VI Interpretation

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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Qu:1; Define the statutory interpretation

Ans; When the court find difficult to apply the statute or Act because

of certain ambiguity, then courts interpret the statute and apply the law

in the case while making judgement, it called statutory interpretation.

There are different part of Statute i .e. (i) Short Tit le, (i i) Long Title,

(iii) Preamble, (iv) Marginal Notes,(v) Heading of a group of sections,

(vi) definition of interpretation clause, (vii) Proviso, (viii) illustration,

(ix) exception & saving clauses, (x) explanation schedules and (xi)

punctuation.

There are mainly three rules: Literal Rule, Golden Rule or ModificationRule and Michief Rule / Heydons Rule / Purposive Rule.

Literal Rule: If in the statute there is no ambiguity, and meaning is

clear, then the ordinary and natural meaning should be given, to statute.

Means to take the words as the legislature have given in statute, and to

take the meaning as given naturally, unless where the construction of

these words is either by the preambles or by the context of the words in

question controlled or altered.

The Golden Rule: This rule has been defined that before making any

interpretation the court must read the statutory language, grammatically

and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense, directly in its

context , without omiss ion or addit ion of any word f rom s ta tu te ,

the reaf te r make judgement di scarding injus ti ce , absurdi ty and

contradiction.

CASE LAW: Bangalore Water Supply V/s A. Rajjappa

In thi s case the Bench o f Supreme Court did not ar rived at one

conclusive decision on the meaning of Industry and the meaning ofindustry construed by judges are parallel to each other, therefore the

matter was referred to Constitutional Larger bench of Supreme Court.

Is the modification of l iteral Rule, the purpose and meaning of the

Golden Rule has been given by Justice Parke B in case of Black V

Smith

Mischief Rule / Heyden Rules / Purposive Rule; When the language

of statute capable of two or more construction, in such case it becomesimportant to consider the remedial and correct construction, which is in

the interest of public welfare and against the public evil and avoid the

mischief.

Qu:2; Explain mensor sententia legis

Means Main Sentiments of legislature

Ans : The s ta tu te i s an land mark l ega l work of l egis la ture, t he

conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute should not

touch the humble true intentions of the legislature, therefore the statuteshould be construed according to intention of legislature. If the statute

have provision of interpretation more than one in such case the court

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shall interpret the statue in such way that it express the true intention of

legislature. The elementary principle of interpretation of statute to

gather mens or sententia legis means to gather the main sentiments of

legislature behind the statute.

CASE LAW: Bhatiya Iernational V/s Bulk Trading S. A & Anr [AIR

2002 SC 1432]

This appeal came before Supreme Court against the judgement passed

by the Indore MP High Court, challenging the order of High Court,

which was dismissed.

The 1 s t. Respondent fi led a appl icat ion under sect ion 9 o f t he

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before 3 r d. Dist. Judge, Indore,

MP, against the appellant and 2 nd . respondent the main prayer was thatto s tay the proceeding and res train the t ransfer of property and

business. The opposite party said that Part I of Act does not apply to

arbitration which is not in India. The contention of other party was not

tenable, hence the Trial Court and High Court of Indore, al lowed the

application u/s 9 . The Supreme Court held in this case that If the

statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the court has

to choose that interpretation which represent the true intention of the

legislature.

CASE LAW: Bhavnagar University V/s Palitana Sugar Mills, SCI,

AIR 2003 SC 511: This a appeal before Supreme Court , involving

interpretation of section 20 & 21 of Gujarat Town Planning & Urban

Development Act, 1976, the act said that after notification issued, for

acquisition of any plot, the complete procedure ought to be completed

within statutory time period, if not the ownership of plot automatically

goes to original owner of the plot in disputes. The Supreme Court

observed that the basic principle of construction of statute that same

should be read as whole, then chapter by chapter , then section by

section and the word by word, if there is ambiguity or inconsistency orabsurdity, thereafter only the court interpret the statute keeping in mind

the main sentiments of legislature.

CASE LAW: Public Prosecutor V Sreeramulu, Andhra High Court,

here the similar above views are expressed by High Court on meaning

of Dowry

Qu.3; Def ined avoiding addit ion or substi tut ion of word in

construction:

Ans; The Privy Council in the case of Craford V Spooner observed

that We can not aid the legislatures defective phrasing of an Act, we

can not add or amend and by construction make up deficiencies which

are left there It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting

some other words for word of the statute. The judiciary has no power to

add some thing in statute, unless the statute is meaning less or doubtful.

CASE LAW: State of Kerala V Mathai Verghees; (1986) 4 SCC 746;

In this case a Mathai Verghees and one person, were living in Kerala,and applied their mind to make fake foreign currency, US Dollar ,

according to that they planed and purchase the paper from Mumbai, and

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printed 2000 notes of US Dollar of 20, and some they already had,

some one made a complaint t o Po li ce and caugh t, wi th mater ia l

evidence and were chargesheeted for making fake Currency Notes u/s

489 of IPC. The Session Court, acqui tted them on the ground that

section 489 is applicable to currency notes mean Indian Currency

notes appeal fi led before Kerala High Court , the Kerala High Court ,

maintained the order of Session Court , on the ground that currency

notes as use Indian Currency. The fake currency note does not

indicate the Indian or Foreign currency notes. But the accused have

made fake dollar of US and therefore construed by High Court , and

acquitted. In the appeal before Supreme Court held that It is wrong and

dangerous to proceed by substituting currency note some other words

for words of the statute, speaking briefly the court cannot reframe the

legislation for the very good reason that i t has no power to legislate,

and set aside the judgement of High Court , and remand back to trialcourt for trial.

CASE LAW: British India General Insurance V Captain Libar

Singh, AIR 1959 SC 1331 pp 1334

The Supreme Court held that in holding the section 96(2) of the Moter

Vehicle Act 1939, is exhaustive of defence open to an insurer to add

word al so a fter the word on any of the fol lowing grounds and

observed This the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do unless

the section as it stand is meaningless or of doubtful meaning

Qu;4; Explain Principle of Casus omissus:

Ans: In application of same rule the legislature had provided in one

Statue but omitted or forgotten to provide in another statue, and the

court can not provide what the legislature forgotten / omitted in statute.

Of course the court can find out harmonious solutions.

CASE LAW: Hiradevi & Ors (Kailash nath Kapoor-Died) V DistrictBoard Shahjahanpur AIR 1952 SC362; In this case In this case there

are two ways provision of dismissing the services of secretary of

education society. [casus omissus]

The sec tion 71 of the U. P. Board Act 1922, as amended in 1933,

provided that a resolution the Board for dismissal of the secretary

shall not take effect until the period of one month has expired OR until

the State Government has passed orders on any appeal preferred by

him/secretary.

A Dist Board passed a resolution for dismissal of its secretary and also

for his suspension t i l l the matter of his dismissal was decided under

Section 71 of the Act on appeal if any preferred by the secretary.

But Court held that under section 90 of the Act the secretary could be

suspended only as a punishment or pending of the orders of any

authority where sanct ion is nec f irs t way Sect ion 71 of the UP

District Board Act 1922 necessary for his dismissal.

The pending the orders of any authority where sanction is necessary for

his dismissal could not appropriately cover the case of suspension like

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the present one and the resolution for suspension was therefore ultra

vires

The U P Act 1 of 1933, Sec t ion 71 was amended and the amended

section provided that a resolution of dismissal was not to take effect till

the expiry of the period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was

so presented. But the consequent section 90 was not amended. [casus

omissus]

CASE LAW: Nalinakhsya Basak V Shyamsunder AIR 1953 SC 148;

The s ection 18(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control

(Temporary Provision) Act, 1950, which gave power to court to rescind

or vary any decree for recovery of possession was held not to cover a

power to rescind or va ry an order for possession passed under section

43 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act 1882 The Craford VSpooner, is said that whatever given by legislatures, the court shall not

add in it or remove some words, the act is dangerous to judiciary. [casus

omissus]

Qu: 5 ; Discuss the Literal Rule on interpretation with suitable

cases. In what way is the Golden Rule of interpretation a departure

from the Literal rule?

Ans: The meaning of l i terally means exact or similarly. InLiteralRule i t i s essentia l to understand the meaning of words in sta tute ,

through their natural , ordinary or popular sense. The phrases and

sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning; up to

certain extend, not beyond some absurdity or contrary. To take the word

as legislature given in Statute, and take the meaning which the word

given naturally. If the word has given natural meaning one should not

depart from natural and original meaning, unless it leading to absurdity.

Oega Tellis V BMC: AIR 1986 SC 180: This is land mark case before

Supreme Court of India, on issue of fundamental right granted by theconst it ution , t he people o f these communi ty were l iving on the

footpaths of road in Mumbai, they were creating serious problems of

sanitation, water traffic etc. The BMC has passed order to remove them,

this order was cha llenged by the ir l eader in High Court and then

Supreme Court . The Supreme Cour t i nt erpret ed tha t removing

trespassing and unauthorized occupation of land of BMC and State can

not be violation or infringement of fundamental rights.

(Review Petit ion) Oswal Agro Mills Ltd V Collector of CentralExcise: AIR 1993 SC 2288 In Review Peti t ion in Civil Appeal of

same petitioners, before Supreme Court, the notification on excise duty

on toilet sops was challenged by Petitioners, in earlier Civil Appeal,

but which was dismissed by same Bench of Supreme Court, the

Petitioner again file Review Petition in earlier Civil Appeal under the

Supreme Court Rule; 1966, Order XL, Rule 1 , read with Article 137 of

the Constitution, this Review Petition was dismissed by Court.

The Golden rule is that the word of a statute must prima facie be given

their meaning. The natural and ordinary meaning should not be departedunless the meaning requires in legal context different meaning. Such

meaning can not be departed by Judges, the draft ing of statute is so

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important to a people who hope to live under rule of law. Therefore the

court mus t see tha t whenever possibl e to app ly golden rule of

construction. Means to rea d the statu te grammat ically and

terminologica lly, in the ord inary and primary sense , which i s in

context, without omission or addition.

While construing departure of court from the rule of literal

construction, going beyond outside the recognized limits, in the name

or guise of liberal or strict construction leads to unwarranted expansion

or restrict ion of the meaning of words and gives rise to serious error.

The Golden rule departed from li teral rule in when i t construing the

natural meaning and ord inary meaning of words , unless there i s

requirement in legal context.

Case Law-1: Suthendran V/s Immigration Appeal Tribunal Supra;[golden rule]

In the case the ques tion ar is es r el ated to secti on 14(1) of the

Immigration Act, 1971, which provide that a person who has a limited

leave under this Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may

appeal to an adjudicator against any variation of the leave or against

any refusal to vary it. In this case the word a person who has limited

leave were construed not to include a person who has had such

limited and it was held that the section applied only to a person who at

the time he lodged his appeal was lawfully in the UK that is in whose

case leave had not expired at the time of submitting of appeal.

Case Law-2: S A Vekantraman V/s State AIR 1958 SC 107 p 109;

[golden rule] This is Criminal Appeal before Supreme Court , the

Appel lants was public servant and removed from service for gui lty

found in departmental inquiry, under Prevention of Corruption Act,

1947, therefore a criminal case was fi led against him. Supreme Court

held that sanction is not necessary for taking cognizance of the offence

referred to in the section, i f the accused has ceased to be a publicservant on the date when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of

the offence. The Court rejected the construction that the words who is

employed and in not removable as they occur in clause (a) and (b) of

section (1). Means that who was employed-and was not removable an

also the construction that the words competent to remove him from

office in clause (c) mean would have been competent to remove him

from his off ice Jus tice Imam pointed out tha t In const ru ing the

provision of statute it is essential for a court to give effect to the

natural meaning of the words used therein , i f those words are clear enough The appeal was dismissed.

Case Law-3: Workmen of National and Grindlays Bank Ltd V/s

National and Grindlays bank Ltd. AIR 1976 SC 611 p. 618. [golden

rule] The Supreme Court observed that In construing section 6(a) of

the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 , that the words depreciat ion

admissible in accordance with the provision of sub sect ion (1) of

section 32 of the Income Tax Act have to be given their natural

meaning and these words could not be read as depreciation allowed by

the Income Tax Officer in making assessment on employer . I t wastherefore held that it was for the Industrial Tribunal to determine what

was the depreciation admissible in accordance with section 32 of the

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Income Tax Act and the Tribunal could not just accept the amount

allowed by the Income tax Officer as depreciation under that section, It

was further held that the finding of the Income Tax Officer was not

even admissible before the Tribunal for purpose of the Bonus Act.

Case Law-4:Haji S K Subhan V/s Madhavrao AIR 1962 SC 1230 p

1236: [golden rule] In this case the Supreme Court observed that in

construing M P Aboli t ion of proprietary Rights Act 1950 which in

clause (g) of section 2 defines Home farm as meaning land recorded

as Sir and Khudkast in the name of a proprietor in the annual papers

for the year 1948-49, the Nagpur High Court held that this definition

should be construed l iberally and that land, though not recorded as

Khudkast of the proprietor in the annual papers of 1948-49 but which

ought to have been recorded as such, was within this definition. This

decision was overruled by the Supreme Court by interpreting the saiddefinition section in its natural and ordinary meaning and consequently

holding that the basis for treating a particular land as home-farm under

the Act was the record and not fac t o f actua l cul tiva tion I t was

pointed out that There is no ambiguity about the definition of Home-

farm and so the quest ion of s tr ic t or l iberal construct ion does not

arise.

Qu:6; Define Regard to subject and object;

Ans: The Supreme Court said in case Dimkachi tea worker v Its

Management, AIR 1958 SC 353 p 356 [subject / object] said that The

word of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning are to be

understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject

of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view The

Doctor who was appointed by management as Asst . Medical Officer,

was dismissed from service by paying one month salary in lieu of one

month notice, the industrial tribunal rejected the plea of workmen that

the doctor was worker and majority decision of Supreme Court up

held the judgement of Industrial tribunal. The word any person isconstrued

The Supreme Court in case of U P Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v Braj

Kishore, AIR 1988, SC 2239, observed that Having regards to the

object of the U P Bhoodan Yagna Act 1953 to implement the Boodan

movements, which aimed at distribution of land to landless laboures

who were ve rsed in agr icu lture and who had no o ther means o f

subsistence; it was held that the expression Landless person in section

14, which made provision for grant of land to landless person wasl imited to land less person laboures and did not include a landless

business residing in a city.

Qu;7; Discuss Presumption of Constitutionality;

and Discuss construction Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat

Ans ; Is an advance idea in jurisprudence and to fully understand if you

should refer to a legal dictionary, the basic idea of, better the things

should function than that it should perish is that if a piece of law seemsunclear, one should try to understand it in a way that makes sense of it.

The underlying idea of all legal system is that all laws make sense and

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are there for a purpose, if a law seems incomprehensive or si l ly, one

should try to understand it in some way that.

Means the things may rather have effect than to destroyed I t i s

requires to court that legislatures put every provision in Statute for a

purpose and to construed the Statute to give effect to each provision of

the Statute. There is, therefore, presumption of consti tutionali ty that

the legislatures does not exceeds i ts jurisdiction, and the burden of

es tablishing that the Act is not within the competence of the

Legislatures, or that it has transgresses (to cross the limit) the limit laid

down by the organic law of the Constitution it must be allowed to stand

as the true expression of the national will .

Case Law: Khyerbari Tea Co V/s State of Assam AIR 1964 SC 925.

In this case the Petitioner said that they are transporting their tea from

Assam to Calcutta for final fishing and packing, i t is 689 Miles from

Golpaigudi via by Railway to Dibrugad, and from Dibrugad to Ghat by

Steamer and to Calcutta, both booking sta tion and destinat ion are

located in Wes t Benga l. The Conten tion of Pe tit ione r i s that in

accordance with the Art 301 there is freedom of trade and in accordance

with Art 19(1)(G) the Act is infringement of rights guaranteed under

Art . The Supreme Court observed that If law is shown to invade the

freedom of trade under Art 301, a onus shift to the State to satisfy that

the restrictions imposed are reasonable and in the public interest within

the meaning of Art 304(b) The appeal was dismissed by Supreme

Court.

Case Law: Gita Hariharan V/s RBI, AIR 1999 SC 1149 p.1152

The Supreme Court observed that In section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority

and Guardianship Act, 1956, which provides that the natural guardian

of a minors person or property will be the father and after him, the

mother. The word after him were construed not to mean only afterthe life time of the father but to mean in the absence of father . As

the father and after him, mother this construction would have made

the section unconst itut ional for violat ing const itut ional provision

against sex discrimination;

Qu:8; Explain Hardship, incontinence, injustice, absurdity, and

anomaly to be avoided

Ans: The court shall keep in mind that while selecting the interpretationthe court should adopt such interpretation , which is reasonable and

sensible, and avoid to select which is none of those things as it may be

presumed that the legislature should have used the word in that

interpretation which leas t off end our sense of j us tice, i f the

grammatical construction leads to some absurdity or some repugnance

or inconsistency with the test of the instrument it may be departed from

so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency.

CASE LAW: Rakesh Wadhwan V Jagdamba Industrial Corporation,

AIR 2002, SC 2004;

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Section 13(2) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949,

provides for eviction of a tenant, who has not paid or tendered the rent

due. There is provision to that section which reads Provided that if the

tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due

service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at 6% per annum

on such arrears together with cos t o f applica tion assessed by the

controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the

ren t The provision does not in terms provided tha t i f there be a

genuine dispu te rega rd ing the a rrea rs due the con trol le r wil l

provisionally determine the arrears and give time to the tenant to

deposit the same to save the eviction. But such a provision was read by

implication to avoid hardship and injustice to the tenant in case of a

genuine dispute of arrears of rent. The court reached this conclusion by

holding that the qualifying expression assessed by the controller in

the provision qualified also the arrears of rent and not merely cost ofapplication.

CASE LAW: Central India Spinning weaving and manufacturing co.

Ltd V Empress Mills, Nagpur AIR 1958 SC 341 p 346

In const ru ing sect ion 66(1) of the Cen tral Provinces and Berar

Municipalities Act 1922, which authorized imposition of a terminal tax

on goods or animal i mported or expor ted from the limits of a

municipality the question before the Supreme Court was whether the

said clause empowered the municipal i ty to levy a tax on goods in

transit . The High Court adopted derivatives meaning of words import

and export i.e. to bring in and to carry away and has therefore held that

the municipality had the power to levy terminal tax on goods in transit.

The Supreme Court in reversing the decision of High Court pointed out

that the words import and export in their ordinary commercial sense of

the words in preference to der ivat ive sense . The Jus tice Kapur

observed that The effect of the construction of import and export in the

manner insisted upon by the respondent [municipality] would make rail

born goods passing through a railway station within the limit of amunicipality liable to the imposition of the tax on their arrival at the

railway station or departure there from or both which would not only

lead to inconvenience but confusion, and would also result in inordinate

delays and unbearable burden on trade both inter state and intra-state. It

is hardly l ikely that was the intent ion of t he l egi sl ature. Such

interpretation would lead to absurdity which was according to rules of

interpretation to be avoided.

Qu:9; Discuss the following: i] Long Title: It is now settled law that

the long title of an Act is part of the Act and therefore is admissible as

an aid to its construction.

Case Law: Ashwinikuamr Ghosh V/s Arabindo Bose AIR 1952 SC

369 p 388.[ long title]

The Supreme Court observed that while dealing with Supreme Court

Advocates (Practice in High Court) Act 1951, which bears a full t i tle

thus An Act to authorized Advocate of the Supreme Court topractice as of right in any High Court . Justice S R Das observed that

One cannot but be impressed at once with the wording of the full title

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of Act. Although there are observations in earlier English cases that the

title of the Act is not part of the Statute and is therefore to be excluded

from the consideration in construing the statute, it is now settled law

that the t i t le of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be

referred to for the purpose of ascertaining i ts general scope and of

throwing light on its construction, although it can not override the clear

meaning of the enactment.

Case Law: Poppatlal Shah v/s State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274

[long title]

Under the Madras Sales Tax Act 1939, as i t s tood before i t was

amended by the Madras Act XXV of 1947, the mere fac t tha t the

Contract of sales was entered into within the province of Madras did

not make a t ransact ion which was completed in another province,where the property or goods passed, a sale with the province of Madras

and no tax could be legal ly lev ied upon such a t ransac tion under

provision of Act.

Though the provisional legislation could not pass a taxation statute or

Act, which be binding on any other part of India, it was quite competent

for province to enact a leg is la tion imposing taxes on t ransac tion

concluding outside the province provided there was a sufficient and real

territorial nexus between such transaction and the taxing province.

The t it le o f preamble whatsoever the ir value might be as a ids to

construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw light on the intention and

design of the legislatures and indicate the scope and purpose of the

legislatures itself. It is settle rule of construction that to ascertain the

legislat ion intent a ll the const i tute part of s ta tute a lso to be taken

together and each word phrase or sentence is to be considered in the

light of the general purpose and object of the statute. The Judgement of

Madras High Court Reversed.

The Supreme Court observed that the title of the Madras General Sales

tax Act 1939, was uti l ized to indicate that the object of the Act is to

imposed taxes on sales that take place within province.

Qu;10; Discuss Headings

The view now is settled that the Headings or Title prefixed to sections

or group o f sec tions can be refer red to in const ru ing an Act o f

Legislatures. But conflicting opinion has been expressed by the variouscourts on what weight to be attached to heading. According to some

opinion it is key to the interpretation of the clauses of sections of Act,

and thus the heading is equal ly crucial as preambles. But there is

opposite opinion stating that when the word is ambiguous then the role

of heading shall be considered in construction.

Case Law: Frick India Ltd V/s Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 689 p.

693. [heading]

The appel lant before Supreme Court is manufacturer of spares andequipments required for cold storage and deep cooling plants, in dairy

and food industries. Since the unit was registered with Central Excise

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depar tment they paid the exc ise duty and taken out the goods for

sending to Gujarat and after submitt ing return the unit fi led refund

order to get back the duty which they have paid under the order of

not if icat ion. But it was di smissed, by Asst. Commissioner CE,

thereafter they filed appeal against the order of Asst. Comm. before the

Commissioner of Central Excise, that was also dismissed.

Thereafter the unit filed writ petition before High Court, that was also

dismissed, and present civil appeal came before Supreme Court. It was

observed by Supreme Court that whole arguments arose because of

composite sentence used in this paragraph of notification. It is only

means complete plants which are covered by items (1) and (2) cannot be

considered as parts on machinery and such complete plant would not be

classification under sub-item (3) of Item 29 A. The reliance placed by

the learned counsel for the appellant on this notification does not in anyway adverse the case of the appellants, the appeal dimissed.

The Supreme Court observed in this case that It is well settled that the

heading preferred to section or entries ( of a tariff Scheduled) can not

control the plain words of the provision, they cannot also be referred to

for the purpose of construing the provision, they cannot also be referred

to for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in

the provision are clear and unambiguous nor can they be used for

cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only in

the case of ambigui ty or doubt the heading or sub heading may be

referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such case it

could not be used for cutting down the wide application of clear words

used in the provision.

Case Law: Bhinka V/s Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 [heading]

The Supreme Court observed that under section 180 of U P Tenancy

Act, 1939 a remedy was provided for ejectment of a person who was

il legally retaining possession of land otherwise than in accordancewith the provisions of the law for t ime being in force The question

before Supreme Court was whether a person without having title but

retaining possession by virtue of an order passed under section 145 Cr.

P. C, could be ejected under aforesaid provision. In searching the

conclusion that such a person could be ejected the Supreme Court

construed the words possession in accordance with the law for the time

being in force as meaning possession with title. Support for arriving at

this conclusion was taken from the heading of the section which read

Ejectment of person occupying land without title Justice Subbaraoquoted with approval the fol lowing passage f rom max wel l The

heading prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern

statute are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot

control the plain words o f the s ta tute but they may expla in

ambiguous words.

Qu;11; Discuss Punctuation in a statute

In England before 1850 there was no punctuation in the manuscript

copy of any Act which received the Royal assent, therefore, the Courtscannot have any regards to punctuation for construing the older Acts.

Even as regards more modern Acts, i t is very doubtful if punctuation

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can be looked at for purpose of construction. The opinion on Indian

statute is not very much different

Case Law: Ashwinikumar V/s Arbindo Ghosh, AIR 1952 SC 369

[punctuation]

In this case before Supreme Court Justice B. K. Mukherjee expressed

himself as fol lows; Punctuat ion is after a ll a minor element in the

construction of a statute and very little attention is paid to it by English

Courts, It seems however that in the vellum copies printed since 1850,

there are some cases of punctuation and when they occur they can be

booked upon as a sort of contemporaneous expositio. When the statute

is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight

should be given to punctuation. I need not deny that punctuation may

have i ts uses in some cases, but i t cannot certainly be regarded as acontrolling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning

of text.

Qu:12; Explain Parliamentary history and statutes in pari materia

are admissible aids in the interpretation of statue- Elucidate

Ans: According to the traditional English view, the intent of Parliament

which passed the Act, is not to be gathered from Parliamentary history

of the statute, means the bill which Parliament passed was not copied

from the Parliamentary history of the statute. The Bill in its original

form or the amendment s cons idered du ring i ts prog ress in the

Legislatures are not admissible aids to construction. Since the Court are

ent it led to consider such exte rnal or h is to ri ca l fac ts a s may be

necessary to understand the subject matter to which the statute relates

or to have regards to the mischief which the sta tute is intended to

remedy the exclusionary rule was relaxed to admit the reports of the

commission preceding a statutory measure as evidence of surrounding

circumstances with reference to which the word in the statute are used.

Case Law : State of Mysore V/s R V Bidop, AIR 1973 SC 2555. [pari

materia]

The Supreme Court speaking generally, to begin with, enunciated the

rule of exclusion of Parl iamentary history in the way t radi tional ly

enunciated by the English Courts, but on many an occasion, the court

used this aid in revolving question of construction. The Court has now

cleared to the view that legislative history within circumspect l imits

may be consulted by court in resolving ambiguity. But the court st i l lsometimes like the English courts, make a distinction between use of a

materia l for f inding the mischief deal t wi th the Act and i ts use for

finding the meaning of the Act

Case Law: Indira Sawhney V/s Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 1061 p

1071 [pari materia]

The Supreme Court while interpreting Art 16(4) of the Constitution the

Court referred to Dr. Ambedkars speech in the Constituent Assembly

and observed That the debate in the Const ituent Assembly can berelied upon as an aid to interpretation of a consti tution provision is

borne out by series of decision of this court. Since the expression

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backward class of citizens of India is not defined in the Constitution,

reference to such debates is permissible to ascertain at any rate of

context, background and objective behind them. Particularly where the

court wants to ascertain the original intent such reference may be

unavoidable. The Court however, earl ier clarified that the debates or

even the speech of Dr. Ambedkar could not be taken as conclusive or

binding on the court. More recently while interpreting Art 28(1) of the

Const itution which prohibits rel igious instruct ion in educat ional

institution maintained wholly out of state funds, reference was made to

the debates in the constituent assembly which said to be illuminating

and helpful in giving a restricted meaning of the expression.

Qu:13: Explain pari materia

Ans: The meaning of the maxim is statute are in pari materia whichrelates to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or

things. When two pieces of legislations are of different scope, it can not

be said that they are in pari materia

Therefore the Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control

Act 1947 and the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, were not in pari

materia as they do not relates to the same person or things or to same

class of persons or things.

CASE LAW: State of Madras V/s A Vaidyanath Ayer AIR 1958 SC61 p 65 [pari materia]

The Supreme Court observed tha t the sec tion 4 of Prevent ion of

Corruption Act, 1947, which directs that on proof that the accused has

accepted any gratification other than legal remuneration, i t shall be

presumed unless the contrary is established by the accused that the

gra ti fica tion was accepted as a bribe , has been held to be in pari

materia with subject matter dealt with by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

and the definit ion of the expression shall presume in the Evidence

Act has been utilized to construe the words it shall be presumed insection 4 of the P C Act, 1947.

Case Law: Swarva Shramik Sangh V/s Indian Smelting and Refining

Co. Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 269 p 277 [pari materia]

The meaning and intention of the legislatures which must govern the

interpretation of a provision in a statute, have to be ascertain not only

the language in which it is clothed but also by considering its nature,

i ts design and the consequences which would follow in construing i teither way.

Reports of commission or inquiry committee preceding the introduction

of a bil l for the enactment have been always viewed as providing

evidence of the historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of

misch ie f or evi l in te res t to be remed ied and any t ime even for

interpretation the Act as external aids to construction of the Act.

In this case it has been held that the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice Act, 1971 has to beread and construed along with other labour Laws then in force such as

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Contract Labour (Regulation and

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Aboli ti on) Ac t 1970. [pa ri mater ia ] I t was he ld in thi s case that

workmen claiming to be employed by a company ostensibly through a

con trac to r a ll eging thi s t o be a camoufl age to concea l t he rea l

relationship cannot directly complain against the company under the

Maharashtra Act and they have first to raised industrial disputes to have

their status as directly employed by the company determined under the

Industrial Disputes Act. The Appeal was dismissed.

Case Law: Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association V/s

Administrative Officer, AIR 2004 SC 1426 p 1431 [pari materia]

This i s appea l before Supreme Court o f Ind ia , f rom appel lant for

declaring them as employee under Employees Provident Fund Act 1952.

The Supreme Court observed that the legislatures was alive to various

kinds of definitions of word employee contained in various previouslabour enactment when the Act was passed in 1972. If i t intended to

cover in the definit ion of employee all kinds of employee i t could

have as well used. Such wide language as is contained in Section 2(1)

of the Employees provident Funds Act 1952, which defines employee

mean any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work,

manual or ot herwise, in or in connection with the work of an

estab li shment . Non use of such wide language in des tina tion of

employee in section 2(e) of the Act of 1912 reinforce our conclusion

that teachers are clearly not covered i n the definition

The same principle the definit ion of employee in section 2(e) of the

payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 was construed in the light of definition

of employee in them and it was held that teachers cannot be said to be

employed in any skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory

technical or c lerical work and therefore they do not fal l under the

definition of employee. The appeal dismissed.

Qu.:14; Distinguish between mandatory and directory statute with

case: Examine the va rious factors guiding a Judge in ho ld ing aprovision mandatory or directory

Ans: The question arises whether the statute is mandatory or directory

depends upon the intent and wishes of the legislatures and language of

in which intent is cloth. Means the question of statute is mandatory is

wholly depends on the intent of the legislatures and not on the language

of s ta tu te . The int en tions and mean ing o f l egi sl atures sha ll be

calculated or taken granted from and ascertained from the language and

also from its nature, i ts design, and the consequences, which will inconstruing statute by either way. The determining the question whether

statute is mandatory or directory, is depends on the subject matter, the

important of the provision to the general object intended to secure by

the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory.

The study of many cases on this topic does not yield any universal rule

and any result to decide whether the statute is directory of mandatory.

The use of word shall a mandatory requirement and use of word may

directory requirement.

Case Law: Drigraj Kuer ( Rani) V Amar Krishna Narayan Singh(Raja) AIR 1960 SC 444 [mandatory provision]

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In this appeal before Supreme Court was disputes of property of two

estate, the Peti t ioner became unsound mind and the Court appointed

ward. The respondent owner of Ramnagar Estate filed a suit against the

Appel lant owner of Ganeshpur estate for the recovery of cer ta in

properties. The appellant filed cross suit aga inst the respondent during

the pending of suit the appellant became unsound and declared by court

and court of ward was appointed by court to appear before the court ,

who was Dy. Commissioner of Barabanki. Thereafter in High Court

both the parties arrived at mutual agreement and the basis of this

mutual agreement the High Court passed a decree of consent.

Meanwhile the unsound Appel lant Rani recovered from i llness and

court declared her she is sound mind person. Thereafter she filed two

Application before the High Court contending that the compromise

decree is nullity, on the following grounds;

a ] As the court o f wards had not compl ied with the Manada to ry

Provision of sec 6 of the Act

b] As there could not in law be a compromise unless there were two

parties but in the present case there was only one party the Deputy

Commissioner, of Barabanki

c ] The High Court fail ed to appoint a d is in te res ted pe rson as a

guardian of the appellant who was of unsound mind under order XXXII

of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In this case the Supreme Court observed that a mandatory provision

had not been complied with and the suit proceeded with the Collector as

both the plaintiff and defendants. The ward for unsound mind was not

appointed which is mandatory provision.

If the provision is mandatory as act done in breach thereof wil l be

invalid, but if i t is directory the act will be valid although the non-

compliance may give r ise to some other penal ty i f provided by the

statute.

Case Law: State of Punjab V/s Balbir Singh, AIR 1977 SC 629

When substantial compliance is held to be a sufficient observance of a

statutory requirement it is because the statutory provision containing

the requirement is regarded as directory rather than mandatory.

Case Law: Sashikant Sigh V Tarkeshwar Singh [ (2002) 5 Supreme

Court Cases 138 [directory/mandatory]

Their lordship while considering the requirement under section (1) of

the Sec 319 of Cr. P. C. [ read where in the course of any inquiry into,

or trial of an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not

being the accused had committed any offence for which such person

could be tried together with the accused the court may proceed against

such person for the offence which he appears to have committed] that

the person summoned could be tr ied together with the accused is

directory provision.

Whereas requirement in sub sect ion (4) of sect ion 319 of Cr. P. C.

[where the court proceeds against any person under sub section (1) then

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(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced

afresh and the witness re-heard (b) subject to provision of clause (a) the

case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when

the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial

was commenced. It is mandatory provision.

It is very difficult to distinguish the directory provision and mandatory

provision.

Case Law: Rai Vimal Krishna V State of Bihar (2003) 6 SCC 401 pp.

412-414 [mandatory/directory]

It is case of Bihar, Section 149(1) of the Patana Municipal Corporation

Act 1951, requires that the Executive Officer shall sign the assessment

l is t and shal l g ive publ ic not ice by beat of drum and by displayingplacards posted in main public places. Interpreting section it was held

that requi rement of publi c notice was mandatory but the

requirement of manner of publication was directory, therefore,

public notice in the news papers was substantial compliance though

there was no publication by beat of drum or by posting play cards.

Qu:15; Discuss the rule ofEjusdem Generis with the help of cases

Ans: The meaning of maxim that a particular section of statute should

not divorced or removed from rest of Act . When a part icular words

pertaining to class or category are followed by general words, the

general world construed as limited to things of the same kind as those

specified. This rule is known as the rule of ejusdem generis this rule

applies when ;

1. Statute contains an enumeration of specific words

2. The subject of enumeration constitute a class or category

3. That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration

4. The general terms follows the enumeration5. There is no indication of a different legislative intent

Case Law: Sidheshwar Cotton Mills P Ltd V Union of India

The rule was applied in construing the word any other process In

section 2(i) v of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 which defines

manufacturer in relation to goods in item 19.1 of the schedule to the

Central Excise Tariff Act 1985 to include bleaching mercerizing,dying, printing, water proofing, rubberizing, shrink printing, organic

processing or any other processing. The Supreme Court held that the

process which import change of a lusting character to the fabric by

either the addition of some chemicals into the fabric or otherwise and

any other process in the section must necessary share one or other of

these incidents which constitute manufacturing in the extended sense.

Case Law: Jivajirao Cotton mills V/s. M P E B

Section 49(3) of the Electricity Supply Act 1948, empowers to board tofix different tariff for the supply of power to any person having regards

to the geographical posit ion of any area and nature of supply and

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purpose for which the supply is required and any relevant factors. In

const ru ing thi s sec tion the Supreme Court dec ided to the rule of

ejusdem generis for l imiting factors on the ground that there was no

genus of the relevant factors.

Qu.:16; Explain the rule of Harmonious Construction with the help

of decided cases

Case Law: M V Jarali V Mahajan Borwell 1997 (8) SC 386

The rule of harmonious construction was applied while revolving

conflicting in between sections 276B and 278B of the Income tax Act

1961.

Sec 276B: If a person fai ls to pay or credi t to Central Governmenttreasury the amount of TDS, he shall be l iable to imprisonment of 3

months.

Sec 278B: If a company fails to pay or credit to Central Govt. treasury

the amount of TDS he is liable t o pay fine or penalt y and not

imprisonment.

In such case the Supreme Court apply the harmonious construction by

apply ing f ine to d irec tors i f they prosecuted as company and i ts

directors

When Reconciliation not possible

In the disputes of Acts, when the reconciliation is not possible in such

stage the last Act shall play role in construction, but that will be last

resort.

Case Law: Wood V Rilley OR K M Nanavati V S tate of Bombay

The appeal was before Supreme Court, in the case the court held that ifthere is conflict of two sections of Act and can not be reconciled which

may be absolute contradiction, in such situation the court may allow to

play last section or Act, to play role in construction

In case of Nanavati the latter was prevailed

Lord Evershed M R Said It is no doubt that if two sections of an Act

of Parliament are in irreconcilable then from latter will be preferred.

Case Law: Sirsilk Ltd V/s Govt. of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 160

pp 162

There was interesting question before Supreme Court relating conflict

between two equally mandatory provision viz section 17(1) and 18(1) of

t he Indust ri al Dispu te Act , 1947 , is a good il lu st ra tion o f t he

importance of the principle that every effort should be made to give

effect to a ll the provision of an Act by harmonizing any apparent

conflict between two or more of its provisions Section 17(1) of the Act

requires the Government to publish every award of a tribunal withinthirty days of its receipt and by sub section (2) of Section 17 the award

on its publication becomes final. But section 18(1) of the Act provides

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that a sett lement between employer and workmen shall be binding on

the parties to the agreement. In a case where settlement was arrived at

after receipt of the award of a Labour. The tribunal by the Government

but before publication, the question was whether the Government was

still required by section 17(1) to publish the award. In construing these

two equally mandatory provisions, the Supreme Court held that the only

way to resolve the conflict was to hold that by the sett lements which

become effective firm the date of signing, the industrial dispute comes

to an end and the award become in fructuous and the Government

cannot publish it.

Qu:17; Explain any f ive of the fol lowing with reference to the

General Clauses Act

i] Coming into operation of enactment: When any Central Act is notexpressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come

into operation on the day on which it receives the assent;

In the case o f a Central Ac t made before the commencement o f

Constitution, the assent of Governor General and

In case of an Act of Parliament, the assent of President

i i] Gender and number : In all Central Acts and regulations unless

there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, words importing

the masculine gender shall be taken to include females and words in the

singular shall include the plural and vise versa

iii]Duty to be taken pro rata: Where by any enactment now in force or

hereafter to be in force, any duty of customs or excise, or in the nature

thereof, is charged on any given quantity, by weight or measurement or

value of any goods or merchand ize, t hen a li ke duty is cha rged

according to the same rate on any greater or less quantity.

iv] Measurement of distance : In the measurement of any distance forthe purpose of any Central Act or Regulation made after the commence

of this Act that distance shall, unless a different intention appears be

measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane.

v] Effect of repeal: Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation

made after the commencement of this Act, repeal any enactment hereto

made or hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears

the repeal shall not

vi] Imprisonment: Shall means imprisonment of either description as

defined in the Indian Penal Code.

Qu:18; Explain IMPLIED REPEAL;

Ans; This a presumption against a repeal of act or s tatute by

implication, and the reason of this rule is based on the theory that when

legislature while enacting a law has complete knowledge of the existing

law on the same subject matter and therefore, when it does not provide

a repealing provision in new Act, it gives out an intention not to repealthe exist ing Act or leg is la tion . But when the new Act conta in a

repealing section mentioning the Act which i t expressly repeals, the

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presumption aga inst implied repeal of other Act is further strengthened

on the principle of ;

Expressio unis est exclusion alterus; Means expression of one subject,

object and idea is the expulsion of other subject object and idea.

CASE LAW; Municipal Council of Palai V/s T J Joseph, AIR 1963

SC 1561 p 1565

In this case the Municipal Council had constructed the bus stand and

prohibited buses to stand on road or any other places in its limits, and

those are using the bus stand council was charging 50 np per bus. This

resolut ion under 286 and 287 of Travancore Munic ipal Acts, was

challenged in Kerala High Court, by writ petition which was allowed.

The Provision of Municipal Act, which provide to Municipal Council toprovide bus stand, were held to be repealed by a subsequent Motor

Vehicle Act, which empowered the Government or delegate to do the

same. The reason for this conclusion were mainly two fold; (1) that the

Municipality Act was a special law applying to Municipality areas, and

the Motor Vehicle Act was a general law applying to all area in general;

and (2) that both the provision were enabling ones and then could be no

question of conflict till the authority in the later Act also provided for

bus stand for the same areas for which bus stand had already been

provided under the Mu nicipal Act.

CASE LAW; Syndicate Bank V Prabha D Naik, AIR 2001 SC 1968,

p, 1968

If the prior law provides both for right and remedy and a later general

law undoubtedly replace the right, the remedy of the prior law must

also be taken to have been impliedly repealed. The British left India in

15.08.1947, but Portugese were remained in Goa t i ll 1962, because

some unknown political reasons, the Provision of Portugese Civil Code

applicable in the Goa State regulating contracts and remedies as alsoproviding for limitation were taken to be impliedly repealed by

extension of the Indian Contact Act, the Negotiable Instrument Act and

the Indian Limitation Act to Goa

Qu;19; Explain Beneficial Construction

Qu;20; Explain Status to be read as a whole i n its context:

Qu:21; Discuss Reddendo Singula Singulis: This rule applied where

general words of description follows the list of particular things;

The rule is developed from Irish case, in the following words;

Where there ar e general words of descr ipti on, following on

enumera tion , o f par ticu lar things such general words a re to be

construed distributive reddendo singula singgulis and if the general

word is apply to some things and not to others , the general words are

applied to those things to which they will and not to which they will not

apply ; tha t rule i s beyond of a ll controversy . Thus I dev ice and

bequeath all my real and personal property to A, will be construedredendo singula singgulis by applying device to real property and

bequeath to personal property and in the sentence ;

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Il lustration; Wharton; Law Lexicon 14 the edit ion p 650 : If any one

shall draw any sword or gun the word draw is applied to sword and only

and the word load to gun only because it is impossible to load a sword

or draw a gun ;

I can not say I load a sword, I can say I draw the sword, similarly I can

not say I draw the Gun, I can say I load the gun.

An example of the application of the rule is furnished in the

construction of section 59(1) of the local Government Act 1933, which

read A person shall be disqualified for being elected or being member

of a local authority if he has within five years before the day of election

or since his election been convicted of any offence and ordered to be

imprisoned for a period of not less than three months, without theoption of fine

Justice Clauson construing the section said The section provides for

two matters;

first what is to be disqualification for election? and

secondly what i s to be d isqual if icat ion for being a member a fter

election?

Provide for disqualification ; first conviction within five years before

the day of election and secondly conviction since election. It is obvious

that the second disqualification mentioned does not fi t the first case

mentioned namely that of election, but does not fit the second case, and

the second case only. I t a lso obvious that the f irs t d isqual if ication

mentioned fi ts the first case and i t does not seem at al l apt to fi t the

second case.

CASE LAW: Koteshwar Vithal Kamat V K Rangappa Baliga & Co,

AIR 1969 SC 504 p 511

In this case the Rangappa Baliga & Co, booked the Coconut oil on the

forward marketing principles, but letter he failed to lift the material and

subsequent payment, the Kamat, filed a suit of recovery in trial court,

the said suit was decreed by trial court and the decree was upheld by

Kerala High Court. Aggrieved by judgement of High Court the Kamat

went to Supreme Court. Another case law the application of the rule of

Redendo Singula singulis is found in the construction of the Proviso to

Art 304 of the Const itut ion which read Provided tha t Bi ll andAmendment for the purpose of c lause (b) shall be introduced or

moved in the legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the

President It was held by the Supreme Court that the word introduced

referred to bill and the word moved for Amendment.

Qu;22; Explain Heyden Case / Mischief Rule/ Purposive

Construction/ Heyden Rule :

When the material words in statute are capable of bearing two or more

construction or interpretations, the most firmly established rule forconstruction of such words of all statutes in general, they may be penal

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or beneficiary, restrictive or enlarging of the common law the rule laid

down in Heydon Case.

Means the court must select the construction which is most f irmly

established rule, under rule of law and such rule must be far from any

mischief, from the material of statute.

Before construction in accordance to Heydon Rule the court must have

allowed:

a] What was the law before making of Act

b] What was the mischief or defect for which law did not provide

c] What is the remedy

d] what is the reason of giving remedy or relief

Thereafter the court must adopt the construction which shall suppress

the mischief and give relief or r emedy.

Case Law: Bengal Immunity Co V/s State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661

Ans India is a old ancient country in world and having ancient history

of Kingdoms and Princess States, most of these Kings and Princess are

now Ministers and Governors, of course there are exception for instance

Governor of Kerala R S Gawai. After getting freedom the most difficult

work before Indian leaders to draft and accept the constitutions, which

have taken three years, of course that t ime no computer and internet

available. The old Kingdoms and Princess states were having their own

Acts and Rules and Regulations and separate taxation on goods, and in

such laws there was restr ict ion on intersta tes f low of goods. After

adopt ion of the Const i tution, in accordance to Art 286, there is no

restr ic t ion for free f low of goods from one sta te to other s ta te . The

instance appeal came before Supreme Court in 1955, for hearing, the

Supreme Court rejec t the taxat ion and res tr ic tion on interstate

movement of goods.

The Supreme Court applied the Hyden Rule in this case

i] There was separate law for interstate flow of goods and

multiple taxation.

ii] There was mischief and defect in old state laws and old states

law was not providing any remedy or relief

iii] The Art 286 of the Constitution provide fr ee flow of goods

from one state to other state, with single taxation

iv] The people of country are benefited, because there is no

multiple taxation and hurdles on movement of goods.

Case Law: CIT V/s Sodra Devi AIR 1957 SC 832;

The Heyden Rule was again applied in this case, in the construction of

sec 16(3) of the Income tax Act, 1923, the sub section read;

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In computing the total income of any individua l for the purpose of

assessment, there shall be include (a) so much of the income of a wife or

minor child of such individualas arises indirectly or directly.

The quest ion before Supreme Court was whether individual word

stated in the aforesaid section meant only a male or a lso included

female or wife. The Justice Bhagwati said In order to resolve this

ambiguity , therefore, we must of necessity have resort to the state of

the law before the enactment of the provision, the mischief and the

defec t for which the law d id not provide ; the remedy which the

Legislature resolved and appointed to cure the defect and the t rue

reason of the remedy.

After referring to these factors Justice Bhagwati proceeded to point out

It is clear that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the oneresul ting f rom the wide spread pract ice of husband enter ing into

nominal partnership with their wives and father, admitting their minor

children to the benefit of the partnership of which they were member.

This evil was sought to be remedied by the enactment of section 16(3)

in the Act. If this background of the enactment of section 16(3) is borne

in mind there is no room for any doubt that howsoever that mischief

was sought to be remedied by amending the Act, the only intention of

the Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the

wife or minor child, in computation of the total income of the male

assesses, the husband or the father, as the case may be, for the purpose

of assessment. The word any individual were therefore construed as

restricted to male.

Qu;23; Explain Codifying Statutes:

Ans The purpose of codifying sta tute is to present an orderly and

authoritative statement of the leading rules of law on a given subject,

whether those rule are to be found in statute law or common law. The

codified Act could be found from its preamble and title. The codifyingstatute is presumed that not be alter unless contrary intention appeared.

The Section 265 of Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter XXI, Plea

Bargaining was amended in 2006

Qu;24;Explain Casus omissus :

Means while amending one Act omitted to amend corresponding Act.

This is best example of Legislatures office errors or law making body.Of course they amended certa in section of Act but they omitted to

relating Act. omission by the Legislature to amend a related provision

present great difficulties of construction, but on the same time the court

can not remove the deficiency of Legislatures.

Case Law: Hiradevi V/s Dist Board Shahajahanpur, AIR 1952 SC

362

This is civil appeal before the Supreme Court , Section 71 of the U P

Dis tr ic t Board , Act 1972, provide tha t a Board may d ismissed i tssecretary by special resolution which in certain cases required sanction

local Government and section 90 conferred a power to suspend the

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secretary pending inquiry into his conduct or pending the order of any

authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal. By U P Act 1 of

1933 Section 71 was amended and the amended section provided that a

resolut ion of dismissal was not to take effect t il l the expiry of the

period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was so presented. No

corresponding amendment was, however made in Section 90 and it was

held by Supreme Court that the suspension resolved in section 90 to be

operative till the appeal against dismissal was decided was ultra virus

the power of Board.

Qu;24; Explain DICTIONARIES

When any word is not defined in Act i tself, then i t is permissible to

refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is

understood in common parlance. However while selecting one meaningout of many meanings in dictionaries, the regard must be given to

context, because i t is fundamental rule that the colour must be taken

from the context.

CASE LAW: State Bank of India V/s. N Sundara Mani AIR 1976 SC

1111 p 1114

Justice Krishna Ayyar observed that Dictionaries are not dictation of

statutory construction which the benignant (pleasant and beneficiary in

nature) mood of law and more emphatically, the definit ion clause

furnish a different denotation.

CASE LAW: Commissioner of Income Tax V/s. N C Budhraja & Co.

AIR 1993 SC 2529

Jus ti ce Jeevan Reddy obse rved tha t A s tatut e canno t a lways be

construed with the dictionaries in one hand and the statute in the other

hand, but regards must a lso to be the scheme, context and to the

legislative history

Qu;25; Explain Noscitur a sociis;

(Means a doubtful words can be derived from its association with other

words)

The meaning of word is to be judged by the company i t keeps; It is a

rule of legit imate rule of construction to construe words in an act of

Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection withthem. The associated words take their meaning from one another under

the doctrine ofNoscitur a sociis the philosophy of which is that the

meaning of doubt fu l word may be ascer ta ined by reference to the

meaning associated with it; such doctrine is broder than maxim ejusdem

generis ( Particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from rest

of the Act)

CASE LAW: G Radhakrishana Murthy V Commercial Tax Officer,

JT 1998 (4) SC 426.

The Supreme Court held that in entry 16 of schedule A to the Punjab

General Sales Tax Act 1948 which reads cosmetics, perfumery and

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toilet goods, excluding tooth paste, tooth powder, kumkum, and soap,

the perfumery was construed to mean such articles as are used as

cosmetics and toilet goods and are upon the person, and it was held that

the word had no application to dhoop and agarbatti.

CASE LAW: Pradip Agarbatii , Ludhiana V State of Punjab AIR

1988, SC 171

When some article are grouped together in an entry to the schedule of

sales tax and excise statute, each word is the entry draws colour from

the other words therein on the principle of noscitur a sociis

CASE LAW: Sidheshwar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd V Union of India,

AIR 1989 SC 1019 p1023l

Qu; 26; Explain Generalia sphaecialibus non derogant

Means of a special provision is made on a certain matter that matter is

excluded from the general provision. This principle may apply in

between Act and rules, if a provision has been made into Act therefore

the provision shall be excluded from the rule

The principle can be apply to resolve the conflict in between two Acts.

The above said maxim meaning that where a special provision made in

a special statute that special provision excludes the operation of general

provision in the general law

CASE LAW: K M Nanavati V State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112

p123

In this land mark case Supreme Court held that the absolute power of

Governor under Art 161 of the Const itut ion to grant pardon or to

suspend a sentence passed on accused person is not available during the

period the matter become sub-judice before Supreme Court as otherwiseit will conflict with judicial power of that court provided under Art 142

of the Constitution

CASE LAW: Venkatraman Devora V State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC

255

The Supreme Court held that said revolving conflict between Art 25(2)

(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of every

religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairsin mat ter of rel igious Art 26(b) is subject to a law made by a sta te

providing for social welfare and reforms or throwing open of Hindu

religious insti tution of public character to all classes and section of

Hindu Art 25(2)(b)

Qu;27; Explain Ex visceribus actus;

The meaning of this is the statement has been accepted at the basis for

the rule of construction based upon four corners of the Act

Qu;28; Explain CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO;

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The meaning of this maxim is the construction of law, made shortly

after its enactment when the reason for its passage were then fresh in

the mind of the judge is considered as of great weight.

The usage or practice developed under a statute in indicative of the

meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary opinion and in case of

an ancient statute is an admissible external aid to its construction.

When the pract ice receives judicial or legislat ive approval i t gains

additional weight and is to be more respected. In construing old statue

it has been usual to pay great regard to the construction put upon them

by the judge who lived at or soon after the time when they were made

because they were best able to judge of the intention of the makers at

the time.

CASE LAW: In Case of Bhattacharyajee V/s. S. D. Muzumdar, AIR

2007, SC 2102;

The Supreme Court held that the principles stated above relating to use

of contemporaneous officials statement as executive construction; were

reiterated and approved.

CASE LAW: Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys Lts V/s. Collector ofCentral Excise, AIR 1991 SC 1028;

Contemporary, [means belonging to same period of t ime,] offic ia ls

statement throwing light on the construction of a statue and statutory

instrument made under it have been used as contemporanea expositio to

interpret not only ancient but even recent statutes both in England and

India

Qu; 29: Expla in Presumpt ion agains t intending injust ice orabsurdity

Qu;30; Explain Presumption against the retrospective operation of

statute

Qu;31; Explain Presumption against intending what is incontinent

or unreasonable

Qu;32; Explain Presumption against the territorial operation of the

statute;

Ans ; The presumption is that s ta tute is not intended to apply to a

person residing out side the territory of the state, which has passed the

legislation or Act., this presumption is particularly very strong in case

of foreigner , the rule of const ruct ion fur ther became s trong, by

interpreting that the legislature intent to respect the International Law.

It obvious that Indian statute become ineffective against the foreign

property of foreigner outside the jurisdiction, but if there is treaty

among the member country, them matter depends on the terms of suchInternational treaty. But in case of criminal jurisprudence the important

factor is place of offence.

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CASE LAW: Peoples Union for Civil Liberties V/s. Union of India,

AIR 2005, SC 2417 p 2416

The language of the Indian Act is clear, its meaning cannot be affected

by International declarations or United Nations, resolution to which

India is party and has given affect to. It was so held that in deciding

that a retired police officer having knowledge of practical experience

in the matter relating to human right, can be appointed a member of the

National Human Rights Commission being qualified to be so appointed

under section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1994, and

his appointment can not be challenged on the basis of Paris principle

regarding the pro tect ion of human r ights, which i s subsequently

endorsed by UN

CASE LAW: Naim Malvan V/s. Director of Public Prosecution, AIR

1948, PC, 186

The Court he ld tha t the pr incipl es have given r ise to a rule o f

construction which as explained by Lord Simonds, means, A statute an

offence and imposing a penal ty for i t , should be so construed as to

apply only to those person who by virtue of residence or in some case

citizenship or nationality are regarded as subject to the jurisdiction of

the state which has enacted the statute

Qu: 33; Explain Presumption against the ouster of jurisdiction of

Court;

Ans: Means legislature at the time of making statute or any law thought

that whatever they are making statute shall not ouster the jurisdiction of

the courts,

Qu;34; Explain Presumption against violation of international law:

Ans: Means legislatures a t the t ime of making sta tute or any law

thought that whatever acts, statute, law, and rules they are making shall

not violate the International Law.

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VI Interpretation

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Transcript of VI Interpretation