VARIATION, SHIFTING AND IDENTITY IN ARABIC

Dialectologia19(2017),1-21.ISSN:2013-2247

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Received8September2015.

Accepted19December2015.

VARIATION,SHIFTINGANDIDENTITYINARABIC

HassanR.ABDEL-JAWAD

SultanQaboosUniversity(TheSultanateofOman)*∗

[email protected]

Abstract

Thispaperexaminesdifferentideologicalandidentityconstructionfunctionsoflinguisticvariation

and shifting in Arabic through the analysis of the existing literature on language, politics and national

identity, arguing that linguistic variation and shifting may be used for constructing/reconstructing,

locating/relocatingand/orshifting/abandoningidentity,anddivided/splitidentity.Afewmajorcaseswill

be surveyed to exemplify this. It is shown that variation and/or shifting in Arabicmay reflect different

levels of sociopolitical, ethnic, sectarian, and religious grouping/ divisions. In such contexts, language

and/orvarietiesoflanguageserveasmarkersofidentityandasboundary-settersbetweengroups.

Keywords

variation,shifting,identity,boundarysetting,nationalism

VARIACIÓN,CAMBIOYIDENTITADENÁRABE

Resumen

Este artículo examina diferentes funciones ideológicas y de construcción de la identidad de la

variación lingüística y de cambio en árabe a través del análisis de la bibliografía existente sobre el

lenguaje,lapolíticaylaidentidadnacional,argumentandoquelavariaciónlingüísticayelcambiopueden

ser utilizados para construir/reconstruir, localizar/relocalizar y/o cambiar/abandonar la identidad, y

dividir/escindir la identidad.Seencuestaránalgunoscasos importantesseencuestaránparaejemplificar

lo citado. Se demuestra que la variación y/o el cambio en árabe pueden reflejar diferentes niveles de

agrupaciones/divisionessociopolíticas,étnicas,sectariasyreligiosas.Entalescontextos,lalenguay/olas

variedadeslingüísticassirvencomomarcadoresdeidentidadycomocreadoresdefronterasentregrupos.

∗*DepartmentofEnglish,CollegeofArtsandSocialScience,SultanQaboosUniversity(SQU),Al-Khoudh,PC132,TheSultanateofOman.

©Universitat de Barcelona

H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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Palabrasclave

variación,cambio,identidad,creacióndefronteras,nacionalismo

1.Introduction

VariationstudiesofArabichavefrequentlyfocusedtheirattentiononstudyingthe

correlationbetweenlanguagevariationandthetraditionalsocio-economic,culturaland

stylisticvariables suchasage, sex,education,background,etc. In suchcasesusuallya

quantitativeanalysisofcollecteddataisperformedtoestablishthesecorrelations.Then

the results show patterns of sociolinguistic tendencies in the distribution of the

observedvariation.There isnodoubtthatsuchaprocess is thefirstandfundamental

step in discovering these patterns of variation in the linguistic behavior of speakers.

Without this it will be subjective and impressionistic to make any subsequent

conclusions or generalizations or to give any explanations. Having said this, we can

proceed to say that in explaining the findings, some form of qualitative analysis is

deemednecessarytoidentifythefactorsof,orforcesbehindthesedifferentpatternsof

observed variation, e.g. ideological, political, social, and cultural, etc. Accordingly, the

objective of this paper is to survey previous studies of variation in Arabic to offer a

qualitative analysis of the significance, meaning, and function of this variation, with

specialreferencetothefunctionoflocatingidentity.

Furthermore, this geographic area (the Arab world) has its own special

characteristics,where the political scene intersectswith the religious, cultural, social,

ethnic, andnational andall ofwhichexhibit themselves in the linguistic situationand

behaviorasourfriendYasirSuleiman(2006)referstothis inhischapter“Chartingthe

nation:Arabicandthepoliticsofidentity”.Thisareaisdifferentinthatpolitical,social,

religious,ethnic,andsectarianissues/classifications/demarcationsareimportantissues

astheyaredeepseatedintheconsciousnessandawarenessoftheindividualsaswellas

groups.Theyarespecialastheycausealotofpolarizationandpluralization.

In most, if not all Arab countries, the ruling powers starting from the imperial

colonizing ones to the regimes that took over from the colonizers carrying the same



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policyoftheirmasters:themainpolicybeing“dividetorule”andthustheyhavebeen

encouraging/fosteringthesedivisionsandsplitsandalltypesofconflictwhichareagain

linguistically realized in different ways. This has given rise to a set of terms such as

?iqliimiyya ‘regionalism’, jihawiyyia ‘localism’, Ta?ifiyya ‘sectarianism’, 3unSuriyya

‘racism’, 3ilmaaniyya ‘liberalism/secularism vs salafi/religious/theological’; pan-Arab

nationalism (Arab nation or Al watan Al-Arabi or al-Umma al-Arabiyya) vs State

nationalism(Omani,Egyptian,Jordanian,etc.).

Thishasoftengivenrisefromtimetotimetodifferenttypesofmovements,such

as the call for the use of 3aammiyya (colloquial Arabic) rather than FusHa (standard

Arabic). Two clear cases can bementioned here: in the fisrt half of the 20th century

therewasEgyptianNationalMovement:callingforEgyptianizationoflanguageandone

inLebanoncallingforLebanonizationoflanguage.

Within the samestate:politicaldivisionsandconflictsareoccasionallyprovoked

causing differences, including linguistic signs, e.g. in Jordan: Jordanian vs. Palestinian.

And in Oman Zanzibaris vs. Native Omanis (Arabs). The linguistic boundaries in such

cases often coincide with political/power relations. Within the same community one

mayfinddividedtowns,villages,bordertownsordifferentreligionsgroupsand/orsects.

Insomecases,thesedividedtownsorregionsmayeither:

a. belong to two different political systems: Iskenderun (between Turkey and

Syria)orthecaseofmanyPalestinianvillageswheretheso-calledtrucelinein1948cut

them in the middle, thus dividing them into an Eastern part belonging to

Palestine/Arabs and a western part belonging to Israel; e.g. Jerusalem and Bart’a,

amongmany.

or

b. are divided between two or more different Arab countries; e.g. Rafah

betweenPalestineandEgypt,alburaimi/al3ain betweenUAEandOman…whereeach

oneadherestothevarietiesintheirrespectivecountries.

Theoverlapping cycles of identitymaydiffer in order: pan-Arabism, nationalism

withitstwoormoredimensions(thelocal/regionalvsthePan-Arab),religious,localism,

whichmakesitdifficulttoestablishthelinguisticboundariesastheyoftenoverlap.For

instance, there is both an overlap and a conflict between the so-called “Wider


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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nationalismpan-Arabism”(alqawmiyya),andthenarrowernationalismreferringtothe

specific countries: Egyptian nationalism, Jordanian nationalism, etc. which require

different symbols of identity such as a national anthem, flag, currency, etc. Yet each

state considers itself as part of al?umma il 3arabiyya (Arab Umma), alwaTan alarbi

(ArabNation),and/oral?ummail?islamiyya(IslamicUmma).

Inthecasestobepresentedinthispaper, it ishopedtoshowthecomplexroles

linguistic/languagevariationplays in the formationof theoverlapping,conflicting,and

sometimesdividedidentitiesandloyaltiesamongitsspeakersintheArabworld.

Quite recently, there has been an emphasis on the role of identity with its

different types indetermining languageuse, variationand shifting (cf. Suleiman1994,

1996, 2004, 2006). Language with its different varieties has been used by groups to

identifywithonepolitical,social,ethnic,religious,national,etc.grouporanother.Itisa

common practice that Arab speakers use language features from several language

varieties in the same discourse in order to gain authority by tapping into specific

languageideologies(Stadlbauer2010:8).Thispaperexaminesdifferentideologicaland

identityconstructionfunctionsof linguisticvariationthroughadetailedanalysisof the

existing literature on language politics and national identity, arguing that linguistic

variation may be used for integration/disintegration, identity re-

construction/reconstruction, locating/relocating and/or shifting/losing identity, and

divided/splitidentitytogetherwiththedifferentoverlappingcyclesofidentity(national,

ethnic, religious, social, tribal, sectarian, etc.). Beside my own analysis, this study is

based on several individual studies done independently around the wide theme of

language and identity (see bibliography for a list of these studies). In the following

sections, patterns of variation and/or shifting corresponding to different forms of

identityformationwillbepresented.

2.Caseone:Diglossicvariation

Aside from the contextual domain distribution of the two polar varieties of

DiglossicArabicasoutlinedbyFerguson1959,andshowninmanysubsequentstudies

(Schmidt1974; Sallam1980;Husein1980;Abdel-Jawad1981; Ibrahim1986;Al-Khatib



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1988;Haeri1996;Habib2008,2010,2011tomentionjustasample),theuseofthese

varietiesmay also be determined by the patterns of identity and ideologies speakers

desire to associatewith each “Speakers use language features from several language

varieties in the same discourse in order to gain authority by tapping into specific

language ideologies” (Stadlbauer 2010: 8). In this regard,Holt (1996) states that “the

selectiveuseof languagefeaturesfromdifferentvarietiessignalsasmuch information

as thepropositional contentof themessage: choosing features fromonevarietyover

another is a significant marker indexing the position of the speaker in society, their

knowledgeofpoliticalandreligiousvalues,ortheiraspirationforsocialmobility.Arabic

isseenasanobviousandinevitablechoice[…]as it isthe languageoftheHolyQuran

andalltheArabStateshaveaMuslimandArabMajority”(Holt1996:11).

Howevereachofthetwopolarvarietiesstandsfordifferentsetsofvalues:

a)Hvarietyservesasaneutral,corrective/referenceandpan-Arabunifyingmodel,

aimingtotranscendtheboundariesof individualnation-states,whileatthesametime

standsforconflictingdrives:Religious,political,national,orethnic,whichdeterminethe

direction of change, patterns of variation and/or conflict. This is consistent with

“Standard Lang. Ideology” (Lipi-Green1997)which refers to a cluster of beliefs about

thevalueoflinguistichomogeneity.Holt(1996:11)writesthat“itisIslamwhosesacred

languagehasretaineditsoriginalformandstillbecomeanationalandofficiallanguage”.

Similarly, Haeri (2003: 43) states that this H “socializes people into rituals of Islam,

affirmstheiridentityasMuslimsandconnectsthemtotherealmofpurity,morality,and

God”andthereforeattributesofthisvarietyareequatedwiththemoralvirtuesofthe

user.

Furthermore,HisTriballyneutral.InaTRIBALArabworld,wherethetribeisavery

strongsocialandpoliticalunit,thisHvarietyhasbeenneutralanduniversalandhasno

associationwithtribesortribalviewpoints.Somembershiptoitisopentoallequally.

SoArabiccarries“notribalconnotations”(Holt1996:13).

b) Diachronically speaking, SA is neutral as it is not based on any of the local

dialectsthus itstandsatequaldistancefromallArabs.Holt (1996:21)arguesthat“In

theArabworldonecouldarguethatallareequallydistantfromthestandardandthat

on-onethereforebenefitsfromalinguisticadvantage”.


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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Holt (1996),Haeri (2003)Suleiman (2004)andStadlbauer (2010),amongothers,

haveshownthatideologicalforcesgaverisetolinguisticconflictswhichreflectidentity

conflicts,suchas:

Religious conservatives, who are often referred to as “purists”, argue for the

purity, supremacyandsacrednessofHvarietyand thereforecall for themaintenance

anduseofthisvarietyasasymbolofMuslimArabhistory,morality,andidentityasan

MuslimUmma(Nation).

In contrast, pan-Arab nationalists call for a reformed modified modern and

(religiously neutral) formoftheHvarietyofArabicasaunitedArabiclanguage,widely

referred to asModern Standard Arabic (MSA) to be the neutral unifying force of all

Arabic-speakingpeople in theArabworldofallbackgrounds, religiousdenominations,

andaffiliations.

Furthermore,modernists at this era of IT and globalization, tend to advocate

increasinguseofEnglishinmanysocialdomainsinordertoconnecttotheinternational

community.TheybelievethattheHvarietyisacarrieroftraditionandreligiousmorals

buthasnotbeenable to reflect scientificandeconomicprogresssoEnglishhas tobe

usedassymboliccapitallinktothe“prosperity”andmodernityoftheWest(Stadlbauer

2010).

At theotherextreme, stand theNationalists (statenationalism)whocall for the

useofnationalformsofArabicfordifferentArabcountriesthustheyseemaspromoting

separatism.Twoclearcaseswereactiveinthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury:oneinEgypt

(Egyptian National Movement: Egyptinization of language) and one in Lebanon.

(LebaneseChristianideas:Lebanonizationoflanguage).

c)Powermaintenance:Furthermore,SAhasoftenbeenusedbytheolderformsof

power represented in the ruling families to maintain their power. Holt (1996: 20)

explainsthatsuchfamilieshaveseen“it intheir intereststoappealtothemassesina

languagewithgreatsymbolic functionandwhichgives themgreater legitimacy rather

thanpromotingavernacularpopulism”.Tothem,“theemotionalandsymbolicappeal

of religion would be more successful than appealing to the masses on the basis of

nationality” (Holt 1996: 20) which may be served by upgrading local varieties into

standard ones. This is evident in recent years and events as major political parties,



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especially religious-oriented ones, promote the use of standard not as a national

language but a pan-language with wider appeal where religious affiliation is seen as

moreappropriatethattribalorlocal/nationalaffiliation.

d)Prestige:All inall,SAhasanovertprestigewhilethenon-standardoneshave

covertprestige.

e)Religiousvs.political:ItisinterestingtonoteherethatSAcanstandforatleast

twomajorvalues/drives…:Religiousandpolitical.Ifseenfromareligiouspointofview,

itisacceptablebyallArabsandnon-Arabsandevenminorities/ethnicgroupswithinthe

ArabcountriesacceptitasamarkerofMuslimidentity(asinthecaseofKurds,Berbers,

etc.).However,whenitisseenasapoliticalsymbolasmarkerofnational(Arabidentity)

soitisusedastheofficiallanguageinthesecountries,thenitislookedatlikeanyother

languageandisresistedsoKurdscallfortheuseoftheirnativelanguageastheofficial

oneintheirareasandsodotheBerbers,etc.(processofinclusionvs.exclusion).

StandardArabic(H)hasservedanationalfunctionduringcolonization.Holt(1996:

17) writes that “the symbolic function of written Arabic and developing it along

nationalist lines during the nahda…”. It was a symbol of identity in the face of

COLONIZATION…asareactionanddefensestrategy.

f) On the other hand, all the L (non-standard) varieties stand for local, regional

blocs,sub-national,andstatevaluesandidentities.Atthestatelevel,eachcountrysees

itselfasanationstatehavingwhatmaybe referred toasSub-nationalvarieties:Each

countryhasitsownformof“ARABIC”(thoughit includesmanydifferentdialects),e.g.

Omani, Jordanian, Egyptian or Tunisian etc. Arabic. These are not geographical but

territorial, political and therefore territorial Identitymarkers. Linguistically, theremay

beanoverlapand similarityamong them,e.g.northernareas in Jordanare similar to

thoseinthesouthernpartsofSyria,NorthernPalestinianisclosertosouthernLebanon

thanitistoJerusalemone…buttheyarereferredtoasJordanian,Palestinian,Syrian,or

LebaneseArabic.SAisnotusuallyusedforlocal/regionalidentificationbecauseithasno

native speakers as it is seen as a pan-Arab variety. It is interesting to add that even

namesofsuchcountriesmayindicatethekindofidentitytheydesiretoemphasize.E.g.

SyrianArabRepublic,KingdomofSaudiArabia,orHashemiteKingdomof Jordan,This


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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divisioncanbeataregionalgeographiclevel(blocs)asintheGulf(Gulfcouncilcountries

vs.non-Gulforal-itti7aadalmagharibi(Magrhribi(western)union).

An examination the names given to countries, papers and other entities in the

Arabworld shows these tendencies to relocate identity.Egyptwascalled, ‘theUnited

Arab Republic’ during Naser’s period to refer to a larger Arab entity but it was later

changedto‘EgyptArabRepublic’limitingittoanarrowerdomain,indicatingdeparting

the unity dream. Similarly, the terms and names of newspapers, media, etc. are

symbolicand indicateawiderscopeof identification:al-sharqal-awsatPaper (Middle

East Paper),Al-Quds al-Arabipaper (Arab Jerusalempaper), The voice ofArabs (radio

EgyptduringNaser’speriod),Al-Jazeerachannel,andsoon.

Inconclusion,IwouldliketociteHolt(1996)whomaintainsthatthe

linguistic identity in the Arab world is divided between 2 forms which are

both independentof identitywiththestate…..Fushawithallwhat itstandsfor...

pan-Arabidentityand3ammiyya,althoughpossessingavitalityanddynamismnot

echoedinFusha,leadstoanidentitywhichrunsdeepandisregionallybased,and

yetpoliticallyandhistoricallymarginalized(Holt1996:23).

Shiftingfromonevarietytotheotherservesthesedifferentidentitiesandvalues.

ShiftingtoSAisashifttoformalityanddistancewhileashifttonon-standardvarietyisa

shift to informality, solidarity, in-group membership: sub-national vs. national

(pan)culture. This seems to echo Labov (1966) who maintains that the use of non-

standardfeaturesiscontrolledbythenormsofvernacularsubculture,whilsttheuseof

standardfeaturesiscontrolledbytheovertnormsofthemainstreamcultureinsociety.

3.Casetwo:dividedloyalty-politicaldislocation

Language is politically significant and is often used as a tool of penetration,

participating, legitimacy, identity construction, and integration. Politically divided

communitiessuchasthecaseofmanyboundarytowns:e.g.severalPalestiniantowns

(Barta3a),Buraimi/Ala3ainbetweenOmanandUAE,Rafah(EgyptandGaza)mayexhibit



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this political division linguistically. Such political boundaries may set the linguistic

boundarieswithinthesamecommunity:

a)Rafahwhichwasoriginallyonetownisnowdividedpolitically:theEasternside

iswithGazawhiletheWesternsideiswithEgypt.Thispoliticaldivisionseemstoreflect

linguisticallywhere in theEasternpartspeakers tendtousea localPalestinianvariety

while in theWestern side they speak an Egyptian variety and often adopt a regional

Egyptianvarietyastheirsocialstandard.

b)Alburaimi isanOmanibordertownsharingafront linewith itscorresponding

UAEtownofAl3ainwhichwereoriginallyone townwith thesame families.However,

theOmanisinAlburaimibelieve(atleastpsychologically)thattheyuseaOmanivariety

tomark themselvesasOmanis,whileon theUAE side, speakers tend toadoptaUAE

variety to identify themselves as UAE. However, in case of social identification, the

OmanisinAlburaimitendtoadoptlinguisticfeaturesfromAl3ainvarietyastheybelieve

thatitismoresociallyprestigious.

c)Thethirdcase(ThecaseofBarta3a)deservesmoreattentionasitsetsamore

relevantexample

InasociolinguisticstudyofthesituationinadividedPalestinianVillage(Barta’a),

(Amara& Spolsky 1996) presented evidence of a “growing double identity” reflecting

socioeconomic,politicalandreligiousfactors.

Barta3aisaPalestinianvillagewhichwasdividedfollowingthe1948Israelitaking

over of Palestine where they set the border line in the middle of the village, thus

dividing it into theWesternpart, annexed to Israel, andEasternpart, annexed to the

West Bank of Jordan at the time. Accordingly, the two parts started developing

economically, socially, politically and probably linguistically differently: one reflecting

theIsraelisystemwhiletheothertheJordanianArabsystem.Whatdeepenedthesplitis

thetotalpoliticalblockadewhereinhabitantsofthetwoparts,inmanycasesmembers

ofdivided families,wherenotallowedanycontactofany sortand theywerebanned

fromestablishinganylinksunderlegalpunishment,i.e.therehadbeengeographicand

familialproximitybuttotalseparationandchangeofdirections.In1967,followingthe6-

daywar,theWestBankfellunderIsraelioccupation.Theofficialboundarybetweenthe


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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twopartswasremovedandmemberswereallowedtoreunite.Yet, thetwopartsare

stillundertwodifferentjurisdictions.

d)Questionstoberaisedhere:

-Whatistheimpactofdividingthevillagefor20years?

-What is the impact of reunifying the village after the removal of the official

boundary?

Does this result in the removalof social andpolitical divisionsbetween the two

halvesofthevillageandsothe“linguisticfrontier”resultingfromparallelsocial,political

andculturaldifferences”continuesbetweenthem.

What is the impact of rising political, religious, etc. movements such as the

Intifada, feelingofabandonment,changingofattitudeswith theresurgenceof Islamic

movements.

e)Howdoesthisreflectlinguistically?DothePoliticalandeconomicdislocation

resultinLinguisticvariation?

Accordingto(Amara&Spolsky1996)thereseemstobeanumberofProcessesOF

IDENTITYatwork:

Israelization: associated with modernization, urbanization and official authority.

AretheArabsinIsraelundergoingaprocessofIsraelization?(integratingornot).

Palestinianization: associated with the local, national, and cultural values and

heritage:dotheystillidentifywithPalestinians(Palestinianization?).

Islamization: associated with religious values and the resurgence of Islamic

movements.Accordingly, a third trendof identity is competingwith the first two: i.e.

Islamization.

Alienation/exclusion:recently,therehasbeenchanginginpoliticalattitudesand

intentionswheretherehavebeencallstomaintain“aPureJewishState”thusexcluding

allothers,includingNativePalestineArabswhostartrethinkingtheirpoliticalidentities.

Change of attitudes and alternating identities: Attitudes after 1967, and after

Intifadas,theWesternpart,likeallPalestinianswestofthegreenline,werelookedatas

moremodern,richer,andhavemoremovementfreedomastheyareconsideredIsraeli

citizens who have freedom of movement unlike West Bank Palestinians who have

alwaysbeenunderseveremobilityrestrictions.



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It was found that linguistic features distinguish each part of the village: lexical

variationasmanylexicalitemshavebeenborrowedfromHebrewinthewesternpartof

thevillage.Aswellastheexternallinguisticinfluencesmayshapethelocalvernaculars

ofthetwoparts:(Arabic,English,and/orHebrew?).Amara&Spolsky(1996) identifya

largeamountoflinguisticvariationbetweenthetwohalves.

f)FortheWesternpartArabicisthenationalnativelanguagebutisnotthemajor

officialonesinceHebrewis.BothArabicandHebrewareformallytaughtinschoolsand

areinformallyusedindailyinteraction.Hebrewbeingasecondlanguagewherealmost

everyonespeaks,readsandwritesHebrew.

g)IntheEasternpart,ArabicistheonlyofficialandformallanguagewithEnglish

taught as a foreign language… but Hebrew was rarely taught or spoken pre1967.

However after 1967, Hebrew stared to be used informally (spoken) by a growing

numberoflaborers,prisonersandthosewhoworkwithgovt.officeswhohavebecome

fluentinspeakingHebrew.

Theauthorshighlightedseveralidentitiesbyposingthefollowingquestiontotheir

informants:Howdoyoudefineyourself,i.e.whoareyouintermsof:

• Tribal(Hamula)

• Villagers(Rural)

• Palestinian(national)

• Israeli(political)

• Arab(pan-Arabic)

• Muslim(religious)

Accordingly,theyestablishedthefollowingtrends:olderpeople,esp.bornbefore

1967,showstrongernationalArabism(pan-Arab),butthePalestinianidentitybecomes

stronger after 1967 (also following the separation from Jordan andmore specifically

following the disengagement in 1987 and the establishment of the Palestinian

authority)… so in the light of the developing political factors, a lot of locating and

dislocatingidentitieshavetakenplace…DisappointmentwiththeArabsinrecentyears

has ledtorethinkingofPan-Arabism.Whenonegroupfeelsabandoned,marginalized,

threatened, likePalestinians inGazatheytendtoturnofftheiralliancewiththeother


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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groups. Nowadays the Islamic identity is growing, esp. in light of seeing thatMuslim

countries like Iran and Turkey support them more than the Arabs… Following their

disappointmentwiththeirArabcompatriotsandthesecularPLOleadershiptheyshifted

towardsIslamicmovements…

Conclusion: Political changes lead to changing of identities and loyalties…

Sociolinguisticvariation(micro)mayoftenreflectthis.Theseidentitiesintersect:which

comes first andwhy?Changing identities dependingonpolitical andmaybe religious

associations/considerations.

4.Casethree:In-groupvs.out-group

Local/internal Dialects may be in conflict: the case of Palestinian Vs. Jordanian

groups in Jordanwhich shows that “language serves as amarker of identity and as a

boundary-setter between the in-group (ourselves) and the out-group (others)”

(Suleiman2004:7).

There is always “Interaction between language and national/ethnic identity in

situationsof intra-and intergroupconflict” (Suleiman2004:8). InJordan, like inmany

othercommunities,therearepatternsofvariationotherthandiglossic:i.e.Jordanianvs.

Palestinianlinguisticmarkers.

ThreeprinciplesgovernthispatternaccordingtoSuleiman(2004):

First, “the power-language relationship is an important aspect of ideological

contestation, and of identity assertion and negotiation in inter-and-intra-group

interaction”(p.13).

Second,languageisamarkerofidentity”(p.13).

Third, bothoneand twooperate at the communicative and symbolic levels” (p.

14).

WhatistheInteractionbetweenlinguisticchoicesandpoliticalevents/situations?

Language situation in Jordan is closely related to the political situation and

politicaldivision:acaseofethno-politicalsituation.

Linguisticdivision/boundariesrepresentgroupdivisions:togofromonegroupto

anotheryouhavetocrossovertheselinguisticboundariessovariationorshiftinghere



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indicatesdividedpoliticalloyalty…(considersomePalestinianfamiliesresidinginJordan

earlyinthe20thcenturyandhowtheyseethemselvesasJordaniansorPalestiniansand

howthisismarkedlinguistically).

This showshowconflict in theMiddleEast (whether internal, regional,or...) can

alterthelinguisticmapofacountryandthedynamicsofthesociopoliticalevaluation…

Powerandconflictareimportantfactors inshapingthelinguisticsituation(same

patternappliestoBahrain(Cf.Holes1980,1983a1983b,1986aand1986b).

Theuseof(Q)variantshasbeenparticularlymotivatedby/ormotivatetheuseof

ethnolinguisticlabels(beljiki)“(usedtorefertoaPalestinianinJordan)asaboundary

setting label”which is similar toethnic group labels suchasBellushis, Zadjalis,Druze,

Alawaites,etc.regardlessoftheirbackgroundorigintodistinguishthemfromtherest.

Suchtermshavebecome“identityladenlabels”(Suleiman2004)whichmarkInsidersvs.

outsiders, power imbalance, not equal share of power and employment, dominant

groupvs.dominatedgrouporsuperordinategroupvs.subordinateone

Thisisoftenaccompaniedbyothersymbols/artifactsofidentity:Red-checkedvs.

black-checkedheaddress(Kufiyyavs.Hatta).

Inmanycases,thisvariationmaydistinguishthepopulation inthesamecountry

as “nationals vs. naturalized”whichhas also given rise to anumberof dividing terms

suchas“asli(original)vs.“naqli”(notoriginal…borrowingtermsusedtodescribespare

parts), “mulHaq (annexed)” or even using electrical terms such 220 vs. 110 (220

referring to originals while 110 referring to incoming groups (naturalized)”. This

sociopolitical pattern of VARIATION corresponds to social stratification: first-class

citizen,second-classwithwhateverlinguisticandculturalmarkersassociatedwithit.

Insuchcommunities (multi-ethnic) linguistic/culturalaccommodationmustbeat

play:itrelatesvariationtoethnic/nationalidentityinintergrouprelations.Atleastthree

trendscanbeidentifiedinthisregard,whichreflectpatternsofidentityaswell:

a. Convergence:approvaloftheinterlocutorandmaybeforgainingsocialand/or

politicalacceptance(whereoutsidersconvergetotheinsiders’norms,thushidingtheir

originalidentityandadoptingtheso-calledinsiders).


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

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b. Divergence: exaggeration of the difference (where the so-called outsiders

maintaintheirmarkinglinguisticaswellculturalnormsandevenexaggerateusingthem

toemphasizetheirgroupidentityandchallengetheothers).

c. Maintenance: (no-convergence)eachsidemaintains itsownfeatures(without

any challenge or exaggeration involved) where tolerance governs the situation (as in

Omanwheregroupsarefreetousetheirvarietiesorlanguagetoleratingeachotherbut

allmustidentifywithOmanasacoveringumbrella).

In Jordan, the [g] variant (of the voiceless uvula stop (q)) in Jordan has been

establishedasthenormofthein-group,rulingandpoliticallypowerfulgroupwhichhas

the full control,andso it isasymbolofPOWERandSTATUS.Switching to thisvariant

maybeintegralorinstrumental.Switchingto[g]isconsideredbySuleiman(2004:131)

as related “to the formation of nation-state in Jordan”. Jordanizing Jordan and de-

Palestinization of Jordan This has been officially marked as Late king Hussein used a

dividingterm(withhistoricalreligioussignificance)todescribethePalestinian-Jordanian

duality:Muhajiriin(immigrants…outsiders)vs.Ansaar(hostinggroup).

With these political and group divisions, one has to consider Vitality (ethno

linguisticvalidity)inthiscontextwherevariablescanbe

a. Statusvariables

b. Demographicvariables

c. Institutionally-supportedvariables

In such communities, in any political tension, each group resorts to its identity

markers (linguistic and otherwise): East Jordanian sees himself as themajority, host,

employer, ruling, while the Palestinian is a guest, annexed and not original. This has

givenrisetoanumberofpolitical linguisticsloganssuch:Jordaniansofallorigins(min

shattail-manaabitiwal-?uSool),JordanFirst(Al-?urdu?awwalan),JordanforJordanians

(unity slogan) (al-?urdun lil-?uroniyyiin) and soon. Thusone can refer to covert/overt

policiesofinclusionvs.exclusionasshowninthefollowingpoints:

a. Political demographic classification which is linguistically realized (though all

wereundersamejurisdictionupto1987).

b. PureJordanianswhohavefullcitizenshipswithallitentails(national#).



15

c. Jordanian of Palestinian origin which make up two groups: those who hold

Israeli/PalestinianID(believedtohavetwoIdentities)whohavefullrightsexceptavery

fewtechnicalones.ThisgroupismarkedbybeinggivenspecialyellowCards(referredto

asBridgestatisticalcard).

d. The third group is pure Palestinianwho are seen now as foreigners butwith

someJordanianlinksandsotheyaregivenaspecialpassport(withnonationalnumber)

and theirbridge cardsaregreennot yellow,whileablue card is given toPalestinians

fromJerusalem.

e. Inthiscontext,identitycontroversialquestionssuchas:WhoistheJordanian?

Howtodistinguishoneselfaccordingly?Areoftenraised.

f. Furthermore, such complicated context also causes what may be termed as

“identityconflict”.Forinstance,howdotheearlysettlersofJordanofPalestinianorigin

(movedtoEastJordanearly inthe20thcentury)theyseeor identifythemselves?How

dotheyuselg.toidentifywiththissideorthatsideandwhataccommodationprocesses

theyfollow?

g. JordanianwomenwholiveinbigcitieslikeAmmanandIrbidnormallyusethe

urbanvariety(whichisbelievedtohavePalestinianorigins)butswitchtopureJordanian

varietyincaseoftension…(dividedloyalty:covertprestigevs.overtprestige).

Conclusion:ThisisaclearcaseofSOCIOPOLITICALPATTERNOFVARIATIONwhere

linguisticvariationservesasamarkerofidentityandasaboundary-setterbetweenthe

“in-group(ourselves)andtheout-group(others)”(Suleiman2004:7).

5.Religiousidentificationanddivision:thecaseofBethlehem

Different religious groups may use language variation or shifting as a way to

changeidentityandaffiliation. InastudydonebyAmara(2005),hefoundthatamong

ChristiansinthecityofBethlehemwhousedtobethedominantgroup:

Younger women and some Christian men are tending to adopt an urban

pronunciationlikethatofnearbyEastJerusalem,atthesametimeasthespeechof

younger educated Muslims is showing the growing influence of the standard


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

16

variety, of Arabic. By relating the use of linguistic variants to changes in identity,

thisstudyshowsthatBethlehemisatownintransition,beingtransformedfromits

previous status as a Christian Arab town into an important Palestinian and

dominantlyMuslimcity(Amara2005:Abstract).

“Byrelatingtheuseoflinguisticvariantstochangesinidentity,thisstudyshows

thatBethlehemisatownintransition,beingtransformedfromitspreviousstatusasa

ChristiantownintoaMuslimone”(Amara2005:Abstract).Bethlehemhadbeenwidely

seen as a Christian town but now there is a transition into a Muslim town. Here,

linguistic variation is shown to have produced new distinctions. A case of a town in

transition,beingtransformedfromitspreviousstatusasaChristianArabtownintoan

importantPalestiniananddominantlyMuslimcity.Thisalsoprovidesauniquecasefor

testing shiftingof social identities:non-urban tourban. It illustrateshowurbanization

andmigration are reflected in the sociolinguistic changes of theArabic spoken in the

town.Oneofthemostsalientlinguisticfeaturesofthisistheuseofthevariantsof(q).

Whereas most residents formerly used the common (k) Palestinian variety for the

standard /q/, similar to that spoken inPalestinianvillages, youngerwomenand some

ChristianmentendtoadoptanurbanpronunciationlikethatofnearbyEastJerusalem,

while, at the same time, the speech of younger educated Muslims is showing the

growinginfluenceofthestandardvarietyofArabic.Thislinguisticbehaviormaybeseen

asasymbolofreligiousidentificationwhichmaybetracedinotherArabcommunitiesas

well(cf.Blanc1964;Holes1983a).

6. The case of returning-immigrants variation: relocating identity; e.g. Zanzibaris in

Oman

ManyArabOmanisandOmanifamiliesimmigratedtoZanzibaroveralongperiod

of time in the last fewcenturieswhere theyestablished themselvesas the rulingand

upper class. Then in the 60s of last Century they were forced to leave the country

following a local revolution by the native Africans. Few of these (returnees/re-

immigrants)identifywithwhattheyconsiderasnativecountry;yetmanystillfacewhat



17

maybeseenas“identityconflict”or“dividedloyalty”:whethertheyseethemselvesas

OmanisreturninghomeorZanzibariOmanisimmigratingtohostingOman?Thisisalso

linguisticallymarkedthroughthevariantuseofEnglish-ArabicandSwahili.

Kharusi (2012: 13) explains that “language choice among Swahili-speaking

Zanzibaris isverymuch influencedbythe individual’sperceptionand interpretationof

the label Zanzibaris, which in turn determines their acceptance or rejection of it”.

Accordingly, Kharusi identified three different subgroups of Zanzibaris: those who

continue using Swahili in both public and private domains; those who use it only in

privatedomains; and thosewhodonotuseor refuse touseSwahili ineitherdomain

andeventheypretendtheydonotknowthelanguage.

Thisexplainsthedifferentpatternsoflanguageshiftinganduseamongthem:the

firstgroupcontinuetouseSwahili to theexclusionofArabic, thesecondgroup is still

usingSwahilipredominantlywithaweakerversionofArabicthoughtheyhavebeenin

thecountryformostoftheirlives,whilethethirdgrouphasshiftedtoArabicwiththe

exclusionofSwahili.Thispatternof linguisticvariation isclosely tiedwith the issueof

identityforthem.ManyseethemselvesaspureOmanisdescendingfromOmanitribes

whichmaintaintheirexistenceinOmanandsotheyhaveintegratedwiththesetribes;

others feel that they have lost their tribal roots as a result of population mix and

intermarriagessotheyhavenotfullyintegratedwithintherest.

Psychologically, they have developed different attitudes. When they started

returning to the country back in the last century, theywerenotwell receivedby the

people and theywere even looked down on. Then at later stageswhen they started

taking higher jobs because they were more educated and have more command of

English,theystartedtofeelsuperiortotheothers. Itcanbeassumedinthiscasethat

theirlanguagebehaviorisonewayofdistinguishingthemselvesfromtherest:i.e.away

ofdistinctionandprobably superiority (changingofattitudes).Psychologically,Kharusi

(2012)explains thissayingthat the firstgroup,whichbelongs to theupperclass,uses

Swahilipredominantlyastheydonotfeelthattheiridentityisthreated.However,

[m]embersof the secondsubgroup,whoseuseof the language isdomain

dependent, associate themselves with the label only when they perceive the


H.R.ABDEL-JAWAD

18

context in which it is used as being unthreatening to their ‘Arabness’. Among

other Zinjibaris, individuals in the second subgroup readily identify themselves

with the group, for it is within this context that they interpret the term to

represent shared positive cultural values and a means of fostering solidarity.

However, in the presence of non-Zinjibaris, they are concerned that the label

mightbeusedasachallengetotheirArabidentityand,consequently,theymight

bedisinclinedtouseSwahiliinpublic(Kharusi2012:13-14).

Asforthethirdgroup,membersofthisgrouprejecttobeidentifiedasZanzibaris

and accordingly they totally shift to Arabic and abandon Swahili which they see as a

marker of “inferiority”. This group division according to Kharusi (2012: 16) “this

collocates with social boundaries too: higher class, middle class and lower class

respectively”.

At all levels, the language issue is still at the center of this identity conflict for

thesereturningorimmigratinggroups.

7.Conclusion

It is evident from these case studies that variation and shifting in Arabic in its

differentformsandmanifestationsfulfillsdifferentideologicalandidentityconstruction

functions. Itmay be used for constructing/reconstructing, locating/ relocating and/or

shifting/losingidentity,anddivided/splitidentity.Atthediglossiclevel,eachofthetwo

polar varieties stands fordifferent setsof values: SA can stand forat least twomajor

values/drivesandidentitiespoliticalandreligious.Itstandsatanequaldistancefromall

non-standardvarieties,actingasacorrectiveand—referencemodel—umbrella.Non-

standardvarietiesontheotherhandstandforSub-national,territorial,politicalidentity

markers. It may serve, on the one hand, to express unity, pan-Arabism, nationhood

(umma),and Islam,andon theotherhand, itmaymark localism, regionalism,or sub-

nationalism.

Withineach state, variationmay reflectdifferent levelsof sociopolitical, ethnic,

sectarian, and religious grouping/ divisions. In such contexts, Language serves as a



19

markerof identityandasa“boundary-setterbetweengroups”(thecaseofJordanians

and Palestinians) where linguistic boundaries correspond to political divisions.

Accordingly, with any political tension or conflict, each group resorts to its identity

markers, including language,where in somecases languagevariationcansaveor cost

life.Ultimately,politicalchangesleadtochangingofidentitiesandloyalties.Religiously,

DifferentreligiousgroupsmayuseLanguagevariationasawaytorelocateidentity(the

case of Bethlehem). Linguistic variation may also reflect political and economic

dislocationanddividedloyalties.Politicallydividedcommunitiesmaypresentevidence

of “growing double identities” which correspond to linguistic divisions. Yet, further

complicationsofthepicturewillultimatelyleadtostartreconstructingofnewpolitical

identities(thecaseofBarta3a).Finallythecaseof“TheReturning-Immigrantsvariation”

shows“identityconflict”or“dividedloyalty”.

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