation of the research theoretical approach. Moreover, while in the Chinese foreign

policy principles it was appropriate to use the official government documents analysis method.

While in the second and third chapters of the research all mentioned qualitative methods are adopted

from analyzing official government documents, to data analysis of economic indicator charts, the

content of period journals, analytical papers, examining and analyzing the international organizations

reports and news articles, comparison method also adopted throughout the wiring of the third chapter

and comparing the opinions and statements of different authors and government officials.

Literature review: In this paper project, different academic resources referred to build the theoretical

frame work and the content of the chapters. In the first chapter, mainly information taken from the

following books: “International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity” by Tim Dunne, Milja

Kurki, and Steve Smith. Oxford University Press 2013. “International politics, concepts, theories and

issues” by Rumki Basu, Sage Publications 2012. Moreover, Webster dictionary also used to give a

general definition for some of the concepts, while Morgenthau’s book referred to explain the idiomatic

definition of the theory concepts, (In Defense of the National interest: A Critical Examination of

American Foreign Policy), 1951). In the second subsection, China’s national interest frame work

according to its foreign policy towards Myanmar and the rest of the world is explained referring

government official documents and laws. In the Second chapter, book chapters, analytical papers and

official document used to trace back Myanmar’s reasons for democratic transformation and define the

political and economic reforms from 2012 to 2018. Chapters from the book (Myanmar's 'Rohingya'

Conflict) by Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides, which was published in September 2018, is used to

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draw the historical backgrounds about the Rohingya conflict between 2012-2017.The book discussed

analyzed the conflict dynamics and the influence of international actors in the conflict. A second book

by Azeem Ibrahim, published in 2016, (The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide)

explained deeply the root cause of the conflict and Myanmar’s changes and its impact on the

Rohingya. For the third chapter that discussed China’s over all behavior and policies towards

Myanmar information was cover from the United State Institute of Peace (USIP) one of the academic

institutes that formed a Senior Study Groups (SSGs) of thirteen academic experts and scholars like

Yun Sun, a visiting scholar in East Asia Project, Henry L. Stimson Center and former visiting fellow at

the Brookings Institution, covered in her research paper in order to examine China's influence and role

in Myanmar’s internal conflict from February to June 2018. The institute published a serious of reports

and reach papers which have been used in this research.

The structure of the research: The Master research comprises three main chapters, the first chapter

analyzes the theoretical framework of the research, classical realism theory is used to explain the

concepts and the political ideology that illustrates the role and the behavior of the Chinese government

towards the Rohingya conflict. Moreover, in the subsections the definitions of national interest were

provided from the prospective of the classical realism theory in the western school comparing it with

the definitions of the Chinese realist school, in addition to the different types of national interests and

the instruments for securing national interests. The second chapter begins with a brief historical back

ground on the Rohingya conflict, the core problem and the main actors with their interests but explains

in detail the last conflict escalation in August 2017. The second subsection identifies Myanmar

political and economic transformation to a democratic state from 2012 to 2018. The third chapter is the

research core chapter, where the discussion will be about the Chinese government response to the

changes in Myanmar political, economic and social life. In the following subsection investigation of

the most importation Chinese investments in Rakhine state and the active role of China in solving the

Rohingya conflict through its peace proposal. Finally, the conclusion of the research paper, the list of

references and the annexes.

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1.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

The first chapter of this master thesis defines and explains through the lens of classical realism

theory the main concepts in this research, the national interest among the state’s relationships, the

powerful economic interests in another country and their impact on internal conflict or intra-state war

from the perspective of the realist theory. In the second sub-section will focus on the Chines perception

on economic interests and the principles of China’s national interests in its foreign policy towards the

Republic of the Union of Myanmar within the context of the Rohingya Conflict.

Classical realism theory is one of the international relations school of thoughts, that explains the

behavior of the different actors in the international arena and the nature of the international system.

Realism considers the states are rational actors and they are the most important actors in the

international arena, the states are struggling for power and survival, the international system is anarchic

system because there is no superior power that can govern the behavior of the states.11 Hans

Morgenthau said the human nature is conflicting and egoistic, there is a difference between the

domestic and international politics, power and the balance of power are one of the most important

concepts in the realism theory.12 The most important realist thinkers are, Thucydides, Niccolò

Machiavelli and the contemporary theorists, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and Robert Cohen.

These are general concepts of the realism theory, more concepts related to the master thesis topic will

be discussed in the following sections.

1.1 National Interests from the Prospective of Classical Realism

The concept of national interest is a very old political concept in the old nations relation in the

16th century during Niccolò Machiavelli times, the Italian philosopher, diplomat and politician Niccolò

Machiavelli is one of the realist school advocates who promoted the concept of national interest in his

book the prince as the main driver in the states relations. The relations among countries in the

international politics based on the national interests of these states, as a result, the interests and the

eternal relation between politics and economy shape the country’s foreign policy. National interest is a

very broad concept, vary from state to state, there are several types of national interests, however, their

end goals are according to the state foreign policy. Economic interest and national security are the

defining concepts in the international actors’ relations. The concept of “National Interest” in the

international relations is a core concept in the approach of the realist theory, which claims that the

relationship among the state actors is based on the national interest. The concept of national interest

“The interest of a nation as a whole held to be an independent entity separate from the interests of

11 Baldwin, D. A. Realism. Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach. Princeton University Press, 2016. p.125. 12 Donnelly, J. Realist Tradition. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.9-10

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subordinate areas or groups and also of other nations or supranational groups”13, in the realist theory

national interest defined as “National interest assumed to be state power (Morgenthau 1978), and in

neorealist theories it is assumed to be state survival, at a minimum or power, at a maximum (Waltz)”

14. Morgenthau gave more detailed definition of national interest of a state in international relations

“The meaning of national interest is survival—the protection of physical, political and cultural identity

against encroachments by other nation-states”. 15 As mentioned earlier, every country defines its

national interest that serves its security, power and survival. Joseph Frankel in his study classified

national interest into to two parts, first, the objective national interests, second, the subjective national

interests. “Objective national interests are those relate to nation’s ultimate foreign policy goals, these

are permanent interests, comprising factors such as geography, history, neighbor, resource,

population size and ethnicity.” 16 On the other hand, Subjective national interests “are those which

depend on the preferences of a specific government or policy elite, and including ideology, religion

and class identity.”17 In harmony with these classifications, the national interests of a state may change

according to the ruling government, the political elites, interests’ group and its citizens especially in

democratic regimes. And this phenomenon is clearly visible in the American foreign policy,

particularly in the former administration of President Barack Obama in comparison with the current

administration of Donald Trump. For the purpose of this research the first definition the objective

national interests are quite suitable and explains the theoretical framework of the Chinese government

national interests in Myanmar.

1.1.2. Classification of the State’s national Interests

A state has multiple interests which eventually lead to the end goal which is the state survival

and security. Scholars sorted the national interests into categories, these categories exemplify security

issues or potential future security threats, therefore, the government through its foreign policy is

attempting to secure and fulfill these areas of national interests. Thomas W. Robinson, the author of

Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, relied on Hans J. Morgenthau classification of the state

national interests into six groups.

1. The Primary Interests: These include the safeguard of the state’s physical, political and cultural

identity and survival against any potential aggression by other states. These interests can never be

compromised, and it is the state’s duty to defend these at all costs.18

13“National Interest.” Merriam-Webster.com, Merriam-Webster, Found at: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national; Last accessed: 15/11/2018 14 Reus-Smit, C. and Snidal, D. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. OUP Oxford, 2010. P. 43. 15 Morgenthau, H. In Defense of the National interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy. University Press of America, 1951. 16 Burchill, S. The National Interest in International Relations Theory. Springer, 2005. p.3. 17 Burchill, S. The National Interest in International Relations Theory. Springer, 2005. p.3. 18 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. pp.140.

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2. Secondary Interests: Mainly concerned about the protection and safety of the state’s national

citizens resident abroad together with the insurance of the diplomatic immunity for the diplomatic

staff as well, these interests are highly important for the existence of the state. 19

3. Permanent Interests: Those which are relatively constant over long periods of time; they vary

with time. For instance, Great Britain for many centuries has had an interest in the freedom to

navigate the seas and in a narrow definition of coastal waters.20

4. Variable Interests: Those interests which vary according to certain circumstances which defined

and regarded by the personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political

and moral folkways at given periods of time. In this respect, variable interests may diverge from

both primary and permanent interests. For example, Great Britain in 1938 chose to regard certain

events bearing on the security of Czechoslovakia as not within its interest.

5. The General Interests: Those are the positive manner, which the state can extend to other world

nations or in various specified domains such as economics, trade, diplomatic intercourse,

international law, etc.)21 Currently these aspects in the global governance and regimes which are

trying to maintain the international peace by agreements such as non-proliferation nuclear treaty or

the international actions on climate change to protect the international public good.

6. Specific Interests: Those are other positive interests which not included in the fifth type “the

general interests”. They are formed in terms of time and space and often are the logical outgrowth

of the general interests. For example, Britain historically has regarded the continued independence

of the Low Countries as an absolute prerequisite for the maintenance of the balance of power in

Europe.22

In addition to the six categories of national interests, Robinson, also mentioned three international

interests of a state as follows:

1. Identical interests: Those the common national interests among two or more states, which are a

composition of both primary and specific interest.23 For example, the western powers have interests

in assuring the security of Israel in the Middle East.

2. Complementary interests: Those interests between nations are the foundation stone of

agreements and treaties on specific issues.24 For example, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

19Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.140. 20Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.140. 21Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.140. 22 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.141. 23 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.141. 24 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.141.

15

(NATO) a military alliance aimed formerly at the defeat of the Soviet Union and the spread of

communism, currently to defend all its member states.

3. Conflicting interests: Those interests are neither identical nor complementary interests. At the

present time, conflicting interests can be formed by diplomacy, occurrence of events, or the

passage of time into common or complementary interests. Also, it is very likely that these interests

to be transformed into conflicting interests.25

In (Diagram No. 1) below, it shows the interests among states in international relations, as a, b, c, sides

of the triangle, ideological interests are always built on the foundation of some commonly felt interests

b side area.

Diagram No. 1. Alliances in Theory and Practice, International interests

The above diagram shows the different level of interests among states, in the bilateral or multilateral

relations. Both identical and complementary interests can be found in the regional as well as the

international relations, in todays world states and other international actors in the political arena

different actors rely on interdependence in order to achieve mutual goals. But the conflicting interests

arising between states which different political and cultural backgrounds, such as the conflicting

interest among some of the Middle Eastern states with the western democratic values.

These different types of national interests, and the relations between states will be explained

furthermore in the second chapter where the discussion will cover the identical interests between the

different actors in this research.

1.1.3. Instruments for Securing National interests

Machiavelli’s famous quote “Aim justifies means”, is quite adopted approach in today’s politics,

particularly the powerful state actors like the United State of American invasion of Iraq in 2013, the

25 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.141.

Source: T. W. Robinson, A National Interest Analysis of Sino-

Soviet Relations, Jun. 1967, pp.141.

16

expansion of the Chinese military basses in South China sea and Russia annexation of Crimea in 2014,

the justification of their behavior is to preserve their national interests and for security concerns.

Joseph Frankel in his book International relations in a changing world highlighted five instruments

used by a state in order to achieve and secure its national interests.26

1. Diplomacy: Hans Morgenthau argued that the conflicts of interests is the fundamental factor in

the international society, he defined diplomacy as a technique to accommodate these conflicts of

interests by making the best outcome of a bad situation by reconciling a state’s own national

interests with those ones of the other states.27 Through diplomats and diplomatic channels states

can communicate its interests and concerns while negotiating mutual interests of all parties, it is a

formal platform that reduces the use of coercive means and generally accepted by all state actors.

2. Propaganda: One of the soft power instruments, Joseph Frankel defined it as a well-constructed

tool that affect people’s minds for a long time shaping their understating for the sake of national

interest “propaganda is systematic attempt to affect the minds, emotions and actions of a given

group for a specific public purpose”28. In the world of technology, internet and the wide-spread

media outlets, the promotion of a powerful state national interests through mass media became a

vital tool used by powerful states to influence both the state’s public opinion and other states. This

means is intensively used by the united states who spends billions of dollars every year to impact

the American citizens and the rest of the world through its pop culture, Hollywood movies and so,

besides that the English language facilitated the transition of massages. Another example is Russia,

who has several TV channels speaking different foreign languages, China also has number of

foreign languages TV channels, additionally China depending on its cultural diplomacy to spread

not only its political, economic interests, technological innovations and developments but the

Chinese language and Confucian culture.

3. Economic Instruments: Globalization and economic combativeness induce powerful and wealthy

countries of the developed world take the advantage of their advancement to provide economic

funds and development aid to the poor and less developed countries with a view to pursue national

various interests such as economic and security interests. The economic aid instrument is

enormously used in China’s foreign policy towards many of the less developed countries in Asia

and Africa. In this research a detailed discussion on this point will be covered in the second

chapter. Since China uses its technological advancement together with financial assistance to

facilitate commercial ties by expanding its presence in Myanmar, and to monopolize the oil and gas

industry in Rakhine state by establishing mega projects and spending billions of dollars for the

26 Frankel, J. Instruments and Techniques of State Interaction. International relations in a changing world. Oxford University Press, 1989, 4th edition, p. 130-159. 27 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. pp.147. 28 J. Frankel, Chapter 7: Instruments and Techniques of State Interaction, International relations in a changing world, Oxford University Press 1989, 4th edition, pp. 130-159.

17

achievement of its economic interest that will secure the Chinese survival and other security

concerns.

4. Military Power and War: The use of military power as foreign policy instruments is justified by

the state actors in the international political arena as defense mechanism of a state national

interests. If a state decided to use peaceful or coercive means there are other conditions and

objectives impact the state’s choice, every powerful state at a certain point must protect its national

interests with threats or use of force.29 Coercive and offensive measures have been extensively

used to counter the terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and ISIS around the world, all the nation

states agreed that military force is legitimate and necessary in this situation. Moreover, military

power is also justified when the United States of America invaded Iraq in 2013 despite the

objection of the members of the United Nations Security Council, yet Bush administration justified

the use of military force to defend the America’s national security and to deter Saddam from

attacking the United States allies in the Middle East and to promote democracy in Iraq. However,

many political analysists and academic scholars view the American intervention for the Iraqi oil.

Other non-military coercive measures such as economic sanctions, military embargo and boycotts

can be applied by powerful states or international originations such as the United Nations Security

Council or World Trade Organization to force poor and weak states to adhere to their national

interests for economic and political gains.

5. Alliances and Treaties: States entre into regional and international alliances to strengthen its

power and to achieve more national interest, many eastern European states have joined the EU

because they will benefit their interests, for example, Lithuania is benefiting as a NATO member

from any possible aggression from Russia, because of the collective security mechanism an

aggression towards one of the NATO members is an aggression against all members.

China as one of the influential international and regional powers, rely on the above mentioned

instruments to achieve its national interests and to maximize its influence according to the nature of the

political, economic and social system of the target county, as in this research the concern is on the

Sino-Myanmar relations, China relied heavily on all instruments due to the political and economic

reforms in Myanmar. In the third chapter the position of China from the Myanmar’s reforms, a detailed

discussion about how China responded to Myanmar’s domestic politics and foreign affairs, and how

China used these instruments to achieve its national interests in Myanmar.

1.2 Economic Interests of a Powerful Foreign State

Anarchy is one of the classical realism theory concepts, which denotes to the absence of a

global political institution that governs the behaviors of the state actors and enforce binding laws in the

29 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. pp.144.

18

international political arena, therefore, this situation created a self-help system and power struggle

where states depend on themselves to achieve their national interests through diplomatic means or

military force intervention.30

In the world of contemporary politics, the political decision of a powerful foreign state towards another

state pave the way to achieve its economic interests and consequently it has an impact on the

economies of both states. Ever since the colonization era of the 18th and 19th century, the aim of the

European colonizers in Africa, Asia and Latin America was economic benefits. By the end of the

colonial era and the emergence of the newly independent states, the need for raw materials

reinvigorated building strategic relations that continued but under new political terminologies such as

“modern colonialization” utilizing soft power instruments.

In understating the effectiveness of alliances as an instrument for securing national interests,

Morgenthau provided nine propositions explaining the relation of alliances to national interests, for the

purpose of this research only the ninth proposition will be discussed, because it corresponds to the

theoretical framework of this research. “The interests that unite two nations against a third and

therefore the alliance built on their base are usually precise concerning the designation of the enemy

but relatively vague concerning the concrete objectives and policies to be pursued against that

enemy.”31 Morgenthau said that alliances are also formed because of common enemy, the objective

unified both states interests will continue as long as the enemy exist, however, the vision of how to

defeat this enemy may vary in both states. The Sino-Burmese alliance against the existence of the

Rohingya people in Rakhine state represents Morgenthau’s explanation of alliances based on common

enemy interest. Since Myanmar aggressively oppressed the Rohingya people, while China halts

passing any UN resolution against the Burmese government. China’s intervention in Myanmar’s

internal conflict of the Rohingya because of the securing of the Chinese national interests in Rakhine

state, for the protection of the Chinese economic and security concerns.

In addition, turbulent counties where hostiles and internal conflicts are constantly threatening both

counties national interests, the intervention of the powerful foreign state is necessary to protect its

economic interests “Economic interests in a civil war or international crisis stem from expectations

about the loss of future income from a disrupted commercial relationship. Foreign direct investment

(FDI) is arguably more important in this respect than trade because it reflects assets actually owned in

the affected area.”32 The intervention of a third party in intra-state conflict eventually responds to its

own national interests and security concerns , so there are two dimensions of intervention of a third

30 Wendt, A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization. 46, (2). Spring, 1992, p. 391-425, p. 395. 31 Robinson, T.W. A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11 (2) p. 135-175. p.147. 32 Fordham, B. O. Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention. International Studies Quarterly.52 (4). Dec.2008. p. 737-758. P. 745.

19

party “There are thus two dimensions to a third party's regional interests in civil wars: (1) the

likelihood of contagion and (2) the value of the region at risk of infection.” That means the

intervention of a third-party state is a necessity motivated by direct threats against its national interests

in the country of conflict, therefore, the highly important interests will be the protection of the regional

security and stability from the extension of the conflict to other neighboring states and regions, just

like what happened in the Middle East with the expansion of the influence of the Islamic State in the

Iraq and Syria (ISIS) , which encouraged in 2014 the establishment of a global coalition against ISIS.33

1.3 National Interests in the Chinese School of Realism

The Chinese realist scholars accept the western realist framework that based on the

following three principle concepts, 1. state-centrism, 2. international anarchy, 3. international politics

is power politics. 34. Generally, national interests are influenced by ideological thoughts and these set

of ideologies shape the state’s national interests in the international political landscape.35 Therefore, it

is possible to say that China’s national interests are the product of its communist ideology, although its

communist philosophy has been affected by the global liberal economic orientation and other factors of

globalization. The concept of national interests in the Chinese foreign policy has evolved over the past

years due to several internal factors such as the changes of the political decision-makers in the ruling

class between the second world war and now, and the shifts in the international political order after the

second world war and the cold war from bipolar to the current multipolar system.

Moreover, the history of China’s defeat and disgrace against Japan and the western powers during the

second world war propelled China to adopt more protective and opportunistic foreign policy aiming at

its national interests as the ultimate priority in its foreign policy. The Chinese government considers

the source of national interests entrenched in the country’s domestic policy, in another words the

nation interests. Martin Wight also emphasized this notion by saying “the pursuit of domestic policy is

good life, while the goal of international relations is survival.”36 Therefore, the Chinese government

will formulate the policies that respond to the good life conditions to its huge number of its citizens. In

addition, my interpretation of China’s policy orientation is that the Chinese decision makers that

national interests is a mirror for the Chinese people domestic interests and the same interests are

expressed in the international relations stage through China’s five principles of its foreign policy – will

be discussed further more-, that’s why China strictly adhered to the principles of non-interfere in other

state affairs and respect for state sovereignty, because these two principles are directly linked to the

state’s domestic political actions and interactions. Additionally, the anarchic nature of the world

33 The Global Coalition; Found at: https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/f ; Last accessed: 19/11/2018 34 Basu, R. International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues, Sage Publication 2012, p. 173. 35 Naaz, F. Chapter 2: Role of National Interest. International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues, Sage Publication, 2012, p.52-70. p. 53. 36 Deng, y. The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations, The China Quarterly, No. 154 (Jun. 1998), Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies. p. 308-329, P.310.

20

politics imposes on the state actors the self-help system leading to the power and survival struggle. So,

any kind of external criticism or interference will be interpreted by the Chinese government as

infringement of the state’s right to privacy and supremacy.

The Chinese realists perceive the global interdependence and states cooperation as a part of the current

situation in the international political arena and China is attempting to take the advantage of this

situation by maximizing its interests by building cooperative relations in accordance with its foreign

policy objectives.37

China’s economic reforms which begun with Deng Xiaoping from a closed and isolated economy

towards the global liberal economy and open markets, has changed the country’s economic orientation

drastically, ever since the economic reforms in the late 70’s. Unlike Mao orientation, Xiaoping had

revolutionary ideas centered on the modernization of China in four main fields, manufacturing,

agriculture, defense, science and technology. He set modernization as the country’s priority and the

solution for China’s internal and external problems “it is the essential condition for solving our

domestic and external problems, and nothing short of a world war could tear us away from this

line.”38 As a consequence, China’s eagerness for political influence and economic development for

security reasons and survival, constantly created a need for more national interest achievements.

The Chinese definition of national interest by the Chinese scholar Xuetong “National interest in the

context of international politics, meaning the interests of a nation-state in a global arena. This

concept must be contrasted with group interests, international interests or global interests.”39, also,

the former Chinse head of the communist party and the ruler of the China, Mao Zedong defined the

concept of national interest “China wants to maintain its own national interest, sovereignty and

territorial integrity. China also believes that a socialist country cannot violate other countries’

interests, sovereignty or territory.”40 However, during the Maoist ruling era, it was very clear that the

national interests of China were aiming at the best interests of the ruling party and the Chinese elite,

rather than to the best interest of the Chinese people. Because the Chinese people during his ruling

period had suffered aggressive suppression and huge human rights violations which deprived the

Chinese people from the good life that Martin Wight mentioned above.

However, the Chinese and western scholars have been debating about the deviation of China’s from

holding the principle of non-interference in other states internal affairs, although China does not

interfere military, yet its indirect interference is quite prevailing in its external relations, using soft

diplomacy tools, providing massive development aids particularly in less developed countries in

37 Deng, Y. The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations. The China Quarterly, No. 154 (Jun. 1998). Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies, p. 308-329. P.311. 38 Zhao, Q. Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-macro Linkage Approach. Oxford University Press. 1996. p. 51. 39 Xuetong, Y. The Concept of National Interests. An Analysis of China´s National Interests. Tianjin People Press. 1996. P.7. 40 Xuetong, Y. The Concept of National Interests. An Analysis of China´s National Interests. Tianjin People Press. 1996. P.7.

21

Asia, Africa and Latin America, large-scale investments, mediation in the national dialogue in

Myanmar and exercising cultural diplomacy by spreading the Chinese language, arts and so on.

The Chines-Burmese bilateral relations based on the Chinese “Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence” which are complementary set of principles to its foreign policy.

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

2. Mutual non-aggression.

3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

4. Equality and mutual benefit.

5. Peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchange.

“A joint communiqué issued by the prime ministers of Burma and China at the end of Zhou’s visit

affirmed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which have since become the theoretical

foundation of the Sino-Burmese relations.”41 This statement by the former Chinese prime minister

during his visit to Myanmar in 1954, remained until today in the relations between the two countries.

These principles are not only applied towards Myanmar, but they are the framework of China’s foreign

policy worldwide. However, in this paper a thesis statement has written upon China’s economic and

geopolitical interests in Rakhine state, despite the fact that China’s interference in Myanmar’s internal

conflicts contradicts with the principle of non- interference in other state internal affairs, but this adds

to the debate on China’s aberration from adherence to this principle. One may interpret this new

attitude of China as one of the most influence state actors in the world politics, and now is getting

economically stronger and the second largest economy in the world inspired China to act just like the

United State of America after the second world war, when America found its self the world most

powerful state, while states participated in the war were politically, military and economically severely

devasted after the war ended. According to Xiaoping modernization plan China has successfully

achieved its economic, manufacturing and science and technology ends, yet the fourth achievement of

defense capabilities currently China is the second largest country in defense spending, and in the

future, she is willing to increase its defense budget. All these new long-term plans together with the

continuous power struggle in the world politics and the trends of the global market to Asia, incited

China’s ambition for more influential political and economic role regionally and internationally.

The Chinese definition of the national interests demonstrate the domestic office of China that

correlates with the foreign policy strategies in Myanmar and thought which instruments for securing

national interests that China can successfully achieve its gains. Moreover, the Chinese five Principles

of Peaceful Coexistence are mentioned in this research because they will be used to analyses China’s

41 Zin, M. Chapter 10: China-Burma Relations, China’s Risk, Burma’s Dilemma. Lowell, D. Burma Or Myanmar? The Struggle for National Identity. World Scientific. 2010. p.261-294, p. 265

22

behavior and to determine how China applies these principles when it comes to Myanmar case and if

not, what are the reasons.

2. MYANMAR GOVERNMENT REFORMS AND THE ROHINGYA CONFLICT

The period under investigation will be from 2012 to 2018, during this period Myanmar

undergone throughout major changes politically, economically and socially. These changes and

development have great impact on the country’s domestic policies, foreign affairs as well as on the

Rohingya conflict and the role of all the actors involved in the conflict. The second chapter discusses

three issues, first, a brief background of the conflict main actors, core problems and their interests, with

a special focus on the recent conflict eruptions between 2012 and 2017, analyzing the reasons beyond

the ethno-religious conflict in Rakhine state, the position and actions of the Burmese government and

the role of the People's Republic of China in the conflict. Second, the focus will be on Myanmar’s

reform of its political leadership and how does the new political leadership together with the new

internal and external politics affected the conflict, finally, the economic reforms and the liberalization

of the economy and its relations to the ongoing Chines investments in Rakhine state and its impact on

the conflict.

2.1 The Rohingya Conflict: actors, core problems and interests

Rakhine state located in western Myanmar alongside the Bay of Bengal, bordering Chin state

from the north and to north-west bordering Bangladesh, the state’s area is 14,200 square miles

(36,778.0 km2).42 The capital city is Sittwe, Rakhine State comprises of 5 districts, 17 townships and 3

sub-townships, it is the second poorest and least develop state in Myanmar, 43.5% of the state’s

population living below the poverty line, compared to the national average of 25.6%.43 Nonetheless, it

is situated in a geostrategic location and rich source of natural resources, its economy largely depended

on agriculture and fisheries, yet, this has changed with the discovery of huge deposits of natural gas

and oil.44 The abundance of the untapped natural resources in Rakhine dragged China’s attention to

invest and implement the necessary infrastructure to achieve its economic ends, China’s behavior

created aggressive competition among Myanmar’s neighboring states India, Japan and Thailand.

As mentioned earlier in the introduction the Rohingya conflict has started long time ago, many factors

have incited the conflict, chiefly the British colonialism in Burma between 1824 to 1949. But before

42 Assessment Report, SECTION 1: Physical and Demographic Context, Rakhine State Needs Assessments. The Center for Diversity and National Harmony. 2015. p.1. Found at: http://www.cdnh.org/publication/rakhine-state-needs-assessment/ Last accessed: 20/11/2018 43 Myanmar Information Management Unit. Found at: http://themimu.info/emergencies/rakhine ; Last accessed: 20/11/2018 44Chapter 5: International and Myanmar Case Studies of Natural Resource Governance. NATURAL RESOURCES OF MYANMAR (BURMA): Ownership, Management, Revenue Sharing and Impacts. Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Centre. 2017.p.53.

23

the British conquest, Arakan state was under the monarch governing system of the Burmese kings,

which affiliated to Hluttaw, a consultation council consist of elderly leaders representing their

communities, the council appoints the governors to rule for a three-year period. In spite of that, after

the first Anglo-Burmese war in 1826, British-India annexed Arakan state (Rakhine state now) and

changed it to the British administrative and ruling system.45 The Rohingya Muslims allied with the

British against the Rakhine Buddhists who supported the Japanese in the second world war, therefore,

the British promised the Rohingya Muslims an independent state after the end of the second world war

as a reward for their assistance46. This dream had gone in vain, when Burma took its independence

from Britain in 1948, Arakan state remained part of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as a

consequence, a feeling of resentment and insecurity led some of the Rohingyas to form an armed group

calling for the integration of northern Arakan state to Bangladesh, their attempt failed resulting in a

serious concern by the Burmese authorities who conceived the Muslims population as a threat to the

unity of the newly formed state.47 This brief historical background is worth mentioning for better

understating of the conflict timeline and the impact of the colonial legacy in the current conflict.

It is true that the conflict has escalated several times but most of the academic researchers mainly

focused on the communal conflict between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhist

communities, without the inclusion of the role, impact and interests of other active actors in the

conflict, particularly China and its allies, this limited conflict analysis, presented the conflict as an

ethno-religious conflict and provided unclear peaceful resolution to the conflict, additionally, this

notion is widely spread in the international media and press, as the media coverage primarily

concerned with the Rohingya refugee crisis without further details on the root cause of the conflict.

Fortunately, the growing international attention has increased, and the conflict resolution became an

international liability for the international community and the United Nations Security Council to

implement the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as what happened in Libya in 2011, in order to preserve

the regional and international peace in Rakhine state and generally in Myanmar.

For better understanding to the Rohingya conflict, a sociological definition of Edwar Azar is used,

owing to the fact of the conflict nature. The Rohingya conflict is an intrastate conflict and is classified

as a protracted social conflict (PSC), the protracted social conflict defined by Edward Azar as

“Protracted Social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs

on the basis of the communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain

involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions

(colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society) play

45 Gibson, T. James, H. and Falvey, L. Social Exclusion, Rohingyas Insecurity and Citizenship in Myanmar: Insecurity and Citizenship in Myanmar. Thaksin University Press, 2016, pp. 58. 46 Ware, A. and Laoutides, C. Chapter 5: Security Dilemma, Minority Complex, Greed and Political Economy. Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict. Oxford University Press. 2018. p. 139-170. p. 149. 47 Ibrahim, A. Chapter 1: A Short History of Burma to 1984. The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide. Oxford University Press. 2018.p. 17-35. p.26.

24

important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict.”48. This definition perfectly suits

the nature and the characteristics of the Rohingya conflict, because it is a prolonged communal conflict

occurred between two conflicting parties on the basis of ethnic and religious differences, another

reason is the oppressive role of the Burmese government and rob of the Rohingya Muslims basic

human rights, citizenship, forced migration and confiscation of lands, at the same time, the impact of

China and Russia by hindering any UN resolution against Myanmar provided a strong shield to the

Burmese government from international condemnation and further actions to end the massacre of the

innocents, at last, the historical effect of the British former rule and the annexation of Arakan state to

Burma after the second world war and its implication to the current conflict.

According to Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides, the key actors of the conflict are the Rohingya

Muslims, Rakhine Buddhists and Tatmadaw the dominated-military.49The Rohingya Muslims and

Rakhine Buddhists, whom both are the inhabitants of Rakhine State. First, the Rohingya is a Muslim

ethnic minority group suffering systemic and structured discrimination based on their different

ethnicity and religious affiliation to Islam, they represent (4.3%) of the state inhabitants50, according to

the 2018 annual report of Human Rights Watch the population of the Rohingyas in Rakhine state

estimated more than one million before the crackdown in August 2017, the Burmese authorities

excluded the Rohingyas from the 2014 census, the reason as reported “they were not allowed to self-

identify using a name that is not recognized by the Government. The Government made this decision in

the interest of security and to avoid the possibility of violence occurring due to intercommunal

tensions”, without explicit reference to the Rohingya Muslims, the report indicated in point (1.3) that

the population of the three districts of (Mungdaw, Sittway and Myauk) was excluded from the total

number of the State population, and it was estimated that a population of 1,090,0001.51 There are

120,000 IDPs due to the conflict in 2012.52 Moreover, the UN International Organization for Migration

(IOM) reported 712,700 Rohingya arrivals in Cox’s Bazar camp in Bangladesh after August 2017,

making the total number of 925,736 refugees. 53 Additionally, the number of the Rohingya Muslims

diaspora has been increasing ever since the citizenship law in 1982, the estimates of the Rohingya

48 Azar, E. E. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory & Cases. Dartmouth Publishing Company. 1990. p12. 49Ware, A. and Laoutides, C. Chapter 1: Complexities, Misconceptions and Context. Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict. Oxford University Press. 2018. p. 20. 50 Burma, The World Factbook. Found at:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html ; Last accessed: 27/12/2018 51 Rakhine State Census Report, (Census Report Volume 3-K), The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census, p.8-11. Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population. Found at: http://www.dop.gov.mm/en/publications ; 28/12/2018 52World Report 2018. Burma: Events of 2017. Human Rights Watch, p. 100. Found at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018 ; Last accessed: 23/12/2018 53Monthly Situation Report. IOM Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response. December 2018 https://www.iom.int/sitreps/bangladesh-iom-bangladesh-rohingya-refugee-crisis-response-external-update-december-2018 ; Last accessed: 29/12/2018

25

diaspora reached 1,105 Rohingyas in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, India, Thailand

and Malaysia.54 See the map of the major Myanmar ethnic groups (Map No. 1).

Map No.1. Map of Myanmar Major Ethnic groups and the Rohingyas in Rakhine State

As a result, these figures show about two million Rohingya Muslims fled Myanmar over the past

decades due to the systematic persecution and ethnic cleansing. The deprivation of the Rohingyas’

civil rights is a result of the policies of the successive military governments which are dominated by

the Bamar, but the triggering point was when the Burmese government disadvantaged the Rohingyas

from their civil rights and strip their nationality as one of the ethnic minority groups of Myanmar in the

Citizenship Law of 1982.55 According to the 1982 Citizenship Law, the government did not classify

the Rohingya people as one of the country’s 135 ethnic groups, consequently, the Rohingyas became

stateless and called illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Some of the Rohingya Muslims some of them

formed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), their initial aim was to defend the Rohingyas

from the attacks of the Tatmadaw forces, however, the Burmese government call them insurgents and

later after the attack in August 2017, classified them as a terrorist group.56 The ARSA, main interest is

54Leider, J. Rohingya: The History of a Muslim Identity in Myanmar. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. 2018. p.1-35, p.17. 55 Burma Citizenship Law, 1982. Found at: www.ibiblio.org ; Last accessed: 09/11/2018 56The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Central Committee for Counter Terrorism, Countering the Financing of Terrorism Working committee. Order No. 1/2017, 1379, M.E, Nay Pyi Ta, 19,09. 2017. Found at: https://mfiu.gov.mm/order-no12017 ; Last accessed: 10/11/2018

Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/03/myanmar-

major-ethnic-groups-live-170309143208539.html

26

to protect the Rohingya Muslims and defend their citizenship rights.57 Although, the Arakan Rohingya

Salvation Army has raised its demand and they are fighting for the autonomy of Rakhine state, based

on their claims of this piece of land were an independent sovereign nation in the 17th century. The

second actor is the Rakhine Buddhists is a Buddhist majority group (68%)58, according to the official

census of 2014, the total population of Rakhine state is 3,188,807 persons, 2,098,807 persons were

counted, but 1,090,000 persons excluded from the total national population of Myanmar.59 Rakhine

Buddhists and the extremist Buddhist Monks are backed by the Burmese government and the military.

Buddhism is the dominant religion in Myanmar and most of the government officials and the military

staff are mainly from the Bamar ethnic group affiliated to the same belief, the Bamar Buddhists

reluctance to the identification of the Muslim Rohingyas because ever since the end of the second

world war the Rohingya strived for Rakhine autonomous governance, which might lead to the session

of Rakhine State from Myanmar and they fear that Myanmar will become a Muslim dominant state as

what happened in Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh.60 The third actor is the Tatmadaw, is a

Burman-dominated military forces, who ruled the Myanmar from 1962 until 2010, yet, dominate 25 %

in each houses of representatives, as stated in the country’s constitution of 2008.61 The interests of the

Tatmadaw are the control of Rakhine state as part of the state’s responsibility to end any hostilities

made by the Rohingyas who are considers as Bengali illegal migrants and protect the ongoing giant

investments in the state. The relations between the actors suffer distrust, prolong deep grievances and

exclusion. These relations illustrated by (A. Ware and C. Laoutides)’s book, (Diagram No. 2) where

he described the asymmetries of power among the three actors and the struggle of power of each

group.

In spite of the fact that the current government is a pro-democracy and liberal form of government,

Mrs. Aun San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize

laureate, tends to attribute the foundation of the conflict to the prolonged history of the previous

dictator regime, she said “I think that if you live under a dictatorship for many years people do not like

to trust one another - a dictatorship generates a climate of mistrust.”62.

57 Edroos, F. ARSA: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army? Al Jazeera English, 13.09. 2017. Found at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-170912060700394.html Last accessed: 13/11/2018 58 Burma, The World Factbook. Found at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html ; Last accessed: 27/12/2018 59 Rakhine State Census Report, (Census Report Volume 3-K). The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census. p.11. Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population. Found at: http://www.dop.gov.mm/en/publications ; Last accessed: 27/12/2018 60 Gibson, T. James, H. and Falvey, L. Rohingyas Insecurity and Citizenship in Myanmar. Thaksin University Press. 2016. p. 129. 61 Constitution of the Republic of Union Myanmar, 2008. chapter 4. Legislature, 109(b), pp.39 & Legislature, 141(b), p.52. Found at: www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf; Last accessed: 28/12/2018 62How Aung San Suu Kyi sees the Rohingya crisis. BBC News, 25.01.2018. Found at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42824778 ; Last accessed: 02/12/2018

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Diagram No.2: Asymmetries of power and the tripartite nature of the Rakhine state conflict

In spite of the fact that the current government is a pro-democracy and liberal form of government,

Mrs. Aun San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize

laureate, tends to attribute the foundation of the conflict to the prolonged history of the previous

dictator regime, she said “I think that if you live under a dictatorship for many years people do not like

to trust one another - a dictatorship generates a climate of mistrust.”63.

In addition to the main actors, the substantial roles of the external actors, such China, the United

Nations Security Council, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the European Union,

Russia, Asian neighboring countries and the Muslims countries, affecting the conflict dynamics and

outcomes. Thus, precisely the focus in this research will be on the changing role of the People’s

Republic of China in the conflict.

2.1.1 The Conflict Escalations between 2012 and 2017

The conflict escalated several times between 2012 and 2017. In May 2012, the violence erupted

in Rakhine state between the Muslim Rohingyas and the Buddhist community, the riot occurred

because of allegations that a Buddhist woman was raped and killed by Muslim Rohingyas “a 27-year-

old seamstress Ma Thida Htwe on 28 May 2012 has led long-simmering tensions to erupt into violence

between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine state”.64 Violence between the Rohingyas

63How Aung San Suu Kyi sees the Rohingya crisis. BBC News, 25.01.2018. Found at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42824778 ; Last accessed: 02/12/2018

64Myanmar Conflict Alert: Preventing Communal Bloodshed and Building Better Relations, International Crisis Group, 12.12.2012, Found at:https://www.crisisgroup.org/Asia/south-east-Asia/Myanmar/Myanmar-conflict-alert-preventing-communal-bloodshed-and-building-better-relations ; Last accessed: 10/12/2018.

Source: A. Ware, C. Laoutides, Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict, Oxford University Press,2018, p. 141.

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and the Buddhist community in Rakhine state continued until the month of October, the Burmese

government announced a state of emergency and the Burmese military forces intervened to respond to

the situation. More than 5’818 homes were burnt to the ground mainly belong to the Rohingyas. The

police arrested numbers from the Buddhists and the Muslims Rohingyas, 200 dead, about 150,000

Muslim Rohingyas fled from Rakhine to the neighboring countries Bangladesh and Malaysia by

boats65.

The focus in this research will be on the latest escalation in August 2017. Few weeks before the

eruption of the violence in August 2017, the Burmese policemen were depriving the Rohingyas living

in Rathetaung town in Rakhine state from free movement, people were under siege and could not

obtain the essential basic needs which lead to extreme starvation.66

As a response to this situation, on 25th August 2017 the Arakan Salvation Army launched reprisal

attacks on 30 police stations.67 12 policemen 77 civilians were killed, according to the government

statement. The situation escalated rapidly between the months of August until the end of November,

the Tatmadaw soldiers lunched brutal campaigns against the Rohingyas, atrocities committed, killing,

gang rape, looting, kidnaping and mass human rights violations. Human Rights Watch revealed in its

world report 2018, that by November 2017, more than 625,000 Rohingyas had fled to Bangladesh,

satellite imagery showed that more than 340 primarily Rohingya villages either destroyed or burnt to

the ground. 68 OCHA office in Myanmar stated that Over 25,000 IDPs from Rakhine Buddhists and

other ethnic minority groups were displaced, but most of them had returned by November 2017.69 See

(Map No. 2).

On the other side, The Burmese government blocked all humanitarian aid and media access to Rakhine

state, after international criticism and pressure on Myanmar, the Burmese government formed a fact-

finding commission consist of 27 members from different political parties and religious leaders to

carry out investigation in Rakhine state.70

65Banyan, Unforgiving history, The Economist, 03.11.2012 Found at: https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21565638-why-buddhists-and-muslims-rakhine-state-myanmar-are-each-others%E2%80%99-throats-unforgiving ; Last accessed: 10/12/2018. 66Deadly clashes erupt in Myanmar's restive Rakhine state, Al Jazeera English 25.08.2017 Found at:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/deadly-clashes-erupt-myanmar-restive-rakhine-state-170825055848004.html ; Last accessed: 02/12/2018 67Myanmar Tips into New Crisis after Rakhine State Attacks. Crisis Group. 27.08.2017 Found at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-tips-new-crisis-after-rakhine-state-attacks; Last accessed: 23/10/2018. 68World Report 2018. Burma: Events of 2017. Burma, Human Rights Watch. Found at:https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/201801world_report_web.pdf; Last accessed: 23/12/2018. 69Myanmar: 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, OCHA Myanmar, 23.11.2017 Found at:https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018%20Myanmar%20Humanitarian%20Needs%20Overview.pdf ; Last accessed: 23/12/2018. 70 Armstrong, P. Q&A: What's behind sectarian violence in Myanmar?, CNN News, 27.10.2012 Found at: https://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/myanmar-Rohingya-violence-explainer/index.html ; Last accessed: 28/12/2018

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Map No.2: Routes of the Rohingya refugees by sea and land

While, Mrs. Aun San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor of Myanmar, and the winner of the Nobel Peace

Prize laureate, was in a vague silence to what’s happing inside her own country of violation of human

rights and the cruel acts against the marginalized Rohingyas, she came out of her silence days after the

crisis with a statement “strongly condemned the brutal attacks by terrorists on security forces in

Rakhine state.” 71 No wonder, her position is pro-government and the Buddhist community, because

she is affiliated to the same religion and if she would sympathy with the Muslim Rohingya that will

lead to two implications, first, the recognition of the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens would mean the

recognition of their civil rights and duties, second, that will jeopardize her winning chances in the next

national elections and she will lose many Buddhist electors.

Whereas, the conflict greatly aggravated the international community condemned the mass killing and

violence against the Rohingya. However, the UN Security Council weak position only raised the

voices of condemnation and urge the Burmese government to control the situation and protect the

civilians, because China and Russia both vetoed any UN resolution or sanctions against Myanmar

government due to their vested political and economic interests. In March 2017, the United Nations

Human Rights Council assigned a UN fact-finding mission on Myanmar headed by the former

Secretary General Kofi Annan and two UN officials in order to investigate the situation in Rakhine

state, the final report called both conflicting parties to stop the violence and find a resolution to the

71Myanmar troops open fire on civilians fleeing attacks, Al Jazeera English, 26.08.2017 Found at:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/myanmar-violence-traps-rohingya-bangladesh-border-170826101215439.html ; Last accessed: 28/12/2018

Source: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis

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protracted conflict in Rakhine state72, in addition, Myanmar government accepted the recommendation

of the mission and promised to implement them.

As Azar explained the international linkages to the protracted social conflict (PSC), the political and

economic relation between the government and the international system, is another factor may incite or

diminish the protracted social conflict.73The international organizations, the UN agencies, the

neighboring countries of the South Asian countries, the Islamic States in the Middle East and Africa,

all expressed deep concerns, but none of these countries was able to provide beyond the humanitarian

assistance to the refugees in the camps.

In contrast, the most influential external actor in this conflict is the People’s Republic of China. At the

beginning China was not directly involved in the conflict, due to three main reasons, first, China

strongly hold to its foreign policy principle of non-interference in other country’s internal affairs,

second, China involved by selling weaponry to the Burmese military forces, third, China extreme

oppression against the Uyghurs Muslim minority group in Xinjiang autonomous region.

Nevertheless, China recently has great economic interests in Rakhine state, in 2010 China lunched

Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipeline Project, which costs US$2.3 billion to transport the oil and gas

to China. The works of the project postponed several times because the armed conflict in Rakhine.74

That’s why when the crisis exploded in August 2017, the Chinese government for the first time

indirectly intervene in the confits and came up with a proposal called the China Proposes 3-Phase

Solution. 1.The ceasefire on the ground. 2. Mutual talks between Myanmar-Bangladesh on the

resolution for the Rohingya refugees.3. Long-term development schemes to support poverty alleviation

in Rakhine state.75 This proposal by China raised many questions behind the intentions, from the

proposal points, obviously, China does not recognize the Rohingya but what matters is to return the

security and stability back in the region by ending any armed violence. The second point, China

encouraged mutual talks on the Rohingya refugees between Myanmar and Bangladesh not only that,

but it is playing the mediator role by hosting these talks as well. Most important is the third point of the

Chinese proposal, where China foreseen the conflict core problem due to the poverty, unemployment

and under-development in Rakhine state.

72Investigation of alleged human rights violations and abuses against the Rohingya, 26.09.2017, The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Found at:https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/InvestigationAllegedHRViolationsAgainstRohingya.aspx; Last accessed: 30/12/2018 73 Nishikawa, Y. Chapter 1: Human Security: A New Label for Old Challenges. Human Security in Southeast Asia. Routledge. 2010. p.27 74S. Bhaumik. Why do China, India back Myanmar over the Rohingya crisis?, South China Morning Post, 18.10.2017 http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2115839/why-do-china-india-back-myanmar-over-rohingya-crisis Last accessed: 23/10/2018 ; Last accessed: 31/21/2018 75 Wang Yi: China Proposes 3-Phase Solution to Address Issue of the Rakhine State of Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 20.11.2017http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1512592.shtml Last accessed: 23/10/2018 ; Last accessed:31/12/2018

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Azar also referred to how international relations of states impact the orientation of the domestic

politics, this concept is widely applied in the Sino-Burmese relations when it comes to the supporting

position of China to the Burmese government in the UN Security Council, Azar said “Formation of

domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced

by the patterns of the linkage within the international system.”76 Another example would also suits this

concept, is the supportive position of the United States of America to Israel in the Israeli-Palestine

conflict, the international community and precisely the United National Security Council was an able

to take tangible and coercive actions against the powerful states who enjoys the veto power.

In the light of what happened during the past conflict escalation, the condemnation of the international

community and precisely the re-imposition of individual military sanctions by the United States of

American and the European Union, would result in Myanmar’s redirection toward China and other

Asian states. Whereas states in Asian generally they don’t condition their international relations with

Myanmar according to the degree of adoption of the western liberal values of human rights. For

example, the ASEAN member states, they adopt the principle of non-interference in other states’

internal affairs, that’s why when the Rohingya conflict erupted in 2017 the official statement of the

ASEAN initially disregarded the term Rohingya and referred to them as Muslim minority group in

Rakhine state.

2.2 Reform of Myanmar Political Leadership

Ever since the coup d’état of 1962 Burma had been under the military authoritarian regime of

Senior General Than Shwe, the former Head of State, Commander-in-chief of Myanmar Defense

Services, Head of the Union Solidarity and Development Association and Prime Minister. “it was he

who announced in April 1991 the military regime’s refusal to accept the results of the 1990 elections,

declaring the elections winners, the National League for Democracy (NLD), “subversive” and “unfit

to rule”77. Shwe refused the winning candidate of the general elections of April 1999, which was the

main opposition party led by Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi. However, in March 2011, Shwe officially

stepped down from office and all the positions he held, in November 2010 he accepted the winner of

the general election to replace him and form a new government under the new constitution ratified

after a referendum in May 2008, a constitution in conformity with the 1990 declaration 1/90 the Seven-

step Roadmap to Democracy78.

Political scientists and scholars indicated that the political reform in Myanmar backdated to the

resignation of the dictator Than Shwe in 2011. As he claimed that his resignation with a view to enable

76 Nishikawa, Y. Chapter 1: Human Security: A New Label for Old Challenges. Human Security in Southeast Asia. Routledge, 2010, p.28. 77 East, R. and Thomas, R. J. Myanmar. Profiles of People in Power: The World's Government Leaders. Routledge. 2014. p.368. 78 Harding, A. and Oo, K. K. VII. The 1990 Declaration 1/90, The National Convention and The Seven-step Roadmap to Democracy, Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2017. p.15.

32

a democratic government ruled by civilian people, yet it is backed by the military forces. According to

Myanmar constitution the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) comprises in total 224 seats, 168 MPs are

elected directly, while the 56 remaining seats are reserved for the military personnel who will be

appointed by the armed forces, according to the article no. 141(b) “56 Amyotha Hluttaw

representatives who are the Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the

Defence Services in accord with the law, four representatives from each Region or State inclusive of

relevant Union territories”79 . Moreover, the Pyithu Hluttaw (lawyer house) comprises in total 440

seats, 330 MPs are elected directly, and the remaining 110 seats are also appointed military personnel

by the armed forces as well, article no. 109 (b) “not more than 110 Pyithu Hluttaw representatives who

are the Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services in

accord with the law.”80 In conclusion, 25% of the parliament seats are technically subjected to the

Burmese armed forces, consequently, this means the military still has a powerful presence in the

Burmese political life. This formation of the hybrid political leadership reflects the mistrust of the

military leaders in one side, but on the other side they wanted a new civil political leadership widely

accepted by the public and the international community.

2.2.1 Reconciliation with the Political Opposition and Civil Society

Despite the real motives behind the democratization of Myanmar, the government paved the

way for political opposition, human rights activists and generally the civil society to participate in the

process of the liberalization of the country, in order to facilitate the democratic transition peacefully.

In August 2009, Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the main opposition party in Myanmar the

National League for Democracy (NLD) had been under house arrest for 15 years, she was re-sentenced

to extra 18 months because she allowed John Yettaw an American citizen to visit her house while she

was under house arrest.81 The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) which was backed by

the military regime successfully won the elections of April 2010, while the National League for

Democracy (NLD) the leading opposition party declared boycotting the elections,82 due to the unjust

political party registration law which stated “ Political parties cannot be registered with the electoral

commission with any members who are convicts”83. This law directly deprived Suu Kyi from

participating in the elections because of her criminal record according to the law. However, one of the

early stages of the political opening with the opposition, when president Thein Sein invited Suu Kyi to

his residence on 17th August 2010, to discuss outstanding issues and the party’s elections boycott in

2010. Few months later, precisely on 13th November 2010 San Suu Kyi released. As a result of this

79Constitution of the Republic of Union Myanmar (2008). Chapter 4, Legislature, 141(b), p.52. Found at: www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf ; Last accessed: 30/12/2018 80 Constitution of the Republic of Union Myanmar (2008). Chapter 4, Legislature, 109(b). p.39. 81 Kipgen, N. Chapter 3: Power of Elites. Democratisation of Myanmar. Routledge. 2016. p.73-98. p. 89. 82 Harding, A. and Oo, K. K. Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar. Bloomsbury Publishing. 26.01.2017. p.96. 83 Mya, S. (MOFA), Chapter 3: Chronological Events. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: World’s Number One Living Democracy Icon. Lulu.com, 2017. p. 67.

33

meeting the government amended both the party registration law and the elections law, so the head of

the NLD can participate in the future elections.84 In April 2012, by-elections held to fulfil vacant posts

in the government, the National League for Democracy NLD successfully won 43 of the 45 seats, Suu

Kyi became the opposition leader.85 A defining event in Myanmar’s political history occurred in the

general elections of 2015, when Mrs. Suu Kyi achieved a tremendous victory in Myanmar’s general

election in November 2015, 86% of the seats in the Assembly of the Union (both houses of

parliament), 135 of the 168 elected seats in the upper house, 255 of 330 elected seats in the lower

house.86

Right after her victorious winning Suu Kyi made several trips to the United States, where she met

President Obama, other trips to Europe and Asia. The international community praised these results,

and in 2013 the United States of America and the European Union lifted the economic sanctions

against Myanmar gradually until 2016, which imposed since 1990’s, as a result of the government’s

violation of human rights.87 However, this lifting aimed to motivate the democratic transition and to

enable Myanmar to stand out against its isolation. The elections result described as fair and transparent

expressing the Burmese people’s political choices. But for the Rohingya Muslims minority group the

situation was turning from bad to worse and the disentrancement from their rights continued. In 2014

the government amended the political party registration law which deprived the holders of the

temporary registration card (known as white card) citizenship from the right to found or to be members

of political parties, consequently the Rohingyas lost their right to vote in the elections poll, eventually,

it was estimated that half a million voters were not included in the voters list.88

Moreover, many political prisoners released under a general amnesty has granted by President U

Thein, on 6 February 2013, he declared forming a committee in order to investigate the cases of the

remaining political prisoners and detainees all over the country to release them. Furthermore, Amnesty

International reported “since 2011 more than 1,100 political prisoners have been released in Myanmar

through 20 separate presidential amnesties or pardons”89. Internally, Myanmar suffers from ethnic

armed conflicts ever since its independence in 1948, in the states of Kayah, Kayin, Shan, and Rakhine,

but due to the political reforms, peace talks and conflict resolution initiated by the government carried

on more the reforms, in October 2015 the government successfully signed the Nationwide Ceasefire

84 Bünte, M. and Dosch, J. Myanmar: Political Reforms and the Recalibration of External Relations. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs,34 (2). p. 3-19. 2015. p. 6. 85 West, J. Chapter 8: Fixing Asia’s Flawed Politics. Military Hangs on in Myanmar, Asian Century... on a Knife-edge: A 360 Degree Analysis of Asia's Recent Economic Development. Springer. 2018. p. 213-246. p.237. 86 Seekins, D.M. Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar). Rowman & Littlefield, 2nd edition. 2017.p. 383. 87 Kun, Z. and Qingrun, S. Chapter 11: The Motivations and Game in Myanmar’s Transition // C. C. Sein, C. C. Li, and Zhu, X. Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community. World Scientific. 2016. p.218. 88 Lidauer, M. Chapter 7: The 2015 Elections and Conflict Dynamics in Myanmar. // Cheesman, N. and Farrelly, N. Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion. SEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 2016. p.152-153. 89Myanmar: Political imprisonment in numbers, Amnesty International, 24.03.2016; Found at:https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/myanmar-political-imprisonment-in-numbers ; Last accessed: 02/01/2019

34

Agreement with more than eight insurgent groups, to end the violent ethnic conflicts in Shan and

Kachin states. But the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army was not invited for negotiations neither for

the signature of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Decentralization, administrative reforms,

fighting corruption, and education system reforms, new law of media, more freedom of expression,

better workers treatment and compensations, most of the social media plate forms and the internet

access allowed for all citizens.90 The number of foreign NGOs started to increase, more diplomatic

representations, internationally, Myanmar adopted a new foreign policy in order to attract all kind of

investments to boost the country’s economy “Under new government administration, the significant

process of the reform agenda pave the way for the new connection with its external relations and

changing approach to its foreign policy practice”91

Regarding the press and public opinion laws and institutions, in 2011, the government relaxed

restrictions on the media, the press and internet censorship laws, and in August the same year the

competent authorities abolished the prepublication censorship and the closure of the Press Scrutiny and

Registration Division, permitting public political discussion and assembly, people started to use all

means of telecommunications freely.92 Accordingly, Myanmar ranked 145th of 179 countries in the

World Press Freedom Index 2014, according to reporters without borders.93

At an unprecedented event responding to the local citizens' requests and demonstrations in September

2011, the Burmese government suspended the construction works of the Myitsone Dam which costs in

total $3.6 billion, due to environmental damages and the displacement of many locals. This giant

hydroelectric project funded by one of the Chinese government’s companies, in order to generate

electric power benefits Kachin state and mainly the neighboring Chinese states. “We respect public’s

desire as our government is a government elected by the public. We are obligated to address the

public’s concerns and therefore in the time of our government we will stop constructing the Myitsone

dam.”94 This statement by the former Burmese president Thein Sein responding to the demonstrators

against the dam construction was praised by the head of the opposition Mrs. San Suu Kyi, academic

scholars, environment and human rights activists, considering it as a strong stand from the government

by its people. It is important to mention that the interpretation of the Burmese government stand sends

implicit message to the Chinese government that the new ascending democratic government in

Myanmar is a government ruled not only by the officials but also by its people which one of the

attributes of the democratic societies, unlike China, where the political leaders of the socialist party

90 Egreteau, R. and Robinn, F. Metamorphosis: Studies in Social and Political Change in Myanmar. 2015. p.69-70. 91 Sein, C. C. Li, C. Zhu, X. Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community. World Scientific. 2016. p.32. 92 Renshaw, C. Chapter 11: Human Rights Under the Regime. Harding, A. and Oo, K. K. Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2017. p. 216. 93 World press freedom index 2014, Reporters without Borders Found at: https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2014; Last accessed: 01.01.2019 94Hsu Mon, K. Government backs down following widespread public protest over dam project at Myitsone, Myanmar Times, 03.10.2011, Found at: https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/2052-government-backs-down-following-widespread-public-protest-over-dam-project-at-myitsone.html; Last accessed: 01.01.2019

35

controls everything without the consent of the Chinese people. Therefore, this new attitude from the

new Burmese government officials will probably affect the ongoing and future bilateral Sino-Burmese

relations in general and particularly the Chinese investment projects in Myanmar.

2.2.2. The International Community

During the years 2012 until the end of 2015, Myanmar witnessed drastic changes in its

international relations with the neighboring countries or the international community in general. One

of the most important events was in February 2013, when the Burmese president Thein Sein travelled

for the first time to Europe after 46 years in isolation, Myanmar began rapidly to strengthen its bilateral

and multilateral relations, within Asia and with the western world, the visit of Sein to the EU where he

held high-level meeting and talks. He also visited other European countries, such as Norway, Austria,

Italy, Belgium and other European states was a result of lifting the European sanctions on Myanmar

due to its political reforms of the democratic transition of the country, in addition to that the country in

a phase where they extremely want to change the negative image of former Myanmar and to open the

door for all kind of investments. This visit resulted in the EU Commission decisions to open a full-

fledged EU delegation in Myanmar, and to provide €150 million funds per year in humanitarian and

development aid project and financing the Myanmar Peace Centre.95 Additional EU funding € 5.5

million to assist the internally displaced persons in Rakhine State from both communities the Muslims

Rohingya and Buddhist in Rakhine state.96 However, most of the European Union were mainly

concentrated on issues related to the promotion of democratic ruling and defending human rights in the

country. On the other side, Myanmar’s Asian neighbors they were Myanmar’s most important

economic partners and political supports, because the governments of south-east Asia have political

regimes do not interfere in other state internal affairs, they highly conserve the principle of sovereignty

of nonboring states, their relations are mainly based on identical and complementary interests. In the

international level, Myanmar positive political reform attracted the United States of America attention,

consequently, Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar in December 2011, followed by the visit of President

Barack Obama in November 2012, as the first U.S president to visit Myanmar ever since the military

ruling in 1962.

Finally, the opening in the political life and the country’s transition towards democracy is a long path

could be traced back to the foundation of the new constitution in 2008, formerly, the institutions

reforms in Myanmar became a reality, the relaxation of the media and internet, the increasing number

of the organization of civil society are all signs of demarcation transformation. Despite all these

95 Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mr. U Thein Sein, President of Myanmar. European Commission, 05.03.2013, Found at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-184_en.htm ; Last accessed: 06.01.2019 96 Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Mr. U Thein Sein, President of Myanmar. European Commission. 05.03.2013, Found at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-184_en.htm ; Last accessed: 07/01/2019

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reforms, Myanmar government still suffer from internal conflicts with ethnic armed groups, even

though the government called for a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, only eight armed groups out of

fifteen signed the agreement in 2015, but in October 2018 two of the main signatories to the Ceasefire

Agreement to suspend the peace talks with the government.97

Regarding the resolution of the Rohingya conflict, the government continued the same treatment of the

former governments, no recognition for the Rohingyas and nothing extended to improve the lives of

the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine states, the IDP or the refugees in the neighboring countries. The

political leadership of Myanmar cannot condemn acts of violence against the Rohingya Muslims; the

reason is that the National League for Democracy fear of losing the huge electoral votes represented by

nationalists and Buddhist monks, and the fear of growing internal sympathy with the Rohingyas

persecuted to narrow their chances of displacement. While the international community depend on the

United Nations Security Council to solve the Rohingya conflict, but the veto power used by China and

Russia block any resolution by the UNSC, the regional organizations such as the ASEAN and the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) they are unable to reach political solution, but rather they

provide humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya Muslims refugees in Myanmar’s neighboring

counties. The political reform and the democratization on one hand were warmly welcomed by the

west, but on the other hand raised serious concerns in China. Although China knows well how to

perform its international relations despite the country’s regime type, and the evidence for that, is that

China’s biggest trading partner is the United states of America, one of the oldest democracies in the

western world and a strong defender of the human rights and democracy promotor.

At last, the Rohingya conflict is one of the obstacles that hindering the implementation other elements

of democracy in Myanmar, the international community pressure together with the proliferation of the

terrorist groups in Asia, would incite the Rohingya conflict again. If the government did not address

the core problem of the conflict, because the underdevelopment problems in Rakhine state is not the

only reasons of the conflict as the government projected for the international media. The political

reforms in Myanmar would reach the highest level when the government respect the rights of all

citizens in Myanmar whether, they are majority or minority groups.

2.3 Myanmar Economic Reform

The economic reform and the liberalization of the Burmese market were the second step of the

reforms plan “the new government promulgated a new foreign investment law and endeavored for the

building of special economic zone and industrial zone. Myanmar’s economic reforms were carried out

97 MON, Y. Peace Commission to meet as ceasefire signatories withdraw from peace process. Myanmar Frontier, 12.11.2018, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/peace-commission-to-meet-as-ceasefire-signatories-withdraw-from-peace-process ; Last accessed: 19/01/2019

37

in the context of economic development in building and sustaining peace at the domestic level.”98

Myanmar with the democratization and reforms will certainly achieve a real change, attracting

domestic and foreign investments. Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) is a government-

appointed body which is responsible for verifying and approving investment proposals. Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) increased from $59.73 billion in 20112 to $66.54 billion in 2017, about 80 %

of Myanmar foreign investments concentrated in the oil, gas, power, and telecommunication sectors,

with manufacturing accounting for only about 7 %. 99 The main trading partners with Myanmar are the

Asian countries, China, India, Thailand, Japan and South Korea, but China is the biggest trading and

investment partner with $19 billion in 2017.100 The world bank reported economic growth of 8.5% for

real GDP growth in 2013/2014, and 6.5 % the next year and the decline was due to the flood in August

same year. Between March 2014 and February 2015, the manufacturing sector attracted $1.7 billion

for FDI with about 150 new schemes.101 These huge number of investments shows that Myanmar has

plenty of natural resources for various kinds of industries and fertile lands for agricultural project, yet,

Myanmar lack the adequate infrastructure that can help in achieving its economic growth, therefore,

Myanmar, depends on countries such as China to provide the technology and appropriate system to

build efficient infrastructure. For instance, Myanmar has severe shortages of electricity particularly in

the rural areas, therefore, the Chinese had built several dams to provide electricity for both Myanmar

and the neighboring Chinese states. On the other hand, the new government is facing serious allegation

of human right violation committed by the name of development projects, under the land acquisition

act, remained one of the issues that hindered the county’s protection of human rights of the minorities,

as this is a norm from the military rule era and it is prevailing in other Asian countries. “often-times

they are labeled ‘for development for the public interest’ and taken by eminent domain or legal

instrument before being sold off to private investors for personal gain to the government cronies.”102

Between September 2013 and September 2014, 7'615 cases of land-grabbing dispute were presented to

the courts, comparable to the size of Hong Kong. 103 since the end of 2017 the government carried out

operations using heavy machinery to remove the burned Rohingya villages, the government rejected

these allegations of land confiscation and stated that it is for the returnee refugees and IDPs.104

98 Sein, C. C. Li, and Zhu, X. Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community. 2016. p.32. 99New Investment Law Helps Myanmar Rebuild its Economy and Create Job. The World Bank. 25.01.2017 Found at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/01/25/new-investment-law-helps-myanmar-rebuild-its-economy-and-create-jobs Last accessed: 12/01/2019 100Aung, H. L. FDI could exceed MIC’s target in 2017-18, but still lower than previous years’. Myanmar Times, 20.07.2017. Found at: https://www.mmtimes.com/business/26883-fdi-could-exceed-mic-s-target-in-2017-18-but-still-lower-than-previous-years.html Last accessed: 14/01/2019 101 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Myanmar 2016. p.45. Found at: https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/myanmar-2016 Last accessed; 22/01/2019 102 Carter, C. and Harding, A. Land Grabs in Asia: What Role for the Law? Routledge. 2015. p. 4. 103 Cheesman, N. and Farrelly, N. N. Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 2016. p. 203. 104REMAKING RAKHINE STATE Research. Amnesty International. 12.03.2018. Found at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8018/2018/en/; Last accessed 16.11.2018

38

Despite the aforementioned challenges that the Burmese economy is experiencing, the government

continues to encourage foreign investors to do business and to help in the country’s economic growth

and the achievement of sustainable development goals. Within this framework, the government held

two considerable events for the first time to promote new attractive investment environment. The first

is the Investment Myanmar Summit 2019, from 28th to 29th February 2019, under the slogan Explore

Unique Opportunities. In an interview with Mr. U Thaung Tun, Union Minister for Investment and

Foreign Economic Relations, and the Chairman of Myanmar Investment Commission, stressed on the

necessity to change the legal framework and enhancement of the administrative procedures to facilitate

and encourage more foreign investment.105

The second event is Rakhine State Investment Fair, from 21st to 23rd February 2019, its aim is to

develop Rakhine state economy by promoting private sector investment. Aung San Suu Kyi, the State

Counsellor urged in the inaugural speech the investors to come and do business in Rakhine state and

contribute to the development of Rakhine and Myanmar as well. On the other hand, she slightly

blamed the international community limited focus on the conflict in Rakhine state without any

reference to the Rohingya people particularly, she said “For too long the international community’s

attention has been focused narrowly on negative aspects related to problems in North Rakhine rather

than on the panoramic picture that shows the immense potential of this State for peace and

prosperity.”106 Suu Kyi, in her words projected the core problem of the conflict in Rakhine state as if it

was caused by the historic ethno-religious differences between the Rohingya Muslim minority and the

Rakhine Buddhists, and the economic underdevelopment, high rate of unemployment and abject

poverty that causing the conflict, she only talked about the outcome of the conflict but not the other

actors who incited the conflict and led to the huge influx of Rohingya refugees around the region. Suu

Kyi and her government suppose the resolution of the conflict is entrenched in the development of the

state; however, this could be one stage of the solution but not the effective solution that will establish

the sustainable peace in the region.

Moreover, she emphasized on the role of domestic and the foreign investments are the evidence to the

capacities of the state’s natural resources as well as its people, she said “Every kyat spent by this

government, every dollar disbursed by our development partners and every dollar invested by the

private sector is a vote of confidence in the resilience and potential of Rakhine and its people.”.

Nevertheless, the future development projects would revive the economic development and provide

job opportunities, it is still difficult to say that these projects will end the Rohingya conflict, because

even the Chinese mega projects had incited local opposition due to the environment degradation, land

105 A Conversation with H.E. U Thaung Tun, Union Minister of MIFER, and Chairman of MIC, 29 January 2019, Myanmar Convention Centre 2, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. Found at: https://investmyanmar2019.com/general-insights/dialogue-mifer-minister-u-thaung-tun/ Last accessed; 06.01.2019

106 Keynote Speech by H.E. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor at the Rakhine State Investment Fair, Rakhine State Investment Fair 2019, 22 February 2019, Thandwe, Myanmar. Found at: https://investmyanmar2019.com/news/rakhine-state-investment-fair-keynote-speech-aung-san-suu-kyi/ Last accessed; 27.02.2019

39

confiscation and forced displacement of local communities. In addition, the Arakan Rohingya

Salvation Army may attack these projects as a retaliation action, such as what had happened in Nigeria

by the terrorist group of Boko Haram who exploded the crude oil pipelines or kidnaping the foreign

labors in exchange for ransom.

2.3.1 The Challenges to the Economic Reform

The indicators of Myanmar’s economy showed rapid growth ever since the liberalization of the

economy and the political and economic reforms. As much as these measures are essential for

economic growth and attracting foreign investors, the most important is the stability and security of the

country. There are internal and external challenges confronting the economic growth in Myanmar,

first, the internal conflicts between the government and insurgent groups in different states and above

all the eruption of the Rohingya conflict in August 2017 and the refugees crisis, attracted the attention

of the international community and draw a very negative image of a country supposedly is a pro-

democratic state ever since 2011. Second, the growing local opposition of the civil society to the

Chinese investment projects that do not consider the social and environmental consequence on the

local communities resulted in the postponement of ongoing projects and may hinder other projects in

the future. Third, Myanmar is in a huge need to fund and set up various infrastructure projects all over

the country, as stated by the Global Infrastructure Outlook’s report Myanmar requires $ 122 Billion to

meet the country’s infrastructure needs.107 Third, on the international level, the worldwide

condemnation of the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority and the miserable living conditions

of the refugees in Bangladesh and other South-East Asian countries effectiveness of the democratic

government and questioning the influence of the Military on the political life in Myanmar , moreover

there is a tendency that the United States and the European Union to re-impose economic sanctions or

financial restricts on Myanmar’s military officers, consequently, this action will push the western

investors away from Myanmar’s market due to the sanctions, financial obstacles and above all the

insecurity for the foreign investment projects especially those in conflict zones. This scenario would

open the doors widely to the Chinese and other Asian investors, which is in the favor of the regional

interests. At last, it is in the best interest of Myanmar government to strongly continue the project of

Myanmar’s democratization, in order to achieve its national interests, and Myanmar should diversify

the sources of foreign investments and to balance between its international relations, the influence of

China and Russia and the western block led by the United States of America.

3. THE ROLE OF CHINA IN RAKHINE STATE

The People’s Republic of China was the dominant trading partner and the biggest foreign

investor in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar before 2011 due to the unilateral economic

107 Myanmar- Global Infrastructure Outlook. Found at: https://www.gihub.org/countries/myanmar/ ;Last accessed: 02/02/2019

40

sanctions imposed by the United States of America and the European Union in the early 1990’s as a

result of suppression and human rights violations committed by the former military regime. Thus,

China took the advantage of Myanmar’s international isolation and became the main diplomatic and

military ally, the financial and economic aid provider .108 Not only China supported Myanmar but

also the state-members of ASEAN opposed the unilateral economic sanctions, they involved

economically and politically in Myanmar to promote change and reforms.109Therefore, Myanmar’s

economic dependency on China increased the Chinese influence on Myanmar’s domestic polices and

international relations. The Chinese investments in Myanmar are heavily in the energy and natural

resources extractions, these investments principally located in the neighboring states of Kachin and

Shan and in Rakhine state.

Chapter three discusses in three subsections, first, China’s position from Myanmar reforms, the

promotion of democracy and human rights, second, China’s evolving role in the Rohingya conflict and

the reasons led China to avert the non-interference principle in other state internal affairs, by

presenting a three phase-plan to establish peace in Rakhine state. Third a discussion on the ongoing

Chinese investments in Rakhine state, which represent the national interests of China, and its relations

with China’s ambitious initiative of the Belt and Road project, its impact on the conflict and the

bilateral relations with the government of Myanmar, and finally, future prospect of the actors’ interests

and the development of the conflict.

3.1 The position of China from the Myanmar Reforms

Over the past decades China has established solid bilateral relations with the former military

regime. Nevertheless, Myanmar comprehensive democratization process which begun in 2011 and the

western world strong support to the promotion of democracy in the country, highly raised China’s

concerns of the present and future relations with Myanmar. Thomas Risse and Nelli Babayan argued

that illiberal regional powers such as China perceives the promotion of democracy in third countries by

the United States of America and the European Union, as contests in two conditions, first, if the

promotion of democracy is a threat to their geostrategic interests weather they are political, economic

or military interests in the region, second, if it is a threat to the survival of their regime.110 Moreover,

Risse and Babayan claimed an important point, that unlike democratic states such as the United States

of American and the European Union who are promoting the western democratic model and the

promotion of human rights, illiberal states such as China and Russia don’t’ prioritize counteracting the

108 Kuok, L. Promoting Peace in Myanmar: U.S. Interests and Role. Rowman & Littlefield. 2014. p.2. 109 Poole, P. A. Chapter 5: Myanmar: ASEAN’s Problem State. Politics and Society in Southeast Asia. McFarland. 2009. p. 76. 110 Risse, T. and Babayan, N. (2015) Democracy promotion and the challenges of illiberal regional powers: introduction to the special issue. Democratization. 22:3, P. 381-399. p. 384-386.

41

promotion of democracy in their foreign policy plans towards third countries, but it is rather used as a

tool to achieve other goals or an indirect result of other strategies. 111

Whereas China considers Myanmar within its region of influence, the ongoing political and economic

transformation provoked China to seek new strategies to strengthen the bilateral relations in

accordance with the reforms of the current government. Narayanna Ganesam argued that ever since

2012, the Chinese President Xii Jinping foreign policy toward Myanmar working on two main issues,

first, strengthening the economic and trade ties, second, supporting the government of Myanmar in

solving the internal conflicts between the government and the ethnic-minority militias and particularly

the Rohingya conflict.112

3.1.1 China Response to Myanmar Political Reform

Yun SUN is a visiting scholar in East Asia Project, Henry L. Stimson Center and former

visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, argued that China did not expect the rapid shifts in

Myanmar, therefore, these changes have significant impact on the Chinese interests in three areas:

political, economic and strategic.113

First, politically Sun argued that Myanmar’s swift political shift concerned China because it was a

peaceful transformation of an authoritarian regime which subsequently stressed the Chinese political

elite reforms. Additionally, she explained that Myanmar represents completely opposite governance

model to the Chinese political authoritarianism and economic capitalism. China’s prescription to the

Burmese former military regime for the governance reformation, first, prioritizing the economic reform

and second comes the political reform.114 Second, Sun argued that China response to the political

reforms in Myanmar in three fronts “major reduction of Chinese direct investments, the cooling off of

the political relationship, the establishment of relations with the democratic forces and major public

relations campaigns.”115 The cooling off the political ties between the two counties has occurred since

the end of 2011 when the mutual official visits from China declined. Other scholars mentioned that due

to the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in September 2011 and the visits of the U.S Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton in November 2011, followed by president Barak Obama in 2012, created this political

reticence. Moreover, the argument of other academic scholars and political analysts explained that

Myanmar’s internal conflicts at the Chinese borders between Myanmar’s military forces and the ethnic

armed groups, highly threaten the lives of the Chinese citizens together with the security and stability

111 Risse, T. and Babayan, N. (2015) Democracy promotion and the challenges of illiberal regional powers: introduction to the special issue, Democratization, 22:3, 381-399, p.385. 112 Ganesan, N. Chapter 2: Myanmar-China Relations Under President Xi Jinping. Lim, A. F. Cibulka. China and Southeast Asia in the Xi Jinping Era. Lexington Books. 2018. p.17. 113 Sun, Y. (2012), China and the Changing Myanmar, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 4, 51-77. p. 58. www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org 114 Sun, Y. (2012), China and the Changing Myanmar, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 4, pp. 51-77. p. 61. www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org 115 Sun, Y. (2012) China and the Changing Myanmar, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 31, 4. p. 51-77. p. 64.

42

of Yunnan province, and the border trade between both countries.116 Enze Han added to this argument,

by addressing China’s different response to both conflict escalations in Kokang region in Shan state in

2009 2015 and 2017, and Kachin Independence Army from 2011 to 2013,117 in both conflicts,

Myanmar’s military bombs fell in the Chinese territory and 37’000 refugees fled to the Yunnan

province118 and there were Chinese casualties, China responded by spreading police patrols in the

borders.119 During Kachin conflict, the Burmese military bombs fell in the Chinese territory but no

losses, China Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in a briefing “China has raised its concerns with

Myanmar, demanding that Myanmar take immediate measures to avoid such incidents in the future.

Problems in northern Myanmar are Myanmar‘s internal affairs. China hopes the Myanmar

government can solve its problems through peaceful dialogue with the relevant parties and maintain

peace and stability in the borderland area.” It seemed that China held Myanmar full responsibility of

the conflict and without further interference.120 However, when both conflicting parties met for peace

negations they sent an invitation to the United State of America and the United Kingdom to be part of

the peace talks, China strongly disagreed to internationalizing the Kachin conflict.121

Third, China has devoted efforts to renew the ties with Aung San Suu Kyi and her party the National

League for Democracy. The Last time a Chinese official visited Suu Kyi was the former Chinese

ambassador Cheng Ruisheng after the 1990’s elections, in order to congratulate the party winning.

After her house arrest in 1989, Ambassador Ruisheng said that mutual-communication with Suu Kyi

stopped.122 The former military regime would not allow such contact between China and the

opposition party, the Chinese politicians and academicians avoided contact with the NLD party “ for

fear of antagonizing the junta”.123 Some Chinese politicians and academic scholars see the winner of

the Nobel Peace Prize Mrs. Suu Kyi as the pro-democracy and human rights defender and a good ally

to the west and she might prefers cooperation with the west rather than China. However, all these

reasons did not confer the Chinese government to communicate with Suu Kyi and the NLD Party,

especially after she became the State counsellor. China started intensive communication with the NLD

116 Senior Study Groups Report. China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts. United States Institute of Peace. September 2018. No. 1. p. 16. 117 Han, E. (2017) 'Geopolitics, Ethnic Politics along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar.' Asian Security. 13 (1). p. 59-73. P. 13.

118 World Report 2010. Burma: Events of 2009. Human Rights Watch Found at: www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/burma ; Last accessed :24/02/2019

119 Huang, K. Chinese Teacher Killed in Myanmar Conflict after Shelling Hits School. South China Morning Post. March 13, 2017, Found at: www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078409/chinese-teacher-killed-conflict-myanmar ; Last accessed :21/02/2019

120 Sun, Y. “China’s Intervention in the Myanmar-Kachin Peace Talks,” Brookings Institution. 20.02.2013 Found at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-intervention-in-the-myanmar-kachin-peace-talks/ Last accessed :23/02/2019

121 Han, E. (2017) 'Geopolitics, Ethnic Politics along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar.' Asian Security. 13 (1). pp. 59-73. P.18. 122 Mclaugh Lin, T. China courts NLD, Myanmar Times, 20.05.2013 Found at: https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/6787-after-two-decades-china-begins-to-reach-out-to-nld.html ; Last accessed :23/02/2019

123 Chenyang, L. and Char, J. Chapter 5: China-Myanmar Relations since Naypyidaw’s Political Transition: How Beijing Can Balance Short-Term Interests and Long-Term Values. Chenyang, L. Daw, S. Chaw, C. Xianghui, Z. Myanmar: Reintegrating into The International Community. World Scientific. 2016. P.82-83.

43

in accordance with the country’s reformation, therefore, the Chinese ambassador in Myanmar visited

Aung San Suu Kyi on 22nd April 2013, to strengthening both relations between the parties and the

people for their best interests. Following this meeting, one the most important events was the first time

ever visit of Myanmar’s main opposition party the NLD to China in May 2013, responding to the

official invitation from the international department of central community of the communist party of

China (CPC).124 Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi visited China for the first time in June 2015, and met

the Chinese president Xi Jinping and other highly level officials125. Although she is a pro-democratic

in her political thoughts, yet she is aware of the importance of China as a strategic partner, and the

need to balance between Myanmar’s relations with China and the western countries.

Forth, Yun SUN argued that while China cooled down its political relations in one side, on the other

side China launched a huge public and cultural diplomacy campaign and corporate social responsibility

programs, using the Chinese media outlets broadcasting few weeks after the suspension of the

Myitsone Dam, in order to polish its image in front of the eyes of the Burmese people, to propagate the

deeply-rooted relations between the two nations, and most importantly to present the Chinese

investment as beneficial for both Myanmar and China.126

In addition, China uses Buddhist diplomacy as an instrument of public diplomacy to influence the

people to people exchange relation which aims at manipulating Myanmar’s public opinion in favor of

China’s national interests in Myanmar. Chow-Bing Ngeow, argued that China promoted Buddhist

diplomacy in Myanmar in several episodes, for instance during the cold war, it was used to unite

China’s interests during the war time, however, in 2011 episode the goal was to counteract the anti-

Chinese sentiment in Myanmar, Ngeoow said “The 2011 episode in Myanmar occurred amidst the

transition from military Junta toward democratic government in Myanmar, which was accompanied by

a rising-anti Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar public.”127

The use of instruments for Securing National interests is of a powerful country foreign policy tools,

China’s foreign policy adjustment towards Myanmar was response to the internal and external politics

of Myanmar.

3.1.2 China Response to Myanmar’s Economic Reform

China is the main economic partner and investor in Myanmar, previously between 2008 and

2011, the Chinese investment raised from $ 1 billion to nearly $ 13 billion.128 However, ever since

124 Rui, X. Myanmar's NLD party delegation leaves for China, ASEAN-China Center. 09.05.2013. Found at http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-05/09/c_132370570.htm ; Last accessed: 02/03/2019 125 Myanmar's Suu Kyi to make first visit to China, Reuter news, 05.06.2015. Found at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-myanmar-suukyi-idUSKBN0OL0E820150605 ; Last accessed: 10/03/2019 126 Sun, Y. (2012) China and the Changing Myanmar, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31, 4, 51-77. p. 67 127 Ngeow, C. B. Chapter 5: Religion in China’s Public Diplomacy Towards the Belt and Road Countries in Asia. Silk Road to Belt Road: Reinventing the Past and Shaping the Future. Springer. 2018. p. 85. 128 Sun, Y. (2013) Chinese Investment in Myanmar: What Lies Ahead? Great Powers and the Changing Myanmar. The Stimson Center. 1. p.1-12. p.2.

44

Myanmar’s political and economic transformation took place, China reduced its investment in

Myanmar drastically between 2012 and 2013, due to the suspension of the Myitsone dam project in

2013. But the economic relations had flourished again, and indicators showed that investment of USD

4.5 billion was approved from 2012 to 2016.129

Although China deals with both democratic and non-democratic regimes, but the Chinese government

prefers to cooperate with non-democratic governments , Daniel C. O’Neill argued that the Chinese

government and its firms have comparative advantage when they cooperate with the authoritarian

institutions, but he also discussed that ignoring the future political changes is the weakness of this

strategy, and in case these governments become more democratic and reform its institutions in the

future similar to the case of Myanmar, it would consequently risk the Chinese investments in the

foreign developing countries. After the political and economic liberalization adopted by president

Thein Sein, the impact of these reforms revealed the defect in the Chinese foreign policy strategy

which heavily depends on providing financial assistance to influence authoritarian governments, while

it has positive impact in the short term, yet it is subject to backlash following the political reforms

leading to regime change.130

3.2 China Engagement in the Rohingya Conflict

In the bilateral relations level, the Sino-Burmese ties are strong due to the mutual political and

economic interests and the security threats facing both countries. In the last decades China became the

biggest economic partner to Myanmar. For the sake of both countries’ prosperity, stability and

security, in January 2013, China hosted peace talks meetings and played the mediator role in the

resolution of Myanmar internal conflicts against the insurgent separatists’ groups in north Myanmar at

the Chinese bordering states, where thousands of Burmese refugees flee to the refugee’s camps at the

Chinese territories131. China has always been an ally to the government of Myanmar ever since the

military rule. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) the Burmese

military and police import 70.30 % of its weaponry from China and 19.03% from Russia.132 See

(Diagram No.3)

China government has already known it very well that Myanmar government using these weapons to

fight its own people, because Myanmar has other internal armed conflicts in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin and

Shan states, these so-called insurgents want autonomy.

129 Mark, S. and Zhang, Y. (2017) From Impediment to Adaptation: Chinese Investments in Myanmar’s New Regulatory Environment. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 36 (2) p.71–100. p.79. 130 O’Neill, D. C. Chapter 8: Evolving Institutions and Declining Chinese Influence in Myanmar. Dividing ASEAN and Conquering the South China Sea: China’s Financial Power Projection. Hong Kong University Press. 2018. p. 197. 131 The Nationwide Peace Process and Conflict in Kachin and Shan States, China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts. USIP SENIOR STUDY GROUP FINAL REPORT. United States Institute of Peace. September 2018 | No. 1. p.1-40. p.24. 132The state of major arms transfers in 8 graphics. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 20.02.2017. Found at: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017/state-major-arms-transfers-8-graphics ;Last accessed: 02/04/2019

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Diagram No. 3: Myanmar arms trade 1990-2016: who sold what?

The Use of excessive force against the Rohingya Muslims, led to the formation of the Araka Salvation

Army in 1969 aiming to protect the armless Rohingya Muslims, therefore, the Burmese government

consider them insurgents and after the attack in August 2017, they have been classified them as a

terrorist group.133 But China did not stop selling these weapons to Myanmar, because China considers

what’s happening outside its borders is the other state’s internal issues.

In addition, China has very strong economic ties with Myanmar, the total amount of the Chinese all

foreign investments were $18’554’69 billion until 31st March 2017. See (Diagram No. 4)

The current oil and gas pipelines project, incited demonstrations in Rakhine state because of the

government land-grabbing of hundreds of local, with compensations neither from the government nor

the companies, their attempts were in vain. 134For these reasons, first, China had vetoed against any

potential resolution by the UN Security Council condemning the crimes of the Burmese government

contra the Rohingya Muslims. The last Security Council resolution that China opposed was the

resolution no. S/2007/14, in 12 January 2007.135

133 The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Central Committee for Counter Terrorism, Countering the Financing of Terrorism Working committee. Order No. 1/2017, 1379, M.E, Nay Pyi Ta, 19.09. 2017. Found at: https://mfiu.gov.mm/order-no12017 ; Last accessed: 19/03/2019 134 Aung, M. T. Hundreds in Myanmar Protest Lack of Payment For Land Confiscated For Pipeline Project. Radio Free Asia. 22.03.2018. Found at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/hundreds-in-myanmar-protest-lack-of-payment-for-land-confiscated-for-pipeline-project-03222018133100.htm ; Last accessed: 20/03/2019 135 United Nations Security Council Resolutions, UN Documents for Myanmar. Found at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/myanmar/ ; Last accessed: 21/03/2019

Source: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017/state-major-

arms-transfers-8-graphics

46

Diagram No.4. Major Foreign Investment in Myanmar by Country as at 31st March 2017

Although the conflicts erupted in 2012, 2014, 2016 and finally in August 2017, but the most powerful

international body which “responsible for maintaining the international peace and security”136 was

incapable neither to act in favor of the innocent Rohingya Muslims nor harshly stressing the Burmese

government to end this genocide. Nevertheless, this is the norm of the UN security council when its

five-member permanent states act according to their national interests, just like what happened in

Rwanda, Vietnam and what’s happing now in Syria. However, the failure of the UN Security Council

to take coercive measures against Myanmar government was because the reluctance of both China and

Russia due to their economic interests in Myanmar and precisely due to China’s huge investments in

Rakhine state. Second, China wants to eliminate any western influence in the region where China

considered to be the hegemon in Asia. Third, China is blocking any resolution because China itself has

conflict with its Muslims minority and other human rights violations, therefore any actions will be like

a foot in both camps. Forth, the western bloc has limited impact on the South-East Asia countries in

comparison with China.

In March 2017, the UN Security Council failed to pass a statement drafted by Britain on acts of

violence targeting the Rohingya. In the same month the UN Human Rights Council said it would set up

an independent UN fact-finding commission on violations, but Myanmar rejected any international

136 Article 24. Chapter V. The Security Council. Charter of the United Nations. Found at: http://legal.un.org/repertory/art24.shtml ; Last accessed: 20/03/2019

Source: http://www.massa.net.my/message-by-matrade-trade-

commissioner-in-yangon-myanmar-and-country-feature-on-myanmar/

47

inquiry or any international media access137. One month after the crackdown in Rakhine state, at the

beginning of September 2017, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres,

announced that he had sent proposals to the Security Council to end the violence in Rakhine state,

without disclosing the nature and details of these proposals. 138 In 28th September 2017, China has

offered 150 tons humanitarian aid to the Rohingya Muslims refugees via its embassy in Bangladesh,

but a failure to mention the term "Rohingya" or make any remarks about the provenance of the

refugees139. Furthermore, in November 2017, the Chinese Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Wang Yi

introduced a 3-Phase Solution to address the issues in Rakhine state. 1.The ceasefire on the ground. 2.

Mutual talks between Myanmar-Bangladesh on the resolution for the Rohingya refugees.3. Long-term

development schemes to support poverty alleviation in Rakhine state.140 I see that China intentionally

framing the Rohingyas crisis only as a refugee crisis between Myanmar and Bangladesh, second,

depicting the crisis core issue is due to poverty and lack of development in the state, without

addressing the root causes of the crisis and all the actors, finally, the settlement of the Rohingyas can’t

be realizes while the government and the Chinese company are confiscating the lands of the Rohingya

villages.

3.3 Chinese Investments in Rakhine State

Even though Myanmar has started to diversify its source of foreign investments after the

opening up with the west in 2011, yet China still the dominant investor in Myanmar, Rakhine state is

one of the poorest and least developed regions in Myanmar, with population of 3,118,963.141 Rakhine

state has abundant and untapped natural resources, ranging from oil, natural gas, timber, mining, green

and fertile agricultural lands, in addition to its geostrategic location in the Bengal bay in the

northeastern part of Indian Ocean. As mentioned earlier China is the main trade partner and investor in

Myanmar, the total Chinese investments peaked between 2010 and 2011 It is worth mentioning that

Myanmar will benefit from the deep-water port since Myanmar does not have deep-water port, such

137 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar Concludes visit to Malaysia. The United Nations Office in Geneva. 11.12.2017. Found at: https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/D02A9D963D75A633C12581F3003E126E?OpenDocument ; Last accessed: 27/03/2019 138 Secretary-General Voices Concern Over Reported Myanmar Security Excesses, Urges Calm. Restraint, SG/SM/18662, United Nations, 01.09.2017. Found at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sgsm18662.doc.htm ; Last accessed: 25/03/2019

139 Joy, A. Understanding China’s Response to the Rakhine Crisis. the United States Institute of Peace. Feb. 2018. p.4 140 Wang Yi: China Proposes 3-Phase Solution to Address Issue of the Rakhine State of Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 20.11.2017. Found at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1512592.shtml ; Last accessed: 27/03/2019 141 Ministry of Labour. Immigration and Population, Rakhine State Census Report (Census Report Volume 3-K) The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census. Found at: http://www.dop.gov.mm/en/publications ; Last accessed: 26/03/2019

48

port will significantly.142 The Chinese government is investing in the crude oil and natural gas sectors,

and mainly has three major projects in Rakhine state.

1. Kyaukphyu Deep-sea port, the project located in Kyaukphyu district in north-west Rakhine state at

the Bay of Bengal, CITIC consortium comprises of five Chinese firms and one Thai firm will build and

carry out the project for 50 years possibly renewable for another 25 years.143 it costs $7.3 billion, it is

an investment of three parties China, Thailand and Myanmar government. The facility will have an

annual capacity of 7.8 million tons of bulk cargo. The port project estimated to bring a total of US$6.5

billion in tax revenue. In November 2018 the Chinese and Burmese government signed the framework

agreement.144 It is an entry port and a shortcut route to the maritime infrastructure for China’s “Belt

and Road Initiative”. Additionally, it will easily transport the crude oil shipments from the Middle

East to China, instead of passing through the Strait of Malacca, the world’s busiest shipping route.145

Moreover, China also import other goods from the Middle East countries, especially Saudi Arabia,

United Arab Emirates and Qatar and from other European countries.

4. The Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines: In 2005, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)

the state owned company, signed an agreement worth $2.45 billion, lasts for 30 years, with the

Burmese government for the construction of oil and gas dual pipelines, linking Sittwe city at the

Bengal Bay and the capital of Rakhine state with the city of Kunming in the Chinese province

Yunnan.

The oil pipeline is designed to transport 22 million tons of oil per year, and the gas pipeline is

designed to transport 10-13 billion cubic meters of gas per year. China resumed operations in

September 2013. 146 This project is more important to China than the Kyaukphyu Deep-sea port and

the Myitsone dam, a high Chinese official said “Myitsone dam is only a commercial project by one

Chinese company, but the pipeline project is significant on the national and strategic levels. Therefore,

all measures are being taken to preempt potential risk to the pipelines.”147 See (Map No. 3)

142 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Pathways Multi-Dimensional Review of Myanmar. Vol. 2. In-depth Analysis and Recommendations. OECD Publishing. 2015. p.84. Found at: http://www.oecd.org/countries/myanmar/multi-dimensional-review-of-myanmar-9789264220577-en.htm ; Last accessed: 03/04/2019 143 Kyaukphyu port: What happens next? 09.11.2018, Myanmar Times. Found at:

https://www.mmtimes.com/news/kyaukphyu-port-what-happens-next.html ; Last accessed: 01/04/2019 144 Kyaukphyu authorises Environment and Social Impact Assessment (EISA) but Rakhine committee demands strategic review, Myanmar Water Portal. 15.02.2018. Found at: https://www.myanmarwaterportal.com/news/402-kyaukphyu-authorises-esia-but-rakhine-committee-demands-strategic-review.html ; Last accessed: 04/04/2019 145 Wong, C. Five things you should know about China-backed port in Myanmar, South China Morning Post, 09.05.2017 Found at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2093581/five-things-you-should-know-about-china-backed-port ; Last accessed: 08/04/2019 146 CNPC in Myanmar, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) Found at: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/Myanmar/country_index.shtml; Last accessed: 10/04/2019 147 Sun, Y. (2012), China and the Changing Myanmar. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 31 (4) P. 51-77. p. 69

49

Map No. 3: The Myanmar-China oil and gas as pipelines

3.Industrial zone: this project initiated in 2016 by the consortium is a USS$2.3 billion trading estate.

the zone will cover 100 hectares, will include into areas for agriculture, ecotourism development and

industry.148 The tax revenues of the industrial zone estimated to bring $7.8 billion over a 50-year

period while the annual earning income at full capacity estimated $3.2 billion and about 100,000 job

opportunities will be created to the locals. 149

China’s gigantic investments in Rakhine state are one of the complementary interests between China

and Myanmar, and as for China’s ambitious short term and long-term plans of the Belt and Road

project. First, Yunnan province located in South-west China is one of China’s least developed

provinces due to lack of natural resource and its geographical location in a land-lock area,150 yet,

China’s investments in the neighboring state of Rakhine will increase the economic development and

148 Lo, K. The economic stakes for China in Myanmar’s restive Rakhine. South China Morning Post. 22.09.2017 Found at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2112366/economic-stakes-china-myanmars-restive-rakhine; Last accessed: 27/04/2019 149Lee, Y. Lone, Y.W. China's $10 billion strategic project in Myanmar sparks local ire. Reuters News. 09.06.2017 Found at:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-myanmar-sez/chinas-10-billion-strategic-project-in-myanmar-sparks-

local-ire-idUSKBN18Z327; Last accessed: 30/04/2019 150 Kyaw, A. Chapter 6: China Influence in Myanmar: A Strategic Perspective. Chirathivat, S. Rutchatorn, B. Devendrakumar, A. China's Rise in Mainland Asean: New Dynamics and Changing Landscape. World Scientific. 2019. P. 125.

50

revive the social life in Yunnan. Second, Daniel O’Neill argued that the most important geopolitical

Chines project in Myanmar is not the discovery and production of oil and natural gas in Rakhine state,

but rather the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines linking Sittwe the capital city of Rakhine state

and Kunming the capital city of Yunnan province, which will transport the oil imports from the

Middle East and African states to China bypassing the strait of Malacca.151 But it is the KyaukPhyu

deep-sea water port is highly important transit to the Belt and Road Initiative project and through this

port China will avoid passing through Malacca strait and will save extra transportation time as well as

transit tax fees, also, it will link the trade routes with the East-West Economic Corridor. Third, the

likelihood of Chinese military presence in KyaukPhyu port in the future is quite possible, although

Myanmar 2008 constitution prohibits any foreign military presence in its territory. On the other side

the government of Myanmar, eagerly wants to take advantage from the Chinese economic

development and technological advancement to achieve its own economic and social development, the

lack of a deep-water port affected the industrial sector in the country. Therefore, ever since 1990’s

Myanmar paid more attention to the establishment of the industrial zones in order to boost the local

manufacturers to serve the demand of the local markets, to attain equitable share of development in the

different states and to encourage the domestic investments. But, the capacity of the existing industrial

zones only serves local markets and require internarial level facilities, consequently, resulted in the

decline of Myanmar’s manufacturing sector. However, after the decision of economic reform the

government recognized the necessity to invest in the infrastructures by developing industrial zones

which will foster the country’s economy, so, they will attract foreign direct investment (FDI),

exporting and importing goods. 152 Generally, a deep-sea port is essential for the industrial

development of the country, the benefit is in the depth which provides a capacity to store heavy loaded

ships, facilitate the movement of the imports and exports and it is a logistic gateway for other land

locked countries in the region. In order to achieve this objective Myanmar collaborated with its main

trade partner The People’s Republic of China in the establishment of the new KyaukPhyu highly

developed international deep-sea port and special economic zone.

Nevertheless, the anti-Chinese investments of the opposing Burmese local communities and the civil

society organizations claimed that these mega projects will affect the environment and will hinder the

socio-economic development of the region, where the locals depend on the traditional occupation of

farming and fishing. Moreover, the Burmese government has always adopted the policy of the land

confiscation ever since the military regime, the land grabbing and the forced displacement of the locals

are policies used the former military regime to exploit the lands in development projects such as in the

states of Kachin and Shan northern Myanmar. Additionally, Myanmar government also has concerns

151 D. C. O’Neill, Chapter 8: Evolving Institutions and Declining Chinese Influence in Myanmar, Dividing ASEAN and Conquering the South China Sea: China’s Financial Power Projection, Hong Kong University Press, 2018, p. 194. 152 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Pathways Multi-dimensional Review of Myanmar Volume 2. In-depth Analysis and Recommendations: Volume 2. In-depth Analysis and Recommendations, OECD Publishing, 2015, p.84

51

towards these huge projects, that Myanmar does not need such costly projects due to the fact that

China used to overwhelm the governments of least development countries with project with high debt,

Myanmar’s concern is from the debt burden in the future, Myanmar tries to avoid the same dept-trap

that Sri Lanka fell in on the other side Chinese officials attempts to assure the Burmese government

that it won’t amount debt burden. At the end, although, these projects will profit both countries, yet,

the protests of the local communities under the pro-democratic government and the Rohingya conflict

may threaten the stability and security of the state and consequently halt or postpone the

commencement of the projects. China three-phase peace intervention in Rakhine, because China fear

further conflict escalation which will harm the stability and security of the region and for the future.

While Myanmar is in need for both the diplomatic and economic support of China in the UN Security

council and its economic, agricultural and military technologies to boost its economy.

Dr. Than Myint, Union Minister for Commerce and Chair of the Central Working Committee for the

Special Economic Zone. Myanmar has grown wary of Chinese investment and has downsized some of

its projects in the country.153

Despite the fact that both the Chinese government and the NLD party led by Suu Kyi have different

political ideologies yet, the interdependence and cooperation are growing between both of the two

governments specially after the Rohingya conflict escalation in August 2017, because China perceive

the international interdependence and cooperation are parts of today’s international politics among

states China deals with it according to what serves its national interests. The condemnation from the

international community against Myanmar government resulted in the European Union decision to

apply restrictive measures on 29th of April 2019, the European Union prolonged the embargo on arms

and equipment that can be used for internal repression, until the 30th of April 2020.154 This reaction

from the EU represents the conflicting interests between the EU countries and Myanmar, which is the

violation of the human rights of the Rohingya ethnic minority.

153 Exclusive: Myanmar scales back Chinese-backed port project due to debt fears – official. Reuters News. 02.08.2018. Found at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-china-port-exclusive/exclusive-myanmar-scales-back-chinese-backed-port-project-due-to-debt-fears-official-idUSKBN1KN106 ; Last accessed: 29/04/2019 154 Myanmar/Burma: Council prolongs sanctions. Council of the European Union. 29.04.2019. Found at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/04/29/myanmar-burma-council-prolongs-sanctions/ Last accessed: 02/05/2019

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The classical Realism theory used to investigate the behavior of the main actors in this research,

China, Myanmar, the Rohingyas. The investigation resulted in comprehensive explanation for the

both China and Myanmar national interests and what instruments used to secure the national

interests of China and Myanmar. Also, the theory explained China’s chaining political behavior in

response to the changes in Myanmar’s domestic polices and its foreign policy plans, through the

theory that was explainable as each state was struggling for power and survival because the

international system is anarchic and this anarchy resulted in a self-help relation particularly from

China’s side. The theory was quite relevant and it explained the behavior of China towards the

Rohingya conflict and the Rohingyas, because realism theory only recognizes the nation state as

the only international actor in the international political stage, therefore, China considers the

Rohingya conflict as a domestic issue in Myanmar and the internationalizing of the conflict is an

infringement into Myanmar’s state sovereignty. However, realism theory does not recognize the

importance of any other actor in the international relations apart from the nation states, therefore,

the position of China from the Rohingya conflict is perceived as an internal issue that only the

government of Myanmar should solve it. Moreover, the theory also explained the struggle for

power between the international and regional powers against China, such as India, Pakistan, Japan

and the United states of America. The theory does not give attention to the efforts of the United

Nations Organizations and other international organizations in the mitigation of the Rohingya

conflict and the Myanmar’s government acceptance of the recommendation of the UN fact-finding

mission led by the former security general Kofi Annan.

2. The theory explained China’s behavior towards the Rohingya conflict as a threat to its primary

interest which includes the Chinese investment in Rakhine state, the security and stability of its

borders, another threat to the permanent interest in Myanmar which includes the Chinese leverage

on Myanmar. The theory defined national interests at minimum is the state survival at the

maximum is the state power as Morgenthau defined it, also, it illustrates the types of national

interests and how national interests are demonstrated in China’s state foreign policy and the main

driver of the relations among China and Myanmar are based on identical and complementary

national interests. Therefore, there are several instruments adopted in order to achieve these

interests, weather through soft or hard power instruments. Power is a centric concept in realism

theory, as Morgenthau said that the state is determine by its military and economic power.

3. Because there is tendency in the non-democratic state to transform from military regime to a pro-

democratic or democratic regime is increasing but most of the times the change or reforms come

with a deadly price or non-peaceful means. Myanmar’s transformation model is one of few

peaceful transitions comparted to some African states who were government by military juntas, the

experience of their transition to democracy were deadly and costly. Myanmar’s reforms were

53

partial peaceful transformation, there are internal and external factors that resulted in the

democratization of the country and voluntary initiated by the military junta, the international

isolation that Myanmar lived in for decades and heavy dependence on China, in the world of

globalization and inter-dependence Myanmar could not stay in that isolation forever and under the

Chinese pressure. Myanmar’s reforms were genuine and fast, in addition to that the arrival of Suu

Kyi to the government also played crucial role towards the opening to the regional and

international stage. Although, these reforms positively affected the lives of the Burmese people, yet

the only groups which did not benefit from these transformations. This issue raises the question of

the importance of the human rights promotion and social justice as two highly important

components of a democratic state, because Myanmar still suffer from several ethnic armed groups

fighting against the government in different states but the Rohingya conflict attracted the attention

of the international community due to its brutality and massive killing and the forced displacement

to the Rohingyas. Unless the Burmese government reaches a consensus with the armed groups, the

country will not enjoy peace, stability and development, and above all the maximum level of

democratic state, which will improve it image in the international community and to attract more

foreign investors who require not only a country full of untapped natural resources but first and

foremost security and safety.

4. During the past years of the Rohingya conflict the situation remained the same, this ethnic

cleansing happening every now with different scale of atrocities led to the death of thousands of

innocent Rohingya Muslims. Although, since the end of 2015 the new government leadership is

more democratic which led by the leader of the opposition Aun San Suu Kyi, who worked

extensively on the political and economic reforms, yet the situation remained the same for the

Rohingya Muslims, stateless and oppressed, it became even worse after the latest massacre in

August 2017. Myanmar has other internal armed conflicts in Kachin, Kayah and Shan states, the

insurgents want autonomy. However, in October 2015 the government successfully signed the

Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with more than eight insurgent groups. Therefore, we have

witnessed the new government wiliness to negotiate with insurgents, this would probably be a good

approach for the negation with the Araka Salvation Army if the government is willing to end the

Rohingya crisis. Because the Burmese government has the strongest position, this makes it the

principle responsible for ending this asymmetric conflict, in order to prove to the world that under

the new democratic regime, Myanmar is capable to solve its internal issues for the best interest of

the whole nation and without any outside interference, as a consequence that will attract many

countries to invest and establish fruitful common relations, apart from China and its negative

influences not only in Rakhine state but all over Myanmar to diminish gradually.

54

5. The reason of China’s evolving political role towards the Rohingya conflict is due to China’s

foreign policy adjustment plans after Myanmar government internal reforms and its relations with

the western world precisely the United State of America. China responded to the reforms by using

several instruments to secure its national interests. The reforms in Myanmar directly threatening

the Chinese investments in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine state, another threat will be extended

to China’s one partly political regime. On the other hand, China as an essential third-party actor in

this conflict, has been playing a decisive role in the incitement of the Rohingya Muslims fate, first

by vetoing all the UN security council resolutions against the Burmese government. Second

because China want to secure its ongoing mega projects in Rakhine states. Nevertheless, as long as

China is unwilling to intervene coercively to resolve or end this conflict nor receiving any refugees

from the Rohingya Muslims, or even allowing the international community to aid in solving this

conflict, the situation will escalate and de-escalate until all Rohingyas will be executed or forever

live as refugees, IDPs or in diaspora around the world. The continuous denial of the government of

Myanmar of the core problem of the Rohingya conflict won’t help to solve the conflict over time,

but it is getting even worst, moreover, claiming that the core problem of the conflict is due to the

underdevelopment and poverty in Rakhine state is not believable plea to the international

community anymore. It is on the best interest of China to change its foreign policy towards

Myanmar, seeing that Myanmar now is in a transformation phase towards democratic ruling

seeking the best for its own citizens, so, event like the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in 2011, it

is likely to happen in the future in other mutual projects like the demonstrations of the locals in

Rakhine state against the oil and gas pipelines project, due to the confiscations of their lands

without any compensations from the Chinese company or the Burmese government. Therefore, for

China to achieve its ambitious Belt and Road project she must consider the environmental and

economic impact resulting from the implementation of the projects, Myanmar concerns from the

Chinese debt trap of the mega project, like what happened in Sir Lanka, another issues that China

should consider is the reduction of the communal tension arising from these projects, since it is not

only Myanmar people but other countries of the belt and road project witnessed anti-Chinese

demonstrations . The Belt and Road initiative is not just an initiative that seeks to facilitate and

expand the volume of trade between the regions and countries participating in this initiative, by

removing the physical barriers to this trade and reducing its costs as well as developmental

dimensions through important infrastructure development projects and providing the necessary

funding, the initiative involves potential economic gains for the developing countries, as they

include development projects alongside trade. Moreover, China can play a positive role together

with the international community by implementing the United Nations fact-finding mission on

Myanmar led by the former Secretary General Kofi Annan recommendations which the Myanmar

government accepted and promised to follow its guidelines.

55

6. The promotion of democracy and liberal values, such as freedom of expression, political prisoners

release, rights to development and human rights by the western world in Myanmar have positive

influence, yet, Myanmar could not successfully adopt the rights of development and the human

rights of the minority ethnic groups. Other Liberal values concerned China because it affected the

bilateral relations of China and Myanmar and the Chinese economic interests. The promotion of

human rights as a precondition for peace that determines the relations between Myanmar with the

western states as a foreign affairs priority is pushing Myanmar back to the Chinese block, specially

that Myanmar has been strengthening its relations with China after the Rohingya conflict in 2017.

Because in the case of Myanmar even when the United States of America and the European Union

lifted the sanctions, it was China and other Asian states who benefited the most, because the

European and American investors they acknowledged the fact that any changes in the human rights

issues inside Myanmar will severely affect their investments and their security. The reward from

the western countries should be compatible with the reforms inside Myanmar, since the economic

sanctions proved to be ineffective and isolated Myanmar from the rest of the world. The

intervention of the international community in general supposed to encourage both the peaceful

resolution of Myanmar’s internal conflicts together with the acceptance of Myanmar in the

international community as a pro-democratic state in the transition phase which achieved genuine

changes. Myanmar represents a model of peaceful political and economic transformation towards

liberal democracy, it is quite relevant to study the case of Myanmar as one of the few countries

where the military Junta voluntarily lead the government transformation towards civil democratic

state. As for China’s evolving role in Myanmar, China is a county that is capable to adopt its

foreign policy and deal with all types of political regimes, democratic such as the United Stated of

America China’s biggest trading partner and rival. and no-democratic.

7. In conclusion, the resolution of the Rohingya conflict starts with the recognition of all the disputing

parties right and duties. The Myanmar government position from the Rohingya people is

complicated, they don’t recognize the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens, yet they agreed to repatriate

the refugees from Bangladesh. Therefore, Rakhine state will not be a peaceful state unless all

conflicting parties come to the negation table with international mediation accepted from both

sides. Additionally, if China keeps it reluctance to interfere negatively in the resolution of the

Rohingya conflict, soon Rakhine will become a fertile land for terrorist and extremists who will

harm every actor who participated in the execution of the Rohingya, consequently, this will not

only jeopardize the investments in Rakhine state but it will risk all the Chinese investments in

Myanmar, the future plans of China’s Belt and Road initiative which Myanmar is a key state to the

trade route, eventually it will threaten the regional stability and security. For these reasons, and

since China has an influence on Myanmar’s government both they can work together to achieve

collective security interests. Otherwise if both Myanmar and China keep oppressing the Rohingyas

the conflict may escalate again, since many terrorist groups in Asia have contacts with the Arakan

56

Rohingya Salvation Army, and some academic scholars discussing the movement of the terrorist

groups moving from the Middle East to Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and

Bangladesh, after the defeat of the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria. Economic and political

transformation are one of the elements that might improve the lives of the Burmese people yet, the

communal discrimination against the minority groups will incite the internal conflicts inside

Myanmar, as long as Myanmar government extensively oppress the Rohingya people.

8. The reasons behind China’s changing political role towards the Rohingya conflict are:

1. China tries to protect its economic interests in Myanmar, the conflict might spill over and threatens

the three mega investments projects in Rakhine state, the Kyaukphyu Deep-sea port which is an

entry port and a shortcut route to the maritime infrastructure for China’s Belt and Road Initiative,

the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines, the oil pipeline is designed to transport 22 million tons

of oil per year, and the gas pipeline is designed to transport 10-13 billion cubic meters of gas per

year, is the most important among the three projects because it will secure China’s energy security,

the industrial economic zone, is a complementary to the trade route and the deep-sea port and

which will provide about 100,000 job opportunities to the locals, this will fulfil China’s resolution

to the conflict since it perceives that underdevelopment of the conflict core problems.

2. The conflict eruption will threaten the lives of the Chinese employees and the security and stability

of Rakhine.

3. China striving for access to the Indian ocean through Rakhine state, so the Chinese imports and

exports can avoid passing through the Strait of Malacca where 80% of China’s oil passing through

it. Kyaukphyu Deep-sea port will provide a safe and short route for the Chinese trade.

4. Preventing the western countries intervention in the resolution of the Rohingya Conflict, because

China strongly disagree on the internationalization of the Rohingya conflict.

5. China will all not approve any UN resolution that condemns Myanmar’s brutal actions toward the

Rohingya, because inside China, the Chinese government extremely oppressing the Uyghurs

Muslim minority group in Xinjiang autonomous region.

6. Rakhine state has a valuable geostrategic position for China’s Belt and Road project, because more

than 25% of Yunnan state trade with Myanmar’s neighboring states, and the trade will flourish

9. After the investigation the research main hypothesis: The transformation of China’s role towards

the Rohingya conflict has evolved due to its geopolitical and economic interests in Rakhine state,

has been confirmed by the analysis conduced to China’s response to Myanmar’s government

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internal democratic transformation politically, economically and socially together with the changes

in Myanmar’s foreign affairs orientation.

58

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