Vol. 5, No. 1 Spring 2005 T OF C - The Occidental Quarterly · taboo for establishment...

Vol. 5, No. 1 Spring 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITOR’S NOTE Remembering Sam Francis (1947-2005): Patriot, Colleague, and Friend TOQ Editors 3

ARTICLES

Constitutional History, Social Science, and Brown v. Board of Education 1954–1964 Raymond Wolters 7Monarchs and Miracles: Australia’s Need for a Patriot King Andrew Fraser 35A Letter From a Grandfather to His Genes Tony Hilton 53

BOOK REVIEWS

The White Australia Policy Reviewed by R. J. Stove 81The Race and the Pride Reviewed by Derek Turner 91 Race: The Reality of Human Differences Reviewed by Leslie Jones 97Dresden: Tuesday February 13, 1945Apocalypse 1945: The Destruction of Dresden Reviewed by Peter B. Gemma 105

About the Editors 109Editorial Advisory Board 110

THE OCCIDENTAL QUARTERLY (ISSN 1539-3925), a journal of Western thought and opinion, is published by The Charles Martel Society four times annually in the Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. Unsolicited manuscripts from contributing authors should be submitted to the editorial department: P.O. Box 695, Mt. Airy, MD 21771. Style sheets are available upon request. Subscrip-tions in the U.S. are $40 annually, $78 for two years, and $114 for three years; subscription rates for Canada are $45 (first year), $88 (two years), and $129 (three years); European subscription rates: $60 (first year), $118 (two years), and $174 (three years). All subscriptions, including ad-ditional inquiries or subscription problems, should be mailed to the subscription department: P.O. Box 3462, Augusta, GA 30914. Back issues are $10 per issue.

W A S H I N G T O N

S U M M I T

P U B L I S H E R SContemporay Works x Classic Reprints

WA S H I N G T O N SU M M I T PU B L I S H E R S

�WSP� now offers co n te m p o r a ryworks and classic reprints �whichinclude recently abridged versions andtexts drawn from earlier works� inthe social sciences with part i c u l a remphasis on anthropology, evolution

and genetics, philosophy, politics and current ev e n t s ,and psychology.

Currently WSP has �� titles available in its Classic ReprintSeries and �� titles in the Contemporary Titles Series �titlesand rights recently purchased from Scott�Townsend Publishers.�Books from WASHINGTON SUMMIT PUBLISHERS are availableby order from all major book retailers, or may be purchased

directly via the Internet. A complete catalog of theWSP line of publications is available upon inquiryfrom the address below.

WASHINGTON SUMMIT PUBLISHERS

P. O. Box 3514 • Augusta, GA 30914

Ph: 706-736-4884 • Fax: 706-733-7652

[email protected] • http://WSPublishers.com

Wa s h i n g t o nSummit

Publishers

Q Anthropology

Q Evolution

QGenetics

Q Philosophy

QCurrent Events

Q Psychology

P. O. Box 3514Augusta, GA3 0 9 1 4

EDITOR’S NOTE

__________________

REMEMBERING SAM FRANCIS (1947-2005): PATRIOT, COLLEAGUE, AND FRIEND

Several months have passed since the loss of Sam Francis earlier this year due to complications following an operation for an aortal aneurysm, but his passing remains an unforgettable shock. After the surgery, Sam’s

condition seemed to be improving day by day. His unexpected death on February 15 comes as not only a tragic personal loss to his family and friends but as a major setback to our movement. We’ve lost not only a tremendously gifted and talented scholar and writer but a man who stuck to the principles he advocated, regardless of personal cost. Among those principles was the conviction that to defend America and the West one must champion the flesh-and-blood people who have created them, not merely a body of ideas. For standing by that principle, Sam was fired from the Washington Times, although his two national awards for editorial writing are the only ones that have ever been conferred on a writer for the Times.

Following Sam’s dismissal, the nervous Nellies of the conservative estab-lishment quickly distanced themselves from him. While Sam continued to be published here and there, the “respectable” right demonstrated once again that for all its trumpeting against “political correctness,” there are none so politically correct as conservatives. To cite just one instance, the editor in chief and former co-owner of Human Events made it a point to excise Sam’s name whenever it was mentioned in an article, although Sam had once been a valued contributor. For speaking candidly and forcefully about race, ethnicity, and culture—subjects taboo for establishment conservatives—Sam had become persona non grata to the conservative establishment. (There are notable exceptions, such as Pat Buchanan and Howard Phillips, who both attended Sam’s funeral.)

The day before he fell ill in late January, Sam called me at home to dis-cuss pending book reviews and other projects for TOQ. Sam deeply valued his position as the book review editor for this journal; it was clear to anyone who knew Sam well that he considered TOQ one of the most important, and rewarding, of his many endeavors for our cause. In planning reviews and articles for TOQ, we would meet periodically after work to discuss journal-related matters and general political gossip over dinner at the Fish Market in

4 Vol. 5, No. 1 The Occidental Quarterly

Old Town Alexandria. Sam knew innumerable personalities on the near and far right and had countless entertaining stories in his memory banks.

The sad irony of Sam’s untimely death is that he had never seemed healthier. He had given up smoking several years ago, and more recently had lost over one hundred pounds on the Atkins diet. Before that, Sam had come to rely on a cane to get around, and disliked walking great distances. But after his weight loss on Atkins, he preferred to walk the half dozen blocks from his office to the Fish Market. After dinner, we would visit Olsson’s Books and Records nearby in Old Town and peruse the used book collection on the second floor. Sam read avidly and widely. Over the years he had amassed a huge library, as well as a vast erudition often sadly lacking among the owners of impressive book collections. Sam had an encyclopedic knowledge of Western history, from the Greeks to the present, and was deeply versed in English literature, including science fiction, horror, and the occult, and could discourse learnedly on authors from Herodotus to Lovecraft.

Sam’s ability to influence the conservative political landscape, from shaping the intellectual trajectory of paleoconservatism and cultivating a nationalist political perspective to addressing racial and ethnic issues that conservatives have long abandoned, is virtually irreplaceable. He was a beacon of common-sense, wisdom, and insight as well as a great intellect. Sam’s focus, drive, and commitment to his responsibilities as editor, syndicated columnist, and author were beyond exemplary. He was always punctual, never missing a deadline for TOQ. Sam’s friend Pat Buchanan once called him “the Clausewitz of the right,” while radical leftist Leonard Zeskind dubbed him “the philosopher-general of middle American white nationalism.” These appellations express Sam’s role, aspirations, and achievement in fighting for truth, freedom, and the weal of our people. Sam’s devotion to that struggle, more than any excommu-nication, separates him forever from the conservative movement, whose best ideals he served faithfully for decades. We at TOQ believe that, in his work for our publication, this good and gifted colleague was best able to deploy his considerable talents in the cause that he so steadfastly served.

A future issue of TOQ will be devoted to various aspects of Sam’s literary work, cultural interests, and political ideas. Reprinted below are the comments rendered by Rep. Duncan on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives.

____________________

Rep. John J. Duncan, Jr. (R.-Tenn.), paid tribute to Sam Francis on the floor of the House of Representatives:

March 9, 2005United States House of Representatives

Spring 2005 / Editors Note 5

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to a fellow Tennessean, but a man whom I never had the privilege of meeting. Samuel Francis was a nationally syndicated newspaper columnist and a leading voice of traditional conserva-tism. He passed away several days ago, just after the Congress had gone into recess, at the too-young age of 57 from complications after heart surgery.

No two people, not even husbands and wives or best friends, agree on everything; and I did not always agree with Sam Francis. But I admired his courage. He was politically incorrect on almost everything, which made him right on most things, but also very controversial. He was a leading critic of neo-conservatives, Big Government conservatives who really are not very conservative at all.

Raised in Chattanooga, Tennessee, Dr. Francis had a bachelor’s degree from Johns Hopkins and master’s and Ph.D. degrees from the University of North Carolina. Sam Francis did not believe in world government and multi-culturalism. He was a patriotic American who put his own country first and was a brilliant and brave writer.

—The Honorable John J Duncan, Jr.

Understanding the United States:Illusions that Guide

Contemporary America

A collection of articles published inThe Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

by Dwight D. Murphey

JSPES Monograph No. 30, ISBN 1-930690-59-1,181 pages, paperback, $25.00 – plus Postage $3.50 (USA),

$5.50 (foreign), Visa and MasterCard Welcome

purchase from…Council for Social and Economic Studies

P.O. Box 34070, N.W., Washington, D.C. [email protected], TEL:(202) 371-2700 FAX:(202) 371-1523

and visit www.JSPES.org…to buy subscriptions online, search contents of back issues,

and download sample articles. Also see www.mankindquarterly.org.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1954–1964

RAYMOND WOLTERS

The following article is the first of a two-part critique of the constitutional history and social scientific arguments that formed the basis of the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education.

PART I: THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE

FOR AND AGAINST BROWN

The full significance of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) will be apparent only with the passage of more time. In at least three respects the Supreme Court’s ruling was a blessing. By ending de jure segregation, Brown was

a boon to American foreign policy; it reconciled the nation’s official policies with its basic principles; and it allowed many individual African Americans to enjoy opportunities that would not have been available if Brown had not dealt a fatal blow to the Jim Crow system. Most writers have emphasized these benefits. America would not have remained a viable society if blacks had continued to be consigned to separate water fountains and to seats at the back of the bus.

But Brown was also a bane. As this article will show, Brown was problematical in terms of constitutional history and social science. In addition, the quality of American education eventually suffered because of the tensions and disorder that followed in the wake of desegregation and because of the unintended consequences of progressive educational innovations that were implemented to “make integration work.” Brown also established a precedent for judicial policy-making in areas that had nothing to do with race or education. As a result, the Supreme Court has been politicized, while America’s schools still face daunting challenges in the twenty-first century.

PROBLEMATIC PRECEDENTS

When state or local governments insisted that black children must attend separate schools, those governments were placing their stamp of approval on the doctrine of racial inferiority. Government officials were understood to be saying that the intellectual and cultural standards of African Americans were so different from those of Caucasians, and so inferior, that the races


should not associate with one another in social and educational situations. This amounted to officially disparaging the Negro race, a humiliation that re-inforced the message that mean-spirited people conveyed when they refused to shake hands; when they did not address black men as “Mister” but rather as “boy,” “Howard,” or “nigger Jones”; and when they called black women “aunt” or perhaps by their first name but never “Mrs.” Nevertheless, in the early 1950s neither Congress nor many state legislatures were prepared to end segregation.

Segregation also tarnished the reputation of the United States at a time when the nation was vying with the Soviet Union for influence in the Third World. American diplomats assured foreign leaders that segregation was a regional rather than a national practice, a relic of times past, a policy that was on the way out. The Justice Department’s amicus brief in Brown argued that desegregation was in the national interest because of foreign policy. Brown gave the U. S. government the decision it had been hoping for, and the State Department quickly made use of the ruling. Within an hour after the Supreme Court released its opinion, a Voice of America radio broadcast trumpeted the news abroad.1

Brown also legitimized and helped to shape views that were emerging as a moral consensus among white Americans. In the Deep South many whites opposed desegregation, but elsewhere most whites accepted the principle that the government should not discriminate.2 Brown condemned an entrenched injustice and helped to prepare the way for the civil rights movement.

Although Brown struck down an injustice, the rationale of the Supreme Court was spurious. In 1953, when the Brown litigation was pending, the Court asked opposing counsel whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had contemplated and understood that their handiwork would render segre-gated schools unconstitutional. Or had the framers, as a possible alternative, intended that either Congress or the Supreme Court could abolish segregation in light of future conditions? The questions suggested that the Court wanted to rule against segregation but feared that doing so could be justified only by the sort of judicial activism that several of the justices had denounced during the years of the New Deal. The justices therefore asked the NAACP to provide historical evidence to protect the Court against the charge that it would be legislating if, without regard to historical intent, the Court discovered a new meaning in the amendment. The Court asked for additional information about the Thirty-ninth Congress, which submitted the amendment to the states in 1866, and about the subsequent state ratifying conventions.

The NAACP then employed several historians, three of whom later ex-pressed ambivalence if not regret over their role in the venture. At the outset, the black historian John Hope Franklin noted “the difference between scholarship and advocacy” and expressed concern about “the temptation to pollute…schol-arship with polemics.”3 So did the white historian C. Vann Woodward.4 But

Spring 2005 / Wolters 9

Franklin and Woodward nevertheless prepared papers which maintained that segregation frustrated the egalitarian intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1963, Franklin confessed that he had “deliberately transformed the objec-tive data provided by historical research into an urgent plea for justice.”5 And Woodward later retracted his earlier statements that the Fourteenth Amend-ment was prompted by egalitarian intentions.6 In time Woodward conceded that he was mistaken even to contend that segregation was designed to insure inequality—because, given the sentiments that prevailed when Southern public schools were established in the 1860s and 1870s, the alternative to segregation was not integration but exclusion.7

The most important historical work in the Brown litigation was done by the constitutional scholar Alfred H. Kelly. Yet when Kelly delved into the historical records, he discovered that “unhappily, from the NAACP’s point of view, most of what appeared there at first blush looked rather decidedly bad.”8 To begin, there was the fact that the Congress that submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states also established segregated schools in the District of Columbia. It hardly seemed likely that Congress intended to destroy the states’ right to maintain segregated schools when that very same Congress provided a system of segregated schools in the federal district. In addition, although a few states discontinued segregation after endorsing the amendment, most continued with segregation and some introduced segregation contemporaneously with passage of the amendment. They did not think there was any conflict between the two actions. All things considered, it seemed clear that neither the Congress nor the ratifying states understood that the Fourteenth Amendment would destroy the states’ right to maintain segregated schools. Alexander M. Bickel, a leading authority on the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-ment, concluded that “The evidence of congressional purpose is as clear as such evidence is likely to be.”9 Congress neither intended nor expected the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit segregation.

At first Kelly’s role was to alert the NAACP to the difficulties posed by the historical record. Only then could the NAACP formulate “an adequate gloss on the fateful events of 1866 sufficient to convince the Court that we had something of a historical case.”10 “It was not that we were engaged in formu-lating lies,” Kelly later wrote. “There was nothing as crude and naïve as that. But we were using facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down on facts, sliding off facts, quietly ignoring facts, and above all interpreting facts in a way to do what [NAACP lawyer Thurgood] Marshall said we had to do….”11 Initially Kelly, like John Hope Franklin and C. Vann Woodward, hoped it would suf-fice to emphasize the general spirit of humanitarianism and social idealism that allegedly “dominated the rise of the abolitionist movement and which by implication thereby had determined the objectives of the radical Republicans who had written the Fourteenth Amendment.”12 Eventually, Kelly also added something of a conspiracy thesis: that John A. Bingham, a principal author of


the Fourteenth Amendment, had purposely used the broad language of the equal protection clause with the secret intention of making it constitutional for a later federal government to prohibit segregation.

It was a dubious argument. There was no evidence that Bingham camou-flaged an undisclosed purpose. Even if such evidence had been discovered, it would not be conclusive, for the doctrine of ratification presumes that the states understand what they are ratifying. Kelly later admitted that he had “manipulated history in the best tradition of American advocacy, carefully marshaling every possible scrap of evidence in favor of the desired interpreta-tion and just as carefully doctoring all the evidence to the contrary, either by suppressing it when that seemed plausible, or by distorting it when suppres-sion was not possible.”13 Kelly recalled that he was “facing for the first time in my own career the deadly opposition between my professional integrity as a historian and my wishes and hopes with respect to a contemporary ques-tion.… I suppose if a man is without scruple this matter will not bother him, but I am frank to say that it bothered me terribly.”14

While Kelly and other historians were working for the NAACP, Justice Felix Frankfurter asked Alexander Bickel, then a law clerk at the Supreme Court, to undertake yet another examination of the historical record. Unlike Kelly et al., Bickel concluded that the Congress that submitted the Fourteenth Amendment neither intended that segregation be abolished nor foresaw that, under the language they were adopting, it might be.15 The most that could be said for the NAACP, Bickel later wrote, was that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment realized that they were writing a constitution, and understood that constitutional language always contains a certain elasticity that allows for reinterpretation to satisfy the requirements of future times. Like some modern “deconstructionists,” Bickel argued that, through wordplay, constitutions can (and should) be interpreted without regard to original intent to mean whatever the interpreters want them to mean.

Bickel’s argument was clever but not new. It essentially reiterated an opinion that Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes had expressed in 1934, when Hughes rejected the contention that the Supreme Court should interpret “the great clauses of the constitution” according to their original intent. Accord-ing to Hughes, “it was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning—‘we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding—a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.’”16

The Brown Court may have had something like Bickel’s exegesis in mind when it termed the historical evidence “inconclusive.”17 Or perhaps the justices simply meant to say that, in their opinion, the evidence was so diverse that it was hard to determine the historical truth.


Ironically, other historians might have fashioned a better historical argument for Brown. According to Robert H. Bork, the Supreme Court could (and should) have noted that the purpose of the equal protection clause was to ensure that Negroes were not significantly disadvantaged by state laws; that at the time and for some years thereafter it was assumed that separate schools could be equal; but by 1954 it had become apparent that the separate facilities provided for blacks were not as good as those provided for whites. The Court could then have ruled that to achieve the equality that the Fourteenth Amendment had promised, it was necessary to desegregate the public schools. In this way Brown could have been defended as consistent with the original understanding of the equal protection clause.18

Michael W. McConnell has presented another originalist argument for Brown. Since section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority to enforce the amendment with appropriate legislation, McConnell maintained that contemporary congressional debates were germane to the original under-standing with respect to segregated schools. He then noted that on eighteen recorded votes in the early 1870s a majority of either the House or Senate voted to prohibit school segregation, although “because of procedural problems and Democratic filibustering, a two-thirds vote was required at key junctures and the support for [school desegregation] fell just short of two-thirds.”19

Yet these arguments were not developed until years after Brown. Bork and McConnell are distinguished conservative scholars who have served as federal judges, and each recognized that no one could be confirmed for a federal appoint-ment without supporting Brown. They therefore had practical reasons for defend-ing Brown on originalist grounds. Whether or not Bork and McConnell are correct, the point is that in 1954 the justices of the Supreme Court would have welcomed an originalist defense of desegregation, but they were unable to conceive of one. Instead, the justices apparently thought that there was no warrant for their ruling in the historic Constitution. Instead, they mentioned the impossibility of “turn[ing] back the clock to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted.” They said they had to “consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life….”20 They had to find modern meanings to deal with contempo-rary problems.

Years later, after the ruling in Brown had become sacrosanct, liberal activists endorsed the argument that Brown could not be reconciled with the original understanding. They sensed that if it was understood that Brown could not be reconciled with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, then many people would conclude that something was wrong with the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted in accord with the intentions of the framers. Thus in 1982 Michael J. Perry admitted that Brown (and some other Supreme Court decisions) could not plausibly be defended as interpretations of the Constitution. But Perry praised the modern Court for taking a “nonin-terpretivist” approach to constitutional law. According to Perry, the justices


of the Court were modern “prophets” selected by an “American Israel” and authorized to strike down laws they deemed mistaken.21 In 1997 David Gar-row similarly praised Brown for its “repudiation of historical intent.” By ignor-ing “the burdens and limitations of history,” by freeing the Court from “the Constitution’s historical limitations,” Brown established a precedent that later courts could cite to justify overruling the decisions of elected legislators with respect to abortion, criminal justice, equality, religion, and other matters.22

Meanwhile, conservatives lambasted Brown for subverting democracy by departing (as, indeed, the Court thought it was doing) from the original under-standing in order to achieve a socially desirable end. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Court’s ruling, Thomas Sowell found little to celebrate. By then, he said, it had become “painfully clear that the educational results of Brown have been meager for black children.” Meanwhile, “the kind of reasoning used in Brown has had serious negative repercussions on our whole legal system, extending far beyond issues of race and education.”23 George F. Will joined in lamenting the “myriad reverberations” from Brown; and Will complained especially about Brown’s tendency to aggrandize the judiciary—to invest judges with “a prestige that begot arrogance,” with a belief that judges should find that policies they considered mistaken were also “unconstitutional.”24

A WARRANT FOR FORCED INTEGRATION?

After asserting that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was incon-clusive, the Brown Court held that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”25 One year later, the Court ordered school districts to “make a prompt and reasonable start” toward admitting students to public schools “on a nondiscriminatory basis.”26 Brown was ambiguous, however, when it came to the question of whether the Constitution prohibited separation that was not the result of official state policy. At two points in his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the case concerned the official, legal segregation of children in public schools “solely on the basis of race” and “solely because of race”27—thereby implying that there was no constitutional problem if the races failed to mingle because of unofficial and nonracial factors such as choice or residence in racially imbalanced neighborhoods.

This offered reassurance to many Americans, a reassurance that was related to a paradox that lies at the core of the nation’s racial thought. As the Swedish scholar Gunnar Myrdal noted in his classic study, An American Dilemma (1944), even before Brown most whites opposed bigotry and supported equal rights. They were troubled by the contradiction between egalitarian principles and the reality of racial discrimination. They wanted their practices to be consistent with their ideals. 28 But they also feared that desegregation would lead to an increase in miscegenation, which they feared partly because they felt a sense a racial identity and pride; and partly because of what they considered the low cultural and social standards of African Americans. Many whites who


opposed official segregation also insisted on their right to discriminate when it came to choosing friends, associates, and neighborhoods. They recognized that the moral, intellectual, and cultural standards of whites left something to be desired, but they would not accept African Americans socially until American Negroes approached these standards in large numbers.29

These views were not expressed openly in some sections of the country, but throughout the twentieth century white homeowners would leave their neighborhoods if more than a token number of blacks moved in, and most white parents with sufficient means removed their children from schools that became predominantly nonwhite. Most Americans, it seemed, favored a system of segmented development in which people voluntarily chose to live in communities that were predominantly of their own race, living, as W. E. B. Du Bois once recommended, “side by side in peace and mutual happiness,” with each group making its own “peculiar contribution…to the culture of their common country.”30

At first Brown seemed to be consistent with this sort of pluralism. Because it held that government officials could not separate blacks from whites “solely” on the basis of race, Brown was initially understood to require only that states must desist from official racial discrimination. In the 1950s and early 1960s hardly anyone favored the formal assignment of students (or the employment of workers) on the basis of race so as to achieve more racial mixing than could be achieved by racially neutral policies. Desegregation would be required. But integration would not be imposed. Until the late 1960s, Brown was understood to forbid the public schools from practicing any sort of racial discrimination. At that time most civil rights activists said that race and color were irrelevant to the proper consideration of a person’s worth. They sought the advancement of blacks but assumed this could be accomplished if the schools treated students as individuals, without regard to race, color, or creed.

The idea that official racial discrimination was prohibited also seemed to be implied in Bolling v. Sharpe (decided the same day as Brown), in which the Supreme Court ruled against segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia—on the grounds that racial classifications were too arbitrary to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause.31 That Brown prohibited official racial discrimination also seemed to be the message in several per curiam decisions in which the Court later invalidated laws requiring segregation of municipal parks and recreational facilities.32 In 1955 the implementation decision in Brown was worded so as to condemn “discrimination” rather than “segregation” in education.33 Three years later, in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), a case that arose in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Court held that Brown had established that children have “the constitutional right…not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color.”34 Civil rights activists and sympathizers understood this to mean that the Court had declared that official classification by race was unconstitutional per se.


In response to the decisions of the Supreme Court, lower federal courts affirmed that racial discrimination was prohibited and that the Constitution required the government to treat each person as an individual without regard to race. Stated most fluently, perhaps, by Circuit Judge John J. Parker in Briggs v. Elliott (1955), this point of view was frequently called the Briggs dictum. For more than a decade it was the authoritative construction of Brown: “It is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme Court has decided and what it has not decided…. The Constitution…does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.”35

Echoing this view, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which endorsed the common understanding that official discrimination should not be tolerated but racial mixing need not be compelled. Section 407 of the Civil Rights Act authorized the attorney general to initiate school desegregation actions, and section 401 defined desegregation: “‘Desegregation’ means the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but ‘desegregation’ shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools to overcome racial imbalance.”36 Brown, Briggs, and the Civil Rights Act were understood to be about de jure segregation and not about de facto racial imbalances and concentrations.

Some critics raised objections to the reasoning displayed in the opinion (as distinguished from the holding) of Brown; and some others cautioned that in a democracy important changes should not be instigated by unelected judges, appointed for life. But the great majority of influential Americans considered the outcome of the case so morally right, and so clearly in the interests of whites as well as blacks, that Brown became a venerated symbol. By the mid 1960s Brown was revered for having brought an end to shameful official segregation. Because it relieved blacks from stigma and whites from guilt, the Supreme Court received the thanks of a grateful nation. Brown became the example par excellence of what the black activist and legal scholar Derrick Bell has called “interest convergence” as a motivation for racial policy making. In this instance, Bell explained, “the interest of blacks” was “accommodated” because it “converge[d] with the interests of whites in policy-making positions.”37

The celebration of Brown would not have been so widespread if Americans had had a better understanding of all that the opinion of the Supreme Court could be interpreted to imply. After holding that the relevant historical evi-dence was inconclusive, and after repeatedly stating that the litigation arose from segregation compelled by law, the Brown Court engaged in psychological and sociological theorizing that later was held to mean that actual racial mix-ing was called for, not just an end to state-enforced segregation. Both Brown and the later rulings were influenced by social science arguments that, given the evidence available at the time, could best be characterized as not clearly erroneous; social science arguments which, after subsequent research, came to be regarded as either dubious or mistaken.


Specifically, Brown held that racial isolation damaged the confidence of black youths and depressed their ambitions and self-esteem. It said that the segregation of black students generated “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” It approvingly repeated the conclusion of a Kansas court: that segregation tended “to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they could receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.”38 Brown embraced what is sometimes called “the harm and benefit thesis.” It held that school segregation harmed black students and implied that desegregation would help African Americans develop more self-esteem and do better academically.39

In endorsing arguments from social science, and especially from social psychology, the Brown Court turned away from the main line of argument that attorney Thurgood Marshall had presented in his legal briefs for the NAACP. Marshall had acknowledged that the Constitution allowed for some discrimina-tion against groups (as with the all-male military draft and restrictions on the freedom of minors), but Marshall said the due process and equal protection clauses required not only that discrimination must be justified but also that especially weighty evidence was necessary to justify racial discrimination. Marshall said that no such evidence had been presented in Brown, and even suggested that it was just as arbitrary and capricious to discriminate against people with dark skins as it would have been to discriminate against people who had blue eyes or blond hair. According to Marshall, racial segregation fell within a group of unreasonable classifications that the due process and equal protection clauses prohibited.40

Marshall and other NAACP lawyers made these points repeatedly and un-equivocally. They said that classifications based “solely on race or color” were “arbitrary and unreasonable” and “the very kind the equal protection clause was designed to prohibit.” They said it was their “dedicated belief” that the Constitution was “color-blind.” They said that the Fourteenth Amendment had “stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for governmental action.”41 And they also renounced discrimination as a remedy for previous discrimination. They said they were

not asking for affirmative relief.… The only thing that we ask for is that the state-imposed racial segregation be taken off, and to leave the county school board…to assign children on any reasonable basis they want to assign them on.…What we want from this Court is the striking down of race.…Do not deny any child the right to go to the school of his choice on the grounds of race or color.… [D]o not assign them on the basis of race…. If you have some other basis…any other basis, we have no objection. But just do not put in race or color as a factor.42


The Supreme Court embraced this rationale in Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case that was decided with Brown on May 17, 1954. The Bolling case rose from the District of Columbia and was decided separately for legal reasons. The Fourteenth Amendment (which asserted that no state could deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws) did not apply to the federal government. But the Fifth Amendment prohibited the federal government from depriving citizens of liberty without due process. In Bolling the Court recognized that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” It said that “classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions, and hence constitu-tionally suspect.”43

In Brown, however, the Court said nothing about the arbitrariness of racial discrimination. Instead, the Court pointed to the damage that segregation sup-posedly did to blacks. It said that segregation so victimized black students as to make an equal education impossible.

Perhaps it would have been better if Brown had repeated the rationale of Bolling and the implications of the per curiam rulings; if Brown had simply said it was inherently arbitrary for government officials to discriminate on the basis of race; if it had endorsed the major argument that Thurgood Marshall had presented in Brown, or the dictum that Judge Parker had announced in Briggs, or the definition that Congress later provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.44 Instead, after citing evidence from the social sciences, Brown held that segregation was unconstitutional because it damaged blacks psychologically. Later this rationale and holding would lead the Court to affirm that Brown mandated not only what most people at the time thought it required (no ra-cial discrimination) but also something quite different (affirmative racial as-signments to achieve more racial integration than could be achieved through racially neutral policies).

BROWN’S SHAKY SOCIAL SCIENCE

Some of the NAACP’s lawyers had reservations about using evidence from social science,45 but they knew that different minds might be persuaded by different arguments, and that therefore successful lawyers often presented all the arguments they could muster, neglecting none. Thus, at the behest of attorney Robert L. Carter, the NAACP got in touch with psychologist Kenneth B. Clark, who then prepared a statement that eventually was signed by thirty-two prominent anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists—a statement which declared that black children were psychologically injured if they attended segregated schools. Regardless of the condition of the separate facilities, the social scientists said, segregation had a belittling effect upon the self-esteem of African-American students. According to the social science statement, seg-regated black students reacted with “feelings of inferiority” which led to “a generally defeatist attitude and a lowering of personal ambitions.” “In produc-


ing such effects,” the statement said, “segregated schools impair[ed] the ability of the child to profit from the educational opportunities provided him.” The statement further maintained, “under certain circumstances” (among them an absence of competition and special efforts to ensure that the academic status of the black and white students would be equal) “desegregation not only proceeds without major difficulties, but has been observed to lead to the emergence of more favorable attitudes and friendlier relations between races.”46

The statement reflected a paradigm shift in social science. An earlier generation of scientists, influenced by a Darwinian belief that the races were at different stages of evolutionary development, tended to regard Negroes as innately inferior to Caucasians in terms of analytical intelligence. By the 1930s and 1940s, however, new theories were coming into vogue, and many social scientists believed that racial differences in intelligence test scores and societal achievements resulted from the accidents of history and the influence of culture rather than from any innate differences in mental abilities. To allay any fear that black students might jeopardize the education of whites, the NAACP’s social science statement emphasized that “the available scientific evidence indicates that much, perhaps all, of the observable differences among various racial and national groups may be adequately explained in terms of environmental differences.”47

In addition to suggesting that desegregation would boost the self-esteem and academic achievement of blacks, the NAACP’s social scientists and law-yers also said that segregation gave whites a false sense of superiority and denied blacks the opportunity to learn the social skills needed for effective interaction with the dominant group. They said that segregation reinforced racial prejudice, increased mutual hostility and suspicion, and made outbreaks of racial violence more likely. With desegregation, they said, these problems would be ameliorated.

The NAACP’s social science statement was consistent with much of the research of the 1930s and 1940s. The social scientists were not merely activists who were motivated by moral and political concerns rather than scientific data. Nevertheless, many of their assertions have since been discredited. Eventu-ally, as historian John P. Jackson noted in 2001, “the psychologists involved in Brown [came to be] viewed as liberal reformers who cloaked their political wishes in the guise of social science.” That their testimony was unfounded became “the dominant understanding of the case.”48

Numerous post-Brown studies later established that black students do not suffer in terms of self-esteem. In fact, according to one review of the literature, “research is nearly unanimous in reporting either no racial differences in self-esteem or differences favoring blacks over whites.”49 Perhaps this is because most American youths consider academic achievement less important than street smarts, athletic prowess, and success with the opposite sex. Yet because blacks lag behind whites in average academic performance, the self-esteem


of blacks attending predominantly white high schools is substantially lower than the self-esteem of those who attend predominantly black schools. Con-trary to the prediction of the NAACP’s social science statement, “segregation protects self-esteem [of blacks], while the impact of desegregation is to lower self-esteem.”50

Given the relatively low average socioeconomic status of blacks, it may seem surprising that blacks did not suffer from low self-esteem. But the subculture of blacks allowed most African Americans to buffer the negative evaluations of mainstream whites. In An American Dilemma (1944), Gunnar Myrdal noted that blacks tended to attribute their problems and low status not to any per-sonal failings but to racism and the American system. In another classic work, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966), James S. Coleman also reported that blacks had self-esteem levels at least equal to those of whites.51 The self-esteem of blacks was probably enhanced further as the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s placed increased emphasis on black pride and black power.

The NAACP’s social scientists were mistaken when they informed the Supreme Court that blacks were suffering in terms of self-esteem; and they were naively optimistic when they told the Court that the conditions for suc-cessful desegregation could “generally be satisfied in…public schools.”52 Given the racial gap in average academic achievement, there was no likelihood that black and white students, on average, would be of equivalent academic sta-tus. Moreover, because competitiveness is deeply embedded in the American culture and because teachers are expected to give higher grades to better stu-dents, competition could not be eliminated from the classroom. There was no way to create the circumstances that the NAACP’s social scientists themselves identified as essential for the success of desegregation.

Thus further research soon cast doubt on some (although not all) of the assertions of liberal social science. Critics took particular exception to the work of psychologist Kenneth B. Clark, whose testimony in the Brown case had been especially striking and influential. When the Supreme Court cited “modern authority” in social science, as it did in footnote 11 of the Brown opinion, the Court first mentioned the work of “K. B. Clark.”53 During the previous decade Clark had published articles that dealt with the effect of segregation on the self-esteem of black youths, and the NAACP’s lawyers thought that the “general scientific findings would have more weight in a courtroom if it could be demonstrated that they also applied in the specific cases…before the court.”54 To that end, Clark showed black and white dolls to sixteen black children selected at random from segregated schools in Summerton, South Carolina, whose litigation had been consolidated with the Brown litigation from Topeka, Kansas. Clark then reported that nine of the sixteen children, when asked which was the “nice one,” selected the white doll, and that only eleven said the black doll was the one that looked more like themselves.55 From this


Clark inferred that segregation had a detrimental effect on the personalities of black children.

Certainly Clark’s presentation was vulnerable, as several commentators soon noted. Richard Kluger, a celebrant of the Brown decision, conceded that “sixteen children were not very many to start with, and if even one or two of them had undergone atypical experiences or traumas in their young lives, the overall test results would have been thrown out of kilter.”56 Sociologist Ernest van den Haag scoffed that Clark’s sample of students was not only too small for gauging any damage to the ego structure of blacks; “this number would be too small to test the reaction to a new soap.”57

Others weighed in with more substantial criticisms. The legal scholar Ed-mond Cahn, a champion of the Brown decision (but not of the Brown opinion), noted that Clark’s doll test did not purport to demonstrate “the effects of school segregation, which is what the court was being asked to enjoin. If it disclosed anything about the effects of segregation on the children, their experiences at school were not differentiated from other causes.” Cahn thought it dangerous to base constitutional rights on social science as flimsy as that presented by Ken-neth Clark.58 Psychologist Bruno Bettelheim also wondered “how far a good cause can be served by unsubstantiated or even spurious arguments made in its favor.” Bettelheim supported the civil rights movement but, as a Jew who had attended “non-segregated schools in Germany and Austria,” took exception to Clark’s “familiar presumption that meeting children of different races and religions in school leads to better racial and religious relations.” According to Bettelheim, “the seeds of racism and ultra-nationalism” had taken “firm root” in Germany’s integrated schools, “while most children who went to Catholic parochial schools turned out (even under the Nazis) to be much less preju-diced.”59 The educational success of Asian, Catholic, and Jewish students in the United States also cast doubt on the contention that racial or ethnic separation inevitably impaired educational development.

Thus the NAACP’s social science statement, and especially Kenneth Clark’s doll tests, were subjected to withering criticism. Nevertheless, perhaps because most scholars in the field sympathized with the purpose that animated this re-search and testimony, Clark’s professional reputation was not damaged. Clark later enjoyed a lengthy career as a professor at the City University of New York, with stints teaching at Harvard, Columbia, and Berkeley. He became a member of the Board of Regents of New York State and a member of the Board of Direc-tors of the Rand Corporation and of several foundations. He became a trustee of the University of Chicago and a consultant to the State Department. Eventually, Clark became the president of the American Psychological Association.

More immediately, Clark had the satisfaction of knowing that his doll test and social science statement made a crucial contribution to the NAACP’s vic-tory in Brown. The Supreme Court had found the NAACP’s historical argument inconclusive, but it pricked up its ears when the NAACP’s social scientists said


that segregation fostered feelings of inferiority that hampered the education of blacks. Historian Alfred Kelly conceded, “[Clark’s] black and white dolls won the case, not the historians.”60 In tribute to the NAACP’s premier psychologist and most influential witness, some social scientists referred to Brown as the “Ken Clark law.”61

The lawyers for South Carolina probably would have confronted Clark had they known that the Supreme Court would later rely on his doll studies. But since the doll test involved so few children, attorney Robert McCormick Figg recalled, “I didn’t press the matter. [Clark’s] numbers were small and unimposing.”62 John W. Davis, the lead attorney for South Carolina, was especially skeptical of the social science evidence, confiding in one letter: “I think I have never read a drearier lot of testimony than that furnished by the so-called educational and psychological experts.”63 “I can only say that if that sort of ‘fluff’’ can move any court, ‘God save the state!’”64 Instead of stressing social science, Davis made a legal argument. With citations to eighty years of precedents, Davis said that the right of a state to maintain segregated schools had been so frequently affirmed by the highest authorities, including the Su-preme Court, that the matter should be considered settled.65

Despite his confidence in the legal precedents, Davis briefly took exception to the social science evidence in general and to Professor Clark’s doll studies in particular. He noted that Clark’s testimony was especially suspect because Clark had not told the courts that he had previously shown black and white dolls to 134 black children who attended segregated schools in Arkansas and to 119 black children who attended desegregated schools in Massachusetts. Nor had Clark informed the courts that the proportion of black students who preferred the white dolls was actually higher in the desegregated northern schools than in the segregated southern schools. Thus if the doll test was a valid means of indicating what sort of schooling enhanced black self-respect, the data tended to favor segregated schools.66

The result of Clark’s South Carolina doll test also was at odds with results that Clark reported in Belton v. Gebhart, a desegregation case in Delaware. In Delaware, only 12 of 41 black children identified the black doll as “bad,” while 25 refused to make any identification of a bad doll. But in contrast to the situa-tion in South Carolina, where Clark inferred psychological damage if children said the black doll was bad, in Delaware Clark said that children who refused to pronounce a negative judgment were “seeking to avoid coming to grips with the personally disturbing problem of racial status.”67 Whatever choice a child made, Clark interpreted it as evidence of psychological damage.68 “If Negro children say a brown doll is like themselves, he infers that segregation has made them conscious of race; yet if they say a white doll is like themselves, he infers that segregation has forced them to evade reality.”69

The results of other tests were even more damaging to the NAACP’s case. When Clark asked children to color the drawing of a boy or girl, “nearly 80


per cent of the southern Negro children [who had been educated in all-black, segregated schools] colored their preferences brown, whereas only 36 per cent of the northern Negro children did. Furthermore, over 20 per cent of the northern [black] children colored their preferences in a bizarre color, while only five per cent of the southern [black] children did.”70 Such results suggested that desegregation created more psychological problems than it solved. This led psychologist Bruno Bettelheim to conclude that the NAACP would have been wiser if it had steered clear of bogus science and had based its case on legal and ethical principles.71

The Brown Court nevertheless placed its imprimatur on the social science of the NAACP. The Court even listed Kenneth Clark as primus inter pares—the first among a group of scholars whom the Court cited as “modern authority” in social psychology. The headline in the New York Times called Brown “a socio-logical decision,” and the Times’s best-known columnist, James Reston, wrote that the “Court’s opinion read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme Court opinion. It sustained the argument of experts in education, sociology, psychology, and anthropology….”72

SCIENCE AGAINST BROWN

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown took segregationists by surprise, for they had not only considered the NAACP’s social science to be of slight consequence; they had also expected Brown to be decided on the basis of his-torical evidence and legal precedents. Yet when these expectations proved to be mistaken, segregationists enlisted social science in their own behalf and pointed to what John W. Davis once called “a large body of respectable expert opinion to the effect that separate schools, particularly in the South, are in the best interests of children of both races as well as of the community at large.”73 “If the Court wanted scientific data,” historian William H. Tucker has written, “the segregationists would supply the data with a vengeance. Since the plaintiffs’ experts had testified that segregation was damaging to the personality and self-esteem of black children, the opposing scientists would marshal their own evidence to show that integration was even more harmful to the young black psyche.” In response to the NAACP’s argument that racial differences in scholastic performance were environmentally based and in reply to the implication that desegregation would lead to improvement in black educational achievement, segregationists would cite IQ studies that showed that the differences were intractable and other studies that suggested that the differences probably resulted from heredity. When the academic performance of black students either did not improve after desegregation, or improved very little, segregationists insisted that the Brown Court had been “hoodwinked by biased evidence.”74

Much of the evidence for segregation was presented in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Board of Education (1963).75 Segregationist lawyers carefully chose


Savannah because they knew that the presiding judge, Frank M. Scarlett, supported segregation. They therefore expected Judge Scarlett to allow them to introduce social science evidence over the objections of the NAACP, which now maintained that cases should be decided on the basis of legal precedents (that is, Brown), and that social science evidence was irrelevant and should be excluded.76

In Stell the segregationists began with Robert Osborne, a professor of psy-chology at the University of Georgia. Osborne gave testimony to the effect that whites in Savannah, on average, scored significantly higher than blacks on tests of reading and mathematics, with the differential increasing from less than two grade levels at age eleven to more than three grade levels at age seventeen.77 Osborne said that “in regions …where the Negro population is relatively small there may be no problem of balancing the schools in terms of race.” But he predicted trouble ahead “if public schools are ordered to integrate en masse.” If white schools in Savannah did not “lower the educational standards and level of instruction,” there would be “a 40 to 60 percent Negro failure rate.” The only alternatives would be to institute a system of grouping students by academic achievement, which would lead to “de facto segregation,” or “to apply differential marking and evaluation systems to the two groups.”78

The segregationists next presented their star psychologist, Henry E. Garrett, a former president of the American Psychological Association. Garrett was a man of patrician bearing who had taught at Columbia University for thirty years before moving to the University of Virginia. Summarizing the findings of several scholarly studies, Garrett told the court that on IQ tests American Negroes regularly scored from 15 to 20 points below the average for American whites; that only 25 percent of African Americans overlapped the average white on most mental tests; and that the difference was even greater on “tests of an abstract nature…involving reasoning, deduction, comprehension.”79 Garrett recognized that “inequality in social status” made it difficult to obtain a fair comparison of black and white Americans, but he reported that the gap in test scores did not disappear when black and white subjects were paired in terms of fourteen social and economic factors. The persistence of the gap, and the regularity of results from many studies, made it “extremely unlikely [in Garrett’s opinion] that environmental opportunities can possibly explain all the differences.”80 According to Garrett, “the differences between the two racial groups in a variety of mental tests are so large, so regular and so persistent under all sorts of conditions that it is almost unthinkable to conclude that they are entirely a matter of environment.”81

Garrett also mentioned additional points that would receive more emphasis in the years ahead. He said that massive integration would “pull achievement down” and “ruin the white schools.” He opined that “neither group would be happy,” since “one group would be challenged above its ability level and the other group would not be challenged enough.” And he said that as a result of


“bringing the groups together…under classroom conditions” many African-American students would become frustrated, “and frustration leads to aggres-sion and aggression leads to broken windows and muggings and crime.”82 In their legal briefs for Stell v. Savannah, segregationist lawyers Carter Pittman and George Leonard also warned that black students would bring with them “a severe increase in disciplinary problems resulting from the more prevalent use of violence, vile profanity, lascivious sexual behavior, thefts, vandalism…and other anti-social conduct.” ”83

In Stell the segregationists also maintained that differences in academic achievement resulted largely from differences in brain structure. Robert E. Kuttner, a professor of medicine at the Creighton University Medical School, gave testimony on this point. But the segregationists’ star witness was Wes-ley Critz George, emeritus professor of anatomy at the University of North Carolina Medical School and the president of the North Carolina Academy of Science. After summarizing several scholarly studies on the relation of brain weight, body size, and intelligence throughout the animal kingdom, George informed the court that the average weight of the brains of Caucasians was about 1,380 grams, that of Negroes about 1,240 grams, with the difference especially pronounced in the prefrontal area where abstract thought occurred. George further stated that these differences were “no doubt…inherited,” the result of evolutionary development in geographically distinct regions over periods of times best described in geological terms. According to George, schools could modify these differences only “to a minimal degree.”84

Some segregationists considered the racial differences in anatomy to be especially important. Most people already knew that blacks lagged whites on academic tests, but the segregationists sensed that many observers attributed this to differences in environment and opportunity. Yet if blacks and whites differed in brain structure, the segregationists reasoned, more people would recognize that racial differences in IQ and academic achievement were “inher-ent and hereditary.”85

Professor George’s summary of the anatomical evidence was striking—so striking that it caused NAACP attorney Constance Motley to weep audibly in the courtroom.86 But it was not conclusive with respect to school segrega-tion, for even segregationists conceded that there was a considerable overlap in brain weight (as there was in IQ scores), with about 20 percent of African Americans exceeding the white average. Thus the NAACP could argue, as it had in Brown, that children in desegregated schools could be grouped by ability, regardless of race. “Put the dumb colored children in with the dumb white children,” Thurgood Marshall had said to the Supreme Court in 1955, “and put the smart colored children with the smart white children.”87

Segregationists therefore called on their own social scientists, who argued that racial segregation was psychologically beneficial to African-American school children, including those of superior intelligence. In Stell v. Savan-


nah their star witness on this point was Ernest van den Haag, a psychiatrist and professor of social philosophy at New York University. Van den Haag was also the author of one of the earliest articles that had criticized Kenneth Clark. Writing in the Villanova Law Review in 1960, van den Haag had noted that Clark himself, in articles written before Brown, had reported that black children in segregated schools were “less pronounced in their preference for the white doll” and more often thought of the colored dolls as “nice.” Van den Haag suspected that Clark had intentionally misled the courts and delib-erately deceived the NAACP’s lawyers. “Else how could they present as an expert witness to demonstrate the damages of school segregation a man who has actually demonstrated only the damages of desegregation?” According to van den Haag, “The best conclusion that can be drawn is that [Clark] did not know what he was doing; and the worst, that he did.”88

In Stell v. Savannah, van den Haag essentially maintained that African-American children would be happier if they were educated in all-black schools. He granted that there was something to “the common sense view that Negroes are humiliated…by segregation,” but he thought it would be even worse to send black students to school with “hostile” whites who would “resent…the imposition.” Van den Haag said that “being resented and shunned person-ally and concretely by their white schoolmates throughout every day would [not] be less humiliating to Negro children than a general abstract knowledge that they are separately educated because of white prejudice.”89 “If the gifted Negro child is transferred into a hostile white school environment, I doubt that there would be an educational advantage.”90

In making this argument, van den Haag harkened back to points that the black scholar and civil rights leader W. E. B. Du Bois had made in 1935. “The proper education of any people includes sympathetic touch between teacher and pupil,” Du Bois had written. But racial prejudice was so deeply entrenched that it was difficult to find white teachers who regarded blacks as their equal. Consequently, Du Bois wrote, black students in the desegregated North were often “admitted and tolerated,” but they were “not educated” because they did not receive “decent and sympathetic education in the white schools.” Indeed, “the treatment of Negro children in [desegregated] schools…is such that they ought to demand a thorough-going revolution in the official attitude toward Negro students, or absolute separation in educational facilities.” Du Bois complained that he had “repeatedly seen wise and loving colored parents take infinite pains to force their little children into schools where the white children, white teachers, and white parents despised and resented the dark child, made mock of it, neglected or bullied it, and literally rendered its life a living hell. Such parents want their child to ‘fight’ this thing out,—but, dear God, at what cost!” Du Bois thought it would be better for the NAACP to seek equalization of funding and facilities instead of pressing for integration. He doubted the wisdom of trying to compel “a rich and powerful majority


of the citizens to do what they will not do.” He conceded that mixed schools with good and sympathetic teachers and fellow students would be ideal. But “a mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers with hostile public opinion and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad.”91

Du Bois was not defending segregation. He was, rather, stressing that there was “no magic” in mixed schools and that black children would not benefit if they were placed in schools that did not treat them fairly.92 Du Bois insisted that integration was not a panacea. He cast doubt on the value of educating black children in predominantly white schools.

Van den Haag argued in addition that because of deficiencies at home most poor black students needed a special curriculum that would provide elementary instruction on matters that most middle-class white children picked up automatically. He thought that “instruction in schools for Negroes should attempt to remedy the disadvantages suffered by students coming from a culturally deprived home environment.” “At least for the time being, the needs of Negro children would be met best—i.e., to their advantage and without disadvantage to others—by separate education geared to meet the obstacles presented by lack of opportunity and unfavorable environment.”93 Such schools would also facilitate the cultivation and celebration of the African Americans’ unique heritage.

Van den Haag also emphasized the importance of what he called “accept-able group identifications.” He said that “the sense of achievement essential to a healthy personality in a superior pupil is caused by excelling in a group with which he has a strong identification”; that such sense would be “limited or destroyed” if students were placed “in a group with which such identifica-tion is lacking”; that a goal of education “should be to strengthen the degree to which Negroes identify with their own sub-group rather than with other groups.” Van den Haag said that the integration of able black students would have especially unfortunate effects on the black rank and file. He predicted that, with integration, the best black students would move into predominantly white classes, and black children of ordinary aptitude “would be deprived of the natural leadership of their group, would lose a sense of group achievement, be subjected to a demoralizing sense of rejection and…would suffer feelings of inadequacy or inferiority.”94

Once again, van den Haag was asserting views that in some ways were similar to opinions that W. E. B. Du Bois had expressed in the 1930s. Du Bois had then urged African Americans to “stop being stampeded by the word segregation.” What they should be concerned about was discrimination; discrimination as prac-ticed, for example, when public schools “refus[ed]…to spend the same amount of money on the black child as on the white child for its education.” But Du Bois said that segregation and discrimination did “not necessarily go together,” and he insisted that there should “never be an opposition to segregation pure and simple unless that segregation does involve discrimination.”95


Du Bois urged blacks to continue to protest against official segregation. But he also urged them to “go to work” to make sure that black schools were as good as possible. If the Negro could not “educate his children in decent schools with other children, he must, nevertheless, educate his children in decent Negro schools and arrange and conduct and oversee such schools.” Du Bois complained (with some exaggeration) that “the NAACP and other Negro organizations have spent thousands of dollars to prevent the establishment of segregated Negro schools, but scarcely a single cent to see that the division of funds between white and Negro schools, North and South, is carried out with some approximation of justice.” For too many African-American leaders, Du Bois wrote, “the fight against segregation consists merely of one damned protest after another;…the technique is to protest and wail and protest again, and to keep this up until the…walls of segregation fall down.”96

Du Bois also thought it was a mistake to emphasize integration as the best solution to America’s racial problems. He was convinced that “not for a century and more probably not for ten centuries, will any such consummation be reached.” “No person born will ever live to see…racial distinctions altogether abolished.” Indeed, Du Bois dismissed integration as “the absurd Negro philosophy of Scat-ter…Escape.” He insisted that “the problem of 12,000,000 Negro people, mostly poor, ignorant workers, is not going to be settled by having their more educated and wealthy classes gradually and continually escape from their race into the mass of the American people.” To the extent that occurred, Du Bois predicted, the black masses would be left without leaders and would “sink, suffer and die.” 97 Du Bois called on the black “talented tenth” to stay in their black communities and serve as role models and missionaries of culture. He urged “the better class of Negroes [to] recognize their duty toward the masses.” “[T]heir chief excuse for being [is] the work they may do toward lifting the [masses].”98

Some of van den Haag’s views were similar to those of Du Bois, although not identical, and both men had opinions that resembled those of sociologist A. James Gregor. Like van den Haag, Gregor rejected Kenneth Clark’s assertion that “segregation has detrimental psychological effects.” On the contrary, Gregor wrote, Clark’s own evidence “tends to support racial separation in the schools.” It showed that there were “more serious [psychological] impairments…in ‘in-tegrated’ situations.” “If the evidence available to the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ. demonstrates anything at all, it demonstrates that the personality impair-ment suffered by Negro children is less in a racially insulated environment than with congregation.” Gregor warned that “a Negro child who systematically observes his group performing at a lower level…in integrated situations…can hardly avoid assessing [his group] as inferior in some significant sense. This leads to the characteristic negative evaluation of his own group on the part of the Negro child…”99

In addition, like Du Bois, who thought that most African Americans pos-sessed an instinctive preference for one another, a consciousness of kind “which


they cannot escape because it is in the marrow of their bones,”100 Gregor maintained that most whites also possessed a sense of racial identity. More than that, Gregor thought that mankind possessed an inherent drive to form in-groups and out-groups. He said there was “a generic tendency…to identify with those like themselves” and an instinctive “disposition to limit contact with outgroup members.” Admittedly, this tendency could be influenced by “social and political circumstances.” Sometimes group consciousness was focused on religious beliefs or class standing; but often it revolved around race. Indeed, Gregor said, throughout history there had been little mixing on terms of equality when people came into protracted contact with groups of markedly different “racial livery.”101 In making this argument, Gregor was squarely in the mainstream of social science. In The Nature of Prejudice (1954), the influential Harvard psychologist Gordon W. Allport had “argued along similar lines, entitling one chapter ‘The Normality of Pre-judgment’ and argu-ing that the formation of in-groups was a natural phenomenon and was often accompanied by the rejection of out-groups.”102

Thus Gregor was not surprised when educators reported that “each racial group tended to go its own way with little social interaction” when schools were integrated, as many had been outside the South. Neither blacks nor whites could expect to find sympathetic, congenial support in schools that were dominated by members of the other race. Gregor maintained, in addition, that mixing was likely to produce separation if one of the groups, as seemed to be true of African Americans, possessed a “subculture” that was characterized by “minimal academic aspirations.” Just as white homeowners fled residential integration at the first inkling of “sociological problems” in their neighborhoods, so white students would keep their distance from blacks. “The deterioration of the standards of local schools, the increased incidence of delinquency and crime…provide…sufficient rational motive for white flight.”103

In Stell v. Savannah, the lawyers for the NAACP did not try to refute the segregationists’ arguments. Constance Baker Motley briefly mentioned that many experts in anatomy, psychology, and sociology did not agree with the opinions expressed by the segregationists’ scientists, but Motley did not call any witnesses. Instead, she objected to the use of scientific testimony. Her posi-tion resembled that taken by John W. Davis when Brown was being litigated: “that social science testimony was specious and irrelevant since the Supreme Court had already decided the constitutional issues involved in the case.”104 Motley said the law was settled because Brown had held “that segregation itself injures Negro children in the school system. That is what the Supreme Court’s decision is all about, so we do not have to prove that.”105

Judge Scarlett held otherwise. Ruling for the segregationists, Scarlett noted that the preponderance of testimony in his courtroom was to the effect that racial differences in academic achievement were of such magnitude as to make it difficult for most black children to be educated in predominantly white


classrooms. Scarlett wrote that he had heard “no evidence whatsoever…to show that racial integration of the schools could reduce these differences.” And he concluded that “superior” black students (those who admittedly could keep up with whites academically) would suffer psychologically if separated from their fellow African Americans. Scarlett acknowledged that his findings differed from those of the Supreme Court in Brown, but he nevertheless con-cluded that the segregationists had made a reasonable case for separating the races in school.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals then reversed Judge Scarlett’s deci-sion. Circuit Judge Griffin Bell explained that “no inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required…even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred.” Bell went on to say that there was “no constitutional prohibition against an assignment of individual students to particular schools on a basis of intelligence, achievement or other aptitudes,” but “race must not be a factor in making these assignments.” According to Bell, the problem with racial segregation was that

[M]any of the Negro pupils overlap many of the white pupils in achievement and aptitude but are nevertheless to be segregated on the basis of race. They are to be separated, regardless of how great their ability as individuals, into schools with members of their own race because of the differences in test aver-ages as between the races. Therein is the discrimination. The individual Negro student is not to be treated as an individual and allowed to proceed along with other individuals on the basis of ability alone without regard to race.106

Raymond Wolters is Thomas Muney Keith professor of history at the University of Delaware. He received the American Bar Association’s Silver Gavel Award for his earlier study of desegre-gation, The Burden of Brown. The article above is adapted from his forthcoming book.

ENDNOTES

1. Mary L. Dudziak, “Desegregation As a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988): 61–120; and Dudziak, Cold War and Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).2. For discussion of polls conducted in 1942, 1956, and 1963 by the National Opin-ion Research Center, see Herbert H. Hyan and Paul B. Sheatsley, “Attitudes toward Desegregation,” Scientific American 211 (July 1964)): 16–23; and Andrew M. Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley, “Attitudes toward Racial Integration,” Scientific American 225 (December 1971): 13–19.3. John Hope Franklin, “The Dilemma of the American Negro Scholar,” in Herbert Hill, ed., Soon One Morning (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 74, 73. Horace Mann


Bond was another African-American historian who worked for the NAACP on this project.4. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 788.5. John Hope Franklin, “The Dilemma of the American Negro Scholar,” 74.6. C. Vann Woodward, “Postscript, 1968,” to “Equality: The Deferred Commitment,” in Woodward, The Burden of Southern History, revised edition (Baton Rouge: Louisi-ana State University Press, 1968). Also see Woodward, “Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 110 (February 1966): 1–9; Woodward, “The Northern Crusade against Slavery” and “The National Decision against Equality,” in Woodward, American Counterpoint (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 159 and 212–233.7. C. Vann Woodward, Thinking Back (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 96–97. On this point also see, Howard N. Rabinowitz, “More Than the Wood-ward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Career of Jim Crow,” Journal of American History 75 (December 1988): 842–856; and Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).8. Alfred H. Kelly, “An Inside View of Brown v. Board,” paper delivered to the American Historical Association, December 28, 1961, reprinted at the request of J. Strom Thurmond in Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 2d Session, September 11, 1962: 19023.9. Alexander M. Bickel, “The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,” Harvard Law Review 69 (November 1955): 59.10. Kluger, Simple Justice, 895.11. Kelly, “An Inside View of ‘Brown v. Board,’” 19025.12. Ibid., 19024.13. Alfred H. Kelly, “Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,” Supreme Court Review, 1965, 144. Kelly further stated that “the brief submitted by the NAACP and its associ-ated counsel, which purported to prove decisively that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment had indeed intended to knock out state segregation laws, was a piece of highly selective and carefully prepared law-office history.”14. Kelly, “An Inside View of Brown v. Board, 19024. In The Southern Case for School Segregation (Crowell-Collier Press, 1962, pp. 133–134), James J. Kilpatrick offered this assessment of the work of the NAACP’s historians: “They produced a 235-page brief. It must stand as a pathetic monument to what happens when historians cease to be historians and take up the unlicensed practice of the law. The conclusions there drawn, that the ‘proponents of absolute equalitarianism emerged victorious in the Civil War and controlled the Congress that wrote the Fourteenth Amendment,’ are a bitter travesty upon the actual course of events. For it is plain to any objective student . . . that no such thing occurred. The visible, palpable, unrelenting, unavoidable truth is that [Charles] Sumner and [Thad] Stevens and their fellow radicals did not control the Congress in 1866; they did not get what they wanted in the Fourteenth Amendment.”15. Kluger, Simple Justice, 827.16. Hughes’s statement was made in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), 443; and Marshall’s in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316 (1819), 407. Expressing a contrary point of view, the constitutional scholar Charles Cooley observed: “A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation and that their practical construction is to be uni-


form. A Constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time when circumstances may have changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from a written Constitution would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion.” Agreeing with Cooley, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney once stated: “Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.” Cooley and Taney’s statements are quoted in James J. Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation, 129–130 and 130–131. 17. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 489. 18. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 74–84. Charles L. Black, Jr. made a similar argument: “The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,” Yale Law Journal 69 (1959–1960 ): 421–430.19. Michael W. McConnell, “Concurring in the Judgment,” in Jack M. Balkin, ed., What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 164.20. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S 483 (1954), 492.21. Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Grover Rees III, “Prophets without Portfolio,” National Review, September 2, 1983, 1078–1082.22. David Garrow, “From Brown to Casey” in Austin Sarat, ed., Race, Law, and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 74–84.23. Thomas Sowell, “Where Rhetoric Beats Reasoning,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2004.24. George F. Will, “Good and Bad Things Came with Brown v. Board of Education,” Sacramento Bee, May 16, 2004.25. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. (1954), 495.26. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 300.27. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. (1954), 493, 494.28. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944).29. For a statement of this view, see the remarks of Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender, Congressional Quarterly Almanac 20 (1964): 372.30. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races” (1897), reprinted in Herbert Aptheker, ed., Pamphlets and Leaflets by W. E. B. Du Bois (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1986), 7. 31. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (954).32. Florida ex rel Hawkins et al.,347 U.S. 971 (1954); Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Con-stitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 162.33. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 299, 300.34. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), 17.35. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (1955), 777.36. Public Law 88-352 (1964), 246.


37. Derrick Bell “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,” Harvard Law Review 93 (1980): 518; Bell, Silent Covenants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 58, 70.38. Bell, “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma,” at 495, 494. 39. For a discussion of the harm and benefit thesis, see David J. Armor, Forced Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 59–116.40. Leon Friedman, ed., Argument: The Oral Argument before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1952–1955 (New York: Chelsea, 1969), 38, 45.41. Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution, 157; G. W. Foster, Jr., “The North and West Have Problems, Too,” Saturday Review, April 20, 1963, 72.42. Friedman, ed., Argument, 47, 375, 402.43. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), 499. 44. See Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); and Wolters, Right Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan Administration, and Black Civil Rights (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996).45. See James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 44: “Some of the people around [Thurgood] Marshall wondered about such research. Both [Jack] Greenberg and Spottswood Robinson were skeptical. Another top lawyer, William Coleman, pounded the table in opposition to using the research. He said later, ‘Jesus Christ. Those damned dolls! I thought it was a joke.’”46. “The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Sci-ence Statement,” in Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, editors, Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States (Arlington, VA: University Publications of America, 1975), vol. 49, 4–5, 15–17.47. “The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation,” in Kurland and Casper, eds., Landmark Briefs, 52.48. John P. Jackson, Jr., Social Scientists for Social Justice (New York: New York Uni-versity Press, 2001), 2. Edmond Cahn, the author of an especially influential critique, said that the primary motive of the NAACP’s social scientists was not “strict fidelity to objective truth.” Kenneth B. Clark took strong exception to this “serious, grave, and shocking charge,” insisting that the social scientists “presented testimony, opinions, and information consistent with the available empirical studies” and did so “with caution and restraint befitting their roles as trained and disciplined scientists.” See Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” New York University Law Review 30 (January 1955): 150–169; and Clark, “The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist’s Role,” Villanova Law Review 5 (Winter 1959–60): 224–240. 49. Marylee C. Taylor and Edward J. Walsh, “Explanations of Black Self-Esteem,” Social Psychology Quarterly 42 (1979): 242.50. Edgar G. Epps, “The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, Self-Con-cepts, and Other Aspects of Personality,” Law and Contemporary Problems 39 (Spring 1975): 307.51. Myrdal, American Dilemma; James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Oppor-tunity (Washington: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966).


52. “The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation,” in Kurland and Casper, eds., Landmark Briefs,59.53. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 499 n. 11.54. Clark, “The Desegregation Cases”: 229.55. Trial Transcript, Briggs v. Elliott, Civil Action 2657, U.S. District Court, Columbia, South Carolina.56. Kluger, Simple Justice, 446.57. Ernest van den Haag, quoted by Kenneth B. Clark, “The Desegregation Cases,” 238.58. Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 163–164.59. Bruno Bettelheim, “Discrimination and Science,” Commentary 21 (April 1956): 384–386.60. Kelly, “An Inside View of Brown v. Board,” 19026.61. C. P. Armstrong, S. S. Crutchfield, W. E. Hoy, and R. K. Kuttner, “Legal Testimony and Scientific Evidence,” Mankind Quarterly 4 (October–December 1963): 105. Of course Brown has been interpreted in many ways, and some able commentators have denied the social science provenience of the opinion. Edmond Cahn’s already cited law review article, “Jurisprudence,” is one example.62. Kluger, Simple Justice, 446.63. Kluger, Simple Justice, 687.64. William H. Harbaugh, Lawyer’s Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 498.65. Ibid., 499.66. Argument of John W. Davis, in Kurland and Casper, Landmark Briefs, vol. 49, 336; Ernest van den Haag, “Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases—A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark,” Villanova Law Review 6 (Fall 1960): 69, 71; Herbert Gar-finkel, “Social Science Evidence and the School Segregation Cases,” Journal of Politics 21 (1959): 37–59; Harbaugh, Lawyer’s Lawyer, 500. 67. Trial testimony of Kenneth Clark, as quoted by Jackson, Social Scientists for Social Justice, 141.68. Ibid., 142.69. Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 163.70, Bettelheim, “Discrimination and Science,” 386.71, Ibid., 384.72. New York Times, 18 May 1954, page 1. 73. Kluger, Simple Justice, 690.74. William H. Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 150.75. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Board of Education, 220 F.Supp 676 (1963).76. Carleton Putnam included lengthy excerpts from the Transcript of Proceedings in his book, Race and Reality: A Search for Solutions (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1967), 76–85.77. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham, 229 F. Supp 667 (1963) at 669–671.


78. R. Travis Osborne, “Racial Differences in Mental Growth and School Achieve-ment,” in Robert E. Kuttner, ed., Race and Modern Science (New York: Social Science Press, 1967), 405–406.79. Ibid., 672–673; Putnam, Race and Reality, 58–59.80. Henry E. Garrett, “Negro-White Differences in Mental Ability in the United States,” Scientific Monthly 65 (October 1947): 333; Frank C. J. McGurk, “A Scientist’s Report on Race Differences,” U.S. News & World Report, 21 September 1956, 95.81. Henry E. Garrett, “Racial Mixing Could Be Catastrophic,” U.S. News & World Report, 18 November 1963, 93.82. Testimony of Henry E. Garrett, quoted in I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court: So-cial Scientists and the Defense of Segregation, 1954–1966 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 205.83. Ibid., 199.84. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham, 229 F. Supp 667 (1963), 673; Carleton Putnam, Race and Reality, 84, 82–83; Wesley Critz George, The Biology of the Race Problem (New York: National Putnam Letters Committee, 1962).85. John Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation (New York: New York University Press, ms), 221–222. 86. Putnam, Race and Reality, 83.87. Friedman, ed., Argument, 402. In their Social Science Statement, however, the NAACP stated a different view: “Actually, many educators have come to doubt the wisdom of class groupings made homogeneous solely on the basis of intelligence. Those who are opposed to such homogeneous grouping believe that this type of segregation, too, appears to create generalized feelings of inferiority in the child who attends a below average class, leads to undesirable emotional consequences in the education of the gifted child, and reduces learning opportunities which result from the interaction of individuals with varied gifts.” Kurland and Casper, eds., Landmark Briefs, vol. 49, 55 88. Van den Haag, “Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases—A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark,” 77, 79.89. Ibid., 69, 71.90. Van den Haag, “Intelligence or Prejudice?” National Review, 1 December 1964, 1061.91. Du Bois, “Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?” Journal of Negro Education 4 (July 1935), 328, 329, 330, 330–331, 329, 335.92. Kluger, Simple Justice, 691.93. Van den Haag, “Intelligence or Prejudice?” 1061.94. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham, 220 F. Supp. 667 (1963), 674–675.95. Crisis 41 (January 1934): 20, italics added.96. Crisis 41 (June 1934): 183; Du Bois, “Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?” 332. In From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954–1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),25, J. Harvie Wilkinson noted that Du Bois was not alone in making this point. “There had long been disagreement—even within the NAACP high command—about whether to argue an ‘equalization’ strategy within the confines of Plessy or to take the bolder and riskier course of asking the Court to overrule separate but equal altogether.” Also see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, 658–664, 677–680.


97. Crisis 41 (April 1934): 117; Du Bois, “A Negro Nation within the Nation,” Current History 42 (June 1935): 269. For more on Du Bois and integration, see Raymond Wolt-ers, Du Bois and His Rivals (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002). 98. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro (1899; reprint, Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1973), 392, 393.99. Kenneth B. Clark, as quoted by A. James Gregor, “The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation,” Western Reserve Law Review 14 (1963): 626; ibid., 632, 633.100. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Future and Function of the Private Negro College,” Crisis 53 (August 1946): 235.101. A. James Gregor, “The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation,” 629, 630; Gregor, “On the Nature of Prejudice,” Eugenics Review 52 (1961): 217–224.102. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1954), 17–28; John P. Jackson, Jr., “The Scientific Attack on Brown v. Board of Education, 1954–1964,” American Psychologist 59 (September 2004): 533. However, according to Walter A. Jackson, “In contrast to some of the more pessimistic writers on the subject, Allport proclaimed himself an unabashed meliorist and insisted that it was possible to reduce discrimination by changing public policy and to lessen prejudice through a variety of educational strategies.” Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 288–289103. A. James Gregor, “The Law, Social Science and School Segregation,” 629–630; Gregor et al., “Interracial Housing and the Law: A Social Science Assessment,” in Alfred Avins, ed., Open Occupancy vs. Forced Housing under the Fourteenth Amendment (New York: Bookmailer, 1963), 147; George A. Lundberg, Selective Association of Ethnic Groups in a High School (New York: International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics, 1965).104. I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court, 207.105. Stell v. Savannah, 220 F. Supp.667 (1963), 676.106. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham, 333 F.2d 55 (1964), 61, 62.

MONARCHS AND MIRACLES:AUSTRALIA’S NEED FOR A PATRIOT KING

ANDREW FRASER

In the 1999 referendum on the republic, defenders of the monarchy failed to drive a stake through the heart of the Australian republican movement. The votes had hardly been counted before republicans were invoking their

presumptively perennial right to demand a rematch at a time and on terms of their own choosing. If monarchists are ever to achieve a decisive victory, they must not rely upon republicans to shoot themselves in the foot, once again, with another deeply flawed model of the “politician’s republic.” Should re-publicans succeed in their campaign to abolish the constitutional monarchy, the repercussions will be felt far beyond Australia’s shores. Indeed, the fate of what used to be called the British race may very well hang on the outcome of this constitutional battle: The abolition of the monarchy in Australia would weaken the institution elsewhere, further fracturing the already fragile sense of kinship between the peoples of Britain and the old settler dominions.

Of course, the recurrent splits in the republican camp may well doom them to yet another defeat. But if republicans believe that popular support for the monarchy is minimal, limited to a minority of spoilers, they will never rest content until they achieve their objective—and who could blame them? Unless and until the British monarchy, understood and accepted as such, captures the hearts and minds of the Australian people, it will be living on borrowed time. Our rulers no longer conceive Australia as a country, the homeland of a particular people sharing a language, a religion, and their own distinctive folkways. Instead, Australia has been reduced to an economy, open to the free flow of capital, technology, and labor in a global system of production, distri-bution, and exchange. Swamped by “the rising tide of color”1 washing in from every overcrowded corner of the Third World, the old Australian dream of a new Britannia in the Southern Ocean is now little more than a faded memory. Only a miracle can save us now. Australia desperately needs a Patriot King to spark new life into the ancient British constitution, rekindling the ancestral spirit of Anglo-Saxon liberty in an ever more rootless, deracinated, and frag-mented population.

As things stand now, the hard core of support for the monarchy is to be found in a parochial party of the past possessing few friends among opinion leaders in the state or the corporate sector, the universities, or the media. Many ordinary Australians do still revere the monarchy as an essential feature of our


constitutional heritage. Their loyalty to the Crown reflects the historical expe-rience of a distinctive people rooted in a particular place, sharing a collective memory of their genesis in the epic history of the British Empire. Republicans often assert that they have a lock on the younger generation; still, not all Aus-tralian monarchists are only a few steps away from the grave. Generations of republican ideologues have themselves grown old satirizing the hidebound conservatism of Australian monarchists, forever ridiculing the British mon-archy as an anachronistic and obsolescent relic of the colonial era. During the 1999 referendum campaign, members of the Australian Republican Movement (ARM) cast themselves as the progressive party of the future. But the future they proposed—a cosmopolitan, inclusive, multicultural regime open to the world with a resident for president—ran head on into the “parochial” tradi-tions of Australian patriotism.2

Far from throwing in the towel, republican leaders will now pursue a more subtle strategy. Having already foreshadowed one or more “indicative” plebiscites leading up to a second referendum campaign, their aim is to wear down the opposition, stripping the constitutional monarchy of its legitimacy before committing themselves to any particular model of the republic. This war of attrition will be supplied and directed from the commanding heights of political, corporate, and cultural power. Indeed, the final push for a republic might even produce an unprecedented revolution from the top down. Relying on the best kept, dirty little secret of Australian constitutional law, republicans could break a deadlock by proceeding under s15 of the Australia Act 1986 (UK), permitting a phalanx of Labor-controlled Commonwealth and state parliaments, acting jointly, to proclaim a new republican constitution (thereby bypassing the referendum procedure requiring a majority of the popular vote in a majority of the states).3

Republicans are already accustomed to rule from above, being massively overrepresented among the managerial and professional classes. Republicans attract significant support from non-European migrant communities, but their most important constituency is found in prosperous inner city electorates within easy reach of an international airport. Priding themselves on their cos-mopolitan sophistication, republicans are more likely than those who voted No in 1999 to deny that Australia is a much better country than most other countries. Similarly, republicans are less inclined to agree that they would rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country.4

The typical, well-educated republican regards himself as a citizen of the world. Although republicans loudly proclaim their national pride, in the end their loyalty is to a state, or more accurately, the transnational state system, not to a particular people. When republicans refer to the sovereign people they do not mean a pre-political community defined by historic ties of language, religion, and blood, but rather the more or less random collection of individu-als who find themselves resident, for the time being, in Australia.

Spring 2005 / Fraser 37

Republicans believe that time is on their side, that the republic is inevitable. They hope that the parochial party of the past will simply fade away, over-whelmed and demoralized by the relentless onrush of replacement migration from the Third World. Should patriotic sentiment continue its steady decline in Australia, as it has elsewhere in the West, they may turn out to be right.

AUSTRALIAN PATRIOTISM AND THE FUTURE OF THE ANGLOSPHERE

Patriotism is a tie that binds members of a particular community together through time. It is a sentiment that acknowledges the obligation on those of us now living to respect the interests of both the dead and the unborn. “In the Greek the word patriotism goes back to love of one’s fathers, and,” according to Robert Nisbet, “to this day is quite evidently strongest where a political nation is overwhelmingly composed of citizens who can be thought to be of common ethnic descent.”5

Patriotism presupposes a durable community of memory and for that reason a hereditary monarchy provides a natural focus for patriotic sentiment. But no successful patriotism can be anchored solely in the past. Patriotism must also generate the energy and commitment to carry a people forward into the future. Patriotic triumphs are never inevitable—they are the fruit of will, courage, and determination.

If and when it occurs, the advent of an Australian republic will replace the traditionalist patriotism spontaneously generated within a free society with a narcissistic nationalism manufactured by the interlocking ideological media of state and corporate power. Cosmopolitan elites with no loyalty to the con-stitutional monarchy already manage almost every aspect of organized social life. Even the private realm has been invaded by highly refined techniques of media manipulation, therapeutic intervention, and disciplinary normalization. Accustomed to being in the driver’s seat, members of the managerial overclass remain confident that, sooner or later, they will reeducate the hybrid popula-tion of a rootless mass society to accept one of their own as head of their own self-legitimating state.

Make no mistake about it. The republic is a constitutional device to expand managerial control over everyone within the territorial jurisdiction of the Com-monwealth government. By getting rid of a British monarch and removing the Union Jack from the flag, republicans aim to detach the federal constitu-tion from its original, or core, ethnocultural identity. Once the supranational authority of the British Crown has been nationalized, citizenship will become the exclusive property of the Commonwealth government. At that point, the corporate welfare state will be free to create a new Australian nation in its own disembodied image. The ideological mullahs of the managerial regime aim to purge the Australian people of their historic Anglo-Celtic, or British, identity.6


Australian elites were once ashamed of their convict origins. Nowadays the great and the good are embarrassed by any mention of their “English” Queen in the presence of visiting foreign potentates. In fact, of course, the Australian nation-state was created by a proudly British people for whom it was a matter of historical record that the English Crown—in and out of Parliament—was the original source for the fountain of law and justice. They understood that the term “British” is not simply an ethnic category; its widespread modern usage grew out of a major constitutional achievement, the rise of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Ironically, historians tell us that British patriotism flowered within the neo-classical traditions of eighteenth century Anglo-American or Atlantic civic republicanism.7

Despite the fact that the English, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish were separate and distinct, albeit closely related ethnic groups, they had all taken on a common, or British, civic identity by the end of the eighteenth century. In the settler colonies ethnic differences were even more readily submerged in a shared civic identity so that colonial Americans and, later, Australians, Cana-dians, and New Zealanders became more British than the British.8 Through-out the Empire, increasing numbers of French-Canadians, Jews, Afrikaners, Germans, and Indians, to name but a few, were steadily incorporated into a global community of British subjects owing allegiance to the Crown.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that “Britishness,” understood as a civic identity, could never have arisen, nor could it survive, apart from the core ethnocultural identity provided by the English people in particular. In-deed, the greater the genetic distance between any given ethny and the English people, the more likely they are to resent and resist their full assimilation into a British society.9 Throughout the old white Commonwealth, even ethnies phenotypically similar to the English, such as the Irish, the Quebecois, and Jews (whether Orthodox separatists or secular humanist advocates of mass immigration and multiculturalism) have worked, each in their own way, to sever the civic significance of British identity from its ethnic roots.

Today, Australia’s still predominantly Anglo-Celtic political class also re-jects as “racist” any suggestion that the nation possesses a core, specifically Brit-ish, ethnocultural identity. Contemporary Australian citizenship is grounded, not in ethnicity, but in bureaucratic paperwork. Our rulers are dissolving the old Anglo-Australian nation to put a newly disaggregated, polyethnic, and multiracial people in its place.

The Australian nation-state will cease to exist if republicans have their way. It will become a state without a nation. Patriotism will be displaced by new forms of statist idolatry. “Constitutional patriotism,” as the new state religion is called, disapproves the love of fathers. Instead, we are to transfer our loyalty to an impersonal state liberated from the bonds of history and law. Lest the managerial regime be confined within the old superstitious rituals of “ancestor worship” associated with the common law jurisprudence of liberty, progressive


judges have already transformed the meaning of constitutionalism itself. The constitution is no longer a set of fixed rules and principles intended to limit the potentially despotic reach of governments. On the contrary, in well-managed, modern republics, constitutions are heavily watered, “living trees.”10 Open to perpetual innovation from the top down, their function is to enhance the power of the state. Tradition, authority, and the common law spirit of liberty: All will be sacrificed on the multiculturalist altar of equality.11

Patriotic resistance could still derail the “inevitable” victory of the manage-rial republic. However, such a struggle must be waged in the name of the Aus-tralian nation, understood as part of a particular ethny. “An ethny,” according to Frank Salter, “is analogous to a population of cousins.” Anglo-Australians share myths of common ancestry, historical memories, and many elements of a common culture with their ethnocultural “cousins” in the various poli-ties created out of the historic British diaspora emanating from the ancestral homeland in Britain.12 That Australians can never be an island unto themselves is something that was well understood by our forefathers. They valued their special relationship with other British-derived nations, especially but not ex-clusively those which still owe allegiance to the Queen, such as Canada, New Zealand, and the UK itself.

Together with the USA, those nations inhabit a common English-speaking world, the Anglosphere, with its own distinctive language, history, and civic culture.13 Strong traditions of English individualism dating back to the Middle Ages, if not to prehistoric times, lent dynamism to the British diaspora and provided the cultural basis for the most successful liberal democracies and free market economies.14 In the future, as in the past, the fate of the Australian na-tion, no less than that of the British monarchy, will depend upon the capacity of the English-speaking peoples to preserve the vitality while enhancing the strength of their common civilization.

For tactical political reasons, even the organization leading the No campaign in the 1999 referendum, Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM), has been loath to acknowledge openly the British character of the Crown. Austra-lian patriots may love the forefathers who framed the Australian Constitution, but they often forget their kinship with the Canadians who drafted the British North America Act. Even the rebellious American colonists who produced a rough facsimile of the eighteenth-century English constitution at the Philadel-phia convention of 1787 have slipped from their rightful place in the pantheon of British liberty. Tracing our constitutional ancestry still further back, to the Anglo-Saxon patriots who resisted the imposition of the Norman yoke, is no longer done in polite society, much less the classroom.

By inducing the constitutional amnesia causing us to forget who we are and where we came from, governments in every British dominion, including Britain itself, have effectively corrupted “their” respective peoples. Having transformed British subjects throughout the Commonwealth into Australian,


Canadian, New Zealand, and British (now on the road to becoming European) citizens, the managerial state now asserts its own control over questions of national identity.

We have forgotten what it means to be freeborn British subjects. At the same time, Australian citizenship amounts to little more than a legal formality. Citizens may be entitled to an Australian passport or compelled to vote and serve on juries. But we can no longer take it for granted that voters or poten-tial jurors speak the same language. Citizenship is now a vertical relationship between individuals and the state; it does not imply membership in a com-munity of memory. By contrast, old-fashioned British patriotism gathered the far-flung subjects of the Crown together in a common world that would outlive them all. That was then. For decades now, Australian governments have been busy hollowing out the social and cultural significance of the same statutory citizenship they were so eager to substitute for our common law status as British subjects.

All our connections to the ancient British constitution have been sev-ered—save one. That one is the hereditary monarchy. The authority vested in the monarchy has waned, at times precipitously. But the Queen still serves as the only available polestar of constitutional legitimacy for subjects cut adrift from a durable past by creeping republican governments brazenly acting in the name of the Crown. Could it be that only a Patriot King can now save a people that have grown terminally corrupt?

THE IDEA OF A PATRIOT KING IN AN AGE OF MASS MIGRATION

Only the hereditary monarchy can call both despotic governments and corrupted peoples back to the original principles of liberty owing their genesis to the ancient British constitution. At any rate, that is what the eighteenth-cen-tury opposition leader Viscount Bolingbroke tells us. Fearful that the rise of a vast, impersonal system of finance capital would transform government into a sort of self-imposed Norman yoke, Bolingbroke wondered “whether, when the people are grown corrupt, a free government could be maintained, if they enjoy it; or established, if they enjoy it not?”15 Certainly an elective monarch (whether called a president, a governor-general, or a king) was ill equipped and unlikely to save a corrupt people from themselves.

Bolingbroke was convinced that such a people might indeed be saved but only “by means of a very different kind.” That manner of salvation will not be open to us, Bolingbroke suggests, “without the concurrence and the influ-ence of a Patriot King, the most uncommon of all phenomena in the physical or moral world.” For Bolingbroke, it was axiomatic that “[p]atriotism must be founded in great principles and supported by great virtues.”16 Therefore, if the people have fallen away from the spirit of liberty once associated with the ancient British constitution, it is the patriotic duty of their king to call them back to the first principles of free government.


The conventional wisdom has it that the monarch has no role to play in any decision to expunge the Crown from the Commonwealth Constitution. The Queen herself has said it is a matter for the Australian people and that she will accept whatever decision they make. In that respect, Her Majesty has behaved in the regular and thoroughly predictable manner expected of her. But no one should doubt that the monarch possesses a prerogative power to act, spontaneously and unpredictably, in defense of the constitution. Australia’s then governor-general, Sir John Kerr, made that clear on November 11, 1975. Ignoring the convention that the governor-general can act only on the advice of his ministers, Kerr invoked the reserve powers of the Crown to dismiss the Whitlam Labor government.17 The Labor ministry still commanded a majority in the House of Representatives; nevertheless, it immediately surrendered of-fice to a caretaker government under Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. Gough Whitlam’s diehard supporters remained in a state of denial for many years afterward, but at the time of his dismissal the Labor leader himself never dared to call into question the authority behind the viceregal decision.18

The constitutional efficacy of Kerr’s action illustrates the truth of Carl Schmitt’s dictum that the “exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.”19 Rooted in the faculty of freedom, political action always interrupts automatic and petrified processes; it represents a new beginning, breaking into the world as an “infinite improbability.” For that reason, Hannah Arendt maintained that “it is not in the least superstitious, it is even a counsel of realism, to look for the unforeseeable and the unpredictable, to be prepared for and to expect ‘miracles’ in the political realm.”20

It is therefore worth asking whether the reign of a Patriot King in Australia could “effectively restore the virtue and public spirit essential to the preserva-tion of liberty and national prosperity.”21 Could the hereditary monarchy, once again, become the hinge upon which the whole constitution moves?

In his day, Bolingbroke knew, such a suggestion would “pass among some for the reveries of a distempered brain.”22 Today, the ability of the monarch to act independently is even more hemmed in by rigid laws and conventions. But both reason and experience confirm that neither a king nor his subjects can be transformed forever into automatons. Certainly, as Bolingbroke knew, the ancient British constitution has always stood upon a dual foundation: the common law gave expression to both the inchoate needs of a self-governing society and the sovereign will of an emergent state.

Without question, the legal forms and political conventions of parliamentary sovereignty are an essential feature of our constitutional order. But the con-stitution dwells, as well, in the spirit and character of the people. Bolingbroke warned that the preservation of liberty depended upon “the mutual conformity and harmony” of those two elements.23 Once the spirit of the people is broken or corrupted, the fundamental order of the constitution must be altered, if not destroyed.


Our cosmopolitan elites believe that decades of mass immigration have transformed the character of the Australian people. Certainly, republican manifestoes regularly assert as established fact the conclusory claim that “We are no longer a British people.” True, they do not put the change down to im-migration alone. For decades, they have complained that the United Kingdom abandoned the dominions to enter Europe. Interestingly, John Hirst attributes some of the blame for that betrayal to the Queen, who went “to Strasbourg to give her sanction to British membership of the European Community.” In so doing, Hirst charges, she became “one of the enemies of rural Australia.”24

Hirst’s argument implies, of course, that the Queen owes a duty of protec-tion to all her subjects wherever they may be. Bolingbroke agreed, declaring that when a people establish a free constitution, their kings come “under the most sacred obligations that human law can create, and divine law authorize, to defend and maintain the freedom of such constitutions.”25 The Crown has always been under a positive duty to protect the spirit of British liberty. That obligation became especially compelling once universal suffrage permitted every elected government to identify its own absolutist pretensions with the will of the people. Today, the allegedly enlightened despotism holding sway over the British peoples threatens their very survival. In the name of universal human rights, our historic claim to secure possession of an ethnic homeland has been cast into doubt, both “at home” and in the old white settler dominions.

In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and even in the United Kingdom, not to mention the United States, the ultimate genetic interests of the Anglo-Saxon ethny are at risk. Ethnies, like individuals and families, have an interest in securing “the indefinite survival of their own distinctive genes and their copies, whether these be resident in the individual, its descendants, or its collateral relatives.”26 Governments opening their borders to Third World immigration and enforcing policies of official multiculturalism have seriously compromised the genetic interests of the Australian ethny. The Anglo-Australian people constitute a large, partly inbred, extended family, within which even distant kin “carry genetic interests for each other.” But, because—at any given level of technology—the Australian landmass has a finite carrying capacity, mass immigration must replace Australian children with those of other, more or less unrelated, ethnic extended families. If immigrant groups are genetically distant from the Australian ethny, the damage to its genetic interests will be especially pronounced. If England, for example, received 12.5 million closely related Danish immigrants, Frank Salter has calculated that the genetic loss to the remaining English would be relatively low, amounting to the equivalent of 209,000 children. But the same number of immigrants from India would cause a corresponding loss of 2.6 million children. Bantus are even more genetically remote from the English. An influx of 12.5 million Bantus would displace the equivalent of 13 million English children. If Indians or Bantus displayed


higher fertility rates than the host population, the genetic losses incurred by the English would be higher still.27

The abolition of the White Australia policy has had similar consequences. Australians have been stripped of the ethnic monopoly over their antipodean homeland that the federation of the colonies in 1901 was designed to secure. The resultant damage to their genetic interests can also be understood as an attack on the foundation of their constitutional freedom. The word “freedom” is derived from an Indo-European root meaning “dear” or “beloved.”28 In its primordial sense, then, freedom is the right to belong to a community of dearly beloved people, the family being the first and most important model for every such form of association. (Significantly, slaves were denied the right to marry or to raise a family within the walls of their own household.) Every ethny is an extended family with a genetic interest in its own survival and enhanced vitality. Just as parents have a duty to care for their children, it might be said that every free person has a moral obligation to defend his own ethny.29

Unfortunately, over the past half-century, governments throughout the Anglosphere have encouraged us to ignore the genetic interests of our ethnic kin through systematic campaigns of indoctrination and legal coercion. Such policies not only subvert the genetic continuity of the Australian ethny, they also deprive us of the right to belong to a community of free people inhabiting its own homeland. But perhaps we are our own worst enemies. To the extent that the Australian people have been willing to squander the genetic inter-ests of their own ethny by directing scarce territorial, cultural, and economic resources to non-kin, they have been corrupted in a manner and to a degree hardly imaginable to Bolingbroke and his eighteenth-century contemporaries. Whether committed by a single individual or an entire race, suicide is a sin.

The problem Bolingbroke identified so long ago has finally come to a head: What can or should the reigning monarch do to restore the lost freedoms once enshrined in the ancient British constitution? Governments pursuing policies of forced integration in the name of an unachievable ideal of equality have trampled upon the freedom of association as well as the rights of free expression and private property. Having been denied or downplayed for the last three centuries now, the crisis of the ancient constitution has deepened to the point where the very existence of the British people, at home and in the overseas dominions, is now up for grabs. As a consequence, a Patriot King worthy of the name would recognize a moral obligation to defend to the death the genetic interests of his own ethny.

It was once taken for granted that the King would defend his realm per-sonally, by force of arms if need be. But George II was the last British monarch to lead his armies into battle. Nowadays, the greatest threat to the survival interests of the British peoples comes, not from without, but from our “own” governing classes. To save his people today, a Patriot King need not take up arms; he could rely instead upon the power of reasoned speech to rouse his


people to the dangers of demographic decline and territorial displacement. A modern patriot prince would defend the genetic kinship between heredi-tary kings and their historic peoples against managerialist regimes bent on extinguishing the ancestral spirit of the ancient British constitution, not just in Australia but throughout the entire Anglosphere.

DERACINATED STATISM VERSUS THE ANCIENT BRITISH CONSTITUTION

For their part, constitutional jurists committed to the preservation of a free society should begin at once to consider how the ethnic patriotism of a reigning monarch could be reconciled with his role and responsibilities within the Aus-tralian constitutional order. Analysis of that issue must begin from the premise that the Queen is not the Australian head of state—that function is performed by the governor-general. 30 This proposition—a staple item in Australians for Constitutional Monarchy’s intellectual armory—is sound as far as it goes, but it does rather beg the question of what the Queen actually is. The best answer is that she is the head (or sovereign) of a society, one extending far beyond the territorial limits of any single state. The most salient feature of that society is its overwhelmingly British, ethnocultural character. Though governments and, today, even the Queen, are loath to admit it, the British monarch is the de facto and even de jure head of a globe-girdling ethnic community. But the ethnic solidarity, much less the constitutional unity, of that community can never be taken for granted. Nor can it be assumed that the continued passivity of the reigning monarch is a permanent feature of the constitutional landscape. Almost by definition, the sovereign possesses the power to decide and the capacity to act in exceptional circumstances to save his people.31

The king has always been the parens patriae, the father of his country. That kinship metaphor is deeply entrenched in the constitutional and legal history of the British dominions. It implies that the king could be held morally, perhaps even legally, accountable should he fail to defend the interests of his ethnic fam-ily against a clear and present danger. Unfortunately, regal breaches of ethnic loyalty are not at all unknown. Indeed, in her 2004 Christmas broadcast, the Queen celebrated the Third World invasion of the British homeland. Lending her authority to the multiracialist dogma that “diversity is indeed a strength and not a threat,” Her Majesty even took a swipe at those “extremists at home” who posed the only apparent danger to “peaceful and steady progress in our society of differing cultures and heritage.”32

Clearly, the Queen recognizes no duty of loyalty to her coethnics. Even so, the people of the British diaspora should retain their historic allegiance to the Crown. Sooner or later, the Queen or one of her heirs and successors will be forced to recognize that the fate of the hereditary British monarchy is inseparably linked to the ethnic constitution of a particular people. If not and the managerial classes continue their relentless campaign to detach the British


(or the Australian) state from the British (or the Anglo-Australian) nation, the monarchy is doomed.

It follows that the British monarch speaks not just for herself or even for her subjects in the here and now; she must also give voice to the needs and interests of the dead and the unborn—but “not any dead and unborn: only those who belong” to the particular, cross-generational, pre-political commu-nity constituting the British ethny in the United Kingdom and the old white Commonwealth. “Not being elected by popular vote, the monarch cannot be understood as representing the interests of the present generation.” Speaking for absent generations, monarchs “are, in a very real sense, the voice of history.” There is a spiritual dimension to the kingly office that cannot be replicated, much less usurped, by modern governments managing mundane and material affairs of state in pursuit of yet another short-term electoral mandate. Indeed it is precisely because the ancestral authority—literally, the genetic legitimacy—of the British Crown transcends the temporal powers of government that repub-licans want to rid themselves of it. They know, if the Queen does not, that the fate of the monarchy is bound up with the history and destiny of the British ethny. 33 Fortunately, that history is not yet a closed book.

So long as the British monarchy survives, the succession of a Patriot King, or even its widely perceived possibility, could set the Australian Republican Movement back on its heels. If Bolingbroke was right, “a king can, easily to himself and without violence to his people, renew the spirit of liberty in their minds.”34 Kings can quicken the dead letter of the old constitution. To con-firm that proposition one need only imagine how the republicanism debate in Australia would be transformed were the Queen, Prince Charles, or Prince William to champion the constitutional unity of the British peoples. No doubt any such breach of convention would be met with a firestorm of outrage. Our political class expects the royal family to conform to a rigid code of personal and political behavior. But, for just that reason, a patriot prince refusing to remain silent in the face of vital threats to the common interests of the monarchy and his people would demonstrate that freedom of action is open to any citizen possessing the courage of his convictions.

In seeking to renew the freedoms of the ancient British constitution in a modern Australia, a Patriot King would move beyond a sterile and backward-looking defense of the past. Instead, a patriot prince would inspire a forward-looking reconstruction of a British, or, more broadly, Anglo-American, civili-zation. By helping us to recover our historic identity as a British people, such a prince would inspire efforts to establish closer ties with our natural allies in the English-speaking world, including the most important British-derived nation, the USA.

At present, the Queen presides over a Commonwealth that is expanding its membership to the point of absurdity. A British Commonwealth that in-cludes Mozambique but not the USA will be patently irrelevant to the future


of Anglo-American civilization. Of course, those hostile to the British ethny don’t much care. Managerialist republican visions for the future depend on the deliberate devaluation of our British past. Australia’s future, they believe, lies in Asia. Meanwhile, their self-loathing counterparts in the UK look set to submerge themselves in Europe. In both cases, history, politics, and culture are to be subordinated to geography and economics.

Like Turkey, which cannot decide whether to join Europe or remain part of Islamic civilization, Australia has become a “torn country,”35 split asunder by the deepening division between cosmopolitans and parochials. But, in a curious twist, it is the cosmopolitan, republican elites who have promoted the most parochial understanding of citizenship, carving up the Anglosphere into sovereign states, whose peoples are deemed to be foreigners to each other, despite their common origin in the British diaspora. A Patriot King would help us to see over the walls that governments have erected around us.

Governments have an obvious interest in ensuring that people owe no allegiance to any authority above and beyond themselves. For much of the twentieth century, state-building took the place of empire-building, much less nation-building. The appearance of a Patriot King would restore the true im-age of the British Commonwealth as an association of free people “united by one common interest and animated by one common spirit.” A patriot prince would no longer aid and abet the division of the Anglosphere into separate, mutually indifferent, and increasingly hollow nationalities. Instead, he will “endeavor to unite them, and to be himself the center of their union.”36 It is not at all obvious that Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders have become freer through the systematic obliteration of their common law status as free-born British subjects.

Both the Queen and her most loyal subjects must now bend the knee be-fore statist definitions of national identity. ACM is always careful to present the monarchy as an Australian institution. One can, of course, point out that Australia is still British in a formal or at least a residual sense by virtue of its allegiance to the Crown and that most of its people trace their origins back to the United Kingdom. But this cuts no ice with officialdom, not even with Her Majesty’s judges in the High Court of Australia. In their newly minted vision of an autolegitimating state, the Constitution creates the nation, not the other way round.37

Given the current ideological climate, one can hardly fault the monarch for remaining silent in the face of endless insulting references to our “foreign” Queen. In fact, the Queen is no more foreign to Australia than the spirit of the ancient British constitution, without which the formal, black-letter text of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Imp) could never have sprung into life. But if not even the Queen is prepared to do battle with the enemies of the ancient constitution, small wonder that ordinary citizens sometimes give up the ghost. Indeed, many now feel like strangers in their


own land. To resist the massed wealth and power of the political, economic, and cultural elites railroading us toward a republic is no easy task. Yet there can be no doubt that our future as a free people hangs in the balance.

Doubts over our fidelity to the original principles of constitutional liberty became unavoidable once the creation of an Australian republic was touted as the first step toward full membership in a new regional polity. Under the Keating Labor government, it seemed that Australia was ready to defect from the West. Indeed, postmodernist republicanism already assumes that the constitution of our Asian future will not be a liberal democracy on any European or Anglo-American model. Alastair Davidson, for example, admits frankly that we may have to jettison a basic premise of Western constitution-alism, namely, the presence of citizens capable of thinking for themselves. Australians, he says, “will have to come to terms with an ideal of Confucian origin that says that wisdom teaches men and women to fit in and that life is suffering.” Alone in Asia, Australians will have to “accept what Montesquieu called despotism.”38

THE CIVILIZING MISSION OF A PATRIOT KING

In reality, neither the republic nor the Asianization of Australia is inevitable. Moreover, Australian republican rhetoric is fixated on an obsolescent model of sovereign statehood and national independence. International politics is in fact no longer dominated by power struggles between independent nation-states exercising sovereign control over territory, resources, and populations. Even the ideological struggles of the Cold War era have given way to deeper cultural cleavages between civilizations.

According to Samuel Huntington, Australia sits near the intersection of several geopolitical fault lines. Asia is not a homogeneous entity. It is divided between Sinic, Buddhist, Hindu, and Japanese civilizations, not to mention the Islamic and Orthodox countries also to be found there. The “strange multiplic-ity” of Asia offers new opportunities for trade, commerce, and intercourse but it also poses a perennial danger to Anglo-Australian civilization. Whatever else they may be, Asian peoples are overwhelmingly non-Western and, not infrequently, anti-Western to boot. Australia, by contrast, is part of the globe-girdling Anglosphere, still the most dynamic and powerful element within Western civilization. It would be an unmistakable sign of Western weakness were Australia to drift away from its ancient constitutional mooring into the vortex of inter-Asian rivalries. A patriot prince will challenge the ideological hegemony enjoyed by deracinated Australian republicans eager to “bandwagon with rising non-Western civilizations.” 39

In a new world order marked by pervasive conflict between cultures and civilizations, it makes little strategic sense for the Australian people to renounce their (distinctively Anglo-American) Western identity. Australia is not alone in the world. The Crown can act to reinvigorate the ethnocultural community


uniting us with English Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and, above all, the USA. A patriot prince would crown his reign with everlasting glory by reawakening American citizens to the British roots of their own proudly independent, if increasingly incoherent sense of nationhood.

A modern patriot prince, Bolingbroke reminds us, would “deem the union of his subjects his greatest advantage.” At the moment, the fissiparous forces of disunity are in the ascendancy. That is why a Patriot King would be today, as in the eighteenth century:

the most powerful of all reformers; for he is himself a sort of standing miracle, so rarely seen and so little understood that the sure effect of his appearance will be admiration and love in every honest breast, confusion and terror to every guilty conscience, but submission and resignation in all.40

To a Patriot King, the governments of the dominions would appear as so many factions inhabiting a common civilization. Bolingbroke maintained that:

In whatever light we view the divided state of a people, there is none in which these divisions will appear incurable, nor a union of the members of a great community with one another, and with their head, unattainable.41

Precisely because nothing can be more uncommon than a Patriot King, he may be able to accomplish what common sense tells us is improbable or even impossible. Once he succeeds to the throne, nothing less than the hearts of his far-flung people “will content such a prince; nor will he think his throne established, till it is established there.” Nowadays Australia is a country whose “people is divided about submission to their prince.”42 Unity can be restored only when a patriot prince demonstrates that allegiance to the British Crown enhances, rather than diminishes the dignity of Australian citizenship.

One hopes that Bolingbroke figures prominently in the education of young Prince William. But all of us should heed Bolingbroke’s advice to do everything we can to become the sort of people worthy of a Patriot King. We must prepare ourselves for great changes in the world and in ourselves. Bolingbroke predicted that, after the succession of a Patriot King, the people would remain outwardly the same but “the difference of their sentiments will almost persuade them that they are changed into different beings.”43

CONCLUSION

The appearance of a patriot prince would be a miracle indeed. But those who pray for such a deliverance must not neglect such means as are in their own power “to keep the cause of reason, of virtue and of liberty alive.” The blessing of a patriot prince might indeed “be withheld from us” but to “deserve at least that it be granted to us, let us prepare to receive it, to improve it, and to co-operate with it.”44


Were a patriot prince to campaign in defense of the monarchy, he would be subjected to a raging torrent of criticism and abuse. Yet when a good prince is seen “to suffer with the people, and in some measure for them…many advantages would accrue to him.” For one thing, the cause of the British peoples generally “and his own cause would be made the same by their common enemies.”45

What is the nature of that cause? In short, a patriot prince will call forth a spirit of resistance to both managerial statism and the abstract universalism of the capitalist marketplace. He will do everything in his power to civilize those too often wild and amoral forces. But, unlike the long-awaited Australian re-public, the appearance of a Patriot King is not inevitable. Indeed, only a people whose lost liberties are restored to memory will recognize his coming as an opportunity to reshape their allegedly preordained future.

The tables must be turned on Australian republicans. They aim to corner the market on both cosmopolitan tolerance and national pride. All defenders of the monarchy must therefore cast ARM in a new light. Behind the progressive face of official republicanism lie the sordid realities of worldly ambition, class privilege, and the pursuit of power. Considered in the cold light of class analy-sis, a republican victory would enthrone the overbearing self-importance and ideological zeal of shortsighted provincial elites willing to sacrifice the genetic interests of their own people in return for a mess of postmodernist pottage.

Sociologically speaking, republicans represent the local branch plant man-agers and bureaucratic nodes of a transnational corporate state system ever more dependent upon the inscrutable workings of the divine economy. Having embraced the materialist religion of humanity, republicans rush to renounce their historical roots and traditional allegiances, thereby subverting the consti-tutionalist culture of mixed monarchy. Playing an important supporting role in the managerial revolution of our time, an all-pervasive, creeping republicanism is steadily deconstructing the fabric of British civilization.

We no longer publicly call upon God to save the Queen. The ritual absence of the monarch from everyday life is but one more sign that we are no longer a serious people. Forswearing the faith of our fathers, we surrender our bod-ies to the state and our souls to the gospel of wealth. In the end, a Patriot King may have to save us. Remember, though: a king is, indeed, like unto God;46 he cannot save those who will not save themselves.

Andrew Fraser is Associate Professor in the Department of Public Laws at Macquarie University. He is the author of The Spirit of the Laws: Republicanism and the Unfinished Project of Modernity and Reinventing Aristocracy: The Constitutional Reformation of Corporate Governance.


ENDNOTES

1. See the prophetic book of the same title by Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color (New York: Charles Scribners’ Sons, 1920).2. On the running battle since the 1960s between “cosmopolitans” and “pa-rochials,” see Katharine Betts, The Great Divide (Sydney: Duffy & Snellgrove, 1999).3. B O’Brien, “The Australia Acts,” in M. P. Ellinghaus, et al., The Emergence of Australian Law (Sydney: Butterworths, 1989).4. Bob Birrell, Federation: The Secret Story (Sydney: Duffy & Snellgrove, 2001).5. Robert Nisbet, Twilight of Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975): 65.6. On the managerial revolution generally, see James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World (New York: John Day Company, 1941); also, Paul Edward Gottfried, After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Samuel Francis, “Power Trip,” The Occidental Quarterly 3(2) (Summer 2003): 69–78.7. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Andrew Fraser, The Spirit of the Laws: Republicanism and the Unfinished Project of Modernity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).8. Donald Harman Akenson, “The Historiography of English-Speaking Canada and the Concept of Diaspora: A Skeptical Appreciation,” Canadian Historical Review 76 (1995): 377.9. On computing “genetic distance” between different races and ethnic groups, see Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004).10. The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship,” Melbourne University Law Review 24 (2002): 1.11. Andrew Fraser, “A Marx for the Managerial Revolution: Habermas on Law and Democracy,” Journal of Law and Society 28 (2001): 361.12. Salter, 47, 30.13. Robert Conquest, “Bonds and Bureaucratism,” American Outlook (Spring 2001); http://www.americanoutlook.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=article_detail&id=113014. Alan Macfarlane, The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and the Social Transition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978); Kevin MacDonald, “What Makes Western Culture Unique?” The Occidental Quarterly 2(2) (2002); http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol2no2/km-unique.html15. Viscount Bolingbroke, “The Idea of a Patriot King,” [originally published in 1749] in David Armitage ed., Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1997), 249.16. Ibid., 221, 234.


17. Sir John Kerr, Matters for Judgement (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1978).18. See, especially, H. O. Browning, 1975: Crisis (Sydney: Hale and Ironmonger, 1985). 19. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 36.20. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Meridian, 1961), 168–70.21. Bolingbroke, 222.22. Ibid., 240.23. Ibid., 247–48.24. John Hirst, A Republican Manifesto (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4–5.25. Bolingbroke, 244.26. Richard Alexander, quoted in Salter, 26.27. Ibid., 42, 59–75.28. See, e.g., the entry for “free” in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary29. Salter, 283–320.30. David Smith, “The Governor-General Is Our Head of State,” Quadrant 48(7) (July–August 2004); http://www.quadrant.org.au/php/archive_details_list.php?article_id=87131. Schmitt, 5.32. http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/Page3624.asp33. Cf. “In Defence of the Nation,” in Roger Scruton, The Philosopher on Do-ver Beach (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 1998); see also Scruton, “Democracy Is Nnot Enough,” Herbert Spencer Lecture, 2 March 1999, Oxford University.34. Bolingbroke, 251.35. See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996): 138–54.36. Bolingbroke, 258. 37. Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462.38. Alastair Davidson, From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twen-tieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 286.39. Huntington, 151–54.40. Bolingbroke, 259, 251.41. Ibid., 269–70.42. Ibid., 264–65.43. Ibid., 251.44. Ibid., 222.45. Ibid., 239.

46. Cf. “James I on monarchy: speech to Parliament, 21 March 1610,” in J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1966): 12-14.

A LETTER FROM A GRANDFATHER

TO HIS GENES

ANTHONY HILTON

EXPLANATION

These thoughts on “nationalism” were put on paper for the benefit of several young relatives who have misunderstood or been puzzled by my position on certain family and political issues.* Arguing about individual bits of a puzzle without an overall framework has been a waste of time and emotion. So I’ve tried to give, first, a brief overview or “manifesto,” followed by several specific explanations.1 Perhaps these considerations will help others faced with critics unfamiliar with the biology of hu-man nature.

Here’s a thought: You either like your own people or you don’t. If you don’t, well, too bad, and we’ll get back to you in a minute. But if you do like your own people—that is, your own children, family, extended

family, clan, tribe, or ethnic group, hereinafter called your “ethny” or nation (and we’ll get back to these words, in a minute, too)—this memorandum offers some considerations concerning life on this planet that today, oddly, many people and conventional wisdom seem to ignore.2 You may also appreciate the fact that our planet contains many other cultures and ethnies/nations, whose continued existence you might also be in favor of in accordance with today’s quasi-ideology of “bio-diversity.” That is, if you claim to love and respect other cultures, races, or ethnies as well as your own, you would do nothing to destroy or unduly change them. You would then be a “universal nationalist.”3

Most people ought to be able to answer quite easily, when asked, “Yes, I would like to see my own people and culture continue to exist, not disappear,” or else, “No, my people and culture are not worth saving—I couldn’t care less if they vanished from the face of the earth.” To favor the continuation (the non-disappearance) of one’s people does not mean that one wouldn’t like to see improvements in flawed individuals (and who doesn’t have a few flaws?) or find some way of keeping flawed individuals from sabotaging the cause. ________________________* Apart from proselytizing, little or nothing here is original–see end notes. Main sources are Pierre van den Berghe’s 1981 classic, The Ethnic Phenomenon, and Frank Salter’s On Genetic Interests (2003) (for both books, see endnote 1).


One might like to see improvements in certain cultural details or personal-ity traits common in one’s group, or the eugenic elimination of nasty genes wherever feasible. But such improvements would not be intended to remove either the major cultural traits or the vast majority of the characteristic genes that one’s people carry around and reproduce each generation.

Now then, if (and only if) you do not want your people to disappear, wouldn’t you necessarily have to favor the following policies?

First, you would favor a protective/defensive “nationalism” in regard to your own extended family and ethny. This need not be to the exclu-sion of commerce and other valuable reciprocal relationships with other families, other peoples, other ethnies. There is no good reason why your nationalism can’t be thoroughly compatible with other nationalisms and even synergistic with them—at least, or especially, if there is provision for some sort of regulatory-adjudicative body and police force to prevent any one ethny from being unduly predatory and pounding the stuffing out of its neighbors.4 Predation was not always irrational, as long as the odds were good that your side would win out and claim all the booty. But predators have to worry about their victims taking revenge (as in “terrorism”). No one likes to be the loser in a war, and in today’s wars often everyone is the loser, not least because wars pollute and interfere with depolluting the planet. Genocide, the slaughter of an ethny in its entirety, or its complete assimilation into another ethny, is analogous to the extinction of any spe-cies of plant or animal.5 Just as “biodiversity” is regarded as potentially beneficial across the animal and plant kingdoms, so, arguably, is human diversity in particular. One never knows when or how another culture or ethny may turn out to benefit one’s own, but if they go extinct, they are lost forever. Maybe there are some cultures that you detest, but maybe you should hold your nose and hope that they survive, too—someplace.

Second, you would want at least one territory, including a homeland, for your own people and culture as the easiest, most practical way to protect your ethny from being swamped by other ethnies.6 With a territory for every ethny, each is then responsible for not overloading its carrying capacity. The territory need not be large, e.g., a Swiss canton. Most of today’s cities contain micro ethnic enclaves (however vulnerable to invasion) along with areas that are heterogeneous.

Third, you would want at most a very modest amount of immigration into your territory, along with tourism, to provide exposure to alternative and possibly better cultural ways, without being forced to adopt them. Guest workers can provide extra labor when needed. Notice that most people can’t get past an all-or-nothing statement of the issue: You either allow immigration or you don’t; they can’t think in terms of “a little, but not a lot.”

Spring 2005 / Hilton 55

Fourth, at most a very modest amount of intermarriage with other ethnies to counter the genetic effects of too much inbreeding, or to achieve other eugenic goals, e.g., to have smarter kids.

Fifth, you would need some sort of group structure or community (with rules, customs, laws, etc.) designed to help achieve the above goals.

Sixth, group structure and community would, for many people, be handicapped without a full embrace of the spiritual world, which, in essence, seems to be a conscious and unconscious acceptance of and celebration of the “sacred,” i.e., of the extreme importance of certain aspects of our lives, both social and physical, and a devotion to the quest for paradise in this best of all possible worlds. Nowadays, of course, any spiritual or religious dogma that is contrary to the findings of modern science, typified by the antipathy of some Christian and Muslim doctrines to the idea of biologi-cal (Darwinian) evolution, will likely alienate the most talented of one’s people. This antipathy has obscured what is surely the most sacred priority imaginable, the survival on this planet of one’s people, however defined: one’s “sacred nation.” What is sacred is essentially what is vitally impor-tant. Rituals that are sacred are those that surround important milestones in life (birth, marriage, death, etc.) and that promote successful negotiation through these stages of life.

There are people who are nationalistic without calling themselves “re-ligious,” but to exclude the spiritual is to ignore the enormous fulfillment which a focus on the spiritual can provide for many people in matters of success, love, tragedy, and death, and in encouraging a healthy and cohesive community. A major problem historically has been that so much that char-acterizes well-known religions seems contrary to common sense, irrational or silly (some concepts of the hereafter), maladaptive (the “promiscuous” altruism of some Christians), hypocritical (“Onward Christian Soldiers”), unnecessarily hazardous to outsiders (Zionists, Crusaders, Taliban), and therefore unnecessarily alienating.7 For many of us, they also originated in foreign lands, in people and cultures that lived in different times, ecolo-gies, and circumstances. Surely all this can be improved upon.

An incidental note: To say that you favor the above policies doesn’t necessarily imply anything about what you are personally prepared to do about them, only that you would necessarily favor them if you want your people to be protected. E.g., you might be too busy, distracted, discouraged, or lazy to do much about them. Maybe you’re so far along in your life that you can only hope others will do the job. Encourage them.

So, in brief, that’s all there is to it. However, thanks to a half century or so of massive ideological campaigns against the relevance of biology for human social relations, any defender or critic of nationalism should become familiar with a few essential understandings. Perhaps the follow-ing will help.


_____________________

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Addressed in detail are some of the more frequently asked pertinent questions:

1. What is meant by our own people?2. What is biological kinship all about? Why is it such a strong

glue?3. Why aren’t the nearly 100 percent of our genes that everyone shares

more important than those few that vary?4. Why is kinship “relative”?5. Doesn’t nationalism promote wars between ethnies?6. How do we reach reciprocity from “might-makes-right”?7. Doesn’t nationalism inspire a feeling of superiority that is used to

justify dominating other ethnies?8. What is the relationship between reciprocity and kinship?9. Why would anyone doubt the relationship of family or extended

family to ethnicity and nation?10. Why aren’t cultural differences the reason for nationalism?11. Doesn’t the success of multiculturalism show that having the same

ancestry is not necessary for a harmonious society as long as people speak a common language?

12. Why isn’t everyone nationalistic? 13. How do you explain the fact that a major football rivalry for Tu-

nisia seems to be with another North African country, Morocco, rather than with countries that are much more distantly related?

14. What’s wrong with interracial marriage?15. How do you decide how much immigration to have?16. How can a small territory (enclave, ghetto, neighborhood) control

immigration?17. What do you mean by group structure?18. Should everyone be a nationalist?

___________________________

1. WHAT IS MEANT BY OUR OWN PEOPLE?

This can vary all over the lot. Situations differ in how salient they make certain degrees of closeness among kin. A holiday may focus our minds on immediate family, while a family reunion could bring together a vast collec-tion of people with the same name. A war can make us concerned for our whole ethny or nation (e.g., Irish Catholics or Serbs or Jews) as it is aligned


against an enemy nation.8 Note that we often belong to associations such as a flying club, or a labor union, or to a management team. But we’re mostly concerned here with groupings that are based on some degree of biological kinship, which seems to be an especially powerful glue for group formation, rather than common economic or other interests. American workers tend to resent their jobs being outsourced to “fellow” workers in Southeast Asia or to illegal immigrants: Where is the worker solidarity there?

2. WHAT IS BIOLOGICAL KINSHIP ALL ABOUT?

WHY IS IT SUCH A STRONG GLUE?

Most people around the world understand something about the importance of “blood,” or family, as a primary source of help, backup, love, and social cohesion.9 A fundamental basis for sociality. Several sharp minds managed to convince many gullible minds to the contrary, during the twentieth century, but fortunately their forces seem now to be in retreat.

Common sense tells us that a first and very natural impulse for most of us (with due allowance for abnormal individuals or situations) is the promotion of our own lives and self-defense. Thanks however to important insights by biologists (see, e.g., Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, for an introduction), it is now clear that we share our genes (the all-important DNA strands that are blueprints for proteins out of which human beings are constructed) with kin.10 (Note: We are talking about only those distinctive genes [“alleles”] that can vary across humans, not the vast number—well over 90 percent of our genes—that all of us have in common.) If the recent insights are correct, the ultimate meaning of life, and the raison d’être for any altruism and social co-hesion at all, is the promotion of our distinctive genes along with the others. The way DNA gets perpetuated is by building a body that looks and acts in ways that lead to reproduction of those same strands of DNA molecules. No reproduction, no more DNA. Thus one way of promoting this reproduction is by helping our kin as well as ourselves. One sees this dramatically in the ultra-cooperation between identical twins—who share all their genes with each other.11 It can also be seen in the considerable social cohesion exhibited by small, ethnically homogeneous societies such as exist in Iceland. Given their degree of within-island, yet non-incestuous, marriage, the average Icelander has the equivalent of over a thousand siblings in the community, if one con-siders that she will likely share at least a few of the Icelandically distinctive genes with each of the several hundred thousand people in Iceland. Add them all up—that is, across all the individuals with whom she shares at least one—and it makes perfect sense that Icelanders should be cohesive: helping other Icelanders would be like helping all those virtual siblings.12 Genetic commonality means a certain amount of commonality of interest. Common


interest is a basis for trust, since insofar as people want the same thing for each other, they are unlikely to betray each other.

3. WHY AREN’T THE NEARLY 100 PERCENT OF OUR GENES THAT EVERYONE SHARES MORE IMPORTANT THAN THOSE FEW THAT VARY?

Indeed, around 99.9 percent of all the genes that a human being carries can be found in all other humans, and 98 percent in chimpanzees. Similar percent-ages of shared genes are found in most other animal species.13 So obviously it’s the tiny handful of remaining genes (perhaps 30 or so out of 30,000), each of which can have different versions (alleles), that cause people, primates, and other animals to differ from each other. It is those genes that can and do differ which are the basis for an increase in altruism as biological relatedness increases. Perhaps this is the basis for the oft-repeated phrase from Freud, the “narcissism of small differences.”

Suppose that a mutation (a new allele) happens to be useful. It makes sense (from the point of view of the whole package of genes that the muta-tion is immersed within) that there be some way to keep it from being lost to posterity. How? Well, surely not by worrying solely about the 99.9 percent of genes all humans share. No, you have to give proper attention to that new allele. The person carrying it has to reproduce it by making babies with his or her spouse. And while some animals can just walk away at this point, leaving offspring to their own devices, humans take care of their kids, e.g., that child now carrying the good mutation. That mutation might be one that encourages a parent to take better care of her child—who may, in turn, be carrying the same good mutation. That’s the feedback loop enabling altruism in the first place.

All this requires being able to recognize one’s kids. How? There are many possible ways: Look at whose body they came out of and who had sex with the mother; or physical resemblance; or what people say about the child’s ancestry; etc. Some of these clues are more reliable than others. (Hence the attention to “small differences.”) Then the parents have to be motivated to take care of their child—who is carrying half of each parent’s genes (since mammals undergo sexual and not asexual reproduction, or cloning). For all of this to happen reliably, via accurate detection of whose child is whose, plus a desire to take care of one’s own child (rather than any child or any object in the neighborhood), there have to be genes which program us to do the right thing. Notice that if one had a desire to take care of someone else’s child rather than one’s own, that would be the end of one’s own genes—including that lovely mutation. One doesn’t have to know about genes, but one has to have the right genes in order to do the right thing for this object (child) that came out of the mother’s body and the father’s sperm. Other objects come out of our body that we certainly do not take care of (no offense intended). So what’s the difference? Genes. Genes that program the “instincts” which


enable us to identify and take care of our children properly (along with what we’ve learned from our parents). And since our children have inherited those genes, 50 percent of them in each child, the genes will be self-perpetuating. Get rid of those genes for “caring-for-own-kids” and the self-perpetuation evaporates.

Now then, if that logic works so well for one’s own children, couldn’t it work, in principle at least, in regard to individuals who didn’t come out of our own bodies but who nevertheless are carrying many of our genes because we have ancestors in common that came out of the same bodies? Providing, that is, that we can identify them and then want to promote their survival and reproductive careers. Apparently we have such propensities. And that must be the basis for whatever extra cohesion we find among extended rela-tives compared to nonrelatives. How do you feel about your own brothers and sisters? Your nieces, nephews, uncles, aunts, cousins? Some people find themselves alienated from even their closest relatives, but that is usually be-cause of something extremely unpleasant that happened (e.g., excessive sibling rivalry). Were it not for that unfortunate matter, surely they would not be so seemingly indifferent to them. Notice what transpires when long lost relatives suddenly find each other after decades of separation due to war, adoption, or exile. Very touching, no? All because they share genes.” What alternative is there? Remember, if genes were not running the show, you wouldn’t likely have the same show repeated across every other culture. Rather, just by chance you would expect a few different shows: such as cultures in which people routinely prefer non-kin and foreigners to their own kin, where they routinely prefer to raise other ethnies’ children and give their own away to foreigners (if they have them at all). But think natural selection: Whose kids, on average, are most likely to be best off and most likely to reproduce?

Frank Salter, whose book on nationalism is strongly recommended here (but see footnote 16 regarding a terminological confusion), uses the phrase “genetic interests” in conceptualizing the relationship between genes and their reproduction.14 He doesn’t mean that genes or most animals carrying genes are capable of imagining their genes’ interests, even if they act as if they could. Genes just program their carriers to act that way. Such interests are more analogous to financial interests a person might have without being aware of them, an educational fund, say, that one day a child will inherit. A rock doesn’t have an interest one way or another in remaining intact or in becoming crushed rock. But that’s because it lacks any semblance of a process dedicated to even self-interest, never mind reproduction.

It’s an empirical question how and if a human being will go about promoting his genetic interests. Just because an Icelander’s genes are heavily represented in other Icelanders and, metaphorically, have an interest in being reproduced, does not mean that they, their carrier, or anyone else will have the necessary psychological motive for, or psychological interest in, reproducing them. He


might or he might not. Is there any point in saying to a reluctant Icelander, “Hey, your genes have an interest in getting reproduced, so get busy and do the right thing”? It might be worth bringing up the subject in case he had the right motives but had merely been distracted, or didn’t realize he had so many virtual brothers on the island. (Incidentally, Salter, citing recent DNA data, is confident that that Europeans in general are much more closely related to each other than heretofore imagined, thanks to the small size of their early prehistoric breeding pool following initial migrations to Europe. Imagine the thousands of present- day Icelanders growing to a hundred million or so. If additional immigration were restrained, they would find themselves with millions of virtual siblings.)15 However, if our Icelander friend is not at all interested in those previously unimagined relatives, there may not be any point in haranguing him. If he were nationalistic, though, the fact that his genes are scattered among other Icelanders would make it all understand-able; i.e., it would make sense that he had an evolved mechanism for acting as if he knew that they, too, were carriers of his own genes—just as a mother bird acts as if she knew that her eggs carried her genes. Look at a bird for the first time, and for all you know she may be a one-off creature that just came into the world and is unique. But if she has eggs and takes care of them and if you know all about DNA and genes, you say to yourself, Aha! She very likely has some sort of built-in, preprogrammed brain mechanisms for get-ting her to do all that—sitting on eggs, feeding chicks after they hatch, etc. So now when we see Icelanders or the Irish acting nationalistically, we know about the genes they share, and so it makes sense to us that they should be nationalistic—rather than, say, run off en masse to volunteer to be slaves for Africans. A few Irish are not at all nationalistic, but there are probably a few birds now and then that don’t sit on their eggs properly. No machinery is totally impervious to malfunction. And the many interesting things to do in life and the many wonderful people in other cultures easily distract humans. One could distract a bird from sitting on her eggs.

4. WHY IS KINSHIP “RELATIVE”?

If the above account of kinship is true, it means that whom we consider to be “our people” will normally depend on whom we actually are most closely related to and on our ability to reliably detect who those relatives are. But “most closely” is a relative concept. How close is “close” depends on whom we are comparing, which often means whom we are competing with. Compared to chimpanzees, Africans are “closer” to Icelanders. Compared to Africans, Swedes are closer to Icelanders. Compared to Swedes, other Icelanders are closer. Our identical twin is closer than our ordinary sibling. So there are no absolutes here. But the logic implies obvious priorities. Whom we consider “our people” and ally ourselves with in a crunch will follow that logic, other


things being equal. It will depend on context and on whom, if anyone, we find ourselves competing against.16

As a practical matter, the idea of ethnic relativity may have something to do with the notion of “subsidiarity” discussed frequently by Europeans (especially the British, and especially the British magazine The Economist) in connection with the European Union. This is the idea that all problems in life should be dealt with initially at the lowest possible political level (family, or neighborhood, or municipality, etc.), and that only if insoluble at that level should it be moved to the next higher level, and finally even to Brussels and the European Union—or to the United Nations. Subsidiarity would seem to follow a general logic of human concern. The first interest of any human is normally his own welfare and future, followed by his family and up through his extended family and ethny, extending eventually to all human beings and finally to the continued existence of life in general on the planet. At the higher levels of subsidiarity, we find a universal nationalist’s respect for ethnic and cultural diversity—in contrast to homogenizing globalization.

5. DOESN’T NATIONALISM PROMOTE WARS BETWEEN ETHNIES?

Of course. Not a problem if you love the excitement and fulfillment of warfare.17 But suppose you aren’t a war lover? Then go for the “reciprocity” mentioned earlier. And yes, there is a biological underpinning to it all. If that draws a blank, here’s a brief intro.18

Genes can be promoted not only by squashing your competitors but also by mutual aid arrangements—between individuals who don’t necessarily share any genes at all. Think of bees pollinating flowers and getting nectar in return; or the tiny fish that nourish themselves by helpfully cleaning the teeth and gills of very large fish in coastal waters.19 The only way these mutually beneficial arrangements can work, long term, is by ensuring that it’s a two-way street. It can work between nearly any organisms if their mutual benefit is simultaneous, so that if either one ceases to benefit, the other automatically gets cut off, too, and so neither can exploit the other. But humans are capable of reciprocity over time. You help me today and I will, in return, help you to-morrow, thanks to our big brains that can minimize exploitation. It’s division of labor, the economists’ “law of comparative advantage.” It may account for an enormous amount of human sociality, including warm friendships across ethnic and racial lines as well as more prosaic sorts of trade and commerce.20 Some people’s careers make them exceptionally prone to this type of intereth-nic relation, e.g., academics, political and professional elites; those involved in trade and the transport of goods and people between countries, etc.

Much of our emotional make-up (genetically evolved machinery in the brain) is thought to be devoted to monitoring and regulating these reciproci-ties.21 Feelings of friendship, attachment, obligation, or guilt toward nonrela-


tives exist because they provide emotional incentives that promote beneficial reciprocity. The outrage felt when we are cheated motivates us to stop giving anything to those who don’t reciprocate. Vengeful feelings motivate us to punish those who cheat on us or betray us. Specialized cognitive systems serve us in detecting cheaters.22 Since all humans seem to be prone to self-in-terested bias, cheating requires constant management. Reciprocity may have originated in relations with relatively close kin, gradually becoming extended to genetically more and more distant humans as natural selection rewarded such commerce.

6. HOW DO WE REACH RECIPROCITY FROM “MIGHT-MAKES-RIGHT”?

The same way it was done in the Wild West. Try to introduce the “rule of law” (a form of reciprocity insofar as it results from social contract, not imposi-tion) and hire good sheriffs who shoot straight—something never appreciated by the outlaws or by governments of powerful countries that don’t think they will ever have to reciprocate. (“Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”) World War I and then World War II were supposed to mark the end of ethnic holocausts.23 But these have persisted, albeit on a smaller scale. So the rule of law is certainly very hard to establish. Ever since the League of Nations was proposed as a way of substituting self-determination and peaceful arbitration for interethnic warfare, humans still haven’t gotten their act fully together.24 Hypocrisy seems to be built into nearly everyone (“let he who hath not sinned…”). In which case, while we’re waiting, nationalism is still a rational and absolutely necessary strategy for self-defense. Use it or lose it.

7. DOESN’T NATIONALISM INSPIRE A FEELING OF SUPERIORITY THAT IS USED TO JUSTIFY DOMINATING OTHER ETHNIES?

Obviously a nationalist will feel that his own culture is best for himself and not want it to be displaced by another. However, it is common, especially for successful nations, to feel superior to and to want to impose their rule or culture on others (as the U.S. government and Israel are attempting to do in the Middle East, early twenty-first century), but that is not a logically or em-pirically necessary adjunct to ethnic, in-group favoritism. The Swiss cantons, ethnically and linguistically different, have lived for many happy generations with no serious inclination to take over their neighboring cantons, although recently there was a brief cantonal readjustment to better achieve cantonal homogeneity.25

8. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECIPROCITY AND KINSHIP?

They aren’t 100 percent mutually exclusive. There is no reason why we can’t have reciprocal dealings with kin. It’s just that it’s not quite such a di-


saster if they don’t reciprocate—after all, they are carrying some of our genes. On the other hand, there is often an understanding in families that if the family is to be “always there” for its members, the members ought to always be there for the family. So that if a member is not willing to contribute to the family’s vitality, he shouldn’t expect the family to be forever there to help him out. The so-called honor killings of some societies follow that logic and go a step further in not only withdrawing their help but in actually killing the individualist who has, say, married someone not acceptable to the family. The loss of “honor” comes from that person ruining the family’s reputation for trustworthiness in defense of group interests. Who in that culture would want to marry into that family if it is perceived as careless in making mari-tal alliances? Also, having already invested a great deal in that person, the family would resent seeing all their investment wasted—as they perceive it. Obviously people will disagree about how much they are contributing to or detracting from the common good. But in reciprocal relations there is no getting away from such calculations. The value of cleverness in the context of exchange may have been a major selection pressure behind the evolution of the large human brain.

One can have kinship-like dealings with non-kin insofar as non-kin are able to simulate kin. But by and large, kin relationships end up being restricted to kin—with due allowance for the flexibility of who are considered “kin.” We are often extremely fond of other animals, not to mention members of completely different ethnies or races. Yet these affections, however powerful, are arguably not quite the same as close family ties, even though people may try to treat them as such. Example: the adopted child who, even though very fond of her foster parents, eventually has an urge to find her birth parents and (re-)establish a real kin relationship. Another example: Compare marriages between cousins with marriages between spouses who are much less closely related. The great worldwide popularity of the former may relate to the fact that cousins have both kinship ties as well as attraction based on reciprocity, while a marriage of non-kin is dependent entirely on reciprocity.

Members of a human group based on kinship can afford to help each other without too much regard for being “paid back,” since as long as their genes are being reproduced by at least someone in the group, who cares very much whose survival and reproductive success are being most advantaged? In a group of unrelated people (e.g., a labor union), however, members have to continually evaluate whether they are receiving their money’s worth from their common endeavors. Hence the extra effectiveness of nationalist groups in struggling for goals which will benefit their members. The efficacy is so great that there may well have been a natural selection for instinctive mechanisms for group loyalty, willingness to sacrifice oneself for the group (e.g., suicide bombers), patriotism, etc.26 Some animals have such instincts, as when a mother doesn’t simply flee from the nest at the sight of a predator but rather acts, at


some risk to herself, as a decoy to distract the predator from her young. So it shouldn’t be surprising to find humans preprogrammed to take risks for kin. Humans are also at times willing to risk their lives for non-kin, it is true. But the willingness tends to be less than for kin and to take place in contexts where a certain amount of reciprocity can be expected—e.g., only in small communities where everyone knows each other and reputations for risk-taking on behalf of others can be acquired. So expect some sacrificial risk-taking in small communities of unrelated humans, but expect even more in ethnically homogeneous communities.

If someone doesn’t reciprocate, words such as “cheating” or “parasitism” come to a biologist’s mind. Social dilemmas can turn on what should, in fact, have been expected. Usury, the charging of interest for a loan, was histori-cally considered illegitimate for Christians and Muslims (for Jews, too, but not when dealing with non-Jews). Perhaps the value of the interest paid by a borrower was perceived as being more than the cost of the loan to the lender and so represented a form of unequal exchange—or cheating. Or, in a small homogeneous community, loans might have been something everyone could be expected to need sooner or later, and thus be reciprocated in kind. Close kin, as in members of a tribe, might not anticipate “interest” on a loan that benefited common genetic interests.

Consider Christian (or other) ideologies that encourage people to give, charitably, to non-kin without any expectation of getting something in return. Are the people doing the giving being cheated? If it happened enough, they might be severely handicapped relative to competitors. At another level, it might not be cheating if the charity were seen as promoting human biodiver-sity via a form of reciprocal altruism (insurance), provided it does not come at too great a cost to one’s own people.

9. WHY WOULD ANYONE DOUBT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAMILY OR EXTENDED FAMILY TO “ETHNICITY” AND “NATION”?

First, unconscious psychological processes cannot easily be brought to conscious awareness, where they can be evaluated or seen for what they are. Westerners brought up without material suffering, never having lived through a war or other serious crisis, may simply have no idea how they would behave in severe ethnic conflict. Normally they are ever so tolerant and outgoing to people of other ethnies and races, never imagining that they would ever behave otherwise. But if suddenly terrorized by a gang from one of those out-groups, they might well find themselves searching desperately for a familiar face, i.e., someone as much like themselves, ethnically, as possible. This will be done instantly and instinctively, without thought for what is politically correct or egalitarian or nice or prejudiced. Remember how quickly “racial profiling” became de rigueur for American security agencies following the demolition of the World Trade Center by Arabs.


Second, nationalism is not an inevitable or automatic phenomenon, how-ever likely it may be by virtue of belonging, objectively, to an ethny. (Why? See the next FAQ, #10.)

A major reason for confusion over the connection of family to ethnicity is that there have been mischievous ideologies that have propagandized over the years against the positive aspects of biological relatedness, or anything biological at all. One has only to think of all the extreme environmentalists (in the nature-nurture debates) and egalitarians who promote not just equal rights but also the idea that humans have equal abilities across groups, if not as individuals, as if biological variation has ceased to apply to humans. Bring up anything biological and they go through the roof. Won’t discuss it. Hysteria reigns. Finally, there is the ready observation that all is not sweet-ness and light in nearly any family, sibling rivalry being only one example. The Ottoman sultans routinely killed their own brothers. However, this issue seems to have been pretty well laid to rest by those who noticed that if you can hold all other factors constant except for varying degree of kinship, it turns out that one is still clearly better off and safer by being surrounded by kin than by non-kin.27 Other factors are not normally constant, though, so when there is not enough of a resource to go around, or there is a vast amount up for grabs, there is good reason for a bias in favor of all one’s own genes at the expense of even an only slightly smaller set of them present in close relatives, never mind people of a very different ethny or race. So expect competition for resources to take place throughout the relatedness hierarchy whenever competition at a higher level doesn’t take precedence. E.g., expect Jews in Palestine to argue and fight even more with each other than they do now if the Arab-Israeli conflict is ever resolved. That will be subsidiarity at work. However, a healthy family or nation finds ways of balancing the virtues of kin solidarity with rivalries.

Objectively, parents’ biological “interests” are maximally fulfilled if their parental investment is distributed to those offspring with the greatest chance of survival, success, and further reproduction. And so parents sometimes discriminate, whereas no child wants to be discriminated against. Parents can try to treat children equally, especially if their prospects seem comparable, but also in order to minimize counterproductive rivalry and promote coop-eration among them. Family unity in Iran is promoted by outlawing unequal inheritance among sons. (To do otherwise, when one’s heirs seem to have very different potentials, would require performing a triage while still alive.)

Similar logic pertains to the group. Helping one’s kin does not necessarily mean helping all of them equally, since some are more valuable to the group than others. There is no point in expecting otherwise. To ask of someone what he cannot give is simply to guarantee disappointment and resentment toward a person who cannot rise to the occasion as one might have liked.


The most “worthy” of group aid are those who appear to carry the best genes and have the best character and talents relevant to the group’s success—much as scholarships are given to the best students in nearly any context. It doesn’t mean that others have to be thrown to the dogs. The least talented did not wish their bad luck. And a nation benefits if all members are encouraged to contribute to their full potential, however meager, and are appreciated for whatever role they can play. Nationalists living together will want a good safety net for their ethny and are typically willing to pay taxes to a commu-nal pot for both common services and communal insurance systems. But in multicultural societies “it becomes more difficult to sustain the legitimacy of a universal risk-pooling welfare state....”28 The perceived risks of parasitism become too high and sympathy for other ethnies too low.

A successful nation must appreciate and honor differences in talent in many areas—in political leadership, capacity to recognize danger, expertise in technology or agriculture, courage in warfare, charisma, good health (in-cluding good genes), promotion of psychological and social health, noblesse oblige, leadership in community rituals and celebrations.

There will always be some individuals that deliberately, if not out of weakness, sabotage or otherwise work against the interests of the group. These individuals must somehow be neutralized: either placed in a position where their weakness cannot fail the group, or, in extremis, ejected from the group.

10. WHY AREN’T CULTURAL DIFFERENCES THE REASON FOR NATIONALISM?

Well, they are—in a sense. It’s just that they aren’t the fundamental basis of it. Nevertheless, today many think that cultural differences are what cause nationalism. Even people who ought to know better, such as the majority ethny of Québec, the French-speaking Québécois. These days they focus chiefly on protecting the French language, one of the more salient of cultural traits (meaning traits that people learn rather than exhibit instinctively). The result has been that they think that all they have to do to protect their nation is to make sure everyone speaks French, regardless of their ancestry. You can be from China or Haiti, but as long as you speak French, Québec nationalists don’t seem to worry much about your effect on the future of Québec. On the other hand, they have the expression, “Québécois de souche,” which certainly does mean Québécois by virtue of common ancestry—all the way back to the early French immigrants out of St. Milo—and which betrays an instinctive understanding of the importance of that ancestry. But they return uneasily to language in an effort to appease various other ethnies now living in Québec who would be affronted to think that they weren’t considered full-fledged Quebecers. The latter are confusing citizenship with ethnicity.

The sociologist Pierre van den Berghe pointed out that cultural differ-ences are very often the best clue people have to their genetic differences,


i.e., differences in ancestry. Historically, most competition or warfare has been between groups of people who looked much the same physically. Thus differences in clothing, vocabulary, accent, behavior, tattoos, customs, or per-sonal acquaintance were what they had to go on in deciding whose extended family or tribe they belonged to. Genetically transmitted physical features (the basis of “racial differences”), when they are more common in one group than another, can be especially good “markers” for ancestry.29 Returning to the question at hand, think of a hen: FAQ#10 is like asking whether the reason the hen sits on her eggs is that they carry her genes or, alternatively, because of the environmental aspects of the eggs’ appearance and location in the nest. The question makes little sense, since she must use any available and appropriate markers in order to ensure that the eggs’ role in reproducing genes is carried out.

But nothing is perfect: To the extent that one can fake markers for an an-cestry, one will be treated as though one had that ancestry. Teaching a recent immigrant to speak French like a Québécois de souche would be like placing duck eggs in a hen’s nest: Are the markers similar enough? In fact, some hens will still sit on them as though they were their own eggs. Yes, the eggs hatch and the little ducks then imprint on the mother hen and follow her around–-and she just goes about her own business oblivious to the “error” she has made.30 Apparently natural selection has not prepared that species of hen for such trickery. Similarly, speaking Quebec French will clearly help the immigrant to Quebec become accepted, as well. But will it be sufficient? See below.

11. DOESN’T THE SUCCESS OF MULTICULTURALISM SHOW THAT HAVING THE SAME ANCESTRY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY AS LONG AS

PEOPLE DO SPEAK A COMMON LANGUAGE?

It depends on how much “harmony” you would settle for. To achieve the harmony of an ethnically homogeneous nation, you would need more than just a common language. Immigrants would also have to love, accept, and thoroughly learn the host culture, and then intermarry over and over so that any distinctive physical features receded or blended. And they would probably have to forget their ancestral history, so that they wouldn’t end up with dual loyalties.

It is very true that in such countries as Canada, in contexts that force many different peoples to brush up against each other daily in factories, universities, schools, etc., there are innumerable instances of harmonious interethnic rela-tions. Things are so harmonious, in fact, that these countries are still merrily promoting multiculturalism year after year, and show no sign of desisting in their invitations to people around the world to “come on over.” Increas-ingly, however, there are voices to the contrary. The evidence points to a loss of community and mutual trust among citizens as the ethnic homogeneity of


a territory is lost.31 Special interests in control of immigration policy have, in effect, given away the farm.

There are important things to note about multiculturalism. Particularly fascinating is the fact that Jews have arguably been the most vociferous of its advocates in the West, but are ferociously against it when it comes to their own state of Israel. Wonder why?32 Guess.

Second, multiculturalism has never been the subject of a referendum wherein a majority of the citizens of a country could declare themselves in favor of it—with or without their consent being fully informed as to the pos-sible or likely consequences. Africans were brought to the United States by a small minority of people—e.g., plantation owners—who wanted cheap labor. The result may be good American jazz, but it has also been a long history of miserable racial tension and conflict.

Employers looking for cheap labor are still encouraging more illegal migrants from Mexico.33 Now “La Raza,” as many Mexican Latinos now call themselves, is planning a takeover of the American Southwest. At the pres-ent rate of demographic change, they are likely to be a majority in California and several other states before long. They will then have avenged the earlier American takeover of what was once Mexican territory. And their ethny will be dominant. In anticipation of this, many whites are now moving out of California. Regardless of the legal justification for any of these political moves, it should be evident that not all the human beings involved have the same attitude toward these events; that is because they have different psycho-logical “interests.” People the world over can have an interest in moving to economically prosperous lands, and they often succeed, because the majority populations in those lands are not organized effectively to control immigra-tion. Some countries of the West have now probably reached the point of no return, of never being able to stop immigration, and thus prevent another “tragedy of the commons”: alien ethnies will now want to promote further immigration of their own people, so that there will be even less chance of avoiding the overexploitation of a territory’s resources.

Meanwhile, in, e.g., Toronto, various immigrant groups vie with the Hell’s Angels for the highest homicide rate. Jamaican blacks argue that they aren’t the only murderers, that homicide certainly is not in their genes, and that they shouldn’t be racially profiled; their detractors don’t really care whether it’s poverty, genes, or culture: They just wish the Jamaicans would go back to Jamaica. They don’t say that publicly, because such political incorrectness can be prosecuted as a “hate crime.” Then there are the twenty-odd years and millions of dollars it is taking Canada to prosecute the allegedly Sikh perpetra-tors of the 1985 Air India crash, thanks in part to ethnic barriers to collecting evidence.34 Recently Muslim immigrants have demanded the introduction of elements of “sharia” (Muslim law) into the Canadian legal system, while other immigrants screamed that they had just fled sharia. Other Canadians have


preferred a more traditional separation of church and state…or full public financing of private Jewish schools…or a Christian imposition of the “right to life” against abortions.

Isn’t multiculturalism wonderful? Well, it is, if you are one of the im-migrants who successfully made it to Canada or the U.S. (either recently or in an earlier era), especially if you fled conflicts in the old homeland. Im-migrants are mainly looking for improved living conditions, and are not too concerned with their acceptability to host ethnies beyond avoiding serious hostility. Upon arrival, most seem to coalesce around preceding members of their own ethny. Even the aboriginals, who came in several waves, probably did not ask permission from previous waves—any more than did the much later Europeans. The point, for the moment, is not which ethny was right or wrong, but what happens when they all find themselves under the same roof. Multiculturalism, beyond a modest cultural variety in restaurants and the like, is not attractive to those who fear that their political and other cultural ways will be challenged or, sooner or later, overwhelmed and displaced by incompatible mores.

12. WHY ISN’T EVERYONE NATIONALISTIC?

a. Individualismb. No nationc. Attachment to one’s nation is overriddend. Fear of offending otherse. “Deception”

CLARIFICATIONS:

a) IndividualismThe self-sufficient individualist feels that he can achieve happiness on his

own; any form of nationalism may seem like a giant, oppressive handicap, given all the anticipated time and effort expended in in-group activities. People vary for constitutional reasons on nearly every imaginable biological trait, including personality and motivational factors. Thus attachment to a group can be expected to vary as well. Demanding role requirements can make it difficult to herd many people into a cohesive ethnic grouping; not all roles are equally attractive to or suitable for every person. Good leadership is rare. Most humans are easily frightened sheep. So if there is a military or paramilitary role to be played, only a few reasonably macho males, are likely to volunteer to take the necessary risks. The fighters in the IRA and UDA in Ireland are hardly random samples of their populations. Ironically, such “hard men” are sometimes not even supported by many members of their people who later benefit from their sacrifice, e.g., pacifists terrified of violence, true Christians who invariably favor turning the other cheek, devotees of Gandhi, or people


who object (on principle or out of fear of retaliation) to their own nationalists’ theft of land and resources from other groups, and so on.

b) No nation It might not be clear who one’s people are because of mixed ancestry, so

that one is an isolate among other ethnies; or one’s people consists of a mix of equally salient and historically conflicting groups, such as half-Jewish and half-Arab, or half-African and half-British, that lends itself to identity conflicts or ambiguities. The more mixed our perceived ancestry, the more diffuse should be our conception of our people, unless people with the same mixed ancestry can get together to form a new ethny, e.g., the “Métis” of western Canada (a mix of aboriginal and French ancestry), or the growing coalition of half-Jews.35 At one extreme, there are people whose ancestry is so incredibly complex that apart from humanity as a whole, they don’t feel especially close to any single present-day ethny. Ethnicity for such “isolates” ought to be pretty much meaningless—unless, of course, they are somehow discriminated against by people who do belong to a specific ethny and regard them as outsiders. But apart from their immediate family, it ought to be hard for them to form strong bonds to any particular large grouping—compared to, say, the average Croat, whose ancestry is more homogeneous. There are naive idealists, often (erstwhile) communists, who recommend as much mix-ture of ancestry as possible. They urge this, first, because they see ancestry as unimportant: Marry whomever you like. But often they see vast amounts of intermarriage as an antidote to war or other vicissitudes of ethnic competition, an inadvertent recognition that ethnic homogeneity is indeed meaningful. What would be the result? While one batch of multiculturalists is joyfully mixing their children’s ancestry, other batches will be sticking to the path of homogeneous ethnicity, with all the competitive advantages that accrue to especially cohesive groups.36 The isolated idealists will gradually be squeezed to the margins, perhaps under some form of exploitation or even “slavery” (just think of the millions of unprotected Russian and Eastern European women who are currently being forced into prostitution [“white slavery”]), if not eventually lost to the forces of natural selection. Inter-group relations may not be inevitably competitive, at least to the point of unpleasantness, but they sometimes are—in which case, who is likely to win, or at least to successfully defend themselves?

c) Attachment to one’s ethny overriddenIt can be overridden by a lack of pride in one’s people, or by a dislike or

hatred resulting from a harrowing family or group life. Nearly any motive can be overridden by other more urgent needs and motives. Not everyone is hungry at suppertime. Hunger is obviously a “biological need,” but can easily be overridden by an exciting television program.

People also vary in how hunger-driven they are, some becoming obese, others anorexic. It’s the same for ethnic cohesion. Individualism, the desire to


go it alone, love of solitude—all these tendencies may be somewhat heritable (so that if one identical twin were like that, it’s a good bet that the other twin of the pair is similar). Ask them to behave like a hive of Hutterites or Hasidic Jews and they will instantly feel asphyxiated and run for the door.37

Unfortunate family experiences, or the feeling that one’s own people are a bad lot, can prompt a search for another ethny/culture with which to gradually acculturate and eventually assimilate through intermarriage (e.g., Princess Diana’s attraction to the warmth of Egyptian culture).

Serendipitous, wonderful experiences with an out-group can, especially if following upon earlier misery, inspire hope for a new and better life, a feeling of paradise found. This is what many emigrants hope for and, if found, can lead to a desire to change their ethny and assimilate, or else to frustration if the host ethny is not as welcoming as had been hoped.38

Family ties can be overridden by romantic/sexual attractions. But imagine the bind if the respective ethnies are at loggerheads, e.g., a mixed Serbian and Muslim couple in Bosnia during their internecine strife. Imagine their offspring torn in two by pressures from both sides. Such unfortunates must surely feel impelled to just clear out of that part of the world to find solace elsewhere. Hence the effort seen in so many ethnies to prevent their offspring coming in too close contact with out-groups during life stages important for mate choice. Again, think of “honor killings” in which a woman is killed by her father or brother for having contravened the marital choice rules designed to maintain family cohesion where such cohesion is absolutely crucial for success in life. Such people know instinctively that it’s not just a matter of maintaining cultural compatibility but, in addition, has to do with the degree of trust that comes from optimal kinship and from obeying a family’s chief decision maker. “Optimal” here reflects, also, the fact that one shouldn’t marry someone too closely related, either, since too much inbreeding (as in incest, or the equivalent with small endogamous tribes) courts the hazard of genetic defects. See FAQ #14 re interracial marriages.

d) Fear of offending othersA person with friends in out-groups might sense that professing a na-

tionalism on his own part would conflict with such affections. But need that be the case? After all, a powerful love for one’s own parents needn’t prevent anyone from having friends and lovers outside one’s own family. A reunion that is fundamentally one of family ties on Thanksgiving or Christmas has never prevented families from inviting all manner of friends and acquaintances home for at least some of its celebrations. Having one’s own family as a first priority does not preclude positive relations with any other person, or even other species of animal and plant.

Still don’t think such prioritizing is necessary? Well, think about this: To whom do you turn to in severe difficulty? Do you have the backup of people you can trust? Who will take responsibility for you during severe illness


and old age? Or are you all alone to fend off whatever sort of gang you are up against? Whom would you try to save from falling off a cliff when the choice is among individuals varying in kinship to you? Please try your best when doing this mental exercise to equate these individuals on variables other than kinship, such as how nice they are as persons, how healthy they are, their age. Try out different combinations. Your sister vs. your cat; your sister vs. a chimpanzee; your sister vs. your cousin; your father vs. your uncle, a fellow Icelander vs. a Swede; a fellow Icelander vs. a Vietnamese; etc. Which choices are easiest to make? Why?

e) Deception The most vehement criticism of nationalism often comes from members of

a minority ethny who are cleverly attempting to reduce the competitive power of other, larger, ethnies by reducing their cohesion.39 Make nepotism, national-ism, or any kind of in-group appreciation “politically incorrect” enough and an ethny’s nationalism is sabotaged. To override kinship is nothing new. In the past, children have been induced to denounce their parents for not being communist enough or religious enough.40 It’s all very ironic if the people doing the criticizing are themselves highly nationalistic. But it’s a neat trick if they can pull it off.

Religious doctrine can override kinship by, in effect, deceiving a person into treating out-group members as if they were kin: “We are all brothers under the skin,” they might say, when of course literally this is patently untrue. Christi-anity may have succeeded so well in such sleights of hand in part by creating a confusion between an altruistic spirit of reciprocity vs. altruistic sacrifice in which one’s own people are, in effect, handicapped.

13. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE FACT THAT A MAJOR FOOTBALL RIVALRY FOR TUNISIA SEEMS TO BE WITH ANOTHER NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRY, MOROCCO, RATHER THAN WITH COUNTRIES THAT ARE MUCH MORE DISTANTLY RELATED?

Because Morocco is there. Close by. That’s one answer. But this is a frequent phenomenon in sport and is essentially the same issue as in sibling rivalry. You, a Québécoise girl, compete for mummy’s attention with your sibling because she is there. Some girl in China is not there, so why would you worry at all about her? Suppose, however, that both you and your sister are both gymnasts and compete with each other initially, but your sister goes on to the Olympics and beats out a Chinese gymnast. Would you be happy for her? Or would you rather the Chinese won? Well, maybe if the sibling rivalry had been especially severe… But you get the point.

14. WHAT IS WRONG WITH INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE?

From your point of view, maybe nothing—provided you can accept the consequences. These can vary enormously depending on circumstances and personalities. But be prepared:


On the plus side, the girl/guy from the other race you are staring at may be incredibly attractive. Think of the sometime attractiveness of black men and white women for each other; or of white men and oriental women.

A modest degree of out-breeding could also be good for one’s kids. Here’s the story, according to standard biology texts: All your genes come in pairs, one allele of each pair from each parent. If a pair contains an allele that is bad for you but also “dominant,” meaning dominant over the other member of the pair, it will cause the person carrying it to die, be sick, or be otherwise unattractive as a mate. So we tend not to worry too much about dominant bad genes in our planning, since they tend quickly to self-destruct. But reces-sive genes don’t get “expressed” unless matched up with exactly the same allele. Outbreeding reduces the chance of a recessive bad gene you are car-rying being matched up with its like, and thus being expressed. On the other hand, you don’t need to go very far afield to be sufficiently “outbred,” and certainly not as far as what we think of as another race or species (the defining feature of species is the inability to successfully interbreed with other spe-cies). In outbreeding to another race, your offspring may be picking up some surprises, either unpleasant (e.g., genes that encourage diabetes or sickle cell anemia) or pleasant (e.g., genes for high IQ or some more specialized talent). Ethnic and racial groups undoubtedly vary in “genetic load,” the number of bad recessive genes in their gene pool, although geneticists don’t seem to have a completely clear picture of all that. In any case, in picking a spouse it’s hard to know what you are getting into without at the very least a thorough genetic background check; the more ethnically/racially different a person is, the harder in general it is to vet that person for quality in any trait. There is one speculative aspect you might want to entertain. Racial differences are thought to have originally arisen through natural selection favoring those traits that made a person better adapted to a particular climate and ecology. Black skin was protective in tropical climates, while white skin encouraged penetration of rays from the sun when northern climates made them benefi-cial. These climatic selection pressures may not be all that strong today, at least where modern technologies can mitigate them. But the benefits of such natural selection may one day again be appreciated if the earth undergoes dramatic climate change. Intermarriage would reduce the traits that had once been useful in particular climates.

Here’s an ethical consideration: We are importuned daily to regard other ethnies/races with tolerance and respect. Well, if we really do value another group’s cultural and physical traits, why would we want to do anything that would contribute to the destruction of those traits? If you dislike your own race so much that you want to marry into another, aren’t you implying that other races are justified in negatively “profiling,” or looking down upon, yours? In any case, destruction of one’s people would happen only one in-termarriage at a time, but it would happen. One intermarriage might seem


like a drop in the bucket for one’s whole ethny, but overwhelming for one’s immediate family.

The major threats to the success of interracial marriages would have to be (a) the strong chances of cultural incompatibility and (b) the lack of the social cohesion that normally accrues to relatively close kinship. The former is a problem on its own merits but it also can act as a marker for degree of biological relatedness which affects cohesion. Cultural incompatibility doesn’t necessarily show up right away. People’s lives go through stages, each with its own set of customs and expectations that might not be apparent until one reached a particular stage. For instance, whether, where, how, and with whom will we be buried after death? And what sort of lives will the children of such a marriage have to look forward to? There are some horror stories, e.g., the isolation of offspring of Americans (especially blacks) and Vietnam-ese women as a result of the Vietnam War. (Yes, it does depend on what the kids look like.) And where are children of a Jewish-Arab marriage to live? Palestine? If they can form a larger community of people like themselves, they could mitigate the effects of social exclusion, as did the “mulattoes” of Haiti following the war of independence from France. If not, they remain isolates, neither fish nor fowl, possibly handicapped in finding a mate or a welcoming community and a good job. Wishing it otherwise is no help.

15. HOW DO YOU DECIDE HOW MUCH IMMIGRATION TO HAVE?

Easy. “Enough immigration” is when you feel in your heart that there has been enough. The problem is that different people will come up with differ-ent estimates. For anyone needing more labor, cheap or expensive, there is never enough immigration. For people wanting to live among people like themselves and to maintain their culturally specific ways and political sys-tems, nearly any immigration by other ethnies constitutes a potential threat. “None is too many,” a high level Canadian government official is reputed to have said when asked how many Jews should be accepted during the 1930s.41 Canadian Jews are still a tiny minority but they certainly did come to exert considerable political and cultural influence through their lobbying efforts and via the media (a major newspaper publishing and broadcasting empire, CanWest, built by Izzy Asper and his sons, has stridently and successfully promoted a pro-Israel foreign policy). Members of immigrant groups see the sky as the limit. They argue that they constitute no threat whatsoever to the indigenous ethnies/cultures, so not to worry. They naturally ignore the fact that any human being, once he feels at home, will want to adjust his sur-roundings to his own taste, which means “taking over,” to whatever degree becomes possible. If your city eventually becomes majority Chinese, expect the cultural norms to become Chinese as well…sooner or later.

So there is no sacred answer. The best that can be done in a democratic society is to put it to a vote. When was the last time anyone voted on whether


to increase or decrease the level of immigration? Can’t remember, can you? Anyway, each person’s favored immigration rate will reflect some trade-off between a concern for one’s own culture and people going down the tube and some mix of attractions perceived in out-group immigration, including the above economic factors.

16. HOW CAN A SMALL TERRITORY (“ENCLAVE,” “GHETTO,” NEIGHBORHOOD) CONTROL IMMIGRATION?

It’s not easy, today, what with laws established, in the interest of minori-ties, to outlaw “discrimination” in residential housing. Notice that no one is outlawed from discriminating when it comes to marriage (cf. personal ads in newspapers asking to meet, say, a “white heterosexual Catholic female” for friendship and possible marriage, etc.). And few object to exceptionally reli-gious people establishing certain types of social enclave for their own group (a Yeshiva University for Jews or a Bob Jones University for white Christian fundamentalists), since who else would want to go to them? The strongest objectors to the state of Israel discriminating in favor of Jews and against gentiles in immigration are those gentiles whose land was taken to make way for Israel, plus a few sympathizers. So the seeming illegitimacy of discrimina-tion depends entirely on its context, on those doing the discriminating, and whether it involves theft or violence, not on the act of discrimination itself.

When multicultural ideologies become dominant, about the only sure way to favor one’s own (or a culturally compatible) ethny in an enclave would be to form a sovereign state. Meanwhile, one might avoid making public any announcement of housing for sale or rent and, instead, advertise by word of mouth or with the help of a sympathetic real estate agent. Perhaps one could set up a housing association with various covenants, conditions, and restric-tions that discourage, if not prevent outright, people coming into a community who would be culturally incompatible.42 Then we have “ethnic cleansing”—à la Palestine or the late Yugoslavia.

17. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY “GROUP STRUCTURE”?

Humans are not bees. Bees have highly preprogrammed (by genes) brain mechanisms that cause them to work for the whole hive, their “group.” Humans may be a little bit “groupy,” instinctively, but a variety of cultural strategies have had to be devised over millennia for accentuating the will-ingness of group members to act as cohesive, cooperative group members. Some strategies work better than others; some are more enjoyable to live with. There are rules, such as for distinctive clothing – e.g., the Amish, or Hasidic Jews. But if Hasidic men’s garments are unbearably hot in summer, inspir-ing major investment in air conditioners, they also serve as a test of group loyalty: Anyone willing to put up with the hot clothing must surely be will-


ing to adhere to the less visible and hopefully internalized rules of the group, and hence must be trustworthy. If the garments were simply functional and comfortable, they wouldn’t constitute a good test of trustworthiness. The same goes for a woman’s chador in Iran. If it’s hot enough, women stay indoors and out of trouble (from their husband’s point of view); but if they do venture out, wearing a chador suggests trustworthiness. Their husbands can then get on with their work without worrying so much about what their wives are up to.

Rules for helping each other within the group can vary, some seemingly more shortsighted than others. The “bucket of crabs” analogy is cited by North American aboriginals for the case, say, of a person who is awarded a fellowship for educational purposes but who ends up giving away so much of the money, in his in-group’s spirit of sharing, that he never does get the degree which would enable him later to help others get ahead. Put crabs in a bucket and as each one tries to climb out of the bucket, the others in trying to climb out themselves, to latch onto him and pull him back down. 43 The relevant rule was adaptive for one set of conditions (hunter-gatherer), but is less so for the modern world. So groups vary in willingness to help their talented maximize the use of their talents (e.g., via scholarships paid for by other members); and those who take advantage of the help vary in their willingness to contribute to the group later on.

There has never been a guarantee that devising rules for one’s own group would lead to an optimal set. (Try inventing a set, yourself, to see how hard it is.)44 Much mental energy must have been expended by humans in such trial and error. The Biblical “Ten Commandments” are just one such set, created for use within Jewish communities (but, interestingly, not for relations with “gen-tiles”), and Jewish scholarship has devoted thousands of years to elaborating upon these rules (the Talmud).45 The longevity of Jewish groups, in the face of massive pressures to assimilate, is testimony to the effectiveness of their group rules and structure.

A challenge for any modern nationalist is to come up with a set of rules for the group that are both effective, attractive, legal, and do not become unbearable to live with. A major dilemma involves finding a balance between sacrifice for the group vs. working for oneself.

18. Should everyone be a “nationalist?”Nationalists would love to have all fellow coethnics be nationalistic, but any

person’s answer depends on his point of view, and, as we have seen, people often have different psychological interests. However, anyone who criticizes others for their nationalism, rather than simply being uninterested, is likely be-ing either hypocritical or envious.

Anthony Hilton is Associate Professor of Psychology (Ret.) at Con-cordia University, Montréal, Québec, Canada.


REFERENCES

Abella, I. & Troper, H. (1983). None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys.Bateson, P. P. G. (1966). Characteristics and context of imprinting. Biological Reviews 41.Conquest, R. (1990). The Great Terror: A Reassessment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Daly, M. & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: de Gruyter.Dawkins, R. (1976 & 1989). The Selfish Gene. 1st & 2nd eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Finkelstein, N. (2003). The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering. New York: Verso.Fiske, A. P. (1991). Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Rela-tions. New York: The Free Press.Goodhart, D. (2004). Too diverse? Is Britain becoming too diverse to sustain the mutual obligations behind good society and the welfare state? Prospect (Feb. 2004).Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster.Hartung, J. (1995). Ethology and Sociobiology 16, 337.Kotkin, J. (1993). Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy. New York: Random House.MacDonald, K. (1994). A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.MacDonald, K. (1998/2002). The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements. Westport, Conn.: Praeger/1st Books.MacMillan, M. (2001). Paris 1919. New York: Random House.McGoldrick, M., Pearce, J. K., & Giordano, J. (eds.). (1982). Ethnicity and Family Therapy. New York: Guilford.Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.Ridley, M. (1996). The Origin of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Penguin.Salter, F. (2000). On genetic interests. Paper presented to the American Political Sci-ence Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1, 2000.Salter, F. (2003). On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.Segal, N. (1999). Entwined Lives: Twins and What They Tell Us about Human Behavior. New York: Dutton.Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (eds.). (1992). The Adapted Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 14, 35–37.


Van den Berghe, P. L. (1981). The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier.

ENDNOTES

1. Van den Berghe.1981; Salter 2003. 2. The terms “ethny” and “nation” follow the usage of van den Berghe and Salter.3. “Universal nationalism” is from Salter, 172.4. The biology and logic of reciprocity, or reciprocal altruism, were classically ex-amined by Trivers 1971and by van den Berghe 1981 in regard to ethnic relations. In recent years, reciprocity has become a popular topic among the evolutionarily minded. See, e.g., Matt Ridley 1996. See Salter 2003 regarding “free-riders” as a threat to beneficial reciprocity.5. According to one Rabbi Ephrarim Z. Buchwald , “…Concentration camps and gas chambers aren’t the only ways to exterminate the Jewish people…intermarriage can accomplish the same evil end….” The Silent Holocaust. National Jewish Outreach Program. Cited by Hartung 1995, 337. 6. Salter 2003, 60.7. The idea of “promiscuous alms giving” is from Westermarck. (1912). The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. Johnson Reprint Corporation/Macmillan and Co., New York. Cited by Salter 2003, 307.8. By “nation” we mean an ethny that is politicized to some extent (following van den Berghe 1981, 61).9. Van den Berghe 1981, 15.10. Dawkins 1976 & 1989.11. Segal 1999. Entwined Lives: Twins and What They Tell Us About Human Behavior. New York: Dutton.12. Salter 2000. 13. See Salter 2003, 89–91 for an extended discussion of this issue. 14. Salter 2003, Chapter 2.15. Salter 2003, Chapter 2.16. See Salter 2003, Chapter 2, especially 46, for a much more technical discussion of the “relativistic nature of kinship.” Readers of Salter’s book may not be entirely happy with the way some geneticists have recently defined “kinship.” You might find it helpful to add the word “differential” now and then, e.g., “differential genetic interest” and “differential kinship” when evaluating the relationship between indi-viduals who vary in how closely related they are. 17. Van den Berghe 1981, 38–39. 18. See Ridley 1996.19. Trivers 1971.20. For a fascinating perspective on varieties of reciprocity, see Fiske 1991.21. Trivers 197122. Tooby & Cosmides 1992. 23. Finkelstein 2003.


24. MacMillan 2001.25. This refers to the separation of a part of the canton of Berne to form a French-speaking canton of Jura. There were, of course, civil wars in Switzerland in the 19th century and earlier – before their comfortable modus vivendi was worked out.26. MacDonald 1994, 204 ff.27. Daly & Wilson 1988.28. David Willetts, cited by Goodhart 2004, 2.29. Van den Berghe 1981, Chapter 2, especially 28–29.30. See Bateson, P. P. G. 1966,.177–220, for a review of the imprinting literature that relates to this example.31. Goodhart 2004; Putnam 2000.Putnam’s is a fascinating survey of the many contri-butions to the decline in healthy civic engagement in North America, especially since the 1960s, but in regard to reversing the trend he recognizes that “…social capital [all the features of pleasant and cohesive community life] is inevitably easier to foster within [ethnically or racially] homogeneous communities….”(400). He favors a “bal-ance” between “bridging social capital” (amicable race relations within communities) and “bonding social capital” (the bonding that is easier to promote within family, ethnic, and racial groups), apparently according to a form of subsidiarity: develop-ment of social capital regarding children and youth could occur within an ethny/race while higher order social capital of a political nature he would like encouraged across ethnic/racial lines (363). His book does not seem oriented toward defending any one “nation” from another even though he recognizes that, e.g., the civil rights movement was “aimed at destroying certain exclusive non-bridging forms of social capital – racially homogeneous schools, neighborhoods….” (362). That social capital in today’s U.S. is greatest in states with the least history of slavery (and the fewest Afro-Americans) (292–294) is not well developed in this book.32. See MacDonald 1998/2002.33. Huntington 2004.34. See, e.g., the Toronto Globe & Mail, 26 Oct., 2004, A13 for a sample report on the continuing Air India saga (or the G&M archives for more details). [On March 16 of this year, two Canadian Sikhs were acquitted of the Air India bombing, to the outrage of Canada’s Indian community. (Ed.)] 35. An internet site for “half-Jews” was (in 2005) http://www.halfjew.com/36. Kotkin 1993.37. See, e.g., the 1998 film A Price above Rubies, written by Boaz Yakin, about a Jew-ish woman who is unhappy in her Orthodox family and community and tries to escape.38. See van den Berghe 1981, Chapter 10 regarding the forces for assimilation.39. See MacDonald 1998/2002. 40. For an example from Stalinism, see Conquest 1990, 274. I know personally an Iranian who moved his family to Canada, post 1979 Islamic revolution, after his daughter (along with many other children) came under siege from her teachers to report on her parents for not praying enough. There were terrified parents, fearing


the wrath of God, who turned in their own sons for being in the anti-Ayatollah Mu-jahadin organization, whereupon their sons were promptly shot.41. Abella & Troper 1983.42. America’s new utopias: the growth of private communities. Economist (Sept. 1, 2001): 25–26. 43. McGoldrick, Pearce & Giordano 1982, Chapter 2, American Indian Families, 69 and 73–74 on the role of sharing and envy as obstacles to group progress.44. For an interesting and serious recent effort, see Catell, R. B. (1987) Beyondism: Religion from Science. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 45. Hartung, John (1995). Love thy neighbor: the evolution of in-group morality. Skeptic. 3(4).

GOODBYE TO ALL THAT:

REFLECTIONS ON WHITE AUSTRALIA

The White Australia Policy Keith Windschuttle Sydney: Macleay Press, 2004 $AUS34.95 paperback

370 pp.

Reviewed by R. J. Stove

It is not obvious why anyone would actively seek the title of “Australia’s best living historian.” The very phrase suggests some surreal Guinness Book of Records entry, on the lines of “wittiest man in Luxembourg” or “greatest

rock group ever produced by Bangladesh.” What is perfectly obvious is that nowadays, Keith Windschuttle alone among Australians consistently threat-ens the historiographical preeminence of Geoffrey Blainey. One suspects that Blainey himself hails this development. Any major thinker cherishes competi-tors talented enough to be worth fretting about. He may, as Newton said of himself, stand on giants’ shoulders; but he can never be content with his exalted location if his only confreres are earthbound midgets.

Between Windschuttle and Blainey lie similarities as notable as—if less manifest than—their differences. Both men are conspicuously honest, for one thing (eccentric though it would have seemed to our grandparents that possessing mere honesty might one day appear an outlandish intellectual virtue). Accordingly, both men interest themselves more in wherever their researches take them than in half-baked polemics, though Windschuttle’s temperament has a steely argumentative edge, and a relish for combat, which Blainey’s lacks. Yet either man’s merits would have been in vain if they had been expressed through turgid prose. In fact, both Blainey and Windschuttle are blessed with the gift of rare, addictive readability.

This readability takes different forms with each writer. With Blainey, it reveals itself as a heightened poetic consciousness, a feather-light perception of the beauty and menace in nature, even the beauty and menace in those industrial processes which from Stalin’s tame artists inspired torrents of so-cial-realist garbage. Windschuttle’s, by contrast, is an output as unpoetic as

82 Vol.5, No. 1 The Occidental Quarterly

any black-letter lawyer’s case notes. Some ill-wishers think of Windschuttle as a hanging judge. One element of truth resides in the metaphor: Namely, that his historiographical outlook is forensic rather than ambiguous or hesi-tating. He does not moralize. He does not empathize. He adjudicates. He can convey opponents’ theses with often devastating fairness—generally in clearer language than those opponents condescend to use—but when the time comes for him to put on the black cap, he puts on the black cap.

Perhaps a danger exists in the Windschuttle approach: the danger of positivism, of supposing that if an event is officially undocumented it never occurred. (As every student of medieval European history—or of some other area where documentation remains frustratingly fragmented and scarce—soon realizes, what people assume happened can be almost as significant as what actually happened.) Not that Windschuttle himself has been guilty of posi-tivism in the above crude form. Still, some of his less intelligent supporters certainly have been; and their misreadings of Windschuttle’s conclusions as a license to canonize Gradgrind and Scrooge become intrinsically instructive, however unfortunate.

Hence the particular importance of Windschuttle’s latest and best book, titled (with a straightforwardness characteristic of its creator) The White Australia Policy. Many among those who cheered on Windschuttle’s previ-ous volume, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, will find The White Australia Policy an irritant. For Windschuttle—similar to Blainey in his reserves of moral courage, though without Blainey’s Christian beliefs1—has dared to desecrate Australian political modernism’s Holy of Holies. That thrice-sacred relic is the belief in the White Australia Policy’s unremitting malevolence.

What was the White Australia Policy, anyhow? Nothing more—though also nothing less—than a form of ethnically based restriction on migrant intakes. Coeval with Australia’s existence as a federal nation, the Policy began in 1901, was spectacularly relaxed in 1966, and was formally abol-ished in 1973. Hatred of the Policy, as might be predicted, now unites the rent-a-mob left with the rent-a-sleaze right. To the rent-a-mob left, the Policy must always be abominable as the birthmark of “institutional racism” on Australia’s body politic. To the rent-a-sleaze Right, the Policy must always be equally abominable, as Australia’s greatest and longest-lasting barrier to utopian visions of “the global economy.” (Whatever this slogan may mean in textbooks, we have all grown only too aware of what it means in practice: a permanent male underclass of bachelors and divorcés, gutted by anti-marriage femocrats’ employment policies; unable to imagine the concept of a “family wage” even in its dreams; and indistinguishable from the atomized flotsam of Mexican barrios and Brazilian favelas, save by the Latinos’ comparative paucity of television sets.)

Therefore Windschuttle’s production contains material bound to offend everyone, except that minuscule minority which prefers truth to chic. The

Spring 2005 / Stove 83

fact that Windschuttle’s own politics are of a thoroughly temperate sort will probably compound rather than reduce his opponents’ rancor. Windschuttle is no turbo-capitalist. He is no white supremacist (nor is this Catholic-pa-leoconservative reviewer). His outlook is close to that of a mild nineteenth-century British liberal, with a hint of Clement Attlee–style social democracy, in that he concedes labor unions’ right to exist.

DILIGENCE VS. DOGMA

The particular rent-a-mob left fable condemned by Windschuttle flourishes like bindweed in the history departments of Australian “universities,” being upheld in its pure form by—to cite only the best-known names therein—Lyn-dall (“Historians are always making up figures”) Ryan, Henry Reynolds, and Mary Kalantzis. This depositum fidei—for we really are talking here about a religious hallucination, impervious to reasoning—can be summarized, with only slight parodistic elements, as follows:

By the late nineteenth century Australia had become a multicultural paradise, in which the Anglo lion lay down with the Afghan lamb, and in which the Oriental selflessly labored to induct us within (to coin a phrase) The Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Alas, into “this other Eden” there entered—once all the Australian colonies had formed, in 1901, their federation—a serpent, in the shape of Federation’s biological racists. These satanic traitors, such as Sir Edmund Barton (prime minister 1901–1903) and Barton’s successor Alfred Deakin (prime minister thrice between 1903 and 1910), bound Australia hand and foot with the chains of the White Australia Policy. And the great hopes of maintaining the pre-1901 polyethnic haven were therefore doomed. Then behold, the veil of the multicultural temple was torn in two from top to bottom, and the earth quaked, and the rocks were split, and the Thousand-Year Aryan Reich of Sir Robert Menzies came to pass. And every man’s hand was against Australia, and Australia’s hand was against every man. And the very name of Australia was cursed by the tribes of Manhattan and Madras and Manila and Mogadishu, yea, even unto the seventh generation.

It subsequently required the Four Just Men—Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke, and Paul Keating, the prime ministers from 1972 to 1996—to wash away white Australia’s sins. But the forces of evil returned, in the shape of the fascist John Howard, who reimposed the Menzies Aryan dictatorship. And the land brought forth white picket fences. And there was darkness and gnashing of asylum seekers’ teeth.Conflicting interpretations of the same dogma do, naturally, exist. Thus,

whereas for Reynolds the primary Axis of Evil consisted of non-Labor lead-


ers like Barton,2 veteran Maoist Humphrey McQueen saved most of his bile for the embryonic Labor Party.3 But these are mere theological quibbles, to be expected among chronically disputatious high priests. On the central doctrine they agree readily enough.

Windschuttle’s need to refute this doctrine causes him to give unex-pected emphasis—almost two-thirds of his book—to pre-1901 Australian history. He appreciates that Barton and Deakin did not emerge, and could not have emerged, out of the blue; that the firm advocacy by the nation’s most celebrated popular magazine, the Bulletin, of “Australia for the White Man” did not exist in a vacuum (although he is skeptical about the ultimate influence which the Bulletin wielded). What, then, were the Policy’s actual, as opposed to alleged, origins?

In answering this question, Windschuttle alludes to societies as different from pre-Federation and immediately post-Federation Australia as can be imagined. Since some of these allusions comprise the very few disappointing parts of his narrative, let us specify where he fails to convince.

He is right, he is one hundred times right, in accentuating the theological rather than ethnic basis for pre-Reformation Christendom’s hostility toward Muslims and Jews. In his own words: “both these groups were attacked be-cause of their religion, not their race. Indeed, in fifteenth-century Spain … [they] were given the choice of changing their religion, which many chose to do, an option that would not have been available had their persecution been based on biological grounds.”4 (This, of course, is bad news for those fashionable mountebanks—the James Carrolls, the John Cornwells, the Daniel Goldhagens, etc., etc.—who make lucrative authorial careers from blaming Nazism on Catholic “anti-Semitism”; but since such mountebanks’ particular discipline is victimology rather than history, they need not detain cultural literates for longer than is needed to note their deplorable existence.)

Problems arise, and Windschuttle’s own persuasiveness temporarily fails, elsewhere in the same chapter. “One thing now clear,” he writes, “is that modern biological science has been unable to define people by race either in terms of their external physical characteristics or their inherited ge-netic make-up. Race is an unscientific category.”5 Examining Windschuttle’s sources for this and the paragraph’s other assertions, we discover “the same old same-old”: in other words, citations of Marxist and quasi-Marxist gurus who lusted after blatant political power and who cared little or nothing for truth. Ashley Montagu, Margaret Mead, and Sir Julian Huxley are all there. Of these, Montagu (né Israel Ehrenberg) emerged from the anthropological atelier of Franz Boas—who devoted his whole later life to condoning and publicizing environmentalist mythomania, most notoriously in the case of Mead’s Samoans—and became, even by Boasian standards, a slavering apologist for Stalinism. “Soviet Russia,” declared Montagu in 1942, “is the outstanding example of perfect management of ethnic group relations under


unusually difficult economic conditions.”6 Predictably, he afterwards churned out the “Statement on Race” issued by UNESCO, of which Huxley served as the first director-general. Huxley’s own notions of science, although couched in language less absurd than Montagu’s, make for equally ominous read-ing. In Huxley’s view, UNESCO’s role should entail “taking the techniques of persuasion and information and true propaganda that we have learnt to apply nationally in war, and deliberately bending them to the international tasks of peace, if necessary utilizing them, as Lenin envisaged, to ‘overcome the resistance of millions’ to desirable change.”7

To place one’s trust in the veracity of these social engineers is to ignore all the genetic and medical discoveries since the Boasians first flourished: Discoveries that point in entirely the opposite direction. One need not concur with a peevish recent white-nationalist attack on Windschuttle8 to admit that writing on race as if The Bell Curve and Why Race Matters and IQ and the Wealth of Nations9 had never been published does give the proverbial hostages to fortune, though it would be par for the Australian tabloid course.

Complaint over. On page after page of The White Australia Policy’s sub-sequent chapters, revelations abound. Windschuttle shows, first, that the Policy derived mainly from economic rather than from racialist motives; second, that it made eminent civic sense from the standpoint of those social classes which advocated it; third, that most Australians during the Policy’s operation proved perfectly capable of living amicably with nonwhites, and needed no multicultural mafia to force upon them this desirable outcome; fourth, that comparisons of the Policy to Afrikaners’ apartheid—comparisons profuse within such fever-swamps as Humphrey McQueen’s brain—are lu-dicrous. This last conclusion Windschuttle validates with spectacular ease, and the preceding three he validates with heroic diligence. In a strange way, notwithstanding his erudite professionalism, Windschuttle represents the achievement of the commonsensical amateur. After all, most of the evidence he supplies has been lying around ordinary collegiate libraries for decades. Australian history has had no equivalent to the Venona archival revelations that in 1995 transformed the study of European and American Communism. Any clever layman could have located nearly all the primary sources that Windschuttle provides. But it took Windschuttle to make the effort, and, having made the effort, to present his findings with lucid finesse.

ROOTS OF THE POLICY

Hoary legend after hoary legend collapses at the touch of Windschuttle’s scythe. Take the oft-credited role of Social Darwinist thinking in the Policy’s origins. Were the Policy’s architects and supporters really aflame with en-thusiasm for Social Darwinism? Yes, they were, according to the much-read Australian Race Relations, by Melbourne academic Andrew Markus10 (and


half-a-dozen other comparably respected texts). No, Windschuttle shows, they were (mostly) not:

These authors [who portray late-nineteenth-century Australian culture as a Social Darwinist paradise] have done nothing more than comb through a very small sample of reading matter, such as newspaper editorials and contem-porary journal articles, and found three or four phrases each, which appear to express some of the terminology commonly used by Social Darwinists. On no better evidence than this, they have then proclaimed the Australian colonies awash with scientific racism.11

Crucial to Windschuttle’s evidence is the extent to which Australia—at the very time it is supposed to have been inundated with Social Darwinist ideas—managed to continue as, dare one say it, a Christian society. Leading Australian clerics in this period, unlike their predominantly invertebrate counterparts in 2005, actually fought against their foes rather than appeasing them—whether these foes were Social Darwinist or otherwise. Windschuttle reminds us that when Social Darwinism did attract an intellectual following among Australians, it derived this following as often as not from socialist campaigners. Since Marx himself felt abject reverence not only for Social Darwinism, but also for Darwinism—he sent Darwin a copy of Das Kapital, inscribing it as being from a “sincere admirer”—this should occasion no astonishment.

Another fiction similarly felled: Australia as hotbed of genocidal hatred towards Chinese. Windschuttle shows that whatever anti-Chinese outbreaks of goldfield violence occurred (“they are nothing to be proud of, true, but it is important to keep them in perspective…the white men involved were a militant minority”),12 racial aversion in itself cannot have fueled them. After all, “there were plenty of Maoris and black Americans on the gold-fields, who never attracted any animosity.”13 What made the difference in the Chinese case? Two factors primarily: the sheer numbers of Chinese who started congregating on the goldfields from the late 1850s on, by which stage the most profitable gold deposits had begun to give out; and the absence, among the Chinese themselves, of any Western-style concepts concerning the individual’s political freedom.

We can hardly blame this country’s nascent labor movements for resent-ing the presence, and the spectacular augmentation within a few years, of what amounted to a peon caste. Australian pastoralists demonstrated during the mid-nineteenth century—once the convict transportation system had become unsustainable—a voracious appetite for hiring coolies; were these same pastoralists so inherently virtuous and public-spirited that they could automatically be trusted to forgo establishing other forms of serfdom? To the working classes it did not seem so. Eighty years after the goldfields’ heyday had ended, these classes’ sensitivity to anything that would turn their homeland into “a peasant country or a gang labor country”14 made


them recoil with disgust from peasant-farming, Chesterbellocian doctrines, propagated most notably during the 1940s by B. A. Santamaria’s National Catholic Rural Movement. (Whether they should have recoiled with disgust is a wholly different question; but they did thus recoil, and this aspect of Santamaria’s program died a quick, largely unnoticed death.)

Windschuttle’s tour de force is his examination of the parliamentary debates surrounding White Australia’s legal implementation at a national level in 1901. More outright tosh must have been written about these debates than about any other aspect of the Policy, which is saying a vast amount. Like a policeman who knows that solving a crime involves tedious spadework which cannot be delegated to others, Windschuttle painstakingly pores over Hansard (Australia’s equivalent to the Congressional Record) and exhibits the most fantastical discrepancies between what the rent-a-mob left quotes Fed-eral parliamentarians in the early twentieth century as having said, and what they actually said. Far from being—in Reynolds’ meretricious words—“per-vaded with ideas of race and blood” and “talk[ing] over and over about the dangers of pollution and contamination,”15 they bent over backwards (with a few exceptions) to deny any biological animus towards Asians. They paid Asians tribute despite the fact of having a genuine Yellow Peril to fear: the seemingly irreversible rise of Japanese expansionism, which would see off tsarist Russia’s armed forces in 1904–05. Did they demonize this Yellow Peril? They did not. Here—just one example among sixteen which could have been chosen—is Deakin, addressing the national legislature on the Immigration Restriction Bill which eventually became the Policy’s statutory centerpiece:

We all know, from the merest acquaintance with current news and with critical literature, how high a position that nation [Japan] occupies in arts and letters, and how worthy they are of the place, in our estimation, gener-ally conceded to the highest and most civilized among the nations of the world…. I contend that the Japanese require to be excluded because of their high abilities…. It is not the bad qualities but the good qualities of these alien races that make them dangerous to us. It is their inexhaustible energy, their power of applying themselves to new tasks, their endurance, and low standard of living that make them such competitors.16

(As a dizzying example of the way that approval for the Policy crossed ideological and, for that matter, racial lines, we find suffragette and anti-conscriptionist Adela Pankhurst Walsh announcing in the 1930s: “the sur-est—indeed the only—defense of our White Australia is friendship with Japan.”17)

Surprisingly, although he itemizes the specific racial appeal which the White Australia Policy had for this country’s (and the world’s) first socialist prime minister, John Christian Watson,18 Windschuttle fails—in his inves-tigation of White Australia’s zenith—to stress (he does mention) one central point. Namely, the fact that all nations of European stock (most famously the


United States in 1924) adopted similar prohibitions to Australia’s, in actual-ity if not always in statutes, against nonwhite peoples. Sometimes the Policy won support even from those nonwhites who, by modern criteria of identity politics, should have been most hysterical in condemning it. In extreme old age Sir Garfield Barwick, who had been foreign minister in Menzies’s cabinet, recollected a meeting he held with Malaysia’s leader Tunku Abdul Rahman during the mid-1960s:

I remember the Tunku saying to me that he understood Australia maintain-ing a European population: “Why should you have my insoluble problem? The problem of ethnic diversity is insoluble. I have Malays, Indians and Chinese and it is insoluble.”19

Windschuttle makes no mention of this. He likewise omits Menzies’ sorrow at the de facto junking of the Policy by the fashionable flaneur Harold Holt, who succeeded Menzies as prime minister in 1966. Menzies had doggedly opposed the advice of immigration minister and former cyclist Sir Hubert Opperman that the Policy be dropped;20 as late as December 1976 he called himself “[an] old-fashioned White Australian.”21

In fact Windschuttle’s whole coverage of the Policy’s desuetude could well have been more elaborate. He underrates, for instance, the Immigra-tion Reform Group, which exercised so powerful a backstairs influence as Menzies’s reign drew to a close. (Contrary to what might be expected from American usage, this group’s “immigration reform” meant increases, rather than decreases, to Australia’s immigration levels.) Nevertheless Windschuttle is careful to quote a telling passage from the Australian Catholic bishops. While these bishops took pains to censure “any false assumption of racial superiority which too often underlies the so-called White Australia Policy,” they conceded “merit in the economic argument which has been used to justify this policy.”22 This is hardly the zealous endorsement of multicultural tribalism which certain half-educated journalists have credited preconciliar antipodean Catholic officialdom with favoring.

Windschuttle does not believe that the White Australia Policy can be reinstated; nor, it is clear, would he consider this reinstatement desirable even if it became possible. Whether we can now afford to eschew a Christian Australia Policy, this reviewer takes leave to doubt. Queen Isabella of Spain, faced (as we are faced) with a mortal threat to her country’s religious and military survival—a threat at least as immediate as any menace that Islamic terrorism holds for Australians these days—could conceive of one long-term remedy, and one alone, to the problem: eject the infidel, or make him convert. More than five hundred years after the Queen’s reconquista, little if anything can be added to this solution, other than the monstrous and salutary warning of present-day Islamicized Holland. The fact that all advocacy of national self-defense via sharp Christian proselytism is now unpublishable, even as a suggestion (not just in Australia’s lowest-common-denominator scandal-


sheets, but in our notionally “right-wing” magazines), tells us a great deal about the nature of our worst current ethnic problem, about our opinion-forming classes’ blithe indifference to this problem, and about such classes’ total incapacity to solve it.

R. J. Stove lives in Melbourne. A slightly different version of this article is in the April 2005 issue of Melbourne’s National Observer.

ENDNOTES

1. Using a phrase apparently coined by former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, Windschuttle called himself (in a recent e-mail to the present reviewer) “a Christian fellow-traveler.”2. Henry Reynolds, North of Capricorn: The Untold Story of Australia’s North (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003), p. 189.3. Humphrey McQueen, A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning Australian Radicalism and Nationalism (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 50, 53.4. Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 30.5. Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 28.6. M.F. Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 82.7. Sir Julian Huxley: UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1947), p. 60 [italicization added by R.J.S.].8. Andrew Fraser, “Rehabilitating (and Denaturing) the White Australia Policy,” American Renaissance, February 2005.9. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (New York: Free Press, 1994); Michael Levin, Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997); Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen, IQ and the Wealth of Nations (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002).10. Andrew Markus, Australian Race Relations 1788–1993 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 14, 111.11. Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 54.12. Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, pp. 170–171.13. Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 167.14. These words are from K. M. Dallas, “The Origins of White Australia,” Australian Quarterly, March 1955; Windschuttle, pp. 160–161.15. Reynolds, North of Capricorn, p. 188.16. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 4, p. 4812; Windschuttle, The White Australia Policy, p. 72.17. Verna Coleman, Adela Pankhurst: The Wayward Suffragette, 1885–1961 (Melbourne: Mel-bourne University Press, 1996), p. 147.

18. Ross McMullin, So Monstrous a Travesty: Chris Watson and the World’s First National Labour Government (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2004), is—as Windschuttle takes impish pleasure in observing—quaintly reticent on this theme.19. Sir Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and Recollections (Sydney: Federation Press, 1995), p. 181.20. Michelle Grattan (ed.), Australian Prime Ministers (Sydney: New Holland Publishers, 2000), p. 201.21. A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol. 2, 1944-1978 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999), p. 564.22. H. I. London, Non-White Immigration and the “White Australia” Policy (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 121–122; Windschuttle, pp. 330–331.

A SPIT IN THE FACE

The Rage and the PrideOriana FallaciNew York: Rizzoli, 2002$14.95 cloth

187 pages

Reviewed by Derek Turner

Oriana Fallaci once said that behind each of her books is “a great emo-tion, both a psychological or political and [an] intellectual emotion” (www.giselle.com/oriana.html). Books like Lettera a un bambino mai

nato (published in the U.S. in 1976 as Letter to a Child Never Born) and Un uomo: Romanzo (published in the U.S. in 1980 as A Man) are driven by her (very) personal experiences. The Rage and the Pride—which is a blistering attack not just on those responsible for 9/11 but on Islam as a whole—is, she told one interviewer, “a scream rather than an essay” (George Gurely, New York Ob-server, 27 January 2003). It certainly is an extraordinary book.

Fallaci was born in 1930, the daughter of a Florentine cabinet-maker who became a radical politician and Italian resistance fighter. After being inspired by reading Jack London, she began writing short stories at an early age. Now, she is one of continental Europe’s best-known journalists, noted for her war correspondence and her no-prisoners-taken interviewing techniques. Her books and articles have been translated into twenty-one languages, and pub-lished in thirty countries. She has written for many journals, including the New Republic, the New York Times Magazine, Life, La Nouvelle Observateur, the Washington Post, Look, Der Stern, and Corriere della Sera, won various literary prizes, and lectured at the University of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, and Yale. She covered the war in Vietnam, the 1956 Hungarian uprising, various conflicts in Latin America (she was badly wounded in a massacre in Mexico City in 1968), and the first Gulf War.

During her long career, as well as making useful friends like Orson Welles, Ingrid Bergman, and Ariel Sharon, she has famously fallen out with many people—quarrels she assiduously maintains to this day. Jane Fonda and Yasser


Arafat are two such eternal enemies. In the 1970s, Fonda said that Fallaci was an American spy for criticising the Viet Cong. In the present book, Fallaci takes enjoyably bitchy revenge on Fonda (whose name she refuses to use), saying that “I was always engaged in the too serious matters [sic], mainly some war, and she was always engaged in some marriage or movie or video that teached [sic] how to stay in good shape…I spit in her face” (p.160). She also remembers Yasser Arafat’s “weak intelligence and strong ignorance” and “spitting in my face his smelly saliva” as they argued about whether Arabs or Europeans had invented mathematics (p. 93). “I wish him all the worst,” she says elsewhere, somewhat superfluously (p. 64). Henry Kissinger said that his 1972 interview with her was “the most disastrous conversation I ever had with any member of the press” (Gurely, ibid.). Other subjects include Willy Brandt, the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah of Iran, and Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose remarks about Indira Gandhi were so critical that a 1972 peace treaty between India and Pakistan was nearly torn up. When an interviewee refuses to cooperate with her, he becomes “a bastard, a fascist, an idiot,” Esquire’s David Sanford once observed (www.giselle.com/oriana.html).

There is never any attempt at fairness or balance. “She writes not to con-vince or to persuade but to overwhelm, to storm the barriers, to sweep us into a state of transcendent rage” (Charles Taylor, Salon.com, 16 November 2002). She disbelieves in both the possibility and desirability of objectivity, which she has called “a hypocrisy which has been invented in the West which means nothing…. Our weakness in the West is born of the fact of so-called ‘objectiv-ity.’ Objectivity does not exist—it cannot exist!” (Gurely, ibid.).

Her combative style makes her books peculiarly readable. Even though you know she is being grossly unfair and simplistic, and may dislike her occasional scatological outbreaks and constant “spitting-in-the-face,” you cannot help but be dragged along with her—at least for a while. It is very rare, and exhilarating, to read such a courageous, eloquent book by a public figure—especially when you agree anyway with a great deal of what she is saying. Fallaci is undoubt-edly an iconoclast, and therefore something of a cultural treasure in an age of sneaking cowardice and hypocrisy. Her books are worth buying for that reason alone—and also because she outrages the numerous class of “cicadas” (as she calls them)—those whose sole contribution to political discourse is the creaky insect-cry, “racist-racist-racist.”

Fallaci has been campaigning against Islam for twenty years. At the time of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, she was denounced for saying that the Soviets, however awful, were infinitely preferable to the mujahideen; she movingly invoked the “armless and legless Ukrainian recruits” who were the victims of that especially pointless and vicious campaign. (From the per-spective of 2004, this position seems prescient. American support of radical Islam, first in Afghanistan and later in Kosovo, was clearly a cataclysmic error

Spring 2005 / Turner 93

of judgment—for which the U.S. is continuing to pay.) The Rage and the Pride is merely a continuation of that decades-long detestation.

The book, which was first published in Italy in 2001 (La Rabbia e l’Orgoglio, Rome: Rizzoli), has performed well in the bookshops of Europe, with over a million copies sold in Italy and over 500,000 in the rest of Europe (the book has not been published in the UK). The U.S. figures, perhaps surprisingly, are much less impressive, despite generally favorable reviews in the conservative press.

Wherever it has been published, it has created a storm among Muslims and those who pander to Muslims. In Italy, the head of the Italian Islamic Party wrote a screed called Islam Punishes Oriana Fallaci, in which he called for his co-religionists to “go and die with Fallaci.” In France, the Movement against Racism took some time off from attacking Jean-Marie Le Pen and tried to get the book banned, or said that it should be issued with ideological “health warnings” on the cover, as if it were a packet of cigarettes.

Fallaci is an atheist—“all religions are difficult to accept for me” (Gurely, ibid.), but she does not vent similar spleen against the world’s other great religions—although she does say that the Bible or the Gospels and the Torah together have also “tormented humanity” (p. 94—statements like this may help to explain the relatively poor performance of her book in the U.S.). For her, Islam “is not even a religion, in my opinion. It is a tyranny, a dictatorship—the only religion on earth that has never committed a work of self-criticism.... It is immovable. It becomes worse and worse.... It is 1,400 years and these people never review themselves, and now they want to come impose it on me, on us (Gurely, ibid.). She calls Islam “that mountain which in one thousand and four hundred years has not moved, has not risen from the abyss of its blindness, has not opened its doors to the conquests of civilization, has never wanted to know about freedom and democracy and progress” (p. 30).

One can begin to understand why Muslims—a.k.a. “retrograde bigots” (p. 85)—don’t have an especially high opinion of her. She says imams are “pi-ous throat-cutters” who have turned Genoa into “a filthy kasbah” (p. 36) and “spiritual guides of terrorism” (p. 37). And so it goes on—page after page of diatribe and denunciation, barbed, bilious sallies at everyone and everything, an unremitting volley of invective and scorn fired with a blunderbuss. As she admits, “I am very, very, very angry. Angry with a rage that is cold, lucid, ra-tional. A rage that eliminates any detachment, any indulgence.” And, somewhat predictably if unhygienically, she wants to “spit in their face” too (p. 57).

It is not just Muslims who feel the sharp edge of her tongue. She criticizes feminists for being curiously silent when it comes to the treatment of Muslim women, calling them “phony Amazons” (p. 113) and “petulant chickens” (p. 114). She attacks homosexuals, “devoured…by the wrath of being half and half” (p. 113). She denounces Silvio Berlusconi for backtracking from his famous assertion that Western culture was superior to Islamic culture.


Berlusconi, she says, should “light a candle to the Holy Virgin [and] behave like a serious person” (p. 166). She criticizes the politicians whose policies, or lack of policies, have allowed Islam to “nest in the ganglia of our technology” and “live in the heart of a society that hosts them without questioning their dif-ferences, without checking their bad intentions, without penalizing their sullen fanaticism” (p. 97). The pope is assailed for having apologized for the Crusades, although she also gives him advice “respectfully”—one of probably very few cases in which “respectful advice” to the pontiff has contained the words “shitting in our pants” (p. 81). She tongue-lashes her own people for their disunity and their love of “petty glory” (p. 73).

As for today’s youth: “Instead of learned young people we have donkeys with university degrees. Instead of future leaders we have mollusks with expen-sive blue jeans and phony revolutionaries with ski-masks” (p. 176). She attacks communists, fascists, licentiousness, and even jokes—“God, do I hate jokes” (p. 166). Although a fervent Amerophile, she even lambasts America’s “childish cult of opulence…moral hypocrisies, her bullish arrogance.” It is small wonder that the book has discomfited so many people. Almost the only people who get off scot-free are Ariel Sharon, Rudy Giuliani, and the Dalai Lama. Oh yes, and Laura Bush—“Laura Bush has the face of my mother when my mother was young…. The first time I saw on TV Laura Bush, I got frozen because it was as if my mother was not dead. ‘Oh, Mama,’ I said, ‘Mama’” (Gurely, ibid.)—a curiously touching aperçu.

For her, “the West” means mostly the Enlightenment. She says that “the idea of Liberty married to the idea of equality” is the “most sublime idea ever conceived in the West” (p. 76). One suspects she has never considered the contradictions between the two concepts. Indeed, she combines her abstract love of equality with a strange snobbishness, at one point saying that Americans “never had any familiarity with sophistication or refinement…most of them are so inelegant that, in comparison, the Queen of England looks as chic as a high-class model” (p. 80).

She is candid enough to see some of her own contradictory impulses, admit-ting that, atheist though she is, “I have a lot in common with the Roman Catholic Church. Damn, if I do! How couldn’t I? I was born in a landscape of domes, mon-asteries, Christs, Madonnas, Saints, crosses, bells” (p. 145). She is also something of a patriot, listing some of Italy’s great art treasures and avowing “Should the poor-little-things [Muslims] destroy one of those treasures, only one, I swear: it is I who would become a holy warrior. It is I who would become a murderer…war you wanted, war you want? Good. As far as I am concerned, war is and war will be. Until the last breath” (pps. 39 and 40).

The Rage and the Pride is also bombastic, in a way that will make many Anglo-Saxons squirm in vicarious embarrassment. Examples include: “I have more balls than your kamikazes who find the courage to die only when dying means killing thousands of people,” and “I do not play the role of the courageous one. I am courageous. I always have been,” and “I conduct a very severe and intellectually

Spring 2005 / Turner 95

rich life.” These and similar sentiments undermine Fallaci’s insistence that she is “a person who never praises anybody beginning with herself.” The many typos and infelicities demonstrate the haste and passion that have gone into this book.

For her candor, and for her courage, Fallaci deserves considerable credit. Her eloquent defense of our common cultural heritage, and her denunciations of reli-gious monomania, strike a chord. How could anyone who wishes the best for the West disagree with her when she says that: “In our culture there is no room for the muezzins, for the minarets, for the phony abstemious, for the humiliating chador, for the degrading burkah. And should that room exist, I wouldn’t give it to them” (p. 148). And for someone from her leftist, atheist tradition to be able to write in such a way suggests that perhaps some means may yet be found of uniting the contradictory strands in Western civilization—right and left, conservative and radi-cal, atheist, pagan and Christian, American and European, northern and southern European—in battle against a phenomenon that threatens us all equally.

Yet, ultimately, her approach is essentially unhelpful. In fact, it is genuine “Is-lamophobia.” The very vividness of her prose renders the whole book essentially untrustworthy. Islam is one of the great religions, and is believed in by many mil-lions of serious people across the globe. Accordingly, it deserves fair and measured treatment even by those who find the great religions intellectually unsatisfying. In any case, we have to share a globe (and even our countries—thank you, “respon-sible” politicians!) with Muslims, and so we need a little bit of give-and-take.

While the possibility of complete objectivity may be at least partly chimerical, sometimes the effort should be made. A Time reviewer cited by another writer complained of Fallaci “when the account needs historical analysis, she offers tantrums” (www.giselle.com/oriana.html). Such outbursts may gratify Fallaci’s feelings. But it is the rest of us (she is dying of cancer—it reflects well on Fallaci’s personality that she defiantly continues to smoke two packs of cigarettes a day) who will be living cheek by jowl with Muslims for the foreseeable future. While Westerners will never understand Muslims, and may even feel amused contempt for their belief system, attacking Islam so viciously and so publicly is unlikely to assist in that mutual accommodation that has become so urgently necessary.

Fallaci has just followed up The Rage and the Pride with what is apparently a more measured examination of the topics raised in this book, La Forza della Ragione (“The Force of Reason”), but this has not yet been translated into English. It may well be that this will prove a far more useful—if far less exciting—contribution to what may prove to be a long and dirty war of all against all. In the meantime, those who want to reinforce their prejudices, or who just enjoy lively writing, will find The Rage and the Pride ticks many of the right boxes.

Derek Turner is the editor of Right Now (www.right-now.org).

Take your mind for a walkSince 1993, Right Now! has been thinking the unthinkable and saying theunsayable with panache and style. Our distinguished writers and intervie-wees, including Chris Brand, Peter Brimelow, Pat Buchanan, Alain deBenoist, Hans Eysenck, Antony Flew, Frederick Forsyth, Sam Francis, PaulGottfried, Ray Honeyford, Arthur Jensen, Norman Lamont, Jean-Marie LePen, Ezra Mishan, Dwight Murphey, Roger Scruton, Alfred Sherman, NormanTebbit and Taki, cover every conceivable topic in uncensored but thoughtfulfashion. From IQ to the EU, Flynn to Lynn, the GOP to Gramsci, Australia toZimbabwe, Haider to Horowitz, the Nouvelle Droite to the neo-cons, Right

Now! covers it all. With articles from such respected commentators,

British and overseas political news, arts and literarycriticism, profiles of rightwing and conservativethinkers and gently malicious gossip, every issue ofRight Now! is packed with ideas, information andinspiration. Isn't it time you read the magazine every-one's talking about? Subscribe today, and receive twofree back issues, plus the following six issues.

Dept OQ, PO Box 3471, Augusta, Georgia 30914-3471, United States.

Telephone (UK): +44 1507 339 056E-mail: [email protected]

Internet: www.right-now.org

I’d like to subscribe to Right Now! Please rush me TWO FREE BACK ISSUES,plus the NEXT SIX ISSUES. I enclose a US check/money order for $38.00,made payable to Right Now! or I enclose my card details (delete as applicable).

Name: ______________________________________________________

Address: ____________________________________________________

__________________________________________________

Zip: ______________________________________________

E-mail: ______________________________________________________

Card type and number:__________________________________________

Expiry date: __________________________________________________

Cardholder name (if different):____________________________________

You may also subscribe on-line at our secure website: www.right-now.org

…because it’s time for change

Right Now!A magazine of politics, ideas and culture

RN OccQ Ad.qxd 05/05/04 22:09 Page 1

RACE, REASON, AND REALITY

Race:The Reality of Human DifferencesVincent Sarich and Frank MieleBoulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004$27.50 (cloth)

xiii + 287 pp.

Reviewed by Leslie Jones

Ashley Montagu called race “the phlogiston of our time” (Brace, 2000). Fellow anthropologist Alexander Alland Jr. (2002) describes it as a “flawed category.” However, in their new book, Frank Miele, senior

editor of Skeptic, and Vincent Sarich, professor emeritus of anthropology at Berkeley, show that it denotes a biological reality. Indeed, so wide ranging is the evidence they present that this review has unavoidable lacunae.

RACE AND SLAVERY IN HISTORY

In The Emperor’s New Clothes, Joseph L. Graves claims that the race concept is a relatively modern social construct (Brace, 2001); the Public Broadcasting System documentary Race: The Power of an Illusion, shown in 2003, suggested that the ancient civilizations did not differentiate people according to their physical characteristics. Miele and Sarich demonstrate, however, that racial groups were identified in the iconography and literature of all the ancient civilizations. The ancient Greeks elaborated a naturalistic/environmentalist theory of racial differences. Hippocrates attributed them to climate, in particu-lar to gradations in intensity of sunlight. The classical scholar Frank Snowden (1996) has praised the clarity of the classical Greek authors when describing Egypt’s “woolly haired neighbours” to the south.

Islamic scholars produced a sophisticated racial taxonomy. Historian Ibn Khaldun attributed black primitivism and impulsiveness to the tropical climate. The jurist Sa’id al-Andalusi agreed that blacks had not produced any science and learning and were lacking in self-control. Note, however, that the Arabs were no less derogatory about northern Europeans, also deemed to have an unpropitious climate.


Marxist scholars have suggested that racism emerged when the Western bourgeoisie needed to justify the enslavement of blacks (D’Souza, 1995). But this theory overlooks the universality and ubiquity both of notions of racial inferiority and of slavery throughout history. Indeed, enslavement of blacks within the Islamic empire preceded enslavement of blacks by Europeans. As the authors remind us, the Arabs were massively involved in the slave trade with black Africa. The worst conditions of black slaves in Islamic society rivalled the worst conditions in the antebellum South. When the American Civil War cut off the American supply of cotton to England, the Egyptians expanded their cotton production by importing more black slaves.

When the Europeans discovered the Americas, the issue arose of how native Indian peoples should be treated. Miele and Sarich argue that if race was essentially a convenient ideological device to justify slavery, the Euro-pean ruling classes of the sixteenth century should have eagerly embraced the theory of polygenism (multiple origins of races). Yet in 1537, in Sublimis Deus, Pope Paul III upheld monogenism and the capacity of native Indians to receive Christianity. Similarly, in 1550, at a council convened by Emperor Charles V to consider colonization, the rights of native peoples were upheld (in theory at least).

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

The ethnologist James Cowles Prichard (1843) believed that all mankind was derived from a common stock and that the present diversity of races reflected the influence of climate and diet. But in Crania Americana, published in 1839, physician Samuel George Morton pointed out that paintings on ancient Egyptian and Assyrian monuments indicated that races had remained unchanged for at least 4,000 years. His collection of ancient skulls provided further evidence of the immutability of races since antiquity and also of race differences in brain size. Furthermore, Morton complained that the biblical account of the putative creation provided inadequate time for races to appear.

In Types of Mankind (1854), George R. Gliddon and Josiah Nott endorsed Morton’s definition of species as “primordial organic forms.” In their view the white man differs from the black man as much as the gorilla does from the orangutan. As for Prichard’s Lamarckian theory of racial differentiation, they agreed with Morton (1842) that white people had inhabited hot countries for many centuries without any change in skin tone. Miele and Sarich deny that sympathy for slavery drove the American school’s support for polygen-ism. They maintain that Morton and Gliddon were indifferent to the political implications of their racial theories. Yet in Types Of Mankind, Nott pointedly refers to Gliddon’s conversations with Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, in May 1844. At this time, Calhoun was trying to negotiate the annexation of Texas in order to perpetuate slavery therein. Gliddon recommended Morton’s research on race differences to Calhoun. According to Nott, Calhoun consid-

Spring 2005 / Jones 99

ered Morton’s work a refutation of “current speculations about the origin and perfectibility of races….”

ANTHROPOLOGY: SCIENCE OF RACE OR OF CULTURE?

Originally, anthropology was regarded as the science of race. In 1866, James Hunt, the founder of the Anthropological Society of London, declared that anthropology’s primary truth “is the existence of well-marked psychological and moral distinctions in the different races of men” (Hunt, 1866). After 1945, however, this viewpoint was marginalized within anthropology as cultural determinism became de rigueur.

As the authors observe, the fin de siècle disagreements between Ernst Haeckel, professor of zoology at Jena, and his former teacher, the cellular pathologist and radical politician Rudolf Virchow, were a precursor of this transformation of anthropology. The contending issue was the origin of man’s distinctive moral and intellectual faculties, i.e., man’s place in nature.

Virchow, the founder and president of the German Anthropological Society, was initially favourable to Darwinism. But he subsequently disputed man’s descent from the apes and declared his agnosticism as regards the origin of species (Haeckel, 1906). Indeed, in his 1877 discourse The Liberty of Science in the Modern State, Virchow claimed that Darwin’s theory of evolution was merely hypothetical and should not be taught in German schools and universities. Furthermore, he depicted Darwinism as subversive, discerning an affinity with socialism.

Whereas Virchow delighted Darwin’s religious opponents by declaring that the mind is an immaterial entity, Haeckel advocated social Darwinism à outrance. In his opinion, anthropology, ethics, and political philosophy should all be subsumed to the theory of natural selection. He counterposed his monistic system to all forms of dualism that exempted man from the laws of evolution, notably Christianity. In Freedom in Science and Teaching (1879), a response to Virchow, Haeckel argued that socialism has an affinity not with Darwinism but with Christianity, since the latter proclaims the equality of all men before God. For Haeckel, Darwinism was inherently aristocratic since it showed that in any species only a select minority can survive and flourish.

Haeckel viewed anthropology as an extension of biology. In Monism (1894), he maintained that high civilization is a monopoly of the Mediterranean and Mongolian races. In The Pedigree of Man (1903), likewise, he attributed the im-mense superiority of the Caucasians to selection and predicted the eventual disappearance of inferior races. Like Spencer, Haeckel inferred that in the inexorable racial struggle the more perfect, nobler man triumphs.

There is an interesting postscript to this dispute. Qua anthropologist, Vir-chow exerted a profound influence on Franz Boas, a German Jew who sought refuge in America from European anti-Semitism, eventually becoming professor


of anthropology at Columbia. Just as Virchow rejected social Darwinism and the descent of man from the apes (the pithecoid theory), so Boas contested the significance of race/biology for anthropology. Boas and his epigones upheld the autonomous influence of culture and the plasticity of human nature.

RACE AND EVOLUTION

In “The Apportionment of Human Diversity” (1972) geneticist Richard Lewontin argued that human populations are so polymorphic that the human variation within any one population (85%) will exceed that between it and any other population (15%). Lewontin concluded that racial classification is of no heuristic value as regards Homo sapiens and that the race concept is socially destructive.

But Lewontin’s figures, although technically correct, only apply to classic genetic markers such as blood groups, hemoglobin variants, and enzymes that are indeed more variable within populations than between them (Entine, 2001). Nevertheless, Professor Sarich, a molecular biologist, acknowledges that genetic differences between human races are small. Chimps share 98.4% of our DNA. He deduces that very small differences in DNA may translate into profound differences in morphology and behavior, both within humans and between humans and other species. He reminds us that artificial selection as practiced by breeders has in only a few hundred years produced the various different dog breeds. Yet notwithstanding the huge differences between breeds in morphology and behavior, researchers can only differentiate between a few breeds at the level of the gene.

Moreover, Sarich shows that despite the fact that genetically humans are 99.9% alike, racial morphological distances within our species are much greater than those between different species of gorillas or chimpanzees. Indeed, he believes that except for domesticated dogs, there is no other mammalian spe-cies whose constituent races are so strongly marked.

Sarich compared a data set of cranial/facial measurements for 29 human populations with a data set of ape measurements (chimpanzees and gorillas). Chimps are divided into two species. The two chimpanzee lineages separated 1.5 million years ago, and Sarich found that they differ from each other by 15% on the morphological distance scale. This is the same amount of variation as between the Japanese and the Arikara. Yet the latter only separated 15,000 years ago!

Rushton (2000) identified the primacy of variation as “Darwin’s Really Dangerous Idea.” Sarich, in similar vein, insists that natural selection “must have genetically based phenotypic variation to work on,” both within and between groups. He notes that within a population, randomly chosen, normal individuals of the same gender can differ in brain size by around 12%. Two dif-ferent populations can also differ on average by the same amount. Indicatively,


brain size and intelligence are correlated, as Leigh Van Valen demonstrated in a pioneering 1974 paper.

Extrapolating from the latest nuclear DNA, mitochondrial DNA, and Y chromosome studies, Sarich gives an estimated figure of forty to fifty thousand years for the African origination and dispersal of Homo sapiens under the “Out of Africa” scenario. As Watson (2003) has remarked, even 140,000 years “is a blink of an eye by evolutionary standards.” Professor Sarich concedes that Homo sapiens is unquestionably a young species and that its differentiation into races is even more recent. Conversely, in many other species, subspecies (races) have been geographically isolated for millions of years and have accumulated large differences through genetic drift, mutation, and natural selection.

Because our species is so young, Gould (1992) inferred that race-specific genetic differences are very limited. Like Boas, he upheld the inestimable significance for man of cultural evolution. Echoing Huxley’s 1893 Romanes lecture Evolution and Ethics, he (Gould) maintained that there is no evidence of changes in brain size since Homo sapiens appeared some 50,000 years ago. In other words, social progress has not depended on selection.

But Miele and Sarich dispute Gould’s assumption that elapsed time deter-mines the amount of change in traits that have survival value. Entine (2001), likewise, notes that natural selection can produce very rapid change, creating new species in relatively few generations. Geneticist Luigi Cavalli-Sforza has estimated that a variant of a gene leading to 10% more reproductive fitness could become dominant in merely 1,150 years. Messrs. Miele and Sarich also argue, contra Gould, that Western cultural superiority is intrinsic and springs from regional differences in “the selective demands on human cognitive ca-pacities” during the last 10,000 years.

Indeed, the authors endorse the evolutionary theory of race differences elaborated by Kidd (1894), Jensen (1998), Lynn (1991), and Rushton (2000). According to this theory, for the populations that colonized the temperate and cold northern regions and that evolved into the Caucasoids and Mongoloids, complex mental abilities were more essential for survival than they were for the tropical or subtropical Negroid populations.

Critics of this “stimulus of cold winters” hypothesis have recently identified its apparent Achilles’ heel, the fact that sub-Saharan Africans have the low-est average IQ (about 70) ever recorded. The implication that 50% of African blacks are mentally retarded by European standards is regarded as risible by these commentators.

However, in 1998 Rushton (2000), in collaboration with Mervyn Skuy of Witwatersrand University, undertook a study in South Africa of the compara-tive performance of black and white students on Raven’s Progressive Matrices. This study confirmed the earlier findings of depressed black African IQ. But its authors concluded that environmental factors, notably poor schools, poor


homes, and high unemployment, may explain the lower IQ of black Africans compared to Afro-Americans.

RACE AND POLITICS

Races exist, then. But how should we live with them? Like Dietrich (2004), the authors observe that de facto America is becoming increasingly segregated on racial lines. Another salient trend is the demographic decline of the Cauca-sian populations of the U.S., as lamented by Buchanan (2002).

However, Miele and Sarich reject what they call “ethno-politics,” as articu-lated by white or black nationalists. Unashamed individualists (notwithstanding their recognition of race), they are no less critical of ethnic quotas and race-norming in academic and faculty selection, as described by Gottfredson (1994). Professor Sarich witnessed the unintended effects of these invidious policies at Berkeley from 1984 to 1996, where two mutually resentful student bodies emerged separated by race, expectations, and performance. The authors agree with Jensen (2000) that, given the existence of racial differences in g, there is no escape from the adverse impact of cognitive tests on minority groups, except by imposing different selection standards for different groups.

In place of group rights and “ethno-politics,” the authors favor maximum individual opportunity in a color-blind meritocracy. The main advantage of such a system, they maintain, is that productivity and overall standards in every domain will increase, though at the price of inequality and the alienation of certain groups with lower average cognitive performance.

Race: The Reality of Human Differences is a “trip out of political correctness.” On undertaking such a journey, the reader could not wish for better guides.

Leslie Jones is a member of the Galton Society and a London-based freelance writer.

REFERENCES

Alland, A. (2002). Race in Mind. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Brace, C. L. (1999). Racialism, racism, and the bigot brigade. Psycoloquy 10(62). Brace, C. L. (2001). Debunking biological theories of race. American Scientist 89 (May-June): 277.Buchanan, P. J. (2002). The Death of the West. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. D’Souza, D. (1995). The End of Racism. New York: The Free Press. Dietrich, E. (2004). Still unequal after all these years. Education Guardian, November 5.Entine, J. (2001). The straw man of race. The World & I (September): 295–317.Gottfredson, L. (1994). The science and politics of race-norming. American Psychologist 49(11): 955–963.


Gould, S. J. (1992). The Mismeasure of Man. London: Penguin. First published 1981.Haeckel, E. (1879). Freedom in Science and Teaching. London: C. K. Paul. Haeckel, E. (1894). Monism As Connecting Religion and Science. London: A. & C. Black. Haeckel, E. (1903). The Pedigree of Man. London: A. & H. B. Bonner. Haeckel, E. (1906). Last Words on Evolution. London: A. Owen & Co. Hunt, J. (1866). Anniversary Address Delivered before the Anthropological Society of London. London: Trűbner & Co.Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g Factor. Westport: Praeger. Kidd, Benjamin. (1894). Social Evolution. London: Macmillan. Lewontin, R. (1972). The apportionment of human diversity. Evolutionary Biology 6: 381–398.Lynn, R. (1991). The evolution of racial differences in intelligence. The Mankind Quar-terly 32(1–2) (Fall/Winter): 100–121.Morton, S. (1842). Brief Remarks on the Diversity of the Human Species. Philadelphia.Nott, J. & Gliddon, G. R. (1854). Types of Mankind. London: Trübner & Co. Prichard, J. C. (1843). The Natural History of Man. London: H. Bailliere. Rushton, J. P. (2000). Race, Evolution, and Behavior. Port Huron, MI: Charles Darwin Research Institute. 3rd ed.Snowden, F. 1996. Bernal’s “Blacks” and the Afrocentrists. Black Athena Revisited, ed. M. R. Lefkowitz. Chapel Hill; The University of N. Carolina Press: 112–128.Watson, J. (2003). DNA: The Secret of Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

The Lost Philosopher

The Best of Anthony M. Ludovici

EDITED BY

JOHN V. DAY

In the first decades of the twentieth century, An-thony Mario Ludovici (1882-1971) was one of Britain’s most celebrated intellectuals.

One of the first and most accomplished translators of Nietzsche into English and a leading exponent of Nietzsche’s thought, Ludovici was also an original phi-losopher in his own right.

Without a graduate degree or university professor-ship (indeed, without any need of them), Ludovici went over the heads of academia and directly addressed the educated public, supporting himself entirely by his writ-ings.

In nearly forty books, including eight novels, and dozens of shorter works, Ludovici set forth his views on metaphysics, religion, ethics, politics, economics, the sexes, health, eugenics, art, modern culture, and current events with a clarity, wit, and fearless honesty that made him famous.

After World War II, however, Ludovici fell rapidly into obscurity. Why? Because Ludovici was a passionate, principled defender of aristocracy and conservatism and a fierce, uncompromising critic of egalitarianism in all its manifestations: Christianity, liberalism, Marxism, social-

ism, feminism, multiculturalism, crass commercialism, a debased popular culture, and the denial of biological differences between individuals and races, as well as the envious hobbling of the gifted and the sentimental cod-dling of the mediocre and botched.

Thanks to this volume, however, the lost philoso-pher has been found again, and far from seeming anti-quated, his ideas are even more radical, relevant, and challenging in our day than in his own.

The Lost Philosopher collects Ludovici’s thoughts on nine topics—Religion, Conservatism, Liberalism, Men and Women, Eugenics, Health, Education, Econom-ics, and Art—in the hope that our times might catch up to Ludovici’s philosophy.

Praise for The Lost Philosopher:

“Of all unjustly ignored authors, Anthony M. Ludovici is certainly the one who today most deserves to be remembered. In his works, as imposing in quantity as in quality, this profoundly original philosopher never ceased to offer opinions on the most various subjects (from religion and education to art, eugenics, and the relations between the sexes) that are perfectly op-posed to contemporary ‘political correctness.’ Even those who will disapprove of his remarks will be able to recognize their prescient character. For collecting in this volume the most significant pages of Ludovici’s works, John V. Day without a doubt deserves the gratitude of all free spirits.”—Alain de Benoist, author of On Being a Pagan (Ultra, 2004)

Ordering Information:

ISBN 0-9746264-0-6 Cloth edition limited to 500 numbered copies.

v + 305 pages. Printed on acid free paper.

Price: $30.00

California Residents: Add 7.75% sales tax(for a total of $32.33).

U.S. Orders: Add $5.00 for postage. Foreign orders: Add $10.00 for postage (Air Mail).

Send check or money order made payable to ETSF to:

ETSF1678 Shattuck Ave, #330 Berkeley, CA 94709-1631

USA

[email protected]

‘THE SKY WAS ON FIRE’SIXTY YEARS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN,QUESTIONS STILL LINGER

Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945Frederick TaylorNew York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004$26.95

521 pp.

Apocalypse 1945:The Destruction of DresdenDavid IrvingFocal Point Publications: London, 200540.00 ₤

320 pp.

Reviewed by Peter B. Gemma

I imported Dresden into the vocabulary of horror...people now say Dresden in the same breadth as they say Auschwitz

and Hiroshima. That’s my small contribution to the vernacular.—David Irving1

What happened to Dresden sixty years ago is relevant to warfare and foreign policy today—whether analyzing U.S. military strategy in Iraq or debating the political ramifications of Israel’s occupation of Pales-

tine—the question of what price victory is fundamental.Just about any student of history should know something about the bomb-

ing of Dresden: the literature can range from Kurt Vonnegut’s popular novel Slaughterhouse Five to historian F.J.P. Veale’s seminal work Advance to Barbarism. Historian Paul Johnson summed-up the air raid as “the greatest Anglo American moral disaster of the war against Germany.”2 Matthias Gretzschel, author of the book When Dresden Was Obliterated by Fire, says that: “For Dresdeners, February 13 is what 9/11 is to the New Yorkers.”3


According to essayist Mark Greif, the prevalent analysis is this: “Most historians agree that the bombing of Dresden on February 13, 1945, was one of the darkest chapters in the Allied struggle to liberate Europe from Nazism. On that day, as many as 135,000 civilians may have been killed, and a city with an irreplaceable architectural heritage was utterly destroyed—all at a point so late in the war that the justification for the carnage seemed painfully lacking.”4

In assessing the legacy of Dresden’s devastation, Frederick Taylor extends a caveat: “The final moral judgment about the city’s fate... remains, as it must, to the readers.” Good reason to read Taylor’s book as well as Irving’s revised reissue of his ground-breaking look at the same subject.

Historians and military strategists have long debated whether the 750-year-old metropolis known as “Florence on the Elbe” was a legitimate enemy target, and if the number of non-combatant casualties resulting from the attack can be justified. The city of some 650,000 inhabitants (Dresden’s Jewish population was deported to work camps about a year before the infamous Allied raid) served as a magnet for war refugees as well as a holding pen for hundreds of POWs.

Antony Beevor, author of Berlin: The Downfall, 1945, defends the decimation of Dresden because the Nazis “literally obliterated whole cities and that certainly preceded what the British did,” while Jörg Friedrich, author of The Fire: Germany under Bombardment 1940-45, maintains that Dresden “appeared to me to be a just answer to the crimes of the Third Reich, but I’ve since changed my mind. Until the Second World War there was a common consensus that the massacre of civilian populations was illegal.”5 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn once lamented:

[H]ow shall we name those who, with victory fully in hand, dispatched a two-day wave of fighter bombers to reduce to ashes beautiful Dresden, a civilian city teeming with refugees?6

Frederick Taylor writes that the bombing raid was necessary because Dresden was a “vital site of manufacturing, communications and services of great impor-tance to [Germany’s] war effort.” On the other hand, David Irving asserts, “At the time of the air attack in 1945, the city’s military significance was minimal.”

This much is certain: from 10 p.m. February 13, 1945 (ironically, Ash Wednes-day) until about noon the next day, 1,200 British and American bombers dropped 4,500 tons of explosives and incendiary bombs on Dresden, creating a horrific fire storm with the power of a tornado—strong enough to suck in victims off the street and into its hellfire. Tens of thousands of civilians were incinerated in just fourteen hours and ten minutes. Taylor remarks, “Most German cities died a death of a thousand cuts, only a handful suffered swift execution.”

Taylor devotes five extraordinary chapters of his book to describe the attack, mixing dramatic first-person anecdotes of the bombers with those of the bombed: A British airman recollects “we had no qualms about the raid”; a Canadian veteran recalls “The sky lit-up [from] the horrendous inferno on the ground.... There [was] no jubilation from the crew. Not even a slight hurrah.” One Dresden survivor states: “I went outside and the sky was on fire.”

Spring 2005 / Gemma 107

The exclusive color photographs David Irving reproduces in his book provide the most graphic portrayal of what happened. “The horses blink and look away” is a caption he attaches to some grim photos of carts used to collect the dead. Each searing picture is worth a thousand words of shock and awe.

On February 13, 1945, the Third Reich was in its death throes (seventy-two hours earlier, at Yalta, the Allies decided to dismember postwar Germany; eighty-four days later, the Nazis unconditionally surrendered). Yet Taylor offers new findings indicating Dresden still housed “the cutting edge apparatus of modern war 1940s style,” particularly as a manufacturer of radar components, guidance equipment, and even gas masks. Taylor believes that Dresden, as a transportation and com-munications center, enhanced Hitler’s end-game resistance—placing it rightfully in the crosshairs of the Allies. Irving concedes that “Dresden had become a key point in the German postal and telegraph system, and there is little doubt that the obliteration of the postal installations in the city would hamper communications with the eastern front,” but he cautions, “At the time of the attack, however, the city’s strategic significance was less than marginal....”

Taylor and Irving both regard Winston Churchill as chief protagonist in Dresden’s drama. Irving is forthright: “Churchill took a robust view of the ex-pendability of German non-combatants.” Taylor waffles about the culpability of Britain’s prime minister (there was “a mix of motives”) for terror bombing Dres-den and other German cities—“The material so far available is open to differing interpretations and is in any case circumstantial.”

Historian Ralph Raico shares Irving’s take on Sir Winston in writing succinctly about a particular incident that Taylor and Irving cover in detail:

The British Prime Minister “was shaken by the outcry that followed [the raid]... He sent a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff: ‘... the destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing....’ The military chiefs saw through Churchill’s contemptible ploy. Realizing they were being set up, they refused to accept the memorandum. After the war, Churchill casu-ally disclaimed any knowledge of the Dresden bombing, saying ‘I thought the Americans did it.’”7

How many died in the destruction of Dresden? Reich propaganda minister Josef Goebbels, in what Taylor brands his “last and grimmest creation,” furiously spewed out civilian death estimates of 250,000, a figure which curiously survived the test of time. Later, for its own peculiar purposes, communist East Germany accused the Western Allies of killing 320,000 noncombatants.

In his book Dresden 1945: The Devil’s Tinderbox, Alexander McKee states that casualties could be estimated as high as “70,000 without much fear of exaggera-tion.”8 Taylor says “The fairest estimate” of the victims is “between twenty-five thousand and forty thousand,” but Irving counters with a count of “Sixty thou-sand or more; perhaps a hundred thousand—certainly the largest single air raid massacre of the War in Europe.”


Both the Irving and Taylor books should be read as a set; there is indeed com-plementary overlap—confirmation of controversial facts and observations—but very sharp differences on some crucial details as well. Taylor claims that Irving’s work, “with its dramatic casualty estimates, conditioned the English speaking world’s view of the city’s destruction for an entire generation.” Although Taylor calls Apocalypse 1945 “vividly told, well written, and based on what seemed like exhaustive, thoroughly checked research,” he spends more than a dozen pages intensely scrutinizing and debunking Irving’s sources, conclusions, and even his motivations.

David Irving, journaling in his website’s diary (www.fpp.co.uk/online, Febru-ary 11, 2004), had this reaction to the publication of Taylor’s book:

Frederick Taylor sends me a copy of his book Dresden.... I riffle through the book’s pages, and write him: ‘Thank you for showing me the book. You have in fact lifted a very great deal of material from my book...which was first published forty-two years ago.... The route maps in the front are from my book, the dam-age map is based on it, the transcripts of the radio traffic are from my book, etc., etc.... It would therefore have been courteous to include my name and pioneering work on this subject in the Acknowledgments; no doubt you had reasons not to. They cannot have been very honorable ones. It is not the way that I do things, I am glad to say.’Sparks still fly over Dresden sixty years after its firebombing—as well they

should.

Peter B. Gemma was awarded the George Washington Honors Medal for Individual Achievement from the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge for “the ability to communicate patriotic ideas and ideals.” His articles have appeared in USA Today, Military History, Human Events, and the New American.

ENDNOTES

1. D.D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust on Trial (New York W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 43. 2. Paul Johnson, Modern Times: from the Twenties to the Nineties (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 404.3. “Neo-Nazis Vow to Stage Anti-British Protests on 60th Anniversary of Dresden Raids,” London Sunday Telegraph, February 6, 2005. 4. “Devil in the Details,” The American Prospect, December 6, 1999.5. “Germans Call Churchill a War Criminal,”” Daily Telegraph, November 19, 2002.6. “The March of the Hypocrites,” London Times, August 21, 1997.7. “Rethinking Churchill,” The Costs of War: America’s Pyrrhic Victories, John V. Denison, editor (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 287. 8. Alexander McKee, Dresden 1945: The Devil’s Tinderbox (London: Souvenir Press, 1982), as quoted in Taylor, Dresden, p. 446.

Spring 2005 / About the Editors 109

ABOUT THE EDITORS

• EditorKevin Lamb is the editor of Race, Genetics and Society: Glayde Whitney on the Scien-

tific and Social Policy Implications of Racial Differences (2002). His articles have appeared in National Review, Chronicles, The Asian Wall Street Journal, Society, Mankind Quarterly, Conservative Review, and The Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies. He is a fre-quent contributor to The Social Contract and Right Now! Mr. Lamb is a former manag-ing editor of Human Events (2002-2005) and former library assistant for Newsweek’s Washington bureau (1989-2002).

• Associate Editor and Book Review Editor Wayne Lutton, Ph.D., (history) has been writing on national security, military

history, and immigration-related issues for over thirty years. Currently editor of The Social Contract, he has been a college professor of history and government at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, served as research director for a foundation, and has worked as a policy analyst in Washington, D.C. He has testified before Congress and the Colorado legislature on public policy aspects of managing HIV/AIDS.

Dr. Lutton is author, co-author, and a contributor to 19 books, including The Immi-gration Time Bomb, The Immigration Invasion, Immigration and the American Identity, and The Real American Dilemma. Articles by Dr. Lutton are included in eight college-level textbooks. Over the years he has written hundreds of articles and reviews which have appeared in Chronicles, Human Events, National Review, Strategic Review, The Occidental Quarterly, and other journals of scholarship and opinion.

He is a frequent guest on radio talk shows and has appeared on C-SPAN a number of times.

• Managing Editor and Web Edition Editor Louis Andrews is a graduate of the College of Charleston (SC) and did gradu-

ate work in the Department of History at the University of South Carolina. He is a businessman, web developer, and writer and has been published in Right Now!, the Augusta Chronicle, The Occidental Quarterly, and the online journal pinc, for which he served as book review editor. He is also the developer and webmaster of the Stalking the Wild Taboo website and the author of North Carolina’s Demographic Transforma-tion: The Impact of Race and Immigration (2004). Though a native of South Carolina, Mr. Andrews has lived in Augusta, Georgia, since 1982.

• Associate EditorTheodore J. O’Keefe studied history and classics at Harvard College. During his

career in publishing he has edited several racial-nationalist and historical revisionist periodicals and helped bring numerous books on European and American history and culture into print. Mr. O’Keefe has also published many articles on the political and cultural aspects of our civilization’s contemporary crisis.


EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Virginia Abernethy, Ph.D., emeritus professor of psychiatry, Vanderbilt University Medical School, is the author of Population Politics: The Choices That Shape Our Future (Insight Books, 1993; Transaction 1999), Population Pressure and Cultural Adjustment (Human Sciences Press, 1979), and (editor) Frontiers in Medical Ethics: Applications in a Medical Setting (Ballinger, 1980). A former editor of Population and Environment, she is the author of numerous articles in professional journals and a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. She is a graduate of Wellesley College (B.A., 1955) and Harvard University (M.A. 1969, Ph.D., 1970).

Frank Ellis, Ph.D., is a lecturer in Russian at the University of Leeds, England, and the author of Vasily Grossman: The Genesis and Evolution of a Russian Heretic (Berg, 1994), From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia’s New Infosphere (St. Martin’s Press, 1999), and The Macpherson Report: ‘Anti-racist’ Hysteria and Sovietization of the United Kingdom (Right Now Press Ltd., 2001). He has published articles on topics that range from Soviet war literature to political correctness. Prior to taking up an academic career he was a professional soldier and served in the Parachute Regiment of the Special Air Service.

Wayne Lutton, Ph.D. (history), editor of The Social Contract, is a policy analyst and historian. He has published widely on population and immigration concerns. Dr. Lutton has been research director for an educational institute and a college professor and is the author of or contributor to many books and monographs, including The Immigration Time Bomb (revised 1988) and The Immigration Invasion. His articles and reviews have appeared in Chronicles, National Review, The Social Contract, and other journals of scholarship and opinion.

Richard Lynn, Ph.D., professor emeritus of psychology, University of Ulster, Coleraine, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, is the author most recently of Eugenics: A Reassessment (Praeger, 2001), The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund (University Press of America, 2001), and Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Popu-lations (Praeger, 1996). Other published writings include “National IQ and Economic Development: A Study of Eighty-One Developing Nations” (with Tatu Vanhanen), Mankind Quarterly (Summer 2001); “Geographical Variation in Intelligence,” in The Scientific Study of Human Nature: Tribute to Hans J. Eysenck at Eighty, (editor) Helmuth Nyborg (Pergamon, 1997); “The Decline of Genotypic Intelligence” and “In Support of the Nutrition Theory,” in The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures, (editor) Ulric Neisser (APA, 1998). Dr. Lynn is a contributor to various monographs and psychological journals; his previous books include Educational Achievement in Japan: Lessons for the West (M.E. Sharpe, 1988); (editor) Dimensions of Personality: Papers in Hon-our of H.J. Eysenck (Pergamon, 1981); and Personality and National Character (Pergamon, 1971). He currently serves as an editorial advisor to Mankind Quarterly.

Kevin MacDonald, Ph.D., professor of psychology, California State University-Long Beach, is the editor of Population and Environment and former editor of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society Newsletter. He is the author most recently of The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellec-tual and Political Movements (Praeger, 1998), Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism (Praeger, 1998), and A People that Shall Dwell Alone:

Spring 2005 / Editorial Advisory Board 111

Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy (Praeger, 1994). As a frequent contributor to monographs and author of numerous articles in evolutionary psychology, religion, and ethnic relations, his previous books include Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development (Springer-Verlag, 1988), Social and Personality Development: An Evolutionary Synthesis (Plenum, 1988), and (editor) Parent-Child Play: Descriptions and Implications (State University of New York Press, 1993).

Brent A. Nelson, Ph.D., a freelance writer, is the author of America Balkanized— Immigration’s Challenge to Government (American Immigration Control Foundation, 1994), as well as numerous articles and book reviews.

James C. Russell, Ph.D., is the author of The Germanization of Early Medieval Chris-tianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation (Oxford University Press, 1994) and has taught classes at Saint Peter’s College, New Jersey.

Derek Turner, editor of the London-based conservative quarterly Right Now!, is a British journalist and frequent contributor to Chronicles and The Social Contract.

Miles D. Wolpin, Ph.D., J.D., is professor emeritus of political science, State University of New York, Potsdam, (N.Y.), and the author of a dozen books, including Alternative security and military dissent (Austin & Winfield, 1994) and America insecure: arms transfers, global interventionism, and the erosion of national security (McFarland & Co., 1991), as well as scores of articles on militarism, national security, Third World politics, and immigration. He is a frequent contributor to The Social Contract.

Subscriber (your name will not be given out to anyone)

Name: _______________________________________________

Address:______________________________________________

Address:______________________________________________Please make $24.00 check payable to:

American Renaissance, Box 527, Oakton, VA 22124Tel: (703) 716-0900 Fax: (703) 716-0932 www.AmRen.com

Do You Want Your Childrento be Racial Minorities?

If we let current trends con-tinue, by the year 2050whites will be a minority

race in the United States. Willthat be good for your country oryour children?

Current race and immigrationpolicies assume that race issomething trivial that can bemade not to matter. This is false.Race helps determine wheremost of us live, where we sendour children to school, whomwe marry, and what church wejoin. Race will also determinethe character of our country.If we acquire a Third Worldpopulation we will become aThird World country.

American Renaissance is amonthly newsletter that ex-

presses an unabashed prefer-ence for the culture and way oflife of the Euro-American ma-jority. We have been publishingfor 12 years, and our contribu-tors include Samuel Francis,Michael Levin, Jared Taylor,Richard Lynn, and Fr. JamesThornton.

Subscriptions are $24.00 for12 monthly issues.

Vol. 5, No. 1 Spring 2005 T OF C - The Occidental Quarterly · taboo for establishment...

Documents

Transcript of Vol. 5, No. 1 Spring 2005 T OF C - The Occidental Quarterly · taboo for establishment...