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VERBA LEGISMICHAEL PADUA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 168546

July 28, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs. Initially in his

arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of first

time offenders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for

certiorari, the court said that probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions

in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be invoked to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug

trafficking, application for probation should be denied. The court discussed the availment of

suspension of sentence under RA 9344.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial

courts order denying his petition for probation

2. Whether or not Paduas right under RA 9344 violated

3. Whether or not Section 2 of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have

application in this case

HELD:

1. NO

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed

against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such

tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the

RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely

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VERBA LEGISapplied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition

for probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165

for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person

convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug

trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted

by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory co nstruct ion is

that when the word s and p hrases of the statute are clear and unequ ivocal , their

meaning m ust be determined from the language employed and the statute must be

taken to m ean exact ly w hat i t says. If a statute is c lear , plain and free from amb igui ty, i t

mu st be given i ts l i teral meaning and app l ied witho ut attemp ted interpretat ion. This is

what is kn own as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,

index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba

legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in

Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons

convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand

in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11and 15of the

Act.

2 and 3 : NO

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act

No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that

Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with

the Law has application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M.

No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension o f sentence and not prob at ion.

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VERBA LEGISSuspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be

retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that

once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of

pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law

under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the

child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order

execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or

unt i l the ch i ld reaches the m aximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21

years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying

Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far

as his case is concerned.