Vagueness and Truth by Convention

7/26/2019 Vagueness and Truth by Convention

1/3

Oxford University Press and The Analysis Committeeare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Analysis.

http://www.jstor.org

Vagueness and Truth by Convention

Author(s): Dharmendra KumarSource: Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Mar., 1969), pp. 129-130Published by: on behalf ofOxford University Press The Analysis CommitteeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327826Accessed: 28-07-2015 21:55 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.

For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 157.253.50.50 on Tue, 28 Jul 2015 21:55:41 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=anacomhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3327826http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3327826http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=anacomhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/


2/3

VAGUENESS

AND TRUTH

BY

CONVENTION

By

DHARMENDRA KUMAR

PROFESSOR

Kmrner

ays

in

Experience

nd

Theoty

hat two kinds of

universal

propositions,

open

nomic

and

closed

nomic ,

differing

n

the

extent

of truth

by

convention

may

be

expressed

by

sentences

con-

taining

inexact

predicates

like

swan , white ,

magnetised piece

of

iron .

He

also

speaks

of

mixed

nomic

propositions ,

but

they

must

satisfy

his

definition

of

closed

nomic

proposition

or of

open

nomic

proposition

and cannotbe

a third

kind.

But his

argument

or

admitting

open

nomic

propositions

and thus

for

distinguishing

two kinds

of truth-

by-convention

requires

an erroneous

assumption

which his own

observationsdo

not

support.

K6rner

says:

the sentence

All

magnetised

ieces

of iron attractron

filings

.

comes

to

express

n

open

nomic

proposition,

whenthe

predicate

x is a

magnet-

ised

piece

of iron

s modified

n such

a

way

hat

only

objects

which

attract

iron

filings

qualify

or

membership

f

the

class

corresponding

o the

modified

predicatep.

76).

He

contends

that

either use

of the

predicate

leaves

open

the

possibility

of neutralcandidates (p. 76) which can be ... correctlymade either

members

or

non-members

of the

class

(p.

28).

From

this,

he

thinks,

it

follows

that the

truth

of

the

proposition

expressed

by

All

Ps

areQs

may

not be

preserved

when the

neutral

candidates or the relatedclasses

are

considered

(p.

74),

if P

andQ are

related ike

magnetisedpiece

of iron

in

the modified

use

and

attracts ron

filings

(briefly,

M

and

A ).

Expressing

a

proposition

immune to

counter-instances

arising

from

neutral

candidates ,

therefore,

requires

a

further convention

. .

. for-

bidding

such

election

he

says

(p.

75).

The

assumption

required

for

K6rner s

conclusion

may

be

brought

out

by

considering

the three

situations

in which

one

may

suppose

the

termination

of an

object s

neutral

candidature

to

provide

a

counter-

instance to the

proposition

that all

Ms

are

As,

supposing

that

both

M

and A

admit

of

neutral

candidates. These

are:

(a)

the

object

x

is

a

positive

candidatefor

being

an M

(or

for

the

application

of

M )

and

a

neutral

candidate or

being

an

A;

(b)

x

is

clearly

a

non-A

or a

negative

candidate or

being

an A and

a neutral

candidate or

being

an

M;

(c)

x

is

a

neutral candidate

for

being

an

M and also for

being

an A.

The

notion of a neutral

candidate rules

out

(a)

and

(b).

There

will

be

no

point

in

distinguishing,

nor

possibility

of

systematicallydistinguishing,

positive

candidates

from

neutral candidates for the

application

of a

predicate

like

M

if

(a)

is allowed.

By

prefixing qualifies

to the

expression

corresponding

o A in

his

schema

p.

74)

of sentences

ntro-

129

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/3

130

VAGUENESS

AND TRUTH BY

CONVENTION

ducing predicates

ike

M ,

perhaps

K6rner

himself

means

to

rule out

(a).

An

object s

negative

candidature or

being

an A

is for the

same

reason nconsistentwith its neutralcandidatureor beinganM.Ko6rner s

statement

of the

relationship

between

M

and

A ,

regarded

as

the

state-

ment

that

every

positive

candidate

or

being

an M

is

a

positive

candidate

for

being

an

A,

should

be

equivalent

o the

statement

hat

every

negative

candidate

or

being

an A

is a

negative

andidate

or

being

an

M. K6rner

provides

a

deeper

reason or

ruling

out

(b)

and

(a)

by attributing

he

possibility

of

borderline

r neutral

candidates

o

qualifications

nd

disqualifications

or the

membership

f a

class

n

termsof

similarities

and

dissimilarities

o

standard

members

nd non-members

p.

26)

or

standardxamples ndcounter-examples.ince M admitsof neutral

candidates,

he conditions

or its

application

may

as

well be

given

ostensively,

f

objects

capable

of

serving

as standard

xamples

and

counter-examples

re

available,

although

K6rner

has

given

them

verbally

n termsof

N

( magnetised

iece

of iron n the unmodified

sense)

and

A ,

thus

attributing

n

object s

neutral

andidatureor the

application

f

M

to

its

neutral andidatureor

N ,

A ,

rather

han o

incomplete

ver-all

rgestalt

imilarity

o standard

Ms. Butthe ostensive

explanation

f

M

would

require

aking

as a

standard

ounter-example

of an M anobjectwhich s capable f servingasa standardxample f

an

N

and

a

standard

ounter-example

f

an A. It

is obvious

that

an

object

differing

rom such

an

object

by being

a

neutral

ather

han a

positive

N

is

even

more

certainly

negative

M,

and

b)

s thus

mpossible.

(a)

is

similarly

uled

out

by

the

necessity

f

using

only

standard

As as

standard

Ms.

While

situations

a)

and

(b)

are

simply mpossible, c) requires

an

inconsistent

way

of

terminating

n

object s

neutral andidature

or

M

and A .

If

neutral andidature

or

M

can

be

terminated ia

neutral

candidatureor N and for A , it cannotbe terminatedndependently

of the termination

f

the

latter. Since

an

object s

neutral

andidature

for

M

depends

n its

neutral

andidatureor

N and

A ,

and

not vice

versa,

t can

only

be

terminated

n the former

way.

But

the decision

o

regard

a

neutral

A as a non-A can

only

make

a

neutralM a

non-M,

supposing

hat

t

is

not a

neutral

N;

andthe

termination f

its

possible

neutral

andidature

or

N

obviously

annot

provide

a

counter-instance

to the

proposition

hatall Ms

areAs.

If M

is

regarded

s

applying

positively

when

both

N

and

A

apply positively,and neutrallywhen eitherboth N and A apply

neutrally

r

one

appliespositively

and the other

neutrally,

hen

M

is

an

abbreviation

or

N

and

A ,

and he

proposition

hat

all Ms

are As is

true

by

definition ,

s

Krnmer

nwittingly

ays

(p.

73)

of

an

open

nomic

proposition

which he claims to be

empirical

in

so

far as

it

allows a

conjecture

regarding

the

decision o treat

possible

neutral

candidates

as

members

p.

74).

Delhi

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

Vagueness and Truth by Convention

Documents

Transcript of Vagueness and Truth by Convention