View, Master, Title Master and engagement: amending ... · Shell Exploration & Production...

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Shell Exploration & Production This Picture can be removed or made to fill complete area by going to View, Master, Title Master and amending picture accordingly Copyright: Shell Exploration & Production Ltd. 2nd focused topic stakeholder engagement: Gravity Base Structure (GBS) (Shell is operator of the Brent Field for and on behalf of Shell U.K. Limited and Esso Exploration and Production UK Limited )

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Shell Exploration & Production

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2nd focused topic stakeholder engagement:

Gravity Base Structure (GBS)

(Shell is operator of the Brent Field for and on behalf of Shell U.K. Limited and Esso Exploration and Production UK Limited )

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DisclaimerThis presentation contains forward-looking statements concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Royal Dutch Shell.

All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and

uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-

looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Royal Dutch Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified

by their use of terms and phrases such as ‘‘anticipate’’, ‘‘believe’’, ‘‘could’’, ‘‘estimate’’, ‘‘expect’’, ‘‘intend’’, ‘‘may’’, ‘‘plan’’, ‘‘objectives’’, ‘‘outlook’’, ‘‘probably’’, ‘‘project’’, ‘‘will’’, ‘‘seek’’, ‘‘target’’, ‘‘risks’’, ‘‘goals’’, ‘‘should’’ and similar terms and phrases. Also included as a forward looking

statement is our disclosure of reserves, proved oil and gas reserves, proven mining reserves, organic reserves, net reserves and resources. There

are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Royal Dutch Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those

expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this presentation including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and naturalgas; (b) changes in demand for the Group’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserve estimates; (f) loss of

market and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition

properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and

countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, fiscal and regulatory developments including potential litigation and regulatory effects arising

from recategorisation of reserves; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks

of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays

in the reimbursement for shared costs; and (m) changes in trading conditions. All forward-looking statements contained in this presentation are

expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional factors that may affect future results are contained in Royal Dutch Shell’s 20-F for the year ended December

31, 2007 (available at www.shell.com/investor and www.sec.gov ). These factors also should be considered by the reader. Each forward-looking

statement speaks only as of 09/09/2008. Neither Royal Dutch Shell nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise

any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this presentation.

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits oil and gas companies, in their filings with the SEC, to disclose only proved

reserves that a company has demonstrated by actual production or conclusive formation tests to be economically and legally producible under

existing economic and operating conditions. We use certain terms in this presentation that SEC's guidelines strictly prohibit us from including in filings

with the SEC. U.S. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov. You can also obtain these forms from the SEC by calling 1-800-SEC-0330.

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Safety and arrangements for today

• Fire Alarms

• Emergency Exits

• Toilets

• Lunch

• Mobile Phones

• Chatham House Rules

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Objectives for today

• To share understanding of the Brent ‘D’ Gravity Base Structure (GBS) and the issues relevant to its potential removal

• For us to understand…

– your views on the work to date

– the criteria you feel are important for making decisions

• We would like your feedback on the comparative assessment process we propose to use

• We also want to understand and record any thoughts, issues or concerns you have about the overall project and encourage you to record these on the memory wall

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NOT the objectives for today

• Today, we will not be seeking to select a decommissioning option for the GBS

Assess Assess feasibilityfeasibility

Select the Select the conceptconcept

Define the Define the concept as concept as a projecta project

Execute the Execute the projectproject

We are considering concept scenarios for the decommissioning of the GBS.

We are not selecting any particular option.

LATER we will assess feasible decommissioning scenarios using comparative assessment.

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Agenda for today

• Recap the scope and status of the project

• Outcomes from November 2007 engagement session

• Describe how we are going to work today

• Presentation and Q&A on GBS

• Round tables considering different aspects of GBS decommissioning & assessment

• Lunch

• Comparative assessment process

• Round table session and feedback

• Next steps

• CLOSE at 1600

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Project update

Austin Hand

Brent Decommissioning Project Director

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Where is the Brent Field

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~160 wells4 topsides1 steel jacket3 GBS~36 pipelines2 subsea locations

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Brent Alpha Brent Charlie Brent Bravo + Delta

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Recap principles of the project

• Execute with full regulatory compliance

• Cause no harm to people

• Take full account of environmental risks and consequences and strive to ensure no unacceptable or unplanned environmental impacts are caused

• Compliance with Shell’s commitment to sustainable development

• Promote best industry practice and deliver new technology and standards where appropriate

• Adopt the waste hierarchy to maximize re-use and recycling opportunities for the facilities

• Brent decommissioning will deliver maximum cost efficiency and value for partners and stakeholders

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Decommissioning Option Selection Process

I R GBERR Approval

Current overall status

Recommend OptionPlan Approved

Regular Engagement opportunity to listen/share.Identify Issues

Inform decisions

OPEN

TRANSPARENT

INCLUSIVE

INTEGRATED

Ongoing Stakeholder Engagement

Technical Development and Stakeholder Engagement in Parallel

IRG: Challenge & Assurance on Robustness of Technical Basis

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Current project status

• Well Plug and Abandonment ready to go - schedule issues

• Cell sampling deferred

• Other Shell resources (Global Projects Group) engaged for support

• Field development opportunities continue to be progressed

• OSPAR update

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Independent Review Group (IRG)

• Role appreciated by stakeholders on previous projects

• Independent review of technical scope and conclusions, to provide assurance to technical basis of decisions

• Individuals invited to participate by Prof John Shepherd (Chair)

– Independent experts –international reputations in key fields of scientific and technical activity

• Retain “freedom to publish” findings

IRG Panel Members

• Professor John G. Shepherd, Chairman(UK)

• Mr. Torgeir Bakke (Norway)

• Professor Gunther F. Clauss (Germany)

• Professor William D. Dover (UK)

• Professor Jurgen Rullkotter (Germany)

• Professor W. Brian Wilkinson (UK)

• Mr. Richard J. Clements, Secretary (UK)

Biographies and Terms of Reference available on the Brent Field Decommissioning Studies website

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Stakeholder engagement

Jim NivenBrent Decommissioning Stakeholder Engagement Manager

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Proposed stakeholder dialogue events to support Comparative Assessments

Q4

2007

GBS storage cell remediation +sampling update

General project update + drill cuttings+ waste

General project update + focus on GBS decommissioning

GBS storage cell sampling+ remediation

Nov

Sept

Apr

Nov

Q1

2008

Q2

2008

Q3

2008

Q4

2008

Q1

2009

Q2

2009

Q3

2009

Q4

2009

Routine dialogue meetings with some stakeholders

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Engagement plan (proposed) and status

– 2007: Four stakeholder dialogue events held (Aberdeen x2, London x2)

– June/July/August ’08: Routine dialogue meetings with few UK ENGOs

– Q3/Q4 ‘08: Brent Decommissioning www site upgrade (Phase 1)

– September ’08: Stakeholder dialogue sessions (Aberdeen, London)

– Q4 ’08: European ENGOs + few other stakeholders - routine dialogue meetings

– Q2 ’09: Stakeholder Dialogue sessions (Aberdeen, London) - proposed topic Drill Cuttings

– Q4 ‘09: Stakeholder Dialogue sessions (Aberdeen, London) - proposed topic Cell Sampling status + results ?

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Feedback from the Nov. 2007 EventsTopics raised

• Cell sampling techniques, statistical analysis

• Number of cells to be sampled, sampling programme

• Sharing information, language

• Who is doing the analyses? Methodology

• Impacts of sampling

• Additional stakeholders

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Brent Delta Gravity Base Structure

Paul SmyBrent Decommissioning Execution Manager

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OverviewDesign: Dr Olav OlsenBuilt: Norwegian ContractorsInstalled: July 1976

Water Depth: 142 metresWeight: 178,000 tonnes incl.

14,000 tonnes of steelHeight: 173.3 mLeg diameters: 12.1m - 20.3m; Wall thickness: 0.55m - 1.15mNumber of Cells: 19 (16 used for storage)

Storage capacity: 1,100,000 bbls145,000 tonnes160,000m3

Wells: 40 + 8 conductors (not used)inside two drilling legs

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Key Regulatory Aspects• OSPAR Decision 98/3

– Prohibits dumping of offshore installations at sea

– Presumption that offshore installations will be removed entirely

– Recognises difficulties removing footings of steel jackets >10,000 tonnes (pre 1999), and concrete substructures, and therefore allows for derogation from Decision 98/3

– Derogations will be assessed on a case by case basis

BERR Guidelines state:

– If the owners of a concrete installation wish the Government to consider a derogation from the general rule of total removal to land, the Operator must undertake an assessment in accordance with Annex 2 to the Decision.

– The assessment must show that there are significant reasons why sea disposal or leaving the installation in place is preferable to re-use or recycling or final disposal on land.

• In principle the project will use Comparative Assessment to comply with the regulations.

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GBS Decommissioning - Forward study planning

Possible scenarios are identified as:

– Refloat scenario, inshore demolition & onshore disposal

– Derogation of GBS with legs protruding above sea level

– Partial removal/derogation of legs to –55m

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Other operators have addressed GBS decommissioning for a variety of designs. What can we learn ?

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Ekofisk

Key points (ref. Storting Proposition No. 51):• Reverse installation could not be achieved in one summer therefore a high risk of failure during winter.• Significant costs would be required to prepare for removal and verify critical factors without

guarantee of success.• Leaks may arise during refloat leading to unplanned sinking and therefore failure to refloat.• Failure during towing could lead to possible damage to other installations and exceeds operator

limits.• Refloat and inshore demolition has significant risk of fatality and is considered unacceptable.

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Frigg

Key points (ref OSPAR Consultation Document):•The strength and integrity of substructures for refloat cannot be confirmed, failure during refloatoperations is possible.•The reaction of the substructure during freeing from the seabed can not be predicted, failure or damage to other installations may result.•There is significant chance of uncontrolled leakages, leading to unplanned sinking and failure to refloat.•The chance of major accident during attempted refloat is 20x – 300x higher than acceptable risk levels.•Refloat and inshore demolition has significant risk of fatality, and is unacceptable.

Frigg

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Removal – Where are we with the studies ?Studies executed by the original designer Dr Olav Olsen and competitor Doris Engineering

Extensive research into archive documentation and historical records is ongoing (30 years worth)

Key issues that determine the feasibility of refloat have been identified and are undergoing further detailed study.

•Weight and Centre of Gravity•Soils conditions under the GBS•Penetrations•Reinstatement of Ballast systems•Structural integrity during refloat•Installation of under-base water injection.

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The condition of the GBS & systems needs to be fully understood

• Why is this a concern?

– Failure to identify vulnerabilities may result in refloat failure

• Potential uncertainties and vulnerabilities

– Existing cracks and fractures

• Approx 80% of cell tops are covered by material

• Star cell 19; damaged during installation

– Can all penetrations (holes in GBS) be identified & plugged?

– Conductor penetrations

• Slot 24 is thought to have damaged the base

• Is it possible to plug and inspect/ test integrity

– Original installation systems are over30 years old, are they usable ? (Grout filled, deteriorated, complex access)

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Penetrations

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Integrity Modelling (Finite Element Analysis)

• Integrity modelling would allow the structural response to refloat to be analyzed.

• Why is this a concern?

– We need to predict if structural failure is avoidable or inevitable.

• Potential uncertainties and complications

– Concrete cracking (tri-cell wall) and failure

– Water pressure

– Modelling uncertainties

– Cell air pressure

– Original design did not include refloat analysis

– Integrity inspection

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Weight and centre of gravity (CoG)

• Deviation of 2-3% may jeopardise refloat operations

• Why is this a concern?

– Uncontrolled ascent due to overestimated weight and high ”push-out” resistance

– Could potentially result in overstress of critical areas of structure

• Potential uncertainties

– solid ballast (tricells, material inside conductor legs & storage cells)

– grout and mud stuck to underside of structure post refloat

– marine growth

– drill cuttings, debris on top of caisson post clean-up

– potential entrained water

– Accuracy of weight distribution calculations

– Internal cell contents

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Hydrodynamic aspects (behaviour during refloat)

• After deballasting and underbasewater injection, the GBS should technically refloat

• Why is this a concern?

– Requires structure to be stable and predicable during ascent

Potential complexities and uncertainties

– Symmetry of deballasting operation and the need for trim during deballasting

– Accuracy of buoyancy (low as possible) and break loose forces

– Accuracy of weight and CoG (explained elsewhere) , symmetry of skirt penetration

– Underbase water injection

– Extent and speed of ascent

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Sealing the holes left by wells

• Two GBS legs contain a total of 48 well conductor slots requiring to be plugged

• Why is this a concern?

– Refloat unlikely unless water is deballasted from the drilling legs

– Instability during refloat

– Excessive weight

• Potential uncertainties and complications

– Is it possible to remove solid drill cuttings safely from the bottom of the legs ?

– Is it feasible to plug/seal, verify and maintain 48 conductor slots in 142 m of water

– Particular issue with slot 24, conductor sleeve potentially damaged

– Legs are flooded therefore saturated diving would be required; dive bell access very complex

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Soil conditions under GBS and around skirts

• Why is this a concern?

– Need to overcome soil suction to extract GBS from seabed

– This is required during deballasting operations at the point of neutral buoyancy

– There could be potential for water to channel or leak, leading to failure of extraction operations

• Potential uncertainties

– Ability to accurately predict soil behaviour

– Soil properties (after 30 years of operation)

– Soil behaviour during injection of water under foundation

– Propensity for soil channelling

– Potential leak paths in and around foundation skirts while injecting water underneath base

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Reinstatement of the ballast (water pumping) system

• Concerns

– Refloat not possible?

– Original system installed 30 years ago

– Cells required to work independently

– Minicell access- risky and complex

• Uncertainties and Complications

– Access difficult

– Original pipe work grouted up

– Poor reliability

– New system - has to be external - significant cost, time and vulnerability

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Forward study planningAim of current study strategy:

• “For each scenario identify the route to decommissioning which poses least risk from a technical, safety, environmental, and economic perspective to allow a ‘like for like’ comparison of each of the decommissioning scenarios”

• Scenarios identified as:

– Refloat scenario, inshore demolition and onshore disposal

– Derogation of GBS with legs protruding above sea level

– Partial removal/derogation of legs to –55m

• Current investigations concentrating on quantifying technical uncertainties

• Identify key steps for each of the various decommissioning scenarios

• Identify hazards, risks and mitigations associated with each step

• Identify if there are any dominant risks (80-20 rule)

• Contribute to comparative assessment process

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Forward study planning

• GBS Condition & Integrity

• Weight, centre of gravity, metacentric height assessments

• Identification of penetrations and potential leak areas

• Methods of sealing / plugging

• Structural failure assessments

• Tri-cells, dome connections

• Geotechnical aspects

• Soil swelling, capacity, potential for failure via ‘piping’

• Hydrodynamic aspects

• Stability and speed of ascent

• Further detail on previous issues

• Collapse scenario

• Partial removal of legs to –55m

• Marine transportation to disposal site

• Break Up

• Disposal

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Comparative Assessment

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Comparative Assessment Process• Comparative Ranking – identify the elements of a scenario that are critical for success

– and prioritise these studies.

• Comparative Assessment (CA) – combine scenarios and assess against evaluation criteria for preferred option.

• In order to make decisions between options of dissimilar criteria we will use tools such as CA/IDM (Integrated Decision Making) to judge the optimal concepts to pursue.

• Considering technical aspects first, followed by:

– Safety

– Environmental

– Societal

– Economic

• We have employed COWI – a Danish expert consultancy who have previously performed this service for Frigg and NW Hutton decommissioning projects (http://www.cowi.com/cowi/en/menu/home/)

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The Iterative CA Process

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Criteria • BERR Guidance on Criteria include

– Safety

– Environmental

– Technical

– Societal

– Economic

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Approach to the task

• GBS scenarios agreed – Full Removal (refloat), Partial Removal, Derogation

• Each overall scenario split into activities based upon a timeline

• Each activity assessed – Bayesian Network (BN) created – 1st pass

• BN analysed – additional areas of study identified

• Study results fed back into BN

• Iterate as required

• Final BN analyses

As required

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Example timeline – Brent Delta removal

• Step 1 Inspection and testing

• Step 2 Engineering

• Step 3 Remove, repair and install/test

equipment

• Step 4 Remove topside modules

• Step 5 Repair and installation/testing of

equipment

• Step 6 Deballasting

• Step 7 Retraction, break loose and ascent

• Step 8 Tow platform to inshore mooring

site

• Step 9 Inshore dismantling of topsides

• Step 10 Tow to dry dock area

• Step 11 Inshore dismantling near dry

dock

• Step 12 Tow into dry dock

• Step 13 Dismantling of bottom part

• Step 14 Disposal of materials

•A single or group of aspects may dominate the success or failure of the scenario – this is where we focus our study efforts.

•All individual risks may be tolerable but the the cumulative risk may be unacceptable.

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Example Bayesian Network –Step 7 Retraction, break loose and ascent

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Example of output

0.000

0.002

0.004

0.006

0.008

0.010

0.012

0.014

Ma

rgin

al p

rob

ab

ilitie

s

Mission Failure1.00E-05 1.39E-04 7.20E-04 3.00E-04 2.24E-04 1.30E-02 1.01E-04 9.66E-04 7.46E-05 4.34E-03

Step 1 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Step 8 Step 9 Step 10 Step 11

Refloat Operations Inshore Demolition

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Check: have we met the objectives for today?

• To share information on the work done to date on dealing with the GBS removal scenario

• For us to understand…

• … the criteria you feel are important for determining the feasibility and practicality of the removal

• Your feedback on the comparative assessment process we propose to use

• We also want to understand and record any thoughts, issues or concerns you have about the overall project and encourage you to record these on the evaluation forms

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Way Forward

• Feedback report will be provided to all participants

• Your continued feedback is welcome

• We proceed with our studies taking into account this feedback

• Look out for the details of the next engagement

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION