Vi - Stealth Aircraft_ Eagles Among Sparrows

02/07/2015 VISTEALTHAIRCRAFT:EAGLESAMONGSPARROWS?

http://fas.org/spp/aircraft/part06.htm 1/11

VISTEALTHAIRCRAFT:EAGLESAMONGSPARROWS?

ThenewgenerationofAmericancombataircraft,includingtheF117A,YF22,theA12andtheB2,areallcharacterizedbystealthfeaturesunmatchedbytheaircraftofothercountries.Whilethesenewsystemsmayprovidesomeoperationaladvantages,theyhavenotrenderedallotheraircraftobsolete.Stealthisbynotmeansaprerequisitefordeliveryordnanceontarget,sinceaspreviouslydiscussed,theperformanceofairdefensesystemsagainstmoreconventionalattackaircraftstillleavesmuchtobedesired.Norshouldstealthberegardedasthefinalmoveinthegameofelectroniccountermeasures,giventhevarietyofdesignandoperationalconstraintsimposedbystealth.Finally,alltheAmericanstealthprojectsfaceseriousbudgetproblems,andtheirfutureisfarfromassured.

STEALTHTECHNOLOGY

Stealthhasbecomethemagicwordincontemporaryweaponsystems.Contemporaryworkonstealthhasitsrootsinlongstandingeffortstoreducethevisibilityofmilitaryaircraftthroughcamouflagepaintschemes.However,aselectronicsensorshavereplacedtheeyesofpilotsastheprimarymeansoftrackingotheraircraft,moreintricatemeansofdefensewereneeded.

Oftenthoughtofsimplyastheuseofspecialmaterialstorenderaircraftinvisibletoradar,stealthisactuallyacomplexdesignphilosophytoreducetheabilityofanopponent'ssensorstodetect,trackandattackanaircraft(orotherplatformssuchaswarships).Sinceavarietyofsensorswouldbeusedinthisprocess,designofastealthvehiclerequirescarefultradeoffsamongdifferenttechniques.Thegreatsecrecysurroundingstealthprogramsisdesignednotsimplytoprotectaparticularstealthtechnology,asitistoprotectthechoiceandmixoftechniquesthathavebeenusedinaspecificsystem.(1)

Avarietyoftechnologiesaremaybecombinedinordertomakeitself"invisible"toradar.Thesetechnologiesincludeasmoothsurface,"flyingwing"design,radarabsorbentmaterials(RAM),engineshiddeninthebodyoftheairplane,andelectroniccountermeasures(ECM).Eachofthesefeaturescontributetotheattemptfoolenemyairdefensesystems.Theplaneslowradarcrosssection(RCS)reducestherangeatwhichgroundbasedandairbasedradarscandetecttheaircraft.TheRAMabsorbsmostofaradar'ssignal,andtheaircraft'swingshapedandroundeddesignredirectsmuchoftheremainingpowerawayfromtheradarsource.Enginesareburiedinthefuselagewithairintakeandexhaustductsplacedonthetopoftheaircraftinordertoreducetheheattrail,andhidethejetengine'scompressorbladesfromradardetection.ECMisalastresortattempttoconfusetheradaroperatorthroughjammingandghostimaging.



Thebenefitsofstealthtechnologyisinherentlyobvious.Especiallysince,70percentofSovietstyleairdefensesystemsuseradardetectionandtracking.(2)However,asthenextsectiononlimitationswillillustrate,theotherelementsofairdefensedetectionandtrackinginfrared(IR),electrooptical(EO)andvisual,alsoneedtobecircumventedifanaircraftistobetruly"stealthy."

LIMITATIONS

Thereisnooneoptimumstealthdesign,butrathereachmissionrequirementgeneratesanappropriatemixoftechniques.Implementationofstealthisnotwithoutpenalties.Someofthematerialsusedrequirespecialandcostlymaintenance.Themaneuverabilityofanaircraftcanbecompromisedbytheintroductionofstealthdesignfeatures.AswasthecasewiththeF117A,eachB2bomberwillhaveitsowncoveredmaintenancefacility,sincetheB2'slowobservablefeaturesrequirefrequentperformanceofstructuralandmaintenanceactivities.(3)

Stealthrequiresnotonlydesigncompromises,italsoimposesoperationalcompromises.Sensorstolocatetargetsposeaparticularproblemforstealthaircraft.Thelargeradarsusedbyconventionalaircraftwouldobviouslycompromisethepositionofastealthaircraft.Airtoaircombatwouldrelyonpassivedetectionoftransmissionsbyhostileaircraft,aswellasinfraredtracking.However,thesetechniquesareofmarginaleffectivenessagainstotherstealthaircraft,explainingthelimitedapplicationofstealthtotheAdvancedTacticalFighter.

Aircraftforattackingtargetsonthegroundfaceasimilarproblem.FLIRcanbeusedforpreciseaimingattargetswhosegenerallocationisknown,buttheyarepoorlysuitedforsearchingfortargetsoverawidearea.Aradarontheaircrafttoscanforpotentialtargetswouldcompromiseitsposition.Inordertolocatetargets,stealthaircraftmayrelyonanairbornelaserradar,althoughsuchasensormayproveoflimitedutilityinpoorweather.Amorepromisingapproachwouldbetousedatafromreconnaissancesatellites,eithertransmitteddirectlyfromthesatelliteorrelayedthroughcommunicationssatellitesfromprocessingcentersintheUnitedStates.

Therearelimitstotheutilityofstealthtechniques.Sincetheradarcrosssectionofanaircraftdependsontheanglefromwhichitisviewed,anaircraftwilltypicallyhaveamuchsmallerRCSwhenviewedfromthefrontorrearthanwhenviewedfromthesideorfromabove.IngeneralstealthaircraftaredesignedtominimizetheirfrontalRCS.ButitisnotpossibletocontourthesurfaceofanaircrafttoreducetheRCSequallyinalldirections,andreductionsinthefrontalRCSmayleadtoalargerRCSfromabove.Thuswhileastealthaircraftmaybedifficulttotrackwhenitisflyingtowardagroundbasedradaroranotheraircraftatthesamealtitude,ahighaltitudeairborneradaroraspacebasedradarmayhaveaneasiertimetrackingit.

Anotherlimitationofstealthaircraftistheirvulnerabilitytodetectionbybistaticradars.Thecontouringofastealthaircraftisdesignedtoavoidreflectingaradarsignaldirectlybackinthedirectionoftheradartransmitter.Butthetransmitterandreceiverofabistaticradarareinseparatelocationsindeed,asingletransmittermaybeusedbyradarreceiversscatteredoverawidearea.Thisgreatlyincreasestheoddsthatatleastoneofthesereceiverswillpickupareflectedsignal.Theprospectsfordetectionofstealthaircraftbybistaticradararefurtherimprovediftheradartransmitterisspacebased,andthusviewingtheaircraftfromabove,thedirectionofitslargestradarcrosssection.

SeveralanalystsclaimstealthaircraftsuchastheATFwillbevulnerabletodetectionbyinfraredsearchandtracksystems(IRST).Thenaturalheatingofanaircraft'ssurfacemakesitvisibletothistypeofsystem.Thefasterandaircraftflies,thewarmeritgets,andthus,theeasiertodetectthroughinfraredmeans.Oneexpertasserts"ifanaircraftdeviatesfromitssurroundingsbyonlyonedegreecentigrade,youwillbeabletodetectitatmilitarilyusefulranges."(4)Infact,boththeRussianMiG29andSu27carryIRSTdevices,whichindicatesthatthe



Russianshavelongtargetedthisasapotentialstealthweakness.(5)

Stealthaircraftareevenmorevulnerabletomultiplesensorsusedintandem.ByusinganIRSTtotrackthetargetandaLadar(laserradar),oranarrowbeam,highpowerradartopaintthetargetsuperiordataisprovided.(6)

Themostbasicpotentiallimitationofstealth,isitsvulnerabilitytovisualdetection.SincetheATFis2530percentlargerthantheF15and40percentlargerthantheF18,forexample,itwillbemucheasiertodetectvisuallyfromrangesontheorderof10miles.(7)Whenoneconsidersthatstealthcharacteristicswilldrasticallyreducetheeffectivenessofseveraltypesofguidedairtoairmissiles,fighterengagementswillprobablymovebacktothevisualrangearena.Inthiscontext,thecumbersomeF22wouldbeatadistinctdisadvantage.(8)

Anotherpotential"limitation"ofstealthtechnologyhaslittletodowithitscapabilities.Rather,somequestiontheeffectthepursuitofsuchhitechaircraftwillhaveontheUSaerospaceindustryasawhole.Theseaircraftwouldnotbeavailableforforeignexportuntilwellintothenextcentury.Duringthattime,competitorssuchastheGripen,RafaleandEFAwillbepeddledaggressivelybyEuropeanexporters.OneanalystestimatedthatUSforeignsalessavedthePentagon"about$2.8billionthroughsurchargestorecoverpartoftheirdevelopmentcostsandperhapsanother$4billionthroughthelearningcurveeffectofhigherproductionruns."(9)Thus,America'sstealthsuccesscouldactuallybackfire,onitslargeraerospaceindustrybycausingittoforfeitsalestoanewgenerationoftopoftheline,althoughlessformidable,Europeanfighteraircraft.(10)

Programs

F117ADevelopmentofstealthaircraftbeganintheearly1970s,withtheExperimentalStealthTactical(XST),codenamed"HaveBlue."ThisprojectresultedintheLockheedF117A,with20oftheseaircraftorderedfromLockheedbytheAirForcein1981,andatotalof59aircraftwereproduced.TheF117Afirstflewin1983andenteredserviceatNellisAirForceBaseinNevadain1983.TheoriginalF117Aprogramenvisionedover100aircraft,butsoaringcosts(eachaircraftcostsover$100million),performanceproblems(severaloftheaircrafthavecrashedintrainingflights),(11)limitedpayload(theaircraftcancarryonlytwo900Kglaserguidedbombsinternally)(12),andthelackofaclearlydefinedmission(13)allcontributedtothecurtailmentoftheprogram.(14)AlthoughtheF117Aexhibitsbreakthroughlowobservablecharacteristics,itwasnotbuiltfromscratch.DesignersmodifiedF16flightcontrolsandF18engines.Lockheedofficialssaythatusingandimprovingonexistingtechnology,ratherthanreinventingthewheel,allowedthemtomaketheF117athalfthecostandinhalfthetimeofequivalentaircraft.(15)

TheF177AfirstsawcombatintheAmericaninterventioninPanamainDecember1989,whentwooftheaircraftwereusedtoattackanairfield,butthismissionwasmarredbypiloterrorwhichcausedoneoftheaircraft'sbombstolandfarfromtheintendedtarget.(16)TheF117AperformedwellinDesertStorm,whichmaybetheprimaryreasonthattheaircraft'sproductionline,onceslatedforclosure,hasrecentlybeenrevived.(17)

ATFYF22TheAdvancedTacticalFighter,whichwillenterAirForceserviceinthemid1990's,isdesignedprimarilytocarrymissilessuchastheAMRAAMforairsuperiorityoperations.TheATFwillcombinesupersoniccruisecapabilitywithenhancedmaneuverability.TheATFdesignbyLockheed,GeneralDynamicsandBoeingwasselectedinApril1991overtheYF23ofNorthropandMcDonnellDouglas.AlthoughlessfuturisticandperhapslesscapablethantheNorthropdesign,AirForceofficialssaidriskwaskeytotheirdecisiontobuytheF22.Lockheedwasjudgedmorelikelytobeabletoaccomplishwhatitproposed.(18)



Thetwocompetitorsembraceddifferentphilosophiesconcerningthefutureairbattle.Lockheeddesignedanaircraftthatwouldbesuperiorinboththevisualandbeyondvisualrangebattles.Itmaintainedthatinthefuturetherewillalwaysbeoccasionswhenaircraftgetwithinvisualrangeofeachother.Inthosescenarios,stealthoffersnoadvantages.Thus,theF22incorporatessomestealthfeaturessuchasinternalweaponscarriage,(19)butthestealthcharacteristicsoftheairframeconfigurationhavebeencompromisedbyaerodynamicconsiderationsrequiredtoexecutethecloseindogfight.(20)Northrop,bycontrast,prophesiedthatcloseinairbattleswereunlikelyinthefuture,andoptimizedstealthandmaximumspeedattheexpenseofagility.

TheF22'sadvertizedcapabilitiessoundimpressive.Itwillbemoreagilethancurrentfighterswithhigherclimbratesandturningacceleration.Accordingtosomeadvocates,thefighter'sabilitytoexecutesharpturnsatsupersonicspeedswillrevolutionizenextcentury'sdogfighttactics.AirtoairtacticswouldalsoberadicalizedbytheATF'sabilitytodetect,targetanddestroyotheraircraftwellbeforetheythemselveswerediscovered.TheATFwillemploy"supercruise,"whichwillenableittoflyataspeedofatleastMach1.56withoutafterburners,greatlyreducingIRsignatureandsavingfuel.Itsspeed/altitudeoperatingenvelopewithoutafterburnersisestimatedtobegreaterthantheF15C'swithafterburners.TheF22'sradarsignatureisestimatedat1,000timessmallerthantheF15s.(21)TheF22ispredictedtohavea25percentgreaterrangethanthecurrentF15C.(22)TheYF22willemploythrustvectoringwhichwillgiveitasubstantialmaneuverabilityadvantageoverotheraircraftbothatthelowestandhighestspeeds.SeventyfivepercentoftheATF'scostwillbeeatenupbytheaircraft'smosttechnicalcomponentstheavionics,integration,manufacturingandmaterialstechnologies.(23)

TheATF'savionicsreportedlyhavethethroughputcapacityofsevenCraycomputers.(24)The"brains"willbeprovidedbyaHughesAircraftCommonIntegratedProcessor,whichhasbeendescribedasanultrafastcentralcomputermadeupofcommonmodules.Theradarwillbeoftheelectronicallyscanning,activephasedarrayvariety.TheIntegratedCommunicationsNavigationIdentificationAvionics(ICNIA)willconsolidateintoasinglesuitethefunctionsusuallyperformedbyseveralprocessors,transmittersandreceivers.TheIntegratedElectronicWarfareSystem(INEWS)willalsocombinefunctionscurrentlyperformedbyseveralsystemsintoasingleunit.Itwillhandleelectronicwarningandcountermeasurestasks.(25)

WhileDefenseSecretaryCheney'sMajorAircraftReviewdidnotcuttheAirForcegoalofbuying750aircraft,itdiddeferproductionbytwoyears,andreducethemaximumannualbuildratefrom72peryearto48peryear.(26)Thisreductioninprocurementispartiallyresponsibleforthe23percentincreaseovertheATF'soriginal$79.5billionpricetag.(27)Developmentisestimatedat$18billionandproduction$80billion.AnotherramificationoftheATF'sdevelopmentcostsisthattheAirForcewillstopproductionofF16sandF15s(arguablythebestfightersintheworldintheirrespectiveclasses)longbeforeoriginallyplanned.(28)PentagonofficialssaytheATFisrequiredbecausebytheearly2000sforeigncountriesmayclosethegapinavionicsandpilottrainingthatcurrentlymakestheF15superiortoother"aerodynamicallycompetitive"aircraft.(29)

InlightofdiminishinggovernmentsfundsandthealmostnonexistentthreatfromtheformerSovietUnion,abroadrangeofanalystsandpolicymakersarewonderingifspending$95billionon650ATFs(30)isagoodidea.WhiletheF22'scapabilitiesareindeedrevolutionary,therequirementforsuchcapabilitiesisunclear.UpgradingtheaircraftwhichweresoeffectiveinDesertStorm,orpursuingagreementswithotheradvancedcountriestomutuallypostponedevelopingnewfighteraircraftforadecademaybebetterguarantorsofUSnationalsecuritythandevelopingsuchanexpensiveweapon.PentagonofficialsclaimthatF15scouldbeupgradedtobeyondroughparitywithtopofthelineRussianfighters,"butnottotherevolutionaryextentoftheATF."(31)consideringtheRussiansarebusytryingtokeepfromfragmentinglikeabrokenmosaic,doestheUnitedStatesreallyneedtoimproveontoday'sMiGstoa"revolutionaryextent"?

NATF



Boeing,GeneralDynamicsandLockheedaretryingtointeresttheUSNavyinacarrierbasedvariantoftheATF,dubbedtheNATF(NavyATF)asacandidateintheAXcompetition.TheNATFwascanceledasaprogramintheNavy'sFY'92budgetsubmission,buttheAXmaybreathenewlifeintotheprogram.

ThemanufacturersclaimtheNATFhasanumberofadvantagesovertheothercompetitors.TheNavy'sstealthrequirement,forexample,wouldproveeasierfortheNATFtosatisfythanupgradedF14s,A6sandF/A18s.TheNATF'sweaponbayisalmostaslargeastheA12s,allowingmostifnotallradarreflectingarmamentstobecarriedinternally.(32)Priceisanotherfactor.AlthoughtheNATFisprojectedtobeamuchlargeraircraftthantheATF,andcarryalargerbombload,therewouldstillremainagreatdealofcommonalitybetweentheprograms.Enoughcommonalityinavionics,armament,andsubsystems,sayLockheedofficials,tosavetheNATFprogram$11billion.(33)Incurrentandfuturebudgetcrunches,eachservicemaybeforcedtopurchaseeachother'saircraft.TheNATFmaybeLockheed'sonlyopportunitytomanufactureastrikeATF,asAirForceOfficialshaveexpressednointerestinatwoseatF22followon.(34)

ATAA12On7January1991,SecretaryofDefenseRichardCheneycanceledtheNavy'sA12AvengerAdvancedTechnologyAircraft(ATA)slatedtoreplacecurrentA6sonaircraftcarriersinthemid1990's.ItwasthelargestcontractterminationintheDoD'shistory.ByoneestimatetheA12hadbecomesoexpensivethatitwouldhaveconsumedup70percentoftheNavy'saircraftbudgetwithinthreeyears.(35)TheNavyoriginallyplannedtobuy620oftheMcDonnellDouglas/GeneralDynamicsaircraft,andtheAirForceatonepointconsideredbuying400,atanaveragecostthatwasestimatedatcloseto$100millioneach.TheA12wasdesignedtoflyfasterandfurtherthantheA6E,andcarryalargebombload,ininternalbombbaystoreducedragandmaintainalowradarcrosssection.(36)AswiththeATF,theA12wasexpectedtohavegreaterreliabilitythancurrentaircraft(doublethatoftheA6E),andrequirehalfthemaintenancemanhours.

TheA12provedtobethemosttroubledofthenewAmericanstealthaircraftinlargepartbecauseofproblemsfoundintheextensiveuseofcompositesintheaircraft'sstructure.Thesecompositesdidnotresultinanticipatedweightsavings,andsomestructuralelementshadtobereplacedwithheaviermetalcomponents.Theweightoftheaircraftexceeded30tons,30%overdesignspecification,andclosetothelimitsthatcanbeaccommodatedonaircraftcarriers.(37)TheprogramexperiencedproblemswithitscomplexInverseSyntheticApertureRadarsystem,(38)aswellasdelaysinitsadvancedavionicscomponents.(39)

ThefullscopeoftheseproblemswerenotappreciatedatthetimeofDefenseSecretaryCheney'sMajorAircraftReview,whichslowedtheproductionrateanddropped238MarineCorpsaircraftfromtheoriginaltotalNavybuyof858aircraft.Cheneyalsodecidedtodelayforover5yearstheAirForcebuy(from1992to1998),whichwasdecoupledfromtheNavyproject.(40)Subsequently,theA12contractorsrevealedthattheprojectwasfacedwithseriousengineeringproblemsanda$2billioncostoverrun,whichwoulddelaythefirstflightbyoverayear,tothefallof1991.(41)

Atfirstblush,theA12'sperformancecapabilitieswouldhavebeeninroughlythesameclassasexistingaircraft.

Payload Range MaxWeight MaxSpeed Cost*

A12** 16,000lb 1,200mi 58,000lb Mach.9 $105

A6E 6,000lb 1,011mi 58,000lb Mach.9 n/a

F/A18D 4,000lb 575mi 56,000lb Mach1.8 $40

F14D 8,000lb 2,000mi 74,350lb Mach1.88 $75



*Costin$millions;unitprocurement(42)

**A12figuresestimates.(43)

TheA12'skeyimprovementoverexistingaircraft,notinherentlyobviouswhencomparingspecifications,wasstealth.Whiletoday'sradarcandetectexistingnavalaircraftatarangeof50miles,theA12wasdesignedtoremainundetecteduntilapproximately10milesdistant.ThiswouldresultinsignificantoperationalandsurvivalbenefitsfortheA12sincedefenderswouldhavelittleopportunitytoengagetheaircraftoncedetectedsoclosetothetarget.TheA12'sreducedradarcrosssectionwouldhavebeenderived,inpart,fromcarryingitsordnanceinternally.WhilethetopspeedofthemorevisibleF/A18andA6wouldbesignificantlyreducedbythedraginducedbyexternalweaponscarriage,theinternalweaponsbayontheA12wouldprovidenoimpedimenttospeed.(44)

WhentheA12'sproblemsbecameapparent,renewedinterestinalternativestotheA12surfaced.(45)ThethreeprogramsconsideredwereanupgradedA6G,F/A18,and"AdvancedTomcat21"(ATC21)F14D.WhiletheA6wasreallynotaplayer,theotherentrantshadcompetingadvantagesanddisadvantages.TheupgradedF/A18,forexample,wouldbecheaperandmoreamenabletolowobservablesthantheF14.(46)Otherspointout,however,thatitwouldhavetoaddtheallweathercapabilitythattheA6successorwouldrequire.(47)TheATC21,proponentssaid,wouldhavegreaterrangeandpayloadthantheF/A18.(48)Upgradingexistingaircraft,however,wouldbeextremelyexpensive.

AXBecauseitisdoubtfulthatupgradedexistingaircraftwillbeabletofulfillalloftheA12srequirements,NavyofficialsdecidedtogetfreshbidsforanewA12.(49)TheNavyestimatestheAXtocost$150perunitasopposedtotheA12's$165pricetag.(50)InFY1992,theAXprogramwillreceiveover$100million.(51)Tofacilitatethisprogram'simplementation,theNavyreportedlyquizzedtheAirForceonhowitresurrectedtheB1afterPresidentCarter'scancellation.(52)

TheAX'scapabilitieshavebeenslightlyscaledbackfromthoseoftheA12.TheAXcouldbetermed"A12lite"asitsrange,payload,andstealthrequirementswillallbemoremodestthanitspredecessor's.(53)TheNavyhasemphasizedthestrikeroleattheexpenseoftheairtoairmissioninthenewprogram,ratherthantryingto"coverallthebases"andproduceanaircraftthatcouldperformnumerousroles.ThisambitionprovedtobetheA12'sundoing.

TheAX'sinitialoperatingcapability(IOC)isplanedtobebetween2000and2004,fourtoeightyearslaterthantheA12's1996IOC.(54)

Theprogramhasengenderedoneofthemostelaborateandbizarrecontractormatingdancesinhistory.Fiveteamsarecompetingfortheprimecontractorslot.TeamoneiscomprisedofMcDonnellDouglasandtheLTVCorporation.TeamtwoisGeneralDynamicsandMcDonnellDouglas.TeamthreeismadeupofBoeing,Lockheed,andGeneralDynamics.TeamfourisGrumman,Boeing,andLockheed.Northrophadadifficulttimefillingitsdancecard,apparentlybecauseofitsbadpublicimage,butiteventuallyseducedGeneralDynamicstoenterthecontestwithitsthirdentrant.(55)Thus,oftheseventeamscompeting,itappearsthatfourhavedevelopedadvancedcasesofschizophrenia.McDonnellDouglas,GeneralDynamics,LockheedandBoeinghavebe



employingatleasttwoseparateteamsofengineersworkingatseparatelocationswhowon'tbeallowedtoexchangestrategyordata.(56)

Whilethematingprocessmayseemoriginal,someofthedesignsarenot.GeneralDynamicsandMcDonnellDouglaswillrehashtheirA12designandBoeing,GeneralDynamicsandLockheedwillofferaversionoftheirF22ATF.GrummanoriginallytriedtomarketupgradesofitsF14TomcatasanA12replacement.TheNavyrejectedtheTomcatprimarilybecauseofitslackofstealth,buttheGrumman,Boeing,LockheedteamwillsurelydrawfromGrumman'sF14andnavalaviationexperience.(57)EvenifthemacrodesignfortheAXisnew,itislikelythattheaircraftwillborrowfromotherprogramsforsubcomponents.TheA12cancellationsetbacktheNavy'sschedule,anditislookingattheF22'savionicspackageforpossibleintegration.TRWisinvestigatinghowavionicsbeingdevelopedfortheF22couldbeusedontheAX.Monetarysavingsisreportedlyaprimemotivation.(58)

InadditiontotheAX'selaboratecontractormatingdance,theproject'scontractor/Navycontractualrelationshipwillbeunusualaswell.Itwillbethefirstaircraftinadecadetobebuiltona"costplus"whichallowsthePentagontoreimbursecontractorsforcostsincurredovertheagreedceilingratherthana"fixedprice"basis.(59)IndustryofficialsblamedtheA12'sfixedpricecontractforcrampingtheirflexibilityinaddressingandsolvingproblemsastheyarose.(60)

ATBB2TheStealthBomberprojectwasfirstannouncedbytheCarterAdministrationintheheatofthe1980Presidentialcampaign,inresponsetoRepublicancriticismofthedecisiontocanceltheB1Abomber.SinceitsunveilinginNovember1988,theB2hasbeenthefocusofmountingcriticismoftheinexorablygrowingcostoftheproject,theregularitywithwhichitsschedulehasbeendelayed,anddoubtsaboutmissionrequirements.

TheB2willbethemostexpensiveaircrafteverprocured,andbysomeestimateseachbomberwillliterallycostitsweightingold.TheGeneralAccountingOfficeestimatedthatthecostofthe132aircraftprograminthenyeardollarswouldtotal$68.8billion,basedona$36.6billioncostinconstantFY81dollars.(61)Bymid1988thecostestimatefor132aircrafthadgrownto$43billion(inconstant1981dollars).(62)IntheSpringof1990SecretaryCheney'sdecidedtoreducethebuyfrom132aircraftto75,withabudgetinthenyeardollarsof$61billion.(63)BasedonthecostsrequiredtobringtheB1Buptoitsintendedperformance(anadditional$8billionovertheoriginal$20billionprice)theeventualcostofthemoretechnologicallychallengingB2couldexceed$1billioneach.

TwomissionsfortheB2emergedfromtheveilofsecrecy.SomeadvocatesarguedthattheB2isneededtooffsetimprovementsinSovietairdefenses,andthattheexertionstheSovietswouldmaketoaugmenttheirairdefensestocountertheB2willinhibittheireffortsinstrategicoffensiveandconventionalforces.OthersarguethattheB2isneededinordertoattackSovietmobilemissilessuchastheSS24andSS25.Butgiventhehighcostoftheprojectandcompetingbudgetpriorities,neitheroftheserationaleshasprovedparticularlycompellingtotheCongress.SecretaryCheney'sdecisiontoreducescopeoftheprogramprovedawatershed.Recently,HouseandSenateconfereesagreedtospendonly$1.8billionin1992ontheB2.NothingmorecanbespentontheaircraftwithouttheapprovalofthefullHouse,whichhasbeenconsistentlyopposedtotheprogram.WhilesupportersoftheStealthBombersaytheaircraft'sfutureisunclear,the$1.8billionfigurewasadistinctsetback.Criticsclaimthattheagreementliterallykillstheprogram.(64)

NonUSPrograms



GreatBritainhasexpressedinterestindevelopingitsownlowobservableaircraft.TheUSAirForcehasclearlyindicateditsinterestinsellingtheF117totheUnitedStates'closestally.Itismorelikely,however,thatLondonwillacquirecertainstealthtechnologiesthatitcanuseinitsdownprograms,thanbuythefinishedproduct.(65)Britainplanstobeginworkonastealthaircraftinthenextfiveyears,(66)andhaveafunctioningtechnologydemonstratorbytheendofthe1990s.(67)TheRAFsaysitwilldevelopanupgradedTornadothatwillbeakintotheUSNavy'sAXstrikeaircraft.(68)TheRAFhasbeenconductingradarabsorbentmaterial(RAM)experimentsonTornadossinceatleastNovember1990.(69)

OnephenomenonthatworriesUSdefenseofficialsisthetechnologylagbetweenthetimetheUnitedStatesfieldsaparticularsystem,andthetimeitsadversariesdo.Forexample,whiletheUnitedStates'toplinefighterwasintroducedin1975,theSoviet'stopfighter,theMiG29'sinitialoperatingcapability(IOC)was11yearslaterin1986.Thus,"their"bestaircraftisbasedontechnology11yearsmoremodernthan"ours."SecretaryofDefenseCheneyhasrecentlyvoicedconcernthatthismayapplytothefieldingofstealthtechnology,andthat11yearsaftertheF22sIOC,forexample,wewillbefacingabrandnewRussianstealthfighter.(70)

References

1.MostofthetechnicaldiscussioninthissectionisbasedonthedefinitiveworkbytheleadingstealthauthorityBillSweetman,StealthAircraft(Motorbooks,Osceola,WI,1986.

2.Brinkley,Randolph,"FutureUSFightersAreataCost/TechnologyCrossroad,"ArmedForcesJournalInternational,January1991,p.49.

3."AFPlansIndividualCoveredParkingSpacesforB2Bombers,"AerospaceDaily,8March1988,pp358359.

4.Tusa,Francis,"Europeanssufferstealthstickershocksyndrome,"ArmedForcesJournalInternational,February1991,p.24.

5."ATFMightBeTrackedBySkinFrictionInfraredSignature,"AerospaceDaily,26November1990,p.323.

6.Tusa,Francis,"Europeanssufferstealthstickershocksyndrome,"ArmedForcesJournalInternational,February1991,p.24.



9.Schemmer,Benjamin,"WillStealthBackfire,"ArmedForcesJournalInternational,January1991,p.44.


11.Evans,David,"TheStealthMayBeInvisible,ButItsDeficienciesAren't"ChicagoTribune,18November1988,page12.

12."StealthTheNextStep,"FlightInternational,18April1990,page24.

13.Reed,Fred,"StealthFighterRemainsaMystery,"AirForceTimes,5December1988,page78.

14.Wilson,George,"Secrecy'sVeilLiftedFromStealthJet,"TheWashingtonPost,11November1988,pageA3.

15.Wartzman,Rick,"DesignerofStealthFighterSaysUSRunsRiskofLosingTechnologicalEdge,"TheWallStreetJournal,4February1991,p.A7.



16.Gordon,Michael,"StealthJet'sFirstMissionWasMarred,PentagonSays,"TheNewYorkTimes,4April1990.

17.Lancaster,John,"DefenseBillIncludesSovietAid,"TheWashingtonPost,2November1991,p.A1.

18.Bond,David,"Risk,CostSwayAirframe,EngineChoicesforATF,"AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,29April1991,p.20.

19.Dudney,Robert,"TheATFandItsFriends,"AirForceMagazine,January1989,page4653.

20."AnalystsFearYF22NotAsStealthyasYF23,"DefenseDaily,4September1990,page357.

21.Gellman,Barton,"ZeroingInonAmerica's21stCenturyFighterJet,"TheWashingtonPost,21April1991,p.A1.


23."Lockheed:ThrustVectoringisBigPlusatLowest,HighestSpeeds,"AerospaceTechnology,6February1991,p.216.

24.Wartzman,Rick,"DesignerofStealthFighterSaysUSRunsRiskofLosingTechnologicalEdge,"TheWallStreetJournal,4February1991,p.A7.

25.Goodman,Glenn,"ATFBalancesStealth,Supercruise,Agility,Avionics,"ArmedForcesJournalInternational,June1991,p.78.

26."CheneyCuts$34.8BillionFromMajorAircraftThroughFiscal1997,"AerospaceDaily,27April1990,page159163.

27."GAOestimatesATFprogramcostshaveincreasedanother$1.7billion,"InsidethePentagon,7February1991,p.13.

28.Gellman,Barton,"ZeroingInonAmerica's21stCenturyFighterJet,"TheWashingtonPost,21April1991,p.A1.

29.Bond,David,"Risk,CostSwayAirframe,EngineChoicesforATF,"AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,29April1991,p.20.

30.Gelb,Leslie,"F22=$95Billion,"TheNewYorkTimes,22May1991.

31.Canan,James,"TheFutureIsStealth,"AirForceMagazine,January1991,p.14.

32.StarrBarbara,"Avenger:countingthecostsofprogramcancellation,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly,19January1991,p.79

33.Schemmer,Benjamin,"Northrop,Lockheed,andEngineFirmsSweatOutApril30thATFDecisions,"ArmedForcesJournalInternational,February1991,p.14.

34."AirForce:NoStrikeF22Unlessit'sAXCostismainDABissue,"AerospaceDaily,11June1991,p.421.


36."Iraq'sInvasionofKuwaitIllustratesneedforA12Avenger,NavySays,"InsidethePentagon,23August1990,page18.

37.'A12WeightCreepContinuesCompositesDisappointing,"AerospaceDaily,24August1990,page319.

38."NordenSaysGDAdmitsitCan'tProveA12SubcontractDefault,"AerospaceDaily,30August1989,page



369370.

39."First200ATAstoFlyWithA6Avionics,LawmakerSays,"NavyNews&UnderseaTechnology,14March1988,page8.

40."MajorAircraftReview,"InsidethePentagon,27April1990,page78.

41."A12MakersAreRunningOutofCash,"DefenseWeek,1June1990,page1,13.

42."Morrocco,John,"SeniorNavyOfficialsDoubtAXAdaptabletoMultiroleCapability,"AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,13May1991,p.25.

43.Wartzman,Rick,"Cheney'sBombRattlesAerospaceWorld,"TheWallStreetJournal,9January1991,p.A2.


45.Holzer,Robert,"A12WoesPromptNewLookatIntruder,"DefenseNews,23July1990,page1,32.

46.Morrocco,John,"NavytoCutCarrier,UpgradeF/A18CheneythreatenstoterminateA12,"AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,24December1990,p.78.

47."NavyExpectedToAskCongressForMoreRewingedA6Aircraft,"DefenseDaily,9January1991,p.33.

48."NavairhasA12alternativestudyinHipPocket,"DefenseDaily,4January1991,p.10.


50."Development,ProductionCostof575AXPlanesPutAt$86.3billion,AerospaceDaily,15May1991,p.261.

51."AXfundedforover$100millioninFY'92,"DefenseDaily,4February1991,p.169.

52."NavyToReleaseRFIForA12ReplacementWithinAMonth,"AerospaceDaily,29January1991,p.153.

53."FutureofNavalAviationBeginsWighIssuanceofAXRFP,"InsideTheNavy,2September1991,p.8.

54."AXToBeLongTermA12Replacement,"DefenseDaily,22January1991,p.99.

55.Holzer,Robert,"Northrop,GDTeamonAX,"DefenseNews,28October1991.

56.Pearlstein,Steven,"StrangeBedfellowsEmergetoChaseAXBid,"TheWashingtonPost,21July1991,p.H1.

57."GrummanPushingF14StrikeVariantsInWakeOfA12Cancellation,"DefenseDaily,11January1991,p.49

58.Holzer,Robert,"AXMayShareF22Avionics,"DefenseNews,28October1991,p.8.

59."ASighOfReliefOnWallStreet:FirmsVyingForAXPlaneDon'tRiskExposure,"DefenseWeek,22July1991,p.6.

60.Brown,David,"GeneralDynamicsPursuingAXEffortsAsMemberofTwoDevelopmentTeams,"AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,17June1991,p.191.

61."B2StealthBombertoCost$70Billion,"DefenseDaily,6September1988,page17.

62.GeorgeWilson,"CostofStealthBombersSoarsto$450million,"TheWashingtonPost,15May1988,page1.

63.Bond,David,"USAFUncertainAboutB2Costs,"AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,11June1990,page24.



64.Lancaster,John,"DefenseBillIncludesSovietAid,"TheWashingtonPost,2November1991,p.A1.

65.Cook,Nick,"StudypavingwaytoUKstealth,"Jane'sDefenseWeekly,24August1991,p.299.




69."TornadostestRAM,"Jane'sDefenseWeekly,17November1990,p.971.

70."HearingsbeforeasubcommitteeoftheCommitteeonAppropriations,UnitedStatesSenate,"101stCongress,2ndsession,onH.R.5803/S.3189,DepartmentofDefenseAppropriationsforFiscalYear1991,GovernmentPrintingOffice,Washington,DCp.328.

Vi - Stealth Aircraft_ Eagles Among Sparrows

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