Venezuela QPQ Negative - SDI 2013

8/13/2019 Venezuela QPQ Negative - SDI 2013

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1NC



Notes

The ambassador CP argument about why say no is a net benefit – the second card on

the CP, the baverstock ev questions the epistemology behind Maduro’s speech and his

anger toward the U.S, 2 reasons

A) Appeasement - Samantha power angered maduro, replacing the Venezuela

ambassador allows us to engage better specifically towards them because it

shows an act of U.S opening arms towards Venezuela which appeases Maduro

B) Acknowledgment - Maduro fears U.S lack of recognition because he is unsure of

what it means, Maduro sees this as belligerent, making a formal statement

eases Maduro and helps facilitates relations.



Case



Iran – Venezuela

Venezuela doesn’t sponsor dangerous Hezbollah activity – that’s a myth.

Tegel ‘13 Simeon Tegel is a British journalist based in Peru and is GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America. He writes about a broad range of

themes across Latin America – “American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove” –

Salon.com – Jan 8, 2013 – http://www.salon.com/2013/01/08/is_venezuela_harboring_hezbollah/

American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to

prove Is Venezuela providing operational support to Islamic terrorists? That deadly serious question is

increasingly troubling foreign policy and security experts as the South American country and Iran — which funds Hezbollah — move ever closer.

Despite deep cultural differences, a shared antagonism toward the US has drawn Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Iranian

counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, into an unlikely political friendship in recent years. “Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity,

revolution, strong faith,” Chavez said during one early visit to Tehran. “We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is

becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don’t want a single power *i.e., the US+.” Beyond the rhetoric lies a strategic alliance

that has seen Caracas, along with Damascus and Havana, vote against United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and increasing

Iranian investment in the Venezuelan economy, now worth more than $5 billion. All of that is very public. But, according to critics such

as veteran US Republican Latin Americanist Roger Noriega, Venezuela is also providing operational support to Hezbollah,the Lebanese-based organization classified as terrorist by the US, UK and other allies. It even came up in November’s US elections, with the

Republicans claiming in their official online party platform: “Venezuela has become a narco -terrorist state, turning it into an Iranian outpost in

the Western hemisphere.” “The current regime issues Venezuelan passports or visas to thousands o f Middle Eastern terrorists offering safe

haven to Hezbollah trainers, operatives, recruiters and fundraisers.” The GOP did not respond to GlobalPost’s requests for comment. But its

claim was questioned — and even ridiculed — by several security experts in Israel and South America contacted by

GlobalPost. “ That is exaggerated . Generally, this kind of activity [terrorism] is conducted by small units.

It is political rhetoric,” said Ely Karmon, one of Israel’s top independent counter -terrorism experts. Nicholas Watson, a senior

analyst at British firm Control Risks, who specializes in South America, agreed, describing it as “unhelpful.” He added: “That

kind of rhetoric, the blatant accusations, doesn’t help the US’ position in the region. It actually plays into Chavez’s hands

and strengthens him within Venezuela.” That Hezbollah has been active in Latin America is hardly news. Argentine investigators have linked

the group to two deadly bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Together, the attacks on the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center killed

114 people. One of five Iranians wanted by Interpol over the second bombing, Ahmad Vahidi, is now Iran’s defense minister. Last year, he had

to make a rapid departure during a state visit to Bolivia when Argentine prosecutors requested Bolivian police arrest him. Meanwhile,according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington, DC, nonprofit research group, there’s growing evidence that He zbollah is

infiltrating other parts of Latin America, taking advantage of widespread corruption and drug trafficking to raise funds for its activities in the

Middle East. The Buenos Aires attacks took place years before Chavez, now cancer-stricken but recently re-elected, came to power in

Venezuela. He was even in jail, awaiting trial for his role in a failed coup, at the time of the first bombing, on the Israeli embassy. Nevertheless,

a jigsaw of data, put together by everyone from Karmon to Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, paints a disturbing picture of

apparent bilateral cooperation in areas such as Iran’s outlawed nuclear ambitions and the Venezuelan military’s adoption of Tehran’s defense

doctrine of “asymmetrical” warfare; in other words, guerrilla resistance to a potential US invasio n. Now canceled, there was also a secretive

weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated jointly by Iran Air and Conviasa, the state airlines in Iran and

Venezuela respectively. Karmon and others say the passengers did not pass through customs. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s Lebanese-born Interior

Minister Tareck El Aissami — who was previously in charge of the country’s passport office, fueling the Republican claim of papers being given

to Islamic terrorists — makes no secret of his sympathies. “I’m also the son of Arabs, I’m Palestinian, I’m Iraqi, and today we are the resistance

force,” he said at a 2009 event in support of Palestinians in Gaza. “There are Hezbollah supporters in the Venezuelan government. They have

been neither investigated nor fired. They have been kept in their jobs,” said Roman D. Ortiz, director of Bogota-based security consultancy

Decisive Point. But does that translate into the Chavez government arming or providing training facilities or other logistical support to

Hezbollah? “The existence of a Lebanese community [in Venezuela] plus a left-wing populist governmentplus the anti-American rhetoric does not equal terrorism,” says Control Risks’ Watson. “ That is speculation .”

The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led

doctrine — that dies out with Maduro

Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing

editor (Frida Ghitis, World Politics Review , 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive



Chávez?”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-

survive-chavez, Accessed 06-30-2013 | AK)

During almost 14 years in office,Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step

to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was

the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. As

the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the

U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions. The question

for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and

Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran

in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to

“address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America , and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take

measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its L ebanese ally Hezbollah,

Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time . Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is

engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s t ies with Iran and Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech

by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization,

citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as spec ific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer

surgery,

Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President

Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what

the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State

Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with

Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and

Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as

their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas. The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies

or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would

take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqu alified

blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip

on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched Uni ted Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And yet, there is no denying that

Chavismo thrived because of Chávez . There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long

term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. For Washington, this means that forging ties

with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow

the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a cand idate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles,

who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in las t October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from

Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. Washington would do well to

keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in theevent Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to

the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. A close relationship between

Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only

because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the

intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela .

Hezbollah not a threat to the US and Noriega is wrong.

Willans ‘13 Pierce Willans is currently pursuing a degree in political science at Seton Hall University – “Venezuela News: Hezbollah is in Venezuela, But

There's No Threat to U.S. Security” – Policymic – March – http://www.policymic.com/articles/29303/venezuela-news-hezbollah-is-in-

venezuela-but-there-s-no-threat-to-u-s-security

Is Hezbollah in Venezuela? Probably. A more interesting question is: Does it matter, and if so, how much? American

foreign policy hawks have been sounding the alarm on this for years, claiming Hezbollah’s activities in

South America, which they often refer to as "America’s backyard," are a threat to national security. The U.S. State Department labels

Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and Iranian proxy. The origins of Hezbollah are murky, but it first emerged as a force in the early 1980s, in

reaction to Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. During this period, the group quickly gained infamy in the United States when it blew up

the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 200 Marines, only months after it had blown up the U.S. Embassy there. That being said,

attacks on American targets have been the exception, rather than the rule. Throughout its history, the

majority of Hezbollah’s energies have been directed towards Israel. In the decades since its creation, Hezbollah has

evolved and expanded its activities, operating as a political party in Lebanon while simultaneously maintaining its separate criminal and military

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez







activities. Sometime in the 1980s they are believed to have established a foothold in South America, probably to raise funds from the large

Lebanese community there. It has been established that the group is engaged in narcotrafficking and money laundering, no doubt spurred in

part by Iran’s declining support due to the crushing international sanctions against it. Though their activities in Latin America appear to be

primarily aimed at raising money, fears of Hezbollah’s capacity for violence in the region are not without basis; Hezbollah is widely blamed for

bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and then again that city’s Jewish Community Center in the early 90s, killing over 100 peopl e. The

fears of a Venezuelan-Hezbollah axis seem to be spurred in large part by the highly visible personal friendship between the

late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This unlikely alliance between two men of such

different cultural backgrounds appears to be a product of their respective governments’ isolation and shared antagonism towar ds the UnitedStates. In the UN, Venezuela has voted against international sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. Iran has billions of dollars invested in

Venezuela. There is, however, nothing particularly treacherous about that. The claims of a more sinister relationship have been most

prominently voiced by Roger Noriega. Mr. Noriega is currently a visiting fellow at conservative think

tank the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Noriega is no stranger to murky Iran-Latin American

intrigue; while at the U.S. Agency for International Development, he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Scandal during the Reagan

administration. He subsequently served in high-level diplomatic posts under President George W. Bush, including as Ambassador to the

Organization of American States, where he supported the abortive coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002. More recently, he has publicly accused

Venezuela of having a secret nuclear program. In his July 2011 testimony before Congress, Mr. Noriega further stoked the fires by claiming that

Venezuela actually supports Hezbollah and allows it and drug cartel members to operate in its territory, though he offered no proof. He also

hinted darkly that the federal government knows more than it is willing to say publicly on the subject. Noriega clearly knows how

to get attention in Washington, but that is not the same as offering well-informed advice . In this post-9/11

foreign policy environment, his efforts seem to be aimed at reinforcing conservatives’ penchant for conflating

a group’s stated anti-American sentiments with an unstated intention to actually do us harm . In many

ways, Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America are similar to those of other drug cartels, which are rightly viewed as a problem. But their activies

are a law enforcement problem, and needs to be confronted without the hysteria that seems to accompany any statement containing

"Hezbollah" and "America’s backyard" in the same breath.

Iran prolif not inevitable – prefer expert reporters.

Hibbs ‘13 (Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William

Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior

associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran

Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12th

– http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)

You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it

in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do you think that we've reached the

point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless

there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I don't

believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there

have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons

capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a

monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very

far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to

Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus

right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.

US won’t respond with nuclear lash-out.

Washington Post ‘7 (Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)



Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight

terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a

profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians."

Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.

Chapman ‘12 (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-

87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear

Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought

more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second

strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck

bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from

being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that

a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events

required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a

bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would

have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not

maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap meta l.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani

bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized

use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can

grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to

jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with

spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced

equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause.

Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure,

drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion.

This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know

what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has hearteningimplications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it

probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring

terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst

eventuality is one that will never happen.

Terrorist will use Conventional Weapons instead.

Hashmi ‘12 (Muhammad, author of “Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Myth of Reality,” and expert in defense and strategic studies, “Difficul ties For Terrorists

To Fabricate Nuclear RDD/IND Weapons – Analysis,” Jan 30, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30012012-difficulties-for-terrorists-to-fabricate-

nuclear-rddind-weapons-analysis/)

Many believe that these threats of nuclear terrorism are inflated and have been overstated because

technical hurdles still prevent terrorists from acquiring or building a nuclear device. Brain McNair argues thatthe threats of nuclear terrorism have been exaggerated by the world. As the matter stands today, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains

more a fantasy than fact. Furthermore, Shireen Mazari argues that Nuclear weapons would not be a weapon of choice for

terrorists. Instead, she claims that “terrorists already have access to enough destructive capabilities with in

conventional means, so their need for nuclear weapons is simply not there.” Analysts have endorsed

the assessment that the threat of nuclear action by terrorists appears to be exaggerated. Similarly, religious

cults and left-wing terrorists with their beliefs of certain prohibitions against mass murder are less likely by

many estimates to use WMDs in a terrorist activity, even though there is not any guarantee that terrorists will use WMDs.

It has also been witnessed that no terrorist group is known to have developed or deployed a nuclear explosive device, and the severity of the



threat of nuclear terrorism remains disputed amongst international scholars. So it becomes too early to conclude that how grave the threats of

nuclear terrorism are. James kitfield concludes in an interview from security expert that: Seven years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks, experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclear terrorism atop their lists of the gravest threats to the United States. Yet

Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp., says that the threat lies more in the realms of

Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams than in reality. There has never been an act of nuclear

terrorism, he notes, yet the threat is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear fulfills a terrorist’s primary goal. In

nutshell, we can say that it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons andaccess to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon. Current safety and security

systems help ensure that the successful use of a stolen weapon would be very unlikely. Meaning, it remains,

thankfully, an incredibly challenging task for terrorists to practice their idea in a successful way to meet their objectives.

The plan won’t change Maduro’s tune — engagement entrenches the regime and

stifles democratic opposition

Christy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee

(RNC), focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick

worked at the National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the

International practice of Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs

have appeared in the The Commentator, The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard,and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011

and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012. Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick

holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, U.S. News & World Report, 06-13-13, “U.S.

Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition”,

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-

maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition, Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)

On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obama

administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a

"new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's

quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions . Since the death

of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman than a

democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power and discredit his

critics in recent months. First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the fraudulent April 13th

presidential elections, as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full audit "would have included not just

comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries that contain voter signatures and

with digitally recorded fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and Supreme Court – the two

government institutions able to challenge election results – it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount. Second, Maduro's

government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime. Last month, Globovision, one of

Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting station faced years of pressure

as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live video coverage of

opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned. Third, the regime and its allies are

using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition legislators on the floor

of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces. More recently,

Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the sovereignty of the

homeland." In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words,

"an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone

believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior . To be sure, Caracas's

recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks

with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human

rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power

during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed,

Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition






Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a

punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other

outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is

perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime

as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions . The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government

come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimouslypassed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of

Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power. Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama

administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with

the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those

related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government. By resetting relations with the Maduro

government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power

and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular

support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.

Every single piece of 1AC evidence is in the context of Chavez relations with Iran, No

real reason why Maduro maintains these relations; the negative is the only one with

evidence on this question.

No impact to Iran-Venezuela ties — international outreach and status quo sanctions

have halted regional influence

Goodman 6-26 — staff writer for the Bloomberg News (Joshua Goodman, Bloomberg News, 06-26-

13, “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says”,

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-

department-says, Accessed 07-05-2013 | AK)

Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region

after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. While Iran’s interest in Latin America is a

“concern,” sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and politicaltoehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report. “As a result of diplomatic outreach,

strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and

Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean

is waning,” according to the report. The findings disappointed some Republican lawmakers who sa y President Barack Obama’s administration is underestimating the threat from Iran.

The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait-and-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, who has vowed to seek more dialog with the U.S. “I believe the Administration has failed to

consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here a t home,” said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report.

“I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.” Chavez Alliance The U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran’s presence in

Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s outreach

bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven , said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of

the Americas.

Iran-Venezuela ties are no longer a threat — the relationship is dead

Lansberg-Rodriguez and Zonis 7-4 — fellow at The Comparative Constitutions Project and a

columnist for the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal AND *Professor Emeritus at Booth School of

Business (Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez and Marvin Zonis, EconoMonitor, 07-04-13, “Venezuela and Iran:

The End of The Affair?”, http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-

the-affair/, Accessed 07-06-2013 | AK)

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says


http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/









Yet now, given that they never did get around to ending the Empire, does this alliance still have a future? The answer to this question will be of no small

consequence to the world as a whole. It will extend beyond their role as a self-proclaimed rhetorical international disestablishment: an Axis of Insults. The alliance between these

two countries has generated concerns beyond the rhetoric. They have provided financial benefits to poorer neighbors and generated security risks to a

great many others. Some commentators, more than a few of them Republican congressmen, have publically surmised that Iran might

have been using Caracas as a staging ground for terrorist plots throughout the Western hemisphere,

although a State Department report released last week would seem to belie that fact . Others believe that

Iran’s true interest’s lies in accessing Latin America’s largely undeveloped uranium reserves, in hopes of advancing its

ambitions towards the status of a nuclear power. What cannot be denied is that there are, at present, numerous Iranian agents active in Latin America operating at various official levels. The

Iranian security apparatus has been instrumental in teaching Chavista security forces to more efficiently repress dissent among their own people. (The Venezuelan Jewish community, once

among the largest in Latin America, has been a particular target.) So what happens next? Venezuela’s new president, Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon

with Iran’s new president-elect, Hassan Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if Rowhani is the moderate he is touted to be,

he may well seek better relations with Europe and the United States, advanced economies capable of

engaging with Iran on more than a rhetorical level. Meanwhile, barring some unforeseen crisis precipitating the collapse of regime in Caracas, the

Venezuelan government seems unlikely to do likewise. Under fire from accusations of having stolen the recent election, Maduro’s domestic legitimacy is

predicated primarily on his having been fingered by Chávez himself as successor, rather than on any

personal charisma or qualifications. Under these circumstances, seeking rapprochement with “The Empire,” so often vilified

by his hallowed predecessor, would be a dangerous game. In geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries sometimes

outgrow each other . For an Iran that might finally be coming of age, maintaining close ties with

declining, unpopular Venezuela, would be no great benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful

potential dalliance with the West.

No impact to Iranian proliferation — their evidence reflects a fundamental

misunderstanding of IR

Waltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N.

Waltz, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”,

http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-

br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf,

Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)

The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States

has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the

United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms. It should not. Most U.S.,

European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible

outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore

stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with

serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons

can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its

weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to

change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent. The second

possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to

acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear

weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such

as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The United States and its

European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a

significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western

powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at

subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only

weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current

course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that

outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such

language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country

has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to

shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with

http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf






it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional

and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled

instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the

current crisis.Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is

easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to

its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term

have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop

the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis

but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power

is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the

debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings

of how states generally behave in the international system . The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others,

is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian

policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like

any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no

propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume

otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to

argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired anuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though

doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear.

Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the

purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at

the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for

example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly

concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move. Nevertheless, even some

observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear

weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts

even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these

concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 .

History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely

aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness

discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear

weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break

this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists,no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk

of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States'

impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never

entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran

acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is

costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties

that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other

states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East . But the nuclearage is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded . Properly

defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked

slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will

change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly

signal the start of a landslide . When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the

Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear



Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more

worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have

kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as

nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states.

Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other

country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally

dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing anuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear

Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel,

and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear

capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

No Venezuelan – Iran threat – prefer this card it indicts their Noriega evidence

IDTN 07/20/13(http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/1683-the-myth-and-reality-of-

venezuela-iran-ties)

It was just in March that Roger Noriega delivered his red blooded testimony before the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs that alleged that Latin American drug traffickers, Hezbollah, Venezuela

and Iran have all united in some kind of convoluted plot that involves waging “asymmetrical warfare

against U.S. security, interests and allies close to the homeland”. Along with stating that “Hezbollah

operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies hold important senior positions in the Venezuelan

government”, Noriega also argued that Margarita Island is basically one big Hezbollah training camp

(could put a slight dent in the government's ambitions to develop the tourism sector) and that senior

“chavista officials engage routinely in lucrative schemes involving Hezbollah front companies, Colombian

terrorist groups, narcotraffickers, Venezuelan financial institutions and even powerful state-run

entities”. In short a unified front of Arabs, Iranians, terrorism, drugs and state run enterprises united

against Washington. Noriega is far from a lone voice warning against this rainbow of conservative

fears. Vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council Ilan Berman has also warned that a

myriad of recent events ranging from toilet paper shortages in Venezuela to the Colombian peace

process are all possibly playing into the hands of a shadowy “network enabling Iran to carry out

attacks in the region”. Last year, an opinion piece in the Miami Herald penetrated to the core of this

existential threat to the U.S.: the “most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative of the[former] Chávez regime”, its positive relationship with Iran. The article continues by arguing that the

threat of Iran and Venezuela cooperating to “smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S. . . should not be

dismissed lightly”. The relationship between Caracas and Iran was a key consideration when

lawmakers passed the 'Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (CIWHA)', which aims

to “address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity” in the region. Since CIWHA was passed,

Venezuela's state arms manufacturer has been targeted by U.S. sanctions under the Iran, North Korea,

and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Perhaps the events of June will make some of the fear

brigade rethink the Iran-Venezuela relationship. After all, the relationship between the two countries

isn't quite as sinister as the likes of Noriega make it out to be. No, Iran and Venezuela are not

cooperating to nuke Miami, and PDVSA might not actually be a Hezbollah front. The reality of the

relationship is just as interesting, but it just doesn't read like an Ian Fleming novel.



FDI

Econ resilient

E.I.U. ‘11 (Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11

(http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7)

The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the

economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively

robust 2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is

impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.)

Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump,

personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in September

were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more

buoyant: it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on

conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has been

made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies inthe S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in

Washington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital

markets. This reinforces our view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a recession

(absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market—the unemployment rate has

been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a moribund housing market.

No diversionary theory – it’ll be small scale if it happens

Harrison ‘11 (Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, Hoover

Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, “Capitalism at War” Oct 19

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)

Diversionary wars In the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with external

adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite

intuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders’

desire to improve domestic standing. The idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism

only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be

advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars

intended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of the origins of World War I in domestic

German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that

a class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to claim

that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation.

Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by “demagogy, deception, bribery,

and force” (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80 -82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea

(Levy 1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999).

They conclude that the use of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government’s

supporting coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensities

under such circumstances (because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic

conflict is high (because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of

research suggests that new or incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005).

One inspiration for this view was the record of the new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have

provided out-of-sample confirmation. Suppose diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally



conflicted than other societies, and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the

case of fascism seems straightforward. Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists,

war was not a diversion; it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists

do not seem to have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied

on the image of an external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict . Soviet leaders used

external tension to justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy, censorship, and

surveillance. When they tolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls . An

East German Stasi officer told his boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): “How can yo u expect me to prevent *defections and revelations+, when we’ve

signed all these international agreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom o f movement, respect for human

rights?” If Soviet foreign policy was sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of

the 1917 generation knew well that too much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995,

p. 174) noted: “The complex relationship between war and revolution, which had alm ost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its

demise in 1917, was a relationship of which Stalin was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself.” Stalin did all he co uld to avoid

war with Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999). Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the “main adversary.” Faced with

unfavourable odds, they tended to withdraw (from Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in H ungary, Czechoslovakia, and

Afghanistan). Diversionary tension must fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that

capitalism, because of its tendency to give rise to democratic structures and political competition, has

been more open to diversionary wars than other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin

this conclusion also imply that such wars would generally be small scale and short lived, and the

circumstances that give rise to them would be exceptional or transient. We should place this in the

wider context of the “democratic peace.” As Levy (1988) wrote: “Liberal or democratic states do not fight eachother … This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical

law in international relations.” Since all liberal democracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is

a finding of deep relevance.

Decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett ‘ 9 (Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9 – “The New

Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-

remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scarypredictions of , and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to

world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging

markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first

truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.¶ None

of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the

global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates

the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity

conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last

August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the

most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-

decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.¶ Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist

movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea,

Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global

economic trends.¶ And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and

Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan),our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up

to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises

with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty



Technology ¶ “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Panel Data.”

http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v89y1999i3p605-618.html Estimates of the impact of regional

foreign share on domestic firm productivity are given in Table 7. The coefficients on sectoral foreign

investment are negative and significant as before. For both the adjusted and unadjusted estimates, the

coefficient on regional foreign investment is statistically insignificant , and when the real skilled wage

and electricity prices are included, the coefficient on foreign investment falls to zero. We find aconsistently positive and large association between the real skilled wage and individual firm

productivity. The association with electricity prices (although much smaller) is also statistically

significant and negative as expected. This suggests that foreign investment is likely to locate in areas

with highly productive skilled workers or lower energy prices, biasing the unadjusted estimates

upwards. We also experimented with other measures which might reflect location-specific productivity

differences, such as the number of firms in each location, rent prices, and the industry-specific skilled

wage in the location, but the results were unchanged. The within estimates are reported in the last row

of Table 7. These estimates were computed by subtracting from each variable its region-sector mean

over time. This formulation allows us to control for any unobserved differences across regions and

sectors. It would be equivalent to including both sector and region dummies in the estimation, as well as

sector-region interactive terms. The within estimates '"Although the table shows industry values at the

two-digit level, the regressions were estimated with all industry variables calculated at the four-digit

level. 18support the results in the first and second rows, indicating no statistically signiflcant impact of

region-specific foreign investment on domestic firm productivity growth. Two conclusions can be drawn

from the results presented in the previous two sections. The first is that if technology transfer indeed

takes place, it is overwhelmed by the negative productivity effects of joint ventures on domestically-

owned firms. The second is to the extent that domestic and foreign firms compete on national (and

not local) markets, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that technology is transferred locally

from joint ventures to domestically-owned firms. It is interesting to note that the empirical results

confirm case study evidence for Venezuela claiming very little cases of technology transfer from

multinationals to domestically-owned firms (Matos(1977)). In the next section, we explore therobustness of our results.

No solvency for FDI in Venezuela- doesn’t spill over and reduces productivity

Anne E. Harrison and Brian J. Aitken, 2/19/94 Ann E. Harrison is a Professor of Management at

the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. She has also taught at the MBA, PhD, and

undergraduate levels at various other universities, including Columbia Business School, the University of

California, Berkeley, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and the University of

Paris. Harrison is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and an affiliate of

the International Growth Centre in London. She is on the editorial boards of the Journal of Asian

Economics and the World Bank Research Observer, and on various other advisory committees at the

World Bank and elsewhere. Brian J. Aitken has a Ph.D. in economics from the¶ Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology ¶ “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Panel Data.”

http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v89y1999i3p605-618.html

Many developing countries now actively solicit foreign investment, offering income tax holidays,¶

import duty exemptions, and subsidies to foreign firms. One justification for subsidizing these firms is¶

the so-called "spillover' of technology from foreign to domestic firms. Despite the significant interest

in¶ the possibilit,; of such spillovers, there have been no empirical tests using micro data. Using a panel

of ¶ more than 4000 Venezuelan plants between 1975 and 1989, this paper tests for the existence of ¶





technology transfer via foreign firms.¶ First, we examine the relative performance of joint ventures and

domestic firms. We find that¶ plants with some foreign investment consistently outperform domestic

plants. We also find that increases¶ in foreign equity participation are strongly correlated with increases

in plant productivity. This suggests¶ that the host country does benefit from foreign equity participation

through the improved performance¶ of joint ventures.¶ Second, we measure the impact of joint venture

activity and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries¶ on the productivity of plants who receive no foreign

investment. Facing fewer data limitations than any¶ of the previous studies, we find that foreign

investment negatively affects productivity of domestic firms .¶ These negative effects are large and

robust to alternative specifications of the model. Although previous¶ studies generally found positive

effects , we show that these results can be explained by the tendency for¶ multinationals to locate in

the more productive sectors.¶ We conclude that there do exist benefits from foreign investment, but

that such benefits are¶ internalized by joint ventures. In other words, foreign investment provides direct

benefits to those firms receiving the investment, but there are no 'spillovers' to other plants. This

suggests that industrializing¶ countries such as Venezuela are correct in emphasizing the benefits from

foreign investment t to e¶ recipients, However, we also conclude that less emphasis should be placed on

any externalities .r¶ "spillovers' to other local firms.

FDI decreases the productivity of large enterprises like the PDVSA

Anne E. Harrison and Brian J. Aitken, 6/3/99 Ann E. Harrison is a Professor of Management at

the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. She has also taught at the MBA, PhD, and

undergraduate levels at various other universities, including Columbia Business School, the University of

California, Berkeley, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and the University of

Paris. Harrison is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and an affiliate of

the International Growth Centre in London. She is on the editorial boards of the Journal of Asian

Economics and the World Bank Research Observer, and on various other advisory committees at the

World Bank and elsewhere. Brian J. Aitken has a Ph.D. in economics from the¶ Massachusetts Institute of

Technology ¶ “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Venezuela.”


Governments often promote inward foreign investment to encourage technology 'spillovers' from

foreign to domestic firms. Using panel data on Venezuelan plants , the authors find that foreign equity

participation is positively correlated with plant productivity (the 'own-plant' effect), but this

relationship is only robust for small enterprises. They then test for spillovers from joint ventures to

plants with no foreign investment. Foreign investment negatively affects the productivity of

domestically owned plants. The net impact of foreign investment, taking into account these two

offsetting effects, is quite small. The gains from foreign investment appear to be entirely captured by

joint

ventures.



Solvency

Maduro must say “no”. The upside of plan gets outweighed by domestic politics. If he

accepts, he’ll get destroyed politically.

Shifter ‘13 Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council

on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “A Bolivarian

Dream Deferred” – Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013 – http://thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3338

It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the United States, but at least in the short term, Maduro

will have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric . For political survival, he

needs to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the presidency . Whatever

happens abroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela's staggering problems at home. Chávez left a

country devoid of institutions. Instead, he bequeathed cronies like Maduro who has so far been able to fend off criticism

from his neighbors but is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological movement that Chávez was

able to cobble together in his glory days.

Snowden affair confirms US has no leverage over Venezuela.

Sanchez ‘13 W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs – “Asylum for Snowden? Why are Venezuela, Nicaragua, others in Latin

America doing this?” – Matisak Blog – July 7th – http://matisak.wordpress.com/2013/07/07/asylum-for-snowden-why-are-venezuela-

nicaragua-others-in-latin-america-doing-this/

It wouldn’t be outrageous to assume that if Venezuela or Nicaragua accept Snowden, Washington may

want to apply soft power/soft pressure as some kind of “punishment,” this may mean calling back ambassadors and

diplomatic staff (though at this point I’m amazed there are any U.S. diplomats in Venezuela after the Chavez era), expelling diplomatic staff

from these nations from the U.S., or maybe Washington could cancel some trade deals or impose some kind of tradeembargo. For example Ecuador withdrew from the ATPDEA treaty at the same time that it was considering to accept Snowden. But that

treaty was going to expire soon anyways and it seemed unlikely that the U.S. would want to renew it (especially if the Quito had accepted

Snowden). When it comes to Venezuela, it seems clear that Maduro has little interest in strengthening

trade or diplomatic relations with the U.S. , so any kind of “punishment” from Washington. With that said, I am slightly surprised

about Nicaragua. Certainly, Ortega was no friend of the U.S. during the Cold War, but modern-day Nicaragua-U.S. relations are not particularly

bad, or as bad as U.S.-Venezuela relations at least. Recently, SOUTHCOM donated parachutes and some other military equipment to

Nicaragua’s special forces (this happened in late June), so some military cooperation between the two governments does exist. I think

Nicaragua potentially stands to lose a lot if Snowden does touch Nicaraguan soil, as compared if the

American ends up in Venezuela.

Say no- Venezuela not open to increased FDI, especially oil-related- it’s a matter ofgeneral law and specific actions and policies

World Bank 10 The World Bank is a group working to end global poverty. Investing Across Borders is

a World Bank Group initiative comparing regulation of foreign direct investment around the world. It

presents quantitative indicators on economies' laws, regulations, and practices affecting how foreign

companies invest across sectors, start businesses, access industrial land, and arbitrate commercial

disputes. “Investing Across Borders 2010: Indicators of foreign direct investment regulation in 87

economies.” http://iab.worldbank.org/~/media/FPDKM/IAB/Documents/IAB-report.pdf



Among the 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean covered by the Investing Across Sectors

indicators, ¶ República Bolivariana de Venezuela’s restrictions on foreign equity ownership are relatively

stringent. The ¶ National Constitution authorizes the government to reserve for itself those industries

and services that are in ¶ the public interest and of a strategic nature. The most prominent example is

the oil and gas sector , in which ¶ foreign capital participation is restricted by the Hydrocarbons

Organic Law . Several service industry sectors are ¶ closed to foreign ownership, including railway

freight transportation, domestic air transportation, and airport ¶ and port operation. Foreign capital

participation in the media sector (television broadcasting and newspaper ¶ publishing) is limited to a

maximum of 20%. In addition to these overt legal restrictions on foreign investment, ¶ a comparatively

large number of sectors is dominated by government monopolies, including, but not limited to, ¶ those

mentioned above. Notable additional sectors dominated by publicly owned enterprises include the

electricity and fixed-line telecommunications sectors. Those monopolies, together with a high

perceived difficulty of ¶ obtaining required operating licenses, make it more difficult for foreign

companies to invest. In addition the current government has recently nationalized several foreign

companies including hotels, banks and retail chains ¶ further suggesting that República Bolivariana de

Venezuela is less open to FDI than its laws suggest.



Off Case



T - Engagement

“Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program,

Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term engagement was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward

South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the

Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English

speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a

regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply

by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific

way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a

foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its

objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military

force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive

inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or

provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the U nited S tates has important

disagreements.

That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's

Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety,

July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a

reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as gettingsomething you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from

incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least

two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

Plan isn’t --- voting issue:

Limits --- it functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning -

-- the alternative is hundreds of single import or export cases that explode the Neg’s

research burden

Ground --- QPQ locks in core generics like soft power and foreign politics DAs,

counterplans to add or remove a condition, and critiques of diplomacy



Ambassador CP

Text: The United States federal government should reappoint a Venezuelan

ambassador and formally recognize Nicolas Maduro as the Venezuelan president then

The United States federal government should extend an offer to the BolivarianRepublic of Venezuela to substantially increase its investment in Venezuela’s energy

infrastructure.

Ambassador reinstatement is a prerequisite to normalized relations – only the

counterplan solvesMeacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), where he served on the professional staff for Senator

Richard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the committee, the most senior Republican Senate staff position for this region.

In that capacity, he travelled extensively to the region to work with foreign governments, private-sector organizations, and civil society groups. He was also responsible for managing the

committee’s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and overseeing its $2 billion budget. (Carl, June 21st

, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-

Venezuela Relations?,” CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)

If the United States continues on this road, both countries will seek to appoint ambassadors as a step in normalizing

relations. Last week, the Washington Post published an editorial that suggested recent U.S. overtures to Venezuela are something of a lifeline, thrown while the Venezuelan

government is struggling to maintain its legitimacy and when its neighbors, although having recognized the Maduro government, have recognized the need for an impartial audit of the

election results. Many believe it more appropriate for the United States to prioritize delicate issues such as human rights violations and antidrug policies before being willing to consider

reinstating ambassadors. Appointing ambassadors would certainly signal a real intention from both countries to

forge a positive relationship. Having a U.S. ambassador in countries that have similar conditions to

those of Venezuela is not something to be opposed across the board. In many situations, having a U.S.

ambassador in a nondemocratic country serves as a symbol to advance our most cherished beliefs. It

also serves as proof of the U.S. government’s willingness to keep lines of communication open. But the timing of

this appointment would imply that the Unites States would deny the opposition’s claims of a fraudulent election, as well as t he urgency of the audit of the election results. This also comes at a

time when Venezuela is more divided than ever, politically and economically. So rather than serve as an example of a pragmatic posture, this maneuver would be

viewed by a critical mass of a very motivated Venezuelan opposition as U.S. government support for

the Maduro In short, relations between the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track record that recent headlines cannot obscure. And while there are undoubtedly members

of the Venezuelan government who want to improve relations, it’s difficult to see their argument winning over the more hardline Chavistas in the government, who would likely see any steps

to building ties as betraying the cause. Venezuela has time and again proven to be unwilling to work with the United States, making it difficult for the United States to gauge any real intentions

of change. In order to move ahead and legitimize this new relationship, the United States must make a

decision regarding Maduro’s legitimacy: does the United States recognize Maduro’s election sans a

proper audit?

US refusal to recognize Maduro is perceived by Venezuela as belligerent action – kills

relationsBaverstock, 13 (Alasdair, May 17

th, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition,” Christian Science M onitor,

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition,amils)

More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be

recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote

is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed

under the leadership of former President HugoChávez. Venezuela's Maduro victory upheld in audit - but opposition says fight not over A handful of

countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of

the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the resu lts to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of

election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation. “Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to ha ve serious questions

about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in

April. While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize

Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at

all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. “*The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde,

http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations


http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition




professor of sociology at the University of G eorgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of

belligerence.”

Only CP solves, creates plausible U.S Venezuelan relations trades off with Iranian

threat

IDTN 07/20/13(http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/1683-the-myth-and-reality-of-venezuela-iran-ties)

And a dash of reality While military cooperation between Iran and Venezuela still hit the headlines

every so often, energy resources are the real lynchpin of the relationship. In 2010 both countries

agreed to invest US$760 million in each other's energy sectors. On top of this, under another

agreement, US$800 million worth of Venezuelan gasoline was shipped to Iran. In the following year

over 14,000 homes that were built in Venezuela under the housing mission were constructed with

Iranian assistance. In 2012, a slew of new agreements were signed between the two countries; mostly

in the fields of technology, agriculture, food processing and civil construction. The relationship

between Iran and Venezuela is clearly multifaceted – it has a defensive aspect, but is largely focused

on civilian projects. A reasonable . . . nay, inevitable deterrence policy Focusing on the Iran-Venezuela

relationship as a defensive initiative does not give an accurate impression of the whole story, but is,

nonetheless, the most controversial aspect of the relationship. Yet this relationship as an aspect of

defence policy is not only reasonable, but almost inevitable given Washington's handling of the two

countries in recent years. As Michael Corcoran rightly pointed out in February, despite being lumped in

the same basket by much of the Western media, internally the governments of Iran and Venezuela

couldn't be more different. As Corcoran argues: “Venezuela has internationally recognized elections and

works to empower the working class and the poor. Chávez’s opponents in Venezuela are free to

broadcast their discontent and do. Venezuela may in fact be the only nation where the media could

publicly call for a coup of an elected leader, as some Venezuelan media outlets did in 2002, and remain

on the air. Certainly, such activities would not be permitted in the United States. In contrast, Iran, an

Islamist state, jails dissidents, executes gays, and is ruled with absolute power by Supreme Leader

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. "Yet for the U.S. media, Iran and the left-leaning Latin American governments

are all of a piece. This assumption undergirds the demonization of the “pink tide” leaders asdangerous pawns in Iran’s supposed efforts to build nuclear weapons—efforts that are unconfirmed

by U.S. intelligence agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency.” I couldn't put it better

myself. Nonetheless, the disdain with which Washington has treated both countries over the last

decade has led them to take a number of similar actions in the international theatre. If a global

hegemon treats two countries similarly, then it shouldn't be a mystery when they both respond in

similar ways. It really shouldn't have come as a surprise to anyone to see both Iran and Venezuela

pursuing policies of deterrence throughout the last decade. Since the U.S. backed the 2002 coup

against Chávez, Venezuela has developed a multifaceted deterrence strategy primarily reliant on

developing regional alliances (the drive to modernise the Venezuelan military is supplementary at

best). As was blatantly obvious to most observers of this year's Organization of American States (OAS)

summit, this strategy has been nothing short of a spectacular success. From issues ranging fromcounter-narcotics to free trade, the U.S. and Canada were looking pretty lonely. However, Iran's

attempts to integrate into the international community have failed, largely due to U.S.-Israeli efforts.

Hence, while Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro enjoys strong support from most of Latin America

(for proof, look no further than his tour of the Southern Cone, which VA covered here and here), Iran is

encircled by U.S.-aligned regimes in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states of

Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, contrary to Noriega's fear



mongering, as Bloomberg recently reported, even the State Department has conceded that “Iranian

influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning”.



China DA

China is taking the lead in Venezuelan oil now – economically and politically

DT 4/29, “China in Venezuela: loans for oil”, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon’s

Tail, blog about Chinese international affairs, MollieDespite its frequent anti-american rhetoric (which should not stop with Maduro’s election), Venezuela

remains largely financially dependant of the US. It does not brag about this and has been seeking

throughout the Chavez years to escape the US sphere of influence. It is quite naturally that the

socialist state, since Chavez’s election in 1998, has been turning more and more towards China.

Indeed, Chavez visited China 6 times in his 14 year rule in attempts to integrate its alternative world

system. The energy-hungry dragon on the other hand has very clear objectives in Venezuela: securing

through investment and loans a fair share of the world’s largest recoverable oil reserves. In the past

decade but especially in the past 3 years, bilateral trade has soared more than exponentially from $500

million in 1999 to $7,5 billion in 2009 and over $20 billion in 2012 (PDVSA). China is now Venezuela’s

second trading partner after the US (Venezuelan trade ministry). In 2012, 65% of oil exports went to

Venezuela’s traditional oil partner, the US, through its american subsidiary Citgo ; China was in second

place with 20%. These numbers clearly show China’s new interest in the world’s 10th largest oil

exporter (2012). More importantly, according to the US Geological Survey and the OPEC, Venezuela

holds the world’s largest oil deposits in its Orinoco Oil Belt (although mostly heavy crude which needs

important refining) and contracts are up for grabs. The oil industry, which accounts for 95% of the

country’s exports, is controlled by PDVSA (Petroles de Venezuela), a state owned company created in

1976. The process of nationalisation of oil resources continued in 2007, when Chavez nationalised the

Orinoco Belt projects, giving the state a minimum 60% ownership in all joint ventures. In these difficult

conditions for foreign investors, China has two great advantages compared to its Western

counterparts which are independence from the US and money.

The plan kills china’s peaceful riseHilton 2013, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton,

February 2013, Executive Summary,

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=

http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2

F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH

4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie

China has tried to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy to great

power status. In Latin America, this creates a delicate balance between national interests and the

desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States. China sees Asia as its own sphere of

influence, and the Obama administration’s “pivot” – a “rebalancing” of U.S. foreign policy towards Asia – has raised hackles in Beijing. The PRC, until now, has been willing to tread carefully in the U.S.

backyard, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challenges to the U.S., including

from its Latin American partners.

Resource exports

http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/


http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg











Confrontation escalates to retaliatory war

Hilton 2013, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton,

February 2013, Executive Summary,

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=

http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2

F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie

There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of Chinese

involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about China’s still modest military sales to the

region. Examples of these sales include Venezuela’s 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from China.

Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy

circles to the “China threat”. Regardless of whether there is any real “threat” to the U.S., key decision-

makers have not reacted. China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to

affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S.

influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than

confrontation. In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, however, and the latent,

long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing

competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the

South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At

that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

Goes nuclear

Lowther ‘13 Note: when this card has a line that reads “it says”, it is referencing a 42-page report by the Washington

DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS andthe PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) – several of them have worked for that organization and will have

unique insights. The study at hand was prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time

article was written by William Lowther, who is the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and

he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could

spark nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times,

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211

“Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military

Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for

miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,”

the report says. For e xample, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions wouldresult in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to

believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very

uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report

concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says: “With both sides

possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously

dangerous and quite possibly devastating .”











DIP CP

The United States federal government should extend an offer to the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela to establish full diplomatic relations if and only if the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela agrees to end ties to international terrorist groups and rogueregimes, ensure future elections are held as defined by Venezuela’s constitution and

the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and cooperate with the U.S. and regional

partners to combat illicit narcotics trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.

The CP solves the case — offering diplomatic engagement successfully extracts

Venezuelan concessions




International practice of Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs

have appeared in the The Commentator, The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard,

and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011


holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, Foreign Policy Initiative, 04-19-13, “FPI Bulletin:

Post-Chavez Venezuela’s Uncertain Future”, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/files/2013-04-19-Bulletin-

Venezuelan%20Elections_1.pdf, Accessed 07-02-2013 | AK)

For the United States, it should welcome that Capriles may be emerging as the voice of the Venezuelan people and his supporters have already organized mass protests against the election

results. The United States should stand with him and the growing Venezuelan opposition during these dangerous days . As

Senator Marco Rubio recently stated, “The Venezuelan people should know that the democracies of the Western

Hemisphere are watching the electoral review process closely and will seek to hold accountable any

individual determined to have disrupted the peaceful conduct of free and fair elections. What’s more,

Maduro’s dangerous behavior should be a wakeup call. For too long, Washington turned a blind eye to

Venezuela’s attack on democracy and dangerous behavior. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney was right to call for a “100 percent audit

of the *election+ results.” Given the current distribution of power in Caracas (Chavez loyalists dominate the election commission and Supreme Court), policymakers in

Washington will need to determine a policy response that is both pragmatic and in line with America’s

moral interests. The White House should also work with key democratic partners in the hemisphere to

ensure Venezuela’s acting government refrain from using violence against peaceful protestors. Moving

forward, the Obama administration should make clear to whoever emerges in Caracas that full diplomatic relations

with the U nited S tates will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to international terrorist groups

and rogue regimes like Iran, taking meaningful steps to ensure future elections are held as defined by

Venezuela’s constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and cooperating with the U nited

S tates and regional partners to combat illicit narcotics trafficking in the Western Hemisphere . If Nicolas

Maduro does hold on to presidential power, he will have a choice: he can replicate the dangerous—and failed—policies of Hugo

Chavez, or he can respect the will of the people. Sunday’s disputed election shows the Venezuelan people support the latter.

http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/files/2013-04-19-Bulletin-Venezuelan%20Elections_1.pdf







The CP’s signal is key — it solves relations, terrorism, and soft power — the plan crushes

resolve and turns the case




International practice of Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairshave appeared in the The Commentator, The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard,

and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011


holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, U.S. News & World Report LP, 03-15-13, “Obama

Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”,

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-

democratic-venezuela, Accessed 07-01-2013 | AK)

Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and

improved partnership with Caracas . Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence

America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political

opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-

Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms . Venezuela's

opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public

airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to

bolster his populist agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that any attempts to suppress

or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in

the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator

for Latin America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral

reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference. Demand free, fair

and verifiable elections . Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez willbe held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of

democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and

intimidation. The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair elections, properly monitored

by respected international election observers, are essential to Venezuela's future standing in the

hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional partners—including (but not

limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified

regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in

China, Iran and Russia.

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela






Politics DA

Will pass but its close- August recess is key

Kennedy 7/22, 2013, Mark Kennedy: Reporter for Fox News, leads Georgetown Washington

University’s School of poltcal management, served three terms in the House of Representatives, “WhyImmigration Reform will be won or lost in August”

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/07/22/immigration-reform-will-be-won-or-lost-in-august/

House Speaker John Boehner believes that the House will pass immigration legislation at some point

in early fall, but in order to get to that point the desire for reform must survive its most perilous test to date: the August

recess.The pivotal battle on this issue will not take place in Washington itself, but in a select number of House districts all across the United States. Supporters of reform must have

troops with an authentically targeted message on every front line. With House members back in their home districts for a month, opponents have ample opportunities to assemble constituents, an elected offici al’s closest advisers, against a plan. Supporters

of immigration reform are on the path to victory, but in order to cross the finish line they must have a plan to win August and the courage to stick to it.

A transformational issue (health care) during the 2009 August recess gave birth to the Tea Party movement, which grew into a force strong enough to allow the GOP to take control of the

House of Representatives in 2010. Given the passions on both sides of the immigration issue, some lawmakers are wary of a repeat.

Proponents of reform should work to counter that energy with an enthusiasm that matches

opponents and is authentically targeted to each individual district.A true grassroots effort will seek to identify the concerns of targeted lawmakers and allay them, rather than blanketing the airwaves with generic advertisements.

What will work for legislators based in the suburb s won’t work in rural areas or cities; therefore supporters will need a variety of approaches to break through.

Perhaps more importantly, groups will have to show the value of reform to communities without significant immigrant populations. In this they can receive support from outside groups suchas the National Association of Manufacturers, which has spoken in favor of an overhaul by pointing out the economic benefits of reform .

A message that combines a market-based argument, an appeal to the nation’s fundamental value of openness, and the need for action to preserve the rule of law could be persuasive to

skeptical members.

A senior House Republican told me recently that there are approximately 20 to 40 members of the conference that are opposed to any comprehensive immigration measure. That

means that Speaker Boehner will likely need to find some Democratic support.

House Democrats therefore are at a crossroads. Do they want a law that may not contain everything

they desire, or do they want an issue to use during the 2014 election cycle? Careful contemplation

should convince Democrats that governing is preferable to campaigning on this issue.The Senate has

already acted on immigration. They did so in a transparent way that allowed for ample amendments and debate. As is often the case there,

when both sides have a chance to craft legislation, a final product can pass the 60-vote threshold.

House leaders should keep that in mind as they work to get a final vote in their chamber.A successful

resolution could have a positive impact on Congress as a whole. Finding a win-win outcome on

immigration may help build good will in the Capitol that could be of use during negotiations over thedebt ceiling later in the year, which is certain to be extremely contentious.

While it may be difficult for the legislature’s approval ratings to go any lower, showing that Democrats and Republicans can work together

will boost Americans’ faith in their elected leaders. Resolving this issue will also have benefits for

each political party.After the 2012 presidential election it is clear that the GOP needs a broader

coalition in order to win nationwide . The majority in the House needs to ignore the chimera of a 2014

primary challenge and focus instead on the bigger picture. With immigration resolved, Republicans

will be on their way towards shedding the “Party of No” label and able to show how a bottom-up agenda focused on the individual is

superior to a top-down model promulgated by the opposition.

Democrats will have delivered on a major 2012 campaign promise. It could also deflect voters’

attention away from the health care law, which remains unpopular.

Supporters of immigration reform are on the path to victory, but in order to cross the finish line theymust have a plan to win August and the courage to stick to it.

Engagement opponents control the debate on venezuela

Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric

Affairs, americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21,

http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)

http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058

http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058



It's not clear whether some sought to use the QFR to strong arm the State Department to articulate or take tougher

positions , and thereby bolster Palmer's confirmation prospects and support on the heels of his "weak" hearing

performance. Alternatively, perhaps the QFR was publicized to thwart his prospects entirely. Who knows; at this stage, it's irrelevant.

What's very relevant are the unfolding consequences of the QFR mishandling. First and foremost, Palmer got rolled. A dedicated Foreign Service

officer was not treated with due professionalism and respect. We will not know how great he would have been in Venezuela. Second, the State

Department on this matter appears naive, indecisive and disorganized. Third,

critics who never wanted ANY ambassador—and

certainly NOT Palmer—in Caracas, succeeded. As did Chávez, for the short term. To take up the second point, the State

Department appears to have different and confused messages on Venezuela . The ostensible example of this is

the two messages of Larry Palmer's Senate testimony versus his answers to the QFR. What can be said publicly and on the

record regarding Venezuela? Beyond talking with a low voice on the safest matters, it is not clear. Is

such timidity to Chávez' bluster necessary? The next step will be to see whether the State Department will go bold and call Venezuelan

Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez a persona non grata, or take a softer approach and cancel his visa. Alvarez had been back home, and

over the weekend, it was said he was not planning to return to Washington DC—already one move ahead of the anticipated reciprocation to

Palmer's rejection. It was in Chávez’s best interests to welcome Palmer, as he wanted to work with Venezuelans, and help ease the growing

tensions between the two countries. But now, the State Department will have to rethink this, and find another person...most likely with a

stronger track record on human rights and democracy. Perhaps we should accept that playing nice and fair with an irrational actor like Chávez is

not likely to yield positive results. At the end of the day, we've been backed into a corner to put forward a tougher

ambassador, and not Palmer, who was our first pick. Does this mean likewise that our policy of engagement must

be altered? Are we acting in response to Venezuela's moves? In this context, Chávez, and some conservative critics

here, are setting the terms of U.S. policy. This debacle also illustrates the express need for the State Department to complete

its review of Venezuela policy and clarify its positions. The QFR mishandling is a symptom of the bigger issue: uniting

our various agencies to craft a coherent message and policy on Venezuela. What are the "red lines" of what we'll

tolerate from Venezuela? When one of our career diplomats goes on record saying that Venezuela's National Guard is involved in

narcotrafficking, provides safe haven to terrorists like the FARC, imprisons judges for ruling against Chávez, why is the State Department not

publicizing those concerns? Until now, the State Department had been keeping its profile too low for anyone's good. Ostensibly that of

Ambassador Palmer. At this point, why is it a mistake to outline on record ways in which the Venezuelan government is breaking very basic

standards of human rights and hemispheric security? Just some open and disquieting questions. At the least, the State Department needs to

figure out what its basic message is, and then put it out there with a unified voice, loud and clear. This could go far to improve its public

outreach and image. But while silence continues, it seems that the Venezuelans have settled the U.S. debate: this

kind of "engagement" will not get us where we want to be . Chávez is antithetical to our democratic values and security

concerns. He is moving full steam down the field, while we sit on the sidelines. Time to play.

CIR will pass but push is needed

Latimer 7/22 (Brian, writer at NBC Latino, attends Boston University College of Communication, edits The Daily Free Press, worket at 103.1 WRNR,

07/22/2013 “Gutierrez: House has enough vo tes for immigration reform: “Now we need to get it done””http://nbclatino.com/2013/07/22/gutierrez-house-has-

enough-votes-for-immigration-reform-now-we-need-to-get-it-done/)

Illinois Democratic Congressman Luis Gutierrez, one of the seven House members working on a bipartisan immigration

reform proposal, spoke before the National Council of La Raza’s (NCLR‘s) immigration town hall during the organization’s annual convention, saying he

believes the House has enough legislators to support a reform bill. “We found the 50 Republicans

needed to pass immigration reform, now we need to get it done ,” said Gutierrez. The Congressman urged Boehner to let this group of

Republicans join Democrats and not insist on a majority support for reform, like he is insisting on. While answering a direct question, Gutierrez revealed a facet of the House immigration bill.

He said there will be a payment plan set for immigrants applying for a green card. While he said he never suggested a special pathway to citizenship, he said he has

suggested one that is earned. “I also believe in the generosity of our community,” Gutierrez said. “I don’t want people to be here temporarily. I want pe ople to have

the same responsibilities and obligations that I have as a citizen.” Congressman Gutierrez then joined a panel with Republican strategist Ana Navarro; The Alaska Federation of Natives

President, Julie Kitka; Evangelical immigration activist and VP of World Relief, Jenny Yang; and VP of National Association of Manufacturers, Joe Trauger. NCLR’s own Clarissa Martinez de

Castro moderated the town hall. “The key thing is you have to have the full range of legal rights ,” Martinez de Castro said. “If you accept les s than full legal rights, y ou’re automatically a

second-class citizen.” Navarro pointed out some Republicans in the House fear that if immigration reform passes and 11 million people become citizens that will result in 11 million more

Democrats. “Both parties will have to earn our votes,” she said. “I think it’s important to look past this misconception.” Jenny Yang, a prominent religious

advocate for immigration reform, pushed Evangelicals to embrace immigrants and immigration reform. “The Bible is very clear about the treatment of immigrants,” Yang said. “We have to do

something to bring these people who we worship with out of the shad ows.” Kitka closed the town hall, asking people of all backgrounds to come together for immigration reform because she

knows first-hand what it’s like to be a second-class citizen. “We are all in this together and we must ensure everybody has



adequate legal rights,” she said. “We cannot go forward with 11 million people without the rights this country is based on. We really do welcome t he new Americans, it

will make our country a lot richer and the culture strong

Key to sustainable growth- stops double dip recession

Haseltine 10 (Eric, Neuroscientist, Former Head of Science and Technology for US Intelligence Community, "Why America's Economy is On the Brink of Going

Down the Tubes...for Good," The Huffington Post, August 24, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-haseltine/why-americas-economy-is-o_b_688483.html)

Recessions, especially the deep downturn that started in 2008, always cause us to scramble. Companies routinely

slash spending while governments do the opposite, trying to shock the country's economic heart

into beating again through heroic measures such as the recent stimulus package. Concern about a

possible "double dip" recession have the hands of corporate CFO's and Washington officials hovering over the panic

button again, mere months after the last push. But our scramble to reduce the impact of the latest disaster distracts us from

addressing the deep-seated problems that inexorably create the next disaster, and the one after that. Why waste energy on the distant future, we reason,

when we'll never get to that future if we don't so lve the problem staring us in the face? We all focus on addressing here-and-now emergencies because we

have no choice. What limits our options are not outs ide events, such as economic downturns, but internal events that go o n inside our brains. As

a neuroscientist, I've learned that our brains are hardwired to avoid near term threats and to ignore long term opportunities , because our brains are identical

to those of our distant ancestors who faced a daily strugg le for survival. When our brains evolved into their present form, a bout 50,000 years ago, the

environment was incredibly harsh and risky, limiting life expectancies to 20-25 years. Diverting attention from day-today survival in those Paleolithic times

would have invited disaster. Neuroscientists call this hard-wired preference for quick fixes over long rangepursuits temporal myopia: everything past the immediate future looks fuzzy, or even invisible, and

is therefore irrelevant. Unless we overcome our temporal myopia, we'll continue to put band-aids on this economy and

it will continue to deteriorate: in other words, we'll continue to treat symptoms and never go for a complete cure.

And what would such a cure look like? Let's start by looking at disease that afflicts us. The fundamental problem with America's

economy is a decline in the capabilities and motivation of our workforce. True economic growth --

not the artificial kind spurred by fiscal policy -- stems from innovations such as Google's search engine that create

entirely new businesses and markets. Such innovations grow out of technological advances, which in turn emerge

from earlier scientific discoveries. Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, reinforced this idea when he said

"Capitalism expands wealth primarily through creative destruction -- the process by which the cash flow from obsolescent, low-return capital is invested in

high-return, cutting-edge technologies." And where do cutting-edge technologies come from? Modern Economists such as Paul Romer,

Robert Lucas and Robert Barro argue that technical innovations ultimately spring from the cognitive abilities of "human capital" (people)

who attain these abilities through education and training. But the National Academy of Science report, "Is America Falling off a Flat Earth?" points out that

science, technology and math education of the American workforce has been in steep decline for

decades, as students now choose careers in business, law or media over the high tech jobs that were so attractive in

the post-Sputnik 60's and 70's. In stark contrast, workforces of countries such as China are becoming

much more tech savvy, such that China now rivals the US and Europe in patents and technical publications. S. James Gates, a physicist who

served on the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology said, "If you lo ok at U.S. performance on various international metrics, depending on

which one you use, we come out something like 24th or 25th in the world." In my own informal survey of middle school and high-school students, conducted

during school speaking engagements to increase the allure of science, most kids tell me that they plan to s teer clear of science because it's "way too hard."

Other kids observe that "scientists are nerdy." As a result of these widespread attitudes -- nurtured by Hollywood's portrayal of scientists as socially clueless

eccentrics -- innovation-fueled economic growth will increasingly take place outside America's borders,

and our economy will spiral into relative decline for the foreseeable future. We can pull out of this

dive, however, if we see through our temporal myopia to some hard facts: we will never motivate the

majority of America's youth to give up "cool" careers that promise to make lot of money for"nerdy," un-cool science and technology careers that require hard work in school. We have simply

grown too comfortable as a society and lost the fire in our belly. During World War II, and right after Sputnik, did

students, teachers and parents let the prospect of hard work learning science, math and engineering deter them? No, because w e faced obvious

crises. Harvard Business School Professor, John Kao, author of Innovation Nation: How America is Losing Its Innovative Edge, Why It Matters and How We Can

Get it Back said, ""Fifty years ago the Soviet satellite Sputnik burst the nation's bubble of complacency and challenged America's sense of global leadership. But

we rose to the challenge with massive funding for education, revamped school curricula in science and math, created NASA and put a man on the moon."

Today we face a brain race vs. a space race that is every bit as problematic for America as the first

Russian satellite, but this crisis amounts to a "silent Sputnik" that flies under America's radar. Out

of sight, out of mind. I believe that Americans are unlikely to notice, let alone react to such a stealth threat. The only answer is to

http://www.psychologytoday.com/node/43465

http://www.hbs.edu/

http://www.hbs.edu/

http://www.psychologytoday.com/node/43465



reach out to motivated Americans, in places like China and India, who don't yet know they're going

to be Americans. Let's gear up a recruiting system that combs secondary schools in China, India, Russia, Europe and South America for top science

and technology talent, just as college football programs look for the best high school athletes. We'll offer these kids -- who do have fire in their bellies because

they've grown up in countries that haven't gotte n complacent -- full scholarships to American colleges and a fast track to US citizenship once they complete

their studies. This will, in the long run, inject new vitality into our workforce and our economy and help

cure our deep economic ills.

Nuclear wars and turns case

O Hanlon et al, 12O’Hanlon 12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and

Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan *“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,”

Los Angeles Times, July 10th, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon]

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working

classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more

likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over

half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness

undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline.

If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to takeactions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friendswill doubt our

commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will

sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial

Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for

president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the

Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through

development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if

elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now amuch more urgent big-picture issue:

restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamentalprerequisite to

effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon



2NC



Case



Solvency

Venezuela will “say no” – public statements from Maduro confirm

El Universal ‘13 (El Universal is a major Venezuelan newspaper, headquartered in Caracas with an average daily circulation of about 150,000. – “Maduro:

Venezuela will have "zero tolerance" for aggressions of Washington” – July 20th

– http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-

politica/130720/maduro-venezuela-will-have-zero-tolerance-for-aggressions-of-washingto)

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Saturday described as "terminated" his government-initiated talks with

Barack Obama administration. He stressed he would implement a "zero tolerance" policy for "aggressions"

on Venezuela.¶ "My policy as president is zero tolerance for gringo aggression against Venezuela. I am not

going to stand any verbal aggression against Venezuela, neither political nor diplomatic. Enough is

enough! Stay away with your empire. Do not mess any more with Venezuela," said Maduro during a

ceremony of military promotions in Cojedes state, central Venezuela.¶ The Venezuelan president also reiterated his rejection and

condemnation of the statements issued by Samantha Power, the Washington ambassador nominee to the United Nations,

on Venezuela. "When she went to Congress, she went crazy and started to attack Venezuela just like that. She

started to say that she is going to the UN to monitor and make clear what the repression on political and civil institutions in Venezuela is, and

that she will address the lack of democracy in Venezuela."¶ Maduro mentioned a phone call US Secretary of State John Kerrymade to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua. According to Maduro, the Venezuelan foreign minister

warned the US top diplomat that Venezuela will not accept any pressures in connection with Caracas'

offer to grant asylum to former CIA agent Edward Snowden, who is charged with leaking classified information on espionage

programs.

Venezuela won’t cave to US oil QPQ’s.

Lendman ‘13 Stephen Lendman was born in 1934 in Boston, MA. In 1956, he received a BA from Harvard University. Two years of US Army service followed,

then an MBA from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1960. After working seven years as a marketing research analyst, he

joined the Lendman Group family business in 1967. He remained there until retiring at year end 1999. Writing on major world and national

issues began in summer 2005. In early 2007, radio hosting followed. Lendman now hosts the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive

Radio Network three times weekly. Major world and national issues are discussed. Lendman is a 2008 Project Censored winner and 2011

Mexican Journalists Club international journalism award recipient. “Venezuela Bashing” – The People’s Voice – July 21st, 2013 –

http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2013/07/21/venezuela-bashing

Venezuela's oil reserves are the world's largest. At the same time, it requires refined oil imports. It lacks enough domestic

capacity.¶ It relies on around 500,000 barrels of gasoline monthly from America. It needs another half million

barrels to fuel power plants.¶ It imports about 350,000 barrels of MTBE (Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether). It's a gasoline additive for increase

octane.¶ Kerry warned Jaua. Supplies will be halted if Snowden's given refuge on Venezuelan territory.¶ Its

Foreign Ministry so far hasn't commented. Don't expect Jaua and Maduro to cave. It's not their style to do so.

Chavez didn't. Nor will they.

Venezuela will say “no” – US Senate also demands a hardline.

Lendman ‘13 Stephen Lendman was born in 1934 in Boston, MA. In 1956, he received a BA from Harvard University. Two years of US Army service followed,

then an MBA from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1960. After working seven years as a marketing research analyst, he

joined the Lendman Group family business in 1967. He remained there until retiring at year end 1999. Writing on major world and national

issues began in summer 2005. In early 2007, radio hosting followed. Lendman now hosts the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive

Radio Network three times weekly. Major world and national issues are discussed. Lendman is a 2008 Project Censored winner and 2011

Mexican Journalists Club international journalism award recipient. “Venezuela Bashing” – The People’s Voice – July 21st, 2013 –

http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2013/07/21/venezuela-bashing



Maduro said Venezuela's "fascist right" applauded Powers' comments. So did supportive Senate

committee members.¶ On July 19, a Venezuelan Foreign Ministry statement said:¶ "The Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela hereby ends the process of finally normalizing our diplomatic relations" with Washington.¶

In early June, efforts began to do so. They were doomed to fail. America demands total subservience. Venezuela

rejects bullying . It won't roll over irresponsibly.¶ It fiercely defends its sovereignty. Its independencematters most.¶ In 2010, Venezuela and Washington suspended normal diplomatic relations. They haven't exchanged ambassadors since

then.

Will say “no” – recent statement locks Venezuela into rejection of US offers.

BBC News ‘13 “Venezuela 'ends' bid to restore full US ties” – July 20

th – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23387807

Venezuela says it has "ended" steps towards restoring diplomatic ties with the US, after comments by

the woman nominated as the next envoy to the UN.¶ Samantha Power said this week she would seek to combat what she called the

"crackdown on civil society" in countries including Venezuela.¶ She was speaking at a US Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday.¶ The

remarks prompted an angry response from Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro.¶ "The Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela hereby ends the process... of finally normalising our diplomatic relations," said Venezuela's foreign

ministry in a statement.¶ It objected to Ms Power's "interventionist agenda", noting that her "disrespectful

opinions" were later endorsed by the state department, "contradicting in tone and in content" earlier statements by

Secretary of State John Kerry.

Venezuela will “say no” – they’ve publicly staked their credibility on rejecting offers

from the US.

Neuman ‘13 WILLIAM NEUMAN – New York Times Andes Region correspondent – “Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve U.S. Relations” –

New York Times – July 20, 2013 – http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-

us-relations.html?_r=0

Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve

relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United Nations

ambassador. ¶ The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on Wednesday, said part of her role as ambassador

would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society” in several countries, including Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro had already lashed out

on Thursday at Ms. Power for her remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign Ministry said it was terminating efforts to improve relations with the

United States. ¶ Those efforts had inched forward just last month after Secretary of State John Kerry publicly shook hands with the Venezuelan

foreign minister, Elías Jaua, during an international meeting in Guatemala — one of the highest-level meetings between officials of the two

countries in years.¶ Venezuela “will never accept interference of any kind in its internal affairs,” the Foreign

Ministry said in a statement, adding that it “considered terminated the process begun in the conversations in

Guatemala that had as their goal the regularization of our diplomatic relations.”

Power’s comments ruined US-Venezuelan ties – worst timing imaginable.

Khaleej Times ‘13 (Editorial Section – “Venezuela-US row” – 21 July 2013 – http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-

1.asp?xfile=/data/editorial/2013/July/editorial_July41.xml&section=editorial)

WASHINGTON HAS unnecessarily picked up a quarrel with Caracas. The remarks of newly designated ambassador

to the United Nations that the US would seek to combat what she called the ‘crackdown’ on civil society in Venezuela has raised a

diplomatic storm.¶ Samantha Power, the versatile human rights activist who has worked extensively on genocide, kicked the



tin when she went on and on to castigate the neighbour in her backyard in an attempt to please the

august members of the Congress hearing her confirmation bid. She shouldn’t have mentioned Venezuela

in so many words and also at a time when their bilateral relations are at their lowest ebb. Both the countries do not

have diplomatic ties since they de-marched their ambassadors in 2010. Moreover, the US posed itself on the wrong side when

it criticised the presidential elections in Venezuela after the death of Hugo Chavez and drew undue

condemnation. The last but not the least is the evolving Edward Snowden question, which is posing the biggest issue in their relations

with Caracas having extended asylum offer to the fugitive whistleblower.¶ In such a scenario, Samantha could have done a better job by

utilising her talent in a secretive-cum-diplomatic manner, rather than drum-beating ethics before the US legislators. Her appointment to the

world body was a considerate decision by President Barack Obama and was meant to harness congeniality with her immediate neighbours in

the southern hemisphere. Samantha’s remarks have also torpedoed the goodwill gesture that Secretary John

Kerry wanted to promote by initiating a dialogue and hopefully moving on to receive each other’s envoys. Samantha should

come up with a damage control comment earnestly.



Off Case



Ambassador CP

CP solves 100% of the case

View the CP through the lens of sufficiency V. necessity

Resotring ambassadors is a prerequisite to Venezuela compliance – your 1ac evidence.Revise 13 (Nicolas Revise, staffwriter for Arab News. January 13 2013. "US Eyes Better Relations with Venezuela in Post-Chavez Area". Arab News. www.arabnews.com/us-eyes-better-

relations-venezuela-post-chavez-era)

“The prospect of the transition from Chavez to another leader opened up the possibility of resetting the

relationship and putting it not necessarily on a friendly c ourse, but on a correct course,” expert Cynthia Arnson said. The first essential step would be

to reinstate their ambassadors , said Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars. Caracas and Washington have been operating embassies in

each country without an ambassador since a diplomatic spat in 2010. Jacobson took the opportunity to discuss issues of joint

concern such as combating drug-trafficking, counter-terrorism and energy cooperation. Venezuela is sitting on major oil

reserves and accounts for some 10 percent of US oil imports. “We have for some time made clear that we were willing a nd open to trying to improve our ties with Venezuela,” State

Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters this week. Washington had already proposed some ideas on how to improve ties step-by-step, she added, refusing to go into

specifics. “If the Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think there is a path that’s possible.

It’s just going to take two to tango,” she said. But Chavez, who since assuming power in 1999 has long

worked to forge an anti-US alliance among leftist leaders in Latin America, “was not really interested”

in boosting ties, Arnson said.

Restoring ambassadors is the first step toward congressional oversight of Venezuala-

Iran relations and counter-narcotics/terrorism.Sullian, 13 Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of Homeland Security (Mark P. “Hugo Chávez’ s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S.

Relations,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf,amils)

In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan

relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order toaugment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy

concerns, but on trade, investment issues , and other commercial matters. With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential

election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and

democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of

Venezuela’s relations with Iran.

Now the CP solves better 2 reasons

A) Maduro can say yes to the CP because we reinstate a framework for

appeasement towards Venezuela which checks maduros political credibility

which is the biggest reason why they say no.

B) QPQ Negotiations can’t work. Too much tension, too little mutual respect

O’Reilly ‘13 Andrew O'Reilly – Writer/Producer for @FoxNewsLatino. “U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim” – Fox

News Latino – April 17 – http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remain-tense-under-maduro-experts-

claim/#ixzz2YYYnvrAl

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf





While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that relations between the

United States and the administration of President-elect Nicolás Maduro will continue to be as tense as under the

late Hugo Chávez, experts said. After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro said that while he would like to reestablish relations

with the U.S. “in terms of equality and respect,” Washington will always try to undermine his rule. These words followed a steady rhetoric on

the campaign trail of Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule, including

working with opposition labor unions and causing electric power blackouts. Experts argue that given Maduro’s anti-American

sentiments leading up to the election, as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the polarization

in Venezuela, there is little hope for a change in relations between the countries. “It’s hard to see

[Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election,” Eric Hershberg, the director of American

University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, told Fox News Latino. “ Americans will insist on a level of respect

that he is not going to give them .”



Instability NB

Lack of Maduro’s recognition fosters regional violence and instability by legitimizing

the opposition.Carlsen, 13 Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the

Center for International Policy in Mexico City. (Laura, May 2nd

, “U.S. Efforts to Block Democracy in Venezuela Harm Hemispheric Relations,” Foreign Policy

in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere,amils)

The U.S. government stands alone among major world governments in refusing to recognize the

results of the recent Venezuelan presidential election. The petulant position of the Obama

administration harms U.S. relations across the entire hemisphere and feeds a scenario of violence in

that Caribbean country. Nation after nation--including the last hold-out Spain and the Organization of American States—has recognized Nicolas Maduro, who took office

following his narrow win in the April 14 elections. The results ratified by the National Electoral Council show Maduro with 50.78 percent to 48.95 percent for defeated conservative candidate

Henrique Capriles—a difference of 1.8 percent, or some 260,000 votes. There were no major anomalies on Election Day, which by all reports went remarkably smoothly. Following the

elections, Capriles contested the results in fiery speeches and called on supporters to demonstrate, but curiously did not file a legal challenge. The Venezuelan electoral system is highly

tamper-proof, as recognized by monitoring organizations like the Carter Center, which before the vote assessed the system as “the best in the world.” Delegations from the Carter C enter, the

Union of South American Countries, and other experts observed the elections and proclaimed them clean and fair. Venezuelans vote electronically, then print out and double-check a paper

ballot before depositing it as well. The Electoral Council carries out an audit at polls of 54.3 percent of the votes. These reviews are signed by members of the political parties, including

Capriles’ Democratic Unity Party. The Electoral Council has agreed to audit the remaining 46 percent of ballots, although the electronic vote is the legal vote and the process for reviewing the

paper backup after the on-site audit is unprecedented and logistically challenging, with almost no possibility of changing the result. Representatives of the conservative coalition announced

instead that they plan to gather alleged evidence of fraud to present to the Supreme Court. Capriles said from there he will attempt to take the case to international courts, promising a drawn-

out process that will feed sharp divisions with the country. The opposition still has not presented the suit or the proofs for judicial review. Daniel Kovalik, a U.S. human

rights lawyer who was among 170 international election observers from around the world, reported in

the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “What we found was a transparent, reliable, well-run and thoroughly

audited electoral system.” Voter turnout was reportedly 79 percent—a major achievement that would be the envy of more mature

democracies, including the United States. And still the U.S. State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell stated on

April 24, 10 days after the elections, “We do continue to believe that the ongoing CNE recount and a

thorough review of alleged voting irregularities will…ensure that the Venezuelan people feel that their

democratic aspirations are being met and that they have greater confidence in the election outcome.”

This, coming after recognizing in the same press conference that the Maduro government was making

overtures to repair relations with the United States through the appointment of its new charge

d’affaires, dashed hopes of more cordial relations between the two trade partners. The frame of concern for “the

Venezuelan people” rings hollow. In a democratic contest, especially in a society as polarized as Venezuela’s, the losing side nev er feels like its “aspirations are being met” when they lose. And

the insistence on a 100-percent recount after the ignominy of the Bush-Gore election of 2000 and the

immediate U.S. recognition of the conservative Mexican president Felipe Calderon, despite evidence

of voter fraud and a much narrower margin in 2006, is hypocritical at best. At worst, it is an example

of U.S. external pressure that encourages a break with the rule of law and violates the principle of

self-determination that President Barack Obama claims to uphold. This is the first time the U.S.

government has refused to recognize a Venezuelan election result, as Mark Weisbrot of the Center for

Economic and Political Research points out. Weisbrot notes, “Washington's efforts to de-legitimise

the election mark a significant escalation of US efforts at regime change in Venezuela. Not since its involvement in

the 2002 military coup has the US government done this much to promote open conflict in Venezuela.” The Obama administration is bending over backwards to spur on an opposition

movement that has no virtually legal leg to stand on in its desire for new presidential elections. There are some indications that the strategy to refuse to accept defeat at the polls was

considered even before the close vote. Although Capriles conceded rapidly and gracefully to former President Hugo Chavez in the presidential elections last fall, it was a bad omen when he

refused to sign a pre-electoral pact to respect the results prior to this election. Now violent opposition protests in the streets have led to

the deaths of nine people. Maduro has attended the funerals of his supporters killed in the

disturbances with vows to defend his victory and prosecute those inciting and participating in violent

acts. Health clinics established by Chavez have been frequent targets. It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his future on

rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have the support of the U.S. government. It is even more unlikely that he could sustain a movement for non-recognition. Even many members

of his own coalition will not go so far as to say they honestly believe he won the April 14th elections. The other countries of the region recognized

Maduro as the new president within hours of the results. Not only did the left-leaning governments

provide their diplomatic welcome, but also Colombia, Mexico, and other nations closely allied with

the United States. Capriles’ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post-electoral unrest not

http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere

http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere



only endanger peace and stability in Venezuela, but also potentially the entire region. Venezuela is a

geopolitical hub—for its oil, for its role in building south-south integration projects like ALBA and

Unasur, for its solidarity trade pacts, and for its defiance of U.S. hegemony. To illegally disrupt the constitutional order there

will not be as easy as it was in Honduras, where even a broad opposition movement couldn’t restore the constitutionally elected president after a right-wing coup in 2009. Inevitably,

nations across the hemisphere and the world will react with anger if the Obama administration

decides to maintain this course, both in defense of their neighbor Venezuela and also in what they see

as a threat to their own sovereignty. Already former Brazilian president Lula da Silva has warned that"Americans should take care of their own business a little and let us decide our own destiny." The

longer the United States remains globally isolated in its refusal to accept Venezuela’s election results,

the longer the instability, uncertainty, and violence will continue. Extending the conflict could very

well end up unnecessarily costing more lives. The Obama administration should consider that its

stubbornness about what it considers an adverse election result in a foreign country is a direct cause

of bloodshed. It harms relations with our hemispheric neighbors and partners and sows the seeds of distrust and enmity in a region where we have a good chance at building

cooperation on issues of vital importance to all of our countries. Venezuela’s elections must be accepted at once to show that the United States will uphold democratic processes and the rule

of law, even when its government is not particularly pleased with the results.

Opposition seeks support in Colombian – damages relations and increases regional

instabilityCorrero del Ornico, 13 (June 11th, “Venezuela “Destabilization Plan”: Colombian Government Meets

Venezuelan Opposition,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/venezuela-destabilization-plan-colombian-

government-meets-venezuelan-opposition/5338592, amils)

In what has become a new diplomatic crisis in the region, the Maduro administration continued to criticize Colombian

officials this week for a meeting held between Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles and

President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota on May 29th. The encounter, which has threatened the strong

ties that have characterized Colombian-Venezuelan relations since 2010, saw Santos receive Capriles,

the right-wing governor of Miranda state and losing presidential candidate, for private talks that the

Maduro government has characterized as “lamentable”. “I’m very sorry that Santos is giving credence to

the people who refuse to recognize Venezuela’s legitimate authority, and to the false idea that we can

be overthrown, and the false ideas of the traitorous, fascist sectors of the Venezuelan right wing”, the

Venezuelan President said in response to the meeting. Capriles, who was beaten by Nicolas Maduro in

Venezuela’s Colombian government’s meeting with Venezuelan opposition derails relations April 14th

presidential elections, has failed to recognize his defeat, taking instead the reins of an opposition

movement that has attempted to challenge the legitimacy of Maduro’s victory and the country’s

electoral authorities. Capriles has said he is seeking international support to delegitimize Maduro’s

presidency. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua called the reception of such a controversial figure by

the Santos government “a knife in the back”. “We have done everything we can to help find peace for

the Colombian people. It’s not right that in Colombia they are promoting and legitimizing someone who

openly refuses to acknowledge the institutions of the Venezuelan state”, Jaua said.The Venezuelan

Minister referred to Capriles’ visit as part of a destabilization plan that involves mobilizing right-wing

sectors of Colombian society to sow violence and chaos in the OPEC member state. The same

sentiment has been expressed by President Maduro, who has alleged that in Bogota “a situation ofcomplete conspiracy” exists. “We are neutralizing the plots against our country. It is well known that

the principal conspiracies against our homeland have been hatched in Bogota. All of Venezuela knows

this and we’ve given proof of it”, Maduro said. For its part, the Santos administration has called the row

a “misunderstanding” and has refused to comment on the meetings, calling for dialogue with the

Venezuelan government instead of “microphone diplomacy”. But as of earlier this week, efforts to mend

the impasse had yet to be made by Colombia’s diplomatic corps. “We haven’t had contact with *Foreign

Minister Holguin] since Saturday. We are waiting for their communication to express the ideas that

http://www.globalresearch.ca/venezuela-destabilization-plan-colombian-government-meets-venezuelan-opposition/5338592









President Nicolas Maduro has asked me to transmit to the Colombian government”, Jaua said. According

to Venezuela’s highest diplomat, these instructions include a complete revision of bilateral relations.

“Right now we are evaluating everything and all aspects of our relationship with Colombia until the

Colombian government clarifies the reach that those who fail to recognize the *Venezuelan state’s+

institutions have *in their country+”, Minister Jaua affirmed. Last week’s row comes after years of

diplomatic work had successfully rebuilt bilateral relations following the tensions that marked the

governments of former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and the late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.

Santos’ replacement of Uribe as president in 2010 effectively began a new period in Venezuelan-

Colombian relations that witnessed a warming in diplomatic ties and the signing of new multi-faceted

agreements between the neighboring states. The reception of Capriles by Santos, however, was a

“breaking of the rules of the game” established between the two governments three years ago,

President Maduro said. “The Colombians who live in Venezuela understand Chavez’s democratic

revolution and hopefully a way will be found so that truth and principles of respect can reconstruct

the relations between our two governments”, the Venezuelan President stated. Peace Process At Risk

Part of the political fallout that has accompanied the diplomatic breech has been the possible

departure of Venezuela from the peace process underway in Cuba between Colombian authorities

and the country’s FARC rebels. As part of the policies of former President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has been a guiding

force and active mediator in the current talks taking place between the guerrillas and thegovernment. “Nobody can doubt the important role that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has

played and is playing in the search for peace in Colombia”, FARC leadership wrote in a blog on Saturday.

The statement additionally expressed the guerrilla group’s apprehension “over the acts which will

without a doubt affect the extraordinary atmosphere of peace that we have been able to build through

dialogue in Havana”. Representatives of the Colombian government have similarly articulated the

importance of Venezuela to the dialogue. “The situation is very worrying… but I am hopeful that it will

be overcome”, said Humberto de la Calle, the Santos administration’s chief negotiator. Just prior the

diplomatic crisis, the talks had yielded their most significant breakthrough in the past 6 months by

outlining the basis for an agreement that would restructure land tenancy laws in the South American

nation. Meanwhile, the host nation of the peace process, Cuba, has expressed its complete support for

the Maduro administration’s stance towards its neighbor. “Cuba has had an unchanging position ofsolidarity with Venezuela and the recognition of it’s legitimate government headed by President Nicolas

Maduro, whose decisive triumph on April 14th is an unquestionable expression of the sovereign will of

the Venezuelan people”, said Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez. The Minister referred to the

international campaign being carried out against Venezuelan institutions “and any direct or indirect

support for them” as “damaging to the unity of Latin American and the Caribbean. They undermine

independence and hurt the efforts that Venezuela and other states have made for peace



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