ueryday Life. Oxford:

Formal Ethicsif Valuesersity Press. 'r, and theEmotions::y Press.'heory: Essayson Mind,ress.ansformation ofl:BasilBlackwell.sek Philosophy and .LueraJ!ure..

ibridge: MIT Press.ook at Metaphor."

r the Theory ifSocial Behaviour 2 I :4852.5°

__ ~"'AC' of Positioning

HARRE AND LUK VAN LANGENHOVE

I. INTRODUCTION

CO]llCt:Pl of positioning can be used as a dynamic alternative to the more'c concept of role. Talking of positions instead of roles fits within theework of an emerging body of new ideas about the ontology of socialomena. Hence before embarking upon a detailed presentation of theept of positioning, a few words have to be said about this new ontologicaldigm within the social sciences.though there have always been many epistemological differences amongst

al scientists, there does seem to be a relative ontological consensus aboutt the relevant social entities are that make up the subject matters of theal sciences, the 'substances' of the social world, so to speak. In the standardlogy, three different levels of societal phenomena are usually considered:Ie,institutions and societies. People tend to be treated as complex, causallyacting 'things'; institutions as groupings ofpeople (the personnel or staff);societies as higher order aggregates of people groups. As thing like

stances each ofthem can be located in the Newtonian-Euclidian space/timeofthe natural world.just like natural entities and phenomena. This seems

obvious that it hardly receives any attention. However, by locating socialenomena within a natural world locations grid, the door is opened for the.IIoticed transposing ofproperties ofthe natural world to the social realm. As ault, the social realm is all too often pictured as one in which causes areterministic in a Humean sense and in which space and time are independent.e Humean aspects of the social sciences have in recent years been muchticized (e.g. Harre and Secord, 1972 and Manicas, 1987) and severalempts to formulate alternative ways oftheorizing and researching have been

394 Rom Harre and Luk van Langenhove

undertaken (e.g. ethnomethodology, ethogenics, structurationon ... ). In most cases however, the Newtonian and Euclidian sp.ace:/tirrif'has been left unquestioned as the framework in which social phenomenabe considered. This is however not as obvious as it seems to be at first glancecourse, social phenomena are always located in a timet space grid but thisnot necessarily have to imply that this is also the most adequate referentialin which to study them, particularly when questions about the individu~

and identity of social entities and phenomena are raised. The complexflinking material thing, property and process to places and momentliNewtonian space/time may not be transferable to the social world. Besides,e\Tin the natural sciences that referential grid is no longer considered to be the tidpossible one: both on a cosmological and quantum physical scale the timspace grid has proved to be inadequate and other grids have been constructedwhich the independence ofphysical space from time vanishes. In Harre (lg8it is argued that the time/space grid is equally inadequate for locating aunderstanding social phenomena. As an alternative the persons/conversati6referential grid is proposed to go along with a reassessment of assumpti6about the 'substance' of social and psychological realities. If social acincluding speech acts are taken as the 'matter' ofsocial reality, a new grid canconstructed in which people are seen as locations for social acts. As a 'spac~',

set of possible and actual locations, the array of persons is not necess~#l

Euclidian. The grid of temporal locations, the time-aspect of human life,achanges. The distinction between past, present and future does not go OY.neatly into psychological time partly because the social and psychological pis not fixed. The social future can influence the social past. The occurrencesacts are the moments ofsocial time.

Within such a persons/acts referential grid, the social realm can be picmreas composed of three basic processes: conversations, institutional practices anthe uses ofsocietal rhetorics; all forms ofdiscursive practice. Conversationsarthe most basic substance of the social realm. It is within conversations that tsocial world is created, just as causality linked things with propertiesconstitute the natural world. Within conversations, social acts and societal icoare generated and reproduced. This is achieved by two discursive proceswhich we propose to call POSITIONING and RHETORICAL REDESCRIPTION.l'K~

latter can be understood as the discursive construction of stories aboinstitutions and macrosocial events that make them intelligible as societal iC9(Harre, 1975). The former will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Nothat the elements of the standard ontology (people, institutions and societican be understood within the new ontology in terms of both positioning ~

rhetorical redescription.The idea of psychology as the study of discursive practices is the cent.

intuition in the methodological background to the argument of this papeMany, ifnot most mental phenomena are produced discursively. By this wed

mean that discursive''';oteDlce. Many mental pnthe relevant discursiveund in the writings of

veniste: "It is in andbject, because language

Benveniste, quoted in:hilosophy ofpsychology,

psychological states is bas,what fulfills them meet in

The concepts of 'positiontheirorigins in the field ofstrategies that allow one(Ries & Trout, 1981). Thiinthat sense a posi tion is athe social sciences, the cointroduced by Hollway (Iin the area of heterosexudiscourses, Hollway spok"Discourses make availabin relation to other peopwomen and men are plawhich a particular discoiusageof these concepts is

Within the persons/cordiscursive constructionintelligible and relativel:members ofthe conversatlocation or 'position' is, \\instantly recognized andnot immediately intelligilperson mean by that?), ;1990 ) .

A position in a converseto which a person's 'rcompendiously collectedpowerful or powerless,definitive or tentative an'how a speaker's contribi

ructuration theol Euclidian space/ti1 social phenomell~ems to be at first glanet space grid butthst adequate referenrlns about the individraised. The compl~x

) places and mom~

e social world. Besides:er considered to be tIlm physical scale theidshave been construe]e vanishes. In Har£(Iiadequate for locatill'e the persons/conversaeassessment of assump.al realities. If social:ial reality, a new gridc~Dr social acts. As a 'spac~f persons is not necessa.ie-aspect of human life,.nd future does not goocial and psychological:ial past. The occurrell

social realm can be pictuIS, institutional practices~ practice. Conversationsvithin conversations thad:l things with propertiesi, social acts and societal iCDby two discursive proc

rORICAL REDESCRIPTION.

instruction of stories abom intelligible as societal ice following paragraphs.ile, institutions anderms of both pOl;iti,onin~

rrsive practices is thethe argument of this

zeddiscursively. By this

Varieties oj Positioning 395

that discursive activities cause mental phenomena to come intoMany mental phenomena, like attitudes or emotions, are immanent

he relevant discursive activities themselves. Something of this idea can bed in the writings of Bakhtin (1986). It is explicit in the work of E.veniste: "It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a

bject, because language ~lone establishes the concept of~ego' in ~e~lity ..."envenis

te,quoted in: SIlverman, 1983). Much of Wlttgenstem s (1953)

losophy of psychology, particularly his treatment offuture or other directedchological states is based on his thought that, for example, expectations and

at fulfills them meet in language.

2. MODES OF POSITIONING

e concepts of 'position' and 'positioning' that we want to introduce haveeirorigins in the field of marketing where a position refers to communicationrategies that allow one to 'place' a certain product amongst its competitors

ies& Trout, 1981). This usage is close to the military meaning ofa 'position':that sense a position is always taken against the position of the enemy. Within

thesocial sciences, the concepts of 'position' and 'positioning' have been firstilltroduced by Hollway (1984) in her analysis of the construction of subjectivityin the area of heterosexual relations. Focussing on gender differentiation indiscourses, Hollway spoke of 'positioning oneself and 'taking up positions':"Discoursesmake available positions for subjects to take up. These positions arein relation to other people. Like the subject and object of a sentence (...),vomen and men are placed in relation to each other through the meanings\'lhich a particular discourse makes available" (Hollway, 1984, p. 23

6). Our

sageof these concepts is in line with how Hollway used them.Within the persons/conversations grid, positioning can be understood as the

discursive construction of personal stories that make a person's actionsintelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which themembersof the conversation have specific locations.]ust what a conversationallocation or 'position' is, will be explained below. While some social actions areinstantly recognized and accepted as determinate acts, other actions are eithernotimmediately intelligible or their status as acts is questionable (what did theperson mean by that?), and may even be radically indeterminate (Tannen,

1990 ) .Aposition in a conversation then is a metaphorical concept through referenceto which a person's 'moral' and personal attributes as a speaker arecompendiously collected. One can position oneself or be positioned as e.g.powerful or powerless, confident or apologetic, dominant or submissive,definitive or tentative and so on. A "position" can be specified by reference tohow a speaker's contributions are hearable with respect to these and other

396 Rom HarreandLuk vanLangenhove

polarities of character, and sometimes even of role. Positioned asone's cry of pain is hearable as a plea for help. But positioned as uo:mUlansimilar cry can be heard as a protest or even as a reprimand. It can easuv ho

that illocutionary force and position mutually determine oneConversations have story-lines and the positions people take in a COIIV{~rS<lti'"

will be linked to these story-lines. Someone can be seen as acting like a lea.Cll'erithe way his/her talk takes on a familiar form: the story-line ofinstruction,goings-on in the classroom. Living out in one's speech and actions onepedagogical story-lines involves adopting such and such a position, andsame time it makes one's sayings and doings relatively determinate asof instruction, correction, reprimand, congratulation and so on.

Thus in positioning, selves are located in conversations "as observablysubjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story-lines" (DaviesHarre, 1990). The structure of such conversations is tri-polar itpositions, story-lines and relatively determinate speech acts. Several anal"ticaldistinctions can be introduced regarding positioning which together willthe possible forms in which positioning can occur as a discursive practice.

a. First andsecond order positioning

The most basic distinction is that between first and second order pOl;itil::min~.

First order positioning refers to the way persons locate themselves andwithin an essentially moral space by using several categories and story-lines.instance, ifJones says to Smith: "Please, iron my shirts", then both SmithJones are positioned by that utterance. Jones as somebody who has theright (or as someone who thinks he has the moral right) to command Smith,Smith as someone who can be commanded by Jones. When such a positioningoccurs, two things can happen. Smith can indeed do Jones' ironing (in that caseSmith is perhaps Jones' servant) and the story-line will evolve withoutquestioning of the positioning. E.g., Smith can continue the conversationsaying: "Yes of course, which one do you need immediately?" But Smithalso object to what J ones said and answer something like "Why shouldYOUR ironing? I'm not your maid". We can imagine that in this case Smithinstance Jones's wife. At this moment a second order positioningwhich the first order positioning is questioned and has to be negotiated.will have to make a case why he - who always pays lip-service to fenlinisml--+wants his wife to do his ironing. The story-line then will shift from itssubject to the story itself In other words, second order positioning occursthe first order positioning is not taken for granted by one ofthe persons involvedin the discussion. Note that it is an essential feature of rituals that secondpositioning is impossible. Ifone tries to impose a second order positioningritual, then the person trying to do so will be said to "break" the ritual.

A somewhat sirperformative anposition themseljthus made deter!

order or I

revISIlJn, it can t

vosinonings cancase discuss

conver:,ation. Boboth involve taaccountive posit:

outside 1

vos:itiomng. Sudinvolve other peinstance, Jones cSmith concerniipositioned as a rOfcourse, in telliagain involved istory about the:theevent. Jones 1

c. Moralandpets

People can be pcsocial actions. Itgiven moral ordiintelligible and tto make his bed,weknow that Srorder positioninjheasked her to cfrom moral to P'can no longer reistory that accouroles. Such a stcE.g.: "I am sorrjust received thi:morally, they caparticularities. ~

ofrole. Positioned asclelp. But positioned as do, a reprimand. It can easilrtually determine one­ions people take in a con~

.n be seen as acting like a tgthe story-line ofinstructio

ae's speech and actions 0

ch and such a position, alldatively determinate asso~

atulation and so on.conversations "as observabproduced story-lines" (Da\Tiersations is tri-polar it cOIlSlate speech acts. Several anal.itioning which together willoccur as a discursive practic

first and second order positirsons locate themselves and 0

veral categories and story-linn my shirts", then both Smies as somebody who has the.oral right) to command Smithby]ones. When such a positideed do]ones' ironing (in thastory-line will evolve withoucan continue the conversati

reed immediately?" But Smit!isomething like "Why should

imagine that in this case Smith,iiecond order positioning OCC1.1led and has to be negotiated.vays pays lip-service to feminis.line then will shift from its oricond order positioning occursanted by one of the persons invI feature of ri tuals that secondJose a second order positioninbe said to "break" the ritual.

Varieties ofPositioning 397

erformative andaccountive positioning

mewhat similar though not identical distinction is the one betweenormative and accountive positioning. In first order positioning people

ition themselves and others within an on-going and lived story-line. The actss made determinate have immediate perlocutionary effect. As this is unlikend order or reflexive positioning when such acts are subject to challenge or

ision, it can therefore also be called performative positioning. First order~itioningscan be questioned in two ways: either within the conversation (as in~. case discussed above) or within another conversation about the firstIlversation. Both cases can be seen as forms of accountive positioning as theyth involve talk about talk. Second order positioning thus amounts tocountive positioning within an ongoing discussion. Ifaccountive positioningcurs outside the initial discussion, then this can be called third ordersitioning. Such third order positioning can, but does not necessarily have to,volveother persons than the ones performing in the original discussion. Fortance,]ones can talk to Adams about the conversation he had with his wife

rnith concerning the ironing. A story is then created in which Smith isositioned as a radical feminist because she would not even do]ones' ironing.fcourse, in telling that story and replying to it, both]ones and Adams are also

gain involved in first order positioning of themselves. And what is more, thetory about the ironing-conversation will also be a rhetorical redescription ofeevent.]ones will not reiterate to Adams all that was said by him and his wife.

Moral andpersonal positioning

eoplecan be positioned with regard to the moral orders in which they performcial actions. It is often sufficient to refer to the roles people occupy within a

ivenmoral order or to certain institutional aspects of social life to make actionshtelligible and to understand the positions that people take. IfSmith asks]onest()make his bed, then this first order positioning can be perfectly understood ifve know that Smith is a patient and]ones a nurse. But if we consider a second

orderpositioning in which Smith asks]ones why she has not made his bed yet asheasked her to do, then the story-line between Smith and]ones is likely to shiftfrom moral to personal positioning. In order to answer Smith's question, Jones

n no longer reply by referring to her role as a nurse. She will have to bring in aory that accounts for the 'deviance' ofwhat was expected from her in terms ofles. Such a story is likely to contain references to individual particularities.

~.g.: "I am sorry I forgot to make your bed, but I am a bit confused today as I'ust received this letter in which ...". Thus, people can not only be positioned

orally, they can also be positioned in terms of their individual properties andlarticlilarities. Such personal positioning can range from rather general, using

398 Rom HarreandLuk van Langenhove

very broad categories (e.g. "Jones is a nice nurse"), to very detailedseveral elements of the person's characteristics including the ute-histo-t

brought in (e.g.: "I once had an incredible nurse who was actually the daugof. .."). When people are positioned or position themselves, this will ai\include both a moral and a personal positioning. The more a person's atticannot be made intelligible by references to roles, the more prominent

personal positioning will be.

d. Self andother positioning

Positioning is a discursive practice. As already indicated above, withiconversation each of the participants always positions the other \Vsimultaneously positioning him or herself. Whenever somebody positions hherself, this discursive act always implies a positioning of the one whoaddressed. And similarly, when somebody positions somebody else, that alw<l.implies a positioning of the person him/herself. In any discursive practipositioning constitutes the Self and the others in certain ways and at the sa.time it is a resource through which all persons involved can negotiate

positions.

e. Tacit andintentional positioning

Most first order positioning will be of a tacit kind: the people involvedposition themselves or others in an intentional or even conscious way. But whea person is acting in a 'machiavellian' way, or on occasions where (s)he is lyior teasing, the first order positioning can be intentional. E.g. Smith can sayJones "Iron my shirt", not because he really needs a clean shirt but in orderdemonstrate or test his dominance ofJones. Second and third order positionirimust always be intentional. But while an intentional second order positioning']

going on, a tacit first order positioning will have occurred as well.The above analytical discussions allow us to distinguish between three typic

kinds of positioning talk. First, there are the discursive practices in which peopposition themselves, position others and are positioned by them. This kindtalk comprises first order acts of positioning, mostly of a tacit nature. SuSperformative positioning talk takes place within an evolving story-line. .Tperlocutionary effects ofsuch talk include constraints on and openings for kiofillocutionary acts available to speakers as so and so positioned. This folIodirectly since a position is just a set of 'locations' on a variety of polar pairs

moral attributes.

Sf'conoly, there are the dirst kind become a topic orbout, the on-going story-li

IUm by someone else's discu:positioning. The perlocutioblock or accept the perlocuiWe could call the discursiv.ctsare accomplished secor

Thirdly, there are discurtopic the first or second onpractice than the current (practice, namely that of w

first and second order. It midrawingthe attention of Sploftheir habitual discursiveconfined to the writing pra,aswhensomeone spells outcertain remark was patron

3- SITUAT

positioning always takes Fspeaking. What Jones canrights, duties and obligatiprocess occurs. In otherpositioningare unequallyan intentional positioningpositioningrelates to mora

remaining part of this pappossible moral order contebe identified relative tosituations of deliberate sel(iii) situations of deliberapositioning of others. Thproducts of the performatinsection I (see table I).discussed below. Of coursmerely analytic and thpositioning occur simultafocus on one pregnant as]

se"), to very detailed; including the:who was actuallyon themselves, this wiIg. The more a nPror,n','

roles, the more PfiDIliliIlI

ady indicated above,ays positions theenever somebody pClsitiorlspositioning of the

itions somebody else,self In any discursivein certain ways and at

ons involved can negotiate

cind: the people involvedl or even conscious way.r on occasions where (s)heintentional. E.g. Smithneeds a clean shirt but in.econd and third orderntional second order positioniilave occurred as well.odistinguish between threeliscursive practices in which: positioned by them. ThisIg, mostly of a tacitvithin an evolving otr,nT_I11np.

nstraints on and openings; so and so positioned.tions' on a variety ofpolar

Varieties ofPositioning 399

~prnnal'{, there are the discursive practices in which acts of positioning of thebecome a topic or target. Such positioning-talk occurs within, but is

t the on-going story-line. Thus for someone to refuse a positioning laid onby someone else's discursive practices is to act relative to that original act of

sitioning. The perlocutionary effect of such accountive practices is to delete,ckor accept the perlocutionary effect of discursive practices ofthe first type.~could can the discursive practices by which these second order positioning

are accomplished second order practices.hirdly, there are discursive practices in which the positioning-talk has as a

ic the first or second order positioning that occurred in another discursiveactice than the current one. This paper is itself the product of a discursiveactice, namely that of writing about discursive positioning practices of thest and second order. It might have all sorts ofperlocutionary effects, includingawingthe attention ofspeakers to the nature ofwhat they have said, the effecttheir habitual discursive practices etc. Such third order accountive talk is notnfined to the writing practices ofsociolinguists. It also occurs in everyday life,whensomeone spells out what that interlocutor has said. An accusation that artain remark was patronizing would be a case in point.

g. SITUATIONS FOR LNTENTIONAL POSITIONING

ositioning always takes place within the context of a specific moral order ofeaking. What Jones can say to Smith and about Smith is relative to Jones'ghts, duties and obligations within the moral order in which the discursiverocess occurs. In other words, the rights for self-positioning and other­sitioning are unequally distributed and not all situations allow for or call forintentional positioning ~f the participants. The subtle way in which tacit

sitioning relates to moralities is discussed in Davies and Harre (1990). In theternaining part of this paper, we will focus on intentional positioning. Across allpossible moral order contexts, four distinct forms of intentional positioning canbe identified relative to the discursive situations in which they occur: (i)

tuations of deliberate self-positioning; (ii) situations offorced self-positioning,ii) situations of deliberate positioning of others and (iv) situations of forcedsitioning of others. These four types of positioning can be understood asoducts of the perforrnative/accountive and self/other dimensions introducedsection I (see table I). Each of these types of intentional positioning will be

uscussed below. Ofcourse it should be noted that again these distinctions areanalytic and that whenever positioning occurs, several forms of

lositio:niulg occur simultaneously. In the discussion below, we will each timeon one pregnant aspect of positioning talk.