We’re Working on It

Krogh Seminar Working Paper, Draft 2

Trellace Lawrimore and Reno Varghese

Abstract

Do small foreign aid donors trade money for political power in international

organizations? Large donors, like the United States, famously distribute aid for strategic

gain, but scholars often assume that small donors follow more humanitarian motives.

Focusing on Australia, this study quantitatively examines how a country’s desire for

power in international institutions compels it to give aid to countries that provide it

political support. Specifically, we consider countries that elect Australia to the Executive

Boards of the Bretton Woods Institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and

the World Bank. Using aid data from 1960 to 2009 and 186 countries, we test whether

Australia rewards member of its voting bloc with more foreign aid. Regression analyses

controlling for other aid motivations as well as country fixed-effects confirm the

hypothesis. We find that Australia, which has historically controlled powerful Executive

Directorships at the IMF and World Bank, attempts to signal a seemingly subdued

approach to international relations while quietly cultivating power in major financial

institutions.

I. Introduction

Boasting a program that “save[s] lives [and] promote[s] opportunities for all,” the

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) prides itself on its

humanitarian aid practices (AusAID 2012). Large donors famously distribute aid for

political gain, but scholars often assume that small donors, like Australia, follow more

humanitarian motives (Hoadley 1980, Sielaff and Skillman 2014). Yet, small donors do

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have strategic goals, and may use aid as a part of their foreign policy toolkits. 1 Focusing

on Australia, our study quantitatively examines how a country’s desire for power in

international institutions compels it to give aid to countries that provide it political

support. We assert that Australia in particular achieves regional hegemonic status in the

Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the

World Bank—through its strategic aid disbursal.

Existing scholarly research has not reached a consensus on Australia’s foreign aid

policy. Some find that trade is the primary motivation (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Bermeo

2012, Berthelemy 2006, Berthelemy and Tichit 2004); others argue the importance of

colonial legacies and regional ties (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Isopi and Mattesini 2008,

Neumayer 2003). Some even propose strictly selfish motives, whereby Australia benefits

directly from distributing food aid or technical assistance (Davis 2009; Dollery, Fleming,

and Heinecke 2008; Easterly and Williamson 2011). Still others suggest that Australia’s

aid disbursal does not reflect political motivations (Gounder 1995, Gounder 1999,

Gounder and Sen 1999, McCawley 2009). These dissonant (and in some cases, mutually

exclusive) opinions make it difficult to comprehend Australia’s foreign aid policy.

We therefore attempt to construct a more comprehensive story of Australian

foreign aid. Using aid data from 1960-2009, we analyze variables that support either the

Recipient Need (RN) model or the Donor Interest (DI) model.2 We first rebuff the

credibility of the RN model, and then turn to Australia’s DI aid, addressing possible

strategic motivations: colonial legacy, regional ties, and bilateral trade. Importantly, we

1 We credit Secretary Madeleine Albright for the imagery of a foreign policy toolbox. Note to ourselves and the particularly prudent Krogh students: This is actually from a book that Vreeland cites in his UNSC book. We’re dealing with it later.2 We credit this definition of models to McKinlay and Little, 1977.

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introduce an innovative measure of Australia’s foreign policy interests: membership in

Australia’s BWI blocs.

Recent foreign aid literature suggests a relationship between BWI voting blocs

and foreign aid distribution. Vreeland, the first to use the BWI indicator as such,

discusses the flow of bilateral aid from Switzerland to countries in its BWI voting bloc

(Vreeland 2011). Mazumder and Vreeland then contest the claim “that middle-power

countries like Canada do not disburse foreign aid according to strategic foreign policy

objectives” through an analysis of Canadian aid disbursal to countries in its BWI blocs

(Mazumder and Vreeland 2013).

Peter Carroll specifically addresses Australia’s historical relationship with the

IMF. After his extensive analysis of Australia’s IMF bloc dynamics, he ponders, “It

would be interesting to see if the membership in the IMF by the other small island state

members of the constituency was stimulated not only by Australian diplomatic efforts but

by increases in development aid, though there is no evidence to support or reject the case

of which the author is yet aware” (Carroll 2011: 11).

Our research directly addresses Carroll’s question, and proceeds as follows. In the

first section, we synthesize Australia’s history in the BWIs. We then explain AusAID’s

foreign aid policy, and expound on the existing research regarding Australian foreign aid.

We proceed by dividing our methodology section into three categories: descriptive

statistics, control variables, and regression results. We conclude with implications and a

discussion of Australia’s future in the BWIs.

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II. Australia and the Bretton Woods Institutions

In the years post-World War II, Australia was among the almost 50 countries that

congregated in an array of newly founded international organizations. Two of these

organizations were the BWIs, which Australia joined in 1947. Yet despite this long

history in global governance, Australia is absent from international power politics today.

With its relatively small economy (Australia ranks behind Los Angeles, USA, in a 2009

World Bank analysis of top world economies. And in terms of GDP PPP, Australia falls

behind Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran.), Australia lacks the clout of G8,3 G8+5, and

BRICS members (World Bank 2009).

In spite of this, Australia consistently exercises power the BWI Executive Boards.

Eight governments, or “great powers” in the BWIs—the United States, Japan, Germany,

France, the United Kingdom, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia (in order of vote-share)—

have country-specific directors (Vreeland 2011). The other 180 BWI members choose the

remaining 16 (IMF) and 17 (World Bank) directors by forming blocs, usually aligned by

geographical region or colonial legacy. Since 1960, Australia has served on one of the

BWI Executive Boards all but two years. Today, Australia’s bloc includes Kiribati,

Korea, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New

Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu.

Executive Directors have considerable power.4 BWI Directors have the final say

the organizations’ most critical decisions: lending, hiring, and evaluations of member-

countries’ economic policies. Furthermore, the position accompanies a status of prestige

and access to private information in board meetings (Vreeland 2011). When considering

3 At the time of publication, a more accurate description of the G8 is the G7+1 suspended member.4 Certainly, the BWI Executive Boards are no Security Council, on which Australia rarely serves (Langmore 2013).

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Australia’s relatively minor role in the global economy, such authority over international

economic policy seems even more impressive.

But how does Australia convince these small countries to continue electing it to

the Executive Board? Ostensibly, Executive Directors serve as representatives for all of

their bloc members. But surely, Vanuatu, say, does not rely on Australia and only

Australia to deliver its wants and needs to the Executive Board. If relationships of mutual

understanding alone determined IMF blocs, it is unlikely that Mongolia or Vietnam

would choose to elect Australia to the Board.

Australia, in fact, sits in a tenuous place in the IMF. In 2012, Australia’s voting

bloc had a voting power share of 4.94 percent, 2.68 percent of which was from Korea and

Australia alone (IMF 2012). Moreover, Australia’s Pacific neighbors have some of the

lowest quotas in the IMF, leaving Australia with minimal voting capacity (Rapkin and

Strand 2005). In fact, the smallest vote-share holder in the IMF—Tuvalu—is in

Australia’s bloc (IMF 2012). Although an independent share of 1.31 percent keeps

Australia out of the lowest echelon of the quota hierarchy, it holds little gravitas

compared to the powerhouse single-country voters like the United States (17.46 percent),

or the United Kingdom and France (both at 5.05 percent).5

Consequently, without the electoral support of its bloc members, Australia would

lose its most authoritative position in global governance. Thus, it is willing to pay for

their support with increased amounts of foreign aid.

We will be inserting a paragraph here about New Zealand and Korea.

5 In their research, Rapkin and Strand discuss more appropriate ways to calculate and define the IMF quotas.

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III. Determining Australian Foreign Aid

The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) makes a bold

proclamation in its 2012-13 Annual Report: “The fundamental purpose of the Australian

aid program is to help people overcome poverty. This also serves Australia’s national

interests by promoting stability and prosperity both in our region and beyond” (AusAID

2013). The 2011 Partnership Framework between AusAID and the World Bank

epitomizes the agency’s lofty goals, as both parties claim to share the objective of having

the “most effective aid program possible” (AusAID 2012).

Defending the effectiveness of its program, AusAID declares that its regional

focus is the best use of its aid budget, because “two-thirds of the world’s poor live in the

Asian Pacific” (AusAID 2012). McCawley of Sydney’s Lowy Institute of Public also

asserts that “long-term mass poverty in the third world” is an international emergency in

the context of Asia (McCawley 2009). But AusAID’s unsubstantiated claim of regional

poverty ignores an important caveat: 46 percent of the world’s poor do live in the Asian

Pacific—in India and China, where Australia allocates almost no foreign aid (World

Bank 2010).

AusAID’s questionable position on the economic status of its aid recipients

(AusAID 2012), alongside reports that its aid methods may be ineffective and corrupt

(Davis 2009; Dollery, Fleming, and Heinecke 2008), surely challenges the RN model of

Australian foreign aid. Easterly and Williamson find that Australia is one of the “largest

donors of food aid,” an often tied aid practice in which “higher income countries. . .shed

their excess agricultural products without any concern for the local agricultural markets

in the receiving country.” In addition to food aid, more than 30 percent of Australia’s

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foreign aid is technical assistance, which “must be used to hire consultants from the

donor country” (Easterly and Williamson 2011).

Moreover, when the aid program faced dramatic bureaucratic changes in 2013, it

did so at the cost of aid effectiveness. ActionAid Australia noted its concerns after the

government announced in September 2013 that AusAID would merge with the

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

“The government’s short sighted decision to integrate AusAID into DFAT will have massive and devastating effects on Australia’s aid program and on the people living in poverty that the program supports. With AusAID reporting to DFAT, we will inevitably see the aid budget used to promote Australia’s national interests first and foremost. Aid programs that don’t contribute to Australia’s interests will be the first to go, and we are extremely concerned about what this will mean for the most marginalised communities in some of the world’s poorest countries. The message Tony Abbott is sending to the world’s poor is that Australia is no longer committed to ending poverty.” (SBS 2013).

The merger lends an obvious answer to the question of Australian foreign aid.

Australia funds its trade partners. Since Australia’s natural trade partners are in the

developing world, its economy will surely benefit if these partners have more money to

spend on its imports. Alesina and Dollar’s findings support this view. They report that

Australia gives about twice as much aid to open rather than closed economies, rewarding

good economic policy (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Foreign aid analysis has historically

found that countries give to their trade partners, and Australia is no exception to this

theme6 (Bermeo 2012, Berthelemy 2006, Berthelemy and Tichit 2004).

Yet, many of Australia’s trade partners are also its neighbors in the Asian Pacific.

Perhaps, as Neumayer suggests, Australia merely attempts to exert a sphere of influence

6 The trend continues today. Australia has recently affirmed that its “highest regional trade negotiation priority is the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” (TPP) (DFAT 2012b).

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by concentrating its aid in the Asian Pacific (Neumayer 2003).7 Neumayer defines this

idea as regional bias. Or, considering that many countries in Australia’s region also share

its colonial ties, maybe Australia bases its foreign aid policy on colonial history. Alesina

and Dollar find that 55.5 percent of Australia’s aid goes to its former colonies, while

Isopi and Mattesini find a statistically significant relationship between colonial status and

aid received (Isopi and Mattesini 2008).

As the introduction discusses, few scholars have considered how Australia’s

desire for power in the BWIs influences its foreign aid distribution. Yet Carroll’s 2011

research prompts us to explore a new hypothesis regarding Australian foreign aid:

Australia buys its power in the Bretton Woods Institutions by exchanging foreign aid for

membership in its voting blocs.

IV. Methods

A. Descriptive Data

We test whether members of Australia’s BWI bloc receive more foreign aid than

other countries when controlling for regional status, colonial past, and bilateral trade with

Australia. We analyze a time-series cross-sectional dataset of the Official Development

Assistance (ODA) that Australia provides to countries. The dataset comes from the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its Development

Assistance Committee (DAC). It includes annual observations from 1960 to 2009 for 186

countries. The dataset consists of 9,078 country-year observations, and out of these

country-year observations, Australia provides aid in 3,070 of them.

7 Hugo Dobson also discusses Australia’s motivations for regionalism, but in terms of G20 involvement (Dobson 2011).

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We generate a dichotomous indicator for membership in Australia’s BWI bloc,

our main independent variable. The indicator is coded 1 for years when a country is a part

of the Australian bloc and coded 0 otherwise. The country-years where the indicator is 1

are: South Africa (1960-1974), New Zealand (1963-2009), Philippines (1975-2009),

South Korea (1979-2009), Vietnam (1960-1966), Papua New Guinea (1977-2009),

Lesotho (1969-1972), Western Samoa (1973-2009), Marshall Islands (1993-2009),

Swaziland (1971-1974), Mongolia (1993-2009), the Federal State of Micronesia (1995-

2009), Seychelles (1979-2009), Solomon Islands (1979-2009), Vanuatu (1983-2009),

Palau (1996-2009), Kiribati (1987-2009), Cambodia (1995-2009).8

Excluding Korea and New Zealand, the two developed countries that have served

as Executive Directors and rotated the Alternate Directorship, Seychelles has the highest

per capita GDP in the Australian bloc countries at $13,684 (Constant 2013 USD).

Australia provides its bloc members approximately 48 percent of its aid budget.

Considering that the population of these countries is less than 4 percent of the world’s

population, this is a high amount of aid earmarked for solely Australian bloc countries.

However, other factors, such as regional status and bilateral may confound this apparent

relationship. As a result, we begin a rigorous analysis of this perceived relationship.

8 Tuvalu and Uzbekistan joined the bloc in 2011, but our dataset only has data until 2009.

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B. Control Variables

Our control variables include GDP per capita and population. Not only has

previous literature asserted these as important factors in determining foreign aid, they

also test for the recipient need model. Additionally, we capture the traditional

explanations for receiving Australian foreign aid by controlling for a past colonial legacy

with Australia, as well as Britain, regional status, and bilateral trade with Australia. We

predict that poor countries that have historically strong trade relations with Australia will

receive more aid, particularly if they have an Australian or British colonial past. In

addition, we control for Australia’s Executive Director status to determine whether

holding the position affects foreign aid distribution. We include a dichotomous indicator

1 for years when Australia is Executive Director of both institutions, and 0 otherwise.

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Years for which the indicator was 0 are: 1971-1976, 1981, 1982, 1987-1990, 1995-1999,

2004-2007, and 2010. We expect that when Australia holds the Executive Director seat in

the BWI, more aid is dispersed to members of their bloc because of promises made in the

election period.

Bilateral trade data is from the dyadic dataset used in the Correlates of War

project. The dataset measures trade flows between states from 1870-2009 and contains

national export and import data for all countries. Countries in Australia’s region include:

East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Marshall Islands, the Federal State of

Micronesia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Palau, Tonga, New Zealand, Kiribati,

Tuvalu, Fiji, and Nauru. This variable is time-invariant and always coded 1 for these

countries, and 0 otherwise.

We expect a positive and statistically significant correlation between the controls

and Australian foreign aid after we place an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) on

the data. However, we wish to know if the BWI bloc indicator will remain statistically

significant with rigorous controls.

Finally, we apply a year-fixed effects model to our regression analysis to address

possible endogeneity. We do consider controlling for country-fixed effects, but since

there are minimal changes in other variables of interest including the BWI bloc

dichotomous indicator, it is not possible to include them. As a result, we control for

region fixed effects in lieu of controlling for country fixed effects. While these measures

should capture unobserved endogenity between both years and regions, in lieu of

countries, we keep their possible effects in mind.

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C. Regression Results

The regression results support our hypothesis. Australian bloc status has a

statistically significant effect on foreign aid distribution to countries. The coefficient of

Australian bloc status is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all

models including those with all control variables. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics

and data sources.

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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable Stata Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Measure Source

Australian ODA aussieaid 9,080 7.2 53.5 -1.06 1260.23

constant 2010USD, millions OECD

Membership in Australia's

Bloc aussieBWI 9,080 0.04 0.2 0 1 Binary

IMF & WBG Annual Reports

Population population 9,07734,700,0

00142,000,0

00 6,1041,340,000,0000 Count

World Development Indicators 2012(WDI)

GDP per capita gdppercapita 7,122 3006 4868 55 61375

constant 2010

USD, thousand WDI 2012

Bilateral Trade totalflow 9,080 191 1730 -18 75998

constant 2012

USD, millions

Correlates

of War

Membership in Asian Pacific

regional

aussie 9,080 0.06 0.2 0 1 Binary Vreeland

Australian ODA when ED aussieBWIED 9,080 0.02 0.15 0 1 Binary

World Bank Reports; Vreeland

Colony aussiecolony 9,080 0.002 0.04 0 1 BinaryCIA World Factbook

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Table 2 illustrates that with (Model 2) and without (Model 1) preliminary controls

placed on the independent variable, there remains a positive, statistically significant

correlation between the log of Australian Aid and membership in the Australian bloc at

the 0.01 level. All of the controls had the expected effect, except for the Australian BWI

Executive Director variable, which had a statistically significant negative correlation

instead of the expected positive correlation. Overall, membership in the Australian bloc

delivers an extra

Table 2: Preliminary Effects on Log of Australian Aid

Variable (1) (2)Log of Australian Aid

Membership in Australian Bloc

1.442***(0.061)

0.756***(0.094)

Australian BWI Executive Director Status

-0.479***(0.115)(0.000)

Log of Population 0.127***(0.008)

Log of Bilateral Trade 0.133***(0.007)

Australia’s Region 2.216***(0.071)

Australian Colony 1.087***(0.250)

British Colony 0.365***(0.029)

Year Fixed Effects No NoCountry Fixed Effects No No_cons 0.428*** -1.80***

(0.012) (0.122)Number of observations 8753 6077Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.4

Table 3 illustrates the results for when we address endogenity. When both models

for year fixed effects (Model 1) and country fixed effects (Model 2) are applied to the

data with all relevant controls, the positive correlation remains statistically significant at

the 0.01 level. Therefore, our results are robust after we apply fixed effects to the data.

Table 3: Results on Log of Australian Aid

Variable (1) (2)Log of Australian Aid

Australian Bloc 0.709*** 0.537***(0.195) (0.124)

GDP per Capita -0.000*** -0.000***(0.000) (0.000)

Log of Population 0.077*** 0.118***(0.012) (0.008)

Log of Bilateral Trade 0.181*** 0.052***(0.016) (0.009)

Australia’s Region 2.113*** 2.646***(0.228) (0.089)

Australian Colony 0.977 1.248(0.822) (0.840)

British Colony 0.321*** 0.375***(0.027) (0.028)

Australian BWI Executive Director Status -0.498*** -0.538***

(0.186) (0.165)

Year Fixed Effects Yes NoCountry Fixed Effects No Yes_cons -1.071*** -1.725 ***

(0.181) (0.120)Number of observations 6077 6077Adj. R-squared 0.40 0.51

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Beyond our findings about the positive correlation between Australian ODA and

Australian bloc status, the effects of some of the control variables are noteworthy. We

find the expected negative correlation with GDP per capita, indicating that Australia still

follows are RN approach to ODA to a certain extent. The effects of the control variables

support the existing literature. Regional membership, colonial status, and trade have

positive, statistically significant correlations. Interestingly, Australia’s Executive Director

status has a statistically significant negative correlation with foreign aid. We suggest

more rigorous experiments to explain why Australia may give out less aid when it is the

Executive Director. It is possible that Australia increases donations before the vote, and

then decreases aid distribution while it is on the Executive Board.

In context, the results support the claim that Australia follows a DI model of

ODA. After rigorous controls, the correlation is positive, statistically significant, and

robust. Australia, despite its economic mediocrity and military negligence, remains a

power in international financial institutions through manipulating ODA.

Conclusion

Small and mid-level donors go to extensive lengths to gain clout in international

organizations. Despite its unassuming character on the world stage, Australia maintains a

commanding presence in the world’s preeminent financial institutions by exchanging

foreign aid for loyal votes. Since Australia cannot wield great military or economic

power, it pays increased costs in foreign aid to its BWI mates to assert its voice in global

financial decisions. Most members of Australia’s bloc reap the benefits of increased aid,

and the two members that do not require aid (Korea and New Zealand), have a separate

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arrangement to rotate the Alternate Directorship. These commitments create a cohesive

bloc. Thus, despite its weak status relative to single elector states, Australia’s bloc has

remained remarkably consistent since the Cold War.

Still, we wonder if Australia’s system of exchanging aid for political power will

hold in the future. Reapportionments in the IMF and World Bank quota systems will

undoubtedly favor Korea and other Asian countries at the expense of the original 50

Bretton Woods countries. Perhaps Korea and the developing nations in Australia’s bloc

will come to challenge Australia for the Executive Directorship. Australia’s carefully

crafted system may fail as their current aid recipients assert themselves on the

international stage. While its foreign aid scheme has worked in the past, the future is

uncertain. Rising costs, domestic politics, and the growing Asian Tigers imperil the aid-

for-votes arrangement Australia has cultivated for the last 50 years.

Pieter Willem Botha, one of the politicians who helped South Africa leave the

Australian bloc in 1975, stated in 1979, “We are moving into a changing world, we must

adapt otherwise we shall die.”

Australia would do well to heed his words.

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