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426 VI.D. Differential Images of the Future MARVIN ADELSON and SAMUEL ARONI Introduction A good deal of attention has been given recently to how the availability of alternative futures- can affect decisionmaking in the present. Planners, de- cisionmakers, and designers all have a stake in the pattern the future will assume as they make their specific decisions today. Their actions will in part determine that future, and in part be chosen because of what that future is expected to be like. Concern with the future has become a visible movement. One of the most popular best sellers in the past few years has been Future Shock, in which conjectures of future trends by many experts are systematized and interpreted, and some fears about society's ability to cope with the rate of future change are raised. In The Greening of America, another bestseller, a very different image of the future is generated. The literatures of technological forecasting, science fiction, and utopian planning provide many different kinds of such images. One's action in the present is inevitably influenced by which images one carries with him of future prospects. One's choices, political behavior, priorities, and attitudes may well be different depending upon which set of images seems to him more convincing or acceptable. What and how much the farmer plants, how the businessman invests, what the student studies, how the general deploys his forces, what bills the legislator introduces, which experiment the researcher designs-all are determined in large part by expectations which necessarily go beyond the facts. In an open society, and to some degree in any society, the character of the future is determined by innumerable decisions and actions interacting in rich and (in detail) indescribable ways. Such decisions are not made entirely, nor possibly even primarily, by experts. Nor are they random. They derive from the many ideas of future contingencies, possibilities, and certainties that individual people have generated, based on their past experience and present exposure to the world around them. We can classify these ideas as images. Kenneth Boulding 1 has indicated the central role that images play in any thinking process. To the extent that the future is open to human control, information about people's images of the future is likely to be useful in dealing with both the present and the future. Almost certainly, most people's future images are fragmentary, largely implicit, internally inconsistent, and mixed in terms of their time reference. 1 K. Boulding, "The Image," Univ. of Michigan. Press, Ann Arbor, Mich. 1956.

Transcript of VI.D. Differential Images of the Futureturoff/pubs/delphibook/ch6d.pdf · 2003. 3. 11. ·...

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VI.D. Differential Images of the Future MARVIN ADELSON and SAMUEL ARONI Introduction A good deal of attention has been given recently to how the availability of alternative futures - can affect decisionmaking in the present. Planners, de -cisionmakers, and designers all have a stake in the pattern the future will assume as they make their specific decisions today. Their actions will in part determine that future, and in part be chosen because of what that future is expected to be like.

Concern with the future has become a visible movement. One of the most popular best sellers in the past few years has been Future Shock, in which conjectures of future trends by many experts are systematized and interpreted, and some fears about society's ability to cope wit h the rate of future change are raised. In The Greening of America, another bestseller, a very different image of the future is generated. The literatures of technological forecasting, science fiction, and utopian planning provide many different kinds of s uch images.

One's action in the present is inevitably influenced by which images one carries with him of future prospects. One's choices, political behavior, priorities, and attitudes may well be different depending upon which set of images seems to him mo re convincing or acceptable. What and how much the farmer plants, how the businessman invests, what the student studies, how the general deploys his forces, what bills the legislator introduces, which experiment the researcher designs -all are determined in large part by expectations which necessarily go beyond the facts.

In an open society, and to some degree in any society, the character of the future is determined by innumerable decisions and actions interacting in rich and (in detail) indescribable ways. Such decisions are not made entirely, nor possibly even primarily, by experts. Nor are they random. They derive from the many ideas of future contingencies, possibilities, and certainties that individual people have generated, based on their past experience and present exposure to the world around them.

We can classify these ideas as images. Kenneth Boulding1 has indicated the central role that images play in any thinking process. To the extent that the future is open to human control, information about people's images of the future is likely to be useful in dealing with both the present and the future.

Almost certainly, most people's future images are fragmentary, largely implicit, internally inconsistent, and mixed in terms of their time reference.

1 K. Boulding, "The Image," Univ. of Michigan. Press, Ann Arbor, Mich. 1956.

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 427

Cons equently, inferences about them based on "rational" grounds are dangerous, and should be approached cautiously. Purpose This pilot study was an attempt to discover if meaningful information about systematic similarities and differences in expectations of the future (next thirty -plus years) could be obtained from people's responses to a set of images presented in the form of printed pictures. If the answer was affirmative, we would then go on to try to relate those similarities and differences to choice behavior in the present and near-term future (zero to five years). Those choices might relate to investments, politics, lifestyles, dwelling, work, leisure, or purchasing patterns. Results of this kind could have significance for policy, planning, design, and investment decisions at many levels. Background The shape of the future is to a considerable degree subject to human control, but that control is not always well and wisely exercised. Attempts to deal more effectively with the future have tended to take the form of prediction, that is, anticipating what it will be like so as to enable the taking of appropriate and timely action. The more sophisticated attempts have acknowledged the importance of interactions among events as determiners of subsequent ev ents. But too often, they have not involved the wills, wants, perceptions, and attitudes of "people" as either important or explicit variables in the prediction process.

Our basic premises are the very obvious ones, that while in some ways people resemble each other, in other ways they differ, and that there is valuable information in their differences, as well as in their similarities. The value of the difference information from a public -policy point of view is to enable steps that, to the extent possible , suit the differences. How do people differ in the images they have of prospective futures? They differ not only about what they expect to happen, but also about when they expect things to happen, how important different prospects are, and how desirable they are. These expectations influence their behavior, and hence also the expectations of others. Ignorance of these patterns of expectation, or images of the future held by others, is a major source of uncertainty for each of us in attempting to deal with the future. It is possible; in principle, to learn something about such expectations, and thereby improve by at least a little bit the basis for forecasting, and such related functions as policy-setting, decisionmaking, planning, designing, communicating, and interacting.

There is good reason to believe that almost all normal human choice behavior is based in part on anticipations or expectations of future events: Decision theory, management science, systems analysis, much learning

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theory, and related disciplines all involve use of "expected outcomes" as a basis for choice and action. Yet very little work has been done to elicit data on what those expectations are and how they relate to behavior, especially social behavior on a level broad enough to be mean ingful in policy, planning, and design. Some surveys have been done (see below, this section). Generally, they have been couched in verbal terms, which is almost certainly not the best way to elicit some of the needed information. That approach is especially limiting with relatively nonverbal populations. Hence, the present study attempts, among other things, to demonstrate the feasibility of using a partly nonverbal technique. The use of pictures has the added promise of evoking more holistic and emotional associations.

As we remarked above, we view both consensus and dissensus on images of the future to be useful to understand. Consensus may increase the probability of-i.e., facilitate the process of reaching (or avoiding)-a particular future state of affa irs, or increase the conviction that it will occur, but dissensus points up where issues are likely to arise, where incipient problems may lurk, where more information may be needed, or where the fact of diversity must be acknowledged and taken into accoun t. In addition, it may stimulate synergistic thinking to resolve previously irresolvable differences in new creative ways. It is naturally interesting to relate diverse patterns of response on future images to independent variables describing individuals o r groups.

The way to do this is simply to characterize individuals and groups of people in terms of their patterns of expectation, to the extent that those patterns are discernible. In other words, to deal systematically with the future requires information on the statistics of future predictions! But how can such statistics be acquired? Obviously, they cannot be obtained directly on every matter of interest,, that may arise. But it should be possible to gather "indicative" statistics that could be useful in predicting choice and other behavior. Such information should not only characterize whole populations, but should distinguish between identifiable subgroups, especially in a pluralistic system of decisionmaking. It is not hard to imagine how such differential statistics could be used to generate generally more satisfying conditions than present consensual approaches can. In fact, shared knowledge of such predictions may go far to alleviate intergroup misunderstandings, and serve to explain behavior which might otherwise appear incomprehensible to others.

There have been well-documented attempts to model mass reactions to future changes. These attempts are based in mathematical functions which extrapolate from empirical data and/or rational theories. Once the future is predicted in this manner, value judgments can be made by those in positions of authority, and action can be taken in the present to deal with it. Such a system could be greatly improved if a method could be developed which would allow the "people" to communicate their values, eschewing a false or

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 429

forced consensus where a true one is not available and reflecting group differences in images of the future.

User preference studies have long been used to find out about values. These studies respond to a need for information to guide decisions, usually among alternatives of limited scope. Alternatives explored in such studies tend to be those which are practical today. The more distant future, with its more diverse set of alternatives, is deemphasized. Interest centers on micro -decisions. Images of the present, based more often than not on limited experience of the past, tend to be accepted as images of the future. The limitations of such images may exert a constraining effect on what possibilities th e future can contain.

Two recent studies have successfully investigated ordinary people's expectations of the future. "Hopes and Fears of the American People" outlines people's images of future political and economic conditions across the United States. These opinions are divided into subgroups according to the respondents' race, age, education, optimism toward the future, and political party.

One of the most extensive studies of future expectations with emphasis on group differences was reported in 1968 by the Instituto de la Opinión Pública of Spain. Large samples from different parts of Spain, and from various foreign countries, were asked about their expectations concerning some 170 aspects of life and conditions in the year 2000. Results are reported in terms of sex, age, educational level, size of city of residence, region or country, marital status, occupation, economic sector, and income level. However, in both studies, only aggregate percentages are reported, and the patterns of individual response cannot be deduced. The pilot study reported here seeks response patterns via ' correlation analysis. Hypotheses People can coherently estimate the futurity, importance, and desirability of images of the future presented to them in picture form. In a substantial proportion of cases, they will either (a) respond in a way that relates with selected variables that they use to describe themselves, or else (b) show consensus on those images (as manifested in small variance in the distribution of reponses). Procedure

Self-administering questionnaires (see Appendix I, this paper) were distributed to students in the School of Architecture and Urban Planning at U.C.L.A. Each was asked to respond personally and also give copies to parents (or others of the parents age group who were willing to respond). Each questionnaire contained forty pictures representing various aspects of possible future living, learning, or working environments. They were selected

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to cover as wide a range of images as we could conveniently manage. We were able to collect responses on a group of fifty -four persons of both sexes, ranging in age from twenty to seventy -one years, and living in various parts of the country. We asked each of them to describe himself by answering a series of questio ns, including age, sex, marital status, occupation, population of the city from which he comes, region of the country from which he comes, personal and family income, amount of formal education, amount of time he spends thinking about the future compared t o other people, the future "time window" of maximum interest to him, how he discounts the future, e.g., how much he would pay now for a guarantee of $1,000 in 1980, 1990, and 2000. Questions such as "Do you feel you are better off now than you were five (o r ten) years ago," or "Do you feel you are better off now than you will be five (or ten) years from now," were also included.

We then asked each respondent to react to the images in the following five ways:

(1.) On the assumption that various environmental developments may

grow or decline in importance over time, to estimate in what year the kind of thing represented by each picture would most likely reach its peak or high point in importance.

(2.) To estimate in which year, if any, it would have all but disappeared , or become insignificant.

(3.) To estimate its importance relative to "other things in its field" at the time it reached its high point.

(4.) To assess its desirability or undesirability. (5.) To caption the image, so as to indicate concisely what it conveyed

to him. Some of the images derive from past lifestyles, built form, and human

values, and some have no very firm precedent in the past. Since there is ma guarantee that people interpret or perceive the images in the same way, we wished to get a feel for the range of interpretations they actually came up with when confronted with particular objective stimuli by asking for captions. Our intention was to do Delphi-like iterations, but we did not have the opportunity to do so. Clearly, the technique lends itself to De lphi procedures. Results

Respondents report having difficulty in providing responses to many of the items, and they don't always have much confidence in the value of what they are doing. The pictures may, after all, be interpreted in several ways; the es timates we ask for tend to be subjective in the extreme; we do not always define terms, such as "important" or "desirable," leaving them for interpretation by each respondent. Under these circumstances, and assuming that individuals interpret given images rather differently,

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 431

as indicated by their captions, one would expect little relationship to appear between response patterns and independent variables.

Correlation coefficients were computed between the various ratings each respondent gave for the futurity, importance, and desirability of the various images, and each of the independent variables (self-descriptions) used. In the case of the "sex" and "marital status" variables, point bi-serial correlation was used. For "occupation," an analysis of variance was used.

With all the shortcomings in the survey (and there are many), we found a goodly number of significant correlations and analyses of variance. A sample of the resulting table of relationships is shown in Appendix II of this paper. In that array, the column headings pertain to the pictures reproduced above them: "+" represents the "peak year" estimate; i is the "importance" estimate; d is the "desirability" estimate. A technical difficulty with the "phase-out year" estimate led to its omission from the results.

Squares represent negative correlations or inverse relationships, circles represent positive or direct relationships, both significant at the a = .01 level. Solid half circles and half squares represent corresponding relationships at the a = .05 level. Empty half circles and half squares are nearly significant (.05 < a < .055), Obviously, in any large set of interrelations, on the average about 5 percent of them would appear significant at the 5 percent level, when in fact they would not be. At the a = .01 level, about 1 percent of them would appear significant when in fact they wouldn't be, so the question arises, "Is the number obtained a larger number than those expectations?" The answer is, at the a = .01 level, there are about three times as many significant relationships in this study as would be expected by chance. In the case of the a = .05 level, there are some twice as many. Certain of the pictures lead to higher numbers of correlations than others, although variances were not dissimilar. Some correlations are up around .5 and .6 which, for a study of this kind, we consider very substantial.

Most of the correlation coefficients at the a = .05 level ranged around .3 to .4, which accounts for about 10 percent to 15 percent of the variance. (These are not multiple r's, but single r's.) Although we have not examined them, multiple correlations should account for a good deal more variance than that. The matrix shows a larger number of significant relationships associated with the estimates of importance and desirability of the various future images than the latency variable; that is, identifiable groupings of people seem to have more clear-cut differences in whether they like something, or think it is important, than on-when they think it will happen. Considerable variation occurred in estimates of futurity; generally, people did not cluster their estimates closely around certain portions of the scale. A number of other trends could be identified:

(1.) Certain photographs produced high numbers of significant

correlations. These were: 1, 4, 10, 19, 24, and 36.

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432 Marvin Adelson and Samuel Aroni

These pictures may represent alternatives for the future dealing with rela tively drastic and obvious changes with the past. They include two photographs of physical buildings: a trailer and a dome; th ree suggesting new social structure; and one of a person using a computer.

(2.) The means of the "importance" values were in the case of all but four pictures, above the midpoint of the scale (i=5), indicating that the pictures were not considered pointless.

(3.) The means of the "desirability" measures were in the case of twenty -six pictures above the midpoint of the scale (d=0).

(4.) Greater consensus occurred on images of the immediate future; as indicated by lower standard deviations associated with earlier dates.

(5.) Relatively low standard deviations on the "desirability" measure were associated with relatively large mean deviations from the neutral value of 0.

(6.) Relatively low standard deviations on the "importance" measure tended to be associated with large deviations from the midpoint of the scale (5).

(7.) On the occupation variable means were computed for each cell. People trained in the social sciences demonstrated consensus on images of very high organization (militarism and conventional office scenes) and relatively low organization (farm, potters)

Note: The results obtained do not depend upon any hypothesis about

what people were actually responding to in each image; interpretation of the results may, naturally be dependent upon such hypotheses.

Conclusions and Plans Our initial expectations that response patterns are associated with independent descriptors appear to be confirmed. Some images produced stronger systematic differences between subgroups than others. In a few cases consensus on the future can be identified, especially in terms of importance and desirability. We conclude that this kind of survey tool offers promise for achieving the :goals outlined earlier. Because of the shortcomings in the survey and the ill-defined sample, the next effort is using an improved survey instrument and a more carefully designed procedure. The new instrument is given as Appendix III of this paper. It covers a wider range of aspects of possible futures, and in corporates a number of other improvements. The new sample is an inte rnational one. We are now working on means to reduce the effects of cultural bias in selection of images.

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 433

Bibliography

Abt, Clark C. "Public Participation in Future Forecasting and Planning." Washington: World Future Society, July 1967. 12 pp. (mimeo.).

Adelson, Marvin. The Technology of Forecasting and the Forecasting of Technology. System Development Corporation, April 1968.

Banfield, Edward C. The Unheavenly City. The Nature and the Future of Our Urban Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968.

Bernal, John Desmond. The World, the Flesh and the Devil. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1929. Boorstin, Daniel J. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. New York: Harper Row, 1961. Boulding, Kenneth E. The Image. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956.

Cantril, Albert H., and Roll, Charles W., Hopes and Fears of the American People. New York: Universe, 1970.

Dalkey, Norman C. The Delphi Method An Experimental Study of Group Opinion. Rand RM -5888-PR, June 1969.

David, Henry. "Assumptions about Man and Society and Historical Constructs in Futures Research." Futures 2, No. 3 (September 1970), pp. 222-30.

Eldredge, H. Wentworth. "Education for Futurism in the United States: An On -Going Survey and Critical Analysis." Technological Forecasting and Social Change 2 (1970), pp. 133-48.

Enzer, Selwyn. Delphi and Cross-Impact Techniques: An Effective Combination for Systematic Futures Analysis. Institute for the Future, June 1970, W-8.

----. Some Prospects for Residential Housing by 1985. Institute for the Future, January 1971, R -13.

Gordon, T. J. The Current Methods of Futures Research. Institute for the Future, August 1971, P-11.

Hacke, James E., Jr. The Feasibility of Anticipating Economic and Social Consequences of a Major Technological Innovation. St anford Research Institute, May 1967.

Hall, Edward T. The Hidden Dimension. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966. ----, The Silent Language. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1959. Helmer, Olaf. Long-Range Forecasting: Roles and Methods. Institute for the Future,

May 1970. P -7. ----. Social Technology. New York: Basic Books, 1966. Huntley, James Robert. "Gaps in the Future: The American Challenge and the

European Challenge." Futures 2, No. 1 (March 1970), pp. 5-14. Kahn, Herman and Wiener, Anthony J. The Year 2000 : A Framework for Speculation

on the Next Dirty-Three Years. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Kepes, Gyorgy (ed.). Sign, Image, Symbol. New York: Braziller, 1966. Lindblom, Charles E. The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making through

Mutual Adjustment. New York: Free Press, 1965. Little, Dennis L. Models and Simulation: Some Definitions. Institute for the Future,

March 1970, WP-6. Lompe, Klaus. "Problems of Futures Research in the Social Sciences." Futures 1, No.

1 (September 1968). Martino, Joseph P. Techn ological Forecasting for Decisionmaking. New York:

American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1972. McHale, John. The Future of the Future. New York: Braziller, 1969. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

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Polak, Fred L. The Image of the Future: Enlightening the Past, Orienting the Present Forecasting the Future, Vol. 1: The Promised Land Source of Living Culture; Vol. 2: Iconoclasm of the Images of the Future, Demolition of Culture. New York: Oceana Publications, 1961.

----. Prognos tics: A Science in the Making Surveys the Future. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1971.

Rescher, Nicholas. "A Questionnaire Study of American Values by 2000 A. D." In Values in the Future, K. Baier and N. Rescher, (eds.), 1969, pp. 133-47.

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 435

Appendix I: Questionnaires for Images of the Future Study

ADDRESS ZIP CODE TELEPHONE AGE SEX Marital Status Major Occupation or field of study Income: Personal below 5 5-10 10-20 20-50 50+ Income: Family below 5 5-10 10-20 20-50 50+ Formal Education: number of years of school completed. In your future planning have you seriously considered any other occupation or pastime? Every person belongs to some major sub-groups; what are the most important ones you consider yourself a part of: (religion, race, political parties, nationalities, clubs, etc.) Most people are interested in the future to some degree. Their main interest in the future usually extends beyond tomorrow, but not usually as far as hundreds of years from now. On the time scale below, please circle the period(s) in the future in which you are mainly interested: Next Next Next 1973 1974-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000 Week Month Year On the scale below indicate the amount of time you spend thinking about the future, compared with other people. None a very small amount a moderate amount a large amount In what year in the future do you feel you will know as much about the year 2000 as you now feel you know about the year 1950? How much money would you be willing to pay right now for a guarantee of $1,000 in 1980? For $1,000 in 1990? For $1,000 in the year 2000? Do you think you are better off now than you were 10 years ago?______5 years ago? Do you think you are better off now than you will be 5 years from now? 10 years from now? What is the population of the city in which you have lived for most of your life? If it was a suburb of a major city what was the population of the city? In what region of the country have you spent most of your life (West, Midwest, North, South, etc.)?

People have been making a lot of predictions about the future recently. They have been talking about living styles, educat ion, work and the role of technology in all of these. Most of us have some idea about what the future is going to be like. Taken together, these views will have an effect on shaping the future so they can be

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important. We want to find out something about y our own views of what the future will be like.

We have assembled a group of pictures that represent various aspects of living, learning and working. Some of the things these pictures represent are growing in importance, becoming more common. Some are declining. Others will rise for awhile, then fall. 1. Tell us, for each picture, when you think what it represents will become most

common, by writing a year in the (+) box. Think of the range of years between 1972 and 2000. If you think it will reach a highpoint after the year 2000, mark "2000±." If you feel it is or has been as high as it will ever go, mark "1972." If you feel it will never reach a highpoint write "never."

2. Similarly, tell us for each picture by what date you feel that kind of thing will be all but phased out. Do this by writing a year in the (-) box. Use the same range of years that was used for "highpoint" question.

3. When a development reaches its highpoint, it may be important or unimportant compared with other developments in its field. We would like to know your opinion of the importance of what each photograph represents when it reaches its highpoint. In the (i) box, write a number between 0 and 10: 0 would indicate little or no importance and 10 very high importances.

4. Also tell us how desirable you feel what each photograph represents is, whether you really like it or really hate it. Mark a number between -10 and + 10 in box (d). If you really hate it, write -10. If you are neutral write (0), and if you really like it, write (+ 10). If you think it is reasonably desirable, you might use a number such as 3 or 4, etc.

5. On the page opposite the photographs, in the appropriate numbered box write a caption for each photograph. It should be as short as possible: preferably one word; two or three at the most. Try to pick a word that best sums up what the picture means to you. Please do not neglect to complete this part. Try to answer conscientiously, but it shouldn't take much more than 45 minutes

to complete the whole survey.

Copyright ©1972, by Adelson/Valerio.

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 437

Images Used The pictures used were divided into three groups representing a range of Living Learning, and Working conditions, respectively. Briefly, the pictures may be described as follows: Living

1. A mobile home on permanent supports. 2. A bedroom interior furnished with "stylish" Mediterranean pieces and bric-a-brac. 3. A young black man, holding a baby, sitting on a stoop of a high-density urban block. 4. A geodesic-like dome used as a private dwelling. 5. A Soleri "arcology" representing a massive double-pyramid city. 6. A barracks area exterior with a squad of soldiers in formation. 7. An original "futuristically-architected" house from Malibu, California. 8. A modern high-density "Scandinavian" apartment block, emphasizing stacking and

packing. 9. A decidedly rustic scene with farm buildings, trees, and lake. 10. A group of twenty-seven lower-middle-class people of mixed ethnicity standing close

together and smiling. 11. Moshe Safdie's "Habitat," randomly stacked dwellings from the Montreal Expo '67. 12. An aerial view of a California suburb showing curved streets and tract-area

development. 13. A recent high-rise apartment building seen from below rising into an open sky. 14. A woman seated in the corner of a room with diamond-shaped grillwork intended to

denote protection from intrusion. 15. A telephoto view of very uniform row housing. 16. A street of uniform four-story, medium-density dwellings 17. A street of mixed older single-family and multiple-family units with fences, palms, and

a prominently displayed "Vehicles Prohibited" sign. 18. The rear portion of a private yacht with people at leisure. 19. A "hippie" couple with several others in a forest setting. 20. An aerial view of a high-rise cluster of a major city.

Learning 21. Rows of empty seats in a large modem lecture hall. 22. Intimate bubble-shaped interior of an inflatable structure with a handful of

children relaxed but attentive. 23. An oriental print of Buddha in the lotus position with a child seated at his feet

and looking up at his face. 24. A young man seated at a cathode ray tube computer console. 25. A group of soldiers, standing among trees on a campus, with gas

masks and helmets on, firing rifles and a pistol. 26. A group of children in a school-yard with the high wire -fence

prominently between them and the camera.

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438 Marvin Adelson and Samuel Aroni

27. A wrist-television on a child's arm, with the caption "What about Learning" printed above it.

28. A couple of children seated on bicycles on a sidewalk watching a display through the open double side doors of a minibus equipped as a mobile educational unit.

29. A man's head with attached electrodes. 30. A typical college classroom showing rows of plastic chairs with

armrests. Working

31. A large, modern office interior with perhaps eight people working at desks. 32. A modern automated assembly line with a single person in attendance. 33. A helmeted, space-suited astronaut in a futuristic space vehicle (taken from

"2001-A Space Odyssey"). 34. A young couple working closely together making hand-thrown pottery on a

wheel. 35. A business computer setting with two men and a woman working at various

tasks. 36. A young couple dressed in a style reminiscent of India, standing outside a

small (health food?) shop on the walls of which are painted two pictures of a girl in Indian garb.

37. Chimneys, electric power transmission lines and towers, a petroleum plant against a dark sky with lots of smoke and smog.

38. The very old, well-preserved section of a European city seen from within a very modern, very large office building.

39. A very large modern commercial office block with the sunlight glinting off the glass-and-steel facade.

40. A low brick-front commercial arcade entrance with potted plants, an overhead sign "La Ronda de las Estrellas," and several signs indicating the presence of 'offices and art galleries within.

Discussion of Results

Pictures used were divided into three groups: "Living" (20 pictures), "Learning"

(10 pictures), and "Working" (10 pictures), covering three categories of human concerns. We will discuss below the response patterns to six of the pictures, two from each category. Appendix II summarizes the statistical results, showing significant and nearsignificant correlations between responses and the independent variables that describe the respondents. The last column in Appendix II indicates the total number of significant relations for each independent variable with all forty images. Out of a total of 2040 relations, 54 (or 2.6 percent) are found to be significant at the a = 01 level, and 219 (or 10.8 percent) are significant at the a = .05 level, which far exceeds' chance expectation.

Consider, first, picture # 1, which shows a mobile home. We note that the "desirability" estimate correlates, r=.39 with age, and that the correlation is

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 439

significant at the a =.01 level. This means that older people in the study tended to rate the mobile home (and its implications?) to be more desirable than did younger people. So, if we go down the column of entries beneath picture # 1, did people with higher personal income, although this relationship is significant at the a =.05 level, but not at the a =.01 level. However, people with higher family income rated this image as less desirable than those with lower family incomes. They also expected it to peak in importance sooner. To put it the other way, those with lower family incomes tended to rate the mobile home concept as more desirable and to expect it to grow in importance over a longer period of time (a =.05). Those who were interested in the longer-term future tended to see the mobile home concept as less important than those whose interests peaked sooner (presumably this has something to do with age, although it did not show up as a significant correlation there). Those who were willing to pay more for a fixed sum of money in the future also (a =.01) saw this concept as less important. Those who thought they would be less well off in five years than they are now rated the mobile home as more desirable than those who thought they would be better off ( a =.05). Those from larger cities also rated the concept as less desirable than those from smaller places (a =.01). Married individuals also regarded the concept as less desirable, and those of different occupations rated it differently from each other (a =.01). A just slightly less-than-significant relationship to sex of the respondent also appeared (a = .055).

A second picture from the "Living" group, picture # 19, shows a "hippie" couple with several others in a forest setting. Both its "importance" and "desirability" ratings correlated negatively with age, at the a =.01 level. Thus older people in the study tended to rate this image as less important and desirable than did younger people. People with higher personal income, rated less desirable than those with lower personal income, although only at the a =0.014 level. People who said they spend a large amount of time thinking about the future indicated that what this image represents will peak in importance sooner, than did people relatively uninterested in the future (a =.05). However, those who were willing to pay more for a fixed sum of money in the future also saw a later date for its peak importance (a =.01). Those from larger cities rated the image as both more important (a< .01) and more desirable (a< .05) than those from smaller places. Married people thought that it will peak in importance sooner (a = 0.05) but rated it more desirable, also at a = 0.05. People having different occupations also showed different responses to its desirability (a = 0.05).

Picture # 24, from the "Learning" group, shows a young man seated at a cathode ray tube computer console. The correlation coefficients, with age, of the "importance" and "desirability" of this learning concept were r=0.33 (at a =0.05) and r=0.52 (at a = 0.01) respectively. Thus older people tended to rate it more important and desirable than younger people in the study. People who spent a larger amount of time thinking about the. future thought its import ance and desirability (both at a = 0.05) to be less than did; those relatively uninterested in the future. Those who were willing to pay more for a fixed sum of money in the year 2000 also indicated greater importance attaching to this concept (a = 0.05). They also thought it to be more desirable. Depending on the year for the future guarantee, the significance levels varied from a = 0.05 for 1990 to a = 0.01 for the year 2000. Those who thought they were better off now than they were ten years ago also rat ed this learning concept as more desirable (a = 0.05). People from larger cities thought the concept to be less important and less desirable (a = 0.05). Finally, married people also regarded it as less desirable (a < 0.05).

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440 Marvin Adelson and Samuel Aroni

A second picture from the "Learning" group, picture #27, shows a wrist-television on a child's arm, with the caption "What about Learning" printed above it. The correlation coefficient with age of the "desirability" of this concept was r=0.31 at a = 0.05. Thus older people in the study tended to rate it more desirable than younger people. Those with higher education thought it to be less desirable than those less educated (a = 0.05). Those who were interested in the longer-term future tended to see this concept peak in importance later (a = 0.05) and be more desirable (a = 0.01) than those whose future interests were of shorter-term. Those who thought they were better off now than they were ten years ago also rated the concept to reach its peak in importance sooner (a = 0.05). Married individuals regarded this learning concept as less desirable (a = 0.05). A just slightly less-than-significant relationship to sex of the respondent also appeared (a =0.052).

Picture #35, from the "Working" group, shows a business computer setting with two men and a woman working at various tasks. Again, older people in the study tended to rate this working concept as more desirable than younger people (a = 0.05). People who spent a larger amount of time thinking about the future also thought its importance to be greater (a = 0.05). Those who were willing to pay more for a fixed sum of money in the year 1980 also rated this concept as more important and more desirable (both at a = 0.05). Those who thought they were better off now than they were ten years ago als o rated it as more desirable ( a = 0.05). At the same time, those who thought they were better off now than they were five years ago thought that it will peak in importance later (a = 0.05). On the other hand, those who thought they will be better off ten years from now thought that the peak importance will be reached sooner (less-than-significant a =0.055). Those of different occupations rated the image differently from each other (a = 0.05). It should be emphasized that, unlike the other five images discus sed in detail in this Appendix, none of the correlations of picture # 35 reach the a = 0.01 level.

A second picture from the "Working" group, picture #36, shows a young couple dressed in a style reminiscent of India, standing outside a small (health food?) shop on the walls of which are painted two pictures of a girl in Indian garb. Similarly to the "hippie" picture # 19, both the "importance" and "desirability" correlated negatively with age, at the a = 0.01 level. Thus older people in the study tended to rate this image to be less important and desirable than did younger people. So did people with higher education, although only at the a = 0.05 level. To put it the other way, those with lower education tended to rate the image as both more important and desirable. People who spent a larger amount of time thinking about the future also thought its importance to be greater (a = 0.05). Those who thought they were better off now than they were ten years ago rated this concept to be less important and desirable (a = 0.01). The same applied to those who thought they were better off now than they were five years ago, but only with a = 0.05. On the other hand, those who thought they will be better off ten years from now rated the image to be more important (a = 0.01). Presumably, age was the main reason for the correlation with these last three independent variables. Those from larger cities rated the image as both more important (a = 0.01) and more desirable ( a = 0.05) than those from smaller places. This is similar to the "hippie" picture # 19. The importance of the image was related to the sex of the respondent (a = 0.05), and married individuals expected it to peak in importance earlier than single ones (a = 0.05).

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 441

Appendix II: Some Significant Correlations

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442 Marvin Adelson and Samuel Aroni

Appendix III: Expectations II: A Survey about the Future We would like to know something about what you think will be happening in

the world from now on. People's views of emerging conditions tend to affect their choices, and thereby can influence what the future will be like. Similarities and differences in assumptions, attitudes and estimates of the future across countries and cultures are therefore important to understand, although they tend to be difficult to discern. We have found the techniques used in this survey to be helpful.

We have assembled a group of pictures which seem to say something about the future. The images included are just a sample from a range of possible images representing future events. We would like your estimates as to when these events will become most common and how important and desirable they will be when they do.

You may find some of the pictures surprising. Others may seem to be obscure or difficult to interpret unequivocally. Don't be overly concerned. You can indicate what you are responding to by means of the caption you give to each picture. In each case, there is a good reason for inclusion.

Just a small amount of your time in filling out this survey will supply us with very valuable information on how different people view the future. You may not feel that these questions get at the heart of your views. Nevertheless, we can get some very important information from your responses, and we urge you to respond. We think the results migh t be interesting to you, too. We will send you information on the distribution of responses by others. Earlier research along this line has produced very interesting results, so we hope you will cooperate.

Thank you. Marvin Adelson Professor, School of Architecture and Urban Planning U.C.L.A.

Samuel Aroni Professor, School of Architecture and Urban Planning U.C.L.A.

This study is supported by funds from the Committee on International and Comparative Studies, University of California at Los Angeles.

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 445

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Specialized Techniques: Differential Images of the Future 447

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Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge with pride and appreciation the work of Joseph

Valerio (now on the faculty of the School of Architecture, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) for his work in des igning and producing the original "Expectations" survey form and preparing the results for analysis; and of Betsy Morris (at Quinton Budlong) in assembling and producing the "Expectations II" survey form:

The authors also acknowledge the financial support provided, in connection with "Expectations II," by the U.C.L.A. Committee on International and Comparative Studies.