Vol. 42 No. 1 - PDF Version

Editorial Board

The opinions and views expressed in this journal do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Ministry of Defence. The Editorial Board reserves the right to edit and publish selected articles according to its editorial requirements. Copyright© 2015 by the Government of the Republic of Singapore. All rights reserved. The articles in this journal are not to be reproduced in part or in whole without the consent of the Ministry of Defence.

Advisor RADM Giam Hock Koon

Chairman COL Ng Wai Kit

Deputy Chairman COL(NS) Irvin Lim

Members COL(NS) Tan Swee Bock COL(NS) Benedict Ang Kheng Leong COL Lim Siong TiongCOL Simon Lee Wee Chek ME7 Shue Pei SoonLTC Huang Miaw YiME6 Colin TeoMAJ Charles Phua Chao RongMS Deanne Tan Ling HuiMR Kuldip SinghMR Daryl Lee Chin Siong CWO Tang Peck Oon MR Eddie Lim Editorial Team

EditorMS Helen Cheng

Assistant EditorMR Bille Tan

Research SpecialistsLCP Delson OngLCP Adam LeePTE Macalino Minjoot

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c o n t e n t s

iii EDITORIAL

FEATURES

01 The Concept of A Decisive Battle and the Key Takeaways for the Singapore Armed Forces by LTC Tan Wee Heng, Melvyn

12 Restrictions on Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Major Powers’ ‘Lawfare’ by MAJ Chuah Meng Soon

23 The Case for Pre-Emptive Warfare and its Implications for Singapore by CPT Seah Jun Hao

39 Maskirovka in the Information Age by LTA(NS) Chin Hui Han

TECH EDGE

51 Swimming in Sensors, Drowning in Data. Big Data Analytics for Military Intelligence by ME4 Toh Bao En

Vol. 42 No. 1 [2016]ISSN 2017-3956

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VIEW POINT

66 Manned-Unmanned Teaming—An Analysis of UAVs and their Interoperability with Manned Aircraft by LTA Chan Jing Yi

BOOK REVIEW

77 Barry Desker and Ang Cheng Guan (Eds.): Perspectives on the Security Of Singapore by MAJ Phua Chao Rong, Charles

PERSONALITY PROFILE

81 Julius Robert Oppenheimer by Macalino Minjoot

QUOTABLE QUOTES

CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE ESSAY COMPETITION 2014/2015 PRIZE WINNERS

c o n t e n t s

0i-0ii Content_V42N1.indd 2 1/3/16 5:02 PM

editorial iii

POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL.42 NO.1

EditorialIn 2015, we celebrated 50 years of independence—a

milestone in our nation’s young history. These 50 years

of peace and prosperity were won for Singaporeans by

the diligence and dedication of our founding leaders and

pioneer generation who worked to build our young nation

and to defend and safeguard its sovereignty. A strong and

credible defence force was crucial then and today, due

to the complex landscape that Singapore faces, a strong

defence force is even more critical, to Singapore’s stability

and security. Minister of Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen said,

“A strong and credible defence force remains crucial for

Singapore’s security, independence and sovereignty.”1 Dr Ng

added that in order to prepare for a wide range of threats

in the current environment, the Singapore Armed Forces

(SAF) will undergo further transformation in areas such

as unmanned systems and robotics, so that the SAF will

have the added benefit of greater precision while using less

manpower. Another area of focus will be new capabilities to

defend against threats in the cyber domain.2

In this issue of Pointer, very fittingly, we present two

essays—one which will cover the issue of manned and

unmanned systems, and the other is a discussion on big

data analytics, i.e. how to quantitatively deal with masses

of information, drawing out patterns and insights from the

data. There is also a discussion on the power of deception

in the context of information operations in the current

environment. Other topics include a general discourse on

the concept of a decisive battle as well as the concept of

the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the context of the

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Finally, we also feature an analysis on the case for pre-

emptive war and its implications for Singapore.

In the essay, ‘The Concept of A Decisive Battle and

the Key Takeaways for the Singapore Armed Forces’, LTC Tan

Wee Heng, Melvyn highlights that a decisive battle, that

is, a battle that allows for a swift and decisive victory

does not, in itself, decide the outcome of war, but it can

provide the operational advantage over the adversaries

to accelerate the end of the war. He uses the example of

Commanding General, Ulysses. S. Grant’s strategies in the

American Civil War to illustrate this. In addition, LTC Tan

adds that decisive battles are no longer confined to the

traditional battle space and are not solely dependent on

the use of hard power, as seen from the Battle of Fallujah.

LTC Tan concludes that in order to astutely apply the

concept of decisive battles in its strategies, the SAF needs

to be clear on our nation’s concept of victory, continue

honing our information operations capability and ensure

that our professional military education syllabi are

designed to groom military professionals who can think,

reflect and analyse.

MAJ Chuah Meng Soon’s essay is entitled, ‘Restrictions

on Foreign Military Activities in the EEZ: Major Powers’

‘Lawfare’. In his essay, MAJ Chuah first defines and explains

the concept of the EEZ in the context of the UNCLOS.

He elaborates on the regional examples of restrictions

declared and imposed by coastal states and also discusses

the impact on traditional naval freedom of navigation

due to these restrictions. In his conclusion, the author

states that the provisions in UNCLOS have been decisively

clear that the EEZ was conceptualised to meet the coastal

states needs in the realm of economic utilisation, while

giving due regard to the interests of user states. However,

disagreements will continue in the debate of UNCLOS

between maritime powers and coastal states as long as

fundamental nationalist interests are at play and that the

seas remain important as a vital source of assets and a

battle-ground for geopolitics.

The essay, ‘The Case for Pre-Emptive Warfare and its

Implications for Singapore’ is written by CPT Seah Jun Hao.

According to CPT Seah, small states make easy targets and

it is not surprising that preventive measures are being

considered to deter potential aggressors. In his essay, CPT

Seah stresses that there are underlying conditions that

countries should consider before they can justify for a

pre-emptive self-defence. He discusses the justifications

for pre-emptive warfare as a useful tool in achieving

strategic interests in the pre-war to post-war continuum.

He also highlights the various conditions a country should

consider in order to carry our a successful pre-emptive

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editorial iv


war. He discusses the strategic relevance and importance

of pre-emptive warfare for small states. CPT Seah then

explores the various justifications for pre-emptive warfare

and finally suggests the necessary preparations for a pre-

emptive war.

LTA(NS) Chin Hui Han, in his essay, ‘Maskirovka in

the Information Age’, critically examines the power of

deception in the context of information operations in the

modern hybrid battlespace. He has included two examples

in his discussion: the Normandy landings in World War Two

(WWII) and the use of the Russian Maskirovka doctrine

in the ongoing conflict in the Donbass regions. He then

discusses the information space as the new battlefield,

in which dominance is highly prized by the modern war-

fighter. He adds that a democratic platform, with avenues

for influence and exploitation by all parties, civilian or

military, is a quagmire in which militaries globally have

had to adapt operations and technologies to conduct

information operations to increase situational awareness.

Lastly, LTA(NS) Chin then explores the efforts in information

operations that the SAF has undertaken today as part of its

Third Generation transformation.

In our Tech Edge section, we are featuring the essay,

‘Swimming in Sensors, Drowning in Data. Big Data Analytics

for Military Intelligence’ by ME4 Toh Bao En. In this essay,

ME4 Toh emphasises that with the SAF investing heavily in

integrated strike and Command, Control, Communications,

Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities, intelligence

analysts are now faced with the need to produce ever-

more precise intelligence in the face of information

overload—a deluge of data beyond the ability of humans

to process and understand. ME4 Toh explains that big data

analytics provide the ability to quantitatively deal with the

masses of information, as well as to qualitatively improve

intelligence assessments by drawing out patterns and

insights from data. In this essay, she briefly examines how

defence and intelligence agencies in other countries deal

with big data and then outlines a model of what big data

architecture would entail and a vision of how data analytics

will change the way intelligence analysis is performed. In

conclusion, ME4 Toh proposes two approaches to seeding

and implementing big data for intelligence in the SAF.

In the final essay on ‘Manned-Unmanned Teaming—An

Analysis of UAVs and their Interoperability with Manned

Aircraft’, LTA Chan Jing Yi describes the increasing usage of

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in the SAF. She highlights

that the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has now

fully operationalised the H-1 Heron and H-450 Hermes as

UAVs of the 3rd Generation SAF while the Singapore Army

and the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) have utilised the

surveillance capabilities of smaller, shorter-range tactical

UAVs extensively in their operations, with the addition

of Skyblade III and ScanEagle, respectively to their

existing platforms. LTA Chan also explores the potential

development of UAV applications in the RSAF, covering a

discussion on the possible adoption of Manned-Unmanned

Teaming (MUM-T), which refers to the coupling of a manned

platform with one or more designated unmanned platforms

in such a way that the interaction between the two types

of platforms capitalises on their respective strengths.

POINTER would also like to extend a very warm welcome

to COL Simon Lee as he joins the POINTER Editorial Board.

The POINTER Editorial Team

ENDNOTES

1. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2016/jan/18jan16_nr.html#.VsbMqLSGPIU

2. Ibid

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INTRODUCTION

A rapid battlefield victory has traditionally been

the aim of conventional operational warfare. From

the German army in 1914, with its objective of a

six-week victory over France, through the German

blitzkrieg in World War Two (WWII) to Israel’s Six Day

War against Egypt in 1967, the goal of these military

operations has been to achieve a rapid operational

victory. This need to achieve a quick victory of

annihilation is made even more critical to countries

that lack strategic depth where, because of their

size, any operational defeat would automatically have

the gravest strategic consequences for the country.1

Singapore is one example and this need to achieve “a

swift and decisive victory” is explicitly spelt out in

the mission statement of the Singapore Armed Forces

(SAF).2 However, the ways and means of achieving a

swift and decisive victory is not as straightforward

as it seems. Often times, we tend to embrace the

idea of decisive battle as the key towards achieving

a decisive victory. This relationship is valid but in

our application, we tend to be overly simplistic and

neglect to consider the contextual factors. Today, we

are increasingly operating in a politically kaleidoscopic

strategic environment where the value of hard power

is no longer absolute and the strategic narrative is

proving its utility as an effective means of warfare.

Unless we start distilling and embracing the essence

of the decisive battle in reality, its full potential will

not be realised and the goal of achieving a swift and

decisive victory will be impeded.

DECONSTRUCTING THE IDEAL DECISIVE BATTLE

Our misconception of the decisive battle largely

stems from a misinterpretation of the Clausewitzian

paradigm of war. Clausewitz, in his seminal work On

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The Concept Of A Decisive Battle And The Key Takeaways For The Singapore Armed Forces

by LTC Tan Wee Heng, Melvyn

Abstract:

The essay argues that a decisive battle, that is, a battle that allows for a swift and decisive victory, does not, in itself, decide the outcome of war but, it can provide the operational advantage over the adversaries to accelerate the end of the war. This is illustrated through Commanding General Ulysses S. Grant’s strategies in the American Civil War. In addition, decisive battles are no longer confined to the traditional battle space and are not solely dependent on the use of hard power, as illustrated by the Battle of Fallujah. The author concludes that in order to astutely apply the concept of decisive battles in its strategies, the Singapore Armed Forces needs to be clear on our nation’s concept of victory, continue honing our information operations capability and ensure that our professional military education syllabi are designed to groom military professionals who can think, reflect and analyse. Keywords: Modern Warfare; Victory; Art of War; Strategy; Power

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War, started by defining war as “a duel on a larger

scale” and as “an act of force to compel our enemy

to do our will.”3 He goes on to emphasise the need

to exert the “maximum use of force” and added that

“since time began, only great victories have paved

the way for great results.”4 By beginning with this

perspective, Clausewitz had created an impression

that the results in battle decide the outcome of

war. More specifically, he highlighted that the use

of overwhelming offensive force was the most

effective way to compel the enemy into submission

and win the war. Up to this point, a superficial read

of Clausewitz will result in two misconceptions.

First, decisive battle will produce rapid and decisive

strategic results and second, decisive battle can create

permanent outcomes. This over-simplistic mindset

misses the forest for the trees and clearly ignores the

complexities and uncertainties associated with war,

a point that Clausewitz made in subsequent sections

of his book. In actual fact, Clausewitz’s intent by

beginning with framing war in its ideal form was to

bring out the uncertainties in reality. This was clearly

emphasised by Clausewitz when he duly noted that

as we “move from the abstract to the real world…the

whole thing looks quite different.”5

This need to achieve a quick victory of annihilation is made even more critical to countries that lack strategic depth where, because of their size, any operational defeat would automatically have the gravest strategic consequences for the country.

In reality, decisive battles do not decide the

outcome of war and, more specifically, results in

the battlefield do not produce permanent outcomes.

Another fallacy that we have often fallen prey to, is

the belief that decisive battles will end the war and

result in lasting peace. However, as Clausewitz puts

it, “in war, the result is never final…even the ultimate

outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final.”6

The Battle of Austerlitz has often been cited as the

quintessential example of the ideal decisive battle

where, despite being numerically weaker, Napoleon

and his Grande Armee of France annihilated the larger

Russian and Austrian armies and brought the War of

the Third Coalition to a rapid end.7 However, if it is

true that decisive battles can produce permanent

outcomes, then results of the Battle of Austerlitz

should have prevented the War of the Fourth and Fifth

Coalition from happening. Unfortunately, it did not

and Napoleon would go on to be defeated. History

would go on to repeat itself when “Israel’s stunning

success in 1967 turned to dust in the blood bath of

1973, so too did Saddam Hussein’s launching of the

Iraqi armies in 1980 [which] result[ed] in needless

slaughter—and decided nothing.”8

In summary, by closely studying Clausewitz,

there are two key takeaways. First, in reality, war

is complex and uncertain. There are just too many

different factors affecting “the outcome of a battle,

campaign, or series of campaigns that can rarely all

favor a quick [and decisive] result.”9 Second, war

is an interactive affair between emotional living

forces. Therefore, outcomes are never permanent and

governments must “never assume that its country’s

fate, its whole existence, hangs on the outcome of

a single battle, no matter how decisive.”10 Outcomes

are just “transitory evil from which a remedy may still

be found…at some later date.”11 However, this is not

to say that the concept of decisive battle is a fallacy.

More accurately speaking, decisive battles do exist in

reality but in a different form and substance.

features 2



DECISIVE BATTLE IN REALITY

In reality, decisive battles do not decide the

outcome of war but they allow military forces to

gain a marked operational advantage over their

adversaries and help accelerate the end of war. This

value of decisive battle was duly noted by Clausewitz

when he highlighted that “we regard a great battle as

a decisive factor in the outcome of a war or campaign,

but not necessarily as the only one.”12 Simply put,

a decisive battle in reality is not about “decision

in battle” but “advantage in war.”13 This can be

illustrated through Commanding General Ulysess S.

Grant’s strategies in the American Civil War. Unlike

General Robert Edward Lee of the Confederates,

Commanding General Grant “entertained no illusions

about being able to destroy enemy armies in a single

battle” and viewed “battles as means rather than as

ends.”14 This was evident in the Vicksburg Campaign

of 1862-1863 where the Union fought fi ve battles

enroute to Vicksburg but none of these battles were

considered to be decisive in Commanding General

Grant’s strategy. Instead, these battles, such as the

Battle of Port Gibson, were considered critical in

providing the Union with the operational advantage

in achieving the overall objective of conquering

Vicksburg. Similarly, the Battle of Midway in 1942 did

not rapidly bring about the end of WWII but, it did

allow the United States (US) Forces in the Pacifi c to

gain an operational advantage over the Japanese and

signalled the turning point of the war in favour of the

Allied Forces.15

In reality, decisive battles do not decide the outcome of war and, more specifi cally, results in the battlefi eld do not produce permanent outcomes. Another fallacy that we have often fallen prey to, is the belief that decisive battles will end the war and result in lasting peace.

In addition, decisive battles are no longer confi ned

to the traditional battle space (air, land and sea) and

are not restricted to the use of physical force. With

the introduction of cyber confl ict as one of the new

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ia

Napoleon and his Grande Armee at the decisive battle of Waterloo.

features 3



domains of warfare, the idea of using computers as

a viable means of decisive battle is picking up pace

in recent times. One such idea is the Acupuncture

War, a term first coined in a 1997 People’s Liberation

Army Defence University publication, describing a

paralysing massive cyber-attack designed to make the

“first battle the last battle.”16 The growing influence of

information technology in warfare has also expanded

the battle space and seeded the idea that combat in

the 21st century has transited from a ‘battle of wills’

to a ‘battle of ideas’. The US experience in Operation

Enduring Freedom (OEF) best exemplifies this point.

In 2004, the US military leadership believed that

occupying and winning the Battle of Fallujah would

be decisive, but they quickly discovered that the

insurgents did not interpret the battle in the same

way. US forces sought to annihilate Al Qaeda in

Fallujah, yet quickly found that through social media

and the internet, alternative ideas had already spread

throughout the region which brought thousands of

foreign fighters to Al Qaeda’s cause. While Fallujah

was a tactical victory, it was “just the opening salvo”

of a brutal war of ideas.17 In sum, decisive battles are

not confined to the realms of the traditional battle

space and ‘wielding the hammer’ is no longer the

best means to achieve decisive victories. The value

and characteristics of decisive battles in reality is

attributed to three contextual factors: the increasing

politically kaleidoscopic environment, the reducing

value of hard power and the growing utility of

strategic narratives.

THE INCREASING POLITICALLY KALEIDOSCOPIC STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The strategic environment has changed. The

contemporary strategic environment is characterised

by “rising mass passions fuelled by various forces—

economic success, national pride, higher levels

of education, greater access to information with

higher level of transparency and memories of the

past.”18 Zbignew Brzezinski once termed this modern

phenomenon as the “global political awakening”

and warned that “for the first time in history almost

all of humanity is politically activated, politically

conscious and politically interactive.”19 Emile Simpson

takes Brzezinski’s point further by describing how

this “global political awakening” has changed the

strategic environment where 21st century combat is

now taking place in a “fragmented [and] politically

kaleidoscopic battle space.”20 This challenges our

traditional understanding of war and directly impacts

the value of the decisive battle.

Traditionally, war has often been understood

as a polarised contest. This can be seen through

Clausewitz’s definition of war where he defines war

as “a duel on a larger scale” and uses the analogy of

a pair of wrestlers to emphasise the idea of polarity

in war.21 The concept of polarity is important in the

traditional understanding of war because it clearly

identifies a winner and a loser as the decisive battle

provides the means for a nation to accomplish its

strategic objective and gain a decisive victory. For

example, in WWII, there were no questions about

who the winners and losers were. However, the same

cannot be said about the Vietnam War, the Korean

War or, more recently, OEF. This is because in a

politically kaleidoscopic environment, war takes place

in a fragmented environment where there are no clear

polarities, no clearly opposing objectives and, as a

result, no mutually exclusive outcomes.22 In other

words, results in decisive battles are not as significant

at the strategic level as originally thought.

The situation is further compounded by the effects

of globalisation where it “catalyses the importance of

strategic audience who are external to one’s state or

the enemy’s state.”23 The emergence of this group of

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strategic audience who is not aligned to either side of

war further blurs the defi nition of winning or losing,

reduces the value of hard power and emphasises the

need for a coherent strategic narrative.

THE REDUCING VALUE OF HARD POWER

War in the Clausewitzian paradigm assumes that

the adversary has a low tolerance for casualties. To

exploit the opponent’s casualty adverse mentality,

Clausewitz calls for the “maximum use of force”

in order to compel the enemy into submission.24

Unfortunately, such an assumption neglects to

consider other motivational forces that might impel

the enemy to accept a high casualty rate. Nationalism

is one such motivational force and the Japanese and

the Viet Congs are examples of such adversaries.

During the later stages of WWII, the Japanese were

subjected to incendiary attacks by the Allied Forces

to little effect. Despite being hit across 66 cities,

resulting in the deaths of 330,000 Japanese civilians

and with 8.5 million made homeless, the will of the

Japanese hardly cracked.25 This fi nding was captured

in the 1944 MacArthur study which noted that “the

Japanese were too adaptable and inured to hardship

to be affected by bombing.”26 Post war assessment

done by the US Strategic Bombing Survey also

concurred with the fi ndings from the aforementioned

study where it also highlighted that, despite the

Japanese public confi dence declining from 81%

to 32% after Le May’s incendiary attacks in 1945,

the “people’s morale never cracked, and faith, stoicism

and apathy enabled them to endure the horrors

suffered at the hands of the US Army Air Forces

(USAAF).”27 Clearly, the effectiveness of hard power

to force the opponent into submission had declined

and history would repeat itself again in Vietnam 20

years later.

Despite multiple aerial bombardment operations

against the Viet Cong, the military might of the US did

not affect the morale of the Viet Cong to the extent of

A Japanese woman and her child outside their bombed home in Ebisu, Tokyo.

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ia

features 5



forcing them into complete submission. Between 1965

and 1972, there were several key aerial bombardment

operations executed by the US against the Viet Cong.

These include Operation Rolling Thunder, Operation

Linebacker I and Operation Linebacker II. The North

Vietnamese were asymmetrically disadvantaged but

yet, they were able to put up a credible resistance to

nullify the effectiveness of US airpower. The futility

of US hard power in Vietnam is best summed up by a

conversation between Colonel (COL) Harry Summers

and a North Vietnamese officer. As COL Summers

commented, “the US had won all the battles,” to

which the North Vietnamese replied, “that may be so,

but it is also irrelevant.”28 Decisive battles executed

through the use of hard power no longer guarantee

military outcomes that will deliver a conclusive

political result.

Additionally, the Clausewitzian notion that the

use of force is the best way to compel our enemy

to do our will is also being challenged. The goal

of the traditional decisive battle is to use an

overwhelming offensive force, create a tremendous

amount of physical destruction and coerce the

adversary into submission. However, the terms

of the 1973 Paris Peace Accord were based on the

terms jointly negotiated and agreed between then

US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger and

North Vietnamese Politburo member, Le Duc Tho, and

not solely dictated by the US. It is also noteworthy

to highlight that subsequent US attempts to include

additional terms into the Paris Peace Accord were

futile.29 In other words, despite inflicting a huge

amount of physical destruction unto North Vietnam,

the Vietnam War did not end solely on US terms. Wars

can no longer be won through the application of pure

military force. As we transit into a different paradigm

of war, there needs to be a better exploitation of the

strategic narrative instead of renewing blind faith on

military hardware.

THE GROWING EMPHASIS ON THE STRATEGIC NARRATIVE

The world is progressing towards being an

information society—one in which the production,

diffusion and consumption of information dominates

the cultural, economic and political spheres of life

in the country.30 This progression is one reason why

Rupert Smith in his seminal work, The Utility of Force,

argues that there is a paradigm shift in war—a shift

from an 'inter-state industrial war' to 'war amongst

the people.'31 Simpson further crystallises Smith’s

argument by using the juxtaposing analogies of

a boxing match versus a street fight to distil the

difference between 'inter-state industrial war'and

'war amongst the people.' By using these analogies,

Simpson’s point is that, unlike in a boxing match

(inter-state war) where there is an independent

judge to hand out a mutually accepted verdict to

the boxers, there is no neutral judge in a street

fight (war amongst the people) and the audience

are judges in their own right.32 As Simpson puts it,

“War is not a single, fixed, interpretive construct

because audiences can understand war in their own

way.”33 Therefore, 'war amongst the people' is more

about a battle of ideas through the exploitation

of the strategic narrative rather than a battle of

wills executed through the destructive nature of

physical force.

Strategic narrative is the explanation of actions.34

In essence, strategic narrative attempts to explain the

‘why’ behind the ‘what’ and is designed to persuade

people of something. This need for a coherent set

of strategic narrative is especially emphasised in

the contemporary strategic environment where the

strategic audience is highly fragmented, politically

features 6



conscious, highly educated, inter-connected and

has greater access to information at a much faster

pace. As a result, physical actions tend to matter less

to a confl ict’s outcome than how those actions are

being perceived.35 More specifi cally, from a military

perspective, there is now an added dimension to the

concept of ‘means and effects’. Any military action

will create an effect but it cannot be assumed that

the effect will be interpreted the same across the

strategic audience. This is because amongst the

strategic audience, there are many divergent actors

with various objectives which may be confl icting.

For example, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war has been

considered to be a war of competing narratives. The

lack of consonance between strategic narratives from

both sides has gone to the extent where the winner

or loser cannot be easily identifi ed. To the Hezbollah,

they cited their survival and endurance against massive

Israeli attacks as reasons to claim a divine victory. To

the Israelis, they boasted its airpower achievements

and declared the war to be Israel’s “greatest military

and political victories ever.”36 In the Clausewitzian

paradigm, war is complex, uncertain and transient.

This notion cannot be more true today.

THE THREE TAKEAWAYS FOR THE SAF:

Takeaway #1: Our concept of victory must be clear

Based on the discussion above, there are three

takeaways for the SAF. First, we must be clear about

our concept of victory. To reiterate, decisive battles

provide the operational advantage but they do not

decide the outcome of war. Therefore, we must avoid

equating operational military success to victory

that can serve the country’s strategic interests. In

the words of former Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy, Dr. Fred Ikle, we must avoid a situation where

we become blinded by our own military success to the

extent where “the means become ends.“37 To do so, we

must remain grounded in the value proposition of the

military to the larger scheme of things. The military

is a tool of statecraft and, in war, our objective is to

The motto of the Singapore Armoured Regiment is Swift and Decisive. Pictured is a Singapore Army Bionix infantry fi ghting vehicle.

MIN

DEF

features 7



establish military conditions to facilitate a political

solution.38 Hence, borrowing J.B Bartholomees’

definition, our concept of victory should be described

as “a positive assessment of the post-war political

situation in terms of achievement and decisiveness

that is acknowledged, sustainable, and resolves

underlying political issues.”39

On a related note, we must also be aware that

victory is a matter of perception and is not “a

fact or condition.”40 This is an important takeaway

because the implication is that victory will be

defined based on the effects, and not the effort. The

situation is further complicated by the contemporary

kaleidoscopic strategic environment. In response to

this, when designing our military strategies, we need

to go deeper and consider the following: (a) who

are the strategic audience, (b) who are our target

strategic audience and finally, (c) how the created

effects will be perceived by these target strategic

audience. To that end, it is important for us to exploit

the strategic narrative and shape public opinion.

Takeaway #2: Our information operations capability

must remain responsive, calibrated and nuanced

Second, we must ensure that our information

operations capability remain responsive, targeted

and nuanced. This way, we are in a better position

to exploit the strategic narratives to our favour.

This is not something new and the effectiveness of

strategic narratives in shaping public opinion to one’s

benefit has been played out many times in history.

From the hailing of Sultan Suleiman as a national

hero despite his failed attempt to take Vienna in 1529

to the conflicting interpretations of US intentions

in its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The challenge for

the strategic narrative today is “to consider how a

narrative can gain purchase on audiences whose

political persuasions vary widely, without coming

apart.”41 To that end, we must strive to ensure that our

strategic narratives are calibrated and consistent in

order to convince. Key to this would be to constantly

stay abreast with societal changes, both domestic

and international.

Takeaway #3: Our Professional Military Education

(PME) syllabi must continue to be academically

rigorous

Finally, we need to broaden the perspectives of

our military commanders to avoid parochialism and

rigidity. War is an art not a science. In designing

strategies, we must avoid falling into the trap

of believing that there is a winning formula or a

scientific model that can be applied to unravel the

complexities of war. Specifically, when applying the

concept of the decisive battle to achieve a swift and

decisive victory, we need to be contextual, objective

and apply sound judgment. On this, Clausewitz

encouraged the development of a rigorous military

education programme—syllabi that not only

breeds inquisitive and analytical minds but also

equip commanders with knowledge, especially on

military history.42 To that end, we should review the

curriculum of all our Officer PME programmes and

ensure that each syllabus is designed to meet the

spirit of military education—think critically, reflect

objectively and analyse deeply. In other words, we

must not confuse training for education.

Decisive battles do not decide the outcome of war but, when used correctly, they can provide the operational advantage to win the war.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, achieving a swift and decisive

victory is an attainable goal but we must avoid having

a simplistic understanding and application of its key

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component—the decisive battle. Decisive battles

do not decide the outcome of war but, when used

correctly, they can provide the operational advantage

to win the war. Also, given the contextual factors,

decisive battles are no longer confined to the

traditional battle-space and are not solely dependent

on the use of hard power. In order to astutely apply

the concept of decisive battles in our strategies, the

SAF needs to be clear about our concept of victory,

continue honing our information operations capability

and ensure that our professional military education

syllabi are designed to groom military professionals

who can think, reflect and analyse.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bartholomees, J.B., A Theory of Victory, J.B. Bartholomees

ed., US Army War College Guide to National Security

Issues Vol 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd Edition

Brzezinski, Zbignew, The Global Political Awakening, 16

December 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/opini

on/16ihtYEbrzezinski.1.18730411.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Castells Manuel and Gustavo Cardoso ed. The Network

Society: From Knowledge to Policy, Washington D.C: Center

for Transatlantic Relations, 2005

Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution

of Operational Warfare. Lawrence, KS: University Press of

Kansas, 2004

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New Jersey, Princeton

University Press, 1989

Clodfelter, Mark. Beneficial Bombing. Lincoln, NE:

University of Nebraska Press, 2010

Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea

1950-1953, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000

Ikle, Fred. Every War must End, N.Y: Columbia University

Press, 1991

Jones, James L., GEN. “What’s in a Word? Expeditionary

Means More A Than Just Getting There Quickly.” Armed

Forces Journal International, October 2000: 60-64.

Kanwal, Gurmeet, China’s New War Concepts for 21st

Century Battlefields, Institute of Peace and Conflict

Studies, July 2007, No. 48

Keegan, John, The Second World War, New York:

Penguin, 2005

Lipsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, et al., The False Peace:

1972–74, Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985

McChrystal, Stanley. My Share of the Task: A Memoir New

York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2013

Mission of the Ministry of Defence and the Singapore

Armed Forces, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_

us/mission.html

Murray, Williamson. Napoleon’s Flawed Legacy, MHQ: The

Quarterly Journal of Military History, Autumn 1989

Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806,

Princeton University Press, 2009

Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first

Century Combat as Politics, Hurst & Co, 2012

Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the

Modern World, Knopf, 2005

Summers Jr. H.G, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the

Vietnam War, California: Presidio, 1982

Zakaria, Fareed, The Post American World, N.Y: W.W Norton

& Company, 2012

ENDNOTES

1. Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution

of Operational Warfare, (Larence, KS: University of

Kansas, 2004), p.153

2. Mission statement of the Ministry of Defence and the

Singapore Armed Forces. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/

imindef/about_us/mission.html. Accessed on 15 Feb 2015

3. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Edited and translated by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey, Princeton

University Press, 1989), p.75.

4. Ibid, p.260.

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5. Ibid, p.78.

6. Ibid, p.80.

7. Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia

1806, (Princeton University Press, 2009), p.131.

8. Murray, Williamson, Napoleon’s Flawed Legacy (1989),

MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History,

Autumn, p.101.

9. Jones, James L., GEN. “What’s in a Word? Expeditionary

Means More A Than Just Getting There Quickly.” (Armed

Forces Journal International, 2000), 60-64, p.613.




11. Ibid, p.80.

12. Ibid, p.260.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid, p.142.

15. Keegan, John, The Second World War, (New York: Penguin,

2005), p.275.

16. Kanwal, Gurmeet, China’s New War Concepts for 21st

Century Battlefields, (Institute of Peace and Conflict

Studies, 2007) , No. 48, p.4.

17. McChrystal, Stanley, My Share of the Task: A Memoir,

(New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2013), p.145.

18. Zakaria, Fareed, The Post American World, (N.Y: W.W

Norton & Company, 2012), p.36.

19. Brzezinski, Zbignew, The Global Political Awakening,

16 December 2008. http://www.nytimes.

com/2008/12/16/opinion/16iht-YEbrzezinski.1.18730411.

html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed on 18 Feb 2015.

20. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first

Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.5.




22. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first

Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.10.

23. Ibid, p.69.

24. Ibid, p.75.

25. Clodfelter, Mark, Beneficial Bombing, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), p.2.

26. Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p.13.

27. Clodfelter, Mark, Beneficial Bombing, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), p.232.

28. Summers Jr. H.G, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (California: Presidio, 1982), p.1.

29. Lipsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, et al., The False Peace: 1972–74, (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985), p.21.

30. Castells Manuel and Gustavo Cardoso ed, The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy, (Washington D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005), p.15 .

31. Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, (Knopf, 2005), p.5.

32. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.68.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid, p.179

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ikle, Fred, Every War must End, (N.Y: Columbia University Press, 1991), p.13

38. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.1

39. Bartholomees, J.B., A Theory of Victory, J.B. Bartholomees ed., US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues Vol 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd Edition, p.89

40. Ibid, p80.

41. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.181

42. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989), p.141

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LTC Tan Wee Heng, Melvyn is currently the Commanding Offi cer of 207 SQN. An Air Warfare Offi cer (Command, Control & Communications) by vocation, he attended the USAF Air Command and Staff Course in 2012. LTC Melvyn holds a Bachelor of Arts from the National University of Singapore and a Masters of Military Operational Art and Science from the USAF Air University.

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INTRODUCTION

The third United Nations Conference on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) saw extensive debates

between maritime powers and coastal states on

the rights and freedom of use of the seas. Coastal

states wanted full sovereignty and control of the

immediate seas for all its resources while the

maritime powers wanted the freedom of navigation

in the ‘global commons’. The concept of an Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ) was created as part of the

debates and negotiations between the countries

with various interests. It was often stated that the

EEZ was the grand compromise between the coastal

states and the maritime powers.1

Despite having the EEZ as the grand compromise in

UNCLOS since 1982, the fundamental disagreements

between the coastal states and the maritime powers

still exist today. This is because the differences in

fundamental interests between the coastal states

and maritime powers remain. Having said that, the

positive impact of the compromise is that states

now have a common reference founded by having a

law of the sea, acting in concert with other existing

international laws.

The recent debates are now focused on the

legalities within the EEZ, particularly on whether

military activities by foreign military powers should be

restricted. As a result, the discussions on traditional

freedoms of navigation against the provisions in the

UNCLOS are revived.

This essay argues that the provisions in UNCLOS

are clear that restrictions of military activities in EEZ

are not justified. The current debates around what

activities are permissible in EEZ are merely the result of

‘lawfare’ launched against maritime powers as part of

a greater play of geopolitics and jostle for supremacy.

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Restrictions on Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Major Powers’ ‘Lawfare’

by MAJ Chuah Meng Soon

Abstract:

In this article, the author first defines and explains the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the

context of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He elaborates on the regional

examples of restrictions declared and imposed by coastal states and also discusses the impact on traditional

naval freedom of navigation due to these restrictions. The author concludes that the provisions in UNCLOS

have been decisively clear that the EEZ was conceptualised to be exclusively for the coastal states in the realm

of economic utilisation. He adds that disagreements will continue in the debate of UNCLOS between maritime

powers and coastal states as long as fundamental interests are at play and that the seas remained important as

a vital source of assets and a battle-ground for geopolitics.

Keywords: Exclusive Economic Zone; Military Activities; Lawfare; Financially Crippling; Rights

12-22_Restrictions on FMA.indd 12 29/2/16 4:16 PM

The approach of this essay is to first define and

explain the concept of EEZ in the context of the

UNCLOS. It then highlights the legal aspects, i.e. the

text within the convention that had been the source

of the debates. The essay will also look at regional

examples of restrictions declared and imposed by

coastal states. The impact on traditional naval

freedom of navigation due to these restrictions

will also be discussed. This essay will also examine

the United States Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable

incident in 2009 to unravel the motivations behind

the disputes beyond the legal cover.

THE CONCEPT OF EEZ

The EEZ was conceptualised as a new suis generis

zone, i.e. unique in its characteristics and specifi cities,

which is governed by the ‘specific legal regime’ in

UNCLOS (Part V).2 As the name suggests, EEZ is

exclusive only in the economic-related domains.

Article 56 defined the “rights, jurisdiction, and

duties of the coastal states in the EEZ,” while Article

58 spelt the “rights and duties of other states

in the EEZ.”3

The recent debates are now focused on the legalities within the EEZ, particularly on whether military activities by foreign military powers should be restricted.

“RIGHTS, JURISDICTION, AND DUTIES IN EEZ”

Article 56 is clear that coastal states enjoy

‘sovereign rights’ and not ‘sovereignty’ over the EEZ.

This term had been carefully chosen to distinguish

territorial waters and EEZs.4 In Article 56(a),

there is little doubt that ‘economic exploitation’

was the only rationale in the crafting of this

provision. In Article 56(b), the only areas that

coastal states have jurisdiction within the EEZ are

stated. Reading in conjunction with Article 56(a),

Article 56(b) supports the economic exploitation

within the EEZ through the jurisdiction over: (1)

“the establishment and use of artificial islands,

installations and structures” to confer power in the

extraction of resources such as oil and fishery; (2)

‘marine scientific research’ to provide exclusivity in

the exploration of resources such as oil and fishery;

and (3) “the protection and preservation of the

marine environment” to define authority to protect

marine life sustainability specifically in fisheries

which is an important source of economic livelihood

for many coastal states.5 Hence, it is clear that the

text in the convention with regard to coastal states

rights and jurisdiction are only framed with the

rationale of giving these coastal states sufficient

legal power in economic gains within the EEZ. Sea areas in international rights.

Wik

iped

ia

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In Article 58(1), it is expressively stated that “in

the EEZ... all states... enjoy the freedoms referred to

in article 87 of navigation and overflight... and other

internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these

freedoms, such as those associated with the operation

of ships… compatible with the other provisions of

this Convention.”6 Furthermore, Article 58(2) stated

that “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of

international law apply to the EEZ in so far as they

are not incompatible with this Part.”7 This article

again clearly explains that other states are free to use

the EEZs but they are not allowed to contravene and

disrupt the economic exploitation within the EEZs by

the coastal states in the conduct of their activities.8

The UNCLOS was meant to be a comprehensive package deal. Thus, there are no exclusions, no exceptions, and no reservations.

TERRITORIALISING THE EEZ – RESTRICTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Despite the clarities in the regime of EEZ, why did

coastal states continue to debate and argue about

military activities in the EEZ? The short answer is

that such activities were not explicitly written and

permitted within the EEZ. This prompted a comment

by Tommy Koh, President of the Conference in the

third UNCLOS, on the debate:

“The solution in the Convention text is very complicated. Nowhere is it clearly stated whether a third state may or may not conduct military activities in the EEZ of a coastal state. But, it was the general understanding that the text we negotiated and agreed upon would permit such activities to be conducted. I therefore would disagree with the statement made in Montego Bay by Brazil, in December 1982, that a third state may not conduct military activities in Brazil’s exclusive economic zone[…]”9

This statement has essentially explained the

background and robustness of the negotiations that

had gone into the crafting of the UNCLOS texts

allowing foreign military activities within the EEZ.

Had the provisions within UNCLOS been meant to

restrict and regulate military activities, it would have

been made explicit and included in the provisions

much like the various articles involving ‘Innocent

Passage in the Territorial Sea.’10 Furthermore, the

stated activities in Article 87(1) should not be seen as

exhaustive and ‘inter alia’ was deliberately included.11

The fact is, again, that EEZ is not the Territorial Sea

and hence it does not have any provisions against any

conduct of military activities within the EEZ. States

that impose restrictions on military activities in their

EEZs are in fact trying to ‘territorialise’ the EEZs.

EXAMPLES OF RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES BY REGIONAL COASTAL STATES

The UNCLOS was meant to be a comprehensive

package deal. Thus, there are no exclusions, no

exceptions, and no reservations.12 However, regional

coastal states still unilaterally went ahead to institute

laws to control military activities in their Territorial

Seas and EEZs. Table 1 describes the types of rights

asserted by the regional coastal states.

These regional examples of restrictions involving

13 states give a flavour of the type of control and

restrictions imposed. These ranged from registering

a concern, to requirements of notifications, to

establishing ambiguous security zones through to

requirements of prior approval before military activities

can be conducted.

In reality, there had been observers that stated

that of the 18 countries in the world that enact such

laws, only three of these states, i.e. China, North Korea

and Peru, had directly interfered with foreign military

activities within their EEZs.13 What this means is that

although regional coastal states had instituted such

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STATE TYPE OF RIGHTS ASSERTEDBangladesh Warships require prior authorisation; Control Zone (CZ) 18 nmh.

Cambodia All foreign activities on the continental shelf are under control, regardless of their purpose; CZ 24nm.

China Requires prior notice for transports of waste in TS and EEZ; warships require prior authorisation; CZ 24nm Security interests.

India Warships are to announce their passage in advance; Prior consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ and on the continental shelf; CZ 24 nm.

Indonesia Warships and all vessels other than merchantmen must announce their passage in advance; 100 nm ships are not allowed to stop, anchor or cruise ‘without legitimate cause’.

Malaysia Prior consent to military exercises and manoeuvres in the EEZ and on the continental shelf.

Myanmar Warships require prior authorisation; Claims the right to restrict the freedom of navigation and overflight in its exclusive economic zone; CZ 24nm.

North Korea14 “62 nm Military zone 50 nm seaward of the territorial sea. All ships and aircraft require prior approval.”

Pakistan Warships require prior authorisation; supertankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear materials are required to announce their passage in advance; Claims authority to regulate transit through parts of the EEZ and enact and enforce all regulations required for controlling activities in the EEZ; CZ 24nm.

Philippines Expressed concern at UNCLOS III with respect to military activities in the EEZ

South Korea Warships and government ships have to announce their passage three days in advance before exercising Innocent Passage.

Sri Lanka Warships require prior authorisation; CZ 24nm

Vietnam Warships require authorisation to be applied for at least 30 days prior to passage; passage restricted to 3 warships at a time; CZ 24nm. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag; aircraft are not allowed to land on board ships or be launched from them; on-board weapons have to be set in ‘non-operational’ mode prior to the entry into the zone.

Table 1: The Types Of Rights Asserted By The Regional Coastal States.15

laws, they have not actively enforced these laws with the exception of China and North Korea.16

Hence, these so-called restrictions had not really impeded traditional naval freedoms of navigation. The actions of China and the impact to naval freedoms of navigation shall be discussed later in

the USNS Impeccable example.

LAWFARE – THE NEW WARFARE

Now given that the case is so clear as demonstrated

in the explanations of the relevant articles in UNCLOS,

The UNCLOS was meant to be a comprehensive package

deal. Thus, there are no exclusions, no exceptions, and

no reservations. why are there still debates over the

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legitimacy of military activities within the EEZs? This

can be attributed to a new strategy. China uses legal

warfare or otherwise known as ‘lawfare’ to challenge

the maritime powers, namely the United States (US) in

the disputes over the military activities in the EEZs.

‘Lawfare’ aims to win the strategic narrative through

deliberation misinterpretation of existing laws.

The Points For Legal Contention

The key to ‘lawfare’ is to find gaps and ambiguities

in the law in order to attack and turn these points

to one's advantage. The examples of these points

in relation to military activities are: (1) it ‘must be

exercised with due regard to the rights and duties of

the coastal state’, (2) it ‘must comply with laws and

regulations of the coastal state adopted in accordance

with the provisions of the Convention’, (3) it ‘must

not be exercised in such a manner that it would

constitute an abuse of rights’, and (4) it ‘must be for

peaceful purposes’.17 These points can be examined.

1) Due Regard

UNCLOS did not state what is due regard. In

law, this simply means to give a fair consideration.

The opponents supporting restriction of military

activities often cite weapons firing. It was claimed

that weapon exercises would breach this provision as

it can harm resources owned by the coastal state and

deny or disrupt access to known fishing areas posing

hazards to commercial fishing.18

This restriction sounds perfectly logical. However,

this is exactly what ‘due regard’ is stated for.

Maritime states ought not to prejudice or interfere

with that activity in undertaking their right i.e. the

right to conduct military activities.19 The converse is

also true that other states exercising due diligence

in their right, ought not to be interfered by other

users. The truth is till date, maritime states have

been conducting a range of military activities from

navigation through to weapons firing and testing but

there had not been any serious protests by coastal

states as these military activities had been conducted

with ‘due regard’.

2) Laws and Regulations of Coastal State

As discussed earlier in this essay, the laws and

regulations by many coastal states are non-starters

as they have not been adopted in accordance with

UNCLOS. These laws and regulations are deemed illegal

in UNCLOS. Despite this, many argued the validity of

these laws through the concerns of environmental

damage particularly by nuclear powered military

ships. Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Haiti, Iran and

Oman are among these coastal states that regulate

these nuclear-powered vessels in and just outside

their territorial seas. When referencing against the

‘protection of marine environment’, this argument

sounds legitimate.20

The key to ‘lawfare’ is to find gaps and ambiguities in the law in order to attack and turn these points to one's advantage.

However, it should be noted that Article 23 had

expressively stated that “foreign nuclear-powered

ships … shall, when exercising the right of innocent

passage through the territorial sea,... observe special

precautionary measures established for such ships by

international agreements.”21 It is clear that nuclear-

powered ships enjoy the right of innocent passage in

territorial seas, hence such freedoms are undoubtedly

extended in the EEZ. Of note, there had been muted

response to the US nuclear submarines plying all over

the world. Nightmare scenarios cannot be taken as a

planning norm in the application of UNCLOS. Thus,

states asserting excessive restrictions in the EEZ

under the pretext of environment protection should

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not be looked upon as championing a cause but as a

group of wilful actors acting contrary to international

environmental law. These actors are over-reacting

and hence may dilute genuine efforts made in marine

environmental protection.22

3) Abuse of Rights

The oft cited example by analysts to claim that

military activities can constitute an abuse of rights

is the congregating of naval ships within the EEZ of

another state.23 This is far-fetched and in any case

these actions would inadvertently violate the United

Nations (UN) Charter and breach other international

laws as worded in the convention. The truth is the

abuse of rights had not been committed by foreign

militaries using the EEZs; it is the coastal states that

had been abusing their rights to illegally and at times

forcefully enforcing such unfounded restrictions in

the EEZs.

4) Peaceful Purposes

Peaceful purposes is the most quoted point by

many lawfare specialists. Again, peaceful purposes

are left undefined in the convention. Peace simply

means no war and (armed) conflicts. Military

activities should not be seen as war-like. It should be

noted that military manoeuvres and exercises have

long been considered acceptable in the high seas.24

In fact, the military have always been considered the

vanguards of peace. Think about the counter-piracy

efforts in the Gulf of Aden along with other peace-

keeping missions undertaken by the military. It is

evident that military activities do not equate to non-

peaceful purposes.

UNCLOS is not the only international maritime

law; high seas freedom is also subjected to ‘other

rules of international law’.25 The crafting of this

text makes it clear that other international laws

must be considered for legitimate uses in EEZs and

high seas. Take for example The San Remo Manual

on Armed Conflicts at Sea that laid down the rules

of sea combat; it also requires belligerents to avoid

or minimise damage to neutral states in the EEZs.26

It should also be noted that had peaceful purposes

meant no military activities, the US and the Soviet

Union would not have agreed to UNCLOS as it was

negotiated during the Cold War. It must be reminded

that Article 95 did provide immunity from jurisdiction

on warships.

USNS IMPECCABLE – LEGAL OR NOT IN THE EEZ?

In March 2009, USNS Impeccable, a US ocean

surveillance ship was harassed by five Chinese vessels

and was ordered to leave. This happened about 75nm

south of China's Hainan Island.27 The USNS Impeccable

left the area but returned a day later under the

escort of a US destroyer. The US protested against

the aggressive stance by the Chinese while China

claimed that the US presence was illegal in its EEZ.28

This incident brought the spotlight back on the long

drawn disagreement between a maritime power and

a coastal state.

China engaged the tools of ‘lawfare’ in presenting

its case in this incident. Beijing argued that the

activities undertaken by the USNS Impeccable

constitutes an ‘abuse of rights’.29 The Chinese

also claimed that the surveillance ship's activities

amounted to non-peaceful purposes prejudicial to

Article 301. Key to the ‘lawfare’ tactics employed

was the debate about ‘Marine Scientific Research’

(MSR). China claimed that what the USNS Impeccable

was doing was in fact MSR and that it was in China's

jurisdiction since the US ship operated in her EEZ.

MSR was unsurprisingly left undefined as well

in UNCLOS. A clever dissection of the term can be

made to mean any form of study that enhances

the knowledge of the marine environment. Article

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240 also stated that “marine scientifi c research is

exclusively for peaceful purposes.”30 In this sense,

China may have a case where fi rstly MSR was under

her jurisdiction and secondly, a military surveillance

ship activities within her EEZ was prejudicial to her

security and sovereignty.

A retired Chinese general gave this remark after

the incident. “If a military surveillance ship conducts

military intelligence-gathering activities in another

state’s EEZ, it is hard to explain this as friendly

behaviour that is 'harmless' and undertaken in 'good

Figure 1: Incidents between US Ships and Aircraft in China EEZ (2001 – 2009)31

faith'.”32 This remark is not surprising as the USNS

Impeccable incident was a culmination of other similar

incidents between the US and China as seen in Figure 1.

The US thinking on this issue is completely

divergent from the Chinese interpretation. The US

argued that she has the complete legitimacy and

rights in conducting military activities that has no

bearing on a state's resource exploitation and that

the activities were benign. This is evident in the

US statement:

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“... the position of the United States... that the

navigational rights and freedoms applicable within

the EEZ are qualitatively and quantitatively the

same as... applicable on the high seas...” 33

Washington also argued that there had been

instances of Chinese military activities in other EEZ.

For example, in July 2004, a Chinese naval survey

vessel was spotted within Japan's EEZ. When called

to explain her actions, the offi cials replied that

the “ship was engaged in military activities, thus

obviating the need for [prior] notifi cation” to the

Japanese government.35

As elaborated earlier, MSR was framed for

resource-related contexts. China on the other hand

also engaged in surveillance activities in foreign EEZs

citing support from UNCLOS. It is plain to see from this

example that UNCLOS did not justify the restriction

of military activities in the EEZ as supported by the

various articles.

UNCLOS – JUST ANOTHER DEBATE

The debates and disputes in the USNS Impeccable

Incident was ultimately not about the law. A search

through the related literary works will point to

the fact that these disputes were essentially only

between the US and China, the EEZ debate is just one

of the many other disputes in nearly all domains. One

may argue that if Sino-American relations were good,

there will not be any debates on military activities

and EEZ.

Despite its consistent argument that UNCLOS was

not about security concerns, the US constant pitch

for Freedom Of Navigation (FON) is unmistakably

central to her security concern. The US being a

maritime power requires her naval ships to be able

to sail unimpeded in the global commons to protect

her vital overseas territories and interests. A look at

the World EEZ map (see Figure 2) will reveal that if

China wins her case, the US Navy might not even be

Figure 2: World EEZ Claims.34

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able to sail into the South China Sea. China, shaped

by her historical experiences, may have believed that

keeping foreign military activities out of her shoals

and EEZ will provide the security she desires. The

debate was really about the clash of the strategies,

i.e., US Maritime Power Projection versus China's

Anti-Access Area Denial.

CONCLUSION

The provisions in UNCLOS have been decisively

clear that the EEZ was conceptualised to be exclusively

for the coastal states in the realm of economic

exploitation. However, lawfare will continue in the

debate of UNCLOS between maritime powers and

coastal states as long as fundamental interests are at

play and that the seas remained important as a vital

source of assets and a battle-ground for geopolitics.

Incidents will also continue as evident in the 2013

USNS Impeccable incident.

The threat of impediment to the FON is an over-play

of the actual situation. As it stands, ‘FON had not been

seriously threatened as the global interdependence

and military cooperation far outweigh any rhetorics.

Singapore and the Singapore Armed Forces

(SAF) should, however, pay close attention to the

developments of the debates. Singapore should also

monitor or, if possible, provide inputs to the debates as

it has bearing on whether international law continues

to be respected.

It should be perceived that the spirit of UNCLOS

was to resolve the conflicts over the resources of the

sea through the codification of the negotiations in the

law. This was aimed at UNCLOS being able to contribute

to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation

and friendly relations among all nations in conformity

with the principles of justice and equal rights and to

promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the world.36

The freedom of the global commons must not

be undermined and states should not act without

considering the positions of others. Mutual respect

and understanding is a vital key to circumscribe these

pitfalls of tensions. Hence, states should explore

various platforms to iron out their differences.

Ultimately, the seas are vast and the aims are inter-

connected. It is never just a zero-sum game.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS)”, 1982.

Baggett, Joe, and Raul (Pete) Pedrozo. “Slides Titled ‘What Are Other Nations’ Views’ in Briefing for Center for Naval Analysis Excessive Chinese Maritime Claims Workshop”, 2013.

Bateman, Walter S. The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Military Activities and the Need for Compromise? University of Wollongong, 2007.

German Naval Commander’s Handbook: Legal Bases for the Operations of Naval Forces, 2002.

Hayashi, Moritaka. “Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms.” Marine Policy 29, (2005), 133.

Jing, Geng. “The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the EEZ under UNCLOS.” Merkourios - International and European Security Law 28, n._74, (2012), 22 – 30.

Kaye, Stuart. “Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction”.

Maj. Gen. Peng, Guangqian. “China’s Maritime Rights and Interests.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. 7. (Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010).

O’Rourke, Ronald. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress. (Congressional Research Service, 2014).

Oxman, B. “The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Virginia Journal of International Law 24, n._809, (1984).

Pedrozo, Raul (Pete). “Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. 7. (Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010).

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Rahman, C., and M. Tsamenyi. “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea.” Ocean Development and International Law 41, (2010).

Redden, Mark E., and Phillip C. Saunders. “Managing Sino-US Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach.” (Centre for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2012).

“Testimony [prepared Statement] of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” 2009.

Tkacik. “China’s New Challenge to the US-Japan Alliance.” Przystup, Japan-China Relations.

Van Dyke, Jon M. “Military Ships and Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Another Country.” Marine Policy, n._29, (2004).

Wachman, Alan M. “Playing by or Playing with the Rules of UNCLOS.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. Newport, Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010. 7.

“Who’s Right in South China Sea Spat?” BBC. 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7941425.stm.

Williams, Lt. Col. Andrew S. “Aerial Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zone.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. (Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010). 7.

Wu, Jilu. “The Concept of Marine Scientific Research.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. (Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010). 7.

Xue, Guifang (Julia). “Surveys and Research Activities in the EEZ: Issues and Prospects.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. 7. (Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010).

Yu, Zhirong. “Jurisprudential Analysis of the US Navy’s Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries.” In Military Activities in the EEZ: A US-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. 7. Newport, Rhode Island: US Naval War College, 2010.

ENDNOTES

1. Geng Jing, “The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the EEZ under UNCLOS,” Merkourios - International and European Security Law, 28, n._ 74 (2012), 22 – 30.

2. “1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS)”.

3. Ibid.

4. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone,” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, 7 (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 2010).

5. “1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).”

Marine Tourism is also an area which depends on protection of the marine environment.


7. Ibid.

8. Walter S. Bateman, The Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Military Activities and the Need for Compromise? (University of Wollongong, 2007).

9. Jon M. Van Dyke, “Military Ships and Planes Operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Another Country,” Marine Policy, n._ 29, (2004).

10. “1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).” Section 3.

11. Stuart Kaye, “Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction.”

12. Jing, “The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the EEZ under UNCLOS.”

13. Joe Baggett and Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “Slides Titled ‘What Are Other Nations’ Views’ in Briefing for Center for Naval Analysis Excessive Chinese Maritime Claims Workshop,” August 2013.

14. North Korea is not a signatory state of UNCLOS and hence do not have declared EEZs.

15. Extracted from German Naval Commander’s Handbook: Legal Bases for the Operations of Naval Forces, 2002.

16. The slide also notes that there have been “isolated diplomatic protests from Pakistan, India, and Brazil over military surveys” conducted in their EEZs.

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However, there had been little publicity and debates for these protests and had remain obscured in the current debates.

17. “1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).” Article 58, 88, 300 and 301.

18. Moritaka Hayashi, “Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Defi nition of Key Terms,” Marine Policy 29 (2005), 133.

19. B. Oxman, “The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Virginia Journal of International Law 24, n._ 809, 1984.

20. “1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).” Article 58.

21. Ibid.

22. Guifang (Julia) Xue, “Surveys and Research Activities in the EEZ: Issues and Prospects,” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, 7 (Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 2010).

23. Hayashi, “Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Defi nition of Key Terms.”

24. Jing, “The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the EEZ under UNCLOS.”


26. Kaye, “Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction.”

27. C. Rahman and M. Tsamenyi, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea,” Ocean Development and International Law 41, (2010).

28. “Who’s Right in South China Sea Spat?,” BBC. (Asia-Pacifi c, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacifi c/7941425.stm.

29. “1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS).” Article 300.

30. Ibid.

31. Guangqian Maj. Gen. Peng, “China’s Maritime Rights and Interests,” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, 7 (Newport, Rhode Island: (U.S. Naval War College, 2010).

32. Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, “Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach,” Centre for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, (National Defense University, 2012).

33. “Testimony [prepared Statement] of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacifi c Security Affairs, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacifi c Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” 2009.

34. Tkacik, “China’s New Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Przystup, Japan-China Relations.

35. Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, April 2014).


MAJ Chuah Meng Soon is a Naval Combat Offi cer by vocation. He is currently the Executive Offi cer of RSS Intrepid, a Formidable-class frigate. He graduated with a Bachelors of Engineering in Electronics and Electric Engineering from University College, London. MAJ Chuah graduated from the 45th Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College as Top Graduate (Navy) and was a winner of the Commendation Award at the 2014/2015 Chief of Defence Force Essay Competition.

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INTRODUCTION: THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF STUDYING PRE-EMPTIVE WARFARE

Pre-emptive self-defence holds strategic value

as a policy option for small states. It is thus a

subject that must be studied intently by small states

serious about securing peace. However, differing

perspectives on the justification for pre-emptive

warfare have created ambiguity on the subject.

The purpose of this essay is to gain clarity on the

justification for pre-emptive warfare as a useful

tool in achieving strategic interests in the pre-war

to post-war continuum. It will also highlight five

justifications and three superiorities to be achieved

in order for Singapore to carry out a successful just

pre-emptive war. Accordingly, the essay will proceed

as follows: firstly, it will discuss the strategic

relevance and importance of pre-emptive warfare

for small states; secondly, it will study and build

on the existing thoughts regarding the justification

for pre-emptive warfare; and lastly, it will suggest the

necessary preparations for a just pre-emptive war.

SMALL STATES AND THEIR DISPOSITION TOWARDS PRE-EMPTIVE WARFARE

As a preliminary point, small states in this essay

refer to those lacking strategic depth for military

operations. Small states are invariably disadvantaged

in their pursuit of policy and must abide by a strict set

of survival rules. These states suffer from tight policy

space-time dimension and are prone to a myriad of

pressures from the peace-to-war time continuum

which includes military provocation, diplomatic

manipulation, economic sanction, resource restriction

and geographical blockade.1

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The Case for Pre-Emptive Warfare and its Implications for Singapore

by CPT Seah Jun Hao

Abstract:

According to the author, small states make easy targets and it comes as no surprise that preventive measures

are being considered to deter potential aggressors. One topic that has been widely and actively discussed is

the issue of pre-emptive self-defence and warfare. However, the author stresses that there are underlying

conditions that countries should consider before they can justify their cause for a pre-emptive self-defence. In

his essay, he discusses the justifications for pre-emptive warfare as a useful tool in achieving strategic interests

in the pre-war to post-war continuum. He also highlights the five justifications and three superiorities a country

should consider in order to carry out a successful pre-emptive war. He discusses the strategic relevance and

importance of pre-emptive warfare for small states. He then explores the various justifications for pre-emptive

warfare and finally, he suggests the necessary preparations for a pre-emptive war.

Keywords: Pre-emptive; Preventive Measures; Deter Potential Aggressors; Justifiable

23-38_Pre-Emptive Warfare.indd 23 29/2/16 4:17 PM

It is conventional wisdom that a state at war

should fare better if it was able to seize the initiative

and effect a pre-emptive blow on its adversary.

This is critical for small states to overcome their

inherent weaknesses.2 The following are nine unique

characteristics that pre-dispose a small state to

conduct pre-emptive strikes—they indicate why

a small state has a lower threshold of tolerating

inaction during a Period of Tension (PoT).

Small states are invariably disadvantaged in their pursuit of policy and must abide by a strict set of survival rules.

1) Cannot Retreat and Regroup

The most salient factor is the assumed ‘one

chance’ for a small state. A small state seldom has

another shot at a second chance at war. Its small

geographical size means little room for retreating

and regrouping for retaliation.3 If a small state

takes the first hit, it is as good as losing the war.

Thus, to strike first is a military imperative for a

small state.

2) Easy Capitulation As A Concentrated Target

With the small Area of Operations that the

adversary is required to plan and operate in, a small

state is exceedingly vulnerable to a single strike

wipe-out. If the adversary employs its airpower

shrewdly, the limited runways, naval ports and

army depots of a small state can easily be rendered

useless by a single wave of air strike.4 To prevent

such a scenario and to ensure preservation of force

for a chance of winning the war, a small state may

opt to strike pre-emptively.

3) Limited Manpower And The Collapse Of Will

Absorbing the first strike in war can have a

profound psychological impact on a small state,

given the small population base. It is likely to

result in the collapse of the people’s will to contest,

leading to a high rate of military desertion and

civilian despair.5 Therefore, a pre-emptive strike

serves the purpose of avoiding the psychological

trauma and the likelihood of defeat from absorbing

the first strike.

4) Vulnerable To Intelligence Operations

The lack of strategic depth renders a small state

vulnerable to an adversary’s aerial and maritime

intelligence operations. Given the current military

technology, surveillance and reconnaissance

operations may be carried out from across the border.

The adversary can easily map out the movements,

locations and readiness of a small state’s military

assets. This ease of intelligence amplifies the

vulnerabilities of the small state.

5) High Tempo Vigilance Unsustainable During PoT

During PoT, a higher frequency of harassment,

provocation and frontier probing to achieve

“desensitisation and blurring of border(s)” can be

expected.6 These actions serve political and military

purposes. Under this tense climate, a small state

faces greater strain in its military vigilant assets.

This high tempo vigilance may reach a point where

the small state finds it unsustainable. It may then

be compelled to respond with force pre-emptively.

6) Geographical Blockade And Economic Choking

Small states tend to be easily subjected to

geographical blockades and economic choking. During

PoT, the adversary may deprive a small state of its

vital national resources like water, oil, food or other

essential supplies.7 The adversary may do so without

infringing on the small state’s territorial integrity.

Yet, this act is suffi cient to run the small state to

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ruin. In such a scenario, a pre-emptive strike from the

small state can be expected in its bid to release itself

from the shackle of its adversary.

7) Sensitivity Towards Military Exercises Near

Its Border

Large-scale military actions near the borders of

countries send an extremely strong signal to the

other state. Historically, military exercises near the

borders were occasional pre-cursors for the initiation

of war.8 Such actions might be too provocative for

a small state. Due to the vulnerabilities of a small

state, mass mobilisations and military exercises near

the borders may ignite war—even if it was not the

original intent—as the small state might respond

combatively because inaction seems a greater risk.

8) Forward Defence Requirement

Due to the lack of strategic depth, a small state

must seek to fight in ‘forward ground’ to avoid

destruction to its own population, property and

most importantly, its military projection point-

source.9 The small state will thus seek to bring the

war to the adversary using pre-emptive warfare.10

9) Risk Of Single-Hit Annihilation

With the proliferation of chemical, nuclear and

atomic bombs, states without ballistic interceptors

can only resort to neutralising the threat before its

launch. For a small state, the threat is even more

real as annihilation is a likely consequence. Hence,

a small state is compelled to launch pre-emptive

strikes on existential threats. A case in point is the

1981 Osiraq Nuclear Raid by Israel.11

The Osirak reactor prior to the Israeli attack.

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Most of the nine aforementioned factors are

applicable to Singapore. Having established the

strategic relevance of pre-emptive warfare for

small states like Singapore, the essay shall

proceed to study the factors of justification for

pre-emptive warfare.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRE-EMPTIVE WARFARE FOR SMALL STATES

There is tremendous strategic value in acquiring

international support in the pre-war to post-war

continuum. International opinions carry signifi cant

weight in the post-war negotiation process in defi ning

the political rights and obligations pertaining to the

war. Conducting a justifi ed war is one way of ensuring

international support in the post-war phase. For

the purpose of post-war interests, it is important

to understand the justifi cations for pre-emptive

warfare. There are generally two aspects of the Just

War Tradition: the cause of war ( jus ad bellum) and

the conduct of war ( jus in bello).12 In this section,

the Just Cause principle of jus ad bellum with regards

to pre-emptive warfare in relation to small states

will be examined.

The act of striking fi rst may fall into one of these

three categories: (1) pre-emptive war; (2) preventive

war or (3) naked aggression. However, only a fi ne line

distinguishes pre-emptive warfare from preventive

warfare. Signifi cantly, pre-emptive warfare is regarded

as legitimate self-defence whereas preventive warfare

is judged to be illegitimate aggression because other

policy options are available.13 Naked aggression

is clearly illegitimate by any benchmark. However,

The destruction of the American steamboat SS Caroline on the Niagra River in 1837.

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pre-emptive warfare lacks a universal definition

as the interpretation of it is subjective by nature

and is therefore commonly confused with preventive

warfare.

Beginning with international law, the UN Charter

provides the only exception to prohibition on the

use of force in Article 51 as “the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defence” in the face

of an armed attack. The established legal test for

exercising the use of force in self-defence is necessity

(under jus ad bellum) and proportionality (under jus

in bello).14 However, whether a pre-emptive strike

may be considered ‘self-defence’under Article 51

of the UN Charter remains a delicate topic open to

different interpretations.

Early scholars such as Aristotle, Shang Yang, Saint

Augustine and Thomas Aquinas have long recognised

a state’s moral right to self-defence.15 To them, it is

morally just for a state to go to war with the motive

of peace. Hugo Grotius also argued for the legal

right of a state to forestall an attack using force.16

The first legal dispute over pre-emptive warfare was

the 1837 Caroline Affairs, in which Daniel Webster

established the famous ‘Caroline Test’—that that a

pre-emptive war is just where the threat is “instant,

overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and

no moment of deliberation.”17

Contemporary thinker Lawrence Freedman

observes that “prevention can be seen as preemption

in slow motion, more anticipatory or forward

thinking”, encapsulating the main distinguishing

feature as the difference in the maturity level of the

threat posed by the adversary.18 Colin Gray provides

a practicable approach to determining the threat as

the political intent and the capability to injure.19

Michael Walzer, a respected authority in Just

War Tradition, contended that the following

conditions are sufficient for the justification of

pre-emptive warfare: (1) an intention to injure; (2)

military activities that increase the level of danger;

and (3) the need to act immediately because of a

high degree of risk.20 Matthew Flynn judges the

intention of the pre-emptive actor through its post-

war behaviour.21 A justified pre-emptive war should

be intended to establish an enduring peace and not

for the purpose of domination.

Synthesising these schools of thought, the essay

proposes a set of conditions sufficient for a just

pre-emptive war:

1) Hostile Intent

The adversary must possess the intent to use

force for policy ends, prompting pre-emptive

warfare as an anticipatory strategy.

2) Destruction Capability

The adversary’s capability to wage war

must be unfavorable to the small state

such that it may potentially result in great

destruction or even annihilation, prompting

pre-emptive strikes to neutralise such a threat.

3) Provocative Behavior Beyond The Point Of Rubicon

Near-border military actions which provoke

strong reaction, especially those that cross the small

state’s communicated ‘Red Line(s).’22 Surrounding

countries have an obligation to restrain from

provocative behavior for the sake of security. The

intentional breaching of understood ‘Red Line(s)’

may be considered an ‘act of war’ prompting pre-

emptive self-defence.

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4) Necessity

The small state must actively explore other

means of resolving tensions before pre-emptive

warfare becomes the sole option. However, as the

possibilities of resolving the conflict through other

means become increasingly remote despite intensive

efforts, the option of pre-emptive warfare will have

to be exercised.

5) Peaceful Motive Reflected In Post-War Conduct

Post-war behaviour is the best indication of a

victor’s motive of war. Hence, a small state acting out of

self-defence should pursue a long-term solution for

peace and not domination of land and resources.23

The 1967 Israeli Six-Day War—during which

Israel neutralised its enemies’ ability to injure

by executing surprise large-scale air and land

strikes—is perhaps the most widely accepted case

of pre-emption. Independent scholars, jurists and

historians concur that the war was a justified case

of pre-emptive war. James Thuo Gathii, an expert in

international law, assessed Israel’s case to be the

most acceptable case of pre-emptive self-defence.24

The Six-Day War therefore provides a useful

example of a just pre-emptive war.25 Being surrounded

by nations which did not recognise its sovereignty,

Israel was constantly harassed by conventional border

probing and state-sponsored terrorism. The strategic

conditions in the run-up towards the war satisfied the

above conditions for a just pre-emptive strike: (a)

Adversaries’ Hostile Intent; (b) Adversaries’ ‘Act of

War; (provocative behaviour, destruction capabilities)

and (c) Necessity.

1) The Arabians’ hostile intent was clear; Egyptian

Prime Minister Nasser declared the intent to

eliminate the ‘illegitimate’ Jewish State.26 In

addition, the surrounding countries formed a

military encirclement upon Israel through a

mutual war pact.27

2) There were multiple behaviours deemed as ‘acts

of war’. Egypt mobilised troops along its border

numbering 100,000. Similar acts by Jordan and

Syria totalled up an estimated 300,000 troops,

2,300 tanks and 900 fighter jets.28 Tensions were

further elevated when the Egyptians blocked

Israel’s access through the Suez Canal, although

Israel pre-warned this as ‘an act of war’.29 The

situation was further destabilised when the

United Nations (UN) forces in the Sinai Peninsula

were banished—signaling an imminence of war.30

3) Israel was disadvantaged geographically, with

a long border lacking strategic depth. The

reluctance of the United States (US) to defend

Israel, coupled with the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republic’s (USSR) declaration to actively block-

out US access meant that Israel was facing danger

all alone, prompting it to act pre-emptively out

of necessity.31

4) Lastly, Israel’s immediate post-war conduct was

peaceful. Israel returned Sinai to Egypt and

Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for them to

be demilitarised zones.32

Finally, this essay cautions against the danger

of a loose interpretation of pre-emptive self-

defence. Critics point out that the ambiguously

worded revisionist Bush Doctrine, in espousing

the “pre-emptive use of force to prevent hostile

acts by potential adversaries”, allows the US a

liberal use of force, effectively masking preventive

war as a pre-emptive war.33 In Operation Iraqi

Freedom, the “concrete evidence” of Weapons of

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Destroyed remains of Iraqi tanks near Al Qadisiyah during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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Mass Destructions (WMD) remains unverified to-

date, leaving the act of ‘self-defence’ by the US as

technically unjustified.34 This has had a detrimental

impact on the US as countries increasingly question

the motives of its foreign policies. In proposing the

above five conditions, this essay maintains that war

should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Only

where the five conditions are satisfied, is a pre-

emptive strike justifiable. Otherwise, the loss of

lives, stature and resources would be colossal. In

the case of a small state, this price might be costly

beyond national capacity.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SINGAPORE AND THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

The mission of the Singapore Armed Forces

(SAF) is to enhance Singapore’s peace and security

through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these

fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over

the aggressor.35 Pre-emptive warfare is relevant to

Singapore as a small state, by compensating for the

immutable vulnerabilities that the country faces.

Should the SAF structure itself to be ready to win

a just pre-emptive war, three forms of superiorities

must be achieved: (1) Intelligence Superiority,

(2) Narrative Superiority and (3) Strategic Strike

Superiority. Intelligence superiority provides timely

evaluations of threat and relevant information for

the pre-emptive strike. Narrative superiority is the

strategic shaping of the information and opinion with

regards to the conflict. Strategic strike superiority

is the effectiveness of conducting strikes at the

adversary’s strategic nodes with expediency and

accuracy. This essay argues that the prospects of

achieving a successful just pre-emptive war would

be enhanced by achieving the three superiorities.

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1) Intelligence Superiority

Pre-emptive warfare is intelligence-centric.

Intelligence is responsible for threat assessment

(intent × capability) and providing the targeting

information for the pre-emptive strike.36

The nature of intelligence warfare means that the only way to stay ahead is to constantly invest in current and future intelligence technology in order to be in a position of strength.

Intelligence is the collection and analysis of raw

data to produce useful information for the purposes

of conducting the wisest possible course of action.

There are multiple sources of intelligence. All of

them must be intently explored to augment one’s

intelligence position. However, the complexity of

military intelligence is immense and Clausewitz

astutely opined that “many intelligence reports in war

are contradictory; even more are false and most are

uncertain.”37 The diffi culty lies in producing accurate

and reliable intelligence. As intelligence methods

advance, counter-intelligence tactics will emerge. The

nature of intelligence warfare means that the only

way to stay ahead is to constantly invest in current

and future intelligence technology in order to be in a

position of strength.

Intelligence is important in determining the

adversary’s political intent to guide the SAF in

acting not-too-early to be considered a preventive

war agitator and not-too-late such that the SAF

has to suffer the first blow from the adversary.

In gathering the political intent of the adversary,

some countries have gone to the extent of accessing

an adversary’s political leadership via Human

Intelligence (HUMINT).38 The pitfall is that HUMINT

is near-impossible to embed, takes a long process

to cultivate and may be financially and politically

costly to sustain. Political signals may also be sensed

from speeches, white papers, interviews, official

releases and diplomatic platforms. An emerging

field of technology is network analysis to connect-

the-dots on multiple signs of intent to invade.39

Futuristic tools like fleets of fly-sized drones may

be applicable for intelligence missions.40 In order to

A G550 CAEW of 111 Squadron, Republic of Singapore Air Force on display at the Singapore Air Show 2010.

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justify the need for self-defence, the evaluation of

threat must be conducted with rigour as it serves

to gather and provide concrete evidence to achieve

post-war strategic gains.

Gathering the order of battle and war-fighting

capabilities of the adversary is an arduous task

requiring thousands of man-hours. New techniques

to conduct Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

like artificial intelligence, or big data analytics

may circumvent the manpower-intensive phase of

intelligence gathering.41 OSINT confirmation may be

conducted through advanced intelligence methods

to monitor deliveries, movements, trainings, military

exercises and deployments of the adversary’s war-

fighting capabilities. Advanced spectroscopy

techniques can reveal the ammunition and material

composition of particular platforms. Potential

future non-kinetic methods like cyber retrieval of

essential military data promises efficient and direct

access to the adversary’s order of battle.42

Information of the adversary’s resistance forces

and strategic targets must also be available. The

resistance forces including anti-air artillery, sea

mines and land mines should be identified to aid

the strike forces to overcome them in order to reach

the strategic targets successfully. High resolution

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) could unveil the location

features and geographical characteristics surrounding

the targets to aid in terminal stage targeting.43

Increasingly sophisticated radar that makes use of

modern tomography technique to visualise what is

within an infrastructure and low-frequency radar

technique to peer at what is underground should

also be tapped on.44 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

should be conducted in preparation for non-kinetic

electronic support measures to interfere with the

adversary’s electromagnetic spectrum in support of

the strike action.45 Information on the adversary’s

data network, electrical grid, command and control

system alike should also be extracted to support

non-kinetic strategic strikes.46

2) Narrative Superiority

Narrative Superiority is the advantage over the

adversary in the collective discussion, opinion and

value judgment in relation to the war.47 The SAF must

create a compelling political narrative, for the ends

of achieving a just pre-emptive war.

There are several key principles underpinning

a successful narrative. Firstly, the content of the

narrative must be considered. As this essay has

argued, the five justifications provide the necessary

and sufficient rationale to engage in pre-emptive war

and could be relevant for a small state like Singapore.

Secondly, the release of information must be

coordinated and timely to achieve maximum effect.

The centralised control of information better ensures

the consistency and comprehensiveness of the

narrative, the failure of which risks a quick erosion of

confidence in the narrative. Thirdly, an ideal narrative

should generate a positive self-sustaining momentum

requiring minimal effort to perpetuate. In essence,

a successful narrative requires a conscious effort

to create and maintain. Therefore, the SAF should

develop a comprehensive plan and doctrine based

on these principles for the control of information

during the PoT to wartime and beyond.

There are multiple channels for the creation of

the narrative, ranging from official statements

to social media to diplomatic efforts. On top of

traditional media like newspapers, magazines,

journals, radios and televisions, new media like smart

phone apps, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have

changed the texture of strategic communications.48

These new communication platforms are significant

features 31



in influencing public opinions in recent events like

Arab Spring and the meteoric rise of the Islamic

State.49 The SAF should tap on third-party opinion-

makers consisting of academics, media industry and

community leaders both local and abroad. These

actors are generally perceived to be neutral, offering

objective judgement of the war, thereby presenting

strong persuasiveness and high strategic value.

Diplomatic engagement with the UN, Association Of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), strategic partners

and regional players should be intensified during

the PoT and beyond to exact stronger political

support. The SAF must chart clear conceptual plans

for the employment of

all available channels

in the quest to achieve

Narrative Superiority.

Lastly, the greatest

strategic asset in a

strong and persuasive

narrative for Singapore

is its peace-building

records. The SAF has been an active player in

international security efforts, contributing forces

to UN peace support operations, humanitarian

and disaster relief operations and cooperation in

international counter-terrorism.50 Singapore also

opted to settle international disputes through

peaceful means like the International Court of

Justice and actively engages in diplomatic exchanges

to foster mutual understanding with neighbouring

countries.51 Singapore’s involvement in the ASEAN and

confidence-building international platforms like the

Shangri-La Dialogue serve as evidence of Singapore’s

intent of enhancing regional peace and security.52

The SAF should formulate a ready policy for post-war

conduct in line with the peaceful reputation that it

enjoys, so as to further cement its image as a benign

party devoid of hostile dominating motivation.

3) Strategic Strike Superiority

Strategic Strike capability is the crux to any

pre-emptive war and can be a combination of

naval, air, land and non-kinetic strikes. Essentially,

strategic strike is about degrading or damaging key

war-fighting assets of the enemy, rendering him

ineffective for war. It involves deploying assets

capable of penetrating into the adversary’s territory

and destroying targets of strategic value.

Strategic targets refer to assets that decisively

influence the outcome of the war. These critical war-

fighting nodes include runways, naval ports, army

depots, ammunition

dumps, strategic

reserve pools and

the command posts.53

Non-kinetic means

to degrade the

adversary’s ability

to wage war could

also be considered—

shutting down of

essential adversary’s command and control nodes

through interference of the adversary’s operational

electromagnetic spectrum, disruption of electric

grid and network overloading.54 The SAF may also

explore eroding the adversary’s political will to

fight via means of psychological warfare.

Future kinetic mechanism includes supersonic

high-precision sea-based, land-based and air-borne

deliveries.55 The proliferation of technology in the

cyber and information domains provides lots of

potential for non-kinetic methods of decisively

influencing the course of war. The SAF should strive

to stay ahead of the technological curve in order

to remain as a credible deterrent force. Capability

build-up must be proportionate and considered to

The justification of pre-emptive self-defence should be sufficiently qualified by the existence of the adversary’s hostile intent, destruction capability and provocative action. Alternative means of resorting to conflict must be exhausted before resorting to pre-emptive warfare.

features 32



prevent sparking an arms race, creating mutual

distrust or escalating tensions which defeat its

purpose of enhancing peace and security.

CONCLUSION

Small states like Singapore may one day

encounter the need to act pre-emptively for the

purpose of peace and security. The justification

of pre-emptive self-defence should be sufficiently

qualified by the existence of the adversary’s

hostile intent, destruction capability and

provocative action. Alternative means of resorting

to conflict must be exhausted before resorting to

pre-emptive warfare. Peaceful purpose must also

be the core principle in the conduct of post-war

policy. To this end, the SAF should structure itself

to win a just pre-emptive war, should diplomacy and

deterrence fail, by investing in and building up the

three superiorities of intelligence, narrative and

strategic strikes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Astri Surkhe and Charles Morrison, Strategies of Survival:

The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States,

(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978)

Carl von Clausewitz, On War translated by Michael Howard &

Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)

Michael Vickers and Robert Martinage, The Revolution

in War, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budget

Assessments, 2004)

Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An

Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, 3rd edition, (New

Jersey: Pearson, 2004)

Colin Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive

War Doctrines: A Reconsideration, (Pennsylvania: Strategic

Studies Institute, 2007)

Alex Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, (Cambridge:

Polity, 2007)

Jiang Lihong, The Book of Lord Shang, (London: Arthur

Probsthain, 1928)

Hubert Dean, The Political and Social Ideas of St Augustine,

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)

John Finnis, Aquinas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)

Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace translated by

Francis W. Kelsey. IN: (The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc,

1925)

Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America’s Second War Against

Iraq, (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2004)

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument

with Historical Illustrations, (New York, Basic Books, 1977)

Matthew Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern

History, (New York: Routledge, 2008)

Efraim Imbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security,

(Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1999)

Nordin Yusof, Space Warfare: High-Tech Wars of Future

Generation, (Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Teknologi, 1999)

Paulo Shakarian et al., Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A

Multidisciplinary Approach, (MA: Elsevier, 2013)

John Quigley, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16.

Benjamin Sutherland, Modern Warfare, Intelligence and

Deterrence: Intelligence and Spycraft. (London: Profile

Books, 2011)

David Dayan, First Strike: A Battle History of Israel’s Six-

Day War, translated by Dov Ben-Abba, (New York: Pitman

Publishing, 1967)

George Galwich, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and

Policy Between Egypt and Israel in 1967 and 1973 Arab-

Israeli Wars, (California: Greenwood, 2000)

Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic

Signaling, (London: Longman, 1987)

Chaim Herzog, Heroes of Israel: Profiles of Jewish Courage,

(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1989)

Gary Jackson, Warden’s Five-Ring System Theory: Legitimate

Wartime Military Targeting or an Increased Potential to

Violate the Law and Norms of Expected Behavior?. (Alabama:

Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2000)

features 33



Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the Pre-

emptive Use of Military Force”, The Washington Quarterly,

(2003)

Michael Schmitt, “Naval Blockade”, International Law

Studies, (Vol. 75)

Richard Gardener, “Neither Bush nor ‘Juresprudes’”,

American Journal of International Law Vol. 97 No. 3, (2003)

James Thuo Gathii, “Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of

Pre-emptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources”, Osgoode

Hall Law Journal, Vol.43 No. 1&2, (2005)

Mohamad Faisol Keling et al., “The Impact of Singapore’s

Military Development on Malaysia’s Security”, Journal of

Politics and Law. Vol.2 No.2, (2009)

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Affairs (2011)

Joseph de Rivera, “Emotional Climate: Social Structure

and Emotional Dynamics”, International Review of Studies

On Emotion, (1992)

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on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary

Assembly, Council of Europe, (2015)

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in Asia: Strategic and Operational Implications, Policy

Brief, (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, 2014)

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of Preventive Military Attacks”, Ridgway Center for

International Security Studies Policy Brief, (2004)

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Strike Forces”, Report of the Defense Science Board Task

Force to the U.S. Department of Defense, (2004)

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Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014”.

Policy Brief presented at European Leadership Network,

(2014)

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Regional Security”, Fullerton Forum 2015 Keynote Address.

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Iraq, (theguardian, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq

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Track down Protesters’ Names before ‘Rounding Them Up’”,

(Daily Mail (London), 2011)

http://www.dailymail.co.uk /news/ article-1354096/Egypt-

protests-Police-use-FacebookTwitter-track-protesters.html

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Illegal?”, (Al-Jazeera, 2014) http://www.aljazeera.

com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/israeli-set t lement s-

unfortunat-2014114135025395399.html.

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2014) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/

a r ch i ve/2014/06/ i s i s - i r aq - t w i t t e r- soc ia l -med ia -

strategy/372856/

Amelia Smith, “China Could Shut Down U.S. Power Grid with

Cyber Attack, Says NSA Chief”, (Newsweek, 2014)

http://www.newsweek.com/china-could-shut-down-us-

power-grid-cyber-attack-says-nsa-chief-286119

Jessica Cheam, “A Good Ruling for Both”, (AsiaOne News, 2008)

http://news.asiaone.com/News/The%2BStraits%2BTimes/

Story/A1Story20080524-66756.html

David Landa, “Tiniest Drone Takes Off, Sort Of”, (National

Geographic, 2013) http://news.nationalgeographic.com/

news/2013/13/130502--drone-tiny-fly-robobee-harvard-

science-robot/

Ali Mustafa, “Singapore: Small State, Big Weapon Buyer”,

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features/2014/03/s ingapore-smal l-s tate-big-arms-

purchases-2014320922191312.html

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Kuwait”, (Encyclopedia Britannica Blog, 2011)

http://blogs.britannica.com/2011/08/iraq-invades-kuwait/

http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/baliga/

htm/hobbesiantrap.pdf

features 34



Mary Crannell & Ben Sheppard, “Achieving Narrative Superiority

to Succeed in Afghanistan”. http://www.ideasciences.com/

library/papers/NarrativeCornerstonetoSuccess.pdf

MINDEF Singapore. “Mission.”

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/mission.html

MINDEF Singapore. “Overseas Operations”. http://www.

mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/overseas_operations.

html

MINDEF Singapore. “HADR Deployments by the SAF”. http://

www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/

topics/hadr/home.html

MINDEF Singapore, “Defence Policy & Diplomacy”. http://

www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/defence_policy.

htmlMFA Singapore. “ASEAN”

ht tp://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/internat ional _

organisation_initiatives/asean.html

ENDNOTES

1. Astri Surkhe and Charles Morrison, Strategies of

Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller

Asian States (Brisbane: University of Queensland

Press, 1978), 176.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War translated by Michael

Howard & Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1984), 727.

3. With land area of 716.1km2, Singapore has limited

ground for retreating and regrouping to organise a

counter-attack. Ali Mustafa, “Singapore: Small State,

Big Weapon Buyer”, (Al-Jazeera, 2014)

h t t p : / / w w w . a l j a z e e r a . c o m / i n d e p t h /

features/2014/03/singapore-small-state-big-arms-

purchases-2014320922191312.html

4. Given modern airpower technology including stealth,

intelligence, precision and discrimination capabilities,

the lethality of firepower has been greatly enhanced.

Michael Vickers and Robert Martinage, The Revolution

in War, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budget

Assessments, 2004), 33, 36, 48 & 79.

5. The contagious psychological impact amongst the

population of a nation at war cannot be understated.

Joseph de Rivera, “Emotional Climate: Social Structure

and Emotional Dynamics”, (International Review of

Studies On Emotion, 1992), 222.

6. Thomas Frear et al., “Dangerous Brinksmanship: Close

Military Encounters Between Russia and the West

in 2014”, 9-10. Policy Brief presented at European

Leadership Network, (2014)

7. Michael Schmitt, “Naval Blockade”, (International Law

Studies), v._75, 204.

8 . NATO built up forces around Iraq using various military

exercises in the weeks before Operation Desert Shield.

Richard Pallardy, “Desert Storm Brewing: Iraq Invades

Kuwait”, (Encyclopedia Britannica Blog, 2011)

http://blogs.britannica.com/2011/08/iraq-invades-

kuwait/

9. Mohamad Faisol Keling et al., “The Impact of Singapore’s

Military Development on Malaysia’s Security”, (Journal

of Politics and Law, 2009). v._2, n._2, 69.



Press, 1984), 726.

11. A formation of Israeli F-16s launched a surprise raid

on Osiraq, 7 June 1981. Dan Reiter, “The Osiraq Myth

and the Track Record of Preventive Military Attaks”,

(Ridgway Center for International Security Studies

Policy Brief, 2004), v._2, 1-2.

12. Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An

Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, 3rd edition

(New Jersey: Pearson, 2004), 2.

13. Colin Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and

Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration

(Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 31.

14. Necessity and Proportionality are employed as the

legal tests in Nicaragua v. USA (1986), Oil Platforms

Case (2003) and Armed Activities on the Territory of

Congo (2005).

15. Alex Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq

(Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 18-19.

features 35



Jiang Lihong, The Book of Lord Shang (London: Arthur

Probsthain, 1928), 285.

Hubert Dean, The Political and Social Ideas of St

Augustine (New York: Columbia University Press,

1963), 155.

John Finnis, Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1998), 284.

16. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace translated

by Francis W. Kelsey (IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company

Inc, 1925), 175.

17. Anthony Clark Arend, “International Law and the

Pre-emptive Use of Military Force”, (The Washington

Quarterly, 2003), 90-91.

18. Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory: America’s Second War

Against Iraq (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 34.




20. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral

Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York,

Basic Books, 1977), 81.

21. Matthew Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern

History (New York: Routledge, 2008), 240.

22. Point of Rubicon is an idiom that refers to Point of No

Return in military context. It originated from Julius

Caesar’s 49B.C. crossing of the Rubicon River which

marked the beginning of The Great Roman Civil War.

“Red Lines” are those indicators, deemed by a country,

of which breaching would constitute grave security

threats. Efraim Imbar, Rabin and Israel’s National

Security, (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press,

1999), 109.

23. The creation of demilitarized zone without extracting

of resources may be considered a desirable post-war

behavior. Actions otherwise like Israel’s settlement

of supposed buffer zone quickly erodes its cause.

Oliver Miles, “Israeli Settlements: ‘Unfortunate’ or

Illegal?”, (Al-Jazeera, 2014).

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/

israeli-settlements-unfortunat-2014114135025395399.html.

24. James Thuo Gathii, “Assessing Claims of a New

Doctrine of Pre-emptive War Under the Doctrine of

Sources”, (Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 2005), v._43

n._1&2, 75.

25. Matthew Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern

History (New York: Routledge, 2008), 240.

26. On 19 May 1967, Nasser asserted: “This is our chance

Arabs, to deal Israel a mortal blow of annihilation,

to blot out its entire presence in our holy land.”

David Dayan, First Strike: A Battle History of Israel’s

Six-Day War, translated by Dov Ben-Abba (New York:

Pitman Publishing, 1967), 8.

27. On 30 May 1967, a Jordan-Egypt-Syria mutual defense

treaty was established. George Galwich, The Albatross

of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between Egypt and

Israel in 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars (California:

Greenwood, 2000), 5.

28. In fact, non-immediate Arabian countries like

Saudi Arabia and Iraq also provided brigades worth

of assets to augment the immediate neighbours of

Israel. Matthew Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive War in

Modern History (New York: Routledge, 2008), 185.

29. Israel declared in 1957 that denial of Israel’s access

to Straits of Tiran would constitute an act of war.

Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of

Diplomatic Signaling (London: Longman, 1987), 12.

30. On 16 May 1967, Egypt requested the withdrawal of

the United Nations Emergency Force established in

1956. John Quigley, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-

Defense, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2012), 16.

31. U.S. had repeatedly stressed that any unilateral act

by Israel would be unacceptable. Matthew Flynn, First

Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History (New York:

Routledge, 2008), 195.

32. Chaim Herzog, Heroes of Israel: Profiles of Jewish

Courage (New York: Little, Brown and Company,

1989), 89.

33. Richard Gardener, “Neither Bush nor ‘Juresprudes’”,

(American Journal of International Law, 2003), v._97,

n._3, 588.

features 36



34. President George Bush War Ultimatum Speech

Transcript to Iraq, (theguardian, 2003).

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/

usa.iraq

35. MINDEF Singapore. “Mission.”

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/mission.html






Press, 1984), 136.

38. Human Intelligence includes diplomats, military

attachés, espionage, and prisoners-of-war amongst

others.

39. Benjamin Sutherland, Modern Warfare, Intelligence

and Deterrence: Intelligence and Spycraft. (London:

Profile Books, 2011), 264.

40. David Landa, “Tiniest Drone Takes Off, Sort Of”,

(National Geographic, 2013).

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130502--

drone-tiny-fly-robobee-harvard-science-robot/

41. Open Source Intelligence includes media, internet,

public data, academic reports amongst others.

Benjamin Sutherland, Modern Warfare, Intelligence



42. Paulo Shakarian et al., Introduction to Cyber-Warfare:

A Multidisciplinary Approach (MA: Elsevier, 2013), 114.

43. Nordin Yusof, Space Warfare: High-Tech Wars of Future

Generation, (Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Teknologi,

1999), 642.

44. Benjamin Sutherland, Modern Warfare, Intelligence



45. Signal Intelligence includes sources like

communication systems, radars, and electronic

signals amongst others.

46. Amelia Smith, “China Could Shut Down U.S. Power Grid

with Cyber Attack, Says NSA Chief”, (Newsweek, 2014).

http://www.newsweek.com/china-could-shut-down-

us-power-grid-cyber-attack-says-nsa-chief-286119

47. Mary Crannell & Ben Sheppard, Achieving Narrative

Superiority to Succeed in Afghanistan.

h t tp://www.idea sc iences .com/ l ib r a r y/paper s/

NarrativeCornerstonetoSuccess.pdf

48. Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media”,

(Foreign Affairs, 2011).

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-

shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media.

49. Ian Gallagher, “Egyptian Police Use Facebook and Twitter to Track down Protesters’ Names before ‘Rounding Them Up’”, (Daily Mail (London), 2011). http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1354096/Egypt-protests-Police-use-FacebookTwitter-track-protesters.html

J. M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter”, (The Atlantic, 2014).

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/

50. UN Peacekeeping Operations include 1989 UNTAG in Nambia, 1991 UNIKOM in Kuwait, 1993 UNTAC in Cambodia etc. MINDEF Singapore. “Overseas Operations”.

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/overseas_operations.html

HADR efforts include QZ8501, MH370, Hurricane Katrina, Indian Ocean Tsunami etc. MINDEF Singapore. “HADR Deployments by the SAF”.http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/hadr/home.html

International counter-terrorism contributions include 2007 NATO-led ISAF operations in Afghanistan, CTF151 in Gulf of Aden since 2009, 2014 anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria etc. MINDEF Singapore. “Overseas Operations”. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/overseas_operations.html

51. Singapore and Malaysia filed disputes with regard to Pedra Blanca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge to International Court of Justice in 2008. Jessica Cheam, “A Good Ruling for Both”, (AsiaOne News, 2008). http://news.asiaone.com/News/The%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080524-66756.html

features 37



CPT Seah Jun Hao currently serves as a Project Offi cer in the RSAF Offi ce of Strategy, Chief of Air Force Offi ce. He graduated from Imperial College London with a Masters of Engineering (1st Class Honours) in Aeronautical Engineering. CPT Seah is a SAF Overseas Scholar.

EX SEMANGAT BERSATU, EX BERSAMA LIMA, EX INDOPURA are some of the recent military exercises that Singapore conducts with Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore has longstanding military relations with both neighboring countries. MINDEF Singapore, “Defence Policy & Diplomacy”. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/defence_policy.html

52. Association of Southeast Asia Nations. Singapore is a founding member of ASEAN in 1967. MFA Singapore. “ASEAN”.ht tp://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/asean.html

Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue – a gathering of regional defence ministers, armed forces chiefs and distinguished scholars in the field of defence and security. Ng Eng Hen. “Strengthening Cooperation to Enhance Regional Security”, Fullerton Forum 2015 Keynote Address. http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/fullerton-forum-2015-b1ae/keynote-address-be5f

53. Major Gary Jackson, Warden’s Five-Ring System Theory: Legitimate Wartime Military Targeting or an Increased Potential to Violate the Law and Norms of Expected Behavior?, (Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2000), 20.

54. Benjamin Sutherland, Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence: Intelligence and Spycraft. (London: Profile Books, 2011), 162.

55. In Asia alone, India and South Korea are known to be in the midst of developing indigenous supersonic land-attack-cruise-missiles. Kalyan Kemburi, Diffusion of High-Speed Cruise Missiles in Asia: Strategic and Operational Implications, Dec 2014 Policy Brief (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies), 5.

features 38



“All warfare is based on deception”

- Sun Tzu1

INTRODUCTION

Russia’s annexation of Crimea on 21st March, 2014

caught almost everyone off guard. The Russian military

categorically disguised its actions and vehemently

denied them but the ‘little green men’ who popped up

in the Black Sea peninsula were a textbook case of the

Russian practice of military deception or ‘Maskirovka’.2

Given the common belief that the Western Powers had

every meter of the world monitored by reconnaissance

satellites and every electronic information channel

tapped, a theory further perpetuated by increasingly

recurrent leaks of classified information, this was a

particularly astounding feat.3 We live in times where

it is taken for certain that there exists no means by

which a large military operation can be undertaken

without triggering one of many alerts—but the

annexation of Crimea has shown that the place of the

supposedly-antiquated military strategy of deception

lies very much in the modern information age.

Deception exploits the efficacy of surprise to

achieve military goals by concealing or disguising

intentions and the operational details of one’s forces.

The ability to manipulate and disseminate information

today has greatly amplified deception capabilities and

expanded its influence beyond strategic domains to

the tactical levels.

This essay examines the power of deception

in the context of information operations in the

modern hybrid battlespace. We will study the use

of deception in the Normandy landings in World War

Two (WWII), the mitigation of air superiority by the

features 39

POINTER, Journal of the singapore armed forces Vol.42 no.1

Maskirovka In The Information Ageby LTA(NS) Chin Hui Han

Abstract:

The author examines the power of deception in the context of information operations in the modern hybrid

battlespace. Examples discussed include the Normandy landings in World War Two (WWII) and the use of

the Russian Maskirovka doctrine in the ongoing conflict in the Donbass regions. The author then discusses

the information space as the new battlefield in which dominance is highly prized by the modern war-fighter.

He adds that a democratic platform, with avenues for influence and exploitation by all parties, civilian or

military, is a quagmire in which militaries globally have had to adapt operations and technologies to conduct

information operations to increase situational awareness. Lastly, the author then examines the efforts in

information operations that the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has undertaken today as part of the 3rd Generation

transformation.

Keywords: Information; Advantageous; Deceive; Cognisant; Vigilant

Serbians in the Kosovo War and the use of the Russian

Maskirovka doctrine in the ongoing conflict in the

Donbass regions.

Deception exploits the efficacy of surprise to achieve military goals by concealing or disguising intentions and the operational details of one’s forces.

This is followed by a discussion of the information

space as the new battlefield, in which dominance is

highly prized by the modern war-fighter. The media

landscape that forms the backdrop of these campaigns

however, proves as neutral a fighting ground as the

physical terrain. A democratic platform, with avenues

for influence and exploitation by all parties, civilian

or military, is a quagmire in which militaries globally

have had to adapt operations and technologies

to conduct information operations to increase

situational awareness.

Lastly, the essay will examine the efforts in

information operations that the Singapore Armed

Forces (SAF) has undertaken today as part of the

3rd Generation (3rd Gen) transformation. We will

make suggestions for the future SAF to expand its

information operations to counter future deceptive

threats, with a vision of elevating information

operations from its role of a supporting character

to a key player in mission planning and execution.

This will pave the way for the efficient detection

of deception, and the employment of counter-

deception measures in a dynamic battlespace.

THE POWER OF DECEPTION

The goal of a stealthy, deceptive approach is to

shape the adversary’s decision-making processes

through a false impression of the battlespace, and is

designed to lower an opponent's capabilities due to

sub-optimal deployment of his finite resources.4

Simply put, deception is perception manipulation.

Military deception encompasses the use of both

denial and deception, with denial as hiding the

real and deception showing the fake. Within the

military context, deception and its manifestations

of propaganda and disinformation aim to deceive

opponents as to the details of military operations:

intentions, timings, locations, combat strength

and style.5

The use of deception is well recorded in history.

The concept of using the inferior to overcome the

superior has its roots in ancient Chinese military

history which emphasises stealth, deception and

indirect approaches.6 In a recently declassified 1972

seminar by the United States (US) Joint Chief of

Staff on intelligence warning function, a paper was

presented on deception and surprise. The element

of surprise was analysed in 168 battles in 17 wars

from 1914 through 1968 and impressive statistics

on the efficacy of deception were presented. Out of

50 battles in which intense surprise was achieved,

17 far exceeded the objectives of the initiators and

only one ended in defeat. Conversely, out of the

50 battles fought without the advantage of initial

surprise, 30 ended in defeat for the initiators and

only one substantially exceeded the attacking

commander’s expectations.7 With 82% of all cases

of strategic surprise and 57% of tactical surprises

attributed to deception, the paper summarised that

the greater the effort put into the deception plan,

the greater the degree of surprise gained.8

In the following sections, three cases studies

would be used to illustrate effective deception in the

areas relevant to the SAF.

features 40


STRATEGIC DECEPTION OF THE NORMANDY LANDINGS

A watershed moment in WWII was the Normandy

Landings, codenamed Operation Neptune. The landing

of two million men and thousands of ships and aircraft

from around the world formed the largest joint and

combined forces in history.9 It is one of the most

successful in the history of warfare that is retold in

countless documentaries and popular dramas such as

HBO’s Band of Brothers.

A key to the success of Operation Neptune was its

elaborate deception plan, Operation Bodyguard. It had

three main goals: to make the Pas de Calais appear to be

the main invasion target, to mask the actual date and

time of the assault and to keep German reinforcements

in Pas de Calais for at least 14 days after landing.

Operation Bodyguard was implemented as many sub-

operations each focused on:

1. Military decoys and fake material/facilities

pertaining to training and doctrine, for physical

deception;

2. Controlled leaks of information through diplomatic

channels;

3. Creating fake wireless traffic to simulate military

units and operations;

4. Exploiting compromised agents to pass false

information;

5. Media propaganda of phantom units such as

the First United States Army Group (FUSAG) lent

credibility by the supposed command of prominent

US General George S. Patton.10

Operation Bodyguard was a success and it delayed

the Fifteenth German Army in the Pas de Calais for seven

weeks, exceeding the goal of 2 weeks. It has proven that

with a well thought out and robustly executed deception

plan, even a battle-hardened opponent can be deceived

Wik

iped

ia

Naval Bombardments on D-Day, Operation Neptune.

features 41


by the crossing of two million soldiers across a large

water obstacle like the English Channel.

OVERCOMING TECHNOLOGICAL INFERIORITY THOUGH DECEPTION

In the Kosovo Wars of 1999, the military of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) faced off

with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) coalition for the control of Kosovo.

Up against an adversary superior in all

aspects of combat power, the FRY deception

goal was to mitigate the superiority of the coalition’s

air force through the air campaign, Operation Allied

Force, with efforts including staged media events

employing a decoy military.11

The military deception caused Allied aircraft to

engage a variety of decoy targets, allowing FRY to

conserve its limited tactical capabilities. Exploiting

the Allied pilots’ preference of using advanced

thermal imaging for targeting, the FRY army fooled

Coalition aircraft into attacking plywood and canvas

targets tactically by using fires to create thermal

images on bridges. These false thermal signatures

emulated threat vehicles (tanks) exposed in the

open on bridges, typically lucrative targets for

Coalition aircrafts. Not only did it cost the Coalition

to expand expensive smart munitions on cheap

plywood, it lured NATO aircrafts into dangerous

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) ambushes. The success

of the FRY campaign was confirmed by its low

losses from NATO’s air campaign—only 20 tanks, 18

Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) and 20 artillery

pieces—a number significantly smaller than reported

by NATO.12

Deception was used to influence the media

reporting on the conflict. Examples of such media

manipulation, to cast NATO in an evil light, included

escorting reporters to non-military targets hit by

NATO aircraft but not to military ones and placing

blood-stained dolls amongst civilian casualties

whenever the international media photographed a

site controlled by FRY.13

The goal of a stealthy, deceptive approach is to shape the adversary’s decision-making processes through a false impression of the battlespace, and is designed to lower an opponent's capabilities due to sub-optimal deployment of his finite resources.

The FRY deception plan achieved its objectives:

degrade the effectiveness of NATO air strikes;

ensure the survival of Serbian forces; discredit NATO

bombing campaigns; retain key foreign support

by hiding or discrediting evidence of atrocities.

This success, well documented in the open media,

served as a source of embarrassment both for

operational military planners and political leaders.14

It is an excellent example of how technological

superiority can be eclipsed by a technologically-

inferior adversary through the adroit deployment of

deception.

DECEPTION BY BLURRING CIVIL MILITARY LINES

In August 2014, following the annexation of

Crimea, Russian TV showed footage of water and

baby food being loaded on to hastily repainted

white trucks headed for Ukraine’s war zone, as part

of a humanitarian operation. Even though NATO has

plenty of intelligence of Russian military movement

of forces into Ukraine, Major General Davis, in

charge of operations and intelligence at NATO’s

Headquarters, called the first convoy “a wonderful

example of Maskirovka: because it created something

of a media storm.”15

features 42


TV crews breathlessly followed the convoy, trying

to find out what was really inside the army trucks.

To further fuel the media frenzy, Russian reporters

staged interviews with the truck drivers to disprove

speculation that a classic Trojan horse operation

was ongoing to smuggle weapons to rebel militias

in the Donbass region. However, The Trojan horse

theory was reinforced by the distrust of the Russian

media coupled with reports on social media showing

that trucks supposedly loaded with humanitarian

supplies were mostly empty. In response, the Ukraine

military had to divert precious resources from their

embattled army to screen the mostly empty trucks as

they entered and left Ukraine. The true motive was to

divert attention away from the movement of Russian

forces and equipment at other checkpoints that were

under the control of the Russians.

The brilliance of the masquerade was manifested

in the media frenzy over the empty white army

trucks, a self-sustaining smoke-screen for Russia

perpetuated by the news-hungry Western media.

Russian’s constant blurring of military-civilian lines

and its use of ambiguous forces throughout the

Donbass conflict has enabled its operational success,

even under the constant watch of the world and its

military opponents.

INFORMATION DOMINANCE AND THE CO-EVOLUTION WITH DECEPTION

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept

envisioned information as a cornerstone of warfare,

with modern militaries seeking information

dominance by acquiring necessary information for

friendly forces while denying it to the enemy.16

Dominating information is perceived as the key to

dominating the entire battlespace. Vis-à-vis the

advancement in sensor technologies, such as sub-

meter, high resolution satellites, and the capabilities

to monitor the entire electromagnetic spectrum and

electronic information channel, it is unfathomable

that a modern military like the US, with its all-

encompassing Command, Control, Communications,

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(C4ISR) system, can be outfoxed by simple tactics

such as empty trucks.

But the answer is simple, and can be found in

biology; co-evolution, the concept of changes

in the genetic composition of multiple specifies

mutually affecting each other’s evolution, explains

the phenomenon.17 Deception, with its intrinsic

association with information, has co-evolved with

information operations. While the modern war-

fighter and intelligence officer crave a comprehensive

information collection system to enable pervasive

battlespace awareness, the larger the coverage of the

information systems, the greater are the venues for

exploitation and deception effects.18 This leads us to

an analysis of the media landscape, an ever-changing

environment in which dominance is desirable, and

deception thrives.

MEDIA 2.0: THE NEW TERRAIN

The evolving media landscape is a neutral terrain,

open to all. Orit Perlov, a social media analyst for

the Israeli-based Institute for National Security

Studies, commented on the level playing field that

is mainstream social media platforms: "Twitter is

a very equalising platform, it's my voice and your

voice, and the Prime Minister's voice … Each one

of us has 140 characters, no matter what. So it's a

very democratic platform. It doesn't matter if you're

black, white, left-wing, right-wing, your voice is

the same."19

The American documentary maker Eugene Jarecki

drew parallels between the histories of military

and media supremacy. He cited George Orwell’s

features 43


1945 essay, ‘You and the Atom Bomb’, in which

Orwell argued that sophisticated weapons such as

tanks, battleships and planes favour tyrants and

oppressors, whereas accessible weapons such as

rifles strengthen the weak.20 The analogy was that

cameras were big and expensive and only available

to movie and television studios previously. As they

have become cheaper and more available, ordinary

people have gained control of the media narrative.21

Every potential player in a conflict, from individuals

in the grassroots to Non-Government Organisations

(NGOs) all the way up to governments and para-

government organisations, now has a stake in the

game in which they can potentially influence the

public.22 The war-fighter plays by the same rules as

everyone else.

This position is well-understood and effectively

exploited. The media, in addition to the traditional

military C4I system, forms an integral part of the

modern information battlespace, what with its uses

not just for influence, but also for Command and

Control (C2) purposes. For example, Islamic State

in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) generates 200,000 daily

tweets from its supports and members. It has 12

official accounts and 45,000 supporter accounts.23

The terrorist group Al-Qaeda also uses encrypted

e-mail exchanges and encrypted chat forums to

communicate and disseminate its propaganda.24 The

level of technological sophistication rivals that of

military secure communications, with a ubiquity and

resilience that can surpass military C2 networks.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN MEDIA AND THE STRATEGIC CAMERAMAN

A modern military that understands the value

of media in the information battlespace is the

Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF employs social

media to great skill, with the IDF Spokesperson's

Unit established as the IDF’s liaison to domestic

and foreign media and the general public. When the

unit first fired up its interactive media branch in

December 2009, it started with only a few videos on

YouTube. In 2014, it managed nearly 30 platforms

speaking six languages—Hebrew, Arabic, English,

Spanish, French, and Russian—with an estimated

reach of 95 million people worldwide, a Twitter

account with more than 230,000 followers and more

than 380,000 likes on its Facebook page.25

After taking out Hamas military leader Ahmed

Jabari with a precision guided bomb, the IDF tweeted

a chilling warning to Hamas: “We recommend that

no Hamas operatives, whether low level or senior

leaders, show their faces above ground in the

days ahead,” together with a tactical Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle videos of the strike.26 Not only does

the IDF uses media for propaganda, it uses it to

debunk deception and false information created

by its opponents. This is done by crowdsourcing to

its followers, civilian and military alike, and the

use of tools like Google image search and TinEye.27

Despite the democratising power of social media,

the media-savvy IDF’s embrace of information

operations demonstrates the value of social media

for perception management.

Using video and photos to effectively present

a story is also key to mastering the information

domain. A case in point was the toppling of the

statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square, which

marked the symbolic end of the Battle of Baghdad

in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The ‘Strategic Corporal’

of the moment, US Marine Corporal Edward Chin

understood the strategic effects of toppling

Saddam’s statue.28 However, it was the critical use

of an Iraqi flag to cover the head of the statue

that rallied the cheering Iraqi crowds into toppling

features 44


the statue before the congregation of camera lens

held by international journalists staying at the

nearby Palestine Hotel.29 The strategic cameraman

understands not only the strategic act, but also the

framing of it to leverage media to its purposes.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS OF THE 3RD GENERATION SAF

The 3rd Gen SAF prides itself on leading-edge

capabilities that enable it to operate as a networked

and integrated fighting force, effective across a full

spectrum of operations. While the fighting system

has been evolved to deliver precision and integrated

strike capabilities, the SAF’s holistic approach to

transformation has also enabled the growth of its

information operation capabilities.

Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, trying out the controls of the Skyblade III unmanned aerial vehicle, one of the many surveillance equipment used by the C4I community.

Cybe

rPio

neer

The Defence Media Centre (DMC) is a multi-media,

multi-platform agency dedicated to publishing

defence-related content to inform, educate and

engage Singaporean and international audiences

about the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the SAF.

Besides its traditional flagship print products and

corporate website, the DMC has begun tapping on the

social media landscape to connect with its audience

through YouTube, Facebook, Flickr and Twitter.30 In

addition, the SAF has established the Open Source

Centre (OSC) under joint Imagery Support Group

(ISG) to monitor global news and information

related to military and security developments. It

also tracks natural disasters in the region, such as

Typhoon Hudhud over India and Typhoon Haiyan in

the Philippines, using open source information on

print, television and online news. The OSC sends its

features 45


reports to the highest SAF leadership twice daily on

information from the open source channels.31

To enable information operations at the

operational level, the SAF has developed

specialised units such as the C4I battalions to

support the combined arms brigade. The C4I battalion

comprises information warfare specialists who provide

comprehensive situational awareness and responsive

information flows.32

THE PANDORA’S BOX OF THE FUTURE

Revolutions in military affairs predict the

civilianisation of conflict. The emergence of radical

and quasi-state groups such as ISIS that possess heavy

weaponry and state-sponsored use of ‘little green men’

by the Russian military in the annexation of Crimea, are

evidence of the rapidly dissolving boundary between

civilian and military. A preview into the predicaments

Club K launchers at LIMA 2013, Langkawi.34

of the future would be the Russian Club-K containerised

cruise missile system, commonly marketed as the

‘Pandora’s Box’. Packed in a standard shipping container,

the weapon system can be fired from a container ship, a

train cart or a container truck.33 The Club-K blends into

the urban environment and can be positioned covertly,

ready to unleash a surprise attack at a moment’s notice.

Nothing on the exterior distinguishes the Club-K from

a civilian container and this is an apt analogy for the

future of conflict, in which there are no demarcations

between civilians and military actors.

How should the SAF ready itself for a deceitful

threat like the Club-K? There is no clear solution in the

growing quagmire of civil-military relations in a conflict,

but there will be growing emphasis on information

operations. Information operations would be critical

in tweezing out the weak signals of a deceptive threat

among the growing cluttered environment. The recent

features 46


genesis of the SAF’s C4I capabilities as a joint community

highlights the awareness of the growing eminence of

information operations.35

To enable information operations at the operational level, the SAF has developed specialised units such as the C4I battalions to support the combined arms brigade.

TATICAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS

This essay puts forth two suggestions for the

decentralisation of information operations to the

tactical level in anticipation of the future dynamic

operating environment.

First, would be the use of combat media teams

embedded with the frontline troops, similar to the

combat production specialist vocation of the US

Army.36 As future operations are likely to be in the

urban environment, there will be more interactions

with civilian and non-combatants. They will be armed

with a smartphone, eager to produce content to feed

media hunger. The media teams will capture significant

moments for documentation and operational learning

purposes, but will also use them to debunk the aggressor

propaganda of the SAF’s operations or, to provide

evidence in disputes with the civilians. The combat

media teams must be combat capable, possess a good

dose of creativity and media production flair, so as to

capture the endearing moments while avoiding Public

Relation (PR) disasters. The camera lens will shape the

narrative of the operation and the strategic outcomes.

Next, would be the decentralisation of Intelligence

Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, and

intelligence reports, such as those generated by ISG’s

OSC. With the increase in urban operations, there will

be a decrease in situational awareness as it is limited

by the human senses. To overcome these limitations

would require sensors such as Signal Intelligence

(SIGINT) and non-line of sight cameras such as tactical

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to be made available

to the front line troops. In addition, open sources and

social media are rich sources of intelligence that should

be constantly monitored. For example, the top-secret

raid to kill Osama Bin Laden by the US Special Forces

was exposed on Twitter by local residents as the raid

unfolded.38 The combat troops needed to be aware, as

they moved from block to block, if their Operations

Security (OPSEC) had been compromised on social media

or whether there were signs of an Improvised Explosive

Device (IED) waiting for a trigger signal.

The next generation SAF soldier needs to be

information operations capable to operate in the

dynamic and complex urban environment. Also, they

need to have the acumen of an intelligence officer

while being cognisant of the strategic goals of the SAF

as they shape the battlespace with rifles and cameras.

CONCLUSION

This essay argues for the power of deception by

highlighting key examples in modern military history.

Deception thrives on information, and perception

manipulation, and can be used to achieve operational

surprise and to neutralise technological superiority.

The growing importance placed on information

systems by modern militaries has brought about the

co-evolution of deception techniques. The media

has evolved into the new battlespace, where both

deception and information dominance competes.

A democratic field, media provides a voice to every

actor, including the war fighter. It is thus important for

modern militaries to be able to orchestrate information

operations in the media: the strategic corporal gives

raise to the strategic cameraman.

features 47


The 3rd Gen SAF is well aware of the needs of

information operations as it undergoes its third

generation transformation. There will be a push to

further decentralise information operations down to

the tactical levels. In the light of the blurring lines

between civilian and military relations in conflict and

the development of deceptive systems, the SAF must

continue to transform to handle the perilous ‘Pandora’s

Box’ of the future.

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ENDNOTES

1. Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu Quotes from the Art of War, http://www.artofwarquotes.com/

2. How Russia Outfoxes its enemies, (BBC News, 2015).

3. Global Surveillance. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance

3. COL Ong, Y. Understanding why inferior defeats the superior. POINTER,v._ 34, n._ 1.

4. MAJ Mark Johnson, & MAJ Jessica Meyeraan. Military Deception: Hiding the real - showing the fake. US Joint Forces Staff College, (2003), 4.

5. Ibid.

6. Grabo, C. M., & Euan, D. G. Strategic Warning and Deception. Practice to deceive, (2009), 31.

7. Ibid., 32-33.

8. Major Jon S. Wendell. Strategic Deception Behind the Normandy Invasion. United States Airforce, Command Staff College. 1997.

9. Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the 2nd World War. 2004.

10 . NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Wikipedia. ht tp://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_

Yugoslavia

11. MAJ Mark Johnson, & MAJ Jessica Meyeraan. Military Deception: Hiding the real - showing the fake. (US Joint Forces Staff College, 2003), 9.

12. Ibid., 10.

13. Ibid.

14. NATO. New Satellite Imagery Exposes Russian Combat Troops Inside Ukraine.

http://aco.nato.int/new-satellite-imagery-exposes-russian-combat-troops-inside-ukraine.aspx, 2014.

15. How Russia Outfoxes its enemies.( BBC News, 2015).

16. Ibid.

17. Coevolution. Wikipedia.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coevolution.

18. CPT Guo, J. The Laments of Cassandra: Reflections on Warning Intelligence in the information Eden. (POINTER, 2006).

19. How Israel and Hamas weaponized social media. (CNET, 2014).

20. Orwell, George. You and the Atomic Bomb.

http://orwell.ru/library/articles/ABomb/english/e_abomb.

21. The Guardian. The Isis propaganda war: a hi-tech media jihad. 2014.

22. How Israel and Hamas weaponzied social media.

(CNET, 2014).

23. Flashpoint Global Partners. ICSR ”Voices from the

Blogs". US CENTCOM. 2014.

24. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The use of

the Internet for terrorist purpose. (New York: United

Nations, 2012).

25. How Israel and Hamas weaponzied social media. (CNET,

2014).

26. Russian TV news. Twitter Warfare: How Israel and Hamas

wage war online. 2012.

features 49


LTA(NS) Chin Hui Han is currently a Senior Member of Technical Staff at DSO National Laboratories. He graduated from Carnegie Mellon University with two Bachelors of Science degrees in Computer Science and Mathematical Science. LTA(NS) Chin is a Guards Officer by vocation.

27. How Israel and Hamas weaponzied social media.(CNET, 2014).

28. Gen Krulak, C. C. The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. Marine Magezines. 1999.

29. Firdos Square statue destruction, Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firdos_Square_statue_destruction, 2007.

30. MINDEF. The Defence Media Center. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/

atozlistings/dmc/index.html.

31. Dr Ng visits SAF Imagery Support Group.( Cyberpioner , 2014)

ht tp://www.mindef.gov.sg:80/content/imindef/re source l ib r a r y/c yber p ioneer/ top ic s/ar t ic l e s/news/2014/oct/21oct14_news.html

32. MINDEF. Introducing the C4I Battalions. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/

atozlistings/army/army_news/News_Archive/2011/Feb2011/c4ibn.html, 2011.

33. Szaszdi, L. F. The club K: A Deadly Pandora's Box of Cruise Missiles. (The Daily Signal, 2011).

h t t p://da i ly s igna l .com/2011/08/22/the - c l ub -k-a -dead ly -%E2%80%9Cpandor a%E2%80%99s-box%E2%80%9D-of-cruise-missiles/.

34. Club K anti-ship missiles sold to South East Asia, Asitimes.

http://asitimes.blogspot.sg/2013/04/club-k-anti-ship-missile-sold-to.html, 2013.

35. Inauguration of the SAF C4I Community, Cyberpioneer. ht tp://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/

official_releases/nr/2012/apr/02apr12_nr.html#.VPR-KfmUfMJ.

36. "I Shot 29 Bullets and 212 Images”. (Time, 2012). http://nation.time.com/2012/07/17/i-shot-29-bullets-

and-212-images/, 2012.

U.S Army. Combat Documentation / Production Specialist (25V).

37. Bin Laden raid was revealed on Twitter. (BBC News, 2011). http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-13257940

features 50


INTRODUCTION

In the integrated operating environment of

the near-future, intelligence data will come from a

multitude of sources—from closed sources and open

sources; from air defence radars, weapon-locating

radars and maritime surveillance systems; from print

media, radio, blogs and Twitter; from individual ships,

aircraft and ground troopers. Data will come in the

form of video feeds, ground photographs, aerial

imagery, electronic signatures, radar returns, sound

clips, conversation transcripts, tactical reports,

digital text and paper printouts. Twitter generates

an average of 5,700 tweets per second.1 Given the

flight endurance of the Heron 1 UAV, a single mission

could produce a continuous video feed of more than

24 hours.2 If every soldier were a sensor (see Figure

1), the SAF could have more than 300,000 sensors

on the ground during wartime. If each registered

just one data point a week, there would be one data

point every two seconds.3 Yet, today’s methods of

exploitation and analysis still rely on a human analyst

to access, interpret and evaluate each piece of data,

sift out the valuable information from the noise, then

understand how the information fits into a whole. As

we build an SAF that “[sees] first and [sees] more,” we

need to adopt methods of exploitation and analysis

that will enable us to make sense of this swarming,

seething mass of data.4

In the last decade, the 3rd Generation (3rd Gen)

SAF has operationalised its vision of a networked

force with integrated strike capabilities that will give

us a decisive edge in war.5 The early attrition of a

potential adversary’s key infrastructure and assets—

many of which would be highly mobile—would

defang the adversary, boost the success of the SAF’s

operations and minimise the loss of Singaporean lives.

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Swimming In Sensors, Drowning In Data—Big Data Analytics For Military Intelligence

by ME4 Toh Bao En

Abstract:

With the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) investing heavily in integrated strike and Command, Control,

Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities, intelligence analysts are now faced with the

need to produce ever-more precise intelligence in the face of information overload—a deluge of data beyond

the ability of humans to process and understand. Big data analytics provide the ability to quantitatively

deal with the masses of information, as well as to qualitatively improve intelligence assessments by drawing

out patterns and insights from data. In this essay, the author briefly examines how defence and intelligence

agencies in other countries deal with big data and then outlines a model of what big data architecture would

entail and a vision of how data analytics will change the way intelligence analysis is performed. Finally, the

author proposes two approaches to seeding and implementing big data for intelligence in the SAF.

Keywords: Data; Intelligence; Analysis; Information; Integrate

51-65_.SwimmingInSensors.indd 51 1/3/16 3:51 PM

Figure 1: SAF’s Advanced Combat Man System (ACMS).6

Implicit in this vision is the information that fl ows

through the various networks. Precision Manoeuvre

and Precision Fire capabilities have an insatiable

appetite for an exponential volume of Precision

Information on targets and areas of operation—

intelligence that is accurate, geographically-precise

and real-time.7 Recognising this, the Ministry of

Defence (MINDEF) has also invested heavily in

Intelligence/Command, Control, Communications,

Computers and Intelligence (C4I) structures,

capabilities and human resources. Most visible of

these investments was the setting up of the C4I

Community in 2012, with a two-star general at the

helm.8 In the same year, the RSAF inaugurated its

Heron 1 UAVs, which will signifi cantly increase the

amount of imagery intelligence available to the

SAF.9

Yet, all our investments in strike and Command,

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities

will go to waste if the SAF is not able to translate its

volumes of perishable and time-sensitive data into

actionable intelligence for the shooter. Analysis is

the bottleneck; the numbers of human analysts are

fundamentally limited. Without a paradigm shift, the

SAF cannot keep producing more intelligence, not to

mention better intelligence. We need a radical change

in the way we exploit intelligence data—we need big

data analytics.

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Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen at the Inauguration of the Heron 1 UAV.10

In the integrated operating environment of the near-future, intelligence data will come from a multitude of sources— from closed sources and open sources; from air defence radars, weapon-locating radars and maritime surveillance systems; from print media, radio, blogs and Twitter; from individual ships, aircraft and ground troopers.

WHAT IS BIG DATA?

In 2001, analyst Doug Laney of the META Group

identifi ed a new trend, a shift in “consciousness”

about “how data is managed.”11 With the surge

in e-commerce activity and in collaboration, he

predicted that traditional data management

methods would no longer be able to keep up with

the new ‘3Vs’ of data: Volume, Velocity and Variety.12

Data was and is being generated in unprecedented

quantities, at unprecedented speeds. Some of this

data, especially in organisations, is structured in

databases for easy access and management by a

computer. However, 95% of the digital universe is

unstructured and comes in a staggering variety of

formats including documents, images, audio, video,

transaction records and sensor data.13

The ‘3Vs’ apply not only to the supply of data but

also to the demand for information. Consumers—

whether an ‘Amazon’ customer, a strategic decision-

maker or a ground commander—are demanding

for more information at a faster rate, and are

asking questions that traditional databases are not

MIN

DEF

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designed to answer. McKinsey Global Institute

avoided defining ‘big data’ as having a specific

size, reasoning that the ability of an organisation

to handle volumes of data using “typical database

software tools” would vary by sector and time.14

In other words, the defining characteristic of big

data is the organisation’s discomfort with handling

it, using human-centric methods. Big data is, by

definition, beyond human capacity.15

DEFENDING WITH DATA

Although ‘Big Data’ has been the trend for the last 15

years, both commercial and government organisations

are still struggling to overcome its challenges and

make the most of its potential. Governments, and in

particular, defence and intelligence agencies, have

access to an enormous repository of data, but generally

face compounded issues in implementation—privacy

and security concerns, stove piped structures, lengthy

acquisition procedures, a lack of skilled people and

industry solutions geared toward business rather than

government service.16 In spite of this, governments

of countries such as Israel, the United States (US)

and the United Kingdom (UK) are deeply convinced of

the opportunities afforded and have taken big steps

toward building up their big data capabilities.

In 2014, several senior Hamas leaders were

eliminated in a series of targeted attacks. Separately,

the hunt for two terrorists responsible for the lives

of three Israeli teenagers took just three months.

"I am telling you with certainty that quite a few

terrorists are looking at us from the sky owing to

big data capabilities," said Ronen Horowitz, former

head of the Israel Security Agency (ISA).17 According

to him, the leadership of General Ayalon as early as

1996 catalysed the growth of the ISA’s information

capabilities, as critical resources were diverted

from elsewhere and invested in technology. The ISA

maintains close partnerships with industry experts

and research institutes while proactively reaching

out to operational forces, even sending consultants

to work with brigades deployed in the field. Horowitz

describes ISA analysts as the crème de la crème, with

a “highly methodological yet outside-the-box” way of

thinking.18 This is Israel’s recipe for big data success:

visionary leadership, investments, partnerships,

mission-focus and people.

The 2010 report on Networking and Information

Technology produced by the US President’s Council of

Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) boldly

advocated, “Every federal agency needs to have a

‘big data’ strategy.”19 Two years later, the Obama

administration unveiled a slew of ongoing Federal

big data programmes. Under the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) alone were

nine initiatives. The Anomaly Detection at

Multiple Scales (ADAMS) Programme could detect

anomalies in massive datasets, while the XDATA

programme aimed to develop computational

techniques and tools for handling and visualising

volumes of imperfect and unstructured data. The

Cyber-Insider Threat (CINDER) programme sought to

expose potential attacks on networks by comparison

with predicted models of ‘adversary missions’.

A number of projects worked on developing the

artificial intelligence to understand nuances in text

and activities in images or videos.20 Meanwhile,

in a remote corner of Utah, the National Security

Agency (NSA) was building a controversial US$1.9

billion data centre to house ‘yottabytes’—a trillion

terabytes, multiplied—of personal data.21 The

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in

2014 reiterated its belief in the power of human-

machine analysis in its ambitious and inspiring “2020

Analysis Technology Plan”.22 Even the US Marine Corps

is now equipping its field intelligence specialists not

just with rifles, but with ‘Wikipedia-like’ interfaces

to query and connect data.23

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Observing these developments from across the

pond, the UK government in 2013 commissioned

think-tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

to produce a report on ‘Big Data for Defence

and Security’. Ironically, given the US’ apparent

emphasis on big data technologies, the report took

aim at the US military’s incompetence in handling

information overload with an estimate that 95% of

its battlefield video data was never viewed, let alone

assessed.24 The report stated the need for change in

no uncertain terms—“The consequences of ignoring

Big Data… could be profound, including the loss of

life and operational failure.”25 The recommendations

were circumspect—to cultivate security culture in

tandem with the drive toward greater data sharing;

to develop institutional competence in big data

technologies by tapping on industry partners and

expertise in the reserve forces; to balance growth in

sensor capabilities with the ability to exploit; to have

dedicated senior leaders drive the efforts to harness

big data; and to kickstart those efforts with focused

and independent pilot projects.26

This brief survey of how big data has been used

or implemented in various defence and intelligence

agencies shows the promise of the technology,

as well as a reassuring spread of capabilities and

comfort levels. Common to all of them is a deep

conviction of the need to deal with big data—not

just as an ‘opportunity’ or an ‘enabler’ but as an

imperative, without which the mission and survival

of the organisation would be compromised. Their

motivation to harness big data resonates strongly

with the SAF, while their best practices, strategies

and recommendations are strikingly relevant to our

context. Looking outwards will enable us to fast-

forward our progress through learning from others

and encourage creative, cross-disciplinary methods

to unlock the value of our data.

A MODEL FOR BIG DATA ARCHITECTURE

The characteristics of big data described earlier

demand a robust architecture that can handle massive

end-to-end flows. We have also seen how other

defence agencies have dealt with and benefited from

setting up such big data systems and architectures.

What would it take for Intelligence in the SAF to

exploit its big data?

The first element of a big data architecture is

storage, access and computation capacity—the

hardware. The storage and computation capacity must

be able to accommodate the volumetric demands of

big data, while the access networks must be able

to handle rapid and massive flows of traffic. Cloud

computing is the widely-accepted solution, providing

centralised access to powerful processors and massive

storage servers while minimising data duplication.

Of course, in an intelligence ecosystem, the desire

to centralise must be weighed against the need to

segregate classified systems and information.

The second element is to set up the algorithms

and models to conduct data integration and

data analytics. Data integration refers to the

transformation of the mass of unstructured data into

structured data which can be used and analysed,

through machine-automated capture of the content

and provenance of each piece of data. This process

in itself may require sophisticated algorithms

that can parse non-textual content such as audio

and video, which segues into data analytics. Data

analytics is essentially artificial intelligence that

can derive meaning from massive datasets. This

artificial intelligence is powered by models, which

are sequences of analytical algorithms that attempt

to replicate human reasoning. Data analytics is the

real generator of value—I will deal more thoroughly

with its applications in the next section.

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The third element is the user interface, which

mediates the interactions between human and

machine. The software interface and even physical

infrastructure must cater to two groups of people

with different needs: the analysts and the end-users.

Analysts demand full access to raw data and fast

processing speeds, preferring to have complex and

rich data that can be manipulated. A user interface

for analysts should provide multiple views of data

and a comprehensive analytical toolbox. End-users,

especially in a military context, require very specifi c

and relevant information for rapid decision-making.

An end-user interface for a diverse audience must

be able to query and display critical information in

an intuitive and responsive manner.27 Ultimately,

if intelligence is not delivered to the end-user in a

timely, useful and actionable form, it is wasted.

The fi nal element is a body of skilled people.

Statisticians, systems experts and data scientists are

needed to manage, maintain and enhance the data

infrastructure, while human analysts, programmers

and information engineers would develop the

algorithms and animate the analytical models with

their insights and experience. Data analytics is not a

substitute for experience, insight and deep expertise.

What it does is codify and systematise that analytical

expertise so that it can be propagated across the

organisation—so that the furthest-fl ung department

and most junior operators are able to benefi t from it,

so that human effort can be applied with maximum

effi ciency, and so that institutional knowledge will

outlast the individual.28 Deep expertise, captured in

analytical models and algorithms, multiplies in value

when it is used to draw meaning from and is in turn

enriched by massive datasets.

DATA ANALYTICS FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

In my introduction I painted a picture of an

information-saturated battlespace with numerous

data sources, producing data, in multiple formats at

overwhelming speeds. The fi rst challenge is therefore

data integration, or converting unstructured big

data to structured data. Data types like audio, video,

imagery and handwriting are easy for humans to

understand but challenging for computers. Machine

learning refers to the set of algorithms that enables

computers to evolve behavior in response to data

and feedback, to approach a ‘human’ understanding

of such data types.29 One important application is

natural language processing, which allows a computer

to make sense of spoken and written words, and

even their nuances. This technology could be used

to transcribe communication intercepts, audio/ video

clips, news reports and handwritten or hardcopy

documents; data with key words could be fl agged out

for a human analyst’s attention. Another application

is automatic target detection in imagery or video

feeds, where the computer is trained to recognise and

track target signatures, or through anomaly detection,

where the computer identifi es pixel clusters that are

signifi cantly different from their surroundings. Again,

possible targets and anomalies would be highlighted

for verifi cation by a human analyst. As the report

“Designing a Digital Future” put it, “Automation can

track the mundane, and cue the human to attend to

what is interesting, suspicious, and relevant.”30

A deep understanding of a target, be it a

country, organisation, person or military unit,

typically requires a sustained, long-term research

effort. With or without prior study, data analytics

can help a human analyst to quickly understand a

target or subject—its characteristics, interests and

perspectives, or doctrines and patterns of life—as

long as a large historical dataset is available. Data

mining and statistics are basic analytical tools that

allow analysts to fi nd data relevant to their target

and to gain a sense of the spread and content of

tech edge 56



that data. Data mining could be used to sieve out

activities or information associated with events of

concern, while statistics would provide some baseline

norms for target behaviour—future occurrences of

those activity or information indicators as well as

deviations from the baseline would cue analysts to

pay closer attention.31

Visualisation is a valuable technique for

displaying information in a summarised manner

that allows human analysts to quickly spot patterns

and anomalies. It is a simple but effective way of

combining what computers are good at—computation

and processing—with what humans are good at—

pattern-recognition, creative thinking and making

cognitive connections.32 A word tree (Figure 2) or tag

cloud (Figure 3) derived from the speeches made by

an individual could highlight the issues of greatest

concern to him or her. Hotspot mapping (Figure 4)

could illustrate the concentration of target sightings

in an area, while a spatial information fl ow (Figure 5)

would provide a sense of a region’s network activity.

More advanced analytical algorithms can be used to

distill meaning from data. Network analysis maps out

the relationships and key nodes between entities—

applying it to a set of recorded transmissions could

suggest which callsigns were associated with key

decision-makers, while a similar analysis on a

social network could identify relationship clusters

and the major infl uencers in a group (Figure 6).

Time series analysis relates data points in time to

Figure 2: Word Tree.33 Figure 3: Tag Cloud.34

Figure 4: Hotspot Map.35 Figure 5: Spatial Information Flow.36

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extract correlations and identify cyclical patterns.

Examining a particular unit or military asset could

reveal peaks of activity occurring over specific

weeks of the year, painting a picture of the target’s

pattern of life, and perhaps even correlating

certain peaks with specific exercise schedules.

These analytics tools are not just quantitative;

they also allow us to manage and sense-make

masses of data. They are also qualitative, helping

to overcome analyst bias with system logic, making

previously unseen associations; allowing analysts to

derive more rigorous, data-supported assessments

and insights.

The same data mining, statistical and analytical

tools used to extract research insights are even more

critical in short-cycle operations support. Rapid

sense-making for strike requires analysts to generate

target assessments within minutes so as to provide

precise and actionable intelligence to shooters. To

automate and speed up as much of the analysis process

as possible, a human analyst can arrange analytical

tools in a sequence known as a model, which can then

be automatically run to answer the same question

repeatedly, with modifi ed parameters and a different

set of data.

Figure 6: Link Analysis.37

Big data is changing the way intelligence

operates. Today, the SAF’s Intelligence Cycle is

Direction, Collection, Exploitation, Assessment and

Dissemination. Other organisations’ intelligence

cycles may vary in semantics but not in spirit. This

intelligence cycle begins with a question, a user’s

need for specifi c information. The analysts would

decide what data was needed and the collectors

would gather that data. The analysts would analyse

the collected data and deliver the answer to the

user. With really big data, the data is there before

it is demanded for. As a result, the approach many

organisations take is to “collect everything and

then search for signifi cant patterns in the data.”38

This is starting to be described as the “Query, Mine,

Assemble, Disseminate and Integrate” (QMADI) cycle.39

Without planning, data might not always tell us what

we want to know, but it could also tell us what we

never knew we needed to know.

Before big data analytics, such patterns, insights

and assessments would have required countless hours

to generate, or might even have been missed. Data

analytics cannot replace human intuition, curiosity,

tech edge 58



creativity and expertise.

What it can do, however,

is free the human analyst

to focus on the quality of

analysis and to keep an eye

on the big picture—Are

my sources reliable and

my assumptions sound?

How can my analytical

processes and models be improved? Are we missing

the forest for the trees? These are the questions that

only a human analyst can ask and answer.40

FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY

Implementing big data architecture in the SAF

is certainly a daunting enterprise—as seen in the

overview of other defence and intelligence agencies. I

see two concurrent inroads to seeding and ultimately

establishing big data capabilities in the SAF: bottom-

up and top-down.

To see immediate returns, we should begin where

the value is—with data analytics.41 The advantage of

data analytic algorithms is that they are accessible

and useful to individual units or departments.

While developed to handle quantitative big data,

most data analytics techniques and algorithms are

highly scalable and can easily be used to provide

qualitative improvements in how existing ‘small’

data is handled. The algorithms are also the easiest

part of the ecosystem to set up—with software

available commercially ‘off-the-shelf ’, a single

revolutionary algorithm could be used to solve a

problem “a thousand times faster than conventional

computational methods.”42 This approach allows

individual departments to see the value of data

analytics for themselves and for analysts to become

adept at big data approaches.

Today, the SAF has

begun using software

to bring Geospatial

Information Systems

(GIS) capabilities to

units and departments

across the three services.

GIS has been especially

useful in supporting

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

operations, when analysts need to help deployment

teams quickly familiarise themselves with new and

unstable areas of operations, and where information

from a multitude of agencies fl ow in rapidly and must

be quickly assimilated. I see GIS as a more location-

focused precursor of big data—inbuilt in GIS systems

are data management structures for a set of large data

formats, machine learning and analytical algorithms,

tools for building analytical models, and tailored

interfaces to help both analysts and end-users make

sense of information. We should build on our existing

capabilities in this area to seed the concept of a big

data ecosystem across the SAF and help stakeholders

see what it can do for them. Our experience with GIS

also provides invaluable lessons about the structural

and systemic obstacles that need to be overcome,

such as the diffi culty of information sharing and the

limited bandwidth and storage of current IT systems,

so that we can clear the path for big data.

To overcome systemic obstacles, strategic

leadership is key. A visionary leader at the highest

levels is needed to provide direction and emphasis

on developing the capability across the organisation.

The leader must oversee the end-to-end development

of the sensor-exploiter-shooter pipeline, to ensure

that resources invested in all parts are commensurate

and that a single bottleneck or point of failure does

not bring all efforts to naught. The leader is in a

Data analytics cannot replace human intuition, curiosity, creativity and expertise. What it can do, however, is free the human analyst to focus on the quality of analysis and to keep an eye on the big picture

tech edge 59



position to coordinate and create overarching systems

and structures, both organisational and physical. A

dedicated position or office could be set up or tasked

to create the C4, security and information-sharing

infrastructure, processes and policies to accommodate

and enable big data solutions. “Skill sets remain

the biggest challenge” for organisations like the

NGA.43 A dedicated office would have the mandate

to proactively bring in the human expertise we lack;

these data and information systems professionals can

then build and drive big data efforts centrally and

develop organisation-wide systems and standards in

ways far beyond the scope of individual units.

GIS has been especially useful in supporting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations, when analysts need to help deployment teams quickly familiarise themselves with new and unstable areas of operations, and where information from a multitude of agencies flow in rapidly and must be quickly assimilated.

CONCLUSION

Big data has already changed the game. Either

we learn to ride the wave early and maintain that

headstart, or we allow ourselves to drown in the

data deluge while others surge ahead. It will be an

immense challenge but, like many other challenges,

promises to be rewarding. Big data will compel us to

build the architecture, systems and capabilities to

handle it. Big data will demand more highly skilled

people even as it provides an avenue to relieve our

manpower constraints. Intelligence in the age of big

data will reveal different and surprising insights, and

would force us to consider new perspectives and ways

of thinking. Willing or not, big data will evict us from

our comfort zones, and open our eyes to what this

brave new world has to show us.

As an intelligence practitioner in the SAF, it is my

firm conviction that what I do every day contributes

directly to the defence and security of Singapore.

While those who serve in other arms are prepared

to give their lives for this nation when called upon,

it is my duty to ensure that they never have to—

by detecting threats before they materialise, by

understanding how to deal with them through

physical as well as through deterrent and diplomatic

means, and ultimately by guiding our forces to swiftly

and decisively neutralise them before they can take

out a single one of our own. Big data could allow us

to do all this faster and better. With all the sensors

and sources that we have, big data could potentially

provide us with critical, life-saving information, if

we could only recognise and capitalise on it. Can

we stomach a tragedy arising out of an intelligence

“failure to connect the dots”?44 Do we not owe it to

our soldiers and citizens to process, exploit, integrate

and make sense of all information that could impact

their life and death? Harnessing big data is not just

a luxury—it is an obligation and an imperative.

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“IBM i2 Enterprise Insight Analysis for Defense Intelligence.” IBM Corporation. December2013. http://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?subtype=BR&infotype=

PM&appname=SWGE_ZZ_ZZ_USEN&htmlfid=ZZB03045USEN&attachment=ZZB03045U EN.PDF#loaded.

Laney, Doug. “3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and Variety.”

META Group. 6 February 2001. http://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/f iles/2012/01/ad949-3D-DataManagement-Controlling Data-Volume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf.

LaValle, Steve, Eric Lesser, Rebecca Shockley, Michael S. Hopkins and Nina Kruschwitz.

“Big Data, Analytics and the Path from Insights to Value.” MIT Sloan Management Review 52, no. 2 (Winter 2011): 21-31. http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/global/files/in_idea_smarter_computing_to_big-data-analytics_and_path_from_insights-to-value.pdf.

Lohr, Steve. “The Age of Big Data.” The New York Times. 11 February 2012.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-rev iew/big-datas-impact-in-theworld.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=Big%20Data&st=cse&.

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Manyika, James, Michael Chui, Brad Brown, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Charles

Roxburgh and Angela Hung Byers. “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition,and Productivity,” McKinsey Global Institute. May 2011. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovaion.

Marshall, Patrick. “Battlespace awareness through big data.” GCN. 18 November 2014.http://gcn.com/Blogs/Emerging-Tech/2014/11/Battlespace-awareness.aspx.

McNulty, Eileen. “US Military Using Big Data to Improve Situational Awareness.”

Dataconomy. 12 June 2014. http://dataconomy.com/us-military-using-big-data-improvesituational-awareness/.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). “2020 Analysis Technology Plan.” August2014.https://www1.nga.mil/MediaRoom/PressReleases/Documents/NGA_Analysis_Tech_Plan.pdf.

Dr. Ng Eng Hen. “Speech by Minister for Defence Dr. Ng Eng Hen at the C4I Community Inauguration Parade.” Ministry of Defence, Singapore. 2 April 2012. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/2012/02apr12_speech.html#.VO4c4PmUfhu.

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). “Report to the

President and Congress: Designing a Digital Future: Federally Funded Research and

Development in Networking and Information Technology.” December 2010.http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-nitrd-report-2010.pdf.

“‘Quite a Few Terrorists Lost Their Lives Owing to Big Data.’” Israel Defense. 3 Jan 2015.http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=484&ArticleID=3288.

Rooney, Ben. “U.K. Military Failing to Tackle Big Data.” The Wall Street Journal. 23

September 2013. http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2013/09/23/u-k-military-failing-to-tackle-bigdata/.

Savas, Onur, Yalin Sagduyu, Julia Deng and Jason Li. “Tactical Big Data Analytics:

Challenges,Use Cases, and Solutions.” Intelligent Automation Inc. 21 June 2013.http://www.sigmetrics.org/sigmetr ics2013/bigdataanalyt ics/abstracts2013/bdaw2013_submission_12.pdf.

Shaw, Jonathan. “Why ‘Big Data’ Is a Big Deal.” Harvard Magazine. March – April 2014.http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal.

Wood, Colin. “How Does the Military Use Big Data?” 6 Jan 2014.http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Military-Use-Big-Data.html.

Woodie, Alex. “How Analytics is Driving Military Intelligence.” Datanami.com. 3 Feb 2014. http://www.datanami.com/2014/02/03/how_analytics_is_dr iving_military_intelligence/.

Young, Chris. “Military Intelligence Redefined: Big Data in the Battlefield.” Forbes. 12 March 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2012/03/12/military-intelligence redefined-big-data-in-the-battlefield/.

ENDNOTES

1. Raffi Krikorian, “New Tweets per second record, and how!” (blog), Twitter, 16 August 2013, https://blog.twitter.com/2013/new-tweets-per-second-record-and-how.

2. Tan Guan Wei, “RSAF welcomes inauguration of Heron 1 UAV,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 13 May 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/c y b e r p i o n e e r/ t o p i c s / a r t i c l e s / n e w s / 2 0 1 2 /may/23may12_news.html#.VO4YKfmUfht.

3. Gordon Arthur, “‘Sense & Sensorbility’ - Singapore Leads Asian Future Soldier Systems,” Defence Review Asia, 3 June 2012, http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/167/SENSE-SENSORBILITY-SINGAPORE-LEADS-ASIAN-FUTURE-SOLDIER-SYSTEMS.

Estimated from the statement, “‘If only 50% of active and reserve strength of the SAF were to visit the museum only once a year,’ the study group maintained, ‘the museum would have a visitorship in excess of 150 000.’”

Dr. Albert Lau, “Towards an SAF Museum,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 25 April 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/army/microsites/armymuseum/army_museum_singapore/About_Us/towards_an_saf_museum.html.

4. Dr. Ng Eng Hen, “Speech by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at the C4I Community Inauguration Parade,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2 April 2012, ht tp://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/of f icial_releases/sp/2012/02apr12_speech.html#.VO4c4PmUfhu.

5. “Advanced Combat Man System”, ST Electronics, accessed 27 Feb 2015, http://www.stee.stengg.com/pdf/ ACMS.pdf.

6. Ministry of Defence, Singapore, “3rd Generation SAF,” 20 August 2013, Ministry of Defence, Singapore, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/3rd_generation_saf.html.

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7. “Overview of SAF,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 28 July 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlist ings/army/microsites/paccpams/abt_spore/saf.html. Although this frame of Precision Warfare being Precision Manoeuvre, Precision Fires and Precision Information is an Army concept, I find it useful for describing the Joint context as well.

8. Dr. Ng Eng Hen, “Speech at the C4I Community Inauguration Parade.”

Jermyn Chow, “Military chief to get second star in rank,” The Straits Times, 30 June 2013, http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20130629-433414.html.

9. Tan, “RSAF welcomes inauguration of Heron 1 UAV.”

10. “Photo Gallery: RSAF Inaugurates the Heron 1 UAV into 119 Squadron”, Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 23 May 2012, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2012/may/23may12_nr/23may12_ photos.html#.VPFh3vmUfhs.

11. Doug Laney, “3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and Variety,” META Group, 6 February 2001, 1-2, http://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/f iles/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-and-Variety.pdf.

12. Ibid.

13. Erik P. Blasch, Stephen Russell and Guna Seetharaman, “Joint Data Management for MOVINT: Data-to-Decision Making,” Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Information Fusion (2011): 3, http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/imda/sites/www.nrl.navy.mil.itd.imda/files/pdfs/Fusion11_JDM_110126.pdf.

14. James Manyika, Michael Chui, Brad Brown, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Charles Roxburgh and Angela Hung Byers, “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity,” McKinsey Global Institute, May 2011, 1, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation.

15. This may not be a very enlightening definition, but it certainly forces us to discard traditional mental models of data management and analysis.

16. Sean Fahey, “Big Data and Analytics for National Security.”

Ira Hunt, “The CIA’s ‘Grand Challenges’ with Big Data,” Central Intelligence Agency, (presentation, GigaOM Structure 2013, San Francisco, CA, 16-17 Oct 2013), ht tp://www.slideshare.net/morel l imarc/central-intelligence-agency-gigaom-2013?next_slideshow=1.

17. “‘Quite a Few Terrorists Lost Their Lives Owing to Big Data,’” IsraelDefense, 3 Jan 2015, http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=484&ArticleID=3288.

18. Ibid.

19. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), “Report to the President and Congress: Designing a Digital Future: Federally Funded Research and Development in Networking and Information Technology,” December 2010, xvii, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-nitrd-report-2010.pdf.

20. Executive Office of the President, “Big Data Across the Federal Government,” 29 March 2012, 1-2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/big_data_fact_sheet_final.pdf.

21. James Bamford, “The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say),” Wired.com, 15 March 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/.

22. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), “2020 Analysis Technology Plan,” August 2014, https://www1.nga.mil/MediaRoom/PressReleases/Documents/NGA_Analysis_Tech_Plan.pdf.

23. Alex Woodie, “How Analytics is Driving Military Intelligence,” Datanami.com, 3 Feb 2014, http://www.datanami.com/2014/02/03/how_analytics_is_driving_military_intelligence/.

24. Ibid.

25. Neil Couch and Bill Robins, “Big Data for Defence and Security,” Royal United Services Institute, September 2013, 26, https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RUSI_BIGDATA_Report_2013.pdf.

26. Ibid., 26-29.

27. The end-users I have in mind are operational planners in networked command posts. Designing a user interface for military end-users in theatre and on the ground will be far more complex. Secured networks must be in place; hardware and software must be able to function in inhospitable and low-bandwidth environments; information displays may need to be scalable for different devices. If the soldier is a “sensor” or data source as well as a user, the system will need to account for this added dimension.

28. Colin Wood, “How Does the Military Use Big Data?”, 6 Jan 2014, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Military-Use-Big-Data.html.

29. McKinsey Global Institute, “Big Data: The Next Frontier,” 29.

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30. PCAST, “Designing a Digital Future,” 27.

31. NGA, “2020 Analysis Technology Plan,” 7.

32. Jonathan Shaw, “Why ‘Big Data’ Is a Big Deal,” Harvard Magazine, March – April 2014, http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal.

33. Carsten Gorg, Youn-ah Kang, Zhicheng Liu and John Stasko, “Visual Analytics Support for Intelligence Analysis,” 5, http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~stasko/papers/computer13-intell.pdf.


35. “Creating Heat Maps with Bing Maps and Dynamics CRM,” Microsoft Corporation, (blog, 29 October 2012), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/crm/archive/2012/10/29/creating-heat-maps-with-bing-maps-and-dynamics-crm.aspx


37. “The Next Generation of Big Data Visualization,” Sentinel Visualizer, accessed 25 February 2015, http://www.fmsasg.com/Products/SentinelVisualizer.

38. Shaw, “Why ‘Big Data’ Is a Big Deal.”

39. Joseph D. Fargnoli, “Big Data Enables Activity & Location Based Predictive Analytics Applications,” Ritre Corporation, (presentation, Government Big Data Symposium, Arlington, VA, 30 November 2013), http://semanticommunity.info/@api/deki/files/27182/FARGNOLI-TTC_Gov_Bigdata_Conf_fl13.pdf.

40. NGA, “2020 Analysis Technology Plan,” 6; John Edwards, “Military, Intel Turn to Big Data for Better Situational Awareness,” Federal Times, 2 June 2014,

http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20140602/FEDIT/306020009/Mil i t ar y-inte l-turn-big-data-better-situational-awareness.

41. Steve LaValle, Eric Lesser, Rebecca Shockley, Michael S. Hopkins and Nina Kruschwitz, “Big Data, Analytics and the Path from Insights to Value,” MIT Sloan Management Review 52, no. 2 (Winter 2011): 21-31, http://www.ibm .com/smarterplanet/global/files/in_idea_smarter_computing_to_big-data-analytics_and_path_from_insights-to-value.pdf.

42. Jonathan Shaw, “Why ‘Big Data’ Is a Big Deal,” Harvard Magazine, March – April 2014, http://harvardmagazine .com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal.

43. Robert K. Ackerman, “Multiple Thrusts Define Geospatial Agency Big Data Efforts,” SIGNAL, 1 August 2014, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=multiple-thrusts-define-geospatial-agency-big-data-efforts.

44. The phrase was used specifically with reference to intelligence failure prior to 9/11. I hesitate to use 9/11 as a throwaway example and thereby oversimplify the events leading up to it or implicitly suggest that big data could have prevented it, but the point remains that reasons like “failure to connect the dots” seem like frail excuses following a tragedy. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, “Intelligence Analysis—The Emergence of a Discipline,” in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, ed. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 4.

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ME4 Toh Bao En is currently a Staff Offi cer in Joint Intelligence Department. A recipient of the SAF Academic Scholarship, she graduated from the University of Michigan in 2011 with a Bachelor of Arts in English (Highest Honours). She has also served in the 30th Battalion, Singapore Combat Engineers and the Imagery Support Group.

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INTRODUCTION

The turn of the century has seen an increased usage

of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in the Singapore

Armed Forces (SAF) for a greater variety of tasks. The

Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has now fully

operationalised the H-1 Heron and H-450 Hermes as

UAVs of the 3rd Generation SAF, and the restructuring

of the UAV Command (UC) has reinforced its role

as the hub of military unmanned aerial technology

in Singapore. In addition, the Singapore Army and

Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) have utilised the

surveillance capabilities of smaller, shorter-range

tactical UAVs extensively in their operations, with the

addition of Skyblade III and ScanEagle respectively

to their existing platforms.1

As the focus shifts towards an Integrated

Knowledge Command and Control (IKC2) framework,

UAVs are now expected to be more than just

supplements to the fighting force. There is an ever-

increasing demand for UAVs to possess higher levels

of persistence, in providing constant real-time

intelligence. The SAF now requires forward planning

of the UAV’s role in the future fighting force and

seeking of new methods to steer the application

of UAVs. To narrow the scope of discussion, this

essay focuses on the potential development of UAV

applications in the RSAF.

WHAT IS MUM-T?

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) is the

coupling of a manned platform with one or more

designated unmanned platforms, such that the

interaction between the two types of platforms

capitalises on their respective strengths.2 There

have been case studies of MUM-T across the land

and air domains in foreign militaries, as described in

view point 66


Manned-Unmanned Teaming—An Analysis Of UAVs And Their Interoperability With Manned Aircraft

by LTA Chan Jing Yi

Abstract:

In this essay, the author discusses the increased usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in the Singapore

Armed Forces. She highlights that the Republic of Singapore Air Force has now fully operationalised the H-1

Heron and H-450 Hermes as UAVs of the 3rd Generation SAF while the Singapore Army and the Republic of

Singapore Navy have utilised the surveillance capabilities of smaller, shorter-range tactical UAVs extensively in

their operations, with the addition of Skyblade III and ScanEagle, respectively to their existing platforms. The

author also explores the potential development of UAV applications in the RSAF, covering a discussion on the

possible adoption of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T), which refers to the coupling of a manned platform

with one or more designated unmanned platforms in such a way that the interaction between the two types of

platforms capitalises on their respective strengths.

Keywords: : Technological Advancements; Coupling; Role Reversal; Manned and Unmanned; Information

66-76_Manned-Unmanned Teaming.indd 66 1/3/16 3:57 PM

Table 1. While MUM-T is not an entirely new concept in the air domain, with real-life application dating

back to World War II (WWII), its current application,

Domain Platforms involved Description

Air Apache AH-64D & MUM-T2

Ventures into MUM-T have driven not just the employment of UAVs in operations, but also modifications in manned aircraft design requirements. The coupling of AD-64D Apache helicopters with their designated UAVs, via an add-on MUM-T2 system, enables the pilot to control the UAV and its payload whilst on board the helicopter. A newer model of the Apache, AH-64E, has this feature fully incorporated.

Kiowa helicopters & Shadow UASIn 2011, Kiowa helicopters were successfully teamed with various UAV families, including the Shadow UAS, at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.

One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT)

The OSRVT was created by Textron Systems to enable soldiers to remotely download surveillance images and critical geospatial data directly from joint operations UAVs to improve situation awareness. A newer model of the OSRVT will be equipped with bi-directional capabilities, giving the operator greater payload control of the designated UAV. The OSRVT is now compact and wearable, making it convenient for use by any soldier.

Land

Polar Rangers 4x4 (manned) & Polaris Ranger XP (unmanned)

In 2008, DSO National Laboratories completed a project to demonstrate convoy movement involving a manned vehicle and two Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs). Part of the project involved the study of manned-unmanned teaming between the two platforms, with the soldier controlling the UGVs via an Operator Control Unit (OCU) on board the Polar Ranger. The project team indicated potential exploration of the Human-Robot Interface (HRI) to enhance the MUM-T concept.

Table 1: Existing examples of MUM-T.

however, is largely limited to initial testing in the

United States Air Force (USAF), as seen from the

case studies cited in the table below.3

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INTEROPERABILITY IN MUM-T

The concept of interoperability is exceptionally

crucial in MUM-T. Broadly speaking, interoperability

is the ability of different systems to communicate,

exchange data and use the information that

Kiowa helicopter and Shadow UAS undergoing MUM-T.4

Figure 1: Five levels of interoperability in MUM-T.

Level 2

Level 3

Level 4

Level 5• Pilot takes control of all aspects of UAV’s fl ight and payload, including take-off and landing

• Pilot has control over fl ight of UAV, but ground aspects are still handled by a third party

• Pilot has control over payload on UAV, but not over its fl ight

• Pilot is in direct communication with the UAV and receives data from its payload its fl ight

• Pilot receives data from payload indirectly, i.e. through a third party

Level 1

has been exchanged; in this case, the systems

would refer to the pair of manned and unmanned

platforms. Interoperability in MUM-T consists of fi ve

theoretical levels:

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WHAT ROLES WILL OUR UAVS PLAY?

The UAV Systems (UAVS) Association groups the

modern applications of military UAVs into six main

categories:

Impact & DisasterManagement

Monitoring

Communications Search & Rescue

SecurityMunitions

Figure 2: Application categories of military UAVs, as indicated by UAVs Association.5

The extent to which a military organisation

would want to apply UAVs to achieve each of the

six task categories depends largely on the country’s

geographical and strategic needs. Currently, the RSAF

has applied its UAV capabilities primarily in the areas

of Security and Monitoring, as determined by its range

of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(ISR)-related operations.

Any addition to the RSAF’s current inventory or

modes of fl ying should be supported by a prominent

need to expand our UAV capabilities to achieve

evolving mission requirements. However, regardless of

the roles that UAVs in the RSAF will eventually assume

in the future, it is commonly agreed that the usage

of UAVs will become more extensive and dynamic and

continue to increase well into the future.

APPLICATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE

Currently, the UAV’s functionality is still limited

by the maximum payload it can carry.6 This restricts

the application of UAVs in the area of munitions, i.e.

the likelihood of equipping UAVs with the payload

required for precision strikes and using them to

substitute existing combat vehicles is very low. This

limitation on payload also imposes boundaries on the

UAV’s ability to automatically detect and characterise

different types of targets simultaneously with the

collection of imagery intelligence. Thus, the RSAF

still needs a dedicated crew of Subject Matter

Experts (SMEs) to perform analysis and sense-making

on the intelligence gathered by UAVs in real-time.

APPLICATIONS IN THE LONG TERM

However, as smaller and lighter sensors make

their way into the market, UAVs could potentially be

equipped with greater payload at the same weight,

thus expanding their range of applications.7 The

RSAF could explore the automation of UAVs’ Security

and Monitoring roles via the addition of payload

that allow for target detection. This point will be

explored later in the section on the pros and cons

of MUM-T.

Once full operational capability is achieved, MUM-T would potentially provide an avenue for the acquisition of accurate and easily-interpretable intelligence, in real time, with minimal delay.

FACTORS TO CONSIDER FOR MUM-T ACQUISITION

MUM-T has its own spectrum of considerations

and is not a one-size-fits-all solution. The key

view point 69



concerns that could pertain to the RSAF can be

grouped into three main categories: interoperability,

capability development and practicality. Details of

these considerations can be found in Appendix A.

PROS AND CONS OF MUM-T

Once full operational capability is achieved,

MUM-T would potentially provide an avenue for the

acquisition of accurate and easily-interpretable

intelligence, in real time, with minimal delay. The

process of capability development, however, would

be a long and arduous one, and puts many of the

long-term priorities of platform acquisition to the

test. This section includes the potential dilemmas

that the RSAF would face in the exploration of

MUM-T.

DO WE REALLY HAVE MORE CONTROL?

One of the most widely-publicised benefits of

MUM-T is the ability to delegate direct control over

the intelligence acquisition process to the aircrew,

such that they collect the exact information they

need. Table 2 illustrates three different scenarios

where the UAV is controlled by different individuals,

Scenario 1: Separate manning Scenario 2: MUM-T Scenario 3: Separate manning on board

Keyfeatures

Pilot operates manned platform and UAV pilot operates UAV separately from ground

Pilot communicates desired information to UAV pilot, UAV pilot acquires intelligence based on pilot’s request and transmits information back to pilot

Pilot operates both the manned platform and the UAV at the same time

Pilot has direct control over UAV’s flight path and payload operation

No UAV pilot involved

Both the pilot and the UAV pilot are on board the manned platform

Pilot operates manned platform, UAV pilot operates the UAV separately

Pilot communicates desired information to UAV pilot

Remarks Current norm in the RSAF Assumed mode of operation with respect to MUM-T

Similar to scenario 1, but UAV pilot is within the proximity of the pilot

Pros Pilot and UAV pilots are specialised in their respective platforms; no need for cross training

No need for multi-tasking, respective pilots can focus on their own tasks

Minimal time delay in the acquisition of desired information via UAV

Less manpower required

Greatest accuracy of information acquired in satisfying pilot’s needs

Pilot and UAV pilot are specialised in their respective platforms

Reduced time delay in communication

Pilot and UAV pilot can directly advise on each other’s concerns

Cons Subjected to miscommunication between pilot and UAV pilot

Pilot may not be cognizant of the limitations faced by UAV pilot, and vice versa

Time delay between request for information by pilot and delivery of information by UAV

Pilot would need to be cross-trained in both manned and unmanned platform operations

Pilot would need to multi-task, increasing risk of negligence and accidents in flight

Subjected to miscommunication between pilot and UAV pilot

UAV pilot would need to be trained on the basic operations in manned platform

Table 2: Scenarios of delegation of control.

view point 70



and how the delegation of direct control to the pilot

in the manned aircraft could be effective.

However, the MUM-T technology would require a

significant lead time before proper integration into

the current network of systems in the RSAF. MUM-T

remains a rather nascent field in the ISR arena. To

date, many ventures into MUM-T are still at their pilot

test stage due to technological limitations.8 Further

research and development in the area would be required

to resolve issues pertaining to interoperability before

the full benefits of MUM-T could be reaped.

CURRENCY OF INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION

Assuming up-to-date technology, MUM-T could

potentially provide the user with greater accuracy of

the information collected by the UAV, especially since

the user would be able to ‘see’ the ground situation

at a point of interest before he even reaches near

that point.

However, similar to the previous point, existing

technology must undergo substantial improvements

before the advantages of MUM-T intelligence currency

could become apparent. More rigorous research and

testing in this area would be required before the

MUM-T process could be standardised in the form of

doctrines and we know how exactly to perform it.

Assuming up-to-date technology, MUM-T could potentially provide the user with greater accuracy of the information collected by the UAV, especially since the user would be able to ‘see’ the ground situation at a point of interest before he even reaches near that point.

TRAINING AND MANPOWER CONSIDERATIONS

A single military aircraft can be operated by just

one or two pilots at any one time, depending on the

platform. This, however, does not apply to military

UAVs. In addition to the pilot (and sometimes co-

pilot) who controls the UAV from ground, there is also

a team of specialists who interpret the data collected.

As such, the manpower required to perform the

functions of a UAV is theoretically greater than that

for a manned aircraft. MUM-T could thus potentially

eliminate the need for additional manpower.

However, pilots and co-pilots would have to be

trained on UAV operation and analyse the acquired

data whilst operating their main platform. This could

pose an additional challenge to pilots’ training,

especially since pilots and co-pilots already have to

perform large amounts of multi-tasking in flying their

own aircraft. Future advancements in UAV technology

may allow for greater automation of the intelligence

acquisition process, but this would be subjected to

ethics debate and variation in public support, as

discussed in the next point.

ETHICS OF MUM-T

The use of military UAVs, for both the ISR and

strike purposes, has drawn much discussion from the

public—the concept of MUM-T would potentially attract

polarised views on how UAVs should be employed with

manned aircraft. Possible ethical issues pertaining to

MUM-T include the following:

• Usage of designated UAVs, rather than the main

platform, for combat purposes;

• Increase in automation of UAVs to make MUM-T

easier for pilots, which may in turn compromise the

accuracy of target identification;9

• Airspace control for UAVs;

• Programming of UAVs to do the ‘right’ thing instead

of the ‘good’ thing10

There is thus a need to evaluate the exact roles that

UAVs have to perform at different stages in time in the

future, and balance these roles with public support.

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NOVEL APPLICATIONS OF MUM-T

The act of MUM-T alone can be a force multiplier

in different ways, depending on the context and the

pairing. This section includes some possible scenarios

in which MUM-T could be used for applications that

have not yet been explored.

One of the common challenges a pilot faces when performing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations would be to fi nd a possible landing spot in the affected country. There is typically no prior information about what the situation in the affected country is really like. A pilot could thus potentially use MUM-T to deploy a UAV to check for possible landing spots before the main platform arrives at the location.

The Draganfl yer X6 Six Rotor UAV being used for surveillance purposes.

Cybe

rpio

neer

MUM-T IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

Currently, there have been ventures into the

usage of UAVs for humanitarian aid in the non-

military context. The United Nations Offi ce for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has listed

case studies of using UAVs in damage assessment

and mapping, after the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and

Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.11 Similar applications could

be adopted in the RSAF as an avenue for testing of

MUM-T capabilities via non-combat means.

One of the common challenges a pilot faces when

performing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

(HADR) operations would be to fi nd a possible landing

spot in the affected country. There is typically no prior

information about what the situation in the affected

country is really like. A pilot could thus potentially use

MUM-T to deploy a UAV to check for possible landing

spots before the main platform arrives at the location.

view point 72



ROLE REVERSAL – MANNED AIRCRAFT AS SUPPORT TO UAV

UAVs typically play the supportive role in existing

cases of MUM-T, possibly due to technical limitations

and the traditional role of UAVs as reconnaissance

aircraft. However, if UAVs become suffi ciently

advanced to play the main role in their own type of

military operations, the manned aircraft could in turn

support the UAVs in their tasks. Once conceivable,

albeit contentious, it gives rise to the possibility of

pairing a combat UAV with a transport aircraft that

conducts air-to-air refuelling for the UAV to achieve

longer endurance.

FORCE MULTIPLIER IN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING

The effectiveness of an Airborne Early Warning

(AEW) aircraft is determined by the maximum reach

of its radar systems.12 The teaming of an AEW aircraft

with a UAV equipped with its own radar systems could

potentially increase the radius of coverage, enabling

the team to sense threats at further distances.

This is a potential application of MUM-T acting as a

force multiplier in ISR and could be used to perform

reconnaissance missions that require greater range,

especially for Search & Rescue.

CONCLUSION

It is undeniable that UAVs would play an

increasingly major role in airpower. However, owing

to their differing roles from manned aircraft, it is

unlikely for the RSAF to use UAVs alone to project

airpower with the same speed and effi ciency that

manned aircraft can in the short term. However, as

more advanced UAVs make their way into the market,

it is defi nitely worth exploring new opportunities in

the process of achieving air superiority.

MUM-T is one of these potential initiatives. At

present, the military aviation community is still

trying to foresee what MUM-T is capable of achieving

and there are many practical issues to resolve

before we can start reaping the benefi ts of MUM-T.

The decision to bring MUM-T into the RSAF must be

backed by strong reasons for how MUM-T can be a

game-changer in projecting airpower. The most

important step would be to think out of the box and

fi nd innovative ways in which MUM-T could be utilised

in a way that is unique to the RSAF.

APPENDIX A: Considerations for MUM-T

General Considerations Specifi c Considerations Key Questions

Interoperability Platform compatibility Are the manned and unmanned platforms equipped with the setup required for transition into MUM-T?

If not, what are the steps required to prepare platforms for MUM-T? Are the steps achievable?

What are the limitations imposed on MUM-T?(e.g. distance between pilot and UAV)

Data compatibility Would the data on the UAV be communicated properly to the manned platform, and vice versa?

view point 73



General Considerations Specific Considerations Key Questions

Capability Development Platform costs What is the technology needed to add to perform MUM-T? What is the cost of acquiring such technology?

(Is it an upgrade? Is it a new platform altogether?)

What are the costs for maintenance and future upgrading of this technology?

Training costs What are the costs involved in training personnel to use the technology?

What are the costs in maintaining the trained personnel’s security?

Training requirements What are the skill sets required for performing MUM-T?

Is cross-training of existing personnel required?

In addition to control of the manned and unmanned platforms, what other forms of training would the personnel need?

Practicality Integration into Network Centric-Warfare network

What would the standard operating procedures of intelligence acquisition via MUM-T be based on?

Who controls the MUM-T – the pilot or the UAV pilot?

Which level of interoperability are we eventually aiming for?

Would an additional cross-checking step be needed for intelligence acquisition via MUM-T?

Would UAV pilots take on other roles, given that MUM-T allows pilots to acquire their own intelligence?

Technical suitability Are UAVs sufficiently advanced to perform MUM-T with minimum time lag and maximum precision?

Is the current state of technology compatible with the level of technology needed for MUM-T?

If not, what is the length of time required before the level of technology is able to match?

Ethics What are the ethical issues pertaining to the use of MUM-T?

Would the general public support the use of MUM-T?

Who takes ownership of the technology in times of accidents?

view point 74



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Eschenbach, C, Unmanned Aircraft Systems - Manned-Unmanned Teaming, (Armyaviationmagazine.com, 2015)

http://www.armyaviationmagazine.com/index.php/archive/not-so-current/589- unmanned-aircraft-systems-manned-unmanned-teaming

Evangelio, A., et al., Guidance for developing Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) Capability, (Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, 2012)

http://cjoscoe.org/docs/MUS_Final_9July2012.pdf

Flight International, OPINION: In robot wars, manned and unmanned systems must merge, (Flight Global, 2015)

https://www.f lightglobal.com/news/ar t icles/opinion-in-robot-wars-manned-and-unmanned-systems-must-merge-411573/

Gilman, D. & Easton, M., Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Humanitarian Response, (OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch, 2014)

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Unmanned%20Aerial%20Vehicles%20in%20Humanitarian%20Response%20OCHA%20July%202014.pdf

Glade, David, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations, (Alabama: Centre for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 2000) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat16.pdf

Harvey, Amanda, UAV ISR payloads demand lighter weight, faster processing, (Military Embedded Systems, 2015)

http://mil-embedded.com/articles/uav-weight-faster-processing/

Chua Soon Lye, Army to equip 6 units with mini-UAV, (Cyberpioneer, 2010)

ht tp://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrar y/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2010/november/29nov10_news.html

MINDEF, Navy Careers - Our Assets | ScanEagle UAV, (MINDEF, 2015)

http://mindef.gov.sg/navy/careers/our-assets/scaneagle-uav.html

Nine, Thomas W., The Future of USAF Airborne Warning & Control: A Conceptual Approach, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1999)

https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/99-148.pdf

Parsons, Dan, Teaming Pilots With Drones Hampered By Technology, National Defense Magazine, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/July/Pages/TeamingPilotsWithDronesHamperedByTechnology.aspx

Quintana, Elizabeth, The Ethics and Legal Implications of Military Unmanned Vehicles, Royal United Services Institute,

http://www3.nd.edu/~cpence/eewt/Quintana2008.pdf

Shelton, Marty, Manned Unmanned Systems Integration: Mission accomplished, (army.mil, 2011)

http://www.army.mil/article/67838

See, Yew K, et al., Manned-Unmanned Vehicles Convoy, (Defence Science and Technology Agency, 2008)

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA505729

Tham Yeow Min, Unmanned, Unlimited? The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle In The Transformation Of Air Power For The RSAF, (POINTER, 2011)

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/dam/imindef_media_library/graphics/pointer/PDF/2011/Vol.%2037%20No.3-4/6)%20V37N3-4_Unmanned,%20Unlimited%20The%20Unmanned%20Aer ia l%20Vehic l e%20In%20The%20Transformation%20of%20Air%20Power%20For%20The%20RSAF.compressed.pdf

Wilson, J. (2014) The future of military unmanned aircraft. 2014. Military & Aerospace Electronics.

ht tp://www.mil i t ar yaerospace.com/ar t ic les/pr int/volume-25/issue-7/special- report/the-future-of-military-unmanned-aircraft.html

Van Riper, S. (2014). Apache Manned-Unmanned Teaming Capability. 1st ed. Association of the United States Army.

ht tps://www.ausa.org/publicat ions/armymagaz ine/archive/2014/Documents/09S eptember14/VanRiper_Sept2014.pdf

Vergun, David, Apache-UAV teaming combines 'best capabilities of man, machine', (army.mil, 2014

http://www.army.mil/article/125676/

ENDNOTES

1. Ong Hong Tat, Army to equip 6 units with mini-UAV, Cyberpioneer, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2010/november/29nov10_news.html#.VpNqJ7aGOM8

Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), MINDEF, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/navy/careers/our-assets/scaneagle-uav.html

2. Sticha, Paul J., et al., Identifying Critical Manned-Unmanned Teaming Skills for Unmanned Aircraft System Operators, (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a565510.pdf

view point 75



3. During WWII, a fully-loaded B-17 Flying Fortress took off from RAF Fersfi eld in England, closely followed by three chase aircraft. The B-17 was meant to take off as per normal and reach an altitude of 2000 feet, after which it would be piloted remotely towards its target in Germany via control from one of its chase aircraft. Although the mission did not succeed, it had laid the groundwork for further exploration into the concept of coupling manned and unmanned performance to achieve mission goals.

4. Hawkins, Kari, The Shadow Unmanned Aircraft System Shares the Spotlight with the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Helicopter, The Offi cial Homepage of the United States Army, http://www.army.mil/media/220604/

5. Military UAS Application, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Association, http://www.uavs.org/military

6. Harvey, Amanda, UAV ISR payloads demand lighter weight, faster processing, Military Embedded Systems, http://mil-embedded.com/articles/uav-weight-faster-processing/

7. J.R. Wilson, The future of military unmanned aircraft, Military & Aerospace Electronics,http://www.militar yaerospace.com/ar t icles/pr int/volume-25/is sue -7/spec ia l- repor t/the -f uture -of-mi l i t ar y -unmanned-aircraft.html

8. Parsons, Dan, Teaming Pilots With Drones Hampered By Technology, National Defense Magazine, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/July/Pages/TeamingPilotsWithDronesHamperedByTechnology.aspx

9. There is still currently a limit on the accuracy of UAV’s in identifying its targets based on imagery recognition. In other words, the UAV may engage the wrong target, resulting in ‘friendly fi re’, civilian casualties or wasted ammunition on objects that are mistaken for targets.

10. Quintana, Elizabeth, The Ethics and Legal Implications of Military Unmanned Vehicles, Royal United Services Ins t i tu te,ht tp://www3.nd.edu/~ cpence/eew t/Quintana2008.pdf

11. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Humanitarian Response, (United Nations Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014) https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Unmanned%20Aerial%20Vehicles%20in%20Humanitar ian%20Response%20OCHA%20July%202014.pdf

12. Thomas W. Nine, The Future Of USAF Airborne Warning & Control: A Conceptual Approach, (Air Command And Staff College, Air University, 1999) https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/99-148.pdf

LTA Chan Jing Yi joined the RSAF in 2013 and is a UAV Pilot by vocation. She is currently pursuing a Masters degree in Biomedical Engineering at Imperial College London. She served part of her vacation attachment in 2015 at the SAF UAV Offi ce where she learned about the strategic and operational considerations of force build-up.

view point 76



Barry Desker and Ang Cheng Guan (Eds.), Perspectives on the

Security of Singapore, (Singapore: World Scientific), 2015, 329

pages

Book Review

By MAJ Phua Chao Rong, Charles

Perspectives on the Security

of Singapore deserves to be the

101 reading for all SAF personnel,

regardless of service, vocation,

and citizen-soldiers inclusive. In

a relatively short volume of 300

pages, it articulates the purpose

of the SAF, our history, security

context and challenges in 14

substantive chapters. In the final

four chapters, it captures insights

from our local defence and security

pioneers featuring specifically

former President S. R. Nathan,

former Head, Civil Service and

long-time Permanent Secretary

(Defence), Mr Peter Ho, former

Permanent Secretary (Foreign

Affairs), Ambssador Bilahari

Kausikan and former Permanent

Secretary for Defence Research,

Technology and Logistics, Mr

Philip Yeo.

TOTAL DEFENCE AS INSURANCE FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY

Eminent local historian Ang

Cheng Guan’s first chapter gives a

broad overview of the key themes

in this book and several of them

are noteworthy.1 Setting our

historical context in the founding

of Singapore in 1965, defence

and foreign affairs were “closely

inter-related subjects” in which

“foreign policy choices determine

defence commitments which in

turn limit the range of options

of Singapore’s foreign policy.”2

The importance of defence as the

foundation of Singapore’s survival

and prosperity was well articulated

by Mr Lim Kim San (who took over

from Dr Goh Keng Swee as Defence

Minister) in 1968, who said

“without this defence build-up,

there may come a time when all

the economic growth in the world

will not stand us in good stead,

because we would be captured and

it would be too late to regret that

we should have given priority to

our defence build-up first.”3 The

wisdom of this statement still

rings true today and explains

why our defence budget remains

book review 77


77-80_Book Review (REVISED).indd 77 1/3/16 5:05 PM

consistent regardless of ebbs and

flows of economic growth. Hence,

defence and self-reliance is our

best insurance. It is interesting

to note that the ideas of the late

Mr Lee Kuan Yew and the late

Dr Goh Keng Swee predated our

Total Defence concept, which was

adapted in 1984 from the Swiss

experience. In the context of the

Cold War, Dr Goh analysed that “the

first line of defence is economic—

economic development is the most

effective inoculation against

subversion and revolution. The

second line is police intelligence

and, the third and last line is the

Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).”4

As our founding Prime Minister

Mr Lee Kuan Yew surmised later in

2011, “you cannot have a strong

defence, unless you have a strong

finance. And you cannot have a

strong defence and strong finance

unless you have a strong, unified,

well-educated and increasingly

cohesive society. They are all part

of one whole.”5 Hence, we have

Total Defence, a whole of nation

effort to insure our peace and

prosperity.

OUR SECURITY CONTEXT FOR OUR DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY

Ang Cheng Guan next gave a

broad overview of our security

context which is further elaborated

in three ensuing chapters,

by Joey Long, Bilveer Singh,

Theophilus Kwek and Joseph Liow.

As the realist, Mr Lee Kuan Yew

emphasised on many occasions,

“your best friends are never your

immediate neighbours.”6 This

axiom rings true in international

relations; international tensions

tend to revolve around border

disputes, security spillovers

amongst others. But yet, Mr Lee

also noted that “defence and

security is closely interwoven

between Singapore and Malaysia.”7

The historical experience of

Malaysia and Singapore and

our geographical proximity has

intertwined both states together

and the still ongoing Five Power

Defence Arrangements between

Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand,

Australia and the United Kingdom

is a case in point.8

Every day that Singapore

survives is a miracle. From examples

in history, small states tend not to

survive for long. Hence, how small

states can survive in international

politics became Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s

lifelong preoccupation. As Mr

Lee expounded, “a small country

must seek maximum number of

friends, while maintaining the

freedom to be itself as a sovereign

and independent nation; we

are price-takers.”9 According to

Ang, our strategy simply is to

make ourselves relevant to all

the countries that matter to us.

Khong Yuen Foong’s chapter on

‘Singapore and the Great Powers’

discussed this further through

an analysis of the political,

economic and military dynamics

of the relations. As Khong noted,

“Singapore, like many of its ASEAN

and Asian-Pacific neighbours, has

voiced similar inclinations: it does

not want to choose between the

United States (US) and China.”11

That is why the Ministry

of Defence has twin pillars

of diplomacy and deterrence

to safeguard our survival, as

“diplomacy is not a substitute

for (defence) strength… credible

deterrence must be based on a

viable defence and these strategies

are not mutually exclusive and the

way to survive is to apply as many

of them as possible.”12 Following

on, one should read former

President S. R. Nathan’s reflections

on defence and diplomacy where

the three principles of security

still rings true today:

1) we sought to make friends with

all who would be friends with us;

2) we work for a multilateral

system that is fair and equitable

to countries big and small;

3) we must always maintain

the ability to protect our

sovereignty and defend what

is critical for our survival.13

The last point succinctly

justifies the existence of our SAF.

book review 78



On the dynamics of diplomacy,

one will gain wise insights from

Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan’s

chapter on ‘Pragmatic Adaptation’.

At least, nine quotes deserve to

be in every diplomat’s notebook—

note the profundity of thought

and elegance of language:

1) if one does not know what one

fears then everything may seem

fearful;

2) assessments and interests

change over time as circumstances

change or sometimes even when

they do not;

3) although we may fondly believe

otherwise, every country’s policy

in every domain is always a

series of messy improvisations in

response to unpredictable events;

4) diplomacy is not just about

making oneself agreeable; one

does what one must, someone

else will, if necessary clean up the

damage;

5) it is all very well to talk

abstractly about the long term,

but one has to survive the short

term in order to get to the long

term;

6) it is not always obvious who

your friends are or even what is in

your own interests;

7) ASEAN is ‘central’ (to Great

Powers dealing with Southeast

Asia) because it is occasionally

useful without ever becoming

harmful;

8) the US, China and Japan are

profoundly interdependent in a way

that the US and the Soviet Union

never were, but simultaneously

profoundly mistrustful of each

other;

9) the entire purpose of diplomacy

is avoiding choices (between US

and China). If we place ourselves

in a position where we have to

choose, we would have failed.14

OUR CHANGING AND INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Beyond vagaries of

international relations, Ang wrote

about the new security threats

in the new millennium such as

the transnational terrorism and

humanitarian disasters, and

the importance of technology,

national security and community

resilience, amongst others which

sets the background for our

transformation towards a 3rd

Generation SAF. Rohan Gunaratna

elaborates on the ‘Changing

Terrorist Landscape’ further.

Norman Vasu and Bernard Loo

expounds our ‘National Security’

strategy, Peter Ho expatiates

this Singapore experience in

National Security from an insider

perspective and Mohd Alami

Musa and Mohd Imran Mohd Taib

explicates the management of

‘Religious Diversity’ as a counter-

terrorism strategy through building

community resilience across time.

Alan Chong explains the chapter

on Deliquescent Security Threats

in the era of Hyper-Globalisation in

depth. Kwa Chong Guan elucidates

the impact of these threats in

terms of Challenges to Strategic

Intelligence.

SECURITY COOPERATION FOR THE FUTURE

Given the extensive context

painted by Ang and ensuing

chapters by various authors,

the future of diplomacy

lies in multilateral security

cooperation to safeguard our

collective peace and enhance

our collective prosperity. Tan

See Seng sets the framework on

Singapore participation in ‘Global

Governance’ noting our leadership

in the Global Governance Group

(3G), involvement in Small Five

(S5) and the influence of Professor

Tommy Koh and Deputy Prime

Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam

at the international stage.16 In

the ‘International Missions of the

SAF’, Katie Tan and Ong Weichong

articulate how we “deploy around

the world as a responsible member

book review 79



of the international community to

protect our home.”17

Mely Caballero-Anthony

brings the discussion closer to

home in the chapter on ‘ASEAN

Security Community’. On ASEAN,

it is important to note Singapore’s

heavy involvement in the

Cambodian conflict. As the Dr Goh

Keng Swee argued, “Cambodian

issue is a life-and-death

struggle, the outcome will have

a profound impact on Singapore”,

and then former President S. R.

Nathan added, the conflict was

“central to Singapore’s policy.”18

The principle involved was that

no foreign military intervention

should be allowed to overthrow

a legally constituted regime.19

Simply put, “the invasion of

a smaller country by a larger

neighbor, the deposition of

a legitimate government by

external force and the imposition

of a proxy by a foreign power,”

was a “direct challenge to the

fundamentals” of Singapore’s

foreign policy.20 Not many

will know Singapore’s pivotal

role in establishing the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF), that the

ASEAN Charter was signed during

Singapore’s Chairmanship of

ASEAN in 2007 and that Singapore

greatly contributed to the

strengthening of ASEAN Defence

Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) and

later ADMM-Plus.21

Ralf Emmers brings it even

closer in the chapter on the Five

Power Defence Arrangements

between Singapore, Malaysia,

New Zealand, Australia and the

United Kingdom. He argues the

“oldest institutional expression

of defence diplomacy in

Southeast Asia” still matters to

Singapore primarily because it

provides the tangible military

cooperation and conventional

defence component, with its new

focus on non-traditional security

issues such as Humanitarian

Assistance and Disaster Relief

(HADR).22

CONCLUSION

In 2015, Singapore celebrated

SG50. As we forge ahead towards

a collective future of SG100, it

is pertinent that we understand

our past, and work our present

in order to own our future.

Having copies of this book and

encouraging all personnel in our

line units and staff departments

to read them during their rest

time will certainly enhance the

intellectual foundation towards

their affective commitment to

defence (C2D).

ENDNOTES

1. Ang Cheng Guan, Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought, (London: Routledge, 2012).

2. Ibid., 4.

3. Ibid., 8.

4. Ibid., 9.

5. Ibid., 8.

6. Ibid., 9.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 10.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 207.

12. Ibid., 12.

13. Ibid., 283.

14. Ibid., 295-308.

15. Ibid., 13.

16. Ibid., 73-78.

17. Ibid., 154.

18. Ibid., 191.

19. Ibid., 192.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 195-200.

22. Ibid., 173, 183-184.

book review 80



Julius Robert Oppenheimer (1904-1967)by Macalino Minjoot

INTRODUCTION

What really stopped Japanese

ambitions during World War II

(WWII)? Did the Japanese lack the

resources to sustain the war or,

was it because of the two atomic

bombs that were released over

Nagasaki and Hiroshima? These

two bombs were created by Julius

Robert Oppenheimer. And, since

then, Julius Oppenheimer’s name

has been associated with the

atomic bomb.

EARLY LIFE

Julius Robert Oppenheimer

was born on 22nd April, 1902, in

New York City, United States (US).

His father, Julius Oppenheimer,

was a wealthy textile importer

who immigrated to the US from

Germany in 1888. His mother,

Ella Friedman, from the US was an

artist and teacher in watercolour

painting and both of them had no

religious affi liations.2

EDUCATION

Initially, Oppenheimer was

educated at Alcuin Preparatory

School, and was later admitted

to the Ethnical Culture Society

School. The school was known

for its motto, ‘Deed from Creed’

founded by Felix Adler, to promote

a form of ethnical training based

on the Ethnical Culture Movement.3

His father had already been a

member of the Society for many

years, serving on its Board of

Trustees, from 1907 to 1915.

Oppenheimer was a very

versatile scholar; he was greatly

interested in English and French

literature, with a particular

interest in mineralogy. He was an

intelligent boy as he completed the

third and fourth grades in a year

and even managed to complete the

eighth grade in half a year. During

his fi nal year, he became very

interested in chemistry.

By Harvard’s rules, Oppenheimer

was also required to study History,

Literature and Philosophy or

Mathematics. Because of these

requirements, he had to take

up six courses a term in order

for him to make up for his late

start at Harvard. In his fi rst year,

Oppenheimer had applied for

‘graduate standing’ in physics on

the basis of independent study.

This meant that his independent

study, a project, was substantial

enough to allow him to understand

the topics being taught in basic

classes and therefore, he would not

“I am become Death, the

destroyer of worlds.”

- Professor J. Robert Oppenheimer 1

Personality Profi le 81


81-84_ PPOppenheimer.indd 81 1/3/16 3:59 PM

need to attend the basic classes

and could directly enrol himself

into the advanced ones.4 He was

then attracted to experimental

physics during a thermodynamics

course taught by Percy Bridgman,

Higgins University Professor of

Physics and a noble prize winner.

He graduated summa cum laude in

three years.5

After graduating from Harvard,

he enrolled in the University of

Cambridge, where he started his

research on Atoms at Cavenish

Laboratory in 1925. He obtained

his doctorate in Göttingen

University a year later at the age

of 22, teaming up with Max Born,

Oppenheimer’s doctoral advisor.

Both Oppenheimer and Max Born

developed a method, called ‘Born-

Oppenheimer approximation’.6

EARLY PROFESSIONAL WORK

Oppenheimer accepted the

role of Assistant Professorship

in Physics at the University

of California, Berkeley in the

US. He became credited with

being a founding father of the

American school of Theoretical

Physics. He carried out research

in Astrophysics, Spectroscopy,

Nuclear Physics and Quantum

Field Theory. In these areas, he

made important contributions to

the theory of Cosmic Ray Shower,

and put in a lot of work that

led to descriptions of Quantum

Tunnelling, a theory that allow

particles to tunnel though a

barrier.7

Oppenheimer also worked

closely with Ernest O. Lawrence, a

Noble Prize-winning experimental

Physicist for the Cyclotron, a

particle accelerator. Oppenheimer

would help Lawrence's research

team understand the data provided

by their machines in the Lawrence

Berkeley National Laboratory. In

1936, Oppenheimer was promoted

to full professor.

PERSONAL LIFE

When his father died in 1937,

Oppenheimer became a wealthy man

as he inherited all of his father’s

wealth. In 1940, Oppenheimer

married Katharine ‘Kitty’ Puening

Harrison, a biologist and divorcee

whose husband died during the

Spanish Civil War. The couple had

two children, Peter and Katherine.

THE MANHATTAN PROJECT

On 9th October, 1941, the

President of the US, Franklin D.

Roosevelt, approved the crash

programme to develop the atomic

bomb. In May 1942, James B.

Conant, Chairman of the National

Defence Research Committee,

invited Oppenheimer to work on

the fast neutron calculations

which were the basis of creating

the atomic bomb. Oppenheimer

agreed to help as he believed

that the Nazis were developing

a nuclear weapon. His intention

was to create an atomic bomb in

the fastest time possible. Since

he had already carried out some

research on the subject before,

Oppenheimer went ahead with

the project. He even hosted a

summer school for bomb theory

at his building at Berkeley. He

envisioned several hundreds of

people working on this project but

by 1943, six thousand people were

involved. Alongside Oppenheimer,

were a mixed group of European

physicists and Oppenheimer’s

students, who calculated what

was needed to be done to develop

the bomb.

The first artificial nuclear

explosion occurred in mid-1944,

at Alamogordo, New Mexico

which was codenamed ‘Trinity’ by

Oppenheimer. When the testing

explosion occurred, Oppenheimer

had this verse in his head, “I am

become Death, the destroyer of

worlds.”8 He spoke these words in

the television documentary, The

Decision to Drop the Bomb.9

WORKS AFTER WORLD WAR II

After seeing the devastation

that the two atomic bombs

had wrought on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, Oppenheimer did not

want any country to harness such

weapons of mass destruction. In

1947, Oppenheimer was appointed

Chairman of the General Advisory

Committee to Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC). He served till

Personality Profile 82



1952. The AEC is an agency of

the US government, established

after WWII by Congress to foster

and control the peacetime

development of atomic science

and technology.10 In 1953,

Oppenheimer was suspended from

further nuclear research when the

AEC opposed the development of

the Hydrogen Bomb. This shocking

opposition led people to think that

Oppenheimer was a communist

supporter.

During 1947 to 1966,

Oppenheimer also served as

Director of Princeton’s Institute

for Advanced Study. In his later

years, he continued to support

the international control of atomic

energy. At Princeton, he researched

and stimulated discussions on

Quantum and relativistic Physics

in the School of Natural Sciences

as part of his interest. He retired

from the Institute in 1966 and

died on February 1967 from throat

cancer.

LEGACY

After Oppenheimer’s death in

1967, a memorial service was held

at Princeton University, Alexander

Hall. There were three speakers

who spoke at his funeral: Hans

Bethe, Henry Dewolf Smith and

George F. Kennan.11 These three

speakers had all worked closely

with Oppenheimer. In his memorial

to Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe wrote:

"Oppenheimer will leave a lasting

memory in all the scientists who

have worked with him, and in all

the many who have passed through

his school and whose taste in

physics was formed by him. His

was a truly brilliant mind.”12

According to Bethe, Oppenheimer

was best described by his long-

time associate, physicist Charles

Lauritsen, who said, "This man

was unbelievable. He always gave

you the answer before you had

time to formulate the question."13

CONCLUSION

Oppenheimer was a highly

intelligent man who was

synonymous with the name, ‘The

Father of Atomic Bomb’.14 He was

the first to create the atomic bomb,

a weapon of mass destruction. He

was also a very determined and

responsible man, from the creation

of the bomb, to ensuring that no

one else would continue to develop

it. Oppenheimer truly regretted

the amount of devastation and

havoc that he had brought upon

the Japanese. Oppenheimer was a

lover of peace; yet, he became the

man most responsible for a new era

of war.15

ENDNOTES

1. Brainy Quotes, ” J. Robert Oppenheimer Quotes”, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/j/j_robert_oppenheimer.html.

2. Atomic Archive, J. Robert Oppenheimer: biography. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Bios/Oppenheimer.shtml

3. Felix Alder Biography. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felix_Adler_(professor)

4. ‘Graduate Standing’ in Oppenheimer’s case would mean, essentially, skipping lower level courses and going directly for more advanced courses - a testament to his genius.

Berkeley, “Oppenheimer: A Life”, h t t p ://c s t ms . b e r k e l e y. e du/archive/oppenheimer/exhibit/chapter1.html.

5. A Latin word meaning ‘with highest honour.’ Cassidy, David. J. Robert Oppenheimer and the American Century. (New York: Pi Press, 2005).

6. This method separates nuclear motion from electronic motion in the mathematical treatment of molecules which was an important contribution to Quantum Molecular theory, which was essential to create the atomic bombs.

7. Quantum Tunnelling, Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_tunnelling

8. Brainy Quotes, ” J. Robert Oppenheimer Quotes”, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/j/j_robert_oppenheimer.html

9. Oppenheimer read the original text in Sanskrit, and the translation is his own.

"J. Robert Oppenheimer on the Trinity test (1965)". Atomic Archive. 2008.




10. About Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Wikipedia.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Atomic_Energy_Commission

11. Bathe, Hans (1906-2005), John Wendell Anderson Professor of Physics Emeritus at Cornell University and a Noble Prize Winner.

Smith, Henry (1898-1986), former Chairman of Physics at Princeton University, and played a number of key roles in the early development of nuclear energy, as a participant in the Manhattan Project.

Kennan, George (1904-2005), Professor Emeritus in the School of Historical Studies at the Institute.

12. Institute for Advanced Studies, J. Robert Oppenheimer’s Legacy, ht tps://www.ias.edu/people/oppenheimer/legacy

13. Ibid.

14. Biography. ‘The Father of the Atomic Bomb.’ http://www.biography.com/people/j-robert-oppenheimer-9429168

15. Spark Notes, J. Robert Oppenheimer: Biography Study Guides, “Reconstructing the Legacy”. http://www.sparknotes.com/biography/oppenheimer/section12.rhtml




85quotable quotes

Quotable Quotes

The success of Singapore depends upon how well we uphold these ideals: the constant drive to excel in all that we do, as individuals and as a nation,

and a willingness to share responsibility for the common good. – Lee Kuan Yew (1923-2015), former Minister Mentor, Senior Minister and first Prime Minister of Singapore

It is not power that corrupts but fear. – Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), Burmese Social Democratic Stateswoman,

Politician and President of the National League for Democracy.

Most people say that it is the intellect which makes a great scientist. They are wrong: it is character.

– Albert Einstein (1879-1955), theoretical physicist.

It is health that is real wealth and not pieces of gold and silver. – Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), Leadership of Indian independence movement.

I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand. – Confucius (551-479BC), Chinese teacher, politician and philosopher.

People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.

– George Orwell (1903-1950), British novelist, journalist and critic.

Someone is sitting in the shade today because someone planted a tree a long time ago. – Warren Buffett (b. 1930), American business magnate, investor and philanthropist.

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – I took the one less travelled by. And that has made all the difference.

– Robert Lee Frost (1874-1963), American poet.

Be yourself; everyone else is already taken. – Oscar Wilde (1854-1900), Irish playwright, novelist and poet.

There is nothing stronger in the world than gentleness.– Han Suyin (1917-2012), Chinese novelist and doctor

85


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CDFEC 2014-2015 Prize Winners

Chief Of Defence Force Essay Competition 2014/2015

Prize Winners

FIRST PRIZEJekyll and Hyde: Would Nurturing a Strong National Identity Trump a

Religiously Radicalised Identity?MAJ Chandran s/o Nadarajoo

SECOND PRIZEThe case for Pre-Emptive Warfare and its Implication for Singapore.

CPT Seah Jun Hao

THIRD PRIZESwimming in Sensors, Drowning in Data. Big Data Analytics for Military Intelligence.

ME4 Toh Bao En

MERIT AWARDS The Concept of A Decisive Battle and the Key Takeaways for the SAF.

LTC Tan Wee Heng, Melvyn

Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and Maritime Stability in the Indo-Pacific.MAJ Lim Han Wei

Maskirovka in the Information Age.LTA(NS) Chin Hui Han

Is The SAF’s Deterrence Posture Still Relevant as the Nature of Warfare Continues to Evolve?MAJ Bernard Tay

China’s Strategic Culture in the South China Sea and The Recommendations for ASEAN and US. MAJ Choy Yong Cong

Information Warfare – Challenges and Opportunities for Militaries in the Information Age. CPT Ng Zhaohong, Jeffrey

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Future of Airpower: A Technological Perspective. ME4 Goh Qi Wen, Gerald

86-87_CDF Prize Winners 2014- 2015.indd 86 29/2/16 4:12 PM


CDFEC 2014-2015 Prize Winners

COMMENDATION AWARDSRestrictions on Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive

Economic Zone: Major Powers’ ‘Lawfare.’MAJ Chuah Meng Soon

To what extent can Singapore’s Maritime Security Outlook be Considered as Exceptional within Southeast Asia?

MAJ Koh Zhi Guo, Daniel

Cognitive Biases: the Root of Irrationality in Military Decision-Making.CPT Chen Jingkai

The Strategy Bridge: Linking the Tactical and Operational Battles to the National Interest(s).

LTC Eng Cheng Heng

The Impact of China’s Military Rise on the Formation of a Coherent Political-Security Community in Southeast Asia

CPT Tung Wanrong

Cyber Attacks and the Roles The Military Could Play to Support the National Cyber Security Efforts.

ME5 Ho Wei Seng, Alan

The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Contemporary Assessment.CPT Pek Wee Kian

Fighting Just Wars in Asymmetric Conflict Structures. CPT Lee Wen Jie, Jamie

Transplanting EU’s History into ASEAN’s Future: Implications of Regional Economic Integration on Defence Cooperation.

LTA Ng Yeow Choon

A Critical Assessment of the Likelihood of Inter-State War in Southeast Asia in the 21st Century.

ME5 Seah Ser Thong, Calvin & ME4 Harold Lim

The Future of the Singapore Armed Forces amidst the Transforming Strategic, Geopolitical and Domestic Environment.

ME4 Lim Guang Nian, Gabriel

86-87_CDF Prize Winners 2014- 2015.indd 87 29/2/16 4:12 PM

Instructions for AuthorsAIMS & SCOPE

POINTER is the official journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. It is a non-profit, quarterly publication that is circulated to MINDEF/SAF officers and various foreign military and defence institutions. POINTER aims to engage, educate and promote professional reading among SAF officers, and encourage them to think about, debate and discuss professional military issues.

SUBMISSION DEADLINES

All articles submitted are reviewed on a rolling basis. The following dates indicate the approximate publication dates of various issues:

No. 1 (March) No. 2 (June) No. 3 (September) No. 4 (December)

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

POINTER accepts the contribution of journal articles, book reviews and viewpoints by all regular/NS officers, military experts and warrant officers. POINTER also publishes contributions from students and faculty members of local/international academic institutions, members of other Singapore Government Ministries and Statutory Boards, as well as eminent foreign experts.

Contributors should take note of pertinent information found in the Author‘s Guide when preparing and submitting contributions.

Article Topics

POINTER accepts contributions on the following topics:

- Military strategy and tactics

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POINTER accepts reviews of books under the SAF Professional Reading Programme and other suitable publications. Contributors may review up to four books in one submission. Each review should have 1,500 - 2,000 words.

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Article Length

Each article should contain 2,000 to 4,000 words.

ENDNOTE FORMATAuthor’s Responsibilities

Authors are responsible for the contents and correctness of materials submitted. Authors are responsible for:

• the accuracy of quotations and their correct attribution

• the accuracy of technical information presented

• the accuracy of the citations listed

• the legal right to publish any material submitted.

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Citations in POINTER follow the Chicago Manual of Style.

All articles in POINTER must use endnotes. Note numbers should be inserted after punctuation. Each endnote must be complete the first time it is cited. Subsequent references to the same source may be abbreviated.

The various formats of endnotes are summarized below. Punctuate and capitalise as shown.

Books

Citations should give the author, title and subtitle of the book (italicised), editor or translator if applicable (shortened to ‘ed.’ or ‘trans.’), edition number if applicable, publication information (city, publisher and date of publication), appropriate page reference, and URL in the case of e-books. If no author is given, substitute the editor or institution responsible for the book.

For example:

Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (St Leonard, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 4.

Huxley, Defending the Lion City, 4.

Ibid., 4.

Edward Timperlake, William C. Triplett and William II Triplet, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America (Columbia: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 34.

Articles in Periodicals

Citations should include the author, title of the article (quotation marks), title of periodical (italicised), issue information (volume, issue number, date of

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publication), appropriate page reference, and URL in the case of e-books. Note that the volume number immediately follows the italicised title without intervening punctuation, and that page reference is preceded by a colon in the full citation and a comma in abbreviated citations.

For example:

Chan Kim Yin and Psalm Lew, “The Challenge of Systematic Leadership Development in the SAF,” POINTER 30, no. 4 (2005): 39-50.

Chan and Lew, “The Challenge of Systematic Leadership Development in the SAF,” 39-50.

Ibid., 39-50.

Mark J. Valencia, “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,” Ocean Development and International Law 31 (2000): 241.

Articles in Books or Compiled Works

Michael I. Handel, “Introduction,” in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 3.

H. Rothfels, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, eds. Edward Mead Earle and Brian Roy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 102.

Articles in NewspapersCitations should include the author, title of the article (quotation marks), title of newspaper (italicised), date of publication, appropriate page reference, and URL in the case of e-books.

For example:

David Boey, “Old Soldiers Still Have Something to Teach,” The Straits Times, 28 September 2004, 12.

Donald Urquhart, “US Leaves it to Littoral States; Admiral Fallon Says Region Can Do Adequate Job in Securing Straits,” The Business Times Singapore, 2 April 2004, 10.

Online Sources

Citations should include the author, title of the article (quotation marks), name of website (italicised), date of publication,

and URL. If no date is given, substitute date of last modification or date accessed instead.

For example:

Liaquat Ali Khan, “Defeating the IDF,” Counterpunch, 29 July 2006, ht tp://www.counte r punch.org/khan07292006.html.

If the article was written by the publishing organisation, the name of the publishing organisation should only be used once.

For example:

International Committee of the Red Cross, “Direct participation in hostilities,” 31 December 2005, h t t p://www.ic rc .o rg/ Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/par t ic ipat ion-hostilities-ihl-311205.

If the identity of the author cannot be determined, the name of the website the article is hosted on should be used. For example:

“Newly unveiled East Jerusalem plan put on hold,” BBC News, 2 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8546276.stm.

More details can be found at http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/contribution/authorsguide.html.

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Vol. 42 No. 1 - PDF Version

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Transcript of Vol. 42 No. 1 - PDF Version