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SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

VIGIL

QUARTERLY SAFETY BULLETIN NO.3

SEPTEMBER - 2017

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Sl. No

Section Subject Page No.

1 A Extracts of RB letters 1 – 12 2 B Important rules 13 – 15 3 C Latest amendments 16 – 18 4 D Checklist – S&T 18 – 28 5 E Accident cases 29 – 37 6 F Test your knowledge 38 – 39 8 G Safety drives 39 – 49 9 H Accident statistics 50

INDEX

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My dear Railwaymen The trend of increase in number of accidents and unusual incidences of our Railway in this financial year upto the end of 3rd Quarter is not a healthy trend. As many as 34 incidents of unusual / accidents have taken place of which 10 accidents have taken place in BZA Division, 9 in SC Division, 8 in GTL Division, 5 in HYB Division and one each in GNT & NED Divisions. The breakup of accidents are 14 are Goods train derailments, 3 coaching train derailments, 6 loco derailments, 3 Engineering Track Machine derailments, 7 SPAD cases and one fire in loco. Majority of accidents that have taken place are due to human failures (28 cases) and all of them are preventable. Another area of causing concern is increasing trend in LC Gate ‘open’ cases on the face of approaching trains. As many as 22 LC Gate ‘open’ cases have taken place of which failures of Gatemen are 16 and failures of Dy.SMs 6 cases. Divisional Officers and Supervisors shall rededicate themselves in reducing this trend of increase in accidents and unusual incidences by intensifying inspections / ambush checks / counseling the field staff. This apart, Safety Seminars need to be conducted to sensitise the field Officials. I hope that this booklet which contains important RB letters that are helpful in updating the knowledge of all field Officials, contribute for understanding the details of accidents, test your knowledge with key, statistics, important rules, checklist etc., Wishing good wishes. (D.K. SINGH) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

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Sub: Equipments to be provided to ALPs. Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2010/Safety (A&R)/19/18 dated

21.7.2017.

GR 4.19 provides a list of equipment to be provided to Guards and LPs. Under this GR, the Zonal Railways have framed SR for providing equipment to ALPs. It has come to the notice of Board that there is a vast difference between list of equipment being issued to ALPs from one Zonal Railway to another. With a view to bring uniformity regarding number of items being issued to ALPs, it has been decided to issue unified SRs on the subject so as to provide a minimum list of equipment along with a handy bag to carry the same is issued to ALPs.

1. Tri-colour torch 2. Red & green flag 3. Hammer-cum-screw driver 4. Working Time Table.

Section “A” KNOWLEDGE

Extracts of Railway Board letters

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Necessary correction may accordingly be made in SRs under GR 4.19 of the Zonal Railway under advice of this Office. This issues with the approval of M (TR), M(RS and MT.

Director/Safety Railway Board

Sub: Strengthening of Safety Organisation at Zonal and

Divisional level. Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Safety (DM)/19/1 dated

04.8.2017.

RSRC while reviewing efficacy existing in Safety Organisation on Indian Railways has recommended that Safety Department should be made broad-based and suitable Officers from Traffic, Civil, Mechanical, Electrical and S&T should be posted as Safety Officers at all levels. Railway Board has accepted these recommendations and instructions were issued to Zonal Railways from time to time, vide RB letter of even no. dated 28.3.2017, consolidated instructions for posting of Safety Officers at all levels were issued to Zonal Railways.

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Vide Railway Board letter dated 16.5.2005, it was clarified that Assistant Scale Officers to assist Sr.DSOs in Divisions can be posted but same have to be provided by GM from their own resources. In South Central Railway, Assistant Scale Officers are not posted in Divisions. For enhancing in train operations, it is essential to strengthen Safety Organisation at all levels. Zonal Railway may consider posting of one Assistant Scale Officer in each Division as ADSO. Action taken in this regard may please be advised to RB.

Advisor/Safety Sub: Incident of SPAD in SECR. Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Safety (DM)/7/25 dated

17.8.2017.

On 16.8.2017, while working Train No. DN BCN / DTO Goods, LP has passed IBS between Baradwar - Saku stations in Bilaspur Division of SECR at 03.50 hours.

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As per information received from CSO/SECR, LP and ALP have admitted that they passed the signal at ‘on’ due to napping. It is also understood that VCD in the locomotive 31380/WAG-9/Gomoh was in isolated condition since 04.8.2017. VCD was provided on the locomotive to monitor the alertness of the crew through a multi resetting system which gets reset by specified normal operation by the crew. Board had issued policy guidelines regarding functioning of VCD vide letter No. 2014/Safety (DM)/7/1 dated 25.8.2014, as per these instructions, if VCD gets defective / isolated on run, the locomotive should be declared as failed at loco changing point or at the destination. Locomotive involved in the SPAD should have been failed much before, however, traction controllers allowed running of the locomotive in gross violation of RB guidelines. In this case, the purpose of provision of VCD got defeated resulting into an accident. It is requested that the responsibility may be fixed for allowing the locomotive with defective VCD and clear instructions may be issued to all concerned to strictly adhere to the safety guidelines issued by the Board. Action taken in this regard may please be advised to RB.

Advisor / Safety

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Sub: Riding on engine / EMU / MEMU / EMU – provisions contained in GR 4.22

Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Safety (A&R)/19/17 dated 01.9.2017.

As per provisions contained in GR 4.22, no person other

than engine crew is authorized to enter any driving compartment of a single or multiple unit or a train propelled by electric, diesel or petrol engine except in accordance with permitted under special instructions. It has come to notice that more persons other than prescribed limit as contained in special instructions were found occupying engine compartment which has potential of diverting attention / concentration of engine crew and is a safety hazard. It is, therefore, reiterated that:-

1. The number of authorized persons to travel in compartment of engine / EMU / MEMU / DEMU shall not exceed as prescribed under special instructions.

2. Keeping in view the fact that even those who are authorized on duty for carrying foot-plate inspection, trials or proceeding to attend breakdown etc., can divert the attention of the engine crew, they should ensure that

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engine crew should be least disturbed and be made comfortable so as to ensure safe running of train.

Necessary instructions be issued accordingly to all

concerned under advice to this Office.

Advisor / Safety Sub: Safety precautions and prevention / readiness for

accidents. Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2016/52/CE-III/BR/Safety dated

24.8.2017. In connection with the safety of train operations, following action need to be taken by the Zonal Railways; (i) An extensive examination of general and site specific

potential causes of accidents on railway bridges, ROBs, RUBs, tunnels, deep cuttings, level crossings etc., be identified. Some of the suggestions are as under;

Safety items on level crossings such as speed breakers, road surface, warning boards, visibility etc.,

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Compliance of critical items of bridge inspections for structural cracks, scour of foundations, erosion of flooring and track on bridges and approaches.

Safety items at locations of recently inserted boxes for RUBs/LHS like settlement in approaches etc.,

Locations of boulder falls, slide prone deep cuttings, protection works in cuttings, tunnel portals and approaches of tunnels, cleaning of side drains / catch water drains etc.,

Updation of the list of Rail Affecting Works (Canals, reservoirs, dams etc.,) and ensuring their upkeep / maintenance by the concerned State Government Authorities.

Safety items in tunnels such as lighting arrangement, ventilation, track in tunnels, signs of structural weakness etc.,

(ii) After identification, action may be taken for removal of the probable cause of accident. As per the situation, necessary caution order / speed restriction be imposed if required and the necessary action taken for correction of defects noticed with necessary precautions as per codal provisions. Some suggestions are as under;

The structural cracks in bridges may be grouted / rectified, bed floorings repaired, scour areas

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attended by boulder crates, track on bridges and approaches attended etc.,

Safety items on level crossings be recouped, missing warning boards provided, visibility obstructions removed, road surface attended etc.,

The safety works on vulnerable boulder fall areas be done, loose boulders removed, patrolman/watchman provided where needed, works for long term stability be proposed in works programme.

Safety items be recouped in tunnels and structural defects, if any be repaired.

Training of Officers, staff through Institutes /ZTS and special on site trainings be conducted specifically designed towards the needs of above. In-house training may be conducted by senior Officers.

Joint exercise / mock drills for DM rescue especially for tunnels and deep cuttings be conducted in association with state fire departments, medical authorities etc., to check readiness of Officers / staff in meeting with emergencies.

2.0.1 The above items and list are by no means exhaustive and Zonal Railways to draw up plans by mutual

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discussions on the above items in order to meet the desired objectives.

Action taken report on above may be sent to Board within

15 days time.

ED/Civil Engineering/B&SR/RB Sub: Fixed time (corridors) Traffic Blocks for maintenance of

assets. Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2015/Track-III/TK/15 dated

31.8.2017. A joint circular No. 2015/Track-III/TK/15 dated 28.12.2016 for fixed time (corridors) Traffic blocks for maintenance of assets was issued vide Board’s letter No. 2015/Track-III/TK/5/Pt dated 29.12.2016 for planning and operating maintenance blocks Zonal Railways need to take concerted action in this regard and ensure block availability for liquidating track maintenance arrears. It is desired that the joint instructions issued vide letter under reference should immediately be complied with.

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Joint programme for minimum three hours blocks as required for the month of September 2017 duly signed by COM & PCE as per Para 3 of Joint Circular dated 29.12.2016 should be issued and compliance report as per Para 2 of Joint Circular dated 29.12.2016 should be carried out by Zonal Railways and where needed proposals requiring rescheduling of inter-railway trains be submitted to Railway Board by end of September 2017. Till provision of planned corridor blocks of assured duration are included in WTT as per Para 2.0 of Joint Circular, joint monthly plan of traffic blocks as per Para 3 of joint circular shall be issued by COM & PCE of Zonal Railways by 25th of the preceding month. Railway should also take into account integrated maintenance of assets for all the Departments as per Railway Board letter No. 2013/TT-1/7/1 Pt dated 21.3.2017 while preparing annual plan for blocks and submit the same to Railway Board by the end of September 2017. Monitoring of the blocks granted and its effective utilization should be regularly carried out by GMs and DRMs, as per joint circular dated 29.12.2016.

AM/Traffic

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Sub: Derailment of Train No. 18477 Puri – Haridwar Utkal Express at KM No. 101/16-17 between Khatauli – Mansurpur stations of Meerut – Saharanpur section of Delhi Division under Northern Railway at 17.50 hours of 19.8.2017.

Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Elec (TRS)/113/3 dated 21.9.2017.

Consequent upon the above accident, CRS/Northern Circle has made following immediate recommendations; (i) With the increasing traffic and reducing resources, well

defined Integrated Corridor Block System (ICBS) is MUST. Railway Administration must devise a method of ICBS and it should be implemented with all sincerity. Corridor block should be either of minimum 4 hours or two blocks of 2 ½ hours duration.

(ii) There should be a proper system of logging the block request form maintenance staff and its grant / non-grant by station and control staff. Refusal of the block should be decided at appropriate level to avoid inciting staff from doing unsafe working. In this regard, clear cut instructions should be issued by the Railway Administration.

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(iii) Similar to “COACHMITRA”, an app should be introduced for demanding and granting the block and alert should be generated to all stakeholders for block demanded, block denied and block not availed. This will help in keeping track of the demand and its fulfillment, quality of work and also dispute resolution in case of any accident etc.,

(iv) Railway Administration should develop a module for periodic training to Control Staff about understanding and mitigating the difficulties faced by field staff to ensure safe train operation.

Zonal Railways are advised to take necessary actions

accordingly.

Director/Electrical Engineering (RS)

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GR 5.01 Responsibility of SM for working.- (1) The SM shall be responsible for the efficient discharge

of his duties devolving upon the staff employed, either permanently or temporarily, under his orders at the station or within the station limits and such staff shall be subject to his authority and direction in the working of the station.

(2) The SM shall see that all signals, points, gates of level crossings and the whole machinery of his station are in proper working order and shall immediately report all defects therein to the proper authority.

(3) The SM shall also be responsible to see that the working of the station is carried out in strict accordance with the rules and regulations for the time being in force.

(4) No person other than the SM shall ask for or give line clear, or give authority to proceed.

GR 6.01 Accident or obstruction.- (1) When a report of any accident or obstruction is

received by the SM, he shall see that all necessary

Section “B” Some important instructions – GR 5.01, 6.01, 15.08

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precautions are taken by the most expeditious means possible, for the protection of traffic.

(2) If an accident happens to a train, the SM shall arrange for all necessary assistance to be sent to the train.

(3) The SM shall, as soon as practicable, report each accident in accordance with special instructions.

GR 15.08 (1) Precautions before commencing operations which would obstruct the line.-

No person employed on the way or works shall change or turn a rail, disconnect points or signals, or commence any other operation which would obstruct the line until Stop signals have been exhibited and where prescribed detonators used; and if within station limits, he has also obtained the written permission of the SM and all necessary signals have been placed at ‘on’: Provided that the exhibition of stop signal may be dispensed with, if such operations are performed or carried out after necessary signals, other than Automatic Stop Signals, have, in addition to being placed in the ‘on’ position, been disconnected, so that such signals cannot be taken ‘off’ again until it is safe

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to do so and the corresponding adequate distance beyond such signals is kept clear: Provided further that when the area of work is controlled by Automatic signals, the railway servant in-charge of the work shall post a competent railway servant at an adequate distance in rear of the site of the work to stop and warn any train approaching the affected area. (2) No work involving removal of any rail from the track shall be undertaken without traffic block, except as provided in sub-rule (3) below; (3) In emergent cases, the Engineering Official not below the rank of PWI-Grade III, undertaking such operations shall first bring the train to a stop and advise the LP of the train about the need to stop the train through a written memo. The Engineering Official shall simultaneously arrange to send a message to the SM for the need to block the track and obtain written confirmation of the same. In such emergent cases work may be commenced only after bringing the train to a stop and the LP has been advised.

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Amendment Slip No.21 to G&SR issued on 06.9.2017 Item No.1 SR 4.19.2.1 is amended by inserting Item No.3

and renumbering existing Item No.3 as Item No.4 (in page No. 109 & 110) as under;

2.1 ALP shall be in possession of the following personal equipment along with a hand bag to carry the equipment issued to ALP, while working a train (Unified SR):

(1) Tri-colour torch (2) Red and Green flags (3) Hammer-cum-screw driver and (4) WTT

Item No.2 Rule No.11.2 of Appendix I to G&SR (at page 345)

is modified as under (with modified content in bold)

11.2 The SM on receiving the advice regarding the removal of the restriction shall advise this fact to the SM at the other end of the block section concerned, SM of ‘Notice Station’ and other Railway Servants who were advised about it

Section “C” Latest Amendments

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earlier, under exchange of PN. After issue of the advice regarding cancellation of the Caution Order, the SMs may discontinue the issuing of the Caution Order.

Amendment Slip No.22 to G&SR issued on 25.9.2017 / 05.10.2017 Add rule No.3 to SR 2.03 under GR 2.03 (in Page No.9) as under; Assurance Register for Amendments to Rule Books

1. Assurance Register for Amendment to Rule Books shall be maintained to obtain staff acknowledgement for having read and understood the amendments to (i) G&SR (ii) Block Working Manual (iii) Accident Manual and (iv) WTT.

2. Separate portions shall be maintained for each Rule book in the register.

3. Whenever any amendment is issued for each Rule book mentioned above, acknowledgement of all staff working at the station shall be obtained.

4. In case of semi-literate and ‘C’ and ‘D’ graded staff, SM in-charge shall personally explain in vernacular language and obtain their acknowledgement in token of their having understood the rules. The SM in-

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charge shall also certify that they have fully understood the contents in the amendments.

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TESTING OF EQUIPMENT :

1. TESTING OF PANEL: I. To Clear Signal:

i. Ensure SM’s key is ‘IN’, set the relevant points for the route, check the track circuit indications, ensure LCs, if any are closed in the route and then take ‘off’ the signal.

ii. After satisfying that the signal correctly responded, put back the signal.

iii. Initiate route cancellation and also check whether the timer relay is properly functioning or not (120 seconds time).

iv. Make entry in the route cancellation register along with reasons and remarks, if any.

v. In case of end-panels, clear the signal with slot and put back the slot and satisfy whether the signal is put back to ‘on’ or not.

Section “D” Checklist - S&T DEPARTMENT

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vi. For testing of calling-ON signal functioning, ensure the Calling-‘ON’ track circuit is danger (by the occupation of train or by simulating), home signal knob shall be ‘normal’, facing points shall be correctly set before taking ‘off’ calling-ON.

vii. After 120 seconds, the calling-ON signal shall clear. viii. Initiate calling-ON signal cancellation, wait for 240

seconds time and observe whether the route is cleared or not.

ix. Make entry in the register along with reasons and remarks, if any. II. Point Operation:

i. Track circuit in point zone shall be clear. ii. Ensure the crank handle is ‘IN’. iii. Place an obstruction piece of 5mm between stock and

tongue rails at 150mm from the toe of the switch and observe the lock should not enter into the slide and indication should flash on the panel for ‘N’ or ‘R’ position.

iv. Check non-correspondence by making one end of point non-operative with the help of crank handle cut off contacts.

Normal point operation voltage and current readings

Operation Volts (V)

Current (Amp)

Obstruction (V) (Amp)

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‘N’ to ‘R’ 105 + or – 5

1.6 + or – 0.2

100 + or – 5

4 + or – 0.4

‘R’ to ‘N’ 105 + or – 5

1.6 + or – 0.2

100 + or – 5

4 + or – 0.4

v. Enter the readings in the point machine book are made properly and kept in point machine. III. Track Circuits:

i. Ensure POH of track relay is done (once in 10 years). ii. Ensure track relay voltage is not more than 250% of the

pickup value in dry condition for shelf-type relays and 300% of the pickup value for QT relays.

iii. Ensure the anti-tilting arrangements are available for shelf-type relays. IV. Crank Handle:

i. Ensure the crank handle is able to be extracted only when the relevant signal is in ‘ON’ position. V. SGE Block Instrument:

i. Bring commutator to TOL position and then take ‘off’ LSS, it should not get cleared.

ii. Ensure the locking of block instrument with double lock (one key with Operating staff and one key with S&T staff).

iii. Line voltage – outgoing 18V – 26 V; current 18MA – 30MA (depending on the length of the block section).

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iv. Line voltage – incoming 8V – 9V; current 18MA – 20MA (depending on the length of the block section) VI. Podanur Push-button block (PTJ):

i. Normal line voltage: 60V – 80V (depending on the length of the block section).

ii. Line current – outgoing 60MA – 70MA (depending on the length of the block section).

iii. Line current – incoming 60MA – 70MA (depending on the length of the block section). VII. Relay Room:

i. Ensure double lock arrangements are effective. ii. Ensure the relays are clean and in sealed condition.

VIII. Equipment Room: i. Ensure the meters (volt/ammeter) in power board are in

working condition. ii. Records to be maintained in the Equipment Room

a) Battery history maintenance register. b) Track circuit history register. c) Track circuit maintenance register. d) Axle-counter maintenance register, if any. e) Cable-meggering register. f) IPS maintenance register. g) Motor point reading register. h) Earth resistance register.

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i) Signal/LED lamp register. j) Date-logger Register containing the installation date,

date of failure, date intimated to the agency, date of rectification, etc.,

k) Disconnection/Reconnection Notice Memo Register. l) Availability of completion diagrams. m) Availability of surveillance panels. IX. Battery Room:

i. Ensure proper maintenance of battery cells. a) Battery cells when fully charged, specific gravity should

be 1180 – 1220 SPG. SPG < 1180 implies that the cells are discharged.

b) Normally charged cell voltage is 2 – 2.2V. Discharged cell voltage will be < 1.8V.

ii. Whenever cell water level falls below vent-float indicator mark, topping up of distilled water is required. Generally, once in 3 months, topping up of distilled water is required.

X. Registers to be maintained at the station: a) Route cancellation register (UP & DN). b) Calling-ON cancellation register. c) S&T failure and history register. d) Joint inspection of points and crossings register. e) Crank handle register.

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f) Axle-counter re-setting register. g) Line clear cancellation register. h) Relay-room key register. i) Block instrument key register.

ALL CABLES SHALL BE MEGGERED ONCE IN A YEAR

SIGNAL GEARS MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE

S. No

Maintenance work Periodicity ESM JE SE/SSE

Point Machine 1 Check all fittings for tightness,

cleanliness, clean contacts and commutator

F M Q

2 Ensure correct working in ‘N’ & ‘R’

F M Q

3 Check the tripping at the overload of friction clutch

F M Q

4 Conduct obstruction test. Take voltage/current readings

... M Q

5 Check ground connections alignment and intactness of fittings (slack pins to be replaced)

F M Q

6 Check intactness of wiring on terminals

F M Q

7 Check detection contacts. F M Q

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Measure I/C and O/G voltages 8 Check track locking ... M Q

9 Check out correspondence ... ... Q

10 Check ‘D’ clamp/gauge plate insulation

Q Q H

11 Check crank handle contact F M Q

12 Check for proper ballasting and packing of sleepers

F M Q

13 Check the setting of switches for having required amount of spring

F M Q

Track Circuit 1 Check relay for over-energisation F M Q

2 Measure earth resistance F M Q

Block Instrument 1 Check functioning of double

locking arrangement and sealing F M Q

2 Clean and lubricate all points F M Q

3 Check contact pressure F M Q

4 Check functioning of PR Relay tongue

M M Q

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5 Measure line voltage/current F M Q

6 Check SM’s key working F M Q

7 Check whether LSS can be taken ‘off’ without line clear

F M Q

8 Check working of all counters F M Q

9 Check that shunting key is released in closed or TGT position only

F M Q

Battery Room 1 Check all batteries SPG F M Q

2 Clean, tighten and apply petroleum jelly to terminals

F M Q

3 Top the levels of cells, if required F M Q

Battery Chargers 1 Check working of battery charger W M Q

2 Check terminals connections, rotary switches, fuses and working of meters

F M Q

Panel 1 Observe the panel and replace

fused indication lamps W M Q

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2 Check working of knob/push buttons, effectiveness of keys on panel and veeder counters

F M Q

Track circuits 1 Check

bonding/jumper/lead/connection TLJ boxes

M M Q

2 Replace block joint, ML3 months, LL 6 months

... ... ...

3 Clean glued joints

4 Test glued joint H H Y

5 Test block joint M M Q

6 Ensure fail-safe adjustment of TC ... Q Q

7 Measure track voltage at FE/RE/RT F M Q

8 Maintain history/reading book F M Q

9 Check RE bonding/Z bond, pandrol clips, bolts at block joints and GFN liners

F M Q

Rotary key transmitter 1 Check all fittings, clean contact

and lubricate the parts F M Q

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2 Test the working F M Q SM’s slide control frame 1 Check all working parts and

contact pressure ... M Q

2 Contact pressure ... M Q Location box 1 Check location box for locking F M Q 2 Clean the location box F M Q 3 Check the wiring on terminals

and earth connections F M Q

Colour light signals 1 Check signal unit, locking and

opening and holes to be covered M M Q

2 Check fixing of lamp holder contacts springs and terminals

M M Q

3 Ensure and clean lenses, measure voltage and adjust focusing, if required

M M M

Axle-counters 1 EJ Box

Check all nuts, bolts fitting of RX,TX

F M Q

Check connections of EJBs, measure reading and adjust, if required

F M Q

Check DIP, staggering and record M M Q

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the readings 2 Evaluator

Check coupler connections and soldering connections

M M Q

Measure reading, adjust, if required and record

F M Q

3 IB hut/RE cutting Check batteries, battery chargers and wiring on terminals

F M Q

Check voltage on relays F M Q Communication 1 Check block telephones F M Q 2 Check control telephone and VHF

sets F M Q

SCHEDULE OF INSPECTIONS – DIVISIONAL S&T OFFICERS

S.No. Type of inspection Sr.DSTE/DSTE ADSTE 1 Every station of the

Division 10% of total

stations Every station

of the Division in a

year

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1. Brief of the incident (Derailment): On 1st September 2017 at 12.45 hours, WOB Goods while entering on to DN loop line of MQR station of SC Division at a speed of 15 KMPH, one wagon derailed. Cause: Presence of residual coal on one side of the wagon (RH side) in the direction of the movement. Staff held responsible: Siding Authorities of ACC Siding/WADI under ‘Primary’ and on duty Commercial Clerk of ACC Siding/WADI under ‘Secondary’. Matters brought to light: 1. Original BPC was not seized and produced. 2. The front portion with 12 BOXNHL wagons cleared from

the site of accident to SEM station without the certification of C&W Supervisor or GLP written memo.

3. There was no proper lighting and high level platform facility at ACC Siding/WADI for examining wagons to know whether they are completely unloaded or not.

Suggestions and Recommendations:

Section “E” Accident cases – September-2017

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1. Siding Authorities shall be advised for strict compliance of complete unloading of contents from the loaded wagons during unloading either manually or by tipplers.

2. infrastructure facility should be developed by the Siding Authorities to facilitate Commercial Representative at Sidings to examine the complete unloading of the contents.

2. Brief of the incident (SPAD): On 2nd September, 2017 at

08.34 hours, LP of DN 57129 BJP – BMO Passenger passed DN Mainline Signal No.S-18 at ‘ON’ at STPD ‘B’ Cabin of HYB Division. Cause: Disregarding of signal aspect by LP & ALP. Staff held responsible: Primary 1. LP for not being attentive while on duty and not obeying

the aspect of the signal. 2. ALP also failed to apply emergency brake even after

noticing the LP not stopping at the S-18 which was at ‘on’.

3. CCC/KCG who has not followed the prescribed rules for booking of new ALP for duty and not ensuring that ALP has required LR in that section which resulted in SPAD.

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Secondary: CC/KCG fornot replacing the Alp eventhough CMS has rejected the booking while generating Train Ordering number. DRM/HYB while accepting the enquiry report, had also held ADME/HYB responsible for being in-charge Officer of the lobby, has not seen the working of CMS during his tenure of 8 months. All bookings by the lobby are required to be monitored by Officer level to ensure that the systems are in place which he failed to do so. Hence, he is also responsible for not ensuring the system’s health.

Matters Brought to Light: 1. New ALPs are being booked for coaching trains directly

without observing the mandatory guidelines to work in goods train at least for 6 months before utilizing in coaching trains.

2. Staff are being booked without ensuring road learning even though the system is rejecting (CMS) circumventing the procedure and making the entry under ‘fetch all’.

3. The LP & ALP are not able to communicate as there is no common language known to both of them in most of the cases.

Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. As on date against 127 sanctioned posts of LP/Passenger,

only 81 are available.

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2. The usage of smart phones to be banned for LP & ALP while on duty.

3. The LP & ALP should not carry their personal mobiles while on duty.

4. LP & ALP should not be booked in a combination where both of them are not knowing at least one common language.

5. All bookings of crew through CMS should be ‘fetch as per rule’ without any deviation. A statement of bookings done on daily basis under ‘fetch all’ to be put up to ADME and if he feels the reasons for deviating the rule and booking under ‘fetch all’ are not satisfactory, suitable explanation to be called from CCC and D&AR action to be initiated against the concerned staff, if necessary.

6. For the first trip of the ALP, one CLI should invariably to accompany the staff for their maiden trip.

3. Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment): On 4th September,

2017, at 22.10 hours, shunting instructions were given to reverse the BV and work the train from FM station of HYB Division to SNF station of SC Division. In this process, while pulling the formation towards BDVL end i.e., towards DHNE direction, locomotive derailed in Trap Point located just

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after Starter Signal No (which was at ‘on’). Train passing document to pass the Starter signal was given by Dy.SS/FM without operating the trap point from ‘N’ to ‘R’. Cause: Delivering the train passing document to the LP without ensuring the point position by the Dy.SS and Pointsman who was at the site. Staff held responsible: Dy.SS/FM and Guard/KCG are held responsible under ‘Primary’ and Pointsman under ‘Secondry’. Matters brought to light: NIL Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. Lighting needs to be provided towards BDVL end. 2. Conveying the PN by the Dy.SS on walkie talkie should

be avoided; instead it should be written by Dy.SS himself.

3. Ambush checks needs to be intensified.

4. Brief of the incident (SPAD): On 6th September, 2017, at 00.08 hours, LP of DN WOB Goods passed DN Home Signal of VKB station of SC Division at ‘on’ position. Cause: Failure to control the train well in advance of the stop signal which was at ‘on’. Staff held responsible: LP and ALP under ‘Primary responsibility. Guard/SNF who permitted the train to be

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backed after SPAD, Dy.SS/VKB who failed to collect the details from the LP and another Dy.SS/VKB for violation of SWR under ‘Blameworthy’. Matters brought to light: 1. Though LP has passed the Home Signal at ‘on’, CASM

replied that the LP did not pass Home Signal; instead he replied that there is a wire on the track due to which the track dropped.

2. Guard allowed the train to be backed without ascertaining the cause from the LP and also failed to inform SM/VKB.

Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. Effective counseling of LP & ALPs for prevention of SPAD

is essential on sustained basis. 2. Ambush checks need to be conducted by LIs to ascertain

the driving skills of the crew while approaching a stop signal which is at ‘on’.

3. SPM analysis to be done at random to know the alertness of LP.

5. Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment): On 12th September,

2017, at about 05.00 hours, while pushing RC-BTPN Goods into Oil Siding of RC station of GTL Division which is a dead-end, BV derailed.

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Cause: Adoption of incorrect procedures during shunting operations led to the derailment.. Staff held responsible: Dy.SS/RC under ‘Primary’; Shunter/RC and two Pointsman under ‘Secondary’; TI/RC under ‘Blameworthy’. Matters brought to light: 1. Usage of walkie-talkie sets during shunting should be

avoided. 2. Illumination needs improvement in Oil Siding. 3. SMR/RC should depute sufficient Shunting Staff and insist

on duty Dy.SS/Outdoor to adhere SWR provisions. Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. Stop Board need to be provided at the dead end locations

of Spur-1 & 2. 2. Vegetation need to be cleared. 3. TI/RC shall conduct surprise checks during night time to

see whether the staff are adopting safe habits in shunting operations or not.

6. Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment): On 19th September,

2017, at about 01.10 hours, while backing empty rake of 57469 Passenger on to Pitline, SLR derailed. Cause: Backing the formation without ensuring the Point No.110 position.

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Staff held responsible: Shunting Master/GTL and Pointsman under ‘Primary’; Shunter/GTL under ‘Blameworthy’. Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. Point indication was not available to know the point

position. 2. Lighting facility needs to be improved near Point No.110.

7. Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment): On 16th September 2017, at 12.20 hours, while performing shunting in Military Siding of BPP of BZA Division, one wagon derailed. Cause: Due to improper securing of Point No.103 with cotter / clamp & padlocking as a result 22m gap developed between tongue rail and stock rail leading to the derailment. Staff held responsible: Pointsman/BPP under ‘Primary’ for not securing the point; Goods Guard/BZA for not ensuring correct position of point under ‘Secondary. Also, SSE/P.Way under ‘Secondary’ for not maintaining the Point properly. Matters Brought to Light: 1. Standard cotters / bolts for locking / securing the points

are to be supplied to all the stations, especially where the sidings are there to avoid the re-occurrence.

2. It is to indicate that whenever the ARTs are moved, there should be a siren call so as to overcome the delay in starting the ART.

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3. All hand operated points may be converted into motor points.

8. Brief of the incident (Yard Derailment): On 9th September

2017, at 22.32 hours, loco derailed in Upper Yard of SC station of SC Division. While giving placement of MUGR empty rake from Washing Siding No.3 to PF-3 on Shunt Signal on Point No.31, got trailed through resulting in gap between tongue and stock rail on both sides. Cause: Point having both sides opening, cotter pin in LH side got bent. Staff held responsible: Pointsman/Upper Yard under ‘Primary’. Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. For every movement of non-interlocked points presence

of Pointsman is mandatory. 2. After passing shunt Signal, vehicles are passing over

non-interlocked point and hence, it is suggested to relocate the signal or point.

3. Proper lighting is required at point zones.

*****

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1. Tower Car shall be inspected once in ….. by …… 2. A mock NI working is required to be conducted between

--------- hours before the actual commencement of the NI working to understand the difficulties.

3. Expand AFTC 4. The maintenance schedule for TCM/JE/SE-Tele for

checking the emergency telephone sockets. 5. Minimum Horizontal distance from center of track to any

structure as per the revised SOD 6. Quad cable is used for …… 7. Lubrication of ERCs shall be done in corrosion prone

areas ---- 8. The Railway affecting tank which still requires heavy

repairs, despite repeated reminders of Railway, should be considered and included in the list of …….. locations.

9. Hot weather patrolman have a beat of ……. 10. Defective Weld (DFW) shall be marked with…..

Section “F” Test Your Knowledge

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KEY

1. Once in a month, nominated TXR (C&R/RE). 2. 08.00 to 16.00 hours. 3. Audio Frequency Track Circuit 4. Once in 10 days for the TCM, once in a month for the

JE/Tele and bi-monthly for the SE/Tele. 5. 2360mm 6. Axle Counter 7. Every year 8. Vulnerable 9. Two KMs on single line track 10. Two red cross marks

****

S. No.1 Sub: Railway Board Safety drive for prevention of accidents

for a period of 90 days with effect from 21.8.2017. Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Safety-I/3/2 dated

16.8.2017.

Section “G” Safety drives launched

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Member Traffic, Railway Board vide above referred letter advised Zonal Railways to a safety drive for a period of 90 days for prevention of accidents. Special emphasis has to be seen that Guard should not be let down and sustained efforts should be kept up to reduce the accidents. Supervisors and Officers of Traffic, Engineering, Mechanical, Electrical, S&T and Safety Departments need to be involved in the safety drive. The safety drive should be on the following subject / topic in the given pro-forma;

Subject / Topic Details of shortfalls noticed & ATR

Carry out inspections especially during night and ambush checks regularly to prevent accidents attributable to “Failure of Railway Staff”.

Review of fracture-prone locations – identification of OBS (under observation) and IMR (Immediate replacement) locations, action plan for removal, immediate remedial measures like imposing SR, patrolling casual renewal etc., be taken.

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Frequent and intensive footplate inspection of the vulnerable sections especially during night / early morning hours.

Ensuring availability of speed breakers, whistle boards, road signs and stop boards as per provisions laid down in the IRPWM. The condition of road surface at the level crossing should be proper.

Emphasis to be placed on maintenance of track, prevention of rail fractures and weld failures.

There should be ‘zero’ missing fittings particularly at locations like approaches to bridges, curves, and high banks, points and crossings etc.,

Track geometry especially on curves and transition portion of curves is checked and remedial action taken.

Deficiency of ballast especially at locations susceptible to trespassing, approach to bridges / curves is checked and remedial action taken.

Identification of sections where there is deficiency in USFD inspection or follow up action and deficiency is made good at the

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earliest. Joint inspection of Points and Crossings by Engineering and S&T Officials and their follow-up maintenance needs to be tightened up.

Proper attention to the track condition of loop lines and emergency crossovers.

Proper attention to wagons and coaches during maintenance, staff adopting shortcut methods in setting, clamping and padlocking of points during abnormal working.

Railways should exercise stricter control of maintenance standards of rolling stock in Loco Sheds, C&W Depots etc.,

Alertness on the part of station staff, Cabin staff, Gatemen and Running Staff for exchanging ‘all-right’ signals and for the safe passage of trains.

Wipe out arrears of PME and RC among Running Staff and way-side station staff.

Strict adherence to 10 hours rule for Running Staff.

Disconnection / Reconnection of signalling gears for maintenance.

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Rolling ‘out’ of locomotives from Shed with ‘zero’ defects / deficiencies.

Rolling Stock to be turned out with ‘zero’ missing / defective fittings from Depots.

Intensive rolling ‘in’ / ‘out’ checks.

Provision of standard height gauges at LCs and RUBs.

Updation of all SWRs, Traction Working Rules and GWRs to ensure physical matching with yard layout.

Divisions are advised to take suitable follow-up action on the deficiencies / shortfalls / irregularities noticed during the course of safety drive. Divisions are advised to send the details of the safety drive once in a fortnight to the email address of CSO without fail. Final consolidated report of the Division should be sent to this Office latest by 23.11.2017, repeat 23.11.2017 for onward transmission of information to Railway Board.

CSO

S. No.2 Sub: Launching of a fortnightly special safety drive regarding

“working on running lines” and “safety at work sites”.

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Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Safety (A&R)/1/18 dated 24.8.2017.

Railway Board vide above letter advised Zonal Railways that time and again the importance of safety aspects regarding “working on running lines” and “safety at work sites” have been impressed upon through various safety drives and written instructions. Instructions in regard to working on running lines are covered in detail in Chapter VIII of IRPWM and GR 15.06, 15.08 & 15.09. In regard to “safety at work sites” have been advised through Railway Board (ME) vide letter No. 2003/CE-II/safety misc.3 dated 18.02.2010 and D.O. No. 2013/CE-II/Accidt/Misc dated 23.5.2006. However, rising trend of derailments due to non-observance of above stipulations especially on passenger carrying trains is a serious cause of concern.

Hence, it is advised to launch a fortnightly special safety drive on the subject “working on running lines” and “safety at work sites” be launched with immediate effect and sensitise the staff concerned on the subject. Special emphasis may be given to the following; a. All Supervisory Staff of technical Departments and SMs /

SCORs may be sensitised about these instructions with

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special emphasis on Para 806 (3) (c), 807 (1) (f) and 810 (1) (c) of IRPWM and GR&SR 15.06, 15.08 (2 & 3).

b. Officers may be advised to carry out inspections to ensure that these instructions are being followed in letter and spirit to ensure safety of trains.

c. All deficiencies in implementation of safety measures at work sites as per extant instructions to be rectified to avoid recurrence of such incidences.

Officers and Supervisors of Engineering, Operating, Loco and Safety Departments may be involved in the drive. Suitable follow-up action to be taken on all deficiencies and irregularities noticed during the drive. The results of the drive should be sent to this Office latest by 11th of September 2017.

CSO

S. No.3 Sub: Launching of fortnightly safety drive on train

parting of coaching trains with effect from 29.9.2017.

Ref: Railway Board letter No. 2017/Safety-I/3/3 dated 27.9.2017.

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Railway Board vide reference cited above advised Zonal Railways to launch a fortnightly safety drive on “uncoupling of coaching formation” (train parting) subsequent to few incidences of uncoupling of passenger trains. In order to check and prevent such cases of train parting of coaching trains, a fortnightly safety drive is launched with effect from 29.9.2017. Following instructions need to be ensured to prevent train partings of coaching trains; 1. CBC of coaching stock should be maintained as per

RDSO maintenance instructions No. RDSO/2006/CG/CMI-01 – Revision-1 dated 29.7.2010. The loco CBC should be maintained as per RDSO technical booklet No.G-76 and Bulletin No. MP.IB.LD.01.17.10 (Rev.00) dated 07.4.2010.

2. Concerned staff should be rganized on aspects of safe maintenance and for following prescribed procedures / precautions while undertaking the maintenance / repairs of couplers in coaches / locomotives.

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3. Ensure that coaches to be coupled together are dead stopped at a distance of 1 – 2 m from each other. In case of coupling with locomotive, it should be 2 – 3m. In case the formation is occupied by passengers, ensure stoppage at 20m before the formation.

4. Align the two couplers to bring them in the gathering range.

5. Ensure that knuckle of at least one of the coupler is ‘open’. When coupling with locomotive, knuckle of locomotive should preferably be opened. However, when situation demands more gathering range, knuckles of both the couplers may be opened.

6. Ensure that speed at the time of coupling should be 2 to3 KMPH.

7. Ensure that lock lift levers of both the couplers are completely dropped. It is possible that knuckles are locked but the lock lift lever is not fully dropped. This situation is the most dangerous as it gives false indication of coupler locking. The coupler may

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open during run. Ensuring complete dropping of lock lift lever is important.

8. Following points must be checked to ensure proper coupling of CBC coupler; a. Telltale slot should be clear of rotary lift lever. b. Rotary lock lifter rib should be vertical. c. Locking screw of manual uncoupling device

should be in locked condition. This is to prevent manual uncoupling inadvertently.

9. Ensure that coupler must be checked for proper locking by pulling these couplers (by pulling loco forward).

10. Ensure strict observance of rule under GR 4.32 (B) for examination of uncoupling by LP.

11. In case locomotives are not fitted with ‘H’ type, AAR coupler head, a vertical restrictor should be provided in CBC of front end of first vehicle.

12. LP shall ensure provision of mechanical ‘U’ clamp and insertion of lock pin in loco coupler in screw coupling coaches.

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13. Special training should be organized for the concerned staff regarding procedures / precautions for coupling between coach to coach or locomotive to coach.

14. Circulate handbook regarding tight lock coupler and pamphlet No. CAMTECH/2009/M/C/CBC Pamphlet/1.0 of October,2009 (English version) and CAMTECH/2011/M/C/CBC pamphlet/1.0 of August 2011 (Hindi version) on ‘H’ type CBC issued by CAMTECH to the staff concerned (soft copy enclosed).

Officers and supervisors of Mechanical, Electrical, Operating and Safety Departments need to be involved in the safety drive. Results of the drive should be advised to this Office latest by 17th October 2017 for onward submission to Railway Board on 20th October 2017.

CSO

****

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The trend of increase in number of accidents and unusual

incidences of our Railway in this financial year upto the end of 3rd Quarter is not a healthy trend.

As many as 34 incidents of unusual / accidents have taken place of which 10 accidents have taken place in BZA Division, 9 in SC Division, 8 in GTL Division, 5 in HYB Division and one each in GNT & NED Divisions.

The breakup of accidents are 14 are Goods train derailments, 3 coaching train derailments, 6 loco derailments, 3 Engineering Track Machine derailments, 7 SPAD cases and one fire in loco.

Majority of accidents that have taken place are due to human failures (28 cases) and all of them are preventable.

Another area of causing concern is increasing trend in LC Gate ‘open’ cases on the face of approaching trains. As many as 22 LC Gate ‘open’ cases have taken place of which failures of Gatemen are 16 and failures of Dy.SMs 6 cases.

****

Section “H” Accident Statistics