7--

Vbl~·2·Ne. I December, 200]

Identified PhasesBroadly speaking, three phases can be identified in the evolution of official developme

assistance (ODA) to Nigeria. They are 1900-1929,1929-1960and 1960to date (Adeniji, 1998:512). In thfirst phases, there was not much consideration given to social and economic expenditure. To start withe economic basis of the administration was very narrow, being confined mainly to the revenues frocustoms duties. Expenditure on administration consumed the bulk of available resources, i.e. almost 5percent of total revenue. Indeed, it was the determination of the British to reduce the cost 0

governance in Nigeria that led to the amalgamation of 1914. A testimony to this assertion can be founin the fact that by 1913, total British grants-in-aid to Northern Nigeria since 1899 amounted to £4 .million, an assistance which the British abhorred. With amalgamation therefore, the resources 0

Southern Nigeria was deployed to partially offset the cost of administering Northern Nigeria (Anjorin,1967:14).

This phase was also associated with Lord Chamberlain's doctrine of investing in the coloniesfor the benefit of Britain. As Chamberlain himself conceived the matter, the best customers of theBritish were in their colonies, and the government had to do its best possible "not to kill the goosetha~lays the golden eggs" (Falola, undated: p.32). While some scholars have commended Chamberlain foriintroducing the doctrine of imperial responsibility, that is, of using money raised in Britain for"development" projects in colonies, subsequent events were to show that his real concern was actuallyto fulfill the colonial objective of developing agriculture for export. Thus the building of the railwayfrom Lagos to the hinterland and the improvement of the Lagos Port, both of which were carried outthrough external loans, had one common motive: to facilitate the movement of goods to the ports foronward transmission to Europe (Ibid., p. 44).

The second phase of the injection of foreign aid into the Nigerian economy provided for grantsor loans from imperial funds to the colonies and protectorate for the purpose of developing agricultureand industry and thereby promoting commerce with the United Kingdom. The background to the 1929Colonial Development Act was not unconnected with the search for solutions to the problems ofdepression in Britain. The Labour Party which assumed power in that year authorized the British

FOREIGN AID AND THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY, 1900-1993:AN ANALYTICALOVERVIEW

eP0lade Adeniji (Ph.D)

I!

I

Introduction: The Foreign Aid TheoryPerhaps a good starting point to this discussion would be to examine the theoretical place

aid in the development process. One of the first people to inquire into the nature and significanceforeign aid was the American, Walt Rostow. In many ways, Rostow can be seen as the bridge betwthe politics and economics of aid, for his economic reasoning was placed within a specific politiideology. Rostow's theory went beyond the explanation of how aid assists development to providejustification for arguing why, in time, it will no longer be necessary. According to him, aid is needonly in the period to "take-off" (Rostow, 1961). Following the foundation laid by Rostow, it was leftothers to spell out in detail how specific and quantifiable amounts of aid would affect this processin what precise manner. In this connection, works of aid theoreticians like Rosenstein-Rodam, Ho -Chenery, Alan Strout, W. Lewis and J.C.H. Fei,must be acknowledged (Riddel, 1987:87).

While these works differed somewhat in detail, and in the degree of analytical rigour wiwhich they were presented, they nevertheless share a substantial common ground: that aid as a tooldirect intervention can, on the basis of certain conditions, help to accelerate a development procalready in progress by raising investment levels "and increasing absorptive capacity such that aftercertain time, aid will no longer be required.

To round up, the theory has it that aid provides capital and makes available know-how antechnology through technical assistance, personnel or private investment. Aid, in other words, allowdeveloping countries to improve their standards of living, build up their infrastructure, creaindustrial sectors and establish social services more quickly than otherwise would be possible for the(Riddel, 1987:88).

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the role of foreign aid in the Nigerian economy sinthe colonial period to the modern times. We commence by identifying the various phases in thdisbursement of aid and proceed to assess its usefulness or otherwise to the Nigerian economy.

Nigerian [oumal of Unity and Development Vol. 2 No.l December, 200312

Foreign Aid and the Nigerian Economy, 1900-1993: An Analytical Overview

government to spend annually a sum of NI million to aid agriculture and industries in the colonies inorder to promote commerce with, and relieve economic depression in the United Kingdom. TheColonial Development Fund of 1929 achieved very little in its eleven years. Its orientation was nottowards welfare. Only an extremely limited amount was provided under the fund. To use the figuresfor 1938-39as an example, the expenditure per head of the population was 4s 8d, an amount too smallto achieve any development of substance (Ibid., p.45).

In 1940, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed. The colonial office had bythen reached the conclusion that the problems facing the colonies would be alleviated only if they wereprovided with increased external assistance. The British government thus undertook to spend N5million annually for ten years on capital and recurrent expenditure, education, health and housing. Butthe achievements of the 1940 Act and the subsequent Ten-Year Plan were very limited. It has beendemonstrated elsewhere* that in spite of the much talked about success of the Act and Plan, in concreteterms, only a few of these projects were ever executed. This is because, being largely a reaction tointense pressure, the 1940 Act was a political move to use minimal economic reforms to calm downagitators, contain the worsening crisis of colonial rule, and give a signal of change. In privatecorrespondence, the colonial office was clear about its intention: to seek the means to achieve"minimum relief required to alleviate distress" and to "ensure quiet and contentment and themaintenance of morale" (Ibid., p. 111). The Act did not foresee a change that would be so radical andprofound as to disrupt the long-standing goal of deriving benefits from the colonies.

In the third phase of our periodization, i.e. post independence period, development assistancetoNigeria has come mostly from the West. It was not until 1963that aid from the eastern bloc began totricklein. During this period, the United States took the lead in the provision of aid assistance. Withina year of the formal launching of the Nigeria's First National Development Plan, the U.S. had obliged[i.e.,to be negotiated for actual expenditure on feasible development projects) the sum of N62.8millionof its $ 225million aid commitment to Nigeria. By 1966,the total of US developmental aid to Nigeriaamounted to $172,615,700. This did not include the cost of assistance through the Peace CorpsVolunteer (peV) programme, nor did it reflect the value of u.S-supported aid to Nigeria by IBRD,IDA,IPAand other international agencies (Ate, 1988:76).

Beside the USA, a fairly substantial amount of aid also came from the EECmember countriesespeciallyBritain, France, West Germany, Italy etc. By1964however, following the threatened collapseof the First National Plan due to delay in the release of committed funds from donor countries, the~igerian government had to embark on a diversification of its sources of foreign aid. It is against thisbackground that one must understand the acceptance, after a long period of vacillation, of about N5millionfinancial assistance predominantly to the education sector, from the Soviet bloc.

Following the end of the Nigerian civil war, the Nigerian economy experienced a boom due tothe rise in crude oil prices at the international market. The ascendancy of economic populism inNigeria from 1970,nurtured by Nigeria's new oil wealth, conferred on the country an unprecedenteddegreeof financial independence vis-a-vis its external economic relations. Thus Nigeria's economic tieswith the major market economy countries were no longer dominated by aid but essentially by trade incrude oil and to a lesser extent, investment linkages (Ibid., p.201). This relative economic boom was to

, last, by and large, till 1981.Due to a combination of factors viz energy conservation policies of the OECDcountries and the

iover-production of crude petroleum by both OPEC and non-OPEC countries, the international oil[marketby the end of 1981experienced a collapse. For Nigeria, the implication of this crash was grave.iThevalue of Nigeria's oil export plummeted from $22.4 billion in 1980 to $16.7 billion in 1981 and to'~bout $14.3 billion in 1982. Thus, GDP recorded a negative growth of -2.633 percent in 1981,whichfurther degenerated to -10.70 percent in 1983. The Balance of Payment position of the country alsoreflected this affliction. In 1981 the deficit was N3 billion; this rose to N3.5 in 1984. The debt servicetio as a percentage of export earnings moved from 8 percent in 1980 to 33.2 percent in 1985. Theuntry's external debt grew in geometric progression; it was Nl.9 billion in 1982 and became N9.1. ion in 1985. Other economic indicators of the economic crises were revealed in the high level ofemployment, low-capacity utilization (less than 25 percent) and high inflationary pressure (Falae,

992:221).In desperation (and also due to some external prodding) the Nigerian government in July, 1986

troduced the Structural Adjustment Progamme which it hoped would restructure and diversify theoductive base of the economy, lay the basis for sustainable non-inflationary growth, lessen the

Nigerian Journal of Unity and Development Vol. 2 No. 1December, 200313

, 'l~h#f!,h.,;Jii'"

Abolade Adeniji (Ph.D) "-:\

,dominance of the public sector and tap the growth potential of the private sector and achieve sonusemblance of fiscal and balance of payment viability. While this may not have been publidjpronounced, there is no doubt that at the bottom of these polides lay government's hope that a faithfupursuance of these objectives would fadlitate an inflow of Foreign Direct Investment and an enhanceddegree of foreign aid. After all, the above prescriptions were those of the Bretton Woods InstitutionsOn the whole, it soon became clear that the SAP strategy was not the needed panacea.

An overview of the foregoing discussion of the periodization of external assistance to thlNigerian economy reveals that up till date, the score sheet of the exercise has ranged from moderansuccess to a woeful failure. We shall return to this later.

A common feature of development assistance in Nigeria particularly during the colonial periosis the fact that while the British pretended to be aiding the process of economic development iJNigeria, more funds was instead leaving the country through various guise. During the period of thl1929 Colonial Development Act, for example, the British colonial authorities injected through grannand loans the sum of £300,000 (three hundred thousand Pounds) into the Nigerian economy over a tenyear period. In return, the sum of 4.5mil1ion left the economy at the same time. In the same vein, durirqimplementation of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act the Nigerian economy witnessed i

massive capital flight through the activities of the marketing boards. Curiously enough, this pattenhas continued well after independence. As Bade Onimode forcefully demonstrated, between 1970 arv:I1983, capital outflow from the Nigerian economy systematically exceeded capital inflow (Onimode1989:256).

Table 1Total Annual Inflow and Outflow of Foreign Receipts 1970-1983

Year Outflow Inflow Net Flow1970 644.0 592.8 +51.21971 1,038.4 913.6 +124.81972 1,1964 1,23492 -37.81973 2,236.4 1,468.3 +768.11974 5,312.6 2,185.5 +3,127.11975 5,419.3 5,517.3 -26.01976 6,580.6 6,901.2 -320.61977 7,742.9 8,281.1 -538.21978 7,607.3 8,990.9 -1,383.61979 8,664.0 8,664.0 +1,794.11980 11,805.2 11,805.2 +2,450.01981 14,567.3 14,567.3 -2993.11982 10,963.0 10,963.0 -1,461.0 j

:1983 8,364.0 8,521.0 -157.0

Total Net Flow = 1,2220.0. Source:(i) "The Relevance of Foreign Exchange Control in Nigeria's Balance of Payment" by 111

Anifowose, Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Finandal Review, Vo1.2. No. 3, Septembe1983, r.n.

(ii) Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1983, Table 91, p.117.

VVhatVVentVVrong?At this stage, it is pertinent to seek an explanation as to why foreign aid has not had the desire

positive impact on Nigeria's GDP, contrary to what our theoretical predisposition earlier suggesterWe have already noted the limited nature of aid, especially during the colonial era. We have also notethat more capital has left and have continued to leave the country than is coming in.

Under the First National Development Plan, Nigeria obtained aid promises amounting to SOIT

two-thirds of the targeted N327 million. These potential resources were not truly available to finarudevelopment activity until a project negotiation had been carried out, that is, aid offers had been linketo spedfic projects in the Plan. Typically, donors preferred providing support for infrastructu:projects with long gestation lags. This was probably because of the prestige assodated with SUI

projects and the diplomatic publidty they bring to donors. Another possible reason for this preferen

Nigerian Journal of Unity and Development Vol. 2 No. 1 December, 200314

Foreign Aid and the Nigerian Economy, 1900-1993: An Analytical Overview

may be the desire for donors to avoid competing with private capital (a large proportion of which comefrom donor countries) in non-infrastructural investment (Edordu, 1973:49). This concentration oninfrastructural investment which had to be matched with large domestic funds from the governmentlimited the government's ability to undertake other projects and biased the overall structure ofinvestment against directly productive activity in favour of social overheads. This bias towardsinfrastructure may have contributed to the negative impact of aid on output since there is usually a lagbetween investment in these activities and the flow of returns from them. Indeed, in the early years,returns might be negative. This characteristic of aid operation in Nigeria suggests that aid may havedelayed the pace of economic development in the sense that it diverts investment to long-gestationprojects.

A major factor that determines aid performance results from donors is using aid to further theirown economic interest. As noted earlier, the most common way that donor self-interest is achieved isthrough aid-tying stipulating that the aid provided is used to purchase goods or services originating inthe donor country Galee, 1968:39). Although no specific study has been carried out to determine howfar tying provisions influenced the value of aid in Nigeria, studies of other countries suggest that tyingprovisions greatly limit the value of aid. A study of Pakistan's experience by Mahbub Ul Haq (Ibid.,Helleniner, 1967) showed that the average cost of twenty development projects was 51 percent higherfrom tied sources than would have been the case if competitive international bids had been applied.Haq estimated that the increase in the price of Pakistani procurement as a result of tying provisionsaveraged 20 percent. The Pakistani experience further revealed that even an interest-free loan may bequite costly, if as a result of tying, the loan is used to acquire equipment, which is twice as expensive asit needs to be. The real value of the loan is only half the nominal sum, but the redpient has to repay thefull value. From the redpients' viewpoint, this amounts to paying twice the borrowed sum - animplicit interest rate of 100 percent. Against the background of Haq's study, it is plausible to surmisethat the widespread tying of aid in Nigeria probably means that aid projects would have been undulyexpensive and on the balance, left only negative net effect on the economy (Aseniji, 1998:429).

A third broad feature of official development assistance, which also contributed to its lack of2:fectiveness in Nigeria, is the slow pace of disbursement of offers which arose from protracted=--egotiationsand complex administrative requirements of some donors. An UNTAD estimate puts~verall disbursement during the First National Plan period at about 28 percent of the planned target·,..:-:,rrAD,1985). Oearly, this slow pace of disbursement of aid resources, in contrast to its planned<e, is more likely to have retarded than stimulated the growth of output, particularly when finance'..~ a critical bottleneck to development. There were several other consequences of slow disbursement.:=:: ~ example, given that some financial aid go along with technical assistance, slow disbursement=---=-.astautomatically translate into low technical assistance - a particularly needed resource in view of.: ~ shortage of executive capacity.

Another consequence of slow disbursement, particularly under the First National Plan, was the.:..:..·.--c:sionof resources to non-priority sectors, that is administration and to some extent, transportation.-~t7?ian placed substantial emphasis on directly productive activity, some of which were to be foreign;;:~-ci (Dean, 1972: pp.147-148). However, the slow disbursement of aid offers limited the pace of:'·.2~..:.jonof these activities because "projects once started can no longer attract foreign aid, as a rule"'::.:.=:-iu, op. at: 51). The result was the diversion of some domestic resources to non-priority sectors,T>ti--'..-.Lilrlyadministration, which were believed to expand recurrent spending in subsequent years.-E~=S5 of potential technical assistance as well as the distortion of development plans (both derived:rr:,= ~i operation) no doubt contributed to the poor impact of aid on Nigeria's development.

As has been argued elsewhere, low disbursement rate cannot validly be regarded as evidenceir 17.•.•.· =.'='sorptivecapacity. In Nigeria, a more plausible explanation for the slow rate of disbursement

::lE: .: ::-.2 real, rather than the professed objectives of several donors. As former Secretary of State,~~~.::...-':2r Haig, implied in his evidence to the 1981 Foreign Relations Committee, humanitarianC;:;;'::?""";5 while important in the disbursement of aid, should be considered only in the context of~f~-::- ::-..=.tionalinterest. In his words,

Deoelopment assistance provides the United States with other opportunities to:'1fluence economic, social and political change abroad. We remain committed to a5:-rong development assistance program as an integral element toward our

Nigerian Journal o/Unity and Development Vol. 2 No. 1 December, 200315

r.

The implication of the above is instructive: more attention is given-to strategic consideration at texpense of humanitarianism in the disbursement of aid.

The employment of subtle devices by donors to ensure the achievement of specific goalstheir aid programmes was not restricted to the United States. For example, West German aid also hadcomplex character arising from ideological, political as well as commercial considerations. This wtypified for instance by the Eko Bridge project which took some eleven years to accomplish. The WGerman government undertook to finance the bridge in 1960, following preliminary technical survey'1958. It took three years to complete feasibility studies and reach agreements on technical conditionsthe loan. The loan agreement was signed in September 1964. Tendering and contract award took plin 1965. The bridge was finally completed in 1969, an overall period of eleven years. During the 10delays, the cost of the bridge was more than doubled. The estimated cost in 1967 was £4.7 million bby 1967 it had risen to £10.6 million (Dean, op. cit: 174).

The United Kingdom, another important donor in post-colonial Nigeria, also had its own shof complex procedure of aid administration. The usual injunction to recipients of Western aidencourage private investment also operates at the background of U'K, aid programme. Here, as inU.5., the true aim is not altruism. Furthermore, a substantial fraction of what were regarded as U.K. .to Nigeria - particularly in the early 1960s - were received in the form of compensation payme(under special list schemes) to colonial civil servants who left Nigeria on the eve of her independe(Edordu, op. cit: 56).

As for Soviet bloc aid, it had in addition to its sparsity, the objectionable character of being nocompressible because no donor in this block was ready to provide funds to finance a project joinwith another donor. This means that an important condition for attracting Soviet bloc aid would hainvolved a large number of specific projects, which individual donors could support. This was cert .not feasible because, aid being in general limited to the provision of off-shore component of projewould have required the mobilization of large counterpart resources completely out of tuneNigeria's capacity. The non-compressible character of Soviet block aid was probably one of the reasowhy the USSR aid offer of 40 million roubles in 1967 was not utilized. Here, as in the Western BIothe non-compressible character of aid is borne out of the desire of the donor to influence the naturethe development of the recipient. It should be stressed here that as part of their aid philosophy,Russians claim two important distinctions from Western donors. First, that they were not colo .exploiters and so were not under any obligation to make restitution for past wrongs; they pullthemselves up by their own "bootstraps" and believed developing countries should do the sa(Arnold, 1987:169). The approach conveniently allows the USSR to give comparatively little in termsits own GNP. Needless to say, all communist aid is tied to the purchase of goods and services fromdonor country. Besides, much Soviet aid is capital intensive, so that a project requires a relatively hiinput of spare part maintenance which must also be supplied by the donor.

With the adoption of SAP, following insistence of the Western powers, the NigeriGovernment, between 1988 and 1990, made extra effort to either secure or retain the goodwill ofleading donor nations. Thus it agreed to embark on significant reversal of the Indigenization Decree1972, 1974 and 1997. It further agreed to embark on considerable privatization of the economy; freaching liberalization of international trade; crippling devaluation of the exchange rate of the N .and debt rescheduling rather than debt cancellation as a policy goal (Edordu, op. cit.:47). When du .the First Gulf war the allied forces, especially Britain and the U.S., indicated their dissatisfactionrefusal to contribute to the allied forces, the Nigeria Foreign Minister and President, offered publielaborate explanations that virtually amounted to apology, especially when the allies dropped the .that they might withhold certain economic concessions to the country (Adeniji, 2003:16).

From the foregoing, it is clear that one feature common to almost all aid programmesNigeria was the attempt to use complex devices, ranging from grinding and strange administratiprocedures to overt economic coercion, to achieve donor's objectives. These devices generally maaid projects notoriously slow and, as Aboyade pointed out, this was the case with "most developmprojects financed by external aid" (Aboyade, 1971:4). The consequence of the long delays (designeddonors to force compliance with their wishes) for the Nigerian economy was the disruption of linkabetween mutually inter-dependent projects in the National Development Plan, as well as

Abolade Adeniji (Ph.D) .

international security objectives. U.S. foreign polic;y interests should guide ourallocation offoreign aid (emphasis mine). (Black,1968:p.18)

l Nigerian' Journal of UnIty and Development Vol. 2 No. 1December, 200316

on at the

goals ofGO had e-:his was~eWes:,JrVey iri.tions 0:

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Foreign Aid and the Nigerian Economy, 1900-1993: An Analytical Overview

disillusionment of domestic initiative, and these were "sufficiently strong ... to make nonsense ofgeneral equilibrium planning based on crucial analysis of time sequences and projects structured inter-dependent". It is thus plausible to expect that the cumulative effect of micro and macro-economicfeatures of aid operation in Nigeria would be the discouragement of GDP growth.

Some analysts have argued that a fair assessment of the impact of foreign economic assistanceshould not be limited to the attainment of narrow goals (such as the contribution to the GDP). To thoseanalysts, the influence of foreign economic assistance on other social objectives, such as employment,should be taken into consideration. Even if this were done in the Nigerian context, it is hardly likely to.ead to a reversal of the conclusion that aid has made no effective contribution to the tempo of Nigeria'sievelopment. For example, it has been estimated that foreign public capital is on average employed in:crojects with 62 percent capital content. This suggests reasonably high capital intensity and therefore.ne could infer that foreign aid had limited employment effect.

The inescapable conclusion therefore is that foreign assistance, on balance, retarded the pace of:":'1edevelopment of the Nigerian economy mainly because of the desire of donor countries to use':..."1istertechniques to achieve aims which were inconsistent with the goal of Nigeria's development~~licy. As Guy Arnold (1987:165) puts it, "Governments use aid as an instrument of policy; they do not; C,2 it as a means of changing North-South relations". The experience with foreign aid during the First:=.tional Development Plan probably motivated General Gowon's declaration at the launching of the

~",:ondNational Development Plan. According to him:

We shall welcome external financial assistance for the National Reconstruction andDevelopment Plan as a whole. But we would like to serve notice to all those who canassist our development effort that we shall welcome only the external assistance that canbe promptly utilized in the appropriate phases of the reconstruction programme,Assistance in the form of programme support or general commodity loan will be morevaluable than the protracted and endless negotiations over industrial project as in thepast. (Adeniji, 1998: 435).

._~.2ugh this declaration was rewarded with some programme support for the Second National~c,2:opment Plan, this did not remove permanently the objectionable features of foreign aid earlier=.>: .Jghted.

::::.clusionWhat have we learned thus far? We have learned that, especially in the colonial era, any claim

.: ~extension of economic development assistance to Nigeria by the British colonial masters must be>:~~iwith laughable scorn; for more resources left the country than was coming in. We have also..=--:,,:,':: that in the disbursement of aid to Nigeria, donors, mostly made up of the leading Western. ~: ~~.s.used aid as a means of furthering their ideological agenda and severely eroded the sovereignty

.: c :\igeria state. We have also learned that the slow disbursement of aid resources helped in no:-~ -";ay to frustrate the very goal of aid itself. On the whole, we have seen that foreign aid has not,<,. ::2 desired effect of acting as a catalyst for the development process in Nigeria. The policyt: - _::;:::on is very instructive: self-reliance is the only means by which Nigeria can seriously hope to- :-' ~-.2 shackles of poverty and underdevelopment. It is dear that no amount of foreign aid injected

.: ~ Nigerian economy can change the socio-economic life of the country if the people of the.--=::: are lacking in the attributes of self-reliance.

•. "'::~ O. (1971): "Nigeria and U.s. Aid: Some Reflections," Nigerian Opinion. Vo1.7.No.2 .~,-:-- A.O. (1998): itA study of Some Aspects of Official Development Assistance to Nigeria, 1900-

~?93: A Socio-Economic and Political Analysis". Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, UNILAG.=- epartment of History, September.

-::.-- ::A .. (2003): "Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Experience" OOU. Journal of=-:::toryand Diplomatic Studies Vol. 1No. 1.

' .••.'. ::,"', (1971): "Nigeria-Soviet Aid Relations 1960-1968". Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs. Vol. I,,--.:~ary.

'C1111' =: ~..O. (1967): "Background to the Amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914". ODU: Journal of West. "-.:an Studies. VoU No. 2 January.

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Arnold, G. (1985): Aid and the Third World. London: Robert Royce.Ate, B. (1988): "Power and Necessity in Nigeria - US Relations Since 1960" In Adindele RA. and

B. (eds) Nigeria's Economic Relations with the Major Developed Market Economy Countries. 11985, NILA. .~..

Black, L.D. (1968): The Strategy of Foreign Aid. Toronto: Van Nostrand.Chenery, Hand Strout, A.M.(1966): "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development" The A

Economic Review, Vol. WI, September.Colonial Development act, 1929Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940.Common Wealth Secretariat, London (1971):Flow of Intra-Commonwealth Aid 1969.Dean, E.R (1972): Plan Implementation In Nigeria, Ibadan: OUP.Edordu.C, (1973): "Foreign Economic Aid and Nigeria's Economic Development". Unpublished

Thesis submitted to the Department of Economics, University of Lagos.Falae, O.C (1992): "Two years of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria: Achievements, Problems

Prospects". Social Transformation for Self Reliance: Proceedings of a National Conference. IbFountain.

Falola, T. (UNDATED): Prelude to the Take-off Development Planning in Colonial Nigeria, 1940-60.Manuscript.

Fei, J.C and Pauw (1965): "Foreign Assistance and Self- Help: A Reappraisal of Development FinReview of Economics and Statistics Vol. 47, August. House of common Debates, Series 4Vol. 642.

Lewis, W. (1984): "The State of Development Theory". The American Economic Review. Vol. 74 NMarch.

Onimode, B. (1989): "Options for Nigeria's Economic Reconstruction" in U. Joy Ogwu and OmOlaniyan (eds) Nigeria's International Economic Relations, NILA.

Riddel, RC (1987): Foreign Aid Reconsidered. London: ODr John Hopkins University Press, Bal .and James Currey. !

Rosenstein-Rodam, P.N. (1961): "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries" in Revi~Economics and Statistics. Vol. 43 No. 2, May.

Rostow, W. (1961): The Stages of Economic Growth London, Cambridge University Press.UNCTAD (1985): "Foreign Trade Plans of Selected Countries in Africa" UNCTAD DOe: E/c..

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Abolade Adeniii (Ph.D)