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Introduction

In the end of 1970s terrorism appearedin the considerations of politicians andsocial scientists as one of the global prob-lems. The events of September 11, 2001made it an even more important phenom-enon, the eradication of which becameone of the purposes of the strongest stateof the world. The United States has hencegiven a new sense of purpose for its leadof the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-tion and has adopted a concept accord-ing to which friends and enemies are de-cided upon. Now everybody seems toagree that terrorism is one of the greatest

problems of post-Cold War internationalpolitics. However, the agreement on whatexactly this problem entails, on what ter-rorism actually is, is much more difficultto reach. While lengthy books have beenconcentrated on the discussion of theproblem of its definition1 , these efforts didnot result in any substantial advances in theresolution of this issue.

The purpose of this article is not to cre-ate a different definition of terrorism, toadd it to the stockpile of the existing prod-ucts of the scientific efforts, but to high-light the main ideas and problems in theattempts to defining terrorism on the sideof both representatives of the state � politi-

cians, lawmakers, administrators, etc. � andon the side of social scientists. Hence, inthe first part of the article some of the defi-nition problems as they appear in the po-litical milieu will be presented. The second,lengthier part of the article, will deal withthe definition of terrorism in a scientificdiscourse, trying to assess critically the vari-ous elements associated with terrorism andtheir possible usage in the definitions.

Defining terrorism in thepolitical discourse

The increased importance of terrorismfor the policy stance of the governments

Defining Terrorism in the Political andAcademic Discourse

By Asta Maskaliunaite*

* Asta Maskaliunaite, a graduate of Vilnius University, is currently a PhD student at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest (Hungary).

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as well as the need to legally pursue theperpetrators of the alleged terrorist actsresulted in quite a few official definitionsof terrorism. The recent change in the struc-ture and purpose of the American foreignpolicy, aimed at wiping out terrorism fromthe face of the earth, has made this prob-lem even more important. If friends andfoes are distinguished according to theirstance vis-à-vis terrorism (as opponents orsupporters of the terrorist groups), thedefinition of terrorism is the crucial in-gredient of the formation of policy direc-tions towards the countries of the world.The ethics of politics would require that aneutral description of the phenomenonwould apply, and according to that descrip-tion the division would be made. How-ever, as it is rather obvious, this is rarelythe case in the real world. The issue of de-fining terrorism is one of the best examplesof the tendency to include particular in-terests in seemingly neutral descriptions ofwhat is acceptable or not in politics.

Relating the concept itself to the spe-cific interest of defining parties is prob-ably the main reason why a comprehen-

sive definition of the phenomenon can-not be reached. Two examples of concretedefinitions influenced by conflicting in-terests are the descriptions of the actionsof the Palestinians and those of Israel.While in the West there was a great con-troversy about how to call the actions ofAriel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister,and Palestinian suicide bombers, to theleaders of Islamic nations who gatheredin Kuala Lumpur at the beginning ofApril, 2002, Israel is clearly a terroriststate. The view on Palestinian actions,however, is more ambiguous. On the onehand, it is stated that all the attacks againstcivilians should be considered terrorism.As Mohamad Mahathir, the MalaysianPrime Minister, stated: �Whether theattackers are acting on their own or onthe orders of their government; whetherthey are regulars or irregulars, if the attackis against civilians then they must beconsidered terrorists.�

On the other hand, another statement,that of Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian For-eign Minister, implies that the Palestin-ians are fighting for the right cause: �The

Palestinians are resisting the occupationof their land. It is quite different fromthe terror attacks that were carried out inNew York, which the Organization of theIslamic Conference and most of Muslimcountries in the world condemned.�

These two statements are a good exam-ple of how violence tends to appear morelegitimate if its ultimate goals are empha-sized, while it seems to be less legitimatewhen only used as means to attract atten-tion. The different ways of emphasisingcan be very well used for both trying tojustify some people in their attacks andto condemn others.

This particular example is not intendedto show that the policy of Islamic coun-tries towards terrorism and that their as-sessment of the phenomenon is exception-ally ambiguous and somewhat hypocriti-cal. In the West one can also find a greatvariety of such examples. The same con-flict between Israelis and Palestinians isviewed pretty one-sidedly in this part ofthe world; only the angle of this view isthe opposite of that expressed by theConference of Islamic Nations.

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The ongoing war on terrorism and theimportance the United States put on theeradication of this phenomenon led somecountries to present their struggle withinternal problems as a fight against ter-rorism. As Sonika Gupta writes, �theChinese have successfully renegotiated theUS definition of terrorism to includemovements for self-determination�2 . Sucha definition, according to the author, mayaffect not only the country�s stance to-wards violent East Turkestan Islamic Mili-tants but can have a very harmful effecton the peaceful Tibetan self-rule movementas well. Having in mind such examples, itseems that William Connolly has graspedthe relations between the states and theterrorists the best, when writing that:

Terrorism allows, as the state system isconstituted, the state and the interstate system toprotect the logic of sovereignty in the internationalsphere while veiling their inability to modifysystemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents; it also provides domestic constituen-cies with agents of evil to explain the vagueexperiences of danger, frustration, andineffectiveness in taming global contingency.3

Some states devise a list of organiza-tions, which they consider being terror-ist organisations, trying to avoid the prob-lem of definition, but even here the in-terests of the state and their appraisal ofallies and foes sneak in. Brian Whitetakergives some examples of such a �double-standard� game from the British anti-ter-rorism law, which lists the organisationsconsidered to be terrorist and thus illegalin Britain:

� the Kurdistan Workers Party � active inTurkey � is banned, but not the KDP or PUK,which are Kurdish organizations active in Iraq.Among opposition groups, the Iranian People�sMujahedeen is banned, but not its Iraqiequivalent, the INC, which happens to befinanced by the United States.4

According to some observers the sameproblem could be noticed in the UnitedStates� treatment of Afghanistan. DennisHans, for example, argued that the Bushadministration was using terrorists to winover other terrorists in the recentAfghanistan war. The author quotes aHuman Rights Watch report stating thatin ten years since 1992 various factions

of the Northern Alliance killed tens ofthousands of civilians, engaged in rape,torture, summary executions, etc.5 . Thus,in the political context saying that thereare no �good� or �bad� terrorists (all ofthem are bad) makes perfect sense. Peopleemploying violence would not be called�terrorists�, if their aims were approved.

In the official definitions, even if onelooks only at the �technical� aspects ofterrorism, i.e. ignores the motives of itsperpetrators, the motives which are notalways clear (when, for example, no oneclaimed the responsibility for the attacks)or hard to classify (for example, whetherthe act is committed because of political,religious or, actually, economic consid-erations), the decision of what to includeinto a definition and what to leave asideis influenced strongly by the interests ofthe states. Brian Whitaker, by analysingthe US government report on terrorismwrites that:

Another essential ingredient [of terrorism](you might think) is that terrorism is calculatedto terrorise the public or a particular section ofit. The American definition does not mention

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spreading terror at all, because that wouldexclude attacks against property. It is, after all,impossible to frighten inanimate object. Amonglast year�s [1999] attacks, 152 were directedagainst a pipeline in Colombia, which is ownedby multinational oil companies. Such attacksare of concern to the United States and so adefinition is required which allows them to becounted.6

Such factors cause many authors to bevery sceptical about the possibilities todefine the terrorist phenomenon in aneutral manner, especially in political con-text. As Richard Drake puts it: �As a rule,terrorism is the name we give to theviolence of people we do not like orsupport; for the violence of people wedo like or support, we find other names.�7

Defining terrorism insocial sciences

The scientific discourse did not escapethe problems associated with essentiallybiased definitions of terrorism either.According to Schmid and Jongman the�authors have spilled almost as much ink

as the actors of terrorism have spilledblood�8 in trying to assess different fea-tures of the phenomenon and of the state�sresponse to it since the 1970s, when theproblem of terrorism became prettyacute.9 However, as the term became usedfor a wide range of spheres of activitiesconfusion over the question of whatterrorism really is increased substantially.And such confusion was sometimes affect-ing research as well, a situation that couldnot be seen favourably. To quote Schmidagain: �While the language has politicallegitimacy functions � and legal andofficial definitions of terrorism as well aspublic discourse reflect this � social scienceanalysts in academia should attempt tocreate and project their ownterminology.�10

As could be seen in the previous part,the definition of terrorism in the politi-cal discourse is greatly influenced by theinterests of the states. These problems tendto influence the scientific discourse aswell. Some authors argue that �� nocommonly agreed definition can inprinciple be reached, because the very

process of definition is in itself part of awider contestation over ideologies orpolitical objectives.�11

Such a statement is a weighty one andit is proven by the fact that even thoughthere are constant attempts to create acomprehensive definition of terrorism,such an enterprise was not completelysuccessful.

However, there is an argument in lit-erature that, while it is hardly possible toget rid of the normative connotations ofthe term in everyday language, in the sci-entific discourse it might be possible tocreate a certain definition of the notionusing more or less technical terms. This iswhat distinguishes scientific language fromthat of everyday life � it is a languagethrough which one can dispassionatelydescribe the most passionate events ofhuman life. Thus, an election campaignmay acquire the meaning of life-and-deathstruggle for their participants, the sameas football matches seem highly emotion-ally charged for the fans of the teams, butit is possible to narrate these events with-out such passions, using rather neutral

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ideas. Terrorism itself is, of course, a moreproblematic concept. Contrary to thephenomena mentioned above, terrorismactually is connected to life-and-deathstruggle, it actually implies the creationof deepest fears in the minds of the oneswho encounter it. Therefore the need ofa dispassionate conceptualisation of ter-rorism is even more acute.

Hence, in this part of the article, theproblem of conceptualising the phenom-enon will be presented. For this reason,firstly the historical understanding of theterm �terrorism� will be shortly presented.Next, I will analyse the main elements of apossible definition of terrorism and finally,some �normative� questions of thedefinition of terrorism will be addressed.

History of the term

Some authors trace the appearance ofterrorism back to Jewish Zealot�s move-ment (66-73 AD) when the sicarii, in theirattempt to drive the Romans out of Pal-estine, were using rather unorthodoxmeans of violence for those times (likemurders in the midst of the crowds), while

trying to force the moderate Jews into afiercer opposition against occupation andthe Romans themselves to leave.12 Later thephenomenon is said to have occurred inanother sect � the Assassins (11th-13th c.) -who were also using many techniques similarto those of contemporary terrorists, andwho were attempting to reach their goalsby a long campaign of intimidation.

However, these situations describe a so-called pre-history of the idea of terror,while the roots of modern terrorism andthe appearance of the concept itself intothe political lexicon lie in the events ofthe French Revolution. Like the revolu-tion itself, the concept of terror gained avery controversial assessment from the verybeginning of its application. For the ad-herents of revolution it was an unfortu-nate, but necessary part of a revolution-ary struggle. For its adversaries it was abrutality, as unnecessary as the revolutionitself.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasizedthat the primary conceptualisation of ter-ror came from the revolutionaries them-selves. Considering intimidation and vio-

lence to be a neutral weapon, in the sensethat it could be used against the �enemiesof freedom�, but also by them to sup-press its advances13 , robespierrists soughtto give a specific meaning to their terror.Out of this came the emphasis on the aimsof this strategy as opposed to the means,and the emphasis on its virtue, as the truestrategy of revolution with terror only asits emanation employed by necessity. AsRobespierre put it:

Terror is nothing else than swift, severe,inflexible justice, hence, it is an emanation ofvirtue, it is not a particular principle, but aconsequence of a general principle of democracyapplied for the most pressing needs of thecountry.14 (my ranslation)

Jacobins proudly called their rule �reignof terror� and themselves � terrorists.Their actions were meant to intimidateall the enemies of the revolution, to putfear into their hearts and minds. This as-pect of the Jacobin terror made it inti-mately related to the generations of ter-rorists that were yet to come.

In addition, terror, as the revolutionitself, had to stand the test of legality that

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the adversaries of revolutionaries bothinside and outside the country wereputting forward. A solution to this prob-lem was found through envisioning ter-ror as an extra-legal endeavour. As DavidRapoport writes:

The Revolution established a new principleof legitimacy (�The Will of the People�) whichdid not simply absolved its agents from adheringto existing moral and legal rules, even thoseauthorized by the People; it also obligated themsometimes to do so. ... History sometimes sup-plants the People as the legitimising source; ineither case, the idea of a transcendent entitythat cannot be subjected to the rules in theordinary sense of the term, even rules that theentity supposedly creates, remains the same.15

This new principle of legitimacy, to-gether with the idea of general will, whichis not the will of all people taken togetherbut something permanent and objectiveas it appears in the writings of Rousseau,shapes many of the ideas of terrorists to-day as well. The idea that the general willis not graspable by everyone but can beapprehended by some people who then

become real prophets, allows a rather easylegitimisation of the terrorist activities.Like the French revolutionaries in the 18th

century, many contemporary terrorists seethemselves as carrying out the will of Godor the prescription of History and this issupposed to legitimise their activities.

Furthermore, belonging to the realmof �historical necessity�, to use a Marxistterm, any revolution (terrorism itself is�commonly, but not invariably revolu-tionary�16 ) comes from outside the legalsystem existing in any particular country.It is most commonly perceived as a non-legal act, with its opponents calling itillegal while its adherents perceive it asextra-legal, beyond the legality of old codesof laws. It cannot be put into the bracketsof the system it opposes, because itslegitimacy or illegitimacy comes from avery different level of justification. Thesame circumstances that make terrornecessary give it this kind of legitimacy,not that of laws, but a legitimacy of thewill of the People. Terror, thus, appearsin the beginning as an emanation ofvirtue, a certain expression of the

working of general will and an extra-legalphenomenon. It is to preserve thesefeatures in the minds of consecutivegenerations of terrorists as well.

Not taking into much considerationthe subtleties of the Jacobin philosophyof terror, the dictionaries of the time gavea definition of terrorism as a �système,régime de terreur�.17 Consequently, a ter-rorist was seen as �anyone who attemptedto further his views by a system of coer-cive intimidation�.18

Unfortunately, the whole perceptionof terrorism was substantially clouded bythe political struggles both before and afterthe Thermidorian coup, which put an endto the so-called Robespierre�s dictatorshipand to the reign of terror itself. This dis-cussion about the term followed theconcept along the lines of time, makingit rather ambivalent at present. For itseems to raise the obvious question aboutwhose definition we are to take as ourguidance. Is it to be a robespierrist un-derstanding of terror being intimatelyrelated to virtue, an emanation of high-est principles of democracy, justice, and

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freedom, an extra-legal activity, to bejudged by different standards of legalityas well as morality than the actions of theestablished authorities? Or is it to be ananti-robespierrist conceptualisation of thenotion as an illegal, unnecessary brutalityand a systematic use of violence to spreadsomeone�s views? Thus, while some authorsare proposing to use the historical devel-opment of the concept for the guide indeciding what terrorism is, this endeav-our may not be very successful. Further-more, the structure as well as the rhetoricof terrorism has changed significantlyover time, so that the usage of its histori-cal understanding may not be a goodguidance for analysis.

Hence, in defining terrorism we shouldconcern ourselves more with the possi-bility of depicting the contemporaryphenomenon, instead of its historicalprovenance. The historicity of the con-cept remains important and informativefor the overall analysis of the phenom-enon, but in definitions themselves a dif-ferent strategy of assessment should beused. Therefore, in the next section the

main elements of the concept of terror-ism in the social sciences will be criticallyexamined.

Main elements of thedefinition of terrorism

While conducting his most comprehen-sive study so far on terrorism, Alex Schmidpaid considerable attention to the problemof defining the phenomenon. He made asummary of the twenty-two main elementsappearing in 109 scholarly definitions.There is no need to discuss all the elementsof these definitions in this article, for some

of them are pretty closely related to eachother and do not bring essential insightsinto the problem, and others are rarelymentioned in the works. Therefore, onlyseven most commonly used ones will bediscussed, assessing the problems related totheir inclusion into the definition. Theseelements are presented in Table 1 togetherwith the frequency of their use in differentdefinitions.

Violence or force

Violence is the most often used elementand the one that is most clearly associated

tnemelE ycneuqerF

ecrof,ecneloiV.1 %5.38

lacitiloP.2 %56

dezisahpmerorret,raeF.3 %15

taerhT.4 %74

snoitcaer)detapicitna(dnastceffe).hcysP(.5 %5.14

noitaitnereffidtegrat-mitciV.6 %5.73

noitcadezinagro,citametsys,dennalp,evisopruP.7 %23

Table 1. Seven main elements used in the definitions of terrorism

From: Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, databases, theories, andliterature. Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988, p.5.

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with terrorism. Most of the definitionsuse this concept in their depictions ofterrorists. However, not all definitionsmention it, and not all those which domention it use it in the same way. Thefirst question that arises from acharacterisation as the one used bySchmid is whether violence and force canbe equated. If one goes deeper into themeaning of those two words, it becomesquite obvious that such an equation ishardly possible. The connotations of thesetwo words are different. While forcedesignates something which is in a senseapproved, the usage of a term �violence�gives a very different normativesuggestion. Violence by definition is illegalor unjust.19 As Adrian Guelke writes inthis respect, ��characterisation of anaction as violent also usually entailsdisapproval and implies that it isillegitimate. Legitimate violence, if notquite an oxymoron, is usually describedby another word, such as �force�.�20

Thus, it could be said that the rela-tionship between the two terms is hardlysynonymous. One of them has to be cho-

sen to describe the phenomenon of ter-rorism. The choice between the two ele-ments depends, of course, on the research-er�s opinion. However, considering thecombinations of words that appear in thiscontext, it should be possible to say whichword would be preferable to another. Inmany definitions the terms �violence� or�force� are combined with �illegitimate�,�unorthodox�, etc. These words say whatthe essence of the term �violence� alreadyimplies. Therefore, it could be said thatthe usage of the word �violence� couldbe preferred in the definition of terror-ism, as it describes in one word whatwould otherwise have to be said in a com-bination of at least two.

The other question that arises in rela-tion to this element of the definition iswhether it is a necessary element. Thereseems to be little disagreement about that.Terrorism is seen as a form of violence,while the other characteristics of it are usedessentially to distinguish it from otherforms of violence. However, as mentionedbefore, it does not appear in all the defini-tions. As one researcher on terrorism

emphasised, �terrorists want many peoplewatching, not many people dead.� There-fore, it seems that violence is not a neces-sary ingredient of the terrorist strategy.

For example, in a definition of R.P.Hoffman, one finds neither violence norforce. He defines terrorism as:

� a purposeful human political activity whichis directed towards the creation of a generalclimate of fear, and is designed to influence, inways desired by the protagonist, other humanbeings and, through them, some course ofevents.21

According to this definition fear (fromwhich the word �terrorism� itself derivesits meaning) can be created also throughother types of actions, not only throughviolent ones. Threats, which appear as thefourth most often mentioned element inthe definitions of terrorism, can be givenas an example here. Engagement in violentactivities themselves is not necessary forthe creation of a climate of fear, if thethreat of violence is evident enough andis regarded as such by those the terroristswant to terrorise. However, it could alsobe claimed that the credibility of such

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threats is more often than not based onthe previous actions, which in this casewould be violent. Therefore, a certainagreement can be reached: that violenceis indeed a necessary ingredient in thedefinition of terrorism.

�Political� violence

The element of �political� appears quiteoften in the definitions of terrorism. Thereare, however, certain problems arising fromthe use of this term as well. Some authorsargue that stating that terrorism is only�political� is not enough. They claim thatthere is also religious terrorism, which hasdifferent aims and reasons that are notpolitical and therefore should bedistinguished from the so-called �old�,ideological terrorism of the 1970s. StevenLukes and Nadia Urbinati in their article�Words matter� claim that �[t]he newterrorism is completely different because ofits religious character�. They also add that:

[t]hey [the al Qaeda] are unlike the terror-ists of the past, such as the Red Brigades or theIRA (or even Hezbollah), who speak the

language of their victims and use violent meansto achieve political ends that are contestable butnot obscure.22 (Lukes, Urbinati, 2001)

It is also claimed that there can be�criminal� terrorism, which is closely re-lated to ordinary criminal activities. Forinstance, the idea of �narcoterrorism�could be related to such a notion. AsDavid Campbell writes, this concept en-tails two things:

The power of �narcoterrorism� as a concept isthat it subsumes under one banner a number ofideas, including the assertion that guerrillamovements finance their operations largelythrough drug trafficking, and the more believableargument that the principals in the drug industryemploy extreme violence.23

In this sense terrorism is not politicalbut just criminal, e.g. a part of the drugtrafficking industry. Having in mind suchexamples of the usage of the term, someauthors claim that one needs to add�criminal� to the definition of terrorism.

The argument that one has to includethe epithets of �religious� or �criminal�

in the definition of terrorism, however,can be rather easily refuted. First of all,the so-called �new�, religious terrorists alsohave very clear political goals (e.g. crea-tion of the Palestinian state and removalof the US troops from Saudi Arabia). Sec-ondly, it could be also said that terroristsbelonging to the category of �old� terror-ism develop something like a religious zealin their struggles against the state. There-fore, the whole difference between the twotypes of terrorists, perceived by Lukes andUrbinati, lays not so much in the reli-gious wrapping of their perception, butin their cultural background, which isoutside Western value system.

Secondly, the emphasis on �criminal�reasons can also be seen as rather exagger-ated. It could be claimed that all violenceis shocking and all violence is producinga certain climate of anxiety. However, thedifference between the action and itseffects of �mere criminals� and those ofthe terrorists lies elsewhere. As LorenLomasky writes:

Criminal activity operates within theinterstices of the political order and is parasitic

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upon it. � Terrorism is different. � Terrorists donot aim to free ride but rather to destroy.24

Thus, including such elements into adefinition could just create more confusion.They are often added in more comprehen-sive definitions, but actually, do not bringmore clarity to the concept and can easilybe subsumed under the �political� element.

Fear and terror, psychologicaleffects and anticipated reactions

51% of the definitions emphasizecreation of the atmosphere of fear as animportant element of terrorism. Alongwith violence, this is probably one ofthe most important notions connectedto the phenomenon. Even though notall the definitions mention this element,its relevance for the concept of terror-ism and subsequently the need to in-clude it into a definition is consider-able. In addition to that, the fifth ele-ment in the Schmid�s listing � that ofpsychological effects and reactions � canalso be included in the analysis of this

element, as they all relate to certain psy-chological aspects of the phenomenon.As was mentioned before, violence is im-portant for the whole terrorist enter-prise only in so far as it provokes certainreactions.

However, some objections are made tothe inclusion of this element or at leastwith the understanding of terror as such.For instance, F. Ochberg writes:

The equation of terror with a state of chronicfear is permissible in lay language, but inpsychiatry terror is an extreme form of anxiety,often accompanied by aggression, denial,constricted affect, and followed by frighteningimagery and intrusive, repetitive recollection. Iwould consider a person a terrorist if he attempted[certain] methods � even if the targets did notexperience terror, as long as they were imperilledor victimized.25

As it was mentioned in the firstsection of this article, fear and terrormay not be included into the definitionalso because of the fact that such aninsertion would leave out the attacks onproperty.

These objections notwithstanding, itcould be strongly argued that there is astrong need to include the �terrorizing�aspect of terrorism into a definition. Ter-rorism without terror as a strong emo-tional reaction to the events is actually acontradiction in terms. Even though ter-rorist groups rarely manage to create asustainable atmosphere of fear, only themost spectacular attacks such as that ofSeptember 11, 2001, achieve such results,the aim of the terrorists is to producefear.

As Schmid argues:There is � a solid conceptual core of terrorism,

differentiating it from ordinary violence. It consistsin the calculated production of a state of extremefear of injury and death and, secondarily, theexploitation of this emotional reaction tomanipulate behaviour.26

Even though such an emotional reac-tion is rather hard to operationalize, it isstill to be considered one of the mainelements of terrorism, distinguishing itfrom the other forms of political violenceand allowing it to be seen as a distinctphenomenon.

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Victim-target differentiation

Victim-target differentiation is an ab-breviation of the significant element ofthe notion of terrorism, which empha-sizes that the immediate victims of ter-rorism are not the main targets of theactions. This element, in contrast to mostof the above-mentioned ones, is not con-sidered to be very controversial. It actu-ally allows distinguishing terrorism fromother forms of political violence, such asassassination. While in case of a murder,committed for political reasons or not,the goal is death of a person, terrorism�does not care about the victim itself.�27

It is not what happens to the victim thatis important, but how the fact of whathappens to it will affect the target audienceand, through it, the authorities of thestate. This factor is closely related tocreating the atmosphere of fear. Murder,having as its target a certain concreteperson can rarely ignite a sense of anxietyand fear in the target group. Anger or itsequivalent is a more likely reaction. In

this sense as well, the terrorist violencecan be considered symbolic violence.28

Attacking a somewhat symbolic victim, itaims at producing the aforementionedatmosphere of fear, as a part of populationidentifies itself with the victim and seesitself in its place.

Organized, systematic actions

This element of a definition is againclosely related to producing anenvironment of fear. Singular actions, itis claimed, do not have a strong terror-izing effect. What is important, again, isnot that somebody would die in the at-tacks, but that the rest of the target popu-lation would feel threatened and couldperceive itself in the shoes of the victim.Furthermore, �organized� actions appearin a definition in order to distinguishterrorism from instantaneous psycho-pathic behaviour and from natural ca-lamity-like events or from morespontaneous forms of political violenceas the ones encountered in street violence,etc.

What could be problematic in this partof a definition is the notion of �system-atic� actions. On the one hand, it mightbe reasonable to agree with the point thatsporadic events do not have the same ef-fect as do systematic attacks or a perceiveddanger of further attacks. On the otherhand, what is meant by a �singular ac-tion� or �systematic actions� in this con-text is not always completely clear. Boththese characterizations refer more to thegroups and individuals engaged in ter-rorist activities, but can hardly be usedin general. For example, it could beclaimed that a singular act by a certaingroup cannot create an atmosphere offear, which the terrorists want to attain,but a singular act committed by a groupin the environment of the terrorist actsmay have a significant effect. Furthermore,as it could well be seen, one spectacularattack as the one we witnessed onSeptember 11, 2001 can have a more sig-nificant impact than a long and systematiccampaign.

Such objections, even though theyproblematize significantly this specific

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element of a definition, do not actuallymake it less important. �Systematic� as wellas �organized� are the labels used to dis-tinguish the phenomenon of terrorismfrom spontaneous violence and toemphasize again the importance ofgenerating a terror atmosphere in thepopulace. The possibility of distinguish-ing this phenomenon from other typesof political violence through adding thiselement makes it an important ingredi-ent in any definition of terrorism.

***After having discussed seven elements

most often found in the definitions ofterrorism, it is now time to summarizethe findings. From what was said above,it becomes clear that a definition ofterrorism should include at least fourelements: violence, political motives, anattempt to create a general atmosphere offear and a systematic, organized characterof actions. For the purposes of a clearerand more encompassing understanding ofthe phenomenon a more detailed defini-tion may also be useful. So far, the most

accepted definition in the milieu of so-cial sciences was proposed by Alex Schmid,who sees terror as:

An anxiety-inspiring method of repeatedviolent action, employed by (semi-) clandestineindividual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic,criminal or political reasons, whereby � in contrastto assassination � the direct targets of violenceare not the main targets. The immediate humanvictims of violence are generally chosen randomly(targets of opportunity) or selectively(representative or symbolic targets) from the targetpopulation, and serve as message generators.Threat- and violence-based communicationprocesses between terrorist (organization),(imperilled) victims, and main targets are usedto manipulate the main target (audience(s)),turning it into a target of terror, a target ofdemands, or a target of attention, depending onwhether intimidation, coercion or propagandais primarily sought.29

As it can be noticed, this definition ispretty long and contains elements whichmight not be absolutely necessary. How-ever, it has the advantage of trying to dealwith the most varied aspects of the

phenomenon, which make it distinctfrom the other types of activities, and alsoof dealing with both state and insurgenttypes of terrorism. For the purposes ofmost scientific inquiries a lessencompassing and, therefore, sometimesmore operational definition can also comein handy. However, keeping in mind thelack of agreement in the sphere, such adefinition could be left for the choice ofa researcher.

Normative elements in definitionsof terrorism

The definition elements analysed above,as well as Schmid�s definition itself, excludea certain type of elements used in somescientific inquiries. These elements couldbe seen as more or less �neutral� analyticconcepts. However, there is another set ofelements that has not been analysed so far.Some of the definitions used in analyticalworks on terrorism and especially in thespeeches and articles concerning the figuresof anti-terrorist campaigns all over theworld could be called �normative�. They

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include not only an impassionatedescription of the phenomenon at hand,but also an evaluation on moral grounds.The most common feature of thesedefinitions is the emphasis on the victimsof terrorism, on the innocence of thetargets of the terrorist attacks. It is nowtime to look at these definitions and toexamine their advantages and disadvantagescompared to the analytical ones.30

For the authors using such definitions,the conceptualisation itself serves as a toolfor strong condemnation of terroristactors. Alfred J. Fortin in his article�Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Useof Roland Barthes� Textual Analysis in theInterpretation of Political Meaning�analyses a text of Jeane Kirkpatrick, a po-litical scientist and former representativeof the US to the United Nations, as anexample of what he calls a �terroristtext�.31 In her article in Harpers (Octo-ber 1984), Kirkpatrick sees terrorists asthe ones who �kill, maim, kidnap, tor-ture�, who �chooses violence as the in-strument of first resort� whose victimscan be �schoolchildren, travellers, indus-

trialists returning home from work, po-litical leaders or diplomats�. Additionally,terrorism is seen as �a form of politicalwar�, but it �should also be distinguishedfrom conventional war, and terroristsfrom soldiers� as �a soldier uses violencein accordance with the legally constitutedauthorities of his society against the en-emies designated by those authorities�,while a terrorist �engages in violence inviolation of law against people who donot understand themselves to be at war�.32

According to Fortin, such constructionof the argument has several importantimplications for the analysis. First of all, itis not so much a �building or structurationof the terrorist, than it is a structurationof the terrorist-victim relation�33 in whichthe reader is encouraged to �identify withthe victim status� and thereupon to adhereto the political agenda proposed by theauthorities. Furthermore, opposition tothis agenda, as well as a neutral analysis,becomes basically impossible and:

[w]e see this constraint in the rigidities of thedramatic oppositions created, in the marginaland covert status of the hermeneutical code, in

the incessant drive of the moral claim to trivializecontending discourses, in the choice of a non-interpretive epistemology with its dogmatic senseof real, and in the performative nature of thetext itself.34

The argument is constructed in such away that it is impossible not to take sidesin the eternal fight between the good andthe evil, and those sides are clearly indi-cated. Showing a reader as a potential vic-tim, the text is paternalistic; it does notask for the evaluation of its ideas. Theevaluation is pre-given in the definitionand, consequently, the article itself appearsto be not so much the analysis of terrorismbut a condemnatory artefact and a tool ofpolitical struggle. This type of definitionexhibits the same problems as politicaldefinitions presented in the first section;they are influenced significantly by a certainstand that a researcher wants to take, notonly as a researcher, but as a defender ofthe policies and ideas of the government.As Martha Crenshaw emphasizes:

The danger inherent in the normativedefinition is that it verges on the polemical. If

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�terrorist� is what one calls one�s opponent(regardless of whether or not one�s friend is afreedom fighter), then the word is more of anepithet or a debating stratagem than a labelthat enables all who read it, whatever theirideological affiliation, to know what terrorismis and what it is not.35

Conclusions

The aim of this article was to presentthe problems regarding the concept of ter-rorism and various attempts to define it.Two areas in which such attempts take placewere taken into consideration: the politicaland the academic arena. From what wassaid above it could be argued that thefailure of overarching definitions in thepolitical sphere is related to the strong playof interests in presenting the concept. Thestates are trying to define the phenomenonin their laws and reports in such a waythat would allow them to include certaintypes of attacks and to exclude others, ac-cording to their needs. The neutrality ofsuch definitions is rather dubious.

Attempted conceptualisations of thenotion of terrorism in the social sciences

have often failed as well, because of thevariable nature of the phenomenon andthe diversity of approaches. As with mostof the notions of social sciences, it is diffi-cult to define anything using the usualmethods. Even more so as the term�terrorism�, in contrast to otherphenomena, carries in itself a strong emo-tional component, making a neutralscientific definition of the concept verydifficult to attain. Yet, the objectiveremains, as Laqueur argues, �� acomprehensive, generally accepteddefinition of terrorism does not exist andis unlikely to come into existence, if onlybecause terrorists and their victims will notagree on the matter. But a working defini-tion is certainly not beyond our reach.�36

1 �A recent book discussing attempts by the UNand other international bodies to define terror-ism runs to three volumes and 1866 pages with-out reaching any firm conclusion� (BrianWhitaker. The definition of Terrorism. Guardian, May7, 2001. In http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,487098,00.html )

2 Sonika Gupta. �September 11 and Definitionsof Terrorism� in http://www.ipcs.org/issues/800/871-ter-sonika.html

3 Connolly, William. Identity/Difference. Demo-cratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Ithaca:Cornell University Press. 1991, p.207.

4 Brian Whitaker. The definition of Terrorism.5 See Dennis Hans. Bush�s Definition of Terror-

ism Fits Northern Alliance Like a Glove; TV Inter-viewers Don�t Notice. In http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1123-05.htm And http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/as ia/afghan-bck1005.htm for Human Rights Watch assess-ment of the situation in Afghanistan.

6 Brian Whitaker. The definition of Terrorism.7 Drake, Richard. Revolutionary Mystique and

Terror in Contemporary Italy. � Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 1989. � p.xv

8 Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: anew guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases,theories, and literature. Amsterdam: North Hol-land, Transaction Books, 1988. � p.xiii

9 Although the tactics resembling terrorism istraced as far back as the Jewish struggle againstthe Roman empire, it is the end of the 1960s thatmarks the beginning of the contemporary terror-ist activities, an era of what has been called �ageof terrorism� (see Laqueur, Walter. The Age ofTerrorism. Boston: Little Brown and Company,1987). Several events of that time influenced boththe increasing usage of terrorist tactics to influ-ence the political agenda and the appearance ofthe word �terrorism� in everyday language, espe-cially in the media. These events include death ofChe Guevara in 1967, which revealed the short-comings of guerrilla warfare, student uprisingsof 1968, which had a similar influence on shap-ing the view of impact of revolts, and the Six Day

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War of June 1967, which gave an impetus for anincreasing use of the term �terrorism� by Westernmedia (See, for example, Guelke, Adrian. The ageof terrorism and the international political system.London: I.B.Tauris. 1995. � p.2-3).

10 Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: anew guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases,theories, and literature. � p.27

11 Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. Politicalterrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con-cepts, data bases, theories, and literature. � p.27.

12 See, for example, Laqueur, Walter. The Age ofTerrorism. � p.12-13.

13 �Que le despote gouverne par la terreur sessujets abrutis ; il a raison, comme despote :domptez par la terreur les ennemis de la liberté ;et vous aurez raison, comme fondateurs de laRépublique� (When a despot governs by terrorhis stupefied subjects, he is right as a despot;overcome by terror enemies of freedom and youwill be right as the founders of the Republic)from Robespierre, Maximillien. Pour le bonheuret pour la liberté. Discours. � Paris: La fabriqueeditions, 2000 � p.297.

14 La terreur n�est que la justice prompte, sévère,inflexible; elle est donc une émanation de la vertu;elle est moins un principe particulier qu�uneconséquence du principe général de la democracieappliqué aux plus pressants besoins de la patrie.(Quoted from ibid., p.296-297)

15 Rapoport, David. Introduction // Rapoport,D. and Alexander Y. The Morality of Terrorism:Religious and Secular Justifications. � New York:Pergamo Press, 1982. � p.xiv)

16 Gilbert, Paul. Terrorism, Security and Nation-ality. An Introductory Study in Applied PoliticalPhilosophy. London: Routledge.,1994. � p.26.

17 Dictionnaire de l�Académie Française of 1798.Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terror-ism. � p.11

18 James Murray� New English Dictionary onHistorical Principles, published in 1919 in Ox-ford. Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Ter-rorism. � p.11.

19 For example, the third understanding of �vio-lence� in the Webster dictionary reads that vio-lence is an �unjust or callous use of force orpower, as in violating another�s rights, sensibili-ties, etc� (Webster�s New World College Diction-ary, 3rd Edition. NY: Macmillan, 1996. � p.1490).

20 Guelke, Adrian. The age of terrorism and theinternational political system. London. � p.20.

21 Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. Politicalterrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con-cepts, data bases, theories, and literature. � p.4.

22 Lukes, Steven and Urbinati, Nadia (2001)�Words matter� in http://www.opendemocracy.net/document_store/Doc862-5.pdf

23 Campbell, David. Writing Security. UnitedStates foreign policy and the politics of identity.Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. �p.212.

24 Lomasky, Loren. The political significance of ter-rorism // Frey, Morris eds. Violence, Terrorismand Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1991. � p. 100.

25 Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. Politicalterrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con-

cepts, data bases, theories, and literature. � p.19.26 Ibid. p.2127 Ibid., p.828 Notion of terrorism as a symbolic violence

was introduced in 1964 by Th. P. Thornton29 Schmid, Jongman. Political terrorism: a new

guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theo-ries, and literature. � p.28.

30 The distinction between normative and ana-lytical definitions of terrorism was proposed byMartha Crenshaw (see Crenshaw, Martha. Reflec-tions on the Effects of Terrorism // Martha Crenshawed. Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power. Conse-quences of Political Violence. Middletown:Wesleyan University Press. 1983. � p.1)

31 �The text is not a quest, but an act of combat.And to the extent that it strikes without notice,trades on fear, and is impatient with process, it isa terrorist text� See Fortin, Alfred. Notes on a Terror-ist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes� TextualAnalysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning //Der Derian, Shapiro, eds. International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings ofWorld Politics. Lexington, Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1989. � p.203

32 The text is taken from Fortin, Alfred. Notes ona Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes�Textual Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Mean-ing � p.205-206.

33 ibid., p.203.34 ibid.35 Crenshaw, Martha. Reflections on the Effects of

Terrorism � p.236 Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terrorism. � p.149.