Earliest Bird ’13 Venezuela Neg

Venezuela Oil Neg

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FYIThere are two routes you can go in the 1NC on the relations advantage- either relations are resilient or that they’re already ruined. I included both, but you should choose one when constructing the 1NC.

The China Relations turn is more battle-ready, although the link evidence for the Columbia FDI turn is better.

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Solvency

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1NC

Strict investment regime means the plan fails- Venezuela prefers our rivalsRoberts and Daga 4-15-13 [James M. Roberts is Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics and Sergio Daga is Visiting Senior Policy Analyst for Economic Freedom in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, “Venezuela: U.S. Should Push President Maduro Toward Economic Freedom,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/venezuela-us-should-push-president-maduro-toward-economic-freedom]

An inefficient and non-transparent regulatory environment that is hostile to private foreign direct investment obstructs long-term development and hampers entrepreneurial growth. The investment regime is tightly controlled by the state and favors investors from China, Russia, Iran, and other democracy-challenged countries.[10] Investor protection in Venezuela is ranked at 140 out of 144 countries, according to the WEF report.[11] In 1998, before Chavez took power, there were more than 14,000 private industrial companies in Venezuela; in 2011, after 13 years of extensive nationalizations and expropriations, only about 9,000 remained.[12]

Venezuela’s constitution bans foreign oil investmentCoggin ’11 [John, Senior Editor for International Policy Digest, “Venezuela’s Oil Sword,” May 26, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/05/26/venezuelas-oil-sword/]

It’s the uncertain quantity and quality of Venezuela’s oil reserves that keep U.S. foreign policy analysts and energy forecasters up at night. Like Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, PDVSA operates behind a cloak of secrecy. The Venezuelan constitution strictly forbids foreign investment in upstream oil activities. U.S. oil companies ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips exited Venezuela in 2007 due to nationalization reforms.

Venezuelan companies can’t turn a profit, even with investmentHelman 3-5-13 [Christopher, Forbes, “What Does Chavez's Death Mean For Venezuelan Oil Giant Pdvsa?” http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/03/05/what-does-chavez-death-mean-for-venezuelan-oil-giant-pdvsa/]

In desperation, earlier this year, Chavez, through Pdvsa, sought to land $6 billion in loans from China

Development Bank ($4 billion) and Chevron ($2 billion). The Chevron cash was supposedly earmarked for the company’s Petroboscan joint venture. The U.S. oil giant had previously loaned Pdvsa billions.¶ But Chavez’s biggest enabler was China. Beijing over the past decade has shown a willingness to prop up Chavez –more out of a desire for cheap oil than any kind of socialist objectives (Venezuela could only dream of

having economic planners as competent as China’s). Venezuela has been repaying China’s $36 billion in loans with oil, not cash.¶ By last September the financial situation at Pdvsa had gotten so dire that the company was paying service providers with IOUs.¶ So what’s going to happen to Pdvsa under Chavez’s heir Nicolas Maduro? Probably more of

the same. Maduro last month showed that he is likely to be little more than a chip off of Chavez’s block when he announced that Pdvsa would “annex” the share of oilfields owned by privately held Suelopetrol.¶ Whatever happens next, we can be sure that unless Maduro turns out to have the same charisma-driven cult of personality that Chavez managed, Venezuela’s partners, especially China, will be increasingly unwilling to take the role of “pendejo” (sucker). The oil industry has been waiting patiently for Chavez to die with the hope that whoever came next would be more interested in building value rather than destroying it.

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2NC- Investment illegal

Investment is illegal- the industry is privatizedUSTR ’13 [Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2013 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, “Venezuela,” http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20NTE%20Venezuela%20Final.pdf]

The government controls key sectors of the economy, including oil, petrochemicals, and much of the ¶ mining and aluminum industries. Venezuela began an ambitious program of privatization under the ¶ Caldera administration (1994 to 1999), but privatization

halted under the Chavez Administration (2000 to ¶ March 5, 2013), who also re-nationalized companies in key sectors of the

economy, including the ¶ telecommunications and oil sectors. According to data maintained by Conindustria (Confederación ¶ Venezolana de Industriales), there have been 1,171 state interventions (expropriations, private property ¶ seizures and nationalizations) since 2002. Of these, 40.9 percent were companies involved in the ¶ construction sector, 30.8 percent in the industrial sector (manufacturing, agro-industrial, agriculture or ¶ related industries), 19 percent in the oil sector, and 7.9 percent in the service and trade-related sectors. ¶ Other affected sectors include food, mining, chemicals, and transport services.¶ On January 24, 2012, the Venezuelan government announced its withdrawal from the Convention on the ¶ Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). ¶ Venezuela’s exit from ICSID became effective on July 25, 2012. At least 29 ICSID cases against ¶ Venezuela are currently pending, making Venezuela the country with the largest number of pending ¶ ICSID claims. Prior to announcing Venezuela’s ICSID withdrawal, President Chavez announced that the ¶

Venezuelan government would not recognize any ICSID decision related to the pending claim of a U.S. ¶ company. The United States does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Venezuela.¶ Foreign investment in the petroleum sector is restricted. The exploration (except for offshore natural ¶ gas), production, refinement, transportation, storage, and foreign

and domestic sale of hydrocarbons are ¶ reserved to the state . Private companies can engage in hydrocarbons-related activities only through ¶ mixed companies and equity joint ventures with the state-owned oil company, PDVSA. The government ¶ has in recent years forced international oil companies to convert investment interests in oil projects into ¶ minority stakes in joint ventures, without the right to operate the projects themselves. Combined with a ¶ windfall tax on profits, these and other government measures have substantially increased uncertainty in ¶

the hydrocarbons sector.

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Oil

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1NC

Takes years to solve Venezuelan oil productionMoney Morning 3-19-13 [“Oil Companies Hope for New Opportunity in Energy-Rich Venezuela,” http://moneymorning.com/2013/03/19/oil-companies-hope-for-new-opportunity-in-energy-rich-venezuela/]

Due to years of not properly investing in its oil industry resources, production steadily declined by about 25% in the 14 years Chavez was in power, and oil exports fell by nearly 50%. In fact, there were various points during the Chavez years that Venezuela was actually a net importer of crude.¶ “Venezuela’s clout on OPEC and on world oil prices has been greatly diminished because of its inability to exploit its enormous resources,” Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a consultancy, told The New York Times. “In the 1990s, their production was booming and they could thumb their nose at Saudi Arabia and get away with it, but now they

have become OPEC’s poor cousin.”¶ That is to say even with a regime change, which does not appear imminent, it will take years for output there to jump to the point where Venezuela makes a significant contribution to reserves and

profits for major oil companies.

Venezuelan oil doesn’t cause price shocksJegarajah 3-5-13 [Sri, Market reporter for CNBC Asia Pacific, “Venezuela—The Next Risk for Oil Markets,” http://www.cnbc.com/id/100520892]

Meanwhile, a former executive at PDVSA told CNBC that Venezuela has lost its ability to influence global oil markets because years of under investment in the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) member's petroleum industry has constrained production.¶ "Venezuela is a weak OPEC hawk, as it has no sufficient production to influence prices," said Gustavo Coronel, a founding member of the board of state-oil firm Petroleos de Venezuela. "Venezuela is no longer a factor that can really upset the markets as it was the case 20 years ago."¶ Furthermore, the energy boom in the U.S. has helped cut dependence of Venezuelan net crude and oil products and exports to the U.S. have dropped to levels last seen nearly 30

years ago. "The U.S. would not miss Venezuelan oil very much," Coronel said. "Whatever disruption would be almost entirely psychologically induced."

Multiple checks to the impact of oil shocksThe Economist ‘11 [March 3, 2011, “The 2011 oil shock,” http://www.economist.com/node/18281774]

So far, the shocks to supply have been tiny . Libya’s turmoil has reduced global oil output by a mere 1% . In 1973 the figure was around 7.5%. Today’s oil market also has plenty of buffers . Governments have stockpiles, which they didn’t in 1973. Commercial oil stocks are more ample than they were when prices peaked in 2008.

Saudi Arabia, the central bank of the oil market, technically has enough spare capacity to replace Libya, Algeria and a clutch of other small producers. And the Saudis have made clear that they are willing to pump .

Venezuelan oil is stable- reforms are unecessaryParraga 3-8-13 [Marianna, Reuters, “Exclusive: Venezuela to maintain oil industry framework under Maduro,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/09/us-venezuela-oil-idUSBRE92803720130309]

Venezuela will maintain its oil industry tax and legal framework under the leadership of acting President Nicolas Maduro, the OPEC nation's oil minister said on Friday to reassure foreign investors after the death of President Hugo Chavez.¶ Rafael Ramirez told Reuters that Venezuela would continue to push for a minimum price of $100 per barrel at the next OPEC meeting, and that he did not expect Chavez's death to push up crude prices.¶ "The tax and legal framework were set out clearly by President Chavez," the oil minister said outside the National Assembly, where Maduro was being inaugurated as acting leader on Friday ahead of a new presidential election due in weeks.¶ "While

our government is here and the people remain in charge, our oil policy will remain unchanged ." ¶ Ramirez said he

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expected the South American country to increase its oil output by 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) this year, bringing its total production to 3.5 million bpd.¶ The government says it is pumping 3.0 million bpd, but many industry experts question those

figures. Analysts say Venezuela produced just 2.34 million bpd last month.¶ Ramirez said state oil company PDVSA invested $22 billion in 2012, and expected to invest $25 billion this year.¶ He said foreign energy companies working with PDVSA in Venezuela sent condolences following Chavez's death after a two-year battle with cancer, but had expressed no concerns about the political

situation in the country with the world's biggest oil reserves.¶ "Everything is normal in the oil industry. We're guaranteeing fuel supplies," Ramirez said . "We will keep our oil policy the same , internally and in OPEC ... we will defend a minimum price of $100 per barrel (at the next meeting)."¶ The next gathering of the oil producers' cartel is scheduled to take place in Vienna on May 31.

Russian oil investment solves nowReuters 4-15-13 [“Putin congratulates vote winner in oil ally Venezuela,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-venezuela-election-russia-idUSBRE93E0C920130415]

Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Nicolas Maduro on Monday on winning Venezuela's presidential election, saying he expected good relations to continue with a country where Moscow has significant oil investments.¶ Ties between Moscow and Caracas flourished under Hugo Chavez, the socialist leader who died last month of cancer. Maduro was Chavez's chosen successor and Russian

officials were hoping for continuity to protect their energy and arms deals there.¶ "Putin expressed confidence that under Maduro's leadership Venezuela will further strengthen its relations of strategic partnership with Russia,"

the Kremlin said after the Sunday vote.¶ Russia has invested billions of dollars in Venezuelan oil projects and has given

Caracas loans to buy weapons.¶ Igor Sechin, a Putin ally who is the head of Rosneft, Russia's top crude oil producer, has been a regular visitor to discuss oil deals and arms sales in Venezuela.

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2NC- Long timeframe

Oil production takes forever, even with investmentFlannelly 3-6-13 [Michael, analyst for Dividend.com, “Venezuelan Oil Production in the Post-Chavez World (CVX, XOM, COP, more),” http://www.dividend.com/news/2013/venezuelan-oil-production-in-the-post-chavez-world-cvx-xom-cop-more/]

Venezuela’s current oil production infrastructure is pretty dilapidated due to Chavez’s inability (or

indifference) to reinvest in the nationalized oil industry, especially with limited technological innovations and expertise. Even if future leaders in the Latin American country were to open up their borders to a variety of multinational oil corporations, it may take awhile for the foreign direct investment to lead to a substantial oil production.

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2NC- No oil shocks impact

Even large oil spikes don’t cause crises- 2010 provesShapiro 2-9-11 [Robert, chairman and co-founder of Sonecon, LLC, a private firm that provides advice and analysis to senior executives and officials of U.S. and foreign businesses, governments, and non-profit organizations and former Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs from 1997 to 2001, “The Real Economic Implications of the Uprising in Egypt,” http://ndn.org/blog/2011/02/real-economic-implications-uprising-egypt] But in order to threaten the U.S. and global recoveries, an oil price spike would have to be both very large and persistent -- for at least four-to-six months. Before this year’s unrest gripped Tunisia and Egypt, oil prices in 2010 had risen by about 27 percent. That cost the U nited S tates an additional $72 billion for oil imports, an extra $70 billion for the EU’s oil imports, and $27 billion more for Japan . That’s not peanuts, but it was still just ripples for economies of their size. Saudi Arabia is the only country with the capacity to engineer and maintain a price spike sufficient to wreck real economic havoc – as it has the capacity to prevent any other oil-producing country from trying to do the same.

No impact to shocks- newest empirical study provesKhadduri ’11 [Walid, Former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, "The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations," http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html]

What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that

the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They

Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil

prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less.” The study elaborates on this by stating

that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in

new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase , benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled , for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United

States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the

previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy.

Oil price spikes haven’t hurt emerging economies:The Economist’11 [“Indonesia's oil problem,” 1-11-11, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/01/commodity_prices)

WERE one told a decade ago that oil prices would quadruple but not seriously hurt growth in emerging economies, it would have seemed fantastic . (After all, the oil shocks of the 1970s substantially curtailed growth in Latin

America). Yet this is precisely what has happened. As oil prices approach $100 a barrel , economists are wondering why. Jon Anderson at UBS has a note out this week titled, "Why Doesn’t Oil Matter?” with a few ideas. The most interesting

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one is the smaller role oil plays in energy consumption in emerging economies relative to developed ones . Roughly 40% of primary energy used in developed economies comes from oil, as against 28% in emerging economies. Coal is still pretty much king in developing economies, at 49%, whereas the equivalent figure is 20% in developed economies. For India and China, the reliance on coal—mostly domestically produced—is even greater, at 67%.

Feedback mechanisms prevent oil prices from rising too highBoucek ‘11 [Christopher, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, “Oil Prices and Middle East Turmoil: The Economic Consequences,” 3-31-11, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/31/oil-prices-and-middle-east-turmoil-economic-consequences/1fa]

Though the oil price has risen, Timmer noted that price volatility was low in March. Even as events unfolded in the Middle East, the price held steady, suggesting that forward-looking oil markets had already taken the unrest into account. Feedback mechanisms that keep the price from surging too high and a healthy oil supply may also have helped.

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AT: Latin America stability

Latin American conflicts are decreasing and won’t escalate- data provesUNDP ’13 [United Nations Development Programme, “UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA,” http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/Understanding%20Social%20Conflict%20in%20Latin%20America%202013%20ENG.pdf]

One of the central findings of this study addresses social inequalities and institutional legitimacy. The data reveal larger numbers of conflicts in countries with broad social inequality and ¶ regimes that have low institutional legitimacy (Figures 4 and 6). The relationship between

institutional legitimacy, social gaps, and the radicalization of conflicts is more complex. Conflicts ¶ in societies with higher levels of institutional support are less likely to evolve into violent confrontations. The relationship between social inequality and radicalization is not linear. Instead ¶ it is generally U-shaped, as the countries with medium levels of inequality have fewer cases of ¶ violence and confrontation than countries with high or low levels of inequality (Figure 6). This ¶ is due to the different levels of interaction between State, society, and conflict (particularly ¶ the capacity to manage these elements), as well as the political culture and historical experience of each

country. The data also reveal that there are no countries that experienced both ¶ high numbers of social conflicts and high levels of radicalization. This is a positive finding for ¶ the region in terms of democracy and development.¶ The relationship between collective action and radicalization is linked principally to the region’s chronic gaps between institutional capacity and social demands, as well as its political ¶ culture of radicalized collective action. Societies with low levels of conflict, strong institutions, ¶ and relatively high levels of radicalism are prevalent in the region. ¶ The data correlating conflict radicalization and number of conflicts (Figure 5) reveal four combinations of the two variables:¶ • Many conflicts and high levels of radicalization: no cases¶ • Many conflicts and low levels of radicalization: Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, ¶ Peru, Bolivia, Panama, and Guatemala¶ • Few conflicts and high levels of radicalization: Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay¶ • Few conflicts and low levels of radicalization: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Costa ¶ Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Mexico¶ Figure 6. Number of social conflicts per country and percentage of social conflicts involving ¶ violent clashes¶ In general, there is no direct relationship between the number of conflicts and the level of ¶ radicalization where greater numbers of conflicts correlate with higher levels of violence ¶ (Figure 6). This is consistent with the study’s theoretical framework which considers conflict ¶ to be a key element in processes of social change, particularly in democratic contexts. It also ¶ underscores the risks of destabilization

and violence that are implicit in processes of conflict ¶ escalation.¶ The data also show that there is a fragmentation of conflicts that employ violent strategies. ¶ This suggests that there is a multiplication of non-institutionalized conflicts. There is also evidence of a proliferation of more dangerous conflicts that threaten governability. Conflicts ¶ over land represent the largest percentage of this class of

conflict. Structural issues, socioeconomic conditions, and institutional failures also continue to be strong sources of instability32¶ . ¶ However, in general the data on conflict radicalization suggest that Latin America seems to be ¶ entering a period of greater stability, and that social conflict does not seriously affect governability. Although these struggles represent a small fraction of the total number of conflicts in ¶ the region, in many cases they reach relatively high levels of violence. Institutional conflicts ¶ related to the nonfulfillment of agreements comprised the next most significant group of violent conflicts. The hypothesis is that these conflicts tend to escalate due to a lack of institutional frameworks capable of offering solutions and platforms for negotiation.

Latin American states are resilient- no econ shocksIDB ’12 [Inter-American Development Bank, leading source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Latin America and the Caribbean remain resilient to external shocks, IDB study says,” March 18, http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2012-03-18/2012-latin-america-macroeconomic-report,9875.html]

MONTEVIDEO – Latin America and the Caribbean remain resilient to a possible slowdown in world economic growth that could stem from a deepening of the debt crisis in Europe and a deceleration in China, according to the Inter-American Development Bank’s 2012 Latin American and Caribbean Macroeconomic Report released today during the Bank’s annual meeting.

The report outlines two major potential economic risks the region could face in the next year: a faster-than-expected deceleration of China’s economy and deepening economic problems in Europe. Using a global economic model, the study concludes that

even if both of these two major events were to occur, Latin America and the Caribbean might suffer only a relatively mild recession.¶ The study presented to the IDB’s Board of Governors, “The World of Forking Paths,” offers a comprehensive analysis of potential risks affecting the region in the short and medium-term, providing an assessment of main macroeconomic

vulnerabilities and strengths as well as policy recommendations.¶ “We are cautiously optimistic for Latin America and the Caribbean. The region has grown strongly in the last couple of years and it has shown it is resilient to shocks,’’ said Santiago

Levy, Vice President for Sectors and Knowledge for the IDB. “Most importantly, the region has developed a set of policy tools that have proven to be effective during economic downturns.”¶ The report notes that a number of countries, especially

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commodity exporters, have accumulated international reserves that would help cushion them from international financial turbulence and have reduced external liabilities. Breaking with the past, most countries were able to implement effective fiscal stimulus packages to smooth the last downturn, and have gained valuable experience in counter cyclical fisal policymaking.¶ Most of the larger economies in the region have adopted

flexible exchange rate regimes that make it easier for them to smooth fluctuations. And, several countries in recent years have implemented more sophisticated monetary policies and employed macro-prudential tools, such as the active use of Bank-liquidity requirements and measures to slow currency appreciation, which have all enhanced the region’s resilience against another possible international financial crisis.

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2NC- No LA conflict

No Latin America conflict- cooperation solvesRuiz-Dana et al ’07 [Alejandra Ruiz-Dana, Peter Goldschagg, Edmundo Claro and Hernán Blanco, researchers for The International Institute for Sustainable Development, which contributes to sustainable development by ¶ advancing policy recommendations on international trade and investment, economic policy, climate ¶ change, measurement and assessment, and natural resources management, “Regional Integration, Trade and Conflict in Latin America,” January, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/tas_rta_latin_america.pdf]

In general, the region “no longer represents a global threat in terms of security.”30 Indeed, ¶ Latin America is often trumpeted “as an example for the rest of the world when one deals ¶ with traditional security issues.”31 Latin America’s considerable religious and ethnic ¶ homogeneity helps to explain the absence of violent conflict to some degree.32 Simón ¶ Bolívar, leader of the independence movements in South America, appealed to the region’s ¶ common cultural heritage to seek the union of American states in 1826.33 His call sparked an ¶ inter-American cooperation process that eventually led to the creation of the Organization ¶ of American States (OAS) in 1948, a predecessor to the United Nations (and, in some ¶ instances, much more effective than the latter).

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AT: Canadian Oil Sands

Canadian oil sands are ending nowJones 2-27-13 [Jeffrey, Reuters, “Analysis: U.S. shale boom forces change in Canadian oil patch,” http://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/analysis-u-shale-boom-forces-change-canadian-oil-230606513--finance.html]

T he U.S. shale oil revolution is forcing Canada's oil sands industry to question whether there is a future in processing its crude into lighter oil, a tried-and-true way of wringing the most money out of a resource considered crucial to the country's prosperity.¶ Suncor Energy Inc , which nearly 50 years ago pioneered the practice in Canada of mining and then upgrading the oil sands bitumen

into refinery-ready light crude at the same site, served notice this month that the era of the integrated project may be ending.¶ It said it was reexamining a plan to build a multibillion-dollar upgrading plant in northern Alberta and taking a C$1.5 billion ($1.5 billion) charge to account for lower projected cash flow. The reason: cheap oil from North Dakota and elsewhere is making it uneconomical over the long haul to build such complexes.¶ "Why would you spend billions of dollars to build an upgrader to create a product that is looking to be oversupplied in the markets you can access today?" said Jackie Forrest, director of global oil for consultancy IHS CERA.¶ The Suncor move is more evidence of a shift from upgrading that is already well underway. Imperial Oil Ltd , for example, is building the C$12.9 billion Kearl development - the next

major oil sands project to come online - without a processing plant.¶ Once considered a sure winner by most Canadians, the oil sands industry is now on the defensive on several fronts, struggling to prove it can deliver its raw materials to refiners at a competitive price and at an acceptable environmental cost¶ The dilemma over upgrading points to more problems ahead

as oil sands producers compete for capital against the developers of the cheaper, less damaging shale oil.¶

With less-processed heavy oil competing with the increased Bakken flows for pipeline space to U.S. refineries, a glut in Western

Canada has built up, generating a wide discount on Canadian crude against benchmark West Texas Intermediate. That has created an immediate problem, not the least for Alberta, the province at the center of Canada's oil industry.

Oil sands are unsustainableJones 2-27-13 [Jeffrey, Reuters, “Analysis: U.S. shale boom forces change in Canadian oil patch,” http://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/analysis-u-shale-boom-forces-change-canadian-oil-230606513--finance.html]

In another trend working against upgrading, oil sands mining is giving way to less-centralized steam-driven production methods, which are less costly to expand and which can ship diluted bitumen directly into the market. Several U.S. refineries have been retooled to run more of the heavy crude.¶ Meanwhile, notorious construction cost overruns and a string of outages at existing

upgraders have raised questions about reliability of returns and operations.¶ For more than a decade, most tar sands projects in Alberta blew well through their budgets as the rush to develop the resources stretched Alberta's skilled labor pool thin. Companies sought to bolster manpower by importing workers from around the world, and the rush to develop drove up the

costs of steel, other materials and equipment.¶ Several plants proposed before the 2008-2009 financial crisis were canceled, as credit dried up.¶ "It's been the perception that any and nearly all upgraders have been plagued with fires, maintenance issues, cold weather issues. They're expensive to run, and even more so, they're expensive to build," said Wood Mackenzie analyst Mark Oberstoetter.

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AT: Warming

We’re too far gone to solve warmingCarnegie Institute ’12 [Carnegie Institute of Science, February 16, 2012, "Only the lowest CO2 emitting technologies can avoid a hot end-of-century", http://carnegiescience.edu/news/only_lowest_co2_emitting_technologies_can_avoid_hot_endofcentury]

Washington, D.C.— Could replacing coal-fired electricity plants with generators fueled by natural gas bring global warming to a halt in this century? What about rapid construction of massive numbers of solar or wind farms, hydroelectric dams, or nuclear reactors—or the invention of new technology for capturing the carbon dioxide produced by fossil-fueled power plants and storing it permanently underground? Nathan Myhrvold of Intellectual Ventures teamed up with Carnegie Institution’s Ken Caldeira to calculate the expected climate effects of replacing the world’s supply of electricity from coal plants with any of eight cleaner options. The work was published online by Environmental Research Letters on February 16. When published, it will be available at http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/1/014019. In each case, Myhrvold and Caldeira found that to achieve substantial benefit this century, we would need to engage in a rapid transition to the lowest emitting energy

technologies such as solar, wind, or nuclear power – as well as conserve energy where possible. The researchers found that it takes much longer to curtail the warming of the Earth than one might expect. And in the case of natural gas—increasingly

the power industry’s fuel of choice, because gas reserves have been growing and prices have been falling—the study finds that warming would continue even if over the next 40 years every coal -fired power plant in the world were replaced with a gas-

fueled plant. “There is no quick fix to global warming,” Caldeira said. “Shifting from one energy system to another is hard work and a slow process. Plus, it takes several decades for the climate system to fully respond to reductions in emissions. If we expect to see substantial benefits in the second half of this century, we had better get started now.” Researchers have previously conducted studies projecting the long-term climate effects of rolling out a single new energy technology. But this work from Myhrvold and Caldeira is the first to examine all the major candidate technologies for replacing coal power—including conservation—and to examine wide ranges of possible assumptions about both the emissions each technology generates and also the scope and duration of the build-out. “It takes a lot of energy to make new power plants—and it generally takes more energy to make those that use cleaner technology--like nuclear, solar, and wind--than it does to make dirty ones that burn coal and gas,” Myhrvold added. “You have to use the energy system of today to build the new-and-improved energy system of tomorrow, and unfortunately that means creating more emission in the near-term than we would otherwise. So we incur a kind of ‘emissions debt’ in making the transition to a better system, and it can take decades to pay that off. Meanwhile, the temperature

keeps rising.” The study used widely accepted models relating emissions to temperature. The two researchers also drew on a rich literature of studies, called life-cycle analyses, that total up all the greenhouse gases produced during the construction and operation of, say, a natural gas plant or a hydroelectric dam or a solar photovoltaic farm. It also examined the potential that technological improvements, such as advances in carbon capture and storage or in solar panel efficiency, could have on outcomes. “It was surprising to us just how long it takes for the benefit of a switch from coal to something better to show up in the climate in the form of a slowdown in global

warming,” Caldeira said. “If countries were to start right away and build really fast, so that they installed a trillion watts of gas-fired electricity generation steadily over the next 40 years,” Myhrvold said, “that would still add about half a degree Fahrenheit to the average surface temperature of the Earth in 2112—that’s within a tenth of a degree of the warming that coal-fired plants would produce by that year.”

We’ll adapt to warmingKenny 12 [April 9, 2012, Charles, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More., “Not Too Hot to Handle,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not_too_hot_to_handle?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers worldwide, it is important to put climate change in a broader context. It is a vital global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward improved quality of life. Climate change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction -- and

may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But it is also a problem that we know how to tackle, and one to which we have some time to respond before it is likely to completely derail progress. And that's good news, because the fact that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.¶ Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the most

comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in terms of income, g reenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "A2 scenario" -- one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow

global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But even under this model , Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold, and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested

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by the Stern report, and people in those countries are still markedly better off -- four times as rich for Afghanistan, a little

more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.¶ It's worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests that the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse

gases, the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the next century even if we are idiotic enough to

delay our response to climate change by a few years. For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.¶ And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.¶ What

about other diseases? Christian Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do poorly in

frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time, there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases , and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy

could compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.¶ It's the same with agriculture . Global

warming will have many negative (and a few positive) impacts on food supply, but it is likely that other impacts -- both positive,

including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger effects . The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90

percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.¶ Again, while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow . That's because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has

shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country . The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death

tolls.¶ Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that dealing with climate change will

take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is affordable, practical , and wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S. Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least, isn't

like that yet.¶ So, if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like , say, the threat of global thermo nuclear war or a rogue

asteroid. The fight to curb greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.

Warming won’t cause extinctionBarrett ‘7 professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, (Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species .5 If unchecked, it will cause other species

to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons ). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area

as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain . Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly,

perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though

potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous . Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we

cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

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2NC- Warming irreversible

We’re already past the warming thresholdAP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a U nited N ations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming,

trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations , which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which

issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century , said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

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AT: Food Insecurity

Food shortages won’t cause warAllouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown,

conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian

arguments . Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in

agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and

international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key

policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but

rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by

president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over

water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the

various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International

Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251).

In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the

electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),

organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example

Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water

needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have

argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch,

2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that

violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts

of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars

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(Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

Double bind- either no food scarcity or there are tons of alt causesAdeline 13 – food preservation specialist (02/17, “Food Storage: The Solution to Food Shortage,” http://beforeitsnews.com/survival/2013/02/food-storage-the-solution-to-food-shortage-2462712.html)

We humans need food for proper nutrition. In times of crisis, access to a stable food supply is the key to continued survival. In the presence

of natural disasters, human conflicts, climate change, and overpopulation , the threat of food shortages and total famine is not as far-fetched as it seems. Preparing long-term food supplies can buffer the effects of these potential catastrophes. The Anatomy of a Catastrophe Many people think that food shortages may be a thing of the past. Thanks to the marvels of modern

technology and scientific farming methods, we have a constant and abundant supply of food. It is difficult to

imagine how a food shortage can happen – but it is still a possibility. During ancient times, humans hunted and gathered for food. Then a revolution occurred and changed the course of history: we learned how to cultivate the soil, plant crops, and domesticate animals for a stable

source of food. Eventually, modern technology has improved farming and fishing techniques, that food production has

now become large-scale. People now depend on hard-working farmers and fishermen for their everyday supply of food. But what happens when the harvests are poor? The farmer will keep his produce to feed his own family first – other people are left without food. Such scenario is still possible today because there are man-made disasters and natural calamities that threaten the world’s food supply. For example, a hurricane rages across the country and floods several states. Our access to food is restricted because travel is nearly impossible. To add to that, business establishments like groceries and supermarkets are probably closed down due to the flood as well as a power outage. Some might argue that this is not a real food shortage scenario because the problem is merely logistics: there is food; it is just that we have no access to it. It is true that

natural calamities and wars cause a food shortage only temporarily. However, recent studies show that at present, we

consume more than we produce. The UN warns that grain reserves are progressively getting lower because of

droughts and crop failures in major food producing countries. The famine in Africa may possibly be felt in other parts of the world. This is an emergency situation that requires us to prepare beforehand. We must have a supply of food and water for us to survive.

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AT: LNG terror

LNG defenses are adequateRidgeway ’07 [James, former senior correspondent at Mother Jones and a 2012 Soros Justice Media Fellow, “Homeland Insecurity: Floating Targets,” Sept. 6, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/09/homeland-insecurity-floating-targets]

LNG ships are built according to standards by the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization. Ship owners also must meet design specifications and other requirements set by various private organizations, whose approval

is needed to obtain insurance. The ships' containers are surrounded by insulation. During construction, this insulation has

caught fire, leading to questions about its safety. The LNG industry dismisses such fears, citing its long safety record.

Indeed, the precautions already taken are elaborate: LNG tankers must provide 96 hours' notice before approaching the American coast, and a small flotilla of tugs, choppers, firefighters, police, and divers must be assembled to

escort them. Bridges along the way are closed, private boats are warned away, and the tankers are inspected and screened for explosives before they are allowed to approach land. Tanker crews also must pass security checks.

No impact to LNG explosionStyles 4 (Geoffrey SW, Managing Director – GSW Strategy Group, LLC, “Energy Outlook”, 5-14, http://energyoutlook.blogspot.com/2004/05/lng-disaster-movie-front-page-of-last.html)

The other remarkable feature of this situation is the degree of fear being instilled by those opposed to the LNG terminals. Although I don't fault communities for wanting a say in the kind of industrial facilities that will be in close proximity to them, those discussions should still be

based on fact and not wild ravings. The Wall Street Journal cited one LNG opponent who claimed that the destructive

potential of an LNG tanker was equivalent to 55 Hiroshima bombs (see analysis below). This reflects an

irrational fear, bolstered by junk science. It's hard to argue with, but we cannot base the nation's energy policies on paranoia. Many have picked up on the explosion at the LNG plant in Skikda, Algeria (see my blog of January 21) as evidence of the risks of handling LNG, but even if that were a fair comparison--and there are good reasons why it is not--it is actually a pretty good illustration that the risks are similar to those associated with many kinds of industrial facilities and not orders of magnitude greater, as activists assert. Having recently seen prosaic and trusted objects turned into deadly weapons, it is natural to worry a bit more about LNG than we might have a few years ago. Every LNG tanker--along with every crude oil or gasoline tanker, tank truck, or rail car--has the potential for destructive misuse. Yet we have not grounded all airplanes for fear they will be turned into cruise missiles, nor can we shun every link in the energy chain on which we all rely. While we can minimize risk, we cannot eliminate it. And if you don't want the LNG terminal in your neighborhood, for reasons that seem perfectly valid to you, just exactly whose neighborhood are you proposing as an alternative? Or are you and your neighbors prepared to take your houses off the gas grid and heat them with something else?Finally, for anyone interested in the atomic bomb comparison, a few facts: 1. A fully loaded LNG tanker of 120,000 cubic meters capacity holds about 50,000 tons of methane. 2. The yield of the Hiroshima bomb was equivalent to 21,000 tons of TNT. 3. Conservatively

assuming that TNT and methane have the same energy content gives you a ratio of 2.5 , not 55 , but

we are not done yet. 4. An atomic bomb releases its energy (from the conversion of matter into energy, via our old friend

e=mc^2) in 1/1000th of a second. This makes for a stupendous flash and explosion, with a surface temperature comparable to that

of the sun. This is why every H-bomb has an A-bomb trigger.5. A chemical explosion of methane requires a narrow range of

air/fuel mix (5-15%) that could not be achieved all at once for the entire volume of an LNG tanker. In the real world, it would take many seconds and probably minutes to consume all the available fuel. 6. The difference between

points 4 and 5 above is analogous to the difference between going from 60-0 mph by hitting a brick wall, compared to a panic stop using the brakes. The same energy is released, but in very different ways. 7. If it were easy to liberate nuclear weapon yields from large quantities of fuel, people would be doing this routinely.

The closest we get is something like this. And note that there is an enormous distinction between achieving A-bomb-like overpressures in a very limited radius with a fuel/air device vs. the kind of wide-scale effects of an actual nuclear explosion.

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AT: CBW Terror

No impact to chemical terrorismMueller ‘5, John -Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, May (International Studies Perspectives, Volume 6 Issue 2 Page 208-234)

Biologist Matthew Meselson calculates that it would take a ton of nerve gas or 5 tons of mustard gas to produce heavy casualties among unprotected people in an open area of 1 km2. Even for nerve gas this would take the concentrated delivery into a rather small area of

about 300 heavy artillery shells or seven 500-lb bombs (1991:13). And, this would usually require a considerable amount of time, allowing many people to evacuate the targeted area (McNaugher, 1990:31). A 1993 analysis by the Office of Technology

Assessment of the U.S. Congress finds that a ton of Sarin nerve gas perfectly delivered under absolutely ideal conditions over a heavily populated area against unprotected people could cause between 3,000 and 8,000 deaths. Under slightly less ideal circumstances—if there was a moderate wind or if the sun was out, for example—the death rate would be only 1/10th as great.21 Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction because a single bomb can generate great devastation. For chemical weapons to cause extensive damage, by contrast, many of them must be used, just like conventional ones.

Terrorists will kill themselves while producing chemical weaponsStimson Center ‘5 (Henry L. Stimson Center, Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons, http://www.stimson.org/cwc/terror.htm)

However, two factors stand in the way of manufacturing chemical agents for the purpose of mass casualty . First, the chemical reactions involved with the production of agents are dangerous : precursor chemicals can be

volatile and corrosive, and minor misjudgments or mistakes in processing could easily result in the deaths of would-be weaponeers . Second, this danger grows when the amount of agent that would be needed to successfully mount a mass casualty attack is considered. Attempting to make sufficient quantities would require either a large, well-financed operation that would increase the likelihood of discovery or, alternatively, a long, drawn-out process of making small amounts incrementally. These small quantities would then need to be stored safely in a manner that would not weaken the agent's toxicity before

being released. It would take 18 years for a basement-sized operation to produce the more than two tons of sarin gas that the Pentagon estimates would be necessary to kill 10,000 people , assuming the sarin was manufactured correctly at its top lethality.

Safeguards solve the impact, and technical difficulties prevent mass casualtiesStimson Center ‘5 (Henry L. Stimson Center, Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons, http://www.stimson.org/cwc/terror.htm)

The options for delivering poison gas range from high to low tech. Theoretically, super toxic chemicals could be employed to foul food or water supplies, put into munitions, or distributed by an aerosol or spray method. Because of safeguards on both

our food and water supplies as well as the difficulty of covertly disbursing sufficient quantities of agent, this method is unlikely to be an effective means to achieving terrorist aims. Chemical agents could also be the payload of any number of

specially designed or modified conventional munitions, from bombs and grenades to artillery shells and mines. However designing munitions that reliably produce vapor and liquid droplets requires a certain amount of engineering skill . Finally, commercial sprayers could be mounted on planes or other vehicles . In an outdoor attack such as this,

however, 90 percent of the agent is likely to dissipate before ever reaching its target . Effective delivery, which

entails getting the right concentration of agent and maintaining it long enough for inhalation to occur, is quite difficult to achieve because chemical agents are highly susceptible to weather conditions.

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AT: OAS

OAS fails- other groups solveLee ’12 [Brianna, Senior Production Editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Organization of American States,” April 13, http://www.cfr.org/americas/organization-american-states/p27945]

One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future.¶ Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful.¶ Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though

Washington seems to have lost interest."¶ Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that

the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.¶ Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin

American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael

Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC

is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream."¶ Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations

(UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008.

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Relations

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1NC

US can’t save Venezuelan relations- past Obama efforts proveThe Washington Post 3-6-13 [“A misguided U.S. strategy for Venezuela,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/opinions/37497866_1_nicolas-maduro-apartments-and-appliances-henrique-capriles]

ANTICIPATING THE death of Hugo Chavez, the Obama administration began reaching out months ago to his designated

successor, Nicolas Maduro, in the hope of bettering U.S.-Venezuelan relations. On Tuesday, that strategy absorbed a body blow: Hours before revealing that Mr. Chavez had died of cancer, Mr. Maduro tried to blame the United States for

his illness, and he expelled two U.S. military attaches on charges of “proposing destabilizing plans” to the armed

forces.¶ So much for the “reset” with Caracas. The ludicrous and crude propaganda launched by Mr. Maduro was a sign that Mr.

Chavez’s successors will be more thuggish and less politically adept than he was — and, if anything, more inclined to scapegoat the United States and Venezuela’s democratic opposition for the horrendous problems the caudillo leaves behind.

Alt cause to relations- human rights, drugs, Cuba and IranSullivan 1-10-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf]

The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign ¶ oil to the United

States, but there has been significant friction with the Chávez government. For ¶ several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military ¶ arms purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, its efforts to export its ¶ brand of populism to other Latin American countries, and the use of Venezuelan territory by ¶ Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces . Declining Venezuelan cooperation on antidrug and ¶ antiterrorism efforts also has been a U.S. concern . Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated ¶ annually (by President Bush and President Obama) as a country that has failed to adhere to its ¶ international anti-drug obligations. Since 2006, the Department of State has prohibited the sale of ¶ defense articles and services to Venezuela because of lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts.

<OR>

Relations are strong- cooperation is resilientJamison 5-9-13 [Anne, BRICS Policy Center, research assistant at Georgetown University, BA in International Politics, Foreign Service, Arab Studies, “Maduro Venezuela: He Won't Usher in a New Era Of U.S.-Venezuela Relations, and That's OK,” http://www.policymic.com/articles/40027/maduro-venezuela-he-won-t-usher-in-a-new-era-of-u-s--venezuela-relations-and-that-s-ok]

The April 19 inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, vice president of Venezuela under the recently deceased Hugo Chávez, has the world debating whether or not the self-proclaimed "son of Chávez" could lead to improved relations with the United States.¶ However, the question isn't as

relevant as we are making it out to be. The U.S. and Venezuela have for years managed to cooperate economically, despite all the heated political rhetoric you read about in the media, and they'll likely continue to do so.¶ Before we tackle the future of diplomatic relations, allow me to offer a brief history of the tumultuous relationship shared by Venezuela and the U.S. in the past 14 years. Let's begin with the nasty break-up that occurred when Hugo Chávez assumed office in 1999. Prior to Chávez, the U.S. and Venezuela enjoyed a rather blissful diplomatic and economic relationship, complemented by the shared ambition to curb illegal drug production and distribution. This strong relationship between the two countries existed under the government of conservative neoliberal Rafael Caldera (President of Venezuela 1969-1974; 1994-1999).¶ In 1999 things began to go downhill, and were hardly helped by the controversy over the Bush administration’s support for the failed coup attempt against Chávez. In 2005 the two countries stopped working together to fight illegal drugs. Then, in 2006, there was Chávez's infamous speech to the United Nations in which he referred to George W. Bush as the devil. In 2008 Venezuela broke off diplomatic ties with the U.S. altogether out of solidarity with its ally Bolivia, but President Obama managed to patch things

up to an extent in June 2009. Ties between the two countries have been strained (to the extent that neither country had an

ambassador in the other’s capital since June 2010), until now, when the opportunity for an improved relationship has accompanied a new leader to the table. It is worth nothing that throughout diplomatic problems OPEC member

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Venezuela never stopped supplying oil, its biggest export, to the U.S., its biggest customer.¶ Optimists cringed as Maduro employed a strong anti-American sentiment in his campaign to be Chávez. To be fair, it would have been hard to try and embody the spirit of Chávez without aggressively opposing the United States. Maduro even went so far as to suggest that the CIA was responsible for the cancer that killed Chávez on March 5.¶ Albeit unsurprisingly, none of Maduro's rhetoric looked particularly promising. However, just before securing the election, Maduro contacted the former governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson, who was in Caracas on behalf of the Organization

of American States. Maduro said, according to an interview with Richardson, that "we want to improve the relationship with the U.S., regularize the relationship." Apparently the U.S. did not respond favorably to this, and subsequently supported a recount of the close election that declared Maduro the winner. Maduro hardly found this amusing in the aftermath of the 2000 Bush vs. Gore election, and referred to the actions of the U.S. as "brutal" and "vulgar."¶ However, during a live television address on Tuesday, Maduro seemed to offer a conciliatory message. "We want to have the best ties with all the world's governments, and the U.S. government, but on the basis of respect. There can be no threats." He also named Calixto Ortega the new charge d'affaires in Washington, doing so in hope of opening up a dialogue with the U.S. in the absence of an ambassador.¶ Maduro proceeded to proclaim that Venezuela "[hopes] one day to have respectful relations with the United States, a dialogue between equals, state-to-state."¶ These are, without question, steps in the right direction. They are not, however, reason to assume that diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Venezuela will get their happy ever after. Ultimately, if the 14 years of Chávez proved anything about relations between the two nations, they proved that their economic co-dependent relationship is not dependent on having a stable diplomatic relationship or any diplomatic relationship at all. Keeping that in mind, while both sides would prefer amicable diplomatic relations,

they are not a matter of life or death. Their trade relationship is intact, and that is their priority.

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2NC- Can’t solve relations

Oil investment can’t solve relations- anti-Americanism is entrenchedDrezner 3-7-13 [ “Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Why post-Chavez Venezuela won’t be a U.S. ally anytime soon,” http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/07/why_post_chavez_venezeula_wont_be_a_us_ally_anytime_soon]

So, with Chavez's passing, it would seem like a no-brainer for his successor to tamp down hostility with the United States. After all, Chavez's

"Bolivarian" foreign policy was rather expensive -- energy subsidies to Cuba alone were equal to U.S. foreign aid to Israel, for example. With U.S. oil multinationals looking hopefully at Venezuela and Caracas in desperate need of foreign investment, could Chavez's successor re-align foreign relations closer to the U.S.A.? ¶ I'm not betting on it, however, for

one simple reason: Venezuela might be the most primed country in the world for anti-American conspiracy theories. ¶ International relations theory doesn't talk a lot about conspiracy thinking, but I've read up a bit on it, and I'd say post-Chavez Venezuela is the perfect breeding ground. Indeed, the day of Chavez's death his vice president/anointed successor was already accusing the United States of giving Chavez his cancer. ¶ Besides that, here's a recipe for creating a political climate that is just itching to believe any wild-ass theory involving a malevolent United States:¶ 1) Pick a country that possesses very high levels of national self-regard. ¶ 2) Make sure that the country's economic performance fails to match expectations.¶ 3) Create political institutions within the country that are semi-authoritarian or authoritarian. ¶ 4) Select a nation with a past history of U.S. interventions in the domestic body politic.¶ 5) Have the United States play a minor supporting role in a recent coup attempt. ¶ 6) Make sure the United States is closely allied with the enduring rival of the country in question.¶ 7) Inculcate a long history of accusations of nutty, American-led conspiracies from the political elite. ¶ 8) Finally, create a political transition in

which the new leader is desperate to appropriate any popular tropes used by the previous leader. ¶ Venezuela is the perfect breeding ground for populist, anti-American conspiracy theories. And once a conspiratorial, anti-American culture is fomented, it sets like concrete. Only genuine political reform in Venezuela will cure it, and I don't expect that anytime soon.

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2NC- Alt Causes

Drug controversies kill relationsCordoba and Munoz 1-11-13 [Jose and Sara, Wall Street Journal, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html]

Another stumbling block to improved relations could be U.S. allegations of high-level involvement by the Chávez government in drug trafficking. The U.S. has put seven top current and former Venezuelan officials on a Treasury blacklist for their alleged drug and arms dealing links to Colombian guerrillas based in Venezuela. Those links were exposed in 2008 after the Colombian military captured computers used by a guerrilla leader killed on a cross border raid in Ecuador.

Alt cause- arms embargo and terrorism disputesSullivan 1-10-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf]

U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of ¶ cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, President Chávez’s sympathetic statements for Colombian ¶ terrorist groups (the

FARC and ELN), and Venezuela’s relations with Cuba and Iran. Since May ¶ 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual determination that Venezuela has not been ¶ “cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms ¶

Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629).143 As a result, the United States has imposed an arms embargo ¶ on Venezuela since 2006, which prohibits all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to ¶ Venezuela. For several years, U.S. officials also expressed concern that Venezuelan citizenship, ¶ identity, and travel documents were easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive ¶ way-station for terrorists. In June 2011 congressional testimony, State Department officials again ¶ expressed concern about “Venezuela’s relations with Iran, its support for the FARC, [and] its ¶ lackluster cooperation on counterterrorism.”144

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2NC- Relations resilient

Tensions don’t kill relations- cooperation is resilientSullivan 1-10-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf]

During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Barack Obama maintained that his Administration ¶ would use principled

bilateral diplomacy to engage with such adversaries in the region as ¶ Venezuela under populist President Hugo Chávez. Nevertheless, tensions continued in U.S.-¶ Venezuelan relations, with President Chávez continuing “to define himself in opposition to the ¶ United States, using incendiary rhetoric to insult the U.S. Government and U.S. influence in Latin ¶ America.”68 While in mid-2009, Ambassadors were returned, in late 2010, the Chávez ¶ government revoked an agreement for U.S. Ambassador-designate Larry Palmer to be posted to ¶ Venezuela. The Obama Administration responded by revoking the diplomatic visa of the ¶ Venezuelan Ambassador to the United

States. Despite tensions in relations, the State Department maintains that the U nited S tates

remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela , focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.

US-Venezuelan oil relations are resilientLevi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the Michael A. Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security at the CFR, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, online]

How much leverage this gives each side is ultimately unclear. Matching refineries to crude supplies is more a matter of relative suitability than of absolute compatibility. Venezuelan crude, for example, can be processed in less sophisticated

refineries than those in the Gulf of Mexico, but the products it yields will be less valuable; similarly, complex U.S. refineries that are built to handle Venezuelan oil can process lighter, sweeter supplies. In each case, though, the shift would be economically painful for the companies involved (precisely how much so is unclear), which is why they tend to prefer the

stable status quo. Scholars of U.S.-Venezuela relations who look at this situation conclude that although both countries would like to diversify away from their dependence on each other, both are too compelled by the economics (including sunk costs) of the current relationship to let a frosty political situation get in the way.12

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AT: Iran influence

Iran is losing Latin American influence now, including VenezuelaAgence France-Presse 3-19-13 [ “Iran's influence 'waning' in Latin America: US general,” http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130319/irans-influence-waning-latin-america-us-general]

Iran is "struggling" to cultivate ties with Latin American countries that are wary of the United States, and Tehran's influence in the region is on the decline, a top US general said Tuesday.¶ "The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the

United States are waning," General John Kelly, head of US Southern Command, told lawmakers.¶ In Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina, Iran has sought to expand diplomatic and economic links to counter international sanctions and to promote anti-

US sentiment, Kelly told the Senate Armed Services Committee.¶ But the bid has only been "marginally successful" and the broader region "has not been receptive to Iranian efforts," the general said.

US action can’t prevent Iranian influenceFernandez 1-11-13 [Yusuf, journalist and the secretary of the Muslim Federation of Spain. He started to work for Radio Prague. He has been editor of several Islamic sites in Spanish and English and is currently editor of the Spanish site of Al Manar, “Why Latin America Will Not Bow to US Pressure over Iran,” http://alethonews.wordpress.com/2013/01/11/why-latin-america-will-not-bow-to-us-pressure-over-iran/]

Therefore, Latin American nations won´t allow the US to dictate their foreign policy on the issue of their relations with Iran or any other country. In fact, Washington has already had a sign of this when it tried to pressure these countries to vote against Palestine´s bid to gain the status of a non-member state at the United Nations. Only one country, Panama, whose government has strong links with the Zionist entity and the local Zionist lobby voted against it.

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AT: US-Iran war

The US dominates Iran’s military- we’d quickly win a warCordesman ’10 [Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Strategic Competition With Iran: The Military Dimension,” 8-13-10, http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/resources/selections/selected-reports-studies/125674-strategic-competition-with-iran-the-military-dimension.html]

It is dangerous to assume that US and Iranian strategic competition must end in war or the large-scale use of force.

Clashes and the sporadic low-level use of violence seem likely and some already have occurred. As the attached briefings show,

however, the US and its allies in the region have a decisive military edge over Iran and are likely to indefinitely retain this superiority into the future. The US has political, diplomatic, economic, and military tools it can use to deter and contain Iran in military terms; and some forms of Iranian gains in diplomatic, economic, and energy efforts would serve both nations’ interests. So would a more stable Iraq, Afghanistan, and Central Asia – as well as a stable Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The US and Iran have already cooperated in some aspects of the Afghan conflict and narrowly defined contentious areas like counternarcotics. They have common interests in dealing with some aspects of counterterrorism.

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AT: Prolif

Prolif is slow and unlikelyHymans ‘12 [Jacques E. C. Hymans, PhD from Harvard, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, his most recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own-and Why Iran's Might, Too,” Foreign Affairs91. 3 (May/Jun 2012): 44-53, Proquest]

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts . But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists , engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies-Iran's political

leaders-to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves. Nuclear dogs that have not barked "Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear tech nology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion . Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb . And only one of the six states that failed-Iraq-had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out

on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years. International security experts have been unable to convincingly explain this remarkable trend. The first and most credible conventional explanation is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt) has prevented a cascade of new nuclear weapons states by creating a system of export controls, technology safeguards, and on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. The npt regime has certainly closed off the most straightforward pathways to the bomb. However, the npt became a formidable obstacle to would-be nuclear states only in the 1990s, when its export-control lists were expanded and Western states finally became serious about enforcing them and when international inspectors started acting less like tourists and more like detectives. Yet the proliferation slowdown started at least 20 years before the system was solidified. So the

npt, useful though it may be, cannot alone account for this phenomenon. A second conventional explanation is that although the NPT regime may not have been very effective, American and Israeli bombs have been. Syria's nascent nuclear effort, for instance, was apparently dealt a major setback by an Israeli air raid on its secret reactor construction site in 2007. But the record of military strikes is mixed. Contrary to the popular myth of the success of Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq, the strike actually spurred Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to move beyond vague intentions and commit strongly to a dedicated nuclear weapons project, which lasted until the 1990-91 Gulf War. Moreover, the bombs that the United States dropped on

Iraq during that conflict mostly missed Saddam's nuclear sites. Finally, some analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons projects become inefficient due to political leaders' flagging levels of commitment. But these analysts are reversing

cause and effect: leaders lose interest when their nuclear programs are not running well. And some nuclear weapons

projects, such as France's, have performed well despite very tepid support from above. The imperfect correlation between the commitment of leaders and the quality of nuclear programs should not be surprising, for although commentators may speak casually of "Mao's bomb" or "Kim Jong Il's bomb," the real work has to be carried out by other people.

No prolif spread- too expensive and countries don’t perceive the benefits Mueller ‘11 [John, professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “'Clocking' Nuclear Weapons” International Relations and Security Network, online]

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It is difficult to see how any country that has possessed nuclear weapons has found them beneficial since World War II. They have supplied little diplomatic advantage , and no nuclear-armed country has discovered an effective use for them in the many wars waged in places like Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, the Falklands, Algeria, Lebanon, Kashmir, Kosovo, Iraq, Grenada, Panama and Hungary. Nor have they been useful in deterring war. Their supposed chief achievement was to prevent World War III during the Cold War, but this notion continues to be undercut with each leak from Soviet archives. Although highly sympathetic to revolutionary and civil war violence, Soviet ideology dismissed direct war against the capitalist world, whether nuclear or not, as stupendously stupid. That is, there was nothing for the nukes to deter. Those who experienced World War II scarcely needed visions of mushroom clouds to realize that it was

imperative to be cautious about major war. The weapons' uselessness also helps to ex plain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear prolifer ation. Dozens of countries have been tech nologically capable of obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so . Although international efforts have often been given credit for this, the chief rea son seems to be that countries considering developing the weapons have found them to be a foolish and wasteful expenditure. Most, like Japan, joined the nonproliferation regime

only after deciding they didn't want the weapons anyway. And some of those that tried to get the weapons even tually gave up in frustration. Thus when Libya's self-important dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, abruptly abandoned his nuclear program in 2003, inspectors found much of his laboriously-acquired material still in its packing boxes. In the last decades, in fact, more countries have abandoned nuclear weapons programs than have taken them up. Although happy to take the bribes offered to them for so doing, none has yet found that abandoning the weapons has been disadvantageous.

NPT solves rapid proliferation- sets strong international framework that bolsters the nuclear tabooVan der Meer ’11 [Sico, Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ and a PhD Candidate at the Erasmus University Rotterdam; his PhD project on nuclear proliferation dynamics is financially supported by the Dutch non-governmental organisation IKV Pax Christi. “Not that bad: Looking back on 65 years of nuclear non-proliferation efforts,” Security and Human Rights 2011, no.1]

Although the NPT has a history of being heavily criticized, it has been very successful in seriously slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons . The treaty is nowadays signed and ratified by all states of the world except three: Israel, India and Pakistan. Moreover, since the existence of the NPT only five states have obtained nuclear weapons . Of these five, three are the non-signatory states of Israel, India and Pakistan, as well as one state that was not a member state at the time of its nuclear weapon production, but later dismantled its nuclear arsenal and joined the NPT : South Africa. The only state that signed the NPT and still acquired nuclear weapons is North Korea,

although serious doubts exist as to the usability of its nuclear weapons.7 The main success of the NPT is in general explained by the norm-setting function of the treaty: because of the broad, almost universal support for the treaty a moral taboo against nuclear weapons has been created, which shapes international and domestic debates about this category of weapons. Violating these international norms will result in severe constraints to any state, such as political, economic and possibly even military reactions .8

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AT: Terrorism

No terror threatWalt ‘12 Stephen M. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "'America the brittle?'" September 10, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/09/inflating_the_terrorist_threat_again

According to yesterday's New York Times, assorted "senior American officials" are upset that adversaries like al Qaeda, the Taliban,

or the Somali pirates are not simply rolling over and dying. Instead, these foes are proving to be "resilient ," "adaptable," and "flexible." These same U.S. officials are also worried that the United States isn't demonstrating the same grit, as supposedly revealed by high military suicide rates, increased reports of PTSD, etc. According to Times reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, these developments¶ "raise concerns that the United States is losing ground in the New Darwinism of security threats, in which an agile enemy evolves in new ways to blunt America's vast technological prowess with clever homemade bombs and anti-American propaganda that helps supply a steady stream of

fighters."¶ Or as Shanker and Schmitt put it (cue the scary music): "Have we become America the brittle?"¶ This sort of pop sociology is not very illuminating , especially when there's no evidence presented to support the various officials' gloomy pronouncements. In fact, the glass looks more than half-full. Let's start by remembering that the Somali pirates and al Qaeda have been doing pretty badly of late. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is down sharply, Osama bin Laden is dead, and his movement's popularity is lower than ever. Whatever silly dreams he might have had about restoring the caliphate have proven to be just hollow

fantasies. And as John Mueller and Mark Stewart showed in an article I linked to a few weeks ago, the actual record of post-9/11 plots against the United States suggests that these supposedly "agile" and "resilient" conspirators are mostly bumbling incompetents. In fact, Lehman Bros. might be the only major world organization that had a worse decade than al Qaeda did.

No terrorism impact – groups are too weak and law enforcement solvesZenko and Cohen 12, (Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, *Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world. Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States'

vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky . Since then , the United States has been preparing for the one percent

chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan

in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization , which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States. According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the

defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults . All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted , owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who

wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

Zero risk of terrorism- their impact is alarmismMueller ’12 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 81–110, Summer 2012)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many

ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because

terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a

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nuclear bomb. In 2005 an FBI report found that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, the Bureau had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States. The report was secret but managed to be leaked. Brian Ross, “Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No ‘True’ Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,” ABC News, March 9, 2005. Fox News reported that the FBI, however, observed that “just because there’s no concrete evidence of sleeper cells now, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.” “FBI Can’t Find Sleeper Cells,” Fox News, March 10, 2005. Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002. 47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48 Few of the

sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000. 49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders. 50 If the miscreants in the American

cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very

close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons —or for that matter biological,

radiological, or chemical ones . In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself

into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones.

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AT: Alliances

No country will ever turn away from US commitment – even if they are tempted, they know they need a superpowerAlterman 11 (Jon, director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program at CSIS, Former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, June 2011, “Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power,” http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_Cohen_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf

Beneath the surface, however, is an appreciation of how much of the region’s security order is a consequence of U.S. action and how little ability any other country or collection of countries has to do anything close to what the U nited S tates does . While there is fear for the future of the U.S. role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the military resources or the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons. Rather than seek to eliminate the U.S. role, regional countries—both friendly and unfriendly—are determined to try to shape it in order to advance their own interests. It is worth pointing out two things at the outset. The first is that much of this is a speculative exercise. Decisions on foreign policy are closely held, with no public consultation, at the highest levels of the Gulf leadership. Those leaders are often mannered when talking with Americans, almost seeming as if they are calibrating their messages to achieve the desired response rather than to give insight into their own thinking. Although it is worth paying attention to words spoken in private, those words need to be supplemented with attention to the actions the leaders take as well as to the parameters of the public debate that they allow to exist. Second, there is a tremendous range of views within the Gulf, not only between Iran, Iraq, and their GCC neighbors, but even within the GCC itself. The United Arab Emirates feels most vulnerable to Iran, for example, while Oman and Qatar seem intent on finding a modus vivendi with Iran. Kuwait feels threatened by everyone in its neighborhood, while Saudi Arabia relies on

U.S. backing in order to seek to lead the neighborhood. For each country, the bilateral relationship with the United States is the most important relation, not least because it protects each country from the predatory actions of its neighbors . Correspondingly, there is no single “Gulf” or “Arab” view of the United States, nor a single view of U.S.

power or U.S. commitment to the region. Even within countries, there seems to be considerable diversity. Where there is unanimity,

however, is in the expectation that the region must have some external guarantor, as it has had since the early sixteenth century.

Alliances are resilientMax Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “America is still the best

guarantor of freedom and prosperity,” 5/31/2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/31/opinion/la-oe-boot-20100531/3

Much nonsense has been written in recent years about the prospects of American decline and the inevitable rise of China. But it was not a declining power that I saw in recent weeks as I jetted from the Middle East to the Far East through two of America's pivotal geographic commands — Central Command and

Pacific Command. The very fact that the entire world is divided up into American military commands is significant. There is no French, Indian or Brazilian equivalent — not yet even a Chinese counterpart . It is simply assumed without much comment that American soldiers will be central players in the affairs of the entire world. It is also taken for granted that a vast network of American bases will stretch from Germany to Japan — more than 700 in all, depending on how you

count. They constitute a virtual American empire of Wal-Mart-style PXs, fast-food restaurants, golf courses and gyms. There is an especially large American presence in the Middle East , one of the world's most crisis-prone regions. For all the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, almost all the states bordering what they call the Arabian Gulf support substantial American bases. These governments are worried about the looming Iranian threat and know that only the United States can offer them protection. They are happy to deal with China, but it would never

occur to a single sultan or sheik that the People's Liberation Army will protect them from Iranian intimidation. In the Far East, a similar dynamic prevails. All of China's neighbors happily trade with it, but all are wary of the Middle Kingdom's pretensions to regional

hegemony. Even Vietnam, a country that handed America its worst military defeat ever, is eager to establish close ties with Washington as a counter to Beijing. What of America's two most important allies in Northeast Asia — South Korea and Japan?

Not long ago, relations with Seoul were frosty because it was pursuing a "sunshine policy" of outreach to North

Korea that the George W. Bush administration (rightly) viewed as one of the world's most dangerous rogue states. More recently, relations with Japan became strained after the election of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2009 on a platform of cozying up

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to China, rethinking the 50-year-old alliance between the U.S. and Japan, and moving U.S. bases out of Okinawa. Now Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has had to undertake an embarrassing U-turn by agreeing to an earlier plan that would move a U.S. Marine Corps air base from one part of Okinawa to another but keep it on the island . In justifying his reversal, Hatoyama said that "we cannot afford to reduce the U.S. military deterrence " because of "political uncertainties remaining in East Asia." There is no shortage of such uncertainties with the Chinese navy becoming increasingly assertive in moving into Japanese waters and with North Korea, which has missiles that can easily hit Japan, sinking a South Korean naval ship with the loss of 46 sailors. The latter incident naturally has focused attention in Seoul and served to accelerate the reaffirmation of close American-Korean ties that had already begun with the election of

the more conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2008. The anti-Americanism that had been prevalent in South Korea only a few years ago has all but disappeared , and it is not only (or even mainly) because of President Obama's vaunted charm. It

is largely because South Korea has tried detente and found that it did nothing to moderate the aggressive behavior of the North Korean regime. China is South Korea's largest trade partner by far, but Beijing shows scant interest in reining in Kim Jong Il. The greatest fear of Chinese leaders is that North Korea will collapse, leading to a horde of refugees moving north and, eventually, the creation an American-allied regime on the Yalu River. Rather than risk this strategic calamity, China continues to prop up the crazy North Korean communists — to the growing consternation of South Koreans, who can never forget that Seoul, a city of 15 million people,

is within range of what the top U.S. commander in South Korea describes as the world's largest concentration of artillery. South Korea knows that only the U.S. offers the deterrence needed to keep a nuclear-armed North Korea in check. That is why the South Koreans, who have one of the world's largest militaries (655,000 activity-duty personnel), are eager to host 28,000 American troops in perpetuity and even to hand over their military forces in wartime to the command of an American four-star general. Under an agreement negotiated during the Bush administration, operational control is due to revert to the South Koreans in 2012, but senior members of the government and military told us they want to push that date back

by a number of years. South Korea's eagerness to continue subordinating its armed forces to American control is the ultimate vote of confidence in American leadership. What other country would the South Koreans possibly entrust with the very core of their national existence? Not China, that's for sure. And yet South Korea is not so unusual in this regard. The Persian Gulf emirates also entrust their continued existence to America's benign power. The Kurds, whom we visited in Irbil, are eager to host an American base, because they know that all of the gains they have made since 1991 have been made possible by American protection. Even Arab Iraqi politicians, who traffic in nationalist slogans while running for office, are quietly talking about renegotiating the accord that

would bring the U.S. troop presence in Iraq down to zero by the end of 2011. They know what Kosovars, Kuwaitis and countless others

have learned over many decades: American power is the world's best guarantor of freedom and prosperity. This isn't to deny the prevalence of anti-Americanism even in the Age of Obama. Nor is it to wish away the real threats to American power — from external challenges ( Iran, China, Islamist terrorists) to, more

worrying, internal weaknesses (rising debt levels, decreasing military spending as a percentage of the federal budget, a shrinking Navy).

But if my cross-global jaunt taught me anything, it is that those countries that dismiss the prospects for continuing American leadership do so at their peril. The U.S. still possesses unprecedented power projection capabilities, and, just as important, it is armed with the goodwill of countless countries that know the U.S. offers protection from local bullies. They may resent us, but they fear their neighbors, and that's the ultimate buttress of our status as the world's sole superpower.

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China Relations Turn

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1NC

Turn- China relations

A. US-China relations are strong nowGresser 3-15-13 [Ed Gresser directs Progressive Economy, a trade and global-economy research programme, at GlobalWorks Foundation in Washington, DC., “Lopsided Sino-US ties,” http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2013/May/opinion_May29.xml&section=opinion]

In tracking the behaviour of each country’s citizens, the US-Chinese relationship looks large, lively and fundamentally healthy. Economic ties continue to grow quickly. Two-way trade has risen from $375 billion in recessionary 2009 to nearly $600 billion last year, and Chinese investment in the US doubled during the last three years.¶

People-to-people ties, though less frequently studied, are rising even faster than the trade figures. Just five years ago, 67,000 Chinese students were enrolled in American colleges and universities. Since then the total has nearly tripled, hitting 194,000 in 2012. Mandarin language classes are spreading through American elementary schools and high schools. Chinese tourist and business arrivals are growing at an astonishing pace, up from 400,000 in 2008 to 1.5 million and likely to reach 4 million — or 10,000 arrivals a day — by 2017.¶ Every day, the relationship is endorsed with thousands of individual votes of confidence from intelligent and well-connected young

people, tourists and business managers. By this calculation, the future of the US-Chinese relationship is good, its problems manageable, and while the two governments may have little reason to love one another, they have even less to fight.

B. Oil investment causes China freakoutLevi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the Michael A. Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security at the CFR, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, online]

What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from

telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In Latin America, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can thus take on a special cast .¶ 3¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms

and technological potential than on the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7¶ Chinese oil companies,

meanwhile, appear to select their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness , with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in

places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.

C. Relations are key to solve every high-magnitude scenarioEcon – Warming – Non-prolif – Terror – Leadership

Cohen ‘09 [William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf]

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The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement . In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world . Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.- China relations will determine the success , or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues . Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries.

Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly

through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges.

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UQ- Relations strong

US-China relations are strongWenzhao 4-18-13 [Tao, China Daily, “A strong and special relationship,” http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-04/18/content_16417551.htm]

Kerry's visit consolidated ties with China and enhanced cooperation amid growing tensions on Korean Peninsula¶ US Secretary of State John Kerry has just concluded his first visit to China since taking office. His trip had three purposes: The first was to establish a working relationship with China's leaders, the second was to establish a strong and special Sino-US relationship, and the third

was to consult with China over the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.¶ While meeting with Chinese leaders - President Xi Jinping,

Premier Li Keqiang, State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi all had in-depth talks with Kerry - both sides agreed to continuously enrich the content of bilateral relations, achieve new breakthroughs in the depth and quality of their cooperation, and expand their common interests.

Relations are upFu 2-19-13 [Mengzi, vice-president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “Balancing cooperation and friction,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-02/19/content_16238224.htm]

There will be significant personnel changes in Obama's cabinet during his second term, the secretary of state, defense

minister, commerce minister and CIA chief have, or will be, changed. If these personnel changes lead to changes in the US' China policy so it

becomes more balanced, it will be a positive development . Certainly John Kerry, an experienced and prudent diplomat, has

a more pragmatic and realistic stance toward China than Hillary Clinton, as he views the US and China as competitors rather than adversaries. Politicians in both countries should acknowledge that cooperation and friction will coexist

for a long time, and they should try to resolve their differences through dialogue to advance their cooperation and development. This is not only important for the future of Sino-US relations but also for a peaceful, stable and prosperous future for the Asia-Pacific region and the whole world.

Their evidence is hype- relations are strong Weihua 1-22-13 [Chen, China Daily, Asia News Network, “An era of great expectations for Sino-US ties,” http://my.news.yahoo.com/era-great-expectations-sino-us-ties-090004088.html]

Washington (China Daily/ANN) - Analysts express optimism over ties as Obama starts new term A president at the beginning

of a second term in the White House is in need of a legacy and expectations are running high for improved relations after US President

Barack Obama was sworn in for another four years. Obama was officially inaugurated at a White House ceremony on Sunday as the US Constitution requires that the president be sworn in by January 20. Leaders of both China and the US have already defined their ties as the most

important relationship of the century. After a bruising presidential campaign, characterised by China bashing by both

political parties, recent months have seen a cooling of rhetoric . When Obama met with Premier Wen Jiabao in November,

the US president described the relationship as "cooperative and constructive". Party chief Xi Jinping told former US president Jimmy Carter last

month that both countries should build a partnership based on respect. Despite media attempts to hype intense

rivalry between the two countries, Jeffrey Bader, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former senior

director for East Asia affairs in Obama's National Security Council, said ties have been quite good . The two leading economies in the world have become each other's second-largest trade partners, with bilateral trade approaching US$500 billion. China is one of the fastest-growing markets for US exports and the biggest market for US farm products. Even Apple CEO Tim Cook predicted a week ago that China will replace the US as the company's largest market. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese students at US colleges and universities has reached a record high of 194,000, a 23 percent increase from a year ago, while the US has embarked on a 100,000-strong initiative to send US students to study in China. The countries have become so interdependent that Larry Summers, the former treasury secretary and economic adviser to Obama, said he could picture a 21st century in which the US and China prosper and he could

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picture a 21st century in which the US and China do not prosper, but he could not picture a 21st century in which one of the two prospered and the other did not. Obama was the first US president to visit China during his first year in office, in 2009, and President Hu Jintao and Vice-

President Xi Jinping both visited the US in the last two years. China and the US have also worked together over the last year

on a host of global issues .

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2NC Link- Plan upsets relations

US and China oil investment is part of economic competition- upsets China’s market accessTania ’12 [Maxime, Master of Science (M.Sc.), International Relations and Affairs from the University of Amsterdam, master’s thesis on China’s energy security in Venezuelan politics, “China’s energy security¶ strategy towards Venezuela,” July 1, http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20-%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20-%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20Sino-Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf]

In furtherance to what is discussed above, it is interesting to illustrate whether the constraints to expanding ¶ the Sino-Venezuelan relations stems from the fact that, both for China and Venezuela, the U.S. is a more ¶ attractive option. With regard to the U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the advantages of geographical proximity ¶ and processing Venezuelan oil in the U.S. has previously been discussed and concludes that, despite ¶ Venezuela´s political friction, doing oil business is quite lucrative. But why is China likely to benefit more ¶ from a benign U.S. than a strategic

partnership with Venezuela? The Sino-U.S. relations are the final factor¶ requiring discussion in order to assess the geopolitical impact that the relationship between China and ¶ Venezuela have on the world. ¶ Some would assess China’s oil diplomacy and its quest for overseas energy resources as a negative ¶ component to its relations with various countries. As China is strengthening its relations with oil-producing ¶ and exporting countries, constituting a great competitor for other countries that rely on oil imports, China is ¶ likely to undermine

their oil security and contravene their policies towards oil-producing countries ¶ (Hongyi, 2007: 530). In scrambling for energy resources, both China and the U.S. as the world’s major ¶ powers want to project their influence on the world’s geopolitical regions. Although Latin America may be ¶ the backyard of the U.S., for both China and the U.S. Latin America is turning into another geopolitical ¶ region. China’s relations with Latin American countries in general and Venezuela in particular, have ¶ primarily emphasized on their economic relations in terms of trade and investments. Along these lines, ¶ China could be reducing U.S.’ opportunity to have trade relations and make investments in the region ¶ instead. The fact that China’s military relations with countries would affect the U.S., could be construed as ¶

an upcoming threat to U.S. national security. Although China’s power projection on the world can ¶ generally be characterized as ‘soft power’,

China is also growing security relations with its international ¶ partners. China claims that its militarization in these countries is a natural

consequence of the need it has to ¶ protect its interests from potential rivals . It is hard to tell whether or not the U.S. should be

keeping a close ¶ eye on this, still, minor threat to preserve its national security. Also, the consolidation of China’s political ¶

relations with U.S. opposing parties, fuels tensions between the U.S. and China whether this is justified or ¶ not.

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Impacts- Warming

Relations are key to solve warmingCohen ‘09 [William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf]

The Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society and the and Pew Center on Global Climate Change launched their Initiative for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate to consider how China and the United States could contribute to managing global climate change. The Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Committee on U.S.China Relations, and the

Environmental Defense Fund also participated. The project specifically seeks to promote U.S.-China cooperation to minimize greenhouse gas emissions by changing how the two countries produce and use energy, especially by reducing the heavy dependence on coal in both states. This report is the first to arise from the initiative. It draws on the insights of many experts, policymakers, and industry and civil society experts in both China and the United States. The report stresses the dangerous implications of global climate change and the urgency for joint action by China and the United States to counter it. Both countries rely heavily on environmentally and

climate-unfriendly coal as a major energy source. Combined, China and the United States contribute to nearly half of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. Unless they jointly adopt cleaner energy practices and become coleaders in transitioning the world to more climate-friendly policies, international progress in curbing global climate change could prove impossible

Warming is anthropogenic and causes extinctionDeibel ‘07 (Terry L. Deibel, professor of IR at National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2”)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in

the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty . Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth

Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming .” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above

show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals , species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees

or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of

Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP.

But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures.

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Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support

system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re

going to het the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between

the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet .

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Impacts- Econ

U.S.-Sino relations solves economic declineCohen ‘09 [William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of American International Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history, “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf]

In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence

of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between the United States and China, Beijing’s newfound ability, owing to its recent economic successes, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less

resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—

the world’s first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China, previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignite simmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States and China more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar–denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world’s largest holder—by far—of U.S. government debt. Former treasury secretary Henry M.

Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances created by this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet, China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion’s share of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s February 23,

2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her call for continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a

means to help both countries, and the world, emerge from global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning around the global economy quickly. Although China’s considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution.

Econ decline causes wars- studies proveRoyal ‘10 (Director of CTR Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008)

advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the

next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin.

1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a

relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link

between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal

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conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic

decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that

economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated . Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and

Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

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AT: Relations resilient

Don’t buy their resiliency arguments- the relationship can still breakHao and Wang ’11 [Yufan Hao, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the University of Macau, Senior Visiting Fellow, Keio University, Global Security Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan (2006 - 2007) Luce Fellow, East Asian Institute, Seoul, South Korea (2005 - 2006), Residential research Fellow at the Institute of International Research, Johns Hopkins University Nanjing University Center for Sino-American Studies, Nanjing, China (fall 2005) and Jianwei Wang, Research Fellow Department of Geological Sciences University of Michigan, “Macau and Us-China Relations,” Google Books]

But China and America still have different interests and values, have not yet established high levels of mutual trust or mutual understanding, and may well be experiencing a significant shift in their relative power . They hold different views on many international issues, even where they share common interests. They are competing for advantage, bilaterally, globally, and regionally. Their relationship should not be assumed to be completely invulnerable to a very serious shock, nor should such a shock - such as a crisis in the Taiwan Strait

or on the Korean Peninsula- be completely ruled out. Even a series of smaller events could exacerbate the mistrust and suspicion that already exists, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the relationship .

Relations aren’t resilient- still room for disasterShobert ’11 [Benjamin A Shobert is the managing director of Teleos Inc (www.teleos-inc.com), a consulting firm dedicated to helping Asian businesses bring innovative technologies into the North American market, “Beijing fails the American test,” 10-20-11, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MJ20Ad02.html] Even outside the recent frustrations over China's indigenous innovation are long-standing unresolved issues related to China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Specifically, the report makes note, "Industrial policies limit market access for non-Chinese companies and in some cases violate the core WTO [World Trade Organization] principle of national treatment." Is this enough to finally upset the apple cart of US-China

relations? Probably not; but what continues to be obvious is that American attitudes from both sides of the aisle, and from both labor and business is changing towards China, and not for the better. While the 2011 CECC report makes

note of some positive trends in the US-China relationship, it is also a reminder that all is not well between the two countries and that much distrust and unease could still threaten a policy of engagement that has been a pillar of the world for several decades.

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Colombia Turn

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1NC

Turn- Colombian FDI

Venezuelan oil investment trades off with Colombian FDIDelgado-Kling 1-29-13 [Paula, MA in International Affairs from Columbia University, “A destabilized Venezuela is good for Colombia’s foreign investment in the oil sector,” http://talkingaboutcolombia.com/2013/01/29/a-destabilized-venezuela-is-good-for-colombias-foreign-investment-in-the-oil-sector/]

People have asked me: why do you write about Venezuela in this blog? — In short: what happens in Venezuela determines, to some degree, the amount of investment in the oil sector in Colombia. A stable (read: a non-Chavez) Venezuela translates into more foreign investment in the oil sector in Venezuela, which means less foreign investment flowing into Colombia’s oil.¶ The turmoils in Venezuela have helped Colombia become the fastest-growing major oil producer in Latin America in the past five years.¶ Hence, it is with that light that Colombia should look at what experts predict for Venezuela now that Vice President Nicolas Maduro is filling in for a sick Chavez, in what may be the end of the Chavez era.¶ Moisés Naím, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the New York Times: Venezuela faces a fiscal deficit approaching 20 percent of the economy, a black market where a U.S. dollar costs four times more than the government-determined exchange rate, one of the world’s highest inflation rates, a swollen number of public sector jobs, debt 10 times larger than it was in 2003, a fragile banking system and the free fall of the state-controlled oil industry, the country’s main source of revenue.¶ Naím added: Mismanagement and lack of investment have decreased oil production.¶ Francisco Toro, a Venezuelan political scientist and a consultant founder of Caracas Chronicles, told the New York Times: Venezuela’s debt has quintupled in 14 years. Time and again spending has been hiked just ahead of elections to give Chavistas an edge. This last one was no exception. … This kind of spending-led “socialim” can’t last. For years, Venezuela has been borrowing at credit-card level interest rates.¶ Michael Shifter, the president of the Inter-American Dialogue and an adjunct professor of Latin American politics at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, told the New York Times: If Chavistas retain power, they should quickly take steps to rein in spending, rebuild relations with Venezuela’s business and professional communities and encourage foreign investment. Revamping PDVSA, the state oil company, should also get high priority.¶ Anita Isaacs, a political science professor at Haverford College, told the New York Times: The prospect of armed conflict in Venezuela is real and should not be underestimated. Should political violence ensue, all bets are off on the Latin American front. Rather than play a productive role in the region Venezuela could arouse regional fears of a destabilizing spillover of violence, becoming instead the target of efforts at containment and peace making.¶ Conclusively:

Venezuela is not creating the ideal conditions suitable for foreign investment, and it is up to Colombia to profit and increase oil production — and that is the reason why the FARC and other groups are attacking the Colombian oil infrastructure in hopes of forcing concessions from the government.

Key to Colombian economic growthValores ’12 [Caiman Valores is a Colombian based independent investment analytics and risk management consultancy specializing in South American stocks and regional economic and risk assessments, “Beat The BRICs: Invest In Colombia, Latin America's Hidden Investment Gem,” March 22, http://seekingalpha.com/article/451881-beat-the-brics-invest-in-colombia-latin-america-s-hidden-investment-gem]

Colombia has been closed to investors for decades, not only due to its once heavily regulated economy but mainly due to ongoing political instability and an unstable internal security environment. It is a country that for many still has a reputation of violence and is associated with being one of the world's most dangerous countries with high rates of kidnapping, terrorism and narco-trafficking, as well as Latin America's

longest running insurgency. Yet despite this it is fast turning into an investment hotspot.¶ In my opinion it is now the hidden investment gem of South America, with the country opening up to tourism, foreign investment and experiencing enviable rates of economic growth. All of which can be attributed to a government that is focused on stabilizing the

internal security situation, reforming the economy, creating optimal conditions for economic growth and encouraging foreign direct

investment ('FDI'). This has seen the economy grow at a staggering rate over the last 10 years, except during the peak of the global financial crisis ('GFC'), the increased growth of an entrepreneurial and educated middle class, growing domestic consumption, the substantial expansion of the local business sector and the solid growth of the local bourse, the Bolsa de Valores de Colombia ('BVC'). In my opinion this can only continue and create further solid opportunities for investors.¶ Colombia has been experiencing solid economic growth since the early 2000s, in fact the Colombian economy has had GDP growth of over 4% annually since 2003, except during the peak of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. For 2011 the International Monetary Fund ('IMF') forecast GDP growth of 4.9%, but in a recent report from José Darío Uribe the governor of Colombia's central bank, the Banco de la Republica Colombia, GDP growth was reported as being between

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5.6% to 6% in 2011. Furthermore in 2011, the Colombian economy saw its greatest quarter of GDP growth since 1979, with third quarter GDP growth of 1.7%, which equates to an annualized rate of 7.7%.

Turns the case- Colombian collapse destroys Latin American stability and democracyWilhelm ‘00 [General Charles E., FDCH, US Marine Corp Commander in Chief, USSC before House Committee on Govm’t Reform Subcommittee on Crim. Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Feb. 15, online]

STRATEGY AND LONG RANGE PLAN TO ASSIST COLOMBIA WITH ITS CD EFFORTS Personal Assessment As I stated earlier, as Colombia's problems spill over into neighboring countries, they threaten the regional stability that is essential to the growth and sustainment of strong democracies and free market economies throughout the region . Drug trafficking is a major contributing factor to Colombia's internal problems.

Democracy solves extinctionDiamond ’95 [Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html]

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate . The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality, accountability,

popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another . They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize

themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring

trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

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UQ- Colombian econ strong

Colombia’s economy is set to growCrowe 5-10-13 [Darcy, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130510-712197.html?mod=googlenews_wsj]

The Colombian economy likely continued to suffer a slowdown in the first quarter, but activity will pick up pace during the rest year, the central bank said Friday in the minutes for its last monetary policy meeting.¶ The central bank cited these projections to explain the unanimous decision last month by the seven-member monetary policy board to leave in check the bank's key

lending rate at 3.25%, a move that was widely expected by the market.¶ In the minutes from that meeting, the central bank showed that it was confident that the cycle of rate cuts during the last few months would be enough to offset the slowdown and steer the economy towards faster growth.¶ Additionally, the government has stepped up its spending plans, a move that the central bank says will help generate faster growth.¶ "The Colombian economy currently is growing below its potential," the central bank said. "The monetary and fiscal policy measures adopted in 2013 will help to place output near the economy's productive capacity and move inflation towards the long‐term target," it added.¶ The Colombian economy grew 4% in 2012, a figure that came in below the 2011 expansion of the country's gross domestic product by 6.6%.

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