Variability in Citizens' Reactions to Different Types of Negative Campaigns
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Variability in Citizens' Reactions to Different Types of Negative CampaignsAuthor(s): Kim L. Fridkin and Patrick J. KenneyReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2 (April • 2011), pp. 307-325Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23025053 .
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Variability in Citizens' Reactions to
Different Types of Negative Campaigns
Kim L. Fridkin Arizona State University Patrick J. Kenney Arizona State University
Do negative advertisements lower voters' evaluations of the targeted candidate? We theorize that there is much to be gained
by examining the variance in the content and tone of negative campaign messages and the variance in voters' sensitivity
to negative political rhetoric. We employ data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to investigate the
impact of negative campaigning in U.S. Senate campaigns. We sampled 1,045 respondents in 21 of the 28 U.S. Senate races
featuring a majority party incumbent and challenger. In addition to the survey data, we collected contextual data regarding
the political advertisements aired during the campaigns and the news coverage of these campaigns in state newspapers. The
evidence suggests that the impact of negative information is multifaceted, and under some circumstances, substantial. We
find that uncivil and relevant negative messages are the most powerful, especially for people with less tolerance for negative
political rhetoric.
Is
negative campaigning effective? Do negative adver
tisements lower evaluations of the targeted candi
date? The preponderance of the evidence, after 25
years of scholarship, suggests that negative campaigning has limited effects on citizens' impressions of candidates
(e.g., Lau et al. 1999; Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007). In
the most comprehensive and up-to-date review of the lit
erature, Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner conclude, "The find
ings reported in the research literature do not bear out
the proposition that attacking is an effective way to bol
ster one's own image relative to that of one's opponent"
(2007, 118). Such findings of the ineffectiveness of negative cam
paigning are not surprising given the plethora of evidence
suggesting that many Americans do not pay close atten
tion to political messages, negative or otherwise (e.g.,
Zaller 1992). And, when people do pay attention to cam
paign rhetoric, they are not easily persuaded (e.g., Kinder
2003). Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of negative cam
paigning is entirely consistent with the cottage industry
of scholarship demonstrating that the outcomes of pres idential elections can be predicted before the onset of
the fall campaign.1 All told, the conclusion that negative
campaigning is ineffective is consistent with theories and
evidence emanating from the voting and public opinion literature.
So, why do we feel uncomfortable concluding that
negative advertisements are ineffective? It seems unrea
sonable that the millions of dollars spent on negative
campaign messages are for naught. Negative messages are
pervasive in presidential and competitive congressional and senatorial elections (Franz et al. 2008; Geer 2006;
Jacobson 2009). In the final days of competitive cam
paigns, especially in the battleground states during presi dential elections, the campaign messages are often exclu
sively negative (Teinowitz 2008). Given the preponderance of negative advertisements
produced and disseminated by the candidates and the
political parties on television, on the radio, and online, the information costs for obtaining negative messages
Kim L. Fridkin is Professor of Government, Politics, and Global Studies, Arizona State University, Coor Hall, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 873902,
Tempe, AZ 85287-3902 ([email protected]). Patrick J. Kenney is Professor and Director in the School of Politics and Global Studies,
Arizona State University, Coor Hall, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902 ([email protected]).
This article was supported by a grant from the Institute of Social Science Research at Arizona State University. We would like to thank
Pat Crittenden for her editorial assistance and Jill Carle for her research assistance. An online appendix with supplementary material for
this article is available at http://www.ajps.org/. The data and the syntax files used in this article will be available by January 10, 2012, at
http://pgs.clas.asu.edu/research.
'The most recent round of predictions appeared in PS: Political Science and Politics, October 2008. Ten articles, authored by 15 researchers,
appeared in a symposium entitled "Forecasting the 2008 National Elections."
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, April 2011, Pp. 307-325
©2011, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/j.l540-5907.2010.00494.x
307
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KIM L. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
for voters is approaching zero. Since negative messages
are abundant during the final weeks of many presiden tial and subpresidential campaigns, we expect that such
saturation coverage would influence attitudes toward the
candidates.
Consistent with this expectation, some researchers
have found that negative commercials do produce critical
impressions of targeted candidates (e.g., Ansolabehere
and Iyengar 1997; Fridkin and Kenney 2004; Roddy and
Garramone 1988).2 Moreover, political consultants and
political candidates consider negative advertisements to be a valuable tool in campaigns (Abbe et al. 2001; Thurber and Nelson 2000).
Therefore, we believe that additional exploration into
how negative advertising affects citizens' attitudes about
candidates is worthwhile. Specifically, we believe that scholars have not fully investigated the variance in the content and tone of negative messages and the variance
in citizens' receptivity and tolerance of negative political rhetoric. We hypothesize that the variability in these di mensions is related to how negative information shapes
voters' attitudes toward candidates.
Theory and Expectations The Message
We know that negative information is likely to attract peo ple's attention, even when individuals are distracted by the demands associated with daily life (Fiske 1980). This"neg ativity bias" in impression formation is well established
(e.g., Fiske 1980; Taylor 1981). The reason that people attend readily to negative information is that the content of negative messages is filled with clues about events or situations that people should avoid (e.g., Kahneman and
Tversky 1979; Lau 1982; McGrawand Steenbergen 1997). In addition to the negativity of messages, people pay
more attention to messages that they perceive as relevant
to their daily lives. In social psychology, for example, a
variety of models of persuasion indicate that the relevance of the message is a prerequisite for persuasion (McGuire 1964, 1989; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). McGuire (1989), in his classic model of persuasion, argues that a message is persuasive only if people attend to and comprehend the message. And, when deciding which messages to pay attention to, people use the relevance of the message as
a decision rule, concentrating on the messages that are
relevant and ignoring those that are irrelevant.3
Although the social psychological literature is based
on messages that are personally relevant to individuals, we believe that the same logic extends to "relevance for
governing" in the political realm. We define "relevance"
as discussions about issues, personal traits, or other top
ics that people consider pertinent for an electoral cam
paign.4 We reason that voters find some negative mes
sages far more relevant (e.g., candidates' voting records) than others (e.g., candidates' drug use in college). A re
cent survey experiment examined subjects' impressions of fictitious candidates and the relevance of several com
mercials (Fridkin and Kenney 2008). Findings from this
study demonstrated that subjects readily rated certain
commercials as more relevant to governing than others.
And, the same data indicated that relevant negative mes
sages (e.g., a message about the candidate's health care
proposal) are more effective in shaping attitudes than
irrelevant negative messages (e.g., a message about the candidate's divorce).5
Negative commercials, in addition to varying in con
tent, also vary dramatically in tone. Some negative mes
sages are delivered in an uncivil and strident manner, while other negative commercials embrace a more mea
sured and courteous tone (Geer 2006). We expect that
negative messages differing in their civility will vary in their impact on citizens' evaluations of candidates. Our
expectations rest on research demonstrating that people
embrace norms that guide their interactions with other individuals. These norms about civil discourse extend to public discourse as well, with people expecting a cer tain level of civility from political actors, including candi dates running for office (Guttman 1993; Mutz and Reeves
2005). In fact, several studies have yielded consistent find
ings demonstrating that not only do citizens make pre dictable distinctions between civil and uncivil messages,
2In contrast, other scholars have found that negative advertisements are ineffective in lowering evaluations of the targeted candidate or that negative advertisements produce modest or inconsistent effects. See, for example, Basil, Schooler, and Reeves (1991), Lau and Pomper (2004), and Thorson, Christ, and Caywood (1991).
3Petty and Cacioppo (1986) also show that the relevance of the
message significantly influences people's willingness to process a
message (see also O'Keefe 2002; Perloff 2003).
4We theorize that issues and traits can be relevant or irrelevant for governing. For example, an irrelevant issue may be an issue no longer on the public agenda (e.g., a candidate's opposition to a war that has been over for several years). Similarly, an example of a relevant trait may be the candidate's prior political experience or the candidate's questionable integrity, as evidenced by the acceptance of gifts by a wealthy donor.
5To be sure, scholars have explored the role of the content of mes
sages by distinguishing between negative messages focusing on the candidate's personality and negative messages focusing on a candi date's policy positions (e.g., Brooks and Geer 2007; Geer 2006, Lau and Pomper 2004; Thorson, Christ, and Caywood 1991). However, the results of these studies are inconclusive.
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
but also uncivil messages consistently produce more neg
ative views of politicians and the political process (e.g., Brooks and Geer 2007; Fridkin and Kenney 2008; Mutz
and Reeves 2005). Given the importance of civility as a norm in pub
lic discourse, how might people respond to political dis
course violating these established norms? According to re
search focused on product advertising, an advertisement
is a social object and is evaluated by common social norms
(Dahl, Frankenberger, and Manchanda 2003). When the
content or tone of an advertisement breaches norms for
decency, good taste, and personal moral standards, the
advertisement causes surprise, thereby attracting atten
tion to the novel stimulus (Meyer et al. 1991). In the political realm, a campaign advertisement vi
olating norms of civility is likely to be noticed. And,
consistent with theoretical and empirical research on
information-processing models, advertisements that vio
late the norms of civility are viewed as shocking, thereby
facilitating message comprehension and enhancing mes
sage retention (e.g., McGuire 1976). In exploring the impact of negative messages, it is
essential to consider the civility of those messages in con
junction with their relevance.6 In particular, in predicting how negative messages will influence evaluations of the
candidates, the relevance of the message is paramount.
Prospective voters are only interested in hearing criticisms
and critiques that provide information directly relevant
to how a candidate will perform in office. In contrast,
we expect that negative messages focusing on topics ir
relevant to governing will not influence evaluations of a
targeted candidate.
Although all relevant messages should influence vot
ers' assessments of a targeted candidate, we expect that
the civility of the message will alter its impact. An un
civil message—on a relevant topic—will heighten peo
ple's attention to the message and will more likely be
remembered (Lau 1982; Mutz and Reeves 2005). There
fore, relevant and uncivil messages should produce the
most powerful negative images of a targeted candidate.
Relevant and civil messages should produce more mod
erate negative impressions. And, irrelevant messages—
whether they are civil or uncivil—should not influence
impressions of a targeted candidate.
The Receiver
Just as negative messages vary in terms of their relevance
and civility, we think that citizens' tolerance of negative
messages varies. In particular, we expect that certain peo
ple may be more tolerant of messages delivered in a stri
dent fashion or focused on topics only tangentially related
to governing. That is, for some people, "anything goes" when it comes to negative campaigning. These people believe that candidates should be free to attack their op
ponents in whatever way they choose. For other people,
certain types of negative messages "cross the line" and in
sult their sensibilities regarding public decency and fair
ness.
We contend that people's predispositions regarding the appropriate nature of political discourse will deter
mine their receptivity to certain types of negative mes
sages delivered during campaigns. For people who have
a high tolerance for negative messages (i.e., people who
think any type of attack advertising is appropriate), the
relevance and civility of the message will be less influ
ential. In contrast, citizens who have a low tolerance for
certain types of negative political messages will be more
affected by the (ir)relevance and (in)civility of negative
messages.
We draw an analogy for illustrative purposes between
tolerance toward political messages and tolerance of phys
iological conditions. In the medical field, for example, we
know that people who have a low tolerance for pain are
more likely to feel pain when they are hurt physically. So,
even if two people in a laboratory setting are exposed to
the same amount of pain (e.g., a certain level of pressure
on a subject's finger), the person with a lower tolerance
for pain will report a higher level of discomfort (see, for
example, Ellermeier and Westphal 1995). Similarly, we
expect that people with a low tolerance for certain types of negative messages are more sensitive and will be more
influenced by such messages. Therefore, the impact of
these messages will be greater.
We are not the first to hypothesize that people differ
in their sensitivity to negative stimuli. For example, Ulbig and Funk (1999) theorize that people differ in their "con
flict avoidance" tendencies and people who are more likely to dislike conflict are less likely to participate in politics. The authors find that conflict avoidance is significantly and inversely related to political participation.7
'Consistent with our notion regarding the importance of relevance
and civility, Sides, Lipsitz, and Grossman (2010) find that citi
zens' evaluations of the negative tone of a campaign are distinct
from their evaluations of the informational nature of the cam
paign messages. Brader (2006) and Brooks and Geer (2007) look at
the interaction of different message dimensions in their research.
Brader explores the combination of visual and sound stimuli in
an advertisement, along with the content. Brooks and Geer (2007)
investigate the intersection of the civility of the advertisement with
the content of the advertisement (i.e., issues vs. traits).
7In the field of psychology, researchers have found individual
differences in people's attention to threatening social cues (e.g.,
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KIM L. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
These findings suggest that individual differences ex
ist in people's reactions to negative or threatening stimuli.
We extend this logic to negative political messages: cer
tain people will be more sensitive to irrelevant and uncivil
messages and may react more strongly when exposed to
these types of messages during campaigns. We think that
these differences in sensitivity to negative information go
beyond standard political variables, such as political so
phistication, partisanship, or political interest.8 Instead, we contend that people have distinct attitudes concern
ing their sensitivity or receptivity to negative political rhetoric. Some citizens have an easier time tolerating
negative political messages, while others dislike public criticism and grow weary of such messages as campaigns
progress.
In this article, we hope to advance our understanding
of the impact of negative messages on people's impres sions of campaigns by examining the intersection between
the relevance and civility of negative messages and how
people differ in their reactions to these types of mes
sages. We rely on a representative survey sample of over
1,000 respondents along with data assessing the content
of political communications during the 2006 senatorial
campaigns. We turn now to a discussion of our data and
measurements.
Data
This study uses data from the 2006 Cooperative Congres sional Election Study (CCES) to investigate the impact of negative campaigning in U.S. Senate races. The CCES is a preelection/postelection Internet survey, conducted
by Polimetrix, Inc., on behalf of a consortium of scholars
at 37 colleges and universities. Each group of scholars in
the consortium designed a "module" with unique sur
vey questions asked of 1,000 respondents. In other words, each group of scholars controlled the content of ques
tions for 1,000 citizens. In addition, these respondents
completed a "common content" survey. The common
content survey included 30,000 respondents.
Polimetrix uses a sample matching methodology to
produce a sample that is representative of the overall U.S.
electorate (Rivers, n.d.). Comparisons of the CCES sam
ple with census data suggest that the CCES sample is
somewhat more educated and younger than the popula
tion at large. However, the CCES sample matches census
data in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity composition (Hill et al. 2007). And, analysis conducted by Hill et al.
(2007) suggests that the 2006 CCES produces an Internet
sample that looks similar to existing RDD phone surveys. For our "module," Polimetrix sampled about 75 re
spondents in 21 of the 28 U.S. Senate races featuring a majority party incumbent and a majority party chal
lenger, for a total of 1,045 respondents.9 The races varied
dramatically in terms of competition, in the amount of
money spent, and in the amount of media attention given to the contests.
In addition to the survey data, we also collected con
textual data regarding the political advertisements aired
during the Senate campaigns and the news coverage of
these campaigns in state newspapers. Turning first to
the political advertising data, we collected advertisements
from the National Journal website. The National Journal website included downloadable links to almost all U.S.
Senate advertisements publicly available (Grose and Glo
betti 2007).10 We searched the candidates' own websites, as well as other websites, to increase the completeness of
candidates' advertisement samples. With this additional
search, we were able to include advertisements from the
following races: Utah, California, Texas, and Wyoming. We coded 302 advertisements for the 42 candi
dates.11 Some contests featured a great number of political threatening facial expressions). For example, anxious individuals
appear to be more sensitive to threat stimuli and are quicker at
perceiving threatening messages (Bradley et al. 1998). Also, psy
chologists relying on functional magnetic imaging find that indi
viduals who score higher on neuroticism demonstrate higher brain
reactivity to negative pictures (Canli et al. 2001). Researchers have
also suggested that there are cultural differences in people's desire
to avoid conflict. In particular, many East Asian cultures value har
mony and conflict avoidance, compared with European Americans
(see Lind, Huo, and Tyler 1994). In addition, some feminist scholars
(e.g., Gilligan 1982) suggest that women prefer less confrontational
procedures compared with men.
8To be sure, researchers have explored who is most susceptible to negative campaigning. For example, some scholars suggest that
Independents are more likely than partisans to be "demobilized" by negative campaigning (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997; Kahn
and Kenney 1999; Lau and Pomper 2004). These explorations, however, have yielded somewhat inconsistent findings (see Brooks
2006; Sigelman and Kugler 2003).
9In selecting the sample of races, we stratified by the competitive ness of the incumbent/challenger contest. In particular, we sampled 10 races classified as competitive (toss-up or leaning) by the Cook
Political Report and 11 races classified as noncompetitive (solid Democrat or solid Republican). We did not include open races in
our sample because of limited resources and the small number of
open races contested (n = 5). In the online Supporting Informa
tion, we present information about the races in our sample.
10Ad Spotlight at the National Journal website featured 544 adver
tisements for 15 of the 21 races included in our sample. We stratified
the population of advertisements on Ad Spotlight by candidate and
collected a maximum of 21 ads per candidate.
11 Overall, the mean number of advertisements coded per candidate
was 7.2, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 21. We cannot
estimate the completeness of our advertising sample because we
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
advertisements aired repeatedly over the months preced
ing Election Day. In contrast, in some Senate campaigns, there were no advertisements on television at all. In cod
ing the political advertisements, we assessed a variety of
factors associated with the tone of the advertisement, in
cluding the civility of each commercial, the relevance of
its content, and the substance of its message.12
Turning to the news coverage, we collected newspaper
data from each state's largest circulating newspaper from
October 1 to Election Day. We coded 2,077 news articles
for the 21 Senate races. In coding the news content, we
assessed a variety of factors associated with the tone of
the coverage, including the number, content, and source
of criticisms published about each candidate.13
Measurement of Key Concepts
There are no established measures for defining the rele
vance and civility of commercials. In addition, we know
of no prior studies that have measured respondents' toler
ance for irrelevant and uncivil messages. Consequently, in
this section we explain how we developed new measures
for these key concepts. We spend a significant amount
of time and effort determining the validity of these mea
sures. We employ three tests to determine the validity of
the measures assessing the relevance and civility of the
commercials, and we conduct two validity tests for the
survey questions measuring citizens' tolerance of nega
tive messages.
Relevance and Civility in Negative Commercials
To content analyze the political advertisements, coders
distinguished between messages that were relevant and
irrelevant for governing.14 For example, negative com
mercials classified as relevant by coders contained the fol
lowing examples of content: "The Senator voted to give
tax breaks for companies that move overseas..." or "The
Senator voted 96% of the time with Bush." In contrast,
negative commercials classified as irrelevant contained
content such as the following: "The candidates' support ers are from Hollywood" or "My opponent parties with
Playboy playmates." Coders also assessed the civility of the message in each
of the political advertisements.15 We adopted a generous
interpretation for determining civility given the rough and-tumble nature of campaign messages in U.S. Senate
campaigns (Kahn and Kenney 1999). That is, there needed
have no measure of the population of commercials aired during the 2006 campaigns. Unfortunately, we do not have access to how
often or where the ads were shown during the 2006 election. The
Wisconsin Advertising Project (WiscAds), the main source for data
regarding the frequency and timing of political advertisements, did
not collect data for the 2006 election cycle. This is clearly a limita
tion of our advertising data. To measure the reach of the political
advertising in our study, we employed campaign spending and es
timated a multiplicative term where each candidate's advertising was interacted with the candidate's campaign spending. However,
this alternative specification did not improve the performance of
our models in the upcoming analyses.
12 In conducting our content analysis, we followed the procedures described by Neuendorf (2002). A team of eight research assistants
(graduate and undergraduate political science students) coded the
advertisements. Coders were provided with the codesheet and a
codebook containing detailed instructions for coding each variable
(the codesheet is available in the online Supporting Information).
The comprehensive guidelines in the codebook helped to reduce
individual differences among coders. Coders were instructed to
view the advertisements as if they were "the average citizen." For
example, while a political science student may be aware that favor
ing increases in the size of government is a liberal position, a typical
person viewing the advertisement may not make such an inference.
During the content analysis training procedure, the coders com
pleted a pilot coding of 10 political advertisements. Differences
among coders were discussed and, when necessary, adjustments were made to the codesheet and codebook. The pilot procedure
helped standardize the coders' techniques so that all coders were
assessing the content in the same way. Given the comprehensive ness of the training procedure, maturation effects by coders during
the content analysis process were reduced. In addition, coders were
kept blind to the purpose of the study as a way to reduce potential bias. Eighty advertisements (10 per coder) were subject to reliability
analysis. One of the authors conducted the reliability checks, com
paring the author's coding of the advertisements with the coding by
the research assistants. Cohen's kappa was used to assess intercoder
reliability, with a resulting score of .91 (p < .001), indicating a high
level of agreement among coders.
13A team of six research assistants (graduate and undergraduate
political science students) coded the news coverage. The procedure
outlined in footnote 12 for the political advertising content analysis
was employed for the newspaper content analysis. An intercoder
reliability analysis using Cohens kappa was performed; kappa =
.93 (p < .001), indicating a high level of agreement among coders.
A copy of this codesheet is available in the online Supporting In
formation.
14The codebook instructions for coding the relevance of the adver
tisement read, "Do you consider the content of the advertisement
relevant for governing? Advertisements focus on diverse subjects, such as: a candidate's past drug use (e.g., in college), a candidate's
vote for a tax increase while serving in the House of Represen
tatives, a former spouse of a candidate accusing the candidate of
marital infidelity in a divorce proceeding a decade earlier, or an
opponent criticizing a candidate for his or her lack of electoral ex
perience. The question is: do you think MOST PEOPLE viewing an
advertisement would consider the content very relevant, somewhat
relevant, somewhat irrelevant, or very irrelevant?"
15For the civility code, the codebook instructions read, "Some ads,
even if negative, present the information in a civil manner (diplo
matically, without derision, etc.), while other ads rely on a more
uncivil tone (e.g., overly strident, rude, discourteous). Do you think
MOST PEOPLE watching the ad would consider it somewhat civil,
very civil, somewhat uncivil, or very uncivil?"
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KIM L. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
to be an explicit use of harsh, shrill, or pejorative adjec tives describing candidates, their policies, or their per sonal traits for an advertisement to be considered uncivil.
The following are sentences taken from advertisements
categorized as civil by coders: "The candidate voted 18
times to raise taxes," or "He talks conservative, but his
record says otherwise." In comparison, advertisements
with the following messages were coded as uncivil in tone:
"The Senator shows a disgusting display of arrogance," or
"After all these years, can't he offer more than smears and
distortions?"
These examples are from actual commercials aired
during the 2006 senatorial campaigns and illustrate dif
ferences between irrelevant and relevant messages and
differences between civil and uncivil messages. According to our coders, most of the negative commercials in our
sample were viewed as focusing on a relevant topic.16 The
coders scored 88% of the ads as relevant and only 12%
as irrelevant.17 This is not surprising given that campaign
managers and insiders have argued that attacks need to
resonate with voters' concerns and worries (Fenno 1996;
Kahn and Kenney 1999). The negative messages, on the
other hand, generated more variance in terms of civility.
Fifty-three percent of the negative advertisements were
classified as civil, while 47% were considered uncivil.
We perform three tests to assess the validity of the
measures of relevance and civility. First, we look at
whether the number of criticisms per advertisement in
creases as the relevance and civility of the advertisement
decreases. We expect that the nastiest commercials (com
mercials that are less relevant and less civil) will also in
clude the greatest number of criticisms.18 The content
analysis confirms our expectations; the number of crit
icisms per advertisement is statistically significant and
negatively correlated with the civility of the commercials
(Kendall's tau b = —.27, p < .01) and relevance of the
commercials (Kendall's taub = —.26, p < .04).19
Second, we examine whether the relevance and civil
ity of political commercials are related to the competitive ness of the campaigns. We expect that candidates running in competitive races would be more likely to produce neg ative messages embracing an uncivil tone and focusing on irrelevant messages, since prior research shows that
negativity—in general—increases in hard-fought races
(e.g., Kahn and Kenney 2004; Lau and Pomper 2004). We find that competitive races (i.e., fewer than 20 points
separating the candidates in preelection polls) generate
messages with a less civil tone and with less relevant con
tent when compared with lopsided races (i.e., more than
20 points separating the candidates in preelection polls). In particular, the average civility score is —.23 in com
petitive races and .05 in noncompetitive races (p < .10, one-tailed test). The average relevance score is .79 in com
petitive races and 1.0 in noncompetitive races (p < .05, one-tailed test).20
As a final validity check, we look at whether the rel
evance and civility of the negative commercials (as mea
sured by the content analysis) predict people's assessment
of the tone of the Senate campaigns in their state. If we
have captured the tone and content of the advertisements
properly, then these indicators should be strongly cor
related with respondents' perceptions of the tone of the
16If we use the more traditional operationalization of negative ad
vertisements as "attack ads" or "comparative ads" (e.g., Geer 2006;
Jamieson et al. 2000) and further distinguish between negative advertisements focusing on traits and issues, we find that attack
advertisements focusing on issues and comparative advertisements
emphasizing issues are the most common types of negative com
mercials. In particular, 26% of the negative advertisements were
categorized as issue attack ads, and 26% of the ads were classified
as comparative issue ads. In contrast, negative advertisements fo
cusing on personality were less common. In our sample, only 6%
of the advertisements are "comparative trait advertisements," and
15% of the advertisements are categorized as "trait attack ads."
And, 15% of the negative ads are issue/trait attack ads and 12%
are issue/trait comparative advertisements. The preponderance of
negative issue ads, compared with negative trait ads, has been doc
umented by other scholars. For example, Franz et al. (2008) find
that the majority of negative ads aired during U.S. House, Senate, and presidential elections in 2000 and 2004 focused on issues.
17While measuring relevance of negative commercials is less
straightforward than simply distinguishing between negative com
mercials focusing on issues or traits, we think that the effort is
worthwhile. First, prior work examining the impact of negative trait versus negative issue advertisements has been inconclusive.
Some researchers find that negative issue advertisements are more
effective than negative trait advertisements (e.g., Min 2004), while
others find that negative trait advertisements are more influential
than negative issue appeals (e.g., Brooks and Geer 2007). Therefore, the trait/issue dichotomy may not be a critical dimension. Second,
negative trait advertisements are not necessarily irrelevant. Accord
ing to our content analysis, 40% of the negative trait commercials
are irrelevant, while 60% are relevant. Second, Brooks and Geer's
(2007) study shows that respondents do not differ in their view of
the informational value of civil negative trait commercials and civil
negative issue commercials, suggesting that the issue/trait dimen
sion is not the key dimension determining relevance.
18All commercials were scored on a 5-point scale: —2 (very uncivil
or very irrelevant), —1 (somewhat uncivil or somewhat relevant), 0 (neutral), +1 (somewhat civil or somewhat relevant), +2 (very civil or very relevant).
19We rely on a one-tailed test since our hypothesis is directional. We
use Kendall's tau b because of the ordinal nature of the relevance
and civility variable.
20We looked at whether the relevance and civility of political dis
course increase with the seniority of the senator. Senior senators
are less vulnerable and are less likely to generate quality challengers (Jacobson 2009). We find a significant positive correlation between
the seniority of the senator and the civility (r = .51, p < .01) of the
commercials, and the seniority of the senator and the relevance (r = .55, p < .02) of the political advertisements.
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
campaigns. We asked people during the postelection sur
vey to describe the tone of the U.S. Senate campaign as
"very positive," "somewhat positive," "somewhat nega
tive," or "very negative."21 To predict people's views of the
tone of the campaign, we include the measures of civility and relevance of the candidates' campaign commercials.22
We expect that as civility of the negative commercials in
creases, people will view the campaign discourse as more
positive. In contrast, we expect that the relationship be
tween the relevance of negative messages and the tone of
the campaign to be negative. That is, as the relevance of
negative messages increases, we expect people's view of
the campaign to become more negative since we expect
relevant negative messages will be more influential than
irrelevant negative messages. To avoid specification error, we include several stan
dard control variables that are correlated with people's
views of the overall tenor of a senatorial campaign. We
include a simple measure of the number of criticisms aired
in the candidates' political commercials.23 This control is
important to be certain that the measures of the relevance
and the civility of the ads are not simply picking up overall
negativity. We also include a measure of the number of
criticisms published about the candidates in the largest
circulating newspaper in the state.24 We also control for
the context of the campaign by including a measure of the
closeness of the campaign based on preelection polls.25
The results of the MLM/MLE analysis are presented in Table l.26 The dependent variable, tone of the cam
Table 1 MLM/MLE Estimates Predicting Respondents' Assessments of the Overall Tone of the U.S. Senate
Campaign1
Campaign Tone Fixed Components
Advertisement Characteristics
Relevance of Negative Advertisement — ,03(.01)***
Civility of Negative Advertisement ,03(.01)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition ,005(.008) Criticisms in Candidates' Ads — ,04(.02)** Criticisms in the Newspapers
— ,001(.0007)* Constant 1.84(.09)*** Variance Components
Intercept .05(.01)** N (survey) /N (states) 482/21
'Parameter estimates are followed by standard errors in parenthe ses.
Note: The dependent variable campaign tone is a scale ranging from
1 (very negative) to 4 (very positive). The advertisement charac
teristics run from low (civility or relevance) to high (civility or
relevance). See text for additional information about the opera tionalization of the variables, and see Supporting Information for
exact question wording. P-values are based on one-tailed tests:
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.
paign, ranges from 1 (very negative) to 4 (very positive). The results demonstrate that the tone of the candidates'
commercials significantly influences people's perceptions of the tone of the campaign. As the candidates' negative commercials become increasingly civil, respondents view
the campaign as more positive. And, as expected, the rele
vance of the negative advertisements is negatively related
to people's assessment of the tone of the campaign. When
candidates' negative commercials focus on more relevant
topics, people see the campaign as more negative.
Turning to the control variables, the number of crit
icisms presented in the candidates' commercials leads
people to view the campaign as more negative. It is im
portant that this variable, as well as the relevance and
civility of the advertisements, reaches statistical signifi
cance, demonstrating that our measures of relevance and
civility are not simply tapping the number of criticisms in
the ads. Similarly, as the number of criticisms in the press
increases, people are significantly more likely to view the
campaign tone as negative.
21Twenty-five percent of respondents characterized their campaign as "very negative," 22% answered "somewhat negative," 13% an
swered "somewhat positive," 5% said "very positive," and 15%
answered "don't know." Respondents who answered "don't know"
were eliminated from the analysis in Table 1.
22In this analysis, we multiply the relevance rating (or civility rat
ing) by the total number of criticisms in the advertisements in
order to capture the intensity of the message. Then, we combine
the measure of relevant negative advertisements for incumbents
and relevant negative advertisements for challengers since we are
predicting general tone of campaign. Similarly, we combine the
measures of civil negative advertisements for incumbents and chal
lengers.
23This measure is a simple count of the number of criticisms aired
in the candidates' commercials. The average number of criticisms
in the advertisements in a Senate race is 13.94 (with a standard
deviation of 8.06).
24The number of press criticisms in a Senate race averaged 117.3
(with a standard deviation of 114.0).
25We relied on preelection polling data published in the 2006 New
York Times Election Guide, and we subtracted incumbent support
from challenger support.
26We employ multilevel modeling (MLM) with maximum likeli
hood estimation (MLE) because we have a cluster of survey re
spondents located in the same state or campaign. Under these
circumstances, the OLS assumptions of uncorrelated error terms
maybe violated (Luke 2004; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
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KIM L. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
Individual Differences in Tolerance toward
Incivility and Irrelevance
We contend that people differ in their tolerance toward
negative campaigning, and we have developed four survey items to assess people's tolerance for negative campaign
ing. We presented respondents with four statements and
asked them to indicate whether they strongly agree, some
what agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with
each statement. The first two statements tap the person's
tolerance for uncivil discourse, and the second two state
ments measure the person's tolerance for irrelevant com
mentary. We vary whether an "agree" response means the
respondent likes or dislikes uncivil or irrelevant negative commercials.27 The four items are as follows:
Some negative advertisements are so nasty that I
stop paying attention to what the candidates are
saying.
Mean-spirited commercials attacking the oppo nent are appropriate during election campaigns.
Negative advertisements attacking a candidate's
personal life are inappropriate.
I find negative political commercials attacking the opponent's personal life as a young person to
be interesting.
Responses to the two civility questions suggest that
most people in our sample do not like mean-spirited
campaigns. For example, 47% of respondents "strongly
agree" and 35% "somewhat agree" that campaign ad
vertisements are ".. .so nasty that I stop paying at
tention." Similarly, 45% of respondents "strongly dis
agree" and 27% "somewhat disagree" that "mean-spirited
commercials..." are appropriate during a campaign.
Turning to the relevance of certain types of attacks, more
than half of the respondents (55%) "strongly agree" and
27% "somewhat agree" that attacking a candidate's per sonal life is inappropriate. Similarly, 61% of the people in the survey "strongly disagree" and 21% "somewhat
disagree" that negative advertisements attacking a candi
date's personal life as a young person are interesting. These
responses resonate with the electorate's long-standing an
tagonism toward negative campaign rhetoric (Kahn and
Kenney 2004). We conduct two tests to examine the validity of the
individual measures of tolerance toward incivility and
irrelevance. In our first test, we assess whether theoreti
cally relevant variables help predict people's level of toler
ance toward negative messages. To predict people's level
of tolerance toward negative messages, we look at two
sets of variables: demographic variables (i.e., the gen der of the respondent, the respondent's age, and the re
spondent's education level) and political variables (i.e., the respondent's political sophistication, the respondent's
ideology, and the strength of the respondent's party af
filiation).28 Research examining the connection between
negative campaigning and turnout suggests that women
and Independents may react most strongly to negative
messages. In particular, some scholars find that women
and Independents are more likely to become demobilized
as negativity increases (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Kern and Just 1997). These in
dividuals may be more affected by campaign negativity because they are less tolerant of uncivil and irrelevant
messages.29
We estimate two OLS models, one predicting an in
dividual's tolerance toward irrelevant messages and one
predicting an individual's tolerance toward uncivil mes
sages.30 The results presented in Table 2 indicate that
certain people are significantly more tolerant of uncivil
27See the online Supporting Information, for a copy of the survey questions used in this study.
28Strength of party affiliation is measured by recoding the 7-point
party identification scale into 3 points (strong partisans = 3, weak
partisans = 2, and Independents = 1). Respondent's ideology is
measured on a 100-point ideological scale (where 0 is extremely liberal and 100 is extremely conservative), and we recode the 100
point scale into five points (0-20 = 1,21-40 = 2,41-60 = 3,61-80 = 4, 81-100 = 5). The measure of political sophistication takes
on one of three values: 0 (incorrectly placing both parties on the
ideological scale), 1 (correctly placing one of the parties on the ide
ological scale), 2 (correctly placing both parties on the ideological scale). Correct placements include locating the Democratic party on the liberal side of the scale and locating the Republican party on
the conservative side of the scale. Political interest is measured with
a 3-point scale ranging from very interested (3), to somewhat inter
ested (2), to not very interested (1). Gender is coded 1 = male, 0 =
female; age is an interval measure; education is an interval measure
based on years of schooling. We look at ideology (as opposed to
strength of ideology) because we know that Republicans are more
likely to use negative advertising, compared with Democrats (e.g., Lau and Pomper 2001; West 2010), and researchers have found that
Republicans are less likely to be demobilized by negative campaign
ing, compared with Democrats and Independents (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997).
29We also looked at whether strength of ideology (like strength of
party) was related to tolerance of uncivil and irrelevant negative
messages. In both cases, we find strength of ideology is signifi
cantly related to tolerance, with strong ideologues being more tol
erant of irrelevant and uncivil negative messages than respondents with more moderate ideological profiles. These findings mirror the
findings for strength of party identification.
30We combine the two measures of tolerance toward irrelevant
messages into a single relevance index, and we combine the two
measures of tolerance toward uncivil messages into a single civility index. Both indices range from a low of 2 (not tolerant) to a high of 8
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
Table 2 OLS Regression Predicting Respondents' Tolerance of Irrelevant and Uncivil Negative Commercials1
Tolerance of Irrelevant
Commercials
Political Characteristics
Strength of Party
Ideology
Sophistication Political Interest
Demographics
Education
Age Gender
Constant
R2
N
. 11 (.04)***
24( 04)***
-,19(.07)***
,24(.07)***
.03(.03)
-.005(.003)**
.44(.09)***
1.95(.28)*** .10
979
Tolerance of Uncivil Commercials
08 .12(.04)*** .08
2 .20(.04)*** .16
09 —.09(.07) -.04
10 ,27(.08)*** .11
04 —,02(.03) -.02
06 — .01(.003)*** -.13
16 ,53(.09)*** .18
2.55(.29)*** .10
987
1 Unstandardized regression coefficients are followed by standard errors in parentheses; beta coefficients are reported after levels of statistical
significance. Note: The dependent variables measuring tolerance of irrelevant messages and tolerance of uncivil messages range from 2 (not very tolerant) to a high of 8 (very tolerant). See Supporting Information for exact question wording. P-values are based on one-tailed tests:
"*p < .01; "p < .05; *p < .10.
and irrelevant messages. We find that people who are
more strongly attached to the political parties are more
tolerant of uncivil and irrelevant messages, as are people who are more interested in political campaigns. Ideology is related to people's tolerance to negativity, with con
servatives being more tolerant of uncivil and irrelevant
messages, compared with more liberal respondents. We
also find that men are more tolerant of uncivil and irrel
evant negative messages when compared with women. In
addition, older people are less tolerant of uncivil and ir
relevant messages. And, politically sophisticated citizens, who are most skilled at sorting through relevant and ir
relevant discourse, appear to be less tolerant of irrelevant
messages.31
A second test to establish the validity of our tolerance
measures is to examine whether people's level of political tolerance predicts how they view political commercials.
In our survey, we asked respondents to rate the useful
ness and civility of negative commercials they reported
seeing during their state's Senate race. These questions are asked in the postelection wave, whereas the questions
assessing the respondents' levels of tolerance regarding relevance and civility were asked in the preelection wave
of the survey. We find that as people's tolerance for ir
relevant advertisements increased, they were more likely
to view the advertisements they saw as relevant. The cor
relation between people's tolerance for irrelevant com
mercials and their relevance ratings for the incumbent
and challenger commercials was .21 (p < .01) and .13
(p < .01), respectively.32 Similarly, as people's tolerance
for uncivil advertisements increased, people were more
likely to view the advertisements they saw as civil. The
correlation between people's tolerance for uncivil com
mercials and their civility ratings for the incumbent and
challenger commercials was .16 (p < .01) and .08 (p <
.05), respectively.33 Based on the series of tests reported here, we be
lieve that we have developed valid measures of the civility
(highly tolerant). The correlation between these two civility items is
.25, p < .01, and the correlation between these two relevance items
is .48, p < .01. We rely on the Spearman's reliability rho to calculate
the correlation between the measures because of the ordinal nature
of the tolerance measures.
3IWe reestimate the model with ordered logit regression given the
ordinal nature of the dependent variable. However, the results are
unchanged and this can be seen in Table SI in the online Supporting Information.
32The correlations are based on Kendall's tau b since the data are
ordinal and the p-values are based on one-sided tests since our
hypotheses are directional. The correlations do not change sub
stantively if we rely on Spearman's rho.
33We also find that people who are less tolerant of uncivil political discourse and people who are less tolerant of irrelevant political discourse are significantly more likely to view campaigns as negative
(Kendall's tau b = .08, p < .01; Kendall's tau b = .06, p < .02,
respectively).
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KIM L. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
and the relevance of the candidates' advertisements as
well as valid measures of respondents' tolerance toward
uncivil and irrelevant advertisements. We have demon
strated that these measures are related to a set of theoreti
cally important predictors. And, we have shown that these
measures predict citizens' views of the Senate campaigns as well as their views of the candidates' commercials.
Findings
We turn now to exploring the key question in this article:
do negative advertisements lower evaluations of a targeted candidate? As we have argued throughout the article, we
believe that certain types of negative messages are more
powerful than others. Specifically, we expect that the rele
vance of the message combined with the message's civility will influence evaluations of the candidates. In addition, we expect that the influence of the negative messages on
citizens' assessments of candidates will depend on peo
ple's tolerance for negative campaigning. With the important independent variables in place,
we focus on developing several key dependent variables
that capture citizens' evaluations of the candidates seek
ing U.S. Senate seats in 2006. We assess four traditional
dimensions that capture individuals' evaluations of the
candidates: (1) citizens' impressions of the candidates'
personality traits, (2) individuals' affective assessments of
the candidates, (3) voters' views regarding the candidates'
abilities to deal with several issues, and (4) citizens' overall
favorability ratings of the candidates (Abramowitz 1988;
Campbell et al. 1960; Kinder 1986; Wright and Berkman
1986). The questions used to tap the dependent variables
are derived primarily from standard NES measures.34
The analyses take place in two steps. First, we examine
how negative campaign messages shape people's evalua
tions of the Senate candidates. With this initial analysis, we
examine how the interplay between the tone (civility) and
content (relevance) of the messages shapes citizens' im
pressions of the candidates. Second, we examine whether
citizens' tolerance of negative campaigning affects how
the tone and content of negative messages shape citizens'
views of candidates.
As discussed earlier, we expect that only relevant neg ative commercials will depress people's impressions of the
targeted candidate. Among these relevant negative com
mercials, we hypothesize that uncivil advertisements will
be more powerful than civil advertisements. Based on
these theoretical expectations, we categorize the commer
cials of each candidate as relevant and uncivil, relevant
and civil, and irrelevant. In particular, if a candidate's
commercials are rated as high on relevance and low on
civility, the candidate is given a score of 3.35 If a can
didate's commercials are rated as high on relevance and
high on civility, the candidate is given a score of 2. Finally, if a candidate's commercials are rated as low on relevance, the candidate is given a score of l.36
To properly estimate the effect of the relevance and
civility of negative advertisements on people's views of the
candidates, we need to control for several rival factors. To
begin, we need to assess whether candidates who engage in negative campaigning are susceptible to a "backlash"
effect; that is, candidates who attack their opponents may hurt their own evaluations.37 Relying on the theoretical
34See the online Supporting Information for exact question word
ing. To measure traits, we combine five questions asking respon dents to rate the candidates on the following trait dimensions: intel
ligence, leadership, honesty, experience, and caring. The resulting index ranges from 5 to 20, with a mean of 14.4 for incumbents
and 12.98 for challengers. We relied on Cronbach's alpha to test for the internal consistency of the items in each trait index: Cron bach's alpha = .84 for incumbent traits, .84 for challenger traits.
To measure affect, we combine four questions asking respondents whether the candidates make them hopeful, worried, proud, and
angry. The resulting index ranges from 4 to 12, with a mean of 7.80 for incumbents and 7.53 for challengers. Cronbach's alpha =
.90 for incumbent affect and .87 for challenger affect. To measure
issues, we combine two questions asking respondents to rate the candidate's competence for dealing with the economy and health care. The resulting index ranges from 2 to 12, with a mean of 7.77 for incumbents and 7.20 for challengers. Cronbach's alpha = .95 for incumbent issues and .94 for challenger issues. Finally, the overall
favorability score is based on a 10-point scale. The mean is 5.36 for incumbents and 4.68 for challengers. For each of these four
measures, a high score represents a more positive score.
35 To develop an overall measure of the relevance of a candidate's commercials during a campaign, we utilize the coding from the content analysis of the individual advertisements to derive an over all race estimate for the candidates' commercials as low, medium, or
high in terms of relevance. We then multiply the relevance ratings by the total number of criticisms in the advertisements in order
to capture the intensity of the message. Since we expect that only relevant advertisements will be effective, we take the mean of the
resulting relevance scores and classify the candidate's message as
having a low (below the mean) or high (above the mean) score for
relevance. We repeat the same procedure for civility, producing a
low (below the mean) or high (above the mean) score for civility. Based on these scores, we create the 3-point relevance/civility in
dex. The mean for the relevance/civility advertising measure is 1.79 for incumbents and 1.65 for challengers.
36We examine the relationship between the 3-point rele
vance/civility index and respondents' assessments of the tone of
the campaign. We find a significant negative relationship between the relevance/civility index and people's views regarding the tone of the campaign. In particular, as advertisements become more relevant and more uncivil, people view the campaign as more neg ative. The Kendall tau b is —.39 (p < .01) for the incumbents' commercials and —.45 (p < .01) for the challengers' commercials.
37Two recent reviews of the literature on the likelihood and size of backlash effects find that candidates who engage in attack
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
framework introduced earlier, we expect to find a back
lash effect when candidates attack their opponents with
uncivil and irrelevant messages. We expect citizens to find
these messages offensive because they are delivered in an
uncivil manner and focus on topics not germane to gov
erning. To measure the backlash effect, we employ a binary
coding where the sponsoring candidates' commercials re
ceive a score of 1 if these commercials are rated as low on
relevance and low on civility. All other combinations of
commercials receive a score of 0.38
We include additional measures assessing the context
of the campaign as well as measures tapping the political
profiles of the respondents. We include a variable mea
suring the number of press criticisms published about the
candidate to capture the general negativity of the cam
paign.39 In addition, we include a measure assessing the
competitiveness of the campaign. Based on prior research
examining campaign intensity, we expect incumbents to
be evaluated more favorably in noncompetitive races and
challengers to be rated more positively in competitive races (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Westlye 1991). Finally, we
control for respondents' ideological and political pref erences since people are likely to rate a candidate more
positively when they share the candidate's party and ide
ological positions.40
The MLM/MLE results predicting evaluations of the
incumbents and challengers are presented in Table 3. The
findings demonstrate that the relevance and civility of the
political advertisements perform precisely as expected.
Overall, in each of the eight equations, the measure tap
ping the relevance and civility of political advertising is
statistically significant and is signed in the hypothesized direction. In each case, as relevance and incivility of the
advertisements increase, people's evaluations of the tar
geted candidates decline. This finding is consistent re
gardless of whether respondents are evaluating the can
didates in terms of (1) personality traits, (2) affective
impressions, (3) issue competence, or (4) overall impres sions.41 In fact, the relevance and civility of the adver
tisements are more powerful and more consistent in their
impact than the amount of press criticisms or the close
ness of the race, suggesting that the relevance and civility measure is capturing something beyond the general neg
ativity of the campaign and the competitiveness of the
contest.
In addition, the influence of the relevance and civil
ity measure is more powerful in the challenger models
than in the incumbent models, according to the param eter estimates. This indicates that the content and tone
of incumbents' advertising is more effective at lowering evaluations of the challengers than vice versa. For exam
ple, in the model predicting respondents' assessments of
candidates' personality traits, the parameter estimate for
the relevance and civility variable is —.76 in the challenger model and —.42 in the incumbent model.
To provide a clearer picture of how the relevance
and civility of negative messages influence citizens'
assessments of candidates' personal traits, we calcu
late the "first differences" for the maximum likelihood
strategies can expect to hurt their own evaluations (Lau and Rovner
2009; Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner 2007). And, the decline in their
own image may offset any damage done to their opponent. The
preponderance of the studies identifying a backlash effect employ
experimental designs (e.g., Chang 2003; Houston and Doan 1999).
A small number of studies examining survey data find some evi
dence for a backlash effect (e.g., Fridkin and Kenney 2004; Lau and
Pomper 2004).
38 We rely on the measures of relevance and civility developed for
the relevance/civility index when operationalizing the backlash ef
fect. The sponsoring candidate received a score of 1 on the backlash
measure if the sponsoring candidate's commercials scored below
the mean on relevance and civility. If the sponsoring candidate's
commercials received a mix score (e.g., above the mean on civil
ity, below the mean on relevance) or a high score (i.e., above the
mean on relevance and above the mean on civility), the sponsoring
candidate received a score of 0.
39We also included an additional measure of negative advertising: a
simple summation of the number of criticisms offered in each can
didate's political advertisements. This measure does not capture
the relevance and civility of the candidates' negative communi
cations. In the models predicting evaluations of incumbents, the
number of criticisms of incumbents in the challengers' advertise
ments never significantly depressed evaluations of the incumbents.
In the models predicting evaluations of challengers, the number of
criticisms of challengers in the incumbents' advertisements never
significantly depressed evaluations of the challenger.
40To code ideological proximity, we rely on the respondent's self
placement on a 100-point ideological scale and the respondent's
placement of the incumbent and challenger on the same ideolog
ical scale. We recoded the 100-point scales into five points (0-20
= 1, 21-40 = 2, 41-60 = 3, 61-80 = 4, 81-100 = 5). Then, we
calculated (1) the absolute value of the difference between the re
spondent's ideological self-placement and respondent's placement
of the incumbent's ideology and (2) the absolute value of the dif
ference between the respondent's ideological self-placement and
the respondent's placement of the challenger's ideology. Finally, we
subtracted the respondent's closeness to the incumbent from the
respondent's closeness to the challenger. The resulting ideologi
cal proximity score ranges from 4 (the respondent and incumbent
share the same location on the ideological scale) to —4 (the respon
dent and the challenger share the same location on the ideological
scale).
41 In addition to the four dependent variables displayed in Table 3,
we also develop a model estimating the impact of the relevance and
civility of the commercials on vote choice. We find that the measure
assessing the relevance and civility of the candidates' commercials
is significant (estimate = —.07, with a standard error of .02). Party
and ideological proximity are significant in the model, as is com
petition. However, news criticisms and the backlash effect fail to
reach statistical significance.
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KIM I. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
Table 3 MLM/MLE Estimates Predicting Evaluations of U.S. Senate Candidates: The Impact of Relevance and Civility of Negative Commercials1
Affect1 Traits Issues Overall Evaluations
Incumbents
Fixed Components
Candidate Commercials '
Relevance/Incivility — .29(.16)** —,42(.23)** — .46(.21)** —.33(.14)*** Backlash Effect —.55(36)* — .93(.52)** —.50(.48) —,57(.32)**
Respondent Characteristics
Party Proximity ,41(.05)*** 48( 08)*** 43( 06)*** .51 (.05)***
Ideological Proximity ,64(.05)*** .98(08)*** .71 (.06)*** .75(.06)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition —.003(.01) ,03(.02)* .02(.01)** .006(.009) Criticisms in the News ~.007(.003)*** —.01(.003)*** — ,003(.003) —.006(.002)*** Constant 7.67(.12)*** 14.28(.17)*** 7.73(. 16)*** 5.17(. 10)*** Variance Components
Intercept .10(.07)* . 19(. 16)* ,23(.13)* .04(.04) N (Survey)/N (states) 646/21 622/21 716/21
Challengers
793/21
Fixed Components
Candidate Commercials
Relevance/Incivility —.36(.25)* — .76(.39)** —.60(.22)*** —.36(.25)* Backlash Effect —.38(.36) — .06(.56) — .36(.31) — ,07(.35)
Respondent Characteristics
Party Proximity .55(.06)*** 69( 09)*** .51(.07)*** .63(.05)***
Ideological Proximity .47(.05)*** .82(09)*** ,52(.07)*** .61(.05)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition — ,01(.02) — ,0007(.03) —.003(.02) — .006(.02) Criticisms in the News —.002(.004) — ,0005(.006) .0005(.004) — .0002(.003) Constant 7.57(.17)*** 12.88(.29)*** 7.21 (. 15)*** 4.75(.17)*** Variance Components
Intercept .24(.13)** .55(.34)** o * .23(. 13)**
N(Survey)/N(states) 462/21 374/21 479/21 621/21
'Parameter estimates are followed by standard errors in parentheses. P-values are based on one-tailed tests: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10. 2Affect is measured on a scale ranging from 4 to 12. Traits are measured on a scale ranging from 5 to 20. Issues are measured on a scale
ranging from 2 to 12. Overall evaluations are measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. See the text and Supporting Information for information about the operationalization of the variables.
3Relevance/Incivility is measured on a 3-point scale where the candidate is given a score of 3 if the candidate's commercials are rated as
high on relevance and low on civility, the candidate is given a score of 2 if the commercials are rated as high on relevance and high on
civility, and the candidate is given a score of 1 if the commercials are rated as low on relevance. The Backlash Effect is measured with a
binary variable where the sponsoring candidates' commercials receive a score of 1 if these commercials are rated as low on relevance and low on civility, and 0 for all other combinations of the sponsoring candidates' commercials.
coefficients (King 1989, 107-8).42 We want to estimate the average probability (i.e., 0 to 1.0) that people will
lower their evaluations of candidates' personal traits as the negative messages change in terms of relevance and
civility. We turn first to an examination of the size of the effects when challengers attack incumbents. In
42The first differences are estimates of the probability that citizens will decrease assessments of candidates as the content and tone of
campaign messages change. In nonlinear equations "a single unit
change in X will have a different effect on the expected value of Y depending on the points at which the curve is evaluated" (King
1989,108). While calculating the first differences, all other variables are held at their means.
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
particular, if challengers move from producing irrelevant
commercials to producing relevant and civil commer
cials, there is a .22 probability that citizens will decrease
their trait assessments of incumbents' personal traits. If
challengers move from marketing relevant and civil com
mercials to relevant and uncivil commercials, then voters
have a .15 probability of decreasing their assessments of
the incumbents' personal traits. In comparison, changes
in the incumbents' commercials have a larger impact on
assessments of the challengers' personalities. In particu
lar, moving from irrelevant commercials to relevant and
civil commercials produces a .25 probability that citizens
will decrease evaluations of challengers' traits, and chang
ing from relevant and civil commercials to relevant and
uncivil messages produces another .25 probability that
citizens will decrease their impressions of the challengers'
personalities.43
Looking at the remaining variables in the models, the
variable estimating "backlash" is statistically significant in
three of the four incumbent equations. But, the backlash
variable does not reach statistical significance in any of
the challenger models. These findings suggest negative
campaigning by incumbents is risky.44 While incumbents
will be effective at depressing views of their challengers as their commercials become more relevant and more
uncivil, incumbents who air irrelevant and uncivil adver
tisements run the risks of offending potential supporters and hurting their own evaluations.
We also find that press criticisms significantly influ
ence impressions of the incumbent in three of the four
equations. In contrast, the parameter estimates for press
criticisms never reach statistical significance in the four
equations predicting evaluations of the challengers. Press
criticisms are probably more powerful for incumbents
because incumbents garner significantly more press cov
erage than challengers (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Westlye
1991).
Finally, and as expected, ideological and party prox
imity have a substantial and consistent impact on impres sions of incumbents and challengers. This is not surpris
ing. What is impressive, however, is that the relevance and
civility of advertising exert a strong impact on candidate
evaluations, even controlling for party and ideological
proximity. We turn now to our final analysis. Are the strong
effects of relevance and civility modified or altered by cit
izens' tolerance of negative attacks? As discussed earlier,
we expect that people with a low tolerance for uncivil
and irrelevant messages will be more influenced by these
types of communications. The impact of these messages
will be greater simply because these individuals are more
sensitive to the content and tone of the negative adver
tisements.
To test whether tolerance for uncivil and irrelevant
messages influences the impact of negative messages, we
combine the measures of tolerance for uncivil messages and tolerance for irrelevant messages into a single index,
ranging from 4 to 16.45 We then divide our sample at the
mean and reestimate the MLM/MLE equations presented in Table 3 for people low in tolerance of negative messages
(Table 4) and for people high in tolerance of negative
messages (Table 5).46
Turning first to Table 4, the top panel presents the
results for evaluations of incumbents while the bottom
panel presents the results for evaluations of challengers.
We are most interested in the strength, statistical signif
icance, and direction of the parameter estimates for the
measure tapping the relevance and civility of the nega tive advertisements. The relevance and civility variable is
statistically significant in three of the four equations for
incumbents and in four of the four equations for chal
lengers. In addition, the sign of the relevance and civility variable is in the hypothesized (negative) direction in each
of the eight models in Table 4.
As in Table 3, the size of the parameter estimates for
relevance and civility is larger in the challenger models,
compared with the incumbent models. These results indi
cate that for people sensitive to negative campaigning, the
incumbents' messages are more damaging than the chal
lengers' messages. Also, consistent with the findings in
Table 3, the backlash effect is evident for incumbents and
not for challengers. In addition, the criticisms published in the newspaper damage evaluations of incumbents in
each of the four models, while failing to significantly affect
impressions of challengers.
Turning to Table 5, these analyses focus only on peo
ple who have a high score on the tolerance scale (i.e.,
43We also included a measure assessing the proportion of posi
tive advertisements produced by the candidates during the cam
paigns, based on our content analysis. We find that the proportion
of positive advertisements produced by a candidate (incumbent
or challenger) does not significantly influence evaluations of the
sponsoring candidate. The coefficient representing positive adver
tisements fails to influence evaluations in each of the eight equations
presented in Table 3.
44Kahn and Kenney (2004) and Lau and Pomper (2004) also find
a greater backlash effect for incumbents, compared to challengers,
for candidates running in U.S. Senate elections.
45The mean tolerance level is 7.0 on a scale ranging from 4 to 16.
46Dividing the sample by level of tolerance toward negative mes
sages is an appropriate statistical procedure for examining how
tolerance influences the impact of these negative messages on eval
uations (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).
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KIML. FRIDKIN AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
MLM/MLE Estimates Predicting Evaluations of U.S. Senate Candidates: The Impact of Relevance and Civility of Negative Commercials for People with Low Tolerance for Negative Campaigning1
Affect2 Traits Issues Overall Evaluations
Incumbents
Fixed Components
Candidate Commercials3
Relevance/Incivility —.28(.27) —.45(.27)** — .65(.25)*** ,37(.24)* Backlash Effect —1.00(.61)* —,44(.62) — ,77(.58)* —1.15(.53)**
Respondent Characteristics
Party Proximity ,70(.08)*** ,83(.ll)*** ,72(.08)*** .77(.08)***
Ideological Proximity ,46(.08)*** 79(H)*** ,53(.08)*** .62(.08)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition —.03(.02)* —.02(.02) —.02(.02) —.03(.02)* Criticisms in the News — ,01(.004)*** —.01(.004)*** — .007(.004)** — ,01(.004)*** Constant 7.70(.20)*** 14.36(.20)*** 7.77(.19)*** 5.22(.18)*** Variance Components
Intercept .38(.21)** .24(.24) .31(.18)** .22(. 18) N (Survey) /N (States) 308/21 293/21 345/21
Challengers
380/21
Fixed Components
Candidate Commercials
Relevance/Incivility — .46(.33)* —1.02(.45)*** — .97(.34)*** —.57(.30)** Backlash Effect —.55(.47) —.25(.67) —.36(.48) —.12(.43)
Respondent Characteristics
Party Proximity ,66(.08)*** ,75(.15)*** .56(.ll)*** ,82(.08)***
Ideological Proximity ,39(.08)*** ,70(.15)*** .37(.ll)*** .45(.08)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition —,009(.02) —.02(.03) — .03(.02)* —.01 (.02) Criticisms in the News — ,004(.005) — .004(.007) — ,003(.005) — .003(.005) Constant 7.68(.23)*** 12.92(.34)*** 7.24(.25)*** 4.92(.21)*** Variance Components
Intercept .38(.23)** .47(.53) .25(.24) .27(.20)* N(Survey)/N(States) 229./21 189/21 228/21 291/21
'Parameter estimates are followed by standard errors in parentheses. P-values are based on one-tailed tests: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10. 2Affect is measured on a scale ranging from 4 to 12. Traits are measured on a scale ranging from 5 to 20. Issues are measured on a scale
ranging from 2 to 12. Overall evaluations are measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. See the text and Supporting Information for
operationalization of the variables.
3Relevance/Incivility is measured on a 3-point scale where the candidate is scored a 3 if the candidate's commercials are rated as high on relevance and low on civility, the candidate is given a score of 2 if the commercials are rated as high on relevance and high on civility, and the candidate is given a score of 1 if the commercials are rated as low on relevance. The Backlash Effect is measured with a binary variable where the sponsoring candidates' commercials receive a score of 1 if these commercials are rated as low on relevance and low on civility, and 0 for all other combinations of the sponsoring candidates' commercials.
above the mean). For these individuals, we expect that the relevance and civility of the negative advertisements will only minimally influence their evaluations of the can didates. People with a high tolerance for negativity are less sensitive to negative information, and we do not expect
variations in the tone and content of negative messages to alter their impressions of the candidates. For evalua tions of incumbents (the top panel in Table 5), the rel evance and civility measure is statistically significant in
only one of the models (i.e., overall evaluations). And, for
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
MLM/MLE Estimates Predicting Evaluations of U.S. Senate Candidates: The Impact of Relevance and Civility of Negative Commercials for People with High Tolerance for
Negative Campaigning1
Affect2 Traits Issues Overall Evaluations
Incumbents
Fixed Components
Candidate Commercials3
Relevance/Incivility — .10(. 15) — ,21(,33) — ,24(.19) — .23(. 17)* Backlash Effect -.42(34) —1.46(.76)** — .19(.46) —. 10( .41)
Respondent Characteristics
Party Proximity .13(.07)** .23(. 11)** 17( 07)*** ,25(.08)***
Ideological Proximity .81(.06)*** 1 i2( ii)*** ,89(.07)*** ,93(.08)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition ,02(.01)** .06(.02)*** ,05(.01)*** .03(.01)*** Criticisms in the News — ,006(.002)*** -.01(.004)**' —.003(.003) — ,004(.003)* Constant 7.62(.10)*** 14.05(.25)*** 7.58(. 15)*** 5.14(. 13)*** Variance Components
Intercept .OOl(.OOl) ,38(.37) .07(.12) .OOl(.OOl) N (Survey)/N(States) 301/21 298/21 346/21
Challengers
370/21
Fixed Components
Candidate Commercials
Relevance/Incivility — .23(.22) —.39( .51) —.17(.24) —.23(.30) Backlash Effect — .51 (.29)** . 11 (.73) — ,49(.30)* — .08(.42)
Respondent Characteristics
Party Proximity ,36(.08)*** .67(.12)*** _41(_09)*** .41(.07)***
Ideological Proximity ,60(.07)*** .91 (.12)*** ,67(.09)*** 67( 07)***
Campaign Characteristics
Competition — ,01(.02) ,007(.03) ,03(.02)* ,006(.02)
Criticisms in the News —.0003(.003) —,002(.008) ,003(.004) .004(.004)
Constant 7.55(. 15)*** 12.89(.36)*** 7.23(.15)*** 4.58(.20)***
Variance Components
Intercept ,02(.10) ,91(.54)** ■ 14(. 12) .28(.19)*
N (Survey)/N(States) 209/21 161/21 231/21 290/21
'Parameter estimates are followed by standard errors in parentheses. P-values are based on one-tailed tests: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.
2Affect is measured on a scale ranging from 4 to 12. Traits are measured on a scale ranging from 5 to 20. Issues are measured on a scale
ranging from 2 to 12. Overall evaluations are measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. See the text and Supporting Information for
operationalization of the variables.
3Relevance/Incivility is measured on a 3-point scale where the candidate is scored a 3 if the candidate's commercials are rated as high on
relevance and low on civility, the candidate is given a score of 2 if the commercials are rated as high on relevance and high on civility, and
the candidate is given a score of 1 if the commercials are rated as low on relevance. The Backlash Effect is measured with a binary variable
where the sponsoring candidates' commercials receive a score of 1 if these commercials are rated as low on relevance and low on civility,
and 0 for all other combinations of the sponsoring candidates' commercials.
evaluations of challengers, the relevance and civility do
not reach statistical significance in any of the four equa tions.47
Finally, we expect that the magnitude of the rele
vance and civility coefficients will be larger for people with low tolerance (i.e., Table 4) than for people with high
47In addition to the four dependent variables displayed in Tables
4-5, we also develop a model estimating the impact of the rele
vance and civility of the commercials on vote choice for high- and
low-tolerance respondents. We find that the measure assessing the
relevance and civility of the candidates' commercials is significant
(estimate = —.13, with a standard error of .03) for low-tolerance
respondents, but the measure is not significant (estimate = —.008,
with a standard error of .03) for high-tolerance respondents.
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KIM L. FRIDK1N AND PATRICK J. KENNEY
tolerance (i.e., Table 5). And, this is precisely the case. In
eight of the eight models, the size of the relevance and
civility coefficient is larger in the low-tolerance sample than in the high-tolerance sample. In fact, the differences
are quite dramatic. In seven of the eight comparisons, the
relevance and civility coefficients are over twice as large in the low-tolerance sample, compared with the high tolerance sample.
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 provide strong
support for our hypothesis. The analyses, conducted
across four different dependent variables and two sub
populations, are consistent and impressive. People who
do not like uncivil and irrelevant discourse in negative communication are more responsive to the variation in
the content and tone of negative commercials. These mes
sages directly influence their assessments of incumbents
and challengers. This finding stands in stark contrast to
those people who are unperturbed by messages presented
in an uncivil manner and focused on irrelevant content.
For people with higher tolerance for negativity, the vari ance in the relevance and civility of messages has little
influence on their evaluations of candidates running for the U.S. Senate.48
Conclusion
Communication between citizens and candidates dur
ing political campaigns is an essential element of rep resentative democracies. A fundamental aspect of these
discussions is for candidates to "make a case" for their
candidacies. This involves disseminating a variety of
messages, including biographical statements about the
candidates, messages intended to build trust with con
stituents, discussions about the candidates' political phi
losophy, and statements describing the candidates' policy plans for solving contemporary problems. In addition, candidates need to explain why they will be better repre sentatives than their opponents. Candidates often deliver these messages by disseminating negative advertisements
aimed at their rivals. This campaign strategy is extremely common in the last days of statewide and national elec tions.
Although negative campaigning is common, demon
strating the impact of negative campaigning has proven to be elusive. In this article, we introduce and test a more
sophisticated theory of negative campaigning, exploring the conditions contributing to the effectiveness of neg ative messages. In particular, we examine how the rele
vance and civility of negative messages influence citizens' assessments of candidates. The data analyses focus on the
2006 U.S. Senate campaigns and demonstrate that neg ative messages centered on topics relevant to governing
and disseminated in an uncivil manner (e.g., harsh or shrill language) strongly influence citizens' evaluations of candidates. Irrelevant messages, regardless of whether
they are presented in a strident or civil manner, have little
impact on voters' views of the candidates. However, neg
ative advertising is not without risk. When incumbents
stray away from relevant messages and produce and dis
seminate irrelevant and uncivil messages, citizens react
by lowering their evaluations of these incumbents. Chal
lengers, on the other hand, do not face as fierce a backlash
from potential voters.
We also demonstrate that not all citizens are equally influenced by negative campaigning. In particular, the
impact of negative messages is especially strong for cit izens who have limited tolerance for "attack politics." In contrast, for people with a high tolerance for rough and-tumble campaign rhetoric, negative messages are less influential.
All told, the evidence suggests that the effect of neg ative information on targeted politicians is not minimal.
Rather, the effects are multifaceted, and under some cir
cumstances, substantial. These effects hold up in the face of stiff controls for partisan and ideological attachments.
48Scholars have examined how partisanship and political sophisti cation condition the impact of negative campaigning. For example, Fridkin and Kenney (2004) find that political novices are more af fected by negative political advertising, compared with political experts. We reestimate the analysis in Table 3 for political novices and political elites, and we find that novices are more responsive to the variance in relevance and civility. In particular, the rele
vance/incivility coefficient is statistically significant in seven of the
eight equations for novices, but it is statistically significant in only two of the eight tests for experts. However, we contend that toler ance toward negativity is something more than sophistication. As Table 2 shows, sophistication does not influence people's tolerance of uncivil negative messages. And, while sophistication does signif icantly influence people's tolerance of irrelevant negative messages, it is not the most important variable, according to the standardized coefficients. Researchers have also found that partisanship affects the impact of negative advertising, with Independents being more
responsive to negative appeals than partisans (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997). In our analysis, because of the small number of
Independents (n =118), it is difficult to examine whether Indepen dents are more responsive to the relevance and civility of negative messages. However, we compare weaker partisans (Independents and leaners) and stronger partisans (strong and weak identifiers) in their responsiveness to the relevance and civility of negative mes
sages and find no differences. In particular, six of the coefficients for relevance/civility are statistically significant for weaker parti sans and six of the coefficients for relevance/ civility are statistically significant for stronger partisans.
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING
In addition, we have identified these effects in real cam
paigns. While the present article focuses on evaluations
of candidates, we think that the relevance and civility of negative messages—and people's tolerance for these
messages—may also contribute to the resolution of the
ongoing debate regarding the (de)mobilizing effect of
negative campaigning. Embracing the variance in the con
tent and tone of messages may help explain whether nega tive messages enhance or depress turnout. We expect that
not all negative messages will demobilize citizens. Instead,
messages focusing on irrelevant material—and presented in an uncivil manner—may be the most likely type of
message to "turn off' voters. In contrast, messages focus
ing on relevant topics and presented in a civil manner
may actually engage citizens and increase participation. In addition, we expect that the impact of these different
messages will depend on people's tolerance for negative
campaigning. In particular, irrelevant and uncivil mes
sages may be more effective at depressing turnout among
people with little tolerance for negative rhetoric. We en
courage researchers to consider the variability in the con
tent and tone of negative messages when exploring how
negative campaigning affects turnout.
We believe that this article advances our understand
ing of negative campaigning by embracing the variability in the content and tone of negative messages as well as
the variance in people's tolerance for negative messages.
However, this article represents a first step. Future work
should explore variance in additional dimensions of cam
paign rhetoric, such as variance in the medium (e.g., In
ternet vs. television advertising), variance in the timing of the negative messages (e.g., early vs. late in the cam
paign), variance in the presence of a counterattack (e.g., how often, how fierce), and variance in the repetition of
the message (e.g., how many repeated attacks before effec
tiveness is detected). We believe that all of these avenues
will shed more light on how negative messages shape cit
izens' attitudes and, ultimately, their choices at the ballot
box.
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