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Double you? Function and form of implicit and explicit self-esteem

Albers, L.W.A.

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Citation for published version (APA):Albers, L. W. A. (2010). Double you? Function and form of implicit and explicit self-esteem. Amsterdam.

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DOUBLE YOU?

DOUBLE YOU?

Function and form of implicit and explicit

self-esteem

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus

prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties

ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel

op vrijdag 15 januari 2010, te 10:00 uur

door

Lucas Wilhelmus Antonius Albers

geboren te Cuijk en Sint Agatha

Promotor: Prof. dr. A. Dijksterhuis

Copromotor: Dr. M. Rotteveel

Overige leden: Prof. dr. H. Aarts

Prof. dr. A.H. Fischer

Prof. dr. J.A. Forster

Dr. R.W. Holland

Prof. dr. S.L. Koole

Prof. dr. J. van der Pligt

Faculteit Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen

Cover Design: Janneke Albers

5

Preface

In this dissertation I examine function and form of implicit self-esteem, which

reflects the relatively less accessible part of self-esteem. Specifically, this

dissertation is about the additional value implicit self-esteem has in

understanding self-esteem, one of the most researched concepts in

Psychology. I will argue that in order to place the concept of implicit self-

esteem within the realms on current research on self-esteem, understanding of

both measuring implicit self-esteem and its relation with explicit self-esteem

is necessary.

Though several measures exist to capture implicit self-esteem, in this

dissertation I will focus on optimizing and addressing one of the most widely

used measures, the name letter test (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). The name

letter test consists of judging the different letters of the alphabet on their

attractiveness. A name letter effect is then calculated based on attractiveness

ratings of someone’s name letters while correcting for specific and general

letter liking, in order to avoid confounds. This name letter effect is

subsequently used as a measure of implicit self-esteem based on the

assumption that by assessing someone’s evaluation of well established

attributes of the self (e.g., such as someone’s initial letters) in an unobtrusive

Preface

6

way (e.g., under the guise of simply evaluating all alphabet letters),

someone’s implicit evaluation of the self is measured.

In Chapter 1, I will give an overview of the existing literature on the

relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem and then integrate the

findings from the research presented in the chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this

dissertation. Therefore, I did not include a general conclusion as a last chapter

in my dissertation. It should also be noted that because all chapters were

written separately, they can be read on their own.

In Chapter 2, I will focus on optimizing the current calculation method

of the name letter test in order to improve its validity as a measure of implicit

self-esteem. I will argue that the traditional calculation method results in a

name letter score that is confounded, because it cannot separate the influence

of name letter liking from overall letter liking. In three experiments I will

show that this (theoretical) confound of overall letter liking indeed is

problematic in empirical findings when using the traditional name letter score.

I will propose an alternative calculation method for the name letter score to

remedy these issues and to arrive at a more valid measure for implicit self-

esteem.

In Chapter 3, I will discuss function and form of implicit self-esteem in

relation to affect-regulation processes. More specifically I will first show that

implicit self-esteem relates over and above explicit self-esteem and across

time to the personality dimensions Emotional Stability and Neuroticism, the

two personality dimensions that are most strongly related to affective

regulation. In a second and third experiment I will further show that implicit

self-esteem can differentiate between the kinds of affect regulation required:

It is of special importance in regulating affect when the self is threatened. On

the other hand, our explicit measures of self-esteem did not relate to self-

regulation and rather seems to predict a more general state of affect.

In Chapter 4, I will, in search for “the real self”, further dig into the

relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem. I will propose, based on

both theoretical and empirical evidence, that though measures of implicit self-

Preface

7

esteem may not be without problems, in essence implicit self-esteem is closer

to “the real self” than explicit self-esteem. In an additional experiment I

further substantiate this proposition by showing that explicit self-esteem more

resembles implicit self-esteem when an automatic goal to be honest is

activated.

Contents

Preface 5

Chapter 1: Identifying Implicit and Explicit self-esteem 11

Chapter 2: Towards Optimizing the Name Letter Test 35

as a Measure of Implicit Self-Esteem

Chapter 3: Implicit Self-Esteem Goes a Long Way: Common Grounds 59

of Personality, Self-Esteem and Affect Regulation

Chapter 4: Digging for the real attitude: Lessons from research on 81

implicit and explicit self-esteem.

References 105

Summary 117

Summary in Dutch (Nederlandse Samenvatting) 123

Acknowledgements (Dankwoord) 129

KLI Dissertation Series 131

11

Chapter 1

Identifying Implicit and Explicit self-esteem

Chapter 1

12

“One's own self is well hidden from one's own self; of all mines of treasure,

one's own is the last to be dug up.”

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 1883

In the 20th century most psychological measures resembled each other with

regards to their explicit or direct nature. That is, psychological constructs

were measured by asking individuals to indicate their attitudes, feelings,

cognitions or behavior. For example, when measuring self-esteem someone

had to indicate personal agreement with items such as “I have a positive

attitude towards myself”. A collection of agreements and disagreements with

similar statements is then taken as an individual score on the measurement of

that psychological construct, in this example the score on the Rosenberg Self-

Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The sheer prevalence of these self-report

methods of psychological constructs suggests their usefulness and established

value within the field of psychology. However, they rely on two basic

assumptions when applying those measures as indicators of who we are and

how we function: Individuals will and can introspectively indicate what they

think, feel and do. Challenging both assumptions has led in the late 20th

century into a surge of attention in the use and development of implicit, or

indirect, measuring instruments (Fazio & Olson, 2003). However,

falsification of each of these assumptions poses different problems for

psychological research.

The possibility that someone may not be willing to honestly answer

self-report measures is generally acknowledged to pose a validity problem for

the measurement of psychological constructs although the importance of the

problem is subject of ongoing debate (Holtgraves 2004; Alliger & Dwight,

2000). Indirect or implicit measures circumvent this problem since the subject

simply does not know what is being assessed so that the impact of social

Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem

13

desirability factors greatly diminishes.

The idea that individuals actually may not be able to have full

introspective access to themselves can already be found in the works of 18th

and 19th century influential philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and

Nietzsche, but has only been substantiated by empirical evidence conducted

in the last few decades (for reviews see for example Dijksterhuis, & Bargh,

2001; Epley, Savitsky & Kachelski, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;

Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1992). Because traditional self-report measures

cannot capture someone’s introspectively inaccessible parts, our

understanding of psychological functioning might benefit from indirect or

implicit measures that do try the grasp our nonconscious attitudes and

feelings.

So besides circumventing validity problems in self-report measures,

the development of indirect or implicit measures may first and foremost be

useful in exploring the role that both nonconscious content and processes play

in our psychological functioning. In this dissertation I will focus on the latter

and try to demonstrate that implicit measures have added value over and

above explicit measures in understanding the self.

Specifically, the focus will be on the development of the psychological

construct of self-esteem, one of the most researched concepts in psychology,

and its division into two different concepts, namely explicit and implicit self-

esteem. First, a discussion on the emergency of the concept of implicit self-

esteem is presented that focuses on the implicit attitude towards the self and

that resulted especially from research on implicit attitudes and their influence

on our judgments and behavior. This is followed by an analysis and overview

of several instruments that measure implicit self-esteem. Since these measures

are scarcely out of the egg, optimizing them can effectively contribute to our

understanding of implicit self-esteem. In this regard the focus will be on the

development of the name letter test and methods to optimize it as a measure

of implicit self-esteem. The relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem,

which is like any other implicit-explicit relation subject of ongoing debate,

Chapter 1

14

will first be discussed and then connected to other psychological constructs.

Specifically, results will be presented showing that implicit self-esteem relates

over and above explicit self-esteem to important affect-related personality

traits and furthermore serves as a useful predictor of affect-regulation. I will

furthermore attest that these empirical results form the core in the theoretical

development of understanding function and form of implicit self-esteem.

Though I agree with Nietzsche that our own ‘real’ self is well hidden from us,

implicit self-esteem measures may serve as effective tools in digging for it.

This is why this state-of-the-art-overview is ended with an attempt to mine

the self.

The development of implicit self-esteem

Within social psychological research self-esteem has a long-standing

tradition, like any attitude, to be the result of conscious evaluative processes.

Indeed, empirical account of self-esteem resided almost solely in explicit self-

evaluative measures such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,

1965). Psychological research using this explicit conceptualization of self-

esteem showed that people in general have an unrealistically positive explicit

self-esteem, or explicit self-evaluation, that actually promotes psychological

well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988). People with high explicit self-esteem

feel better in the face of threat or after failure (e.g., Brown & Marshall, 2001;

DiPaula & Campbell,2002; Lane, Jones & Stevens, 2002; Pyszczynski,

Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel, 2004) though there is somewhat

conflicting evidence regarding the specificity of this effect: there are also

studies showing that the ability of high-self-esteem individuals to deal better

with threats to the self rather reflects a general disposition in feeling happier

independent of the circumstances (see Baumeister, Campell, Krueger, & Vos,

2003, for a review on the relation between explicit self-esteem and

happiness).

The contention that self-attitudes comprise only conscious evaluations

radically changed when a growing body of empirical research on attitudes


15

showed proof for the existence of implicit attitudes that can influence both

behavior and explicit judgments in a profound manner. Attitudes or

stereotypes can be activated outside of awareness and subsequently influence

our judgments of other people (e.g., Bargh and Pietromonaco,1982) of

ourselves (e.g., Baldwin, Carrel, and Lopez,1991) and even induce behavior

in line or contrary to those attitudes or stereotypes (e.g., Bargh, Chen &

Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).

Furthermore, research has shown that subliminal exposure to a stimulus

influences our attitude toward that stimulus outside of our awareness

(Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980, Zajonc,

2001). This attention to implicit attitudes prompted Greenwald and Banaji

(1995) to introduce the concept of implicit self-esteem that is generally

defined as the introspectively inaccessible part of our self-evaluations (for

reviews see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Koole & DeHart, 2007; Pelham &

Hetts, 1999). In contemporary self-esteem research a division has thus been

made between explicit self-esteem, a form of self-evaluation that occurs under

conscious self-reflection, and implicit self-esteem that is regarded as an

automatic and unconscious evaluation of the self.

Though the concept of implicit self-esteem itself is generally not

contested, both the validity and reliability of contemporary implicit measures

are under debate. Bosson, Swann and Pennebaker (2000) compared seven

different measures of implicit self-esteem on both their validity and

reliability. A meager two measures had acceptable test-retest reliabilities, the

different implicit measures did not correlate among each other and

correlations between the implicit self-esteem measures and several measures

of explicit self-esteem failed to reach significance in most instances.

However, the two implicit measures with acceptable test-rest reliabilities each

did predict criterion variables known to be related to measures of explicit self-

esteem, though both implicit measures each predicted different criterion

variables. These results presented by Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker (2000)

might not seem that promising in measuring implicit self-esteem, there are,

Chapter 1

16

however, several rays of hope.

First of all, since the observation of Bosson et al. (2000) that implicit

self-esteem measures are still in their infancy, several improvements have

been made. In the next section “Measuring Implicit Self-Esteem” these recent

developments and the resulting improved psychometric qualities of the two

most used measures of implicit self-esteem, the self-esteem implicit

association test (self-esteem IAT), originally developed by Greenwald and

Farnham (2000) and the name letter test developed by Kitayama & Karasawa

(1997) will be discussed.

Secondly, ever since the observation by Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker

(2000), additional evidence shows that measures of implicit and explicit self-

esteem do seem to correlate with each other, albeit low to moderate. In the

section “The Relation between Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem” this

evidence is presented, suggesting that previous accounts of the absence of

correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem measures are mainly the

result of several situational factors and psychometric qualities suppressing

this correlation.

Thirdly, there is extensive empirical evidence showing that implicit

self-esteem measures predict important criterion variables and frequently do

so even better than explicit self-esteem measures. Especially the ability of

implicit self-esteem measures to predict the emotion regulation of a person in

self-threatening circumstances is promising. In the section “Function and

Form of Implicit Self-Esteem” these findings will be discussed in more detail.

Measuring Implicit Self-Esteem

Since they seem most promising in measuring implicit self-esteem, in this

section the psychometric qualities are discussed of both the self-esteem IAT,

originally developed by Greenwald and Farnham (2000) and the name letter

test, developed by Kitayama and Karasawa (1997).

The self-esteem IAT is based on the general IAT developed by

Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwarz (1998) and measures the strength of


17

automatic associations between concepts. Along these lines, the assumption

behind the self-esteem IAT is that someone with a more positive implicit self-

concept possesses stronger (automatic) associations between the self-concept

and positive stimuli as opposed to the self and negative stimuli, and thus

should be relatively faster in associating self-items with positive stimuli.

Specifically, the self-esteem IAT measures the relative speed with which a

participant can associate a self-related stimulus with a positive stimulus

compared to a negative stimulus. The self-esteem IAT of Greenwald and

Farnham (2000) consists of two critical blocks of categorization tasks

whereby in each block one response to two sets of paired stimuli is assessed.

In each block two sets of paired stimuli are projected on a screen throughout

that block. In one critical block the first set always consists of a combination

of a self-related stimulus and a positively valenced stimulus (e.g., “me/

pleasant”), while the second set always comprises a not-self related stimulus

and a negatively valenced stimulus (e.g., “not-me/ unpleasant”). A target

stimulus that can be of either four kinds of stimuli (i.e., self-related, not self-

related, positive or negative) appears and has to be correctly classified as fast

as possible to one of the two sets of paired stimuli. In the other critical block

the combination of the two sets of paired stimuli is reversed so that now the

self-related stimulus is combined with a negative stimulus (e.g., “me/

unpleasant”) and the not self-related stimulus with a positive stimulus (e.g.,

“not me/ pleasant”). The difference in response times is subsequently used as

a measure of implicit self-esteem. Since the introduction of the IAT the

scoring algorithm used to assess the IAT effect has been improved resulting

in increased correlations between IAT measures and their parallel explicit

measures as well as improved psychometric qualities of the IAT itself

(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Contrary to these improvements, the

psychometric properties of the IAT have been challenged by several

researchers (see e.g., Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; Rothermund & Wentura,

2004). Specific to the self-esteem IAT, Karpinski (2004) challenged the

notion that the IAT could serve as an adequate measure of implicit self-

Chapter 1

18

esteem. He argued that since the self-esteem IAT is a relative measure that

contrasts positive and negative associations with the self-concept always with

positive and negative associations with the “not-self concept” it is not clear

whether it actually measures the evaluation of the self-attitude or rather the

evaluation someone has of the specific not-self concept used in the IAT. For

example, using a nonspecific other category would lead to different results

than using best friend as category of the not-self concept, since the two

concepts would differ, expectedly, in the positive and negative associations

attached to them.

Though Pinter and Greenwald (2005) partly met this assertion by

showing that a nonspecific other category or a not-me category are relative

neutral in valence, I agree that the inherent relative nature of the (self-esteem)

IAT can be theoretically problematic as a specific measure of implicit self-

esteem, since someone with predominant positive associations with the self-

concept and neutral associations with the not-self concept will show the same

level of implicit self-esteem opposed to someone with neutral associations

with the self-concept and negative association with the not-self concept. To

counter these problems Karpinski and Steinman (2006) recently developed

the single category IAT, modeled after the single target IAT developed by

Wigboldus, Holland, and Van Knippenberg (2005), that assesses the strength

of the evaluative associations of a single category such as the self-concept.

Karpinski and Steinman (2006) show in their research good psychometric

properties of the self-esteem single category IAT, such as a higher correlation

with explicit measures of self-esteem compared to the traditional self-esteem

IAT, though future research is needed to substantiate these preliminary

findings.

Another common measure for implicit self-esteem is the name letter

test, which assesses the liking people have for the letters of their own name.

The idea that the liking people have for their own name letters could serve as

a measure for implicit self-esteem was first put forward by Greenwald and

Banaji (1995). They based their idea on the demonstration by Nuttin (1985)


19

that people tend to prefer the letters in their own name to letters that are not

part of their name. Greenwald and Banaji (1995) argued that since this name

letter effect occurred without the need to think consciously about the self and

without conscious knowledge of the purpose of evaluating letters, it could

serve as a measure of implicit self-esteem. This idea was implemented by

Kitayama and Karasawa (1997) who had participants rate, in random order,

all the letters of the alphabet for their attractiveness. To control for the

baseline attractiveness of the different alphabet of the alphabet, they then

calculated the name letter score as the attractiveness of the name letters minus

the average attractiveness of those same letters rated by participants not

possessing those name letters. This name letter test and its calculation method

of the name letter score has become an important tool to measure implicit

self-esteem, whereby most research using the name letter test focuses only on

the initials of participants, because people prefer their initials to the other

name letters (Koole & DeHart, 2007). The basic assumption underlying this

name letter test is that someone’s name letters are attached to the implicit self-

concept so that evaluations of these name letters represent that persons’

implicit self-esteem and research from Koole, Dijksterhuis, and van

Knippenberg (2001) has shown that the name letter effect is indeed especially

apt in assessing self-evaluations in the absence of conscious self-reflection.

To fully appreciate the potential importance of the name letter test as a

measure of implicit self-esteem, we need to insure that the way we calculate a

name letter score indeed reflects the evaluation of the self-associated name

letters. As mentioned before the traditional name letter score is calculated as

the rated attractiveness of name letters minus the average attractiveness of

those same letters rated by participants not possessing those name letters.

Though this calculation method controls for the baseline attractiveness of the

different letters of the alphabet it neglects the possible influence of general

letter liking of a specific person. Specifically, the traditional calculation

method of the name letter score treats the not-name letter evaluations of a

person as irrelevant evaluations of that person, so these evaluations only

Chapter 1

20

function as a baseline score for calculating the name letter score of other

people. However, not addressing the influence of not-name letter evaluations

introduces a confound. It means that a response bias in letter liking or other

influences on general letter liking can affect the traditional name letter score.

If we want to use the traditional name letter score as a measure of implicit

self-esteem this can be problematic, because someone who happens to dislike

letters in general (e.g., because he just failed a language test) will have a

lower name letter score than someone who happens to like letters (e.g.,

because she just won a game of scrabble).

In the second chapter of this dissertation the assertion that the

traditional calculation method of the name letter effect is confounded is

discussed into more detail and substantiated with empirical evidence showing

that the traditional calculation method of the name letter score cannot

adequately distinguish the evaluation of name letters from not-name letters

and it may therefore mistake response bias or general letter liking for implicit

self-esteem. Because it is crucial for the name letter score as a measure

implicit self-esteem to distinguish the evaluation of the self-associated name

letters from the not-name letters a new scoring algorithm that circumvents the

confound in the traditional scoring algorithm is proposed. The main

difference with the traditional scoring algorithm is that the new scoring

algorithm assesses the unique contribution of the name or initial letter

evaluation by simultaneously controlling for the influence of not-name letter

liking and liking of the specific alphabet letters. Instead of subtracting the

specific evaluation of the different alphabet letters, the new scoring algorithm

removes its influence on the name letter evaluation. More importantly, to

avoid confound of general letter liking, the new scoring algorithm also

removes the influence that not-name letter evaluation has on name letter

evaluation. Statistically this means determining the size of the relation

between name-letter evaluation with both not-name letter evaluation and the

specific alphabet letter evaluation, and then remove their influence using a

regression approach (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). Because this


21

alternative scoring algorithm of the name letter score is by definition

unrelated to not-name letter evaluation it represents a more valid measure of

implicit self-esteem compared to the traditional scoring algorithm.

The relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem

The different accounts on the relation between implicit and explicit self-

esteem show a somewhat mixed picture. Some researchers advocate that the

two forms of self-esteem are independent constructs because they did not find

significant correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem (e.g.,

Baccus, Baldwin & Packer, 2004; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne

& Correll, 2003; Robinson & Meier, 2005; Shimizu & Pelham, 2004;

Spalding & Hardin, 1999). Others, however, did find significant correlations

at least in some experimental conditions or in some samples (e.g., Albers,

Dijksterhuis & Rotteveel, 2009; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000;

Dijksterhuis, Albers & Bongers, 2008; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Jones,

Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002; Jordan, Whitfield, & Zeigler-Hill, 2007;

Koole, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2001; Olson, Fazio, & Hermann,

2007; Pelham, Koole, Hardin, Hetts, Seah & DeHart, 2005) suggesting that an

independency account of both forms of self-esteem is unwarranted. This

contention is further substantiated by two recent meta-analyses showing a

consistent and reliable, albeit weakly, positive relation between explicit self-

esteem and implicit self-esteem measured with both the name letter test

(Krizan & Suls, 2008) and the self-esteem IAT (Hofman, Gawronski,

Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Based on the presented empirical

evidence I believe it is safe to conclude that implicit and explicit self-esteem

are in fact related. The fact that implicit and explicit self-esteem do not relate

in a strong and straightforward way, may be attributable to at least two main

categories of factors that attenuate the relation between implicit and explicit

self-esteem.

First of all, there is growing evidence that the relation between implicit

and explicit self-esteem can be enhanced by psychological variables that

Chapter 1

22

reduce (the need for) an active construction process during the measurement

of explicit self-esteem. Koole, Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg (2001)

showed, for example, that preventing participants from actively constructing

explicit self-esteem (i.e., under high cognitive load) increased the relation

between implicit and explicit self-esteem, while Krizan and Suls (2008)

demonstrated similar results under circumstances when the self-concept is

already activated. Furthermore, Olson, Fazio, and Hermann (2007)

demonstrated an enhanced correlation between implicit and explicit self-

esteem after asking participants to be honest, an effect that was also obtained

by Dijksterhuis et al. (2008) who showed that priming participants with a goal

to be honest resulted in higher correlations between implicit and explicit self-

esteem.

Besides preventing self-presentational strategies, individual differences

in the extent to which self-esteem is deliberately expressed also seem to

influence the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Along these

lines, Pelham et al. (2005) showed that women, who are considered to be

more in touch with their inner feelings and thus rely less on construction

processes, show more overlap between measures of implicit and explicit self-

esteem than men. In a similar fashion, Jordan, Whitfield, and Zeigler-Hill

(2007) demonstrated that people with a higher faith in their own intuition

showed increased correspondence between their implicit and explicit self-

esteem.

Secondly, it may be noted that the generally low correlations between

measures of implicit and explicit self-esteem are also at least in part caused by

the fact that implicit measures are still in a developing stage. Their reliability

is often low (Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000), and it is not fully

understood yet what exactly drives the effects of some of the implicit

measures. Recently, various researchers have proposed improvements to

various measures of implicit self-esteem. Both Karpinski (2004) and Albers,

Dijksterhuis and Rotteveel (2009) suggested improvements to implicit

measures of self-esteem that will likely result in more meaningful correlations


23

between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem.

The evidence presented before support the notion that implicit and

explicit self-esteem do relate in a predictable fashion and as such might reflect

the two parts of a dual process, whereby implicit self-esteem reflects well-

learned associations of the self that are effortlessly activated, as opposed to

the need of an active construction process to express explicit self-esteem.

Both initiatives to strengthen implicit measures of self-esteem as well as

research addressing psychological variables influencing the relation between

implicit and explicit self-esteem give rise to optimism for the usability of self-

esteem measures and their combined contribution in understanding self-

esteem processes in the future.

Function and form of implicit self-esteem

In the previous sections I have tried to show that though measures of implicit

self-esteem are relatively young and still in a developing stage they are

promising in contributing to our understanding of self-esteem, especially

because these measures are, unlike measures of explicit self-esteem, less

likely to be subject to both self-presentational strategies and inaccessibility of

one’s implicit attitudes. Research on the relation between measures of

someone’s implicit and explicit self-esteem shows a small but reliable relation

that is enhanced in an intuitive mindset, when the self is activated, or when an

active construction process of our self-attitude is absent.

So there is convincing empirical support that both forms of self-esteem have

something in common, but to determine what that something may look like

we need to take our exploration a step further. In this respect it might be

insightful to investigate both the unique and shared validity of both implicit

and explicit self-esteem in predicting other relevant psychological constructs

and processes. Not only could it specify the relevance of implicit self-esteem

over and above those other psychological constructs, but it could also clarify

on both the similarities and the differences between implicit and explicit self-

esteem themselves.

Chapter 1

24

The empirical findings on the relation between both implicit and

explicit self-esteem and other psychological traits are sparse but do

consistently demonstrate a relation with those personality traits that have a

strong affective component. Both Connor and Barrett (2005) and Robinson

and Meier (2005) found a positive relation between implicit self-esteem and

Emotional Stability. Robinson and Meier (2005) furthermore showed that

implicit self-esteem still uniquely predicted Emotional Stability when

controlling for explicit self-esteem, however in both experiments implicit and

explicit self-esteem were uncorrelated, so it remains unclear whether implicit

and explicit self-esteem would also share variance with Emotional Stability

when they would in fact be related. This is why in our own research,

presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we investigated whether implicit

and explicit self-esteem would also share variance with Emotional Stability

and three additional personality dimensions (i.e., Extraversion, Conformism

and Egoism) under circumstances when implicit and explicit self-esteem are

in fact related. Taken together the results from our own research demonstrated

that implicit self-esteem, explicit self-esteem, and the two personality

dimensions Extraversion and Emotional Stability were all intrinsically related.

Implicit and explicit self-esteem correlated positively and participants with

high implicit and explicit self-esteem were emotionally more stable and

extraverted. Though the correlations between implicit self-esteem and the

explicit measures were only moderate to small in nature, the variance they

shared was stable across an extended period of time. Because implicit and

explicit related to each other, we could also address the nature of their shared

relation with explicit personality traits. Though explicit self-esteem mediated

the relation between implicit self-esteem and the personality traits

Extraversion and Emotional Stability, in general we did not found full

mediation, suggesting that part of the relation between implicit self-esteem

and (explicit) personality variables is independent from explicit self-esteem,

and thus demonstrates the additional value of implicit self-esteem. Unlike

explicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem was not related to the personality


25

dimensions Egoism and Conformism. These results suggest that the common

grounds between implicit and explicit self-esteem reside predominately in

personality traits that are most strongly connected to affective experience

(DeNeve, & Cooper, 1998).

In order to determine the nature of this unique and shared variance it is

interesting to bridge these findings with research investigating the relation

between both implicit and explicit self-esteem and affect-regulation itself.

Both Robinson and Meier (2005) and Conner and Barrett (2005) showed a

relation between both implicit and explicit self-esteem and affective

experience, with both higher implicit and explicit self-esteem resulting in less

negative affect in daily live. Interestingly, in the study of Connor and Barrett

(2005) implicit self-esteem, as opposed to explicit self-esteem, did not predict

a measure of positive affect in daily life. Since implicit self-esteem did predict

negative affect and not positive affect this might mean that implicit self-

esteem may be specifically related to coping with self-threatening

experiences. Because their study was not set out to test what kind of daily

experiences resulted in these effects it is, however, not clear whether high

implicit self-esteem is indicative of less experienced negative affect in general

or whether it actually specifically pertains to self-threatening and not to self-

affirming experiences.

In another study, Robinson and Meier (2005) did demonstrate that

implicit self-esteem predicted experimenter-reported negative affect after a

self-threat manipulation, but because they did not include a control or self-

affirming condition, and did not measure self-reported affect, it still remains

unclear whether the relation between implicit self-esteem and (negative)

affect is unique to the self threatening circumstances, and if so, whether this

relation would also apply to the actual affective experience of an individual.

This is why we conducted an experiment (see Chapter 3 of this dissertation)

where we elaborated on the role that both implicit and explicit self-esteem

play in affect regulation. Five months prior to the actual experiment

participants completed measures of their implicit and explicit self-esteem and

Chapter 1

26

the personality measures Extraversion and Emotional Stability. At the actual

experiment, participants first completed the same measures for both implicit

and explicit self-esteem and then were subjected to either a self-threatening or

self-affirming manipulation upon which they indicated how they felt. Based

on previous findings of Robinson and Meier (2005) and Meager and Aidan

(2004) and the contention that implicit self-esteem functions as a buffer to

negative affect (Koole & DeHart, 2007) we expected the function of implicit

self-esteem to reside especially in self-threatening circumstances. This is

indeed what we found. Though explicit self-esteem and the personality

dimensions Extraversion and Emotional Stability were predictive of general

experienced affect, implicit self-esteem was specifically related to

experienced affect under self-threatening circumstances. High implicit self-

esteem individuals experienced less negative feelings opposed to low implicit

self-esteem individuals when the self was threatened, but not when the self

was affirmed, an effect that we even could demonstrate with our measure of

implicit self-esteem that we collected 5 months prior to the actual self-threat.

This specific ability for implicit self-esteem to do so was even further

supported by our findings that explicit self-esteem, Extraversion and

Emotional Stability could not do so.

These findings suggest that that the common grounds of implicit and

explicit self-esteem reside mainly in the unaffected self, but diverge in

function when the self is affected. Regardless of the way the self is affected,

explicit self-esteem remains indicative of an individual’s general level of

positive or negative affect. The opposite is true for implicit self-esteem: high

implicit self-esteem individuals feel less negatively affected by threats to their

selves. In this respect our studies support the contention that implicit self-

esteem functions as buffer that only comes into play when it is needed.

Will the real self-esteem please stand up

In the previous paragraphs I have tried to demonstrate that the combined

effort of the explicit and implicit self-esteem constructs has additional value


27

in our attempts to understand function and form of the self, or at least that of

our self-esteem. However, by introducing the concept of implicit self-esteem

we have also complicated matters. Instead of one, we now have two concepts

aimed at measuring self-esteem. So how should we address this complication?

Which concept better reflects our ‘real’ self-esteem? As a first step it makes

sense to consider the empirical evidence presented in the previous paragraphs

demonstrating that implicit and explicit self-esteem are in fact related (in

Chapter 4 of this dissertation additional empirical evidence is provided to

support this notion). From a theoretical point of view such a relation may be

apparent, but these results make it also unlikely that implicit and explicit self-

esteem may each have their own independent concept counterpart from an

empirical point of view. This suggests that the constructs of implicit and

explicit self-esteem are at least indicative of one underlying system that I will

denote from now on as our core self-esteem. This core self-esteem, or core

self-attitude, reflects our self-esteem before it is actually measured,

verbalized, or acted upon. Both implicit and explicit self-esteem try to grasp

this core self-esteem, the question is, however, whether they do equally well.

To answer to what extend both implicit and explicit self-esteem reflect

the core self-esteem, basically there are three areas of empirical data that are

important to consider. The first area consists of the previously mentioned

findings showing that the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem is

enhanced by factors that reduce (the need for) an active construction process

of responding to the explicit self-esteem measures. In itself this is not that

problematic, because core relations between different psychological processes

do support our understanding of human functioning, but because explicit self-

esteem could need more construction, in general there is a bigger chance that

explicit self-esteem measures will be contaminated with other psychological

processes than measures of implicit self-esteem. This makes explicit self-

esteem a less pure measure that is more dissociated from the core self-esteem

than implicit self-esteem.

The second area of findings actually demonstrates that measures of

Chapter 1

28

explicit self-esteem not only have a bigger change of being distorted, but that

empirical findings show that these distortions occur and actually result in the

inability of explicit self-esteem measures to differentiate in important self-

opinions. After a thorough review of the existing literature Baumeister et al.

(2003) concluded that high explicit self-esteem individuals not only comprise

a heterogeneous group of individuals with important differences in their self-

opinions but also that in order to denote these differences and its behavioral

consequences other additional measures such as self-deception, impression

management and narcissism are necessary. If explicit self-esteem itself can

not differentiate between important differences in self-opinions, obviously, it

is impossible to accurately reflect core self-self-esteem with only someone’s

explicit self-esteem.

Binding the findings from the previous paragraphs together provide

further support for the contention that explicit self-esteem is further

dissociated from core self-esteem than implicit self-esteem. Because high

explicit self-esteem individuals comprise a heterogeneous group that is

influenced by other psychological processes and measures of explicit self-

esteem require more construction than measures of implicit self-esteem,

theoretically, implicit self-esteem should be less susceptible to the influence

of those other psychological forces. The third area of findings actually

pertains to empirical support for this notion. Several studies that measured

both implicit and explicit self-esteem demonstrated a positive relation

between explicit self-esteem, but not implicit self-esteem, and measures that

represent self-presentational strategies, such as self-deception, defensive self-

presentation bias, self-enhancement and unrealistic optimism, (e.g., Bosson,

Brown, Ziegler-Hill & Swann, 2003; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-

Browne, & Correll, 2003; Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007; Riketta, 2005). If

we consider core self-esteem to be a stable self-attitude that really reflects

how we feel about ourselves, this also implies that this self-attitude has no

‘reason’ to misrepresent that attitude. It is ‘just’ the attitude of the self, and

only other internal and external psychological forces can instigate a


29

motivation to try to misrepresent this core self-esteem. Because explicit self-

esteem, as opposed to implicit self-esteem, positively relates to

misrepresenting core self-esteem, this further demonstrates that implicit self-

esteem is closer to core self-esteem than explicit self-esteem.

Moreover, an interesting pattern emerges among those studies that

regressed both implicit and explicit self-esteem and their interaction onto the

different dependent measures of self-presentation. While high implicit self-

esteem individuals in general comprises a homogenous group, high explicit

self-esteem individuals were heterogeneous: Those with high explicit self-

esteem and low implicit self-esteem showed more defensive self-presentation

bias, self-enhancement and unrealistic optimism than individuals with both

high explicit and high implicit self-esteem (e.g., Bosson, Brown, Ziegler-Hill

& Swann, 2003; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003;

Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007). I believe this further supports the idea that

implicit self-esteem is a more pure form of core self-esteem than explicit self-

esteem.

Conclusion

In this chapter I focused on the additional value of the construct of implicit

self-esteem in understanding the self. Though the current measures of implicit

self-esteem are still in their infancy, they do predict self-relevant behavior,

affect-regulation and affective personality traits, and they do so over and

above measures of explicit self-esteem. Empirical findings regarding its

function show that implicit self-esteem, if well developed, effectively buffers

against threats to the self. Because implicit self-esteem is closer to core self-

esteem than explicit self-esteem, this also suggests that this buffering function

might be representing an important role our core self-esteem plays in

supporting the self.

Besides the additional value in understanding the self, measures of

implicit self-esteem have also contributed in understanding the desirability of

having high-self-esteem by supporting the notion that high scores on

Chapter 1

30

traditional measures of explicit self-esteem could be either the result of

actually having high self-esteem or the result of other, less desirable self-

presentational strategies. This means that the numerous studies that have

demonstrated less desirable outcomes of having high explicit self-esteem do

not necessarily reflect the consequences of having high self-esteem but may

as well reflect the consequences of not wanting to acknowledge not having

high self-esteem.

Because a score on a measure of explicit self-esteem can be indicative

of two completely different self-opinions, it may no longer be warranted to

use those traditional measures of explicit self-esteem on their own. That is,

every measure of explicit self-esteem should be accompanied by another

measure to separate the bold from the boisterous. In this respect it is wise, but

not sufficient, to include explicit measures that are indicative of these self-

presentational strategies, because these explicit measures may also be subject

to other unwanted factors influencing its construction. Furthermore, explicit

psychological measures require at least some awareness of (the outcome of)

these psychological processes, and thus exclude the possibility that less

conscious processes could also help our understanding of the self. Because

measures of implicit self-esteem need less construction and do not require

awareness of processes related to the self, they represent the best candidates

in furthering our understanding of the self.

We started this state-of-the-art-overview with a statement from

Nietzsche protesting that of all treasures, it is our own that we dig up last. In

‘Thus spoke Zarathustra’ Nietzsche states that this is the result of a lifetime

experience wherein the societal norms are both imposed on us but which we

also impose on ourselves, thus increasing the distances between who we

really are and who we believe or say we are. Because measures of implicit

self-esteem are important empirical tools to diminish precisely these

distances, the self is no longer the last treasure we need to mine for.


31

Limitations and Future Directions

In this chapter I may have come across as being rather harsh on the usability

of explicit self-esteem measures and rather lenient towards measures of

implicit self-esteem. Admittedly, measures of explicit self-esteem have been

used in literally thousands of psychological studies for over more than four

decades, so if such a mature concept as explicit self-esteem still raises serious

concerns regarding its functionality and usability, some exhortation is

justified. In addition, even though recently successful developments have

been made in improving the psychometric qualities of measures of implicit

self-esteem such as the name letter test and the implicit self-esteem IAT, a

critical note is also in place regarding the psychometric qualities of implicit

self-esteem measures.

Although implicit self-esteem as a construct is less prone to biases than

explicit self-esteem and thus closer to the core self-esteem, one may argue

that the relatively lower reliability of the current implicit self-esteem

measures causes distortions of a similar magnitude as when measuring

explicit self-esteem, so in this respect there is no intrinsic evidence to favor

the current implicit self-esteem measures over explicit self-esteem measures.

Furthermore, although it is easier for someone to fake on a measure of explicit

self-esteem it also seems possible to fake on measures of implicit self-esteem,

such as the IAT (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). Empirical evidence concerning

the ability to fake on the name letter test is absent, but it seems very plausible

that if someone is aware of the specifics of the current name letter test and its

scoring algorithm, she will be able, at least to some extent, to influence the

outcomes on the name letter score. This means that effort should not only be

put in identifying and reducing distortions on explicit self-esteem measures

but also on measures of implicit self-esteem.

Another area that warrants additional investigation concerns the special

status that is attributed to individuals with low implicit and high explicit self-

esteem. As mentioned before, these individuals seem to show the most

defensive behaviors, it remains unclear however, whether these findings

Chapter 1

32

really reflect defense behaviors of individuals with low implicit and true high

explicit self-esteem or rather of individuals with low implicit and faked high

explicit self-esteem (or apply to both groups). Because scores on explicit self-

esteem measures can be easily faked, individuals that score high on an

explicit self-esteem measure could really believe to have high explicit self-

esteem but might as well be reluctant in disclosing their knowingly low

explicit self-esteem. This means that defensive behaviors could arise as well

as a consequence of low implicit and explicit self-esteem combined with

reluctance in disclosing the self to others than as a consequence of the

combination between true high explicit and low implicit self-esteem. Because

these two possible profiles clearly differ from a psychological point of view, I

believe further investigation is necessary. One way to shed some light on the

origins of these defensive behaviors would be to test whether similar effects

would still occur when explicit self-esteem is measured under circumstances

when (the need for) active construction is reduced, so that it becomes harder

for individuals to misrepresent their true explicit self-esteem.

Although studies in this area are limited, it seems that the different

measures of implicit self-esteem do not seem to correlate with each other.

Because, in principle, the different measures of implicit self-esteem try to

grasp the same construct, they should be related to at least some extend. The

fact that they do not warrants empirical and theoretical investigation. In this

respect both the reliability and validity of the current implicit self-esteem

measures are in need of further improvement. For those implicit self-esteem

measures that do seem to have acceptable psychometric qualities, such as the

name letter test and the (single category) IAT, it may be wise to look both at

the conceptual differences in the measures themselves and at psychological

factors influencing the relation between them. Since the IAT uses different

stimuli and requires a different response than the name letter test, they may

measure different aspects of implicit self-esteem. In this respect it would be

interesting to investigate whether aggregating the scores on both existing

measures adds more to the prediction of important criterion variables (e.g.,


33

affect-regulation) than adapting both measures in such a way that they

resemble each other more on a conceptual level (e.g., time response window

in the name letter test). In a similar way, it would be interesting to look at the

influence of different psychological contexts (e.g., self-relevance) on the

relation between the different implicit self-esteem measures.

The last critical note to address concerns the stereotype that is

(automatically) activated when confronted with the word “implicit”

throughout this dissertation. It may imply that in the current state of affairs it

is already possible to investigate function and form of that part of the self we

are completely unaware of. I believe, however, that with the current implicit

measurers this is not really possible, because these measures are still subject

to awareness of what is being measured and require, at least to some extent,

awareness on responding to those measures. So, in this respect it is important

to regard the implicitness of the current self-esteem measures from a relative

perspective, whereby the added value of those relatively implicit measures in

understanding our selves is paramount to the discussion how implicit they

really are.

35

Chapter 2

Towards Optimizing the Name Letter Test as a

Measure of Implicit Self-Esteem*

A common measure for implicit self-esteem is the name letter effect,

traditionally calculated as the rated attractiveness of someone’s initials or

name letters minus the average attractiveness of those same letters rated by

people not having those initial or name letters. We present evidence showing

this calculation method is confounded with general letter liking. As such, it

cannot adequately distinguish the evaluation of name letters from not-name

letters, and may therefore mistake response bias or general letter liking for

implicit self-esteem. We propose an alternative calculation method that is

without confounds and assesses the unique contribution of name letter

evaluation by simultaneously controlling for the influence of not-name letter

liking and general liking of the specific letters.

*This chapter is based on: Albers, L., Dijksterhuis, A., & Rotteveel, M. (2009). Towards

Optimizing the Name Letter Test as a Measure of Implicit Self-Esteem. Self and Identity, 8,

63-77.

Chapter 2

36

The notion that most of our behavior is evoked consciously has been

successfully challenged by psychological research using measures and

manipulations that either prevent conscious access and deliberation, or

conceal its real intention (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Within the field of self-

esteem, this research led to the development of the concept of implicit self-

esteem that is generally defined as the introspectively inaccessible part of our

self-evaluations (for reviews see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Koole &

DeHart, 2007; Pelham & Hetts, 1999). A common measure for implicit self-

esteem is the name letter test, which assesses the liking people have for the

letters of their own name (i.e., self-associated evaluations) compared to the

liking of these same letters among people who do not have those letters in

their names. In this article, we argue that the way the score of the name letter

test is traditionally calculated is not adequate to distinguish name letter liking

from not-name letter liking and as such is sensitive to response bias or overall

letter liking. We propose an alternative calculation method that remedies

these issues and serves as a more valid measure for implicit self-esteem.

Origins of the Name Letter Test

The phenomenon that people tend to prefer the letters of their own name to

not-name letters was originally demonstrated by Nuttin (1985) and coined the

name letter effect. Because the effect occurred without the need to think

consciously about the self and without conscious knowledge of the purpose of

evaluating letters, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) suggested the name letter

effect could serve as a measure of implicit self-esteem.

This idea was implemented by Kitayama and Karasawa (1997) who

had participants rate, in random order, all the letters of the alphabet for their

attractiveness. To control for the baseline attractiveness of the different

letters, they calculated the name letter score as the rated attractiveness of the

name letters minus the average attractiveness of those same letters as rated by

participants not possessing those name letters (i.e., they subtracted the

“normative” liking score of the specific alphabet letters). The name letter test

Towards Optimizing the Name Letter Test

37

has become an important tool to measure implicit self-esteem (Koole &

DeHart, 2007) and the method described above is the predominant method to

calculate the name letter score. In all research cited in this paper the method

was used to calculate a name letter score, although Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg,

and Hetts (2002) used the absolute liking scores of name letters, without

subtracting the normative liking score of the specific alphabet letters, in

addition to the traditional method.

In recent years, the name letter effect has contributed considerably to

our understanding of implicit self-esteem. Research using the name letter test

has shown that the name letter effect is indeed especially apt in assessing self-

evaluations in the absence of conscious self-reflection (Koole, Dijksterhuis, &

van Knippenberg, 2001). Furthermore, implicit self-esteem has been linked to

childhood experiences and parenting styles (DeHart, Pelham, & Tennen,

2006), and it has been found to moderate unrealistic optimism and self-

enhancing behaviors (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003). High

implicit self-esteem functions as a buffer helping people to deal with threats

to the self (Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002) or failure (Dijksterhuis,

2004). Finally, it has been found that people gravitate more to other persons,

places and professions that share their name letters (Pelham, Carvallo, &

Jones 2005; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002), demonstrating that name

letter liking can affect major life decisions.

The Importance of Distinguishing Name Letters from Not-Name Letters

To fully appreciate the potential importance of the concept of implicit self-

esteem, we need to insure that the way we measure implicit self-esteem

indeed reflects implicit self-evaluative processes. As mentioned before, the

traditional name letter score is calculated as the rated attractiveness of name

letters minus the average attractiveness of those same letters rated by people

not possessing those name letters. This means that not-name letter evaluations

of a person are treated as irrelevant evaluations in calculating the name letter

score of that person, and only function as a baseline score for calculating the

Chapter 2

38

name letter score of other people.

However, not addressing the influence of not-name letter evaluations

introduces a confound. It means that a response bias in letter liking or other

influences on general letter liking can affect the traditional name letter score.

If we want to use the traditional name letter score as a measure of implicit

self-esteem this can be problematic, because someone who happens to dislike

letters in general (e.g., because he just failed a language test) will have a

lower name letter score than someone who happens to like letters (e.g.,

because she just won a game of scrabble).

A hypothetical example can illuminate this problem. In Table 2.1, we

show a hypothetical dataset with letter-evaluations and the traditional name

letter score. To simplify matters we only show evaluations of three different

letters, but the same logic would apply if we would use all letters of the

alphabet. What happens here? Although Suzy evaluates the S, her own name

letter, as less attractive than other letters, according to the traditional

calculation method she clearly shows a positive name letter score. This is not

caused by the fact that she likes her name letter, but by the fact that she likes

letters in general. Jack and Frank prefer their name letter to other letters, but

in fact, Jack has a negative name letter score, and the name letter score of

Frank suggests no preference for his name letter over the not-name letters.

Table 2.1 Hypothetical Letter-Evaluations and Traditional Name Letter Scores

F S J NLStrada

Frank 6 4 5 0

Suzy 9 7 9 3

Jack 3 4 6 -1

Note. NLStrad represents the name letter score using the traditional calculation method.

a Calculating for example the NLStrad for the initial F of Frank = 6 – [(9 + 3)/2] = 0.

Because the traditional name letter score is sensitive to general letter

liking, any factor, manipulation or response bias (not just winning a game of


39

scrabble) that influences general letter liking will, by definition, influence the

traditional name letter score and thus appear to have influenced implicit self-

esteem. Suppose we would show participants either a funny cartoon or, in a

control condition, something more neutral. Subsequently, they rate letters, and

because the traditional name letter score differs between conditions, we

conclude that watching cartoons enhances implicit self-esteem. Although it is

not impossible that watching cartoons could positively affect implicit self-

esteem, in this case it is much more likely that differences in mood caused

participants to evaluate letters in general as more or less attractive (Mayer,

Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992). Because the traditional name letter

score is not equipped to tell one from the other, it mistakes affect for implicit

self-esteem.

An Alternative Calculation Method for the Name Letter Score

If we want to use the name letter score as a measure of implicit self-esteem, it

is crucial that we are able to distinguish between the evaluation of the name

letters and the not-name letters. In order to achieve this we believe it is

necessary that the evaluation of not-name letters is incorporated in calculating

a name letter score. One way to do this is to extend the traditional calculation

method by also subtracting the not-name letter evaluation from the name

letter evaluation. However, simply subtracting the not-name letter evaluation

could theoretically lead to the same problem as mentioned before, as the

actual size of the impact of not-name letter evaluation is not known. It could

lead to the same confound as in the traditional name letter score and it could

also lead to overcorrection resulting in a similar confound but now in opposite

direction: Someone who happens to like letters will have a lower name letter

score then someone who happens to dislike letters. We believe this possibility

makes this calculation method a less suitable option. In the results section we

will present empirical evidence that supports this notion.

Another alternative method for incorporating the influence of not-name

letter liking is to standardize the evaluation of the alphabet letters of each

Chapter 2

40

individual separately, prior to calculating the traditional name letter score.

Though this method would remove at least part of the confound of general

letter liking, this method will also partly remove the influence of the ‘true’

name letter effect. This is because in standardizing each letter evaluation, the

mean of someone’s overall letter evaluation is subtracted from the specific

letter evaluation, and then followed by dividing it by the standard deviation of

someone’s overall letter evaluation. If we compare two individuals, each with

the same not-name letter evaluations, but with one person showing higher

evaluation on the name letters, both the standard deviation and mean letter

evaluation of the latter person will be higher so that the standardized scores of

the name letter evaluations of this person will be relatively lower.

Furthermore, because the standardized letter evaluations of the not-name

letters partly determines the standardized name letter evaluations, and vice

versa, a confounding correlation between the two could still ensue. In the

results section we will present empirical evidence that supports these possible

problems with this calculation method.

Hence, in order to eliminate a possible confound of general letter liking

it is not sufficient to subtract someone’s not-name letter evaluation from the

traditional name letter score. In addition, standardizing each individual’s letter

evaluation prior to calculating the traditional name letter effect could remove

part of the name letter effect itself.

If we want to use this name letter evaluation as a measure of implicit

self-esteem both the influence of not-name letter liking and specific letter

evaluation need to be controlled for. We can accomplish this statistically

using the following two steps (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003): First,

both the average not-name letter evaluation and the average normative score

of the name letters are regressed onto the average name letter evaluation. The

standardized regression coefficients that follow from this analysis are a

measure of the influence both potential confounds have on the name letter

evaluation. Secondly, to remove the influence of both potential confounds we

need to multiply both the not-name letter evaluation and the normative score


41

by their unstandardized regression coefficients, before subtracting them from

the name letter evaluation. This results in the calculation method for the

alternative name letter score that is depicted in Equation 1:

NLS = NLE – (B1 * NNL + B2 * SLE) (1)

In this equation, B1 and B2 are the unstandardized regression

coefficients when simultaneously predicting name letter evaluation (NLE)

from both the not-name letter evaluation (NNL) and the normative score of

the name letters (SLE). This method results in a name letter score (NLS) that,

by definition, is unrelated to both not-name letter evaluation and the specific

letter evaluation of the name letters.

To recap, our main point is that we should insure that the name letter

score is not confounded with response bias or any factor that influences

general letter liking. The alternative name letter score we propose indeed does

this, but remains sensitive to factors that do influence the evaluation of the

self-associated name letters. We believe that it makes the alternative

calculation method of the name letter score a better measure of implicit self-

esteem than the traditional method. In the remainder of this article, we will

present data from three different studies that empirically support this notion.

Advantages of the Alternative Name Letter Score: Empirical Evidence

Overview of the Studies

We collected name letter evaluations from three different studies to compare

the traditional calculation method of the name letter score with the alternative

calculation method we propose. We will only discuss the results of every

study to the extent they pertain to the calculation method itself. For more

information on the results of Study 1 and 2, we refer to Albers, Dijksterhuis,

and Rotteveel (2009), and for Study 3 to Albers, Dijksterhuis, and Rotteveel

(2004). In every study, participants completed the experiment on a PC-

computer. We administered the name letter test as follows: Participants were

Chapter 2

42

informed that they were about to evaluate simple stimuli, in this case

evaluating the attractiveness of the letters. They were asked to give their first

impression on each letter and not to think too long but to respond intuitively.

Letters were always presented in random order. In every study participants

indicated their liking of every letter by clicking on the corresponding area of a

9-point scale (Study 1) or a continuous scale (Study 2 and 3), ranging from

ugly to beautiful. In Study 2 and 3 the scores on the letter evaluation could

range from -10, representing the left end of the scale (i.e., ugly), to 10,

representing the right end of the scale (i.e., beautiful) and a score of zero

representing the middle point of the scales (i.e., neutral).

At the end of Study 1 and 2, participants provided their full names on

an informed consent form. In Study 3, participants provided their initials. All

participants were undergraduates from the University of Amsterdam and

received course credits for participation. We will first provide some additional

information about each individual study.

Study 1. A total of 384 participants (269 female) completed the name

letter test and Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale

(SSES). The order of the name letter test and SSES was counterbalanced.

After completing these measures, 184 out of these 384 participants also

completed the Dutch Narcissism Scale (Ettema & Zondag, 2002). This scale

measures two distinct aspects of narcissism. The first aspect addresses

internally directed narcissism, and measures someone’s belief of being

important to other people (e.g., “I am disappointed that people do not always

see me for who I really am”). The second aspect is externally directed

narcissism, and measures someone’s believe of influencing other people (e.g.,

“I have no problems in persuading others to do what I deem necessary”).

Study 2. All 128 participants (82 female) completed the name letter test

prior to the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). After a filler

task they answered several questions concerning their participation in the


43

experiment, and the perceived stability of their self-esteem.

Study 3. Fifty-eight participants (40 female) were randomly assigned to

write either about a recent positive experience or a recent negative experience

and then indicated how they felt after describing the event on two continuous

scales ranging from respectively very negative to very positive, and very

angry to very cheerful. Scores on both scales were aggregated to form one

measure of experienced affect (α = .82), with higher scores reflecting more

positive affect. They then completed the name letter test, followed by the

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965).

Calculating the traditional and alternative name letter scores.

Most research using the name letter test focuses only on the initials of

participants, because people prefer their initials to the other name letters

(Koole & DeHart, 2007). This is why we will mainly focus on comparing the

traditional and alternative name letter score using as name letters the

evaluation of the initials of participants and not the evaluation of all name

letters. We will however, also address the relation between the evaluation of

all the name letters and not-name letter evaluations, to show that both initial

evaluation and evaluation of all name letters give rise to the same confound

when using the traditional calculation method of the name letter score.

We calculated the traditional name letter score (NLStrad) as the

average evaluation of someone’s initials (NLE) minus the normative score of

these initials¹ (SLE) which we calculated as the average evaluation of the

corresponding letters rated by participants not possessing those name or initial

letters² (SLE), yielding the following equation (see also Kitayama &

Karasawa, 1997, for a similar approach):

NLStrad = NLE – SLE (2)

We calculated the alternative name letter score (NLSalt) as the average

Chapter 2

44

evaluation of someone’s initials (NLE) minus the influence of both the

average evaluation of not-name letters³ (NNL) and the evaluation of those

same letters rated by participants not possessing those name or initial letters

(SLE) yielding Equation 3. In the Appendix we present a detailed description

of the different steps involved in calculating this alternative name letter score.

NLSalt = NLE – (B1 * NNL + B2 * SLE) (3)

In Table 2.2, we present the regression coefficients for the three different

studies.

Because the calculation method we propose determines whether in any

given sample both not-name letter evaluation and the normative score of the

name letters have a confounding influence on the name letter score, a name

letter score does not have to be corrected if its corresponding confounds are

absent (i.e., non-significant) in that sample.

Table 2.2 Summary of Regression Analyses for NNL and SLE predicting NLE

B SE B β p

Study 1 (N = 384)

NNL 0.61 0.09 .34 .000

SLE 0.67 0.25 .13 .010

Study 2 (N = 128)

NNL 0.48 0.15 .28 .001

SLE 0.37 0.29 .11 .207

Study 3 (N = 58)

NNL 0.98 0.23 .51 .000

SLE -0.26 0.45 -.07 .569

Note. R² = .14 for Study 1; R² = .09 for Study 2; R² = .26 for Study 3; NLE = average evaluation

of initials; in Study 1 and 2, NNL = not-name letter evaluation; in Study 3, NNL = not-initial

letter evaluation; SLE is the average evaluation of the same initials evaluated by participants for

whom it is not a name-letter (Study1 and 2) or not an initial letter (Study3).


45

This is why we excluded NNL or SLE from Equation 3, when its

corresponding unstandardized regression coefficient (i.e., B1 or B2) showed

no significant relation with NLE. However, in all our studies we did find a

confounding influence of not-name letter liking, and hence, B1 was always

included. Furthermore, in- or excluding B2 when it was not significant did not

result in different results than presented in this article.

In our previous section, we mentioned two other possible calculation

methods of the name letter score that, in theory, should be less effective than

the method we propose in Equation 2. To empirically test whether these other

calculation methods indeed show poorer psychometric qualities, we also

included them in our analyses. The first calculation method is an extension of

the traditional calculation method by also subtracting the average evaluation

of not-name letters (NNL). This means that both unstandardized regression

coefficients B1 and B2 from Equation 3 are now fixed to a value of 1,

resulting in the following equation we used to calculate this possible name

letter score:

NLSext = NLE – SLE – NNL (4)

In the second possible method, the letter evaluations of an individual are

first standardized before calculating the traditional name letter score. This

means that first the mean letter evaluation of an individual is subtracted from

each letter evaluation of that individual. These corrected alphabet letter

evaluations are then divided by the standard deviation accompanying the

mean letter evaluation of that individual. With these standardized letter

evaluations we calculate a name letter score in the same way as the traditional

name letter score is calculated.

Results

We first address the problematic (i.e., confounded) relation between the

traditional calculation method of the name letter score and the evaluation of

Chapter 2

46

not-name letters. Secondly, we look at the impact general letter liking can

have on the name letter score depending on which calculation method of the

name letter score is used, followed by evidence concerning the relation

between not-name letter evaluation and several relevant explicit measures.

Finally, we address the relation between explicit self-esteem and implicit self-

esteem, as measured with the different calculation methods.

The confound of not-name letter evaluation on the traditional name letter

score.

We mentioned before that the traditional name letter score is confounded with

general letter liking. We tested this by correlating the traditional name letter

score of participants with their average evaluation of the not-name letters. In

every study, the traditional name letter score correlated positively with not-

name letter evaluation. The correlation between traditional name letter score,

based on the initials, and the not-name letter evaluation was r = .34, p < .000,

in Study 1; in Study 2, r = .29, p < .001; and in Study 3, r =.48, p < .000. The

correlation between the traditional name letter score, based on all name

letters, and the not-name letter evaluation was even more pronounced in the

two studies where we obtained all name letters from participants, r = .60 , p <

.000, in Study 1; and in Study 2, r = .44, p < .000. These positive correlations

do not make sense theoretically. If we conceive of not-name letters as merely

neutral, no correlation should exist between not-name letter evaluation and

the traditional name letter score. Our data however, suggest that between 8

and 36 % of the variance in the traditional name letter score is actually caused

by not-name letter liking.

Extending the traditional name letter score by also subtracting the not-

name letter evaluation, as depicted in Equation 4, resulted in both Study 1 and

2 in a name letter score that was still confounded with not-name letter

evaluation, but now in the opposite direction. The name letter score and the

not-name letter evaluation correlated negatively, in Study 1, r = -.23, p < .000;

in Study 2, r = -.29, p < .001. This means that the extended calculation


47

method of the traditional name letter score is not suitable as a specific

indicator of name letter liking.

Standardizing each letter evaluation of an individual before calculating

the traditional name letter score resulted in a name letter score that still

correlated negatively with not-name letter evaluation in Study 1, r = -.11, p <

.04. In Study 2 this confound was only marginal significant, r = -.14, p < .11,

while in Study 3 the confound was absent, r = .08, p = .55. Though the

standardizing method did show some effect of the confound of general letter

liking, the impact of this confound is smaller compared to the traditional

calculation method or the extended calculation method.

The alternative name letter score we proposed in Equation 4 is by

definition uncorrelated with not-name letter evaluation. Because this method

gets rid of any confound with general letter liking, we believe that in the light

of this confound it is the best candidate to calculate a name letter score.

The influence of general letter liking on the traditional name letter score.

The positive correlations between the traditional name letter score and the

evaluation of not-name letters may have other undesirable consequences. If

some variable affects general letter liking, the results from the traditional

name letter score will lead to the unwarranted conclusion that this variable is

related to implicit self-esteem. Although we did not specifically design our

studies to test this in practice, we did find such an influence of general letter

liking on the traditional name letter score when we used gender of the

participant as a factor. In all three studies, men showed significantly higher

ratings of both name and not-name letter evaluation than women did. This

difference in general letter liking actually resulted, in a higher traditional

name letter score for men than for women: in Study 1, F(1, 382) = 6.0, p <

.02; in Study 2, F(1, 126) = 4.7 , p < .03; in Study 3, F(1, 56) = 6.2, p < .05.

Standardizing each letter evaluation before calculating the traditional

name letter score led the differences between men and women in Study 1 and

2 ( both ps > .22) to disappear, except for Study 3, where we still found

Chapter 2

48

marginally significant difference F(1,56) = 3.6, p < .06. In contrast, both our

alternative calculation method as well as the extended calculation method led

the differences between men and women to disappear in all studies4 (all ps >

.26).

The results from this section show that significant differences in implicit

self-esteem between certain groups can in fact be caused by general letter

liking when we use the traditional name letter score. This means that in these

instances general letter liking is mistaken for implicit self-esteem. We believe

this is an unwanted aspect of the traditional name letter score that is resolved

in our alternative name letter score, because the influence of general letter

liking is removed.

The relation between not-name letter evaluation and relevant explicit

measures.

The findings discussed above clearly demonstrate that correlations between

the traditional name letter score and other variables should be treated with

caution as these correlations may be caused by general letter liking. In Table

2.3, we present data that show that in both Study 1 and 3, we did find

additional evidence for such an influence of general letter liking on the

traditional name letter score.

In Study 1, we found a significant relation between the traditional

name letter score and both internally directed narcissism, r = .20, p < .007,

and externally directed narcissism, r =.18, p < .02. However, also not-name

letter evaluation correlated with externally directed narcissism, r = .27, p <

.0003. On the other hand, the alternative name letter score, did not correlate

significantly with externally directed narcissism, r = .08, p = .29, but did

correlate with internally directed narcissism, r = .20, p < .006. This suggests

that not-name letter evaluation mediates the relation between the traditional

name letter score and externally directed narcissism. We confirmed this in a

mediation analysis using the SPSS-Macro from Preacher & Hayes (2005),

with the traditional name letter score as independent, external narcissism as


49

dependent, and not-name letter evaluation as mediator, showing full

mediation of not-name letter evaluation. The bootstrapped estimate of the

indirect effect was 0.016, p < 0.01, while the direct effect of the traditional

name letter score on external narcissism after controlling for not-name letter

evaluation was no longer significant, β = .09, t(181) = 1.13 , p = .26. Though

both the alternative and traditional name letter score show that implicit self-

esteem relates to internally directed narcissism, the traditional name letter

score leads to the unwarranted conclusion that implicit self-esteem also relates

to external narcissism.

Table 2.3 Correlations Between the Traditional and Alternative Name Letter

Scores, Not-name Letter Evaluation, and Relevant Explicit Measures.

N NLSalt NLStrad NLSext ZNLS NNL

Study 1

Narcissism internal 184 .20** .20** .20** .19* .03

Narcissism external 184 .08 .18* .02 -.01 .27***

SSES 384 .19*** .23*** .16** .15** .15**

Study 2

RSES 128 .29*** .27** .24** .17 .05

Study 3

Affect PE 30 .10 .36* .14 .12 .43*

Affect NE 28 .58*** .61*** .61*** .55** .21

RSES 58 .32* .47*** .29* .16 .44***

Note. SSES = State Self-Esteem Scale; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Affect PE = affect positive

event; Affect NE = affect negative event; NLStrad = traditional name letters score; NLSalt = alternative

name letter score; NLSext = extended name letter score; ZNLS = traditional name letter score based on the

standardized letter evaluations; in Study 1 and 2, NNL = evaluation of not-name letters; in Study3, NNL =

evaluation of not-initial letters.

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

In Study 3, we found another unwanted influence of general letter liking.

Chapter 2

50

In Table 2.3, it is shown that the traditional name letter score correlated

significantly with reported affect, both after describing a negative and after a

positive personal experience, demonstrating that in both conditions a higher

traditional name letter score was associated with more positive affect.

Furthermore, these correlations did not differ between the two conditions, z =

1.2, p = .23. However, not-name letter evaluation also correlated positively

with the reported affect after describing a positive personal experience,

suggesting that the relation between the traditional name letter score and

affect could in fact be due to general letter liking. Indeed, the alternative name

letter score that controls for not-name letter evaluation did not correlate with

the reported affect after describing a positive personal experience, but did

correlate after describing a negative personal experience, resulting in a

significant difference between the two correlations, z = 2.0, p < .04. Again,

using the traditional or alternative name letter score results in different

conclusions on the theory of implicit self-esteem. Should we have used the

traditional name letter score we would have concluded – erroneously- that

after self-threat and after self-enhancement, implicit self-esteem relates

similarly to the way we feel. The results from the alternative name letter score

actually show that this relation can be specified to situations where the self is

threatened.

The results from both the extended calculation method and standardizing

letter evaluations before calculating a traditional name letter score were

similar to our proposed alternative method, showing that on these aspects

these methods had better psychometric qualities then the traditional

calculation method.

The relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Though measures of

implicit and explicit self-esteem both refer to the same construct (i.e., self-

esteem) they tend to correlate only weakly (Pelham et al., 2005). We have

shown that when we use the traditional name letter score, not-name letter

evaluation can obscure the relation between implicit self-esteem and other


51

relevant constructs. Because measures of explicit self-esteem could be equally

sensitive to such a response bias, it is important to rule out the possibility that

the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem is in fact (partly) driven

by similarities in response bias on its measures. In Table 2.3, we present the

correlations between two measures of explicit self-esteem, not-name letter

evaluation, and the different name letter scores. Though in both Study 1 and 3

we found a significant correlation between the measure of explicit self-esteem

and not-name letter evaluation, in all studies the correlation between the

alternative name letter score (i.e., controlling for not-name letter evaluation)

and the measure of explicit self-esteem remained significant, in Study 1, r =

.19, p < .0002; in Study 2, r = .29, p = < .001; in Study 3, r = .32 , p < .02.

Mediation analysis with the traditional name letter score as independent,

explicit self-esteem as dependent, and not-name letter evaluation as mediator,

confirmed the absence of complete mediation in Study 1, 2 and 3, but did

show partial mediation of not-name letter evaluation in Study 3: bootstrapping

resulted in a significant indirect effect of 0.39, p < .05, while the direct effect

of the traditional name letter score on the measure of explicit self-esteem

remained significant after controlling for not-name letter evaluation, β = .28,

t(55) = 2.5, p < .01. These results show that though both the alternative and

the traditional name letter score correlate reliable with explicit self-esteem,

the alternative name letter score we propose provides a more valid estimate of

this relation.

The extended name letter score did correlate significant with explicit

self-esteem in all three studies though in study 1 this correlation appeared to

be less strong compared to the traditional name letter score, z = 1.6 , p < .06

(one-tailed).

Standardizing letter evaluations prior to calculating the traditional

name letter score resulted in a significantly lower correlation in Study 1

compared to the traditional name letter score, z = 1.7 , p < .05 (one-tailed). In

Study 2, this difference was marginally significant compared to both the

traditional calculation method and our proposed alternative calculation

Chapter 2

52

method, respectively z = 1.3, p < .10 (one-tailed); z = 1.5, p < .07 (one-tailed).

Furthermore, in Study 3 the correlation between the standardized name letter

score and explicit self-esteem was no longer significant, r = .16, p = .23, and

significant lower compared to the traditional name letter score, z = 2.5 , p <

.005, and marginally significant lower compared to our proposed alternative

name letter score, z = 1.3, p < .10 (one-tailed).

When we compare the correlations between explicit self-esteem and

the different name letter scores, both our proposed alternative name letter

score and the traditional name letter score do equally well, and better than

both the extended and standardized name letter score. However, the relation

between the traditional name letter score and explicit self-esteem was

mediated, and thus confounded, by not-name letter evaluation in Study 3. We

believe that these findings again rule in favor of our proposed alternative

name letter score as a measure of implicit self-esteem.

Discussion

In this article, we presented an alternative method for calculating the name

letter score and demonstrated that, compared to the traditional calculation of

the name letter score, the alternative name letter score we propose has better

psychometric qualities and serves as a more adequate measure of implicit

self-esteem. Both on a theoretical and empirical level we presented

converging evidence showing that the traditional name letter score does not

adequately deal with the evaluation of not-name letters, potentially leading to

unwarranted conclusions about implicit self-esteem. In all the three studies we

presented, the traditional name letter score correlated positive with not-name

letter evaluation. This confound could have led to the unwarranted conclusion

that men had higher implicit self-esteem than women, whereas our proposed

alternative method did not give rise to this problem. Furthermore, the

traditional name letter score suggested that implicit self-esteem is related to

both internally and externally directed narcissism and is similarly related to

experience of both self-threat and self-enhancement. The alternative name


53

letter score however, only showed a relation between implicit self-esteem and

internally directed narcissism, and further specified that implicit self-esteem is

only related to affective experiences after self-threat (incidentally, this result

corroborates data by Conner and Barrett (2005) who showed that implicit

self-esteem predicts negative but not positive feelings in daily life).

The two other possible name letter scores we presented besides our

alternative name letter score did not fully resolve these issues. Simply

subtracting not-name letter evaluation still resulted in the confound of general

letter liking, making it impossible to guaranty that implicit self-esteem effects

based on such name letter scores are not the result of factors influencing

general letter liking. Standardizing every letter evaluation before calculating

the traditional name letter score did show better psychometric qualities

compared to the traditional name letter score, but resulted in a less sensitive

measure of implicit self-esteem, because part of the ‘true’ name letter effect is

also removed from the name letter score.

In sum, when using the traditional name letter score, it remains unclear

what part of the relation between the traditional name letter score and other

relevant variables or factors actually reflect the specific influence of implicit

self-esteem. Our alternative calculation method of name letter effect is

calculated in such a way that precludes the possibility in any given sample

that the resulting name letter scores are confounded with either general letter

liking or the normative rating of the name letters. We believe this makes our

alternative calculation method of the name letter score a more valid measure

of implicit self-esteem with better psychometric qualities.

Chapter 2

54

Endnotes

¹ The normative score of someone’s initials (SLE) is based on letter

evaluations of participants for whom it is not a name letter. This means that

the normative score of a prevalent name letter will be based on fewer

participants than the normative score of a rare name letter, and the former

could potentially be less reliable. However, in all our studies, the normative

ratings of prevalent name letters actually showed smaller standard deviations

than those of rare letters. This means that prevalent letters are judged more

similar and need fewer normative ratings than less frequent letters to become

reliable. In addition to this finding we also correlated the average evaluation

of each letter from Study 1 with its corresponding average evaluation of that

letter in Study 2, resulting in a correlation of r = .78, p < .000 (i.e., showing

an adequate overall reliability of the normative scores). If the prevalence of a

letter influences the reliability, than controlling for this influence should

lower the correlation mentioned before. In fact, the partial correlation of the

evaluations of letters between Study 1 and 2, while controlling for prevalence,

actually resulted in a slightly higher correlation of r = .81, p < .000,

suggesting that the normative ratings of subjects with common name letters

do not suffer from diminished reliability.

²In Study 3, we used the average evaluation of participants not

possessing the initial letters. In Study 1 and 2, we used the average evaluation

of the letters rated by participants not possessing those name letters. However,

using the average evaluation of participants not possessing the initial letters in

Study 1 and 2 resulted in almost identical name letter scores and did not

influence any other reported relations.

³In Study 1 and 2, we calculated someone’s average not-name letter

evaluation excluding all name letters of that person. In Study 3, where we

only obtained the initials of the participants, we calculated someone’s average

letter evaluation excluding the initials of that person. 4Though these findings clearly demonstrate the impact a confound of

not-name letter evaluation can have on the name letter score, the gender


55

effects themselves might not generalize outside the University of Amsterdam.

In their research, Pelham et al. (2005) did not find any differences between

men and women on the traditional name letter score among six different

samples, one of the samples also consisting of Dutch students, but at a

different university.

Chapter 2

56

APPENDIX

Calculating the Alternative Name Letter Score

Below we have described the steps necessary to calculate the alternative name

letter score. A full SPSS-syntax of these steps can be obtained from the first

author.

To calculate the alternative name letter score, we assume that all name

letters of a participant can be identified. Furthermore, we assume that a name

letter score based on someone’s initials is calculated (the same approach

described below can be used to calculate the name letter score based on all

name letters but now by substituting the evaluation of the initials with the

evaluation of all name letters). First, it is necessary to create a (SPSS)-data

file with the following variables:

1. Someone’s initials

2. The evaluation of these initials

For example if someone’s name is Suzy Jones, the scores on the letter ‘S’ and

‘J’ represent the evaluations of the initials.

3. The 26 evaluations of all letters, whereby the evaluations of the letters

that are in fact name-letters for that individual are set to missing values

For Suzy Jones this means that for the 26 alphabet letter evaluations, the

evaluations of the letters ‘S’, ‘U’, ‘Z’, ‘Y’, ‘J’,‘O’, ‘N’, ‘E’ are set to missing

values

4. The mean of someone’s not-missing evaluations of the alphabet letters

from step 3 is calculated (NNL). This mean represents the average

evaluation of the not-name letters for each individual.

5. The mean of each alphabet letter from the not-missing evaluations of

the alphabet letters from step 3 is calculated. These means represent

the normative ratings of the alphabet letters based on all not-name

letter evaluations.

6. The two variables representing the normative ratings of someone’s

initials are created.


57

For Suzy Jones the two new variables that are created in step 6 are the

normative scores on the letters ‘S’ and ‘J’ from step 5.

7. Two new variables are created: the mean of the two variables from step

6 (SLE) and the mean evaluation of the initials (NLE)

8. The variables NNL and SLE are regressed onto NLE, and the

corresponding unstandardized regression coefficients B1 and B2 can

now be used to calculate the name letter score using the following

equation:

NLS = NLE – (B1 * NNL + B2 * SLE)

59

Chapter 3

Implicit Self-Esteem Goes a Long Way: Common Grounds of

Personality, Self-Esteem and Affect Regulation*

*This chapter is based on: Albers, L., Dijksterhuis, A., & Rotteveel, M. (2009). Implicit self-

esteem goes a long way: Common grounds of Personality, Self-Esteem and Affective

Regulation. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Chapter 3

60

Self-esteem research has a long and rich history in several areas of

psychology, but until recently self-esteem theory was almost entirely based on

conscious self-reports. Inspired by social cognition research demonstrating

the value of assessing evaluations in a more unobtrusive way, the last decade

self-esteem researchers have shown an increasing interest in the more

intuitive components of the self. Consequently, several implicit self-esteem

measures were developed such as the name letter test (Kitayama & Karasawa,

1997), the self-esteem IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and the implicit

self-evaluation survey (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999).

Though the different measures of implicit self-esteem do not seem to

correlate (e.g., Riketta, 2005; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000), two

recent meta-analyses do show a consistent, albeit weak, positive relations

between explicit self-esteem and implicit self-esteem measured with both the

name letter test (Krizan & Suls, 2008) and the self-esteem IAT (Hofman,

Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Furthermore, most implicit

self-esteem researchers do not assume that implicit and explicit self-esteem

are theoretically completely independent (Chapter 4 of this thesis), suggesting

that some kind of relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem should

exist. Consequently, research on the relation between implicit and explicit

self-esteem diverged in into two different directions.

First, a considerable amount of research focused on the differences

between someone’s implicit and explicit self-esteem, showing that especially

having high explicit and low implicit self-esteem can result in maladaptive

self-regulatory strategies. For example, people with high explicit and low

implicit self-esteem display more unrealistic optimism (Bosson, Brown,

Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003), are prone to prejudice (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna,

Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2005), and are more narcissistic and display less

stable self-esteem (Zeigler-Hill, 2006).

A second approach to implicit self-esteem research focuses on the

possibility that implicit and explicit self-esteem reflect the two parts of a dual

process, whereby implicit self-esteem reflects well-learned associations of the

Implicit Self-Esteem, Personality, and Affect Regulation

61

self that are effortlessly activated, as opposed to the need of an active

construction process to express explicit self-esteem (Chapter 4 of this thesis).

Though research in this area is limited, its results support the idea that

circumstances that reduce (the need for) an active construction process causes

explicit self-esteem to correlate stronger with implicit self-esteem. Koole,

Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg (2001) showed, for example, that

preventing participants from actively constructing explicit self-esteem (i.e.,

under high cognitive load) increased the relation between implicit and explicit

self-esteem, while Olson, Fazio, and Hermann (2007) demonstrated an

enhanced correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem after asking

participants to be honest 9see also Chapter 4) .

Besides preventing self-presentational strategies, individual differences in

the extent to which self-esteem is deliberately expressed also seem to

influence the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Along these

lines, Pelham et al. (2005) showed that women, who are considered to be

more in touch with their inner feelings and thus rely less on construction

processes, show more overlap between measures of implicit and explicit self-

esteem than men. In a similar fashion, Jordan, Whitfield, and Zeigler-Hill

(2007) demonstrated that people with a higher faith in their own intuition

showed increased correspondence between their implicit and explicit self-

esteem.

The first approach described before resulted in a better understanding of

what happens when the two forms of self-esteem conflict, whereas the latter

sheds light on the factors influencing the relation between the two forms of

self-esteem. However, both approaches are, de facto, less effective in

specifying the nature of the common grounds between implicit and explicit

self-esteem. Put differently, they specify when implicit and explicit self-

esteem overlap or what happens when the two conflict, but do not show us

what these common grounds might be and where they diverge.

In order to clarify what the common grounds between implicit and

explicit self-esteem are, and where they would diverge, a different approach is

Chapter 3

62

needed. In this respect we think it is insightful to look at possible relations

that both implicit and explicit self-esteem have with other relevant

psychological constructs. First of all, it would place implicit and explicit self-

esteem within a broader context of complex human functioning. Secondly, it

could specify the relevance of implicit self-esteem over and above those other

psychological constructs.

More importantly, the nature of the relation between other psychological

construct and both implicit and explicit self-esteem, especially under

circumstances when the latter two are correlated, can provide insight into both

the similarities and the differences between implicit and explicit self-esteem

themselves. To our knowledge, there is only one study that actually related

both implicit and explicit self-esteem to a third psychological construct.

Robinson and Meier (2005) showed in two experiments that both implicit and

explicit self-esteem were independently and both positively related to the

personality dimension Emotional Stability. Because in both experiments

implicit and explicit self-esteem were uncorrelated, obviously these results

can only clarify on the differences between implicit and explicit self-esteem

in predicting Emotional Stability. This is why in our first study we wanted to

examine whether implicit and explicit self-esteem will also share variance

with Emotional Stability under circumstances when implicit and explicit self-

esteem are in fact related. Furthermore, we also decided to include additional

personality dimensions to extend on the findings of Robinson & Meier

(2005). Specifically we wanted to address whether implicit self-esteem is

especially related to those personality dimensions that have a strong affective

component. Reasons for this were threefold. Affective experience is

positively related to both explicit self-esteem (Baumeister, Campell, Krueger,

& Vos, 2003) and the personality traits Extraversion and Emotional Stability

(DeNeve, & Cooper, 1998). Secondly, both Connor and Barrett (2005) and

Robinson and Meier (2005) showed a positive relation between implicit self-

esteem and both Emotional Stability and affective experience in daily live.

Thirdly, explicit self-esteem seems to be most strongly related to the


63

personality traits Extraversion and Emotional Stability (Robins, Tracy, &

Trzesniewksi, Potter, & Gosling, 2001). These findings suggest that implicit

and explicit self-esteem will similarly relate to both Emotional Stability and

Extraversion.

Another interesting question that arises from the previous paragraph taps

into the specific role both implicit and explicit self-esteem play in their

relation to affective experience. As mentioned before, both Robinson and

Meier (2005) and Conner and Barrett (2005) showed a relation between both

implicit and explicit self-esteem and affective experience, with both higher

implicit and explicit self-esteem resulting in less negative affect in daily live.

Interestingly, in the study of Connor and Barrett (2005) implicit self-esteem,

as opposed to explicit self-esteem, did not predict a measure of positive affect

in daily live, suggesting that especially implicit self-esteem might be

specifically related to coping with self-threatening experiences. Because their

study was not set out to test what kind of daily experiences resulted in these

effects it is, however, not clear whether high implicit self-esteem is indicative

of less experienced negative affect in general or whether it actually

specifically pertains to self-threatening and not to self-affirming experiences.

In another study, Robinson and Meier (2005) did demonstrate that implicit

self-esteem predicted experimenter-reported negative affect after a self-threat

manipulation, but because they did not include a control or self-affirming

condition, and did not measure self-reported affect, it still remains unclear

whether the relation between implicit self-esteem and (negative) affect is

unique to the self threatening circumstances, and if so, whether this relation

would also apply to the actual affective experience of an individual.

As mentioned before, the purpose of our present studies was set out to

gain both a better insight into the common grounds of implicit and explicit

self and to further our understanding in identifying the circumstances when

both forms of self-esteem might differ in relative importance. Based on the

evidence presented before we expected that general affect is an essential

aspect of both implicit and explicit self-esteem processes, while the kind of

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affect-regulation required might differ between the two. This is why in Study

1 we first examined the combined predictive validity of implicit and explicit

self-esteem for those personality dimensions that have a strong affective

component. In Study 2 and 3 we specifically focused on the relation between

both implicit and explicit self-esteem and affect regulation under self-

threatening versus self-affirming circumstances.

Study 1

In Study 1, we set out to show that implicit self-esteem has incremental

validity over and above explicit self-esteem, but only in predicting those

personality dimensions that have a strong affective component. We used the

Dutch Personality Inventory (DPQ; Luteijn, Starren & Van Dijk, 2000) to

measure personality, so we could assess the predictive validity of implicit and

explicit self-esteem on the ‘affective’ personality measures Emotional

Stability and Extraversion and compare it with the predictive validity on two

additional personality measures, Conformity and Egoism, that do not have a

strong affective component.

Furthermore, we wanted to validate our contention that implicit and

explicit self-esteem should share common variance in predicting Emotional

Stability and Extraversion under circumstances when implicit and explicit

self-esteem are related. This is why we chose to use the name letter test as a

measure of implicit self-esteem and conduct our study among a large enough

sample to insure adequate power to detect small to medium correlations.

Method

A time 1, 384 participants (269 female) completed the name letter test and the

Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) on a PC-

computer. All participants were undergraduates from the University of

Amsterdam and received course credits for participation. The order of the

name letter test and SSES was counterbalanced. At time 2, approximately one

week later, 362 of these participants (257 female) completed the Dutch


65

Personality Questionnaire (DPQ). In the Netherlands, the DPQ (Luteijn,

Starren & Van Dijk, 2000) is the most used personality questionnaire that

measures seven personality traits, which can be reduced to four personality

dimensions, Emotional Stability, Extraversion, Conformity and Egoism. The

dimensions Emotional Stability and Extraversion are equal to their Big Five

counterparts, the dimension Conformity resembles the Big Five-factor

Conscientiousness and the dimension Egoism is only measured with the DPQ

(Barelds & Luteijn, 2002). At time 3, approximately 5 months later, 54 of the

384 participants completed the name letter test and the SSES as premeasures

of another experiment (in the section of Study 3 full details are presented).

We included these name letter scores and SSES from these participants to test

the stability of the relations between implicit self-esteem, explicit self-esteem

and personality. At the end of the experiment participants provided their full

names on an informed consent form.

The name letter test. We administered the name letter test as follows:

Participants were informed that they were about to evaluate simple stimuli, in

this case evaluating the attractiveness of the alphabet letters. We asked them

to give their first impression on each letter and not to think too long but to

respond intuitively. Letters were always presented in random order. At both

times participants indicated their liking of every letter by clicking on the

corresponding area of a 9-point scale (time 1) or a continuous scale (time 3),

ranging from ugly to beautiful. A marker appeared at the area a participant

clicked on and by clicking the ‘next’ button, they could continue with the next

evaluation. On the continuous scale a score of 10 represented the right end of

the scale (i.e., beautiful), a score of -10 the left end of the scale (i.e., ugly),

and a score of zero the middle of the scale (i.e., neutral).

We calculated the name letter score according to the proposed method by

Albers, Dijksterhuis Rotteveel (2009, Chapter 2 of this thesis). First, we

calculated the average evaluation of someone’s initials (NLE), the average

evaluation of those specific letters rated by participants for whom it is not a

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66

name letter (SLE) and someone’s average evaluation of the alphabet letters

excluding all not-name letters (NNL). We then regressed NNL and SLE onto

NLE, and calculated the name letter score (NLS) as depicted in Equation 1:

NLS = NLE – (B1 * NNL + B2 * SLE) (1)

In this equation, B1 and B2 are the unstandardized regression coefficients

when simultaneously predicting NLE from both NNL and SLE. We excluded

NNL or SLE from Equation 1, when its corresponding unstandardized

regression coefficient (i.e., B1 or B2) showed no significant relation with NLE

(i.e., p > 0.1).The resulting name letter score (NLS) is, by definition,

unrelated to both not-name letter evaluation and the specific alphabet letter

evaluation. This insures that the name letter effect is not confounded with

factors that influence general letter liking instead of specific name letter

liking.

Results

In none of the analyses we conducted did we find any gender differences or

order effects. We calculated the name letter score according to Equation 1. To

calculate the name letter score at time 1, we included both NNL and SLE in

the equation because the regression analysis showed that both the

corresponding unstandardized regression coefficients where significant,

B1 = .61, t(381) = 7.1, p < .000; B2 = .67, t(381) = 2.6, p < .009, and

calculated the name letter score (NLS) as depicted in Equation 2.

NLS = NLE – (.61 * NNL + .67 * SLE) (2)

At time 3, we calculated the name letter score as depicted in Equation 4

(presented in the result section from Study 3).

Correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem. To explore the


67

relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem we correlated the name

letter score and SSES, at both time 1 and 3. The results are presented in Table

3.1, showing that, albeit moderately to small, at both time 1 and time 2,

implicit and explicit self-esteem correlated significantly with each other.

Furthermore, the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem measured

at different times (i.e., correlating self-esteem at time 1 with time 3) remained

significant, suggesting that the relation between implicit and explicit self-

esteem is relative stable over time.

Table 3.1 Correlations Between Personality Traits, Implicit and Explicit Self-esteem

N Implicit Explicit N Implicit Explicit

SE1 SE1 SE2 SE2

Explicit SE1 384 .19***

Implicit SE2 53 .54*** .28*

Explicit SE2 53 .36** .82*** 115 .34***

Extraversion 362 24*** .42*** 49 .43** .60***

Emotional Stability 362 .22*** .58*** 49 .41** .72***

Conformity 362 .04 -.24*** 49 -.01 -.25†

Egoism 362 .01 -.23*** 49 -.11 -.39**

Note. SE1 and SE2 are self-esteem scores at time 1 and 2 respectively.

† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Correlations between self-esteem and personality traits. To explore the

relation between personality and both implicit and explicit self-esteem we

correlated the name letter score and SSES, measured at both time 1 and time

3, with the personality traits administered at time 2. We present these

correlations in Table 3.1. Explicit self-esteem correlated highest with

Emotional Stability and Extraversion, at both time 1 and time 3, supporting

previous findings (Robins et al., 2001) that high self-esteem individuals tend

to be emotionally stable and extraverted. Conformity and Egoism both

correlated negatively with explicit self-esteem, suggesting that high self-

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esteem individuals are less rigid and egotistic. Implicit self-esteem also

correlated significantly at both time 1 and time 3 with the personality

dimensions Emotional Stability and Extraversion, suggesting that similar to

high explicit self-esteem individuals, high implicit self-esteem individuals are

also emotional stable and extraverted. As expected, implicit self-esteem did

not relate to the personality dimensions Egoism and Conformity, showing that

implicit self-esteem is indeed specifically related to those personality traits

that are most strongly related to affective experience.

The extra predictive validity of implicit self-esteem. The previous

results show that implicit self-esteem shares variance with both explicit self-

esteem and the personality dimensions Emotional Stability and Extraversion.

However, it remains unclear whether implicit and explicit self-esteem are

independently related to these personality dimensions, or that the relation

between implicit self-esteem and personality is in fact mediated by explicit

self-esteem. To determine this, we first conducted two mediation analyses

using the SPSS-Macro from Preacher and Hayes (2005), with implicit self-

esteem and explicit self-esteem, measured at time 1, and the specific

personality dimension measured at time 2 as variables. Mediation analysis

with Emotional Stability as dependent and implicit self-esteem as independent

showed only partial mediation of explicit self-esteem: bootstrapping resulted

in a significant indirect effect of 0.14, p < .01, while the direct effect of

implicit self-esteem on Emotional Stability remained significant after

controlling for explicit self-esteem, β = .13, t(359) = 2.9, p < .004. A

mediation analysis with Extraversion as dependent and implicit self-esteem as

independent also showed partial mediation of explicit self-esteem:

bootstrapping resulted in a significant indirect effect of 0.10, p < .01, while

the direct effect of implicit self-esteem on Extraversion remained significant

after controlling for explicit self-esteem, β = .18, t(359) = 3.8, p < .000.

We then tested whether these partial mediation effects of implicit self-

esteem would sustain using the implicit and explicit self-esteem measures


69

administered at time 3. Though sample size was considerable smaller (N =

49), a mediation analysis with Extraversion as dependent variable and implicit

self-esteem as independent variable again showed only partial mediation of

explicit self-esteem: bootstrapping resulted in a significant indirect effect of

.27, p < .05, while the direct effect of implicit self-esteem on Extraversion

remained significant after controlling for explicit self-esteem, β = .30, t(46) =

2.7, p < .01. We obtained similar results for Emotional Stability. A mediation

analyses only showed partial mediation of explicit self-esteem: bootstrapping

resulted in a marginal significant indirect effect of 0.32, p < .07, while the

direct effect of implicit self-esteem on Extraversion remained significant after

controlling for explicit self-esteem, β = .26, t(46) = 2.6, p < .01.

Discussion

Taken together these results show that implicit and explicit self-esteem are

related to the personality traits Emotional Stability and Extraversion over an

extended period of time, but also that each have their independent relation

with these personality traits. Since explicit self-esteem related to all

personality traits and implicit self-esteem related only to Emotional Stability

and Extraversion and not to Conformity and Egoism, these results further

show that implicit and explicit self-esteem share variance in predicting those

personality traits that have a strong affective component, suggesting that the

common grounds of implicit and explicit self-esteem reside in affect-

regulation.

Study 2

In our second study we wanted to investigate the differences between implicit

and explicit self-esteem by assessing the relative importance of the two forms

of self-esteem as a function of different forms of affect regulation. We

expected implicit self-esteem to be especially important when affect

regulation due to self-threat is required and explicit self-esteem when the self

is affirmed. First of all, Robinson and Meier (2005) showed that under ego

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threat only implicit self-esteem and not explicit self-esteem was a significant

predictor of experimenter reported negative affect. Secondly, Meager and

Aidan (2004) reported similar results, demonstrating that only implicit self-

esteem was predictive of a participants’ implicit mood after negative

feedback, while explicit self-esteem only related to the evaluation of the

confederate who provided the negative feedback.

This is why, in our second study, we tested whether implicit self-

esteem would relate differently to affective experience after self-threat

compared to a self-reinforcing condition. Because the research mentioned

before suggests that implicit self-esteem is especially related to negative

affect we expected implicit self-esteem to be more strongly related to

experienced affect after the self is threatened than after the self is boosted.

Method

Fifty-eight participants (40 female) were randomly assigned to a self-

enhancing or self-threat condition. In the self-enhancement condition

participants described a recent positive self-relevant experience, in the self-

threat a recent negative self-relevant experience. After describing the personal

event they then indicated how they felt on two continuous scales ranging from

respectively very negative to very positive, and very angry to very cheerful.

Scores on both scales were aggregated to form one measure of experienced

affect (α = .82), scores ranging from -20 to 20, with positive scores reflecting

positive affect and negative scores reflecting negative affect. After this they

completed the name letter test as described in Study 1, with the exception that

we only obtained the initials of the participants and not their full names at the

end of the experiment. Upon completion of the name letter test participants

filled out the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). We calculated

the name letter score according the method depicted in Equation 1. Because in

this study we only obtained the initials of the participants, we calculated

someone’s average letter evaluation excluding the initials of that person.


71

Results

We calculated the name letter score according to Equation 1. Because the

regression analysis showed that only the unstandardized regression coefficient

of NNL was significant, B1 = .98, t(56) = 4.4, p < .000, we only included

NNL and not SLE¹, resulting in Equation 3:

NLS = NLE – .98 * NNL (3)

Affect. Experienced affect in both conditions differed significantly, F(1,

56) = 266.9, p < .0001. In the self-threat condition participants experienced

negative affect, M = -3.7, SD = 4.5, while in the self-enhancing condition

participants experienced positive affect, M = 14.0, SD = 3.7, suggesting that

the manipulation was successful. Neither implicit nor explicit self-esteem

differed between both conditions, respectively F(1, 56 ) = 1.58, p = .21 and

F(1,56) = .02, p = .90. Though implicit and explicit self-esteem only

correlated in the self-threat condition, r = .45, p < .02 and not after the self

was enhanced, r = .15, p = .42, these correlations did not differ significantly

from each other, z = 1.2, p = .24.

To determine whether implicit self-esteem and experienced affect were

more strongly related in the self-threat condition compared to the self-

enhancing condition we conducted a regression analyses with condition, the

centered measure of implicit self-esteem and the corresponding two-way

interaction as predictors and experienced affect as dependent. This resulted in

a significant interaction between implicit self-esteem and condition, β = .16,

t(54) = 2.0, p < .05. As expected, separate regression analysis for both the

self-enhancement and self-threat condition with implicit self-esteem as

predictor and experienced affect as dependent variable, showed that in the

self-threat condition implicit self-esteem significantly predicted experienced

affect, β = .58, t(26) = 3.6, p < .001 while in the self-enhancement condition

implicit self-esteem failed to reach significance as a predictor of experienced

affect, β = .1, t(28) = .51, p = .61, showing that only after self-threat higher

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72

implicit self-esteem was predictive of less negative experienced affect.

Similar regression analysis with the centered measure of explicit self-

esteem, condition, and the corresponding two-way interaction as predictors,

and experienced affect as dependent, did not result in a significant interaction

between explicit self-esteem and condition, β = .02, t(54) = .3, p = .77. As

expected, separate regression analysis for both the self-enhancement and self-

threat condition with explicit self-esteem as predictor and experienced affect

as dependent variable showed that in both conditions explicit self-esteem

significantly predicted experienced affect; in the self-threat condition, β = .41,

t(26) = 2.3, p < .03; in the self-enhancement condition, β = .38, t(28) = 2.2, p

< .04, showing higher explicit self-esteem was predictive of less negative

experienced affect, regardless whether the self was threatened or enhanced. In

the self-threat condition explicit self-esteem no longer predicted experienced

affect after controlling for implicit self-esteem, β = .18, t(25) = 1.0, p = .32,

suggesting that implicit self-esteem fully mediated the relation between

explicit self-esteem and experienced affect after the self is threatened. We

confirmed this in a mediation analysis with experienced affect as dependent

and explicit self-esteem as independent showing full mediation of implicit

self-esteem: bootstrapping resulted in a significant indirect effect of .11, p <

.02.

These results show that while explicit self-esteem is similarly related to

experienced affect regard after both self-enhancement and self-threat, implicit

self-esteem is specifically related to experienced affect only after the self is

threatened and under these circumstances even fully mediates the relation

between explicit self-esteem and experienced affect.

Discussion

The results from this study support previous research suggesting that implicit

self-esteem is related to affective processes especially when the self is

threatened. Besides the specific influence implicit esteem has under these

circumstances on someone’s implicit mood (Meager & Aidan, 2004) and


73

someone’s observed negative affect (Robinson & Meier, 2005) we

demonstrated this also to be true for someone’s (explicitly) experienced

affect. Because in our study we included a self-enhancement condition we

could further demonstrate that this relation between implicit self-esteem and

affect is indeed specific to the self-threatening circumstances and not to any

circumstances where the self is activated.

But moreover, our results also extend previous research by showing that

implicit and not explicit self-esteem is at the core of coping with negative

affect. Because explicit self-esteem could not differentiate between

someone’s experienced affect after self-threat compared to self-enhancement

it suggests that the ability of explicit self-esteem to predict experienced affect

rather reflects subjective well being than a specific process of coping with

negative affect. On the other hand, implicit self-esteem did differentiate in

affective experience when affective coping was required, showing that high

implicit self-esteem individuals are more resilient against threats to the self.

Because in this study we measured both implicit and explicit implicit

after self-threat we should be careful in interpreting these results when

denoting implicit and explicit self-esteem as predictors of affect regulation.

Though in our study we did not find clear influences of condition on implicit

and explicit self-esteem, we only found the expected significant correlation

between implicit and explicit self-esteem after the self was threatened, and not

after the self was affirmed (though both correlations did not differ

significantly from each other). This means that experienced affect itself may

have influenced both forms of self-esteem, so it remains unclear whether

implicit and explicit esteem are similar predictive of someone’s affective

experience when measured before the experimental manipulation.

Study 3

In order to investigate the specific roles both implicit and explicit self-esteem

play in predicting experienced affect, in Study 3 we made two changes

compared to Study 2. First of all, both measures of self-esteem were

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74

administered before participants were submitted to a self-enhancing or self-

threatening manipulation. Secondly, participants were submitted to a different

experimental manipulation in order to increase the external validity of our

research.

Method

At the start of the experiment, 117 participants (93 female) completed the

name letter test

followed by the Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale

(SSES). We assigned them randomly to either a self-threat or a self-

reinforcing condition. In both conditions participants first rated the

attractiveness of same-sex faces compared to their own attractiveness by

clicking on a continuous scale, ranging from ugly to beautiful, with a score of

25 represented the right end of the scale (i.e., beautiful), a score of -25 the left

end of the scale (i.e., ugly), and a score of zero the middle of the scale (i.e.,

neutral). We selected the faces from a set of faces that we pre-tested on

attractiveness, such that in the self-threat condition, participants rated eight

attractive faces and in the self-reinforcing condition eight unattractive faces.

In both conditions, participants first rated four neutral faces. After rating the

faces participants indicated how they felt by clicking on two continuous

scales ranging from respectively very negative to very positive, and from not

in the least cheerful to very cheerful, with a score of 25 represented the right

end of the scale (i.e., very positive or very cheerful), a score of -25 the left end

of the scale (i.e., very negative or not in the least cheerful), and a score of zero

the middle of the scale (i.e., neutral). Scores on both scales were averaged to

form one measure of experienced affect (α = .94), with positive scores

reflecting positive affect and negative scores reflecting negative affect.

Results

In none of the analyses we conducted did we find any gender differences. We

calculated the name letter score according to Equation 1. To calculate the


75

name letter score, we only included SLE in the equation because the

regression analysis including NNL showed no significant corresponding

unstandardized regression coefficient for NNL, B1 = .23, t(114) = 1.3, p =

.21, resulting in a significant corresponding unstandardized regression

coefficient of SLE, B2 = .82, t(115) = 2.9, p < .004, and calculated the name

letter score (NLS) as depicted in Equation 4.

NLS = NLE – .82 * SLE (4)

As a manipulation check, we compared the rating of the faces in both

conditions., The average rating of the faces in the self-threat condition

differed significantly from the average rating in the self-enhancing condition,

F(1,115) = 290, p < .0001. Participants rated the attractive faces as being

more attractive than themselves, M = 9.2, SD = 6.1, and the unattractive faces

as less attractive than themselves, M = -13.0, SD = 7.9, suggesting that the

manipulation was successful.

To test whether implicit and explicit self-esteem were differently

related to experienced affect depending on condition (i.e., self-enhancement

versus self-threat), we conducted a regression analysis with the dummy coded

condition, the centered measures of implicit and explicit self-esteem and the

corresponding two-way interactions between condition and both implicit and

explicit self-esteem as predictors, and experienced affect as dependent,

resulted in the expected significant interaction between implicit self-esteem

and condition, β = .23, t(110) = 2.1, p < .03, while both the interaction

between explicit self-esteem and condition and between explicit and implicit

self-esteem were not significant (both ps > .58). Separate regression analysis

for both the self-enhancement and self-threat condition with implicit self-

esteem as predictor and experienced affect as dependent variable, showed that

though in the self-enhancement condition implicit self-esteem failed to reach

significance as a predictor, β = .16, t(57) = .51, p = .61, in the self-threat

condition implicit self-esteem indeed did significantly predict experienced

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affect, β = .40, t(56) = 3.3, p < .002, and remained significant after controlling

for explicit self-esteem, β = .25, t(55) = 2.5, p < .02, suggesting that explicit

self-esteem only partially mediated the relation between implicit self-esteem

and experienced affect. We confirmed this in a mediation analysis with

experienced affect as dependent variable and implicit self-esteem as

independent variable showing partial mediation of explicit self-esteem:

bootstrapping resulted in a significant indirect effect of .43, p < .05.

In order to try to replicate the findings described in the previous

paragraph and test whether the reported effects of self-esteem on affective

experience would sustain over an extended period of time we conducted

similar analyses but now with the measures of both implicit and explicit self-

esteem and personality that we assessed approximately 5 months before the

current study (for a detailed description see Study 1). The results support our

previous findings. Though sample size was considerable smaller, implicit

self-esteem still significantly predicted, over an extended period of

approximately 5 months, experienced affect when the self was threatened, β =

.50, t(24) = 2.8, p < .01, but not when the self was enhanced, β = .06, t(25) =

.30, p = .77. Explicit self-esteem and both affective personality dimensions

(i.e., Extraversion and Emotional Stability) did not differentiate between

conditions and all predicted experienced affect both after the self was

threatened or enhanced (all ps < .09), while both ‘non-affective’ personality

dimensions Conformity and Egoism did not predict experienced affect in

either condition (all ps > .27).

Discussion

The results from this study support the idea that implicit self-esteem and not

explicit self-esteem functions as a buffer when the self is threatened (Koole &

DeHart, 2007). In our study, high implicit self-esteem individuals experienced

less negative feelings opposed to low implicit self-esteem individuals when

the self was threatened, an effect that we even could demonstrate with our

measure of implicit self-esteem that we collected 5 months prior to the actual


77

self-threat. This specific ability for implicit self-esteem to do so was even

further supported by our findings that explicit self-esteem, Extraversion and

Emotional Stability could not do so.

General Discussion

The results from our studies support and extend on the findings of Robinson

and Meier (2005) and Meager and Aidan (2004), showing that implicit and

explicit self-esteem share common grounds with those personality traits that

deal with affective experience and expression. We could furthermore

demonstrate that implicit self-esteem is especially important in dealing with

threats to the self. In fact, it was the only psychological construct we

measured that was specifically related to negative affect. Though our

measures of explicit self-esteem, Emotional Stability and Extraversion each

related to affective experience, they did not differentiate between

circumstances when the self was threatened or boosted.

In our first study we demonstrated that implicit self-esteem, explicit

self-esteem, and the two personality dimensions Extraversion and Emotional

Stability are all intrinsically related. Implicit and explicit self-esteem

correlated positively and participants with high implicit and explicit self-

esteem were emotionally more stable and extraverted. Though these

correlations between implicit self-esteem and the explicit measures were only

moderate to small in nature, the variance they shared stayed stable across

time. Because implicit and explicit related to each other, we could also

address the nature of their shared relation with explicit personality traits.

Though explicit self-esteem mediated the relation between implicit self-

esteem and the personality traits Extraversion and Emotional Stability, in

general we did not found full mediation, suggesting that part of the relation

between implicit self-esteem and (explicit) personality occurs independent

from explicit self-esteem, and thus demonstrates the additional value of

measuring implicit self-esteem. Unlike explicit self-esteem, implicit self-

esteem was not related to the personality dimensions Egoism and

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Conformism. These results suggest that the common grounds between

implicit and explicit self-esteem reside predominately in personality traits that

are most strongly connected to affective experience (DeNeve, & Cooper,

1998), and support the idea that affective regulation is a core function of self-

esteem.

In our second and third study we elaborated on the role of self-esteem

in affective regulation. Based on previous findings of Robinson and Meier

(2005) and Meager and Aidan (2004) and the contention that implicit self-

esteem functions as a buffer to negative affect (Koole & DeHart, 2007) we

expected the function of implicit self-esteem to reside especially in self-

threatening circumstances. This is also what we found. Though explicit self-

esteem and the personality dimensions Extraversion and Emotional Stability

were predictive of a general experienced affect, implicit self-esteem was

specifically related to experienced affect under self-threatening

circumstances.

These results from our studies suggest that that the common grounds of

implicit and explicit self-esteem reside mainly in the unaffected self, but

diverge in function when the self is affected. Regardless of the way the self is

affected, explicit self-esteem remains indicative of an individual’s general

level of positive or negative affect. The opposite is true for implicit self-

esteem: high implicit self-esteem individuals feel less negatively affected by

threats to their selves. In this respect our studies support the contention that

implicit self-esteem functions as buffer that only comes into play when it is

needed.


79

Endnotes

¹Including both NNL and SLE into the regression when predicting

NLE showed that the corresponding unstandardized regression coefficient of

NNL was significant, B1 = .98, t(55) = 4.4, p < .000, while the corresponding

unstandardized regression coefficient of SLE was not significant, B2 = -.26,

t(55) = -.57, p = .57.

81

Chapter 4

Digging for the real attitude: Lessons from research on implicit

and explicit self-esteem*

*This chapter is based on: Dijksterhuis, A., Albers, L., & Bongers, K. (2008). Digging for

the real attitude: Lessons from research on implicit and explicit self-esteem. In R. E. Petty,

R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new wave of implicit measures

(pp. 229-250). New York: Psychology Press.

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82

It has once been argued that attitude formation and attitude expression are

more reminiscent of architecture than of archeology. Rather than uncovering

true, deeper beliefs and values, people’s attitudinal expressions are the result

of often distorted, temporary constructions created on the spot (Bettman, Luce

& Payne, 1998; see also Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Researchers

administer questionnaires aimed at measuring how people think about

themselves, about George W. Bush, or about Chocolate Chip cookies, and

people construct what we call attitudes. Just as there is nothing wrong with

architecture, there is nothing inherently wrong with measuring attitudes with

questions, that is, explicitly. Usually, the goal behind measuring attitudes is to

predict behavior, and indeed, explicitly measured attitudes often do: We are

fairly positive about ourselves helping us to navigate life reasonably well, we

vote against George W. Bush, and we eat way too many Chocolate Chip

cookies.

Still, there is something about this practice that makes it somewhat

unsatisfactory. If an old manuscript suggests an undiscovered tomb in the

Egyptian desert, we send archeologists to find it, rather than ask architects to

recreate the tomb on the basis of some vague descriptions. Have you ever

been in a museum, staring in awe at some beautiful piece of old art, only then

to discover (by reading the brochure that was handed to you at the entrance)

that you are looking at a replica? The real statue created by Michelangelo is in

an area inaccessible to the public, and you are looking at a copy made in 1987

in some Florentine factory. Even in such cases, when a replica looks exactly

like the original, looking at it just does not feel quite right. It is nothing more

than a minor nuisance, and it certainly does not spoil your entire day, but you

had preferred to see the real thing.

One way to look at explicitly measured attitudes is to assume that what

one measures is all there is. Explicitly measured attitudes are what they are,

and there are no such things as underlying, “real” attitudes. This is

unsatisfactory of course, as we know enough about unconscious affective and

cognitive processes to assume that a “7” on a 9-point Likert-scale about

Digging for the Real Attitude

83

Chocolate Chip cookies is not just something hovering in the air. It must

come from somewhere, somehow. It may be the result of a construction

process, but we hope it is, at least to some extent, influenced by deeper

psychological forces. Hence, an alternative viewpoint that is more realistic

(and much more exciting) is to assume that there are such things as “real”

attitudes and that what we assess with attitude measures is at least in part

based on this real thing. Sure, due to poor construction we routinely end up

with very poor replica’s, indeed much more reminiscent of the work of

architects working on the basis of vague descriptions than of contemporary

Florentine artists who can make a detailed copy of the Michelangelo statue.

After all, when we answer a questionnaire we often have not much to work

with other than perhaps some vague hints, such as subtle affective reactions or

old memories of past behavior. Still, somewhere in that Egyptian desert is the

real thing we are looking for. Some process sparked by our millions of brain

cells represents that real attitude.

The observation that attitudes are more the result of architecture rather

than of archeology was made before psychologists started to develop implicit

attitude measures. In our view, the creation and development of implicit

measures is of paramount importance, because it fundamentally changes the

way we think (at least it should) about attitudes. In the present chapter, we

will argue that implicit attitude measurement is not just another style of

architecture. Instead, we will review evidence (and present some new

evidence) strongly suggesting that implicit measurement reflects archeology.

Amateur archeology with limited equipment perhaps, but archeology.

In this chapter, we focus on arguably the most important attitude we

have: Self-esteem, or the attitude towards the self. However, our hope is that

our thinking is generalizable to attitudes in general. Most of this chapter deals

with research on the relation between three protagonists: Explicitly measured

self-esteem, implicitly measured self-esteem, and that what we until now

called “the real thing”. We start out by defining what we conceive of as this

hypothesized “real” attitude and by proposing three hypotheses concerning

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the relationship between explicit and implicit self-esteem. We then discuss

relevant research with the aim to differentiate between these hypotheses and

to decide which of the three is the most plausible. Before we end with some

conclusions, we present an experiment that we recently conducted.

Three alternative hypotheses on the relation between explicit and implicit

self-esteem.

A chapter that features the term “the real thing” too often runs the risk of

alienating a scientific audience (but perhaps attracting people from the music

industry!), so a definition is in order. The “real” attitude, we propose, is the

evaluative “tone” that is automatically activated upon the perception of the

attitude object (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992; Fazio,

Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986). With more multifaceted and/or

important attitude objects, it is perhaps more appropriate (see e.g., Cacioppo,

Crites, Berntson & Coles, 1993) to define the attitude as the sum of the

various evaluative tones that are automatically activated. It is a proposed

underlying construct constituting the core of the attitude, sitting there waiting

to be excavated. It is itself undisturbed by biasing processes that occur when

the attitude is measured or verbalized, but at the same time it feeds such

processes. From now on, we call it the core attitude or core self-esteem (see

also Dijksterhuis, 2004).

What is the relation between this core attitude and implicitly and

explicitly measured attitudes? Or, to turn to self-esteem, is there one core self-

esteem that is related to both measures of implicit and explicit self-esteem?

And if so, how are they related? Let us briefly discuss three possible

hypotheses pertaining to this relation.

1. The independence hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, implicit

and explicit self-esteem are independent constructs. They happen to partly

share their name, they happen to be about the same object, but they are


85

unrelated. Both implicitly measured self-esteem and explicitly measured

esteem are based on their own underlying core construct. Implicit self-esteem

could be based on the automatically activated evaluative tone, whereas

explicit self-esteem could be based on the evaluative tone that becomes

apparent only when one explicitly or consciously reflects on the self.

2. The equal relationship hypothesis. This hypothesis states that

implicit and explicit self-esteem are related because they are both related to

the same core attitude, the one defined above. They are simply different

manifestations of this core. In addition, the two manifestations do not differ as

to how well they represent that core. They measure a different aspect, but

generally do equally well.

3. The hierarchy hypothesis. This hypothesis also assumes that implicit

and explicit self-esteem are related because they are both related to the same

core. However, here implicit measures of self-esteem better represent core

self-esteem than explicit measures of self-esteem. That is, implicit self-esteem

digs deeper and more closely approaches the hidden Egyptian tomb. This

hypothesis also implies that what we measure explicitly is partly based (and

can be partly predicted by) what we find when we measure implicitly1.

In what follows, we will make a (stepwise) comparison between the

plausibility of the hypotheses by reviewing evidence. We will start with

comparing the independence hypothesis with the remaining two, the equal

relationship hypothesis and the hierarchy hypothesis, whereby no distinction

will be made between latter two yet.

Before we move on, it should be noted that although we only review

evidence on self-esteem, the three hypotheses encompass possible relations

between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes in general. Indeed,

versions of both the independence hypothesis and the equal relationship

hypothesis shine through in work on racial attitudes (i.e., prejudice, Dovidio,

Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997). Likewise, the hierarchy

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hypothesis is in part based on, and fully in line with, the work by Fazio and

colleagues on the MODE-model (see e.g., Fazio, 1990; Olson & Fazio, 2008).

The MODE-model also views an attitude as a “core” that can be automatically

activated, whereby implicit measures are more proximal indicators of these

automatically activated attitudes than more downstream explicit measures.

Are implicit and explicit self-esteem related?

If we find evidence for the notion that implicit and explicit self-esteem are

related, this implies that both the equal relationship hypothesis and hierarchy

hypothesis are more plausible than the independence hypothesis. In our view,

there are currently three relevant sets of research findings. First, quite a

number of researchers have directly investigated the relation between implicit

and explicit self-esteem by assessing correlations between the two. A second

fruitful avenue is to investigate whether the same specific levels of implicit

and explicit self-esteem have the same or comparable consequences for other

psychological processes. A third way to shed light on the relationship between

implicit and explicit self-esteem it to see if there are experimental

manipulations that affect both implicit and explicit self-esteem in comparable

ways.

Are implicit and explicit self-esteem correlated? The answer is “sort

of”. Some researchers did not find correlations (Baccus, Baldwin & Packer,

2004; Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-

Browne & Correll, 2003; Spalding & Hardin, 1999), others did find

significant correlations (DeHart, Pelham & Tennen, 2006; Greenwald &

Farnham, 2000), yet others found significant correlations in some

experimental conditions or in some samples and not in others (Jones, Pelham,

Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002; Koole, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2001;

Pelham, et al., 2005). Various people have concluded that implicit and

explicit self-esteem correlate “weakly at best”. There is no arguing with that

conclusion, and on the basis of the current state of affairs we cannot say much


87

about the plausibility of the independence hypothesis. Rejecting the

independence hypothesis would have required more consistent correlations

between explicit and implicit self-esteem. On the other hand, given that some

researchers did find significant correlations, the correlational data cannot be

interpreted as support for the independence hypothesis either.

It may be noted that the generally low correlations between measures

of implicit and explicit self-esteem are at least in part caused by the fact that

implicit measures are still in a developing stage. Their reliability is often low

(Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000), and it is not fully understood yet what

exactly drives the effects of some of the implicit measures. Recently, various

researchers have proposed improvements to various measures of implicit self-

esteem. Both Karpinski (2004) and Albers, Dijksterhuis and Rotteveel (2009)

suggested improvements to implicit measures of self-esteem that will likely

result in more meaningful correlations between implicit and explicit measures

of self-esteem. Wentura, Kulfanek and Greve (2005) even proposed an

interesting new measure that alleviates some problems of other measures.

Such initiatives to strengthen implicit measures of self-esteem give rise to

optimism and it is likely that researchers will obtain higher and more

consistent correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem in the future.

Do implicit and explicit self-esteem have comparable consequences?

Explicit self-esteem is known to be predictive of many things, but arguably

the best known fact is that it is related to how people cope with negative

experiences: High levels of explicit self-esteem help people cope with

negative feedback or negative experiences in general. High explicit self-

esteem forms a “buffer” against stress and experiences of failure (see e.g.,

Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970; Steele, 1988). For

instance, it has been observed that people with low explicit self-esteem

exhibit stronger emotional reactions after failure than people with high

explicit self-esteem (Brown & Dutton, 1995) and that people with low explicit

self-esteem demonstrate impaired motivation after failure whereas individuals

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with high self-esteem generally do not (e.g., DiPaula & Campbell, 2002;

Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970).

After only a few years of research on implicit self-esteem, we can

safely conclude that implicit self-esteem has indeed comparable

consequences. Spalding and Hardin (1999) demonstrated that low implicit

self-esteem individuals show more anxiety during a confronting interview

than high implicit self-esteem individuals. Greenwald and Farnham (2000)

showed that implicit self-esteem is negatively related to motivation after

failure such that people with low self-esteem show a stronger decrease in

motivation than people with high self-esteem. Baccus, Baldwin and Packer

(2004) demonstrated that people with high implicit self-esteem show less

aggression after an insult than people with lower implicit self-esteem. Finally,

Dijksterhuis (2004) showed that people with high implicit self-esteem show

no changes in mood after negative feedback, whereas people with lower

implicit self-esteem reported a more negative mood after negative feedback.

Indeed, high implicit self-esteem is a buffer against negative experiences, just

as high explicit self-esteem is. These findings strongly suggest that implicit

and explicit self-esteem are to some extent related, rendering the

independence hypothesis less plausible.

Do (some) experimental manipulations have the same effects on

implicit and explicit self-esteem? Currently, there are two areas of research

that indeed suggest this to be the case. First, threats to the self have been

known to decrease explicit self-esteem. For instance, both Dutton and Brown

(1997), and Heatherton and Polivy (1991) found that people report lower

explicit self-esteem after negative intelligence feedback. In recent years,

various researchers have reported comparable consequences of threats to the

self on implicit self-esteem. Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg and Hetts (2002) asked

participants to write about a negative aspect of their personality and

demonstrated that this lowered implicit self-esteem. In addition, Dijksterhuis

(2004) gave participants (bogus) negative intelligence feedback and found


89

that it lowered participants’ score on an implicit measure of self-esteem. It is

also known that people engage in self-affirming behavior in order to repair

“dents” in their self-esteem. And again, engaging in self-affirmation after

threat has been shown to both restore explicit (Steele, Spencer & Lynch,

1993), as well as implicit self-esteem (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg &

Dijksterhuis, 1999).

Secondly, it has been demonstrated that both explicit self-esteem and

implicit self-esteem can be changed by evaluative conditioning (Baccus,

Baldwin & Packer, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003).

Evaluative conditioning (see De Houwer, Thomas & Baeyens, 2001, for a

review) is a technique in which is an attitude object (the Conditioned Stimulus

or CS [plural CSi]) is repeatedly paired with either a positive or a negative

stimulus (the Unconditioned Stimulus or US [plural USi]). After a number of

pairings, the CS takes on the valence of the USi. In our view, evaluative

conditioning is fascinating because it changes an attitude at its core. Earlier,

we defined the core attitude as the evaluative tone (or tones) that become

automatically activated upon the perception of the attitude object. And it is

this evaluative tone evaluative conditioning directly works on.

The procedures used by the different researchers differed only subtly.

Baccus et al., (2004) presented participants with self-relevant words (such as

their own names) on a computer screen, and in the experimental condition the

words were followed by smiling faces. In a control condition, self-relevant

words were randomly paired with smiling, frowning and neutral faces.

Dijksterhuis (2004) presented participants repeatedly with the word “I”, in the

experimental condition followed by positive adjectives. In the control

condition, neutral adjectives followed the word “I”. In some of the

experiments, all this information was presented subliminally. Riketta and

Dauenheimer (2003) followed almost exactly the same procedure, except that

whereas in the experiments by Dijksterhuis the adjectives immediately

followed the word “I”, in the Riketta and Dauenheimer experiments the word

“I” and the positive adjectives were presented simultaneously. Both Baccus et

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al., (2004) and Dijksterhuis (2004) assessed implicit self-esteem after the

evaluative conditioning procedure, whereas Riketta and Dauenheimer (2004)

measured self-esteem explicitly. Crucially, in all sets of studies it was found

that evaluative conditioning increased self-esteem2.

Where does this leave things? Although the findings on correlations

between implicit and explicit self-esteem are inconclusive, other evidence is

not. First, high (and low) implicit and explicit self-esteem have comparable

consequences for how people deal with negative experiences. Second, various

experimental manipulations (threat to the self, evaluative conditioning) have

the same effect on implicit as on explicit self-esteem. In our view, this makes

the independence hypothesis untenable. There is some sort of relation

between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Put differently, they must at least to

some extent represent the same underlying core.

Is implicit self-esteem closer to the core than explicit self-esteem?

Now that we have rejected the independence hypothesis, we can begin to

analyze which of the two remaining hypotheses is the most plausible. Is the

equal relationship hypothesis, whereby (measures of) explicit and implicit

self-esteem represent the underlying core attitude equally well (or equally

poorly) the best descriptor of the current state of affairs? Or are the relevant

findings better described by hierarchy hypothesis, stating that implicit

measures of self-esteem represents core self-esteem better?

In order for the hierarchy hypothesis to trump over the equal

relationship hypothesis, it has to be proven that explicit self-esteem is more

dissociated from the core attitude than implicit self-esteem. If this is true, it

should be possible to demonstrate why this dissociation is indeed more

pronounced. As our opening lines suggested, explicit attitudes are often active

constructions, more reminiscent of architecture than of archeology. A

prediction one can derive from the conceptualization of explicit self-esteem as

a construction process is that, since constructive processes are easier to

change than underlying representations, explicit self-esteem must be easier to


91

change than implicit self-esteem. Another way to differentiate between the

two hypotheses is to examine the construction process itself. Is there evidence

for the architectural aspect of explicit self-esteem? Can we find evidence for

biasing psychological forces that leads explicit self-esteem away from its

underlying core? In what follows, we first look at the changeability of explicit

and implicit self-esteem. Later, we examine the evidence for the notion that

explicit self-esteem is a construction partly based on biasing processes that

are not related to the core attitude.

Is explicit self-esteem easier to change than implicit self-esteem? We

already discussed evidence that shows that both implicit and explicit self-

esteem can be changed, at least for a brief period of time, by various

experimental manipulations. However, what can we say about more enduring

changes as a result of major life events?

There is indeed some evidence for a greater flexibility of explicit self-

esteem. Hetts and Pelham (2003) found people whose birthday was

overlooked (!) reported low implicit self-esteem, whereas their explicit self-

esteem was on a normal level. One could assume that when one’s birthday is

overlooked, this initially has negative consequences for both implicit and

explicit self-esteem. However, due to the assumed nature of explicit self-

esteem as more of an active construction process, explicit self-esteem can be

easier brought to more normal levels than implicit self-esteem. Although we

concede that this interpretation of the findings of Hetts and Pelham (2003) is

somewhat speculative, other research from Hetts, Pelham and colleagues

(1999) more firmly support the hierarchy hypothesis. Hetts, Sakuma and

Pelham (1999) assessed implicit and explicit self-esteem among Asian-

Americans who immigrated relatively recently. They reasoned that such

major life events would affect both explicit and implicit self-esteem, but that

it is more likely, due to the nature of explicit self-esteem measures, that

explicit self-esteem changes more quickly than implicit self-esteem. This is

exactly what they found. Whereas recent immigrants still demonstrated low

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implicit self-esteem, their explicit self-esteem soon appeared to be back to

normal levels. Fully in line with the hierarchy hypothesis, they concluded that

conscious constructions are more malleable than “deeper” unconscious

representations (see also DeHart, Pelham & Tennen, 2006).

Is explicit self-esteem a construction process? One could argue that

explicit self-esteem must largely be a construction process, simply because

people do not have much conscious access to deeper, unconscious processes.

Following Nisbett and Wilson (1977) one could reasonably assume that

explicit self-esteem (or explicit measures in general) relies on introspective

processes to an extent that is unwarranted and perhaps even unrealistic. We

simply do not know how we truly feel about ourselves, so we have no choice

but to engage in construction. We are architects working with poor and vague

instructions.

Pelham et al., (2005) recently reported evidence supporting this idea.

They reasoned that some people may have better access to how they truly feel

about themselves than others. Now the better people have access to core self-

esteem, the less need there is for construction. That means that, assuming

implicit self-esteem reflects core self-esteem better than explicit self-esteem,

implicit self-esteem and explicit self-esteem should correlate higher among

people who have better access to their core self-esteem. Pelham et al., (2005)

reasoned this could well mean that gender moderates the correlation between

implicit and explicit self-esteem. After all, aren’t women generally better at

accessing their deeper feelings than men? Socialization processes make

women trust their feelings and intuitions more (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) and

we know that women are generally better than men in expressing their

emotions (e.g., Lakoff, 1990). Pelham et al., (2005) compared six samples

from three different countries and indeed confirmed their prediction. Among

men, explicit and implicit self-esteem did not correlate in any of the samples,

whereas significant correlations were found in all samples for women

(ranging in size from .11 to .51).


93

Other evidence for explicit self-esteem as a construction comes from

studies suggesting that explicit self-esteem assesses factors other than the core

attitude towards the self. For example, various researchers have found that

explicit self-esteem correlates significantly with style of self-presentation,

impression management, and self-deception (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;

Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne & Correll, 2003; Raskin, Novacek,

& Hogan, 1991). These findings support the hierarchy hypothesis. Explicit

self-esteem may be assessing a mixture of core self-esteem, and various

essentially unrelated motives. Especially the finding that explicit self-esteem

is correlated with self-deception is interesting. The higher one’s explicit self-

esteem, the greater the possibility that people’s construction work reflects an

attempt to fool oneself.

If one is willing to assume that motivated construction takes effort, one

can derive a straightforward prediction from the notion that explicit self-

esteem correlates with various motives. Obviously, the people whose explicit

self-esteem does not reflect core self-esteem are the ones who have to engage

in effortful strategies to maintain this inconsistency. Specifically, people with

high explicit self-esteem but low implicit self-esteem are the true construction

workers. They engage in self-presentation and self-deception, thus, they

expend most effort. Conversely, given that implicit self-esteem represents this

core attitude quite well, people with comparable explicit self-esteem and

implicit self-esteem (both high or both low) do not engage in much

construction and hence, do not expend much effort.

There is indeed some evidence that maintaining high self-esteem in the

face of negative experiences requires work. People have to “explain things

away,” for instance by changing the way they interpret experiences or by

making self-serving attributions (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Pelham,

DeHart & Carvallo, 2003). Importantly however, there is evidence that this is

especially true for people who want to maintain high explicit self-esteem in

the face of low implicit self-esteem (Bosson, Brown, Ziegler-Hill and Swann,

2003; Jordan, et al., 2003; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; see also Jordan,

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Logel, Spencer, Zanna & Whitfield, 2008).

Bosson et al., (2003) investigated two groups of participants. They

compared people with both high explicit and implicit self-esteem and people

with high explicit but low implicit self-esteem (often called fragile or

defensive self-esteem, see e.g., Kernis, 2003). They found that people with

low implicit self-esteem engaged more in unrealistic optimism. In addition,

they found evidence that supports the notion that high explicit self-esteem can

be related to self-deception. Participants were presented with four personality

profiles about themselves ranging from highly unflattering to highly

flattering. They were then asked to rate the accuracy of each of the profiles

(that were allegedly written by clinical psychology students) and as it turned

out, participants with low implicit and high explicit self-esteem rated the very

flattering profile as more descriptive of themselves than participants with both

high explicit and implicit self-esteem. The different profiles are given in the

Appendix to the Bosson et al., (2003) article and this makes the data even

more interesting, as the flattering profile is indeed rather extreme, including

the phrase “knows that affection and admiration from others are well-

deserved” (p. 183).

Jordan et al., (2003) distinguished between the same two groups:

People whose explicit and implicit self-esteem are high versus people whose

explicit self-esteem is high, while their implicit self-esteem is low. They first

established that people with low implicit self-esteem showed more narcissistic

behavior. In later experiments, they obtained more direct evidence for the idea

that maintaining high explicit self-esteem based on low implicit self-esteem

takes effort. They demonstrated that individuals with high explicit but low

implicit self-esteem showed much more defensive behavior. They engaged

more in in-group bias, they demonstrated more prejudice when threatened,

and they put more effort in dissonance reduction.

McGregor and Marigold (2003) investigated effects of personal

uncertainty on “compensatory conviction”. Conviction refers to the extremity

and certainty of important personal attitudes and compensatory conviction is


95

the tendency to increase the extremity of such attitudes and the commitment

with which such attitudes are held. People under uncertainty generally show

compensatory conviction, but McGregor and Marigold (2003) showed that

this is especially true for people with low implicit and high explicit self-

esteem. That is, relative to people with both high implicit and explicit self-

esteem, people with low implicit and high explicit self-esteem engaged in

more compensatory conviction regarding such moral topics as the death

penalty or abortion.

The work by Jordan and colleagues (2008) on people with low implicit

and high explicit self-esteem is consistent with our reasoning. Moreover, their

analysis sheds some more light on why people with low implicit and high

explicit self-esteem have to engage in defensive effort. Jordan et al., reason

that implicit self-esteem is not so much unconscious as it is preconscious.

Sometimes, especially in the face of threats, people become aware of their

(low level of) implicit self-esteem. This fleeting awareness is assumed to be

aversive among people with low implicit and high explicit self-esteem,

leading to what they call “nagging doubts”. These nagging doubts, in turn,

will motivate defensive effort. Jordan et al. (2008), present some interesting

first evidence for their reasoning.

To conclude, the research on people with high explicit and low implicit

self-esteem clearly shows that maintaining high explicit self-esteem when

implicit self-esteem is low is, at least sometimes, hard work – construction

work. In general, the evidence for explicit self-esteem as a construction

process with many inherent biases is strong, rendering the hierarchy

hypothesis more plausible than the equal relation hypothesis.

Finding support for the hierarchy hypothesis

With the hierarchy hypothesis coming out as the most plausible, in the last

part of this chapter we try to corroborate the hierarchy hypothesis by

discussing (and to some extent testing) the support for a few hypotheses

derived from the hierarchy hypothesis. The first hypothesis following from

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the hierarchy hypothesis is that there should be an asymmetry in frequency of

occurrence of different combination of implicit and explicit self-esteem. That

is, we can predict that the combination high explicit/low implicit self-esteem

is more common than the combination low explicit/high implicit self-esteem.

The second hypothesis pertains to the fact that, if we assume explicit self-

esteem is a construction, variations in the degree to which people engage in

active construction should affect the relation between implicit and explicit

self-esteem. That is, we expect implicit and explicit self-esteem to correlate

higher when there is less construction. Both hypotheses will be further

discussed, starting with the asymmetry hypothesis.

Is there an asymmetry? First, let us make the rather safe assumption

that the construction process underlying explicit self-esteem biases explicit

self-esteem more often in a positive rather than in a negative fashion. After

all, people are known to be motivated to see themselves (and have others see

them) in a positive light. This was already suggested earlier by the finding

that explicit self-esteem is correlated with self-presentation style, self-

deception and impression management (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Jordan

et al., 2003; Raskin, et al., 1991). It may certainly be the case that people

strategically report low explicit self-esteem (perhaps because they want to

come across as modest), but this is likely to be relatively rare.

If this reasoning is correct we should be able to witness the following

asymmetry: For people with incongruent implicit and explicit self-esteem

(i.e., one is high, the other low), the combination low implicit/high explicit

self-esteem should occur much more often, or among many more people, than

the combination high implicit/low explicit self-esteem. People with high

implicit self-esteem are seldom motivated to report low explicit self-esteem,

whereas low implicit self-esteem individuals may often report relatively high

explicit self-esteem (even if, as we have seen, it is often hard work). Now is

there such an asymmetry?

One problem is that whether one finds support for this asymmetry or


97

not depends on where one draws the line. When do we categorize implicit

self-esteem and explicit self-esteem as truly low or truly high? The evidence

for the hypothesized asymmetry is, up to this point, only suggestive. First,

various people have made the same prediction (Epstein, 1983; O’Brien &

Epstein, 1988; Kernis, 2003). Others have argued that the combination of high

explicit/low implicit self-esteem is indeed uncommon in Western cultures but

not in Asian cultures (see Kitayama & Uchida, 2003, for a brief review).

Kitayama and Uchida (2003) reported that the combination of high

explicit/low implicit self-esteem can be found among Western participants but

only (or at least mostly) under highly specified measuring circumstances.

Concretely, Western participants only showed the high explicit/low implicit

self-esteem combination in the context of close, interdependent relations.

Perhaps also telling is the fact that the combination low implicit/high explicit

has been named – as defensive or fragile self-esteem – and its consequences

have been investigated by an increasing number of research groups (e.g.,

Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003; Kernis, 2003; McGregor & Marigold,

2003), whereas the combination of high implicit/low explicit self-esteem has

received relatively little attention (for exceptions, see Jordan et al., 2008;

Kitayama and Uchida, 2003). Still, we concede that research is needed to

more strongly corroborate this hypothesized asymmetry.

Variations in construction and the relation between implicit and

explicit self-esteem. The second hypothesis derived from the hierarchy

hypothesis is much easier to test. If explicit self-esteem is partly a

construction process guiding people away from core self-esteem and therefore

also from implicit self-esteem, it means that the less construction there is, the

more explicit self-esteem should correlate with implicit self-esteem. After all,

the less construction there is, the better explicit self-esteem should represent

core self-esteem.

Koole, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (2001) have reported

supportive evidence for this hypothesis. In one experiment, they first assessed

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people’s implicit self-esteem. Later they measured explicit self-esteem and

they measured the time it took participants to complete the explicit self-

esteem items. They hypothesized that the longer people would take to

complete the measure of explicit self-esteem, the more they engaged in active

construction. By measuring response times they assessed natural variations in

people’s degree of construction. They then divided the participants in two

groups: Fast responders and slow responders. In support of the hierarchy

hypothesis, for fast responders the correlation between explicit and implicit

self-esteem was high (.51), whereas for slow responders there was no

correlation at all (-.06). In sum, the less people engaged in active construction

during assessment of explicit self-esteem, the more explicit self-esteem

correlated with implicit self-esteem.

In another experiment, Koole et al., (2001) manipulated rather than

measured construction. Again, they first measured participants’ implicit self-

esteem. Subsequently, explicit self-esteem was assessed and this was either

done under cognitive load or not. Obviously, cognitive load prevents people

from engaging in too much active construction and the experimenters

predicted that explicit self-esteem would correlate with implicit self-esteem

under load, but not necessarily under normal conditions. Indeed, this is what

they found. The correlation between explicit and implicit self-esteem was

high under load (.48) and absent under normal conditions (-.15). This fully

supports the hierarchy hypothesis.

Further support for the hierarchy hypothesis: An experiment

The experiment we report here extends the experiments reported by Koole et

al., (2001). Again, we tried to manipulate the extent to which participants

would engage in active construction processes biasing explicit self-esteem

away from core self-esteem. Before participants’ completed measures of

implicit and explicit self-esteem, we subliminally primed half of our

participants with the goal to be honest. This was done under the guise of a

lexical decision task whereby experimental participants were subliminally


99

presented with words such as honest, sincere, and true. Control participants

were not presented with words related to honesty. We then measured implicit

self-esteem by name-letter preferences and explicit self-esteem with

Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale3. We tested three

hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis is the most important and the most

straightforward. Assuming that explicit self-esteem is in part the result of a

construction process biasing the view of the self in a positive way, the goal to

be honest should lead people to engage in this biased construction to a lesser

extent. The goal to be honest should lead reported explicit self-esteem to be

more strongly related to core self-esteem and therefore to implicit self-esteem.

This means that the correlation between the measures of implicit self-esteem

and explicit self-esteem should be higher for people with a primed honesty

goal than for control participants.

Hypothesis 2. The advantage of the SSES scale is that explicit self-

esteem is divided into three subscales, Appearance self-esteem, Performance

self-esteem, and Social self-esteem. Hypothesis 2 pertains to these subscales.

One could argue that the extent to which people can positively construct self-

esteem differs for the different subscales. After all, reality constraints differ

between the different domains they represent. Appearance self-esteem is

probably the hardest to strategically bias in a positive way. We can maintain

that our attractiveness is on par with that of Brad Pitt or Jennifer Lopez, but it

does not make sense. It’s a form of absurd self-deception and we know it. A

mild form of self-deception is likely to be easier in the domain of

Performance self-esteem. The truth is still to some extent objective, but at

least one can easily switch between different domains (“Yes, I lost a game of

Trivial Pursuit against friends, but I had an A+ for Intro Social Psychology!”).

Social self-esteem is, with the exception of extreme cases perhaps, likely the

easiest one to steer towards rosiness. One can think about many different

Chapter 4

100

relationships, and it is often possible to flexibly interpret social behavior (“His

insult was not personal, he must have been in an awful mood”). If this

reasoning is valid, this would mean that, for people without an honesty goal,

appearance self-esteem correlates highest with implicit self-esteem, whereas

social self-esteem correlates lowest with implicit self-esteem. For participants

with an honesty goal, these differences should disappear.

Hypothesis 3. Assuming that explicit self-esteem, although partly

constructed, does to some extent represent core self-esteem, this should also

be true for the three subscales. If participants primed with honesty engage less

in construction, their self-esteem should better reflect core self-esteem (as

reflected in Hypothesis 1). As this should be true for all subscales, it follows

that the different subscales should “converge” towards core self-esteem and

therefore also to each other. Hence, the correlations between the subscales

should be higher among people primed with honesty.

In total, seventy-one undergraduate students participated in the

experiment, 37 in the control condition, 34 in the honesty-prime condition.

The correlations pertaining to the hypotheses are listed in the Table 4.1. As

can be seen, hypothesis 1 was supported, although the difference just failed to

reach significance. As predicted, we found a high correlation between explicit

and implicit self-esteem after honesty priming, and no such correlation for

control participants. Hypothesis 2 also received support in that, for control

participants, the correlation between implicit self-esteem and appearance self-

esteem was highest, whereas the correlation between implicit self-esteem and

social self-esteem was lowest. The honesty prime significantly increased the

correlation between implicit self-esteem and social self-esteem and between

implicit self-esteem and performance self-esteem (although this latter effect

was marginally significant), whereas the honesty prime did not affect the

correlation between implicit self-esteem and appearance self-esteem. Finally,

hypothesis 3 also received support. Correlations between subscales were

generally higher under honesty conditions than under control conditions, with


101

one of them reaching conventional levels of significance. As predicted, the

different subscales converged because the honesty prime decreased the

amount of construction work.

In sum, although some of the evidence was statistically somewhat

weak, the results support the hierarchy hypothesis. The effects of priming of

the honesty goal were exactly as predicted.

Table 4.1 Correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem (and its

subscales) and between the subscales as a function of condition.

Honesty Control Difference

Correlations with implicit SE (p – one-tailed)

Overall explicit SE .54* (.51*) .21 (.17) < .06 (< .06)

Appearance .41* (.43*) .33* (.29†) ns (ns)

Performance .41* (.45*) .14 (.16) < .09 (< .12)

Social .48* (.42*) .05 (.04) < .03 (< .05)

Correlations among subscales

Appearance-Performance .63* .51* ns

Appearance-Social .70* .42* < .02

Performance-Social SLE .77* .68* ns

Note. Correlations between parentheses are based on the new scoring algorithm for the name

letter test proposed by Albers, Dijksterhuis, & Rotteveel (2009)

* p < .05. † p < .10.

Conclusions

To conclude, the hierarchy hypothesis best describes the relation between

implicit and explicit self-esteem. Both explicit and implicit self-esteem are in

part based on the same underlying construct, that what we called core self-

esteem. However, due to the fact that explicit self-esteem is often the

consequence of active and biased construction processes, it represents core

self-esteem less well than implicit self-esteem. Furthermore, as implicit self-

Chapter 4

102

esteem represents core self-esteem better, explicit self-esteem can be partly

predicted by implicit self-esteem. In addition, it was shown that (in line with

Koole et al., 2001) the correlation between explicit and implicit self-esteem

can be increased by interfering with the active construction process

explicit self-esteem is partly based on.

Before ending we would like to remark that we do not see implicit self-

esteem as an infinitely better construct than explicit self-esteem. In addition,

we certainly do not argue that we should stop using the latter. Such a claim

would clearly be unwarranted. The relation between explicit and implicit self-

esteem is often so weak that it clearly pays off to investigate both and to

scrutinize combinations of consistent and inconsistent combinations, as

interesting recent research clearly shows. Another reason for not solely

relying on implicit self-esteem is the fact that measures of implicit self-esteem

are in a sense still in a developing stage. For some measures, the underlying

processes driving its effects are not fully understood. Although some

important improvements have been proposed recently (Albers, Dijksterhuis &

Rotteveel, 2009; Karpinski, 2004; Wentura, Kulfanek & Greve, 2005), there

is still quite some work to be done to optimize implicit measurement.

However, we do want to maintain that explicit self-esteem is a less

pure form of self-esteem. In addition to being less pure though, it is also more

rich and multifaceted. It is in part construction rather than excavation work. It

only weakly reflects core self-esteem and it is affected by self-deception,

impression management, and self-presentation style. However, this inherent

richness is not in itself problematic, after all, explicit self-esteem predicts

quite a number of psychological processes very well.

To recapitulate, both explicit and implicit self-esteem clearly have their

value, also in an Egyptian desert. Measuring explicit self-esteem may be

architecture, but it is pretty good architecture with means we are familiar

with. Measuring implicit self-esteem, on the other hand, is sincere archeology,

but with equipment that still leaves things to be desired.


103

Endnotes

¹One could raise the reverse hierarchy hypothesis, namely that explicit

self-esteem is closer to the core than implicit self-esteem. However, such a

hypothesis is at odds with so much psychological knowledge that it cannot be

seriously defended. Conscious processes are by necessity preceded by

unconscious processes (at least when one maintains that consciousness resides

in the brain). Hence, one cannot be conscious of an attitude (“I really like

Chocolate Chip cookies”) without preceding unconscious attitudinal

processes (such as positive affective reactions upon the perception of

Chocolate Chip cookies). One way out would be to say that attitudes are only

attitudes when they are conscious and that the core is to be found in

consciousness. Such a conceptualization is possible, but it would have some

undesirable consequences, the least problematic being that the current chapter

would be superfluous (as implicit attitudes would not exist). However, it

would also render the attitude concept rather limp as we are not that often

consciously aware of our attitudes, except perhaps during communication. Of

course, we are very often aware of attitude objects of course (“Ah, cookies”)

but not of the attitude. In addition, the reverse hierarchy hypothesis would

severely constrain the number of cases where attitudes can predict behavior,

because even if we are consciously aware of an attitude, this very often

happens only after we act (such as when one mindlessly reaches for Chocolate

Chip cookies, and only then thinks “I’m fond of them!”).

²It should be noted that we take the liberty here to interpret the Riketta

and Dauenheimer findings in terms of evaluative conditioning. The authors

themselves favor a different explanation for their findings.

³The order in which implicit self-esteem and explicit self-esteem were

administered was counterbalanced. Order did not affect the results.

105

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117

Summary

It is hard to find a person that does not have a deep routed feeling of being a

self. A self that is distinguishable from its surroundings and other selves, who

in their own way, distinguish their selves similarly. Moreover, all these selves

seem to attach existential meaning to the affective condition their selves are

in, so that feeling good about oneself is often the ultimate goal. That this

contention is not without support becomes clear when consulting the Web.

The term “Self-help” results in almost one billion hits on the internet,

approaching the far broader concept of health and outnumbering concepts

such as god, religion, war, peace, success, medicine, money, and even food.

The preoccupation with valuing ourselves is also apparent in

psychological research with self-esteem as one of its most studied concepts.

In the 20th century this concept of self-esteem resembled most other

psychological concepts in that the explicit, or direct, approach of defining,

and measuring it was the dominant approach. That is, psychological

constructs were measured by asking individuals to indicate their attitudes,

feelings, cognitions or behavior. For example, when measuring self-esteem

someone had to indicate personal agreement with items such as “I have a

positive attitude towards myself”. A collection of agreements and

Double You?

118

disagreements with similar statements is then taken as an individual score on

self-esteem, in this example the score on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

(Rosenberg, 1965). The prevalence of these self-report methods of

psychological constructs suggests their usefulness and established value

within the field of psychology. However, they rely on two basic assumptions

about who we are and how we function: Individuals will and can

introspectively indicate what they think, feel and do. A challenge of both

assumptions has led to a surge of attention in the use and development of

implicit, or indirect, measuring instruments in the late 20th century (Fazio &

Olson, 2003).

Falsification of each of these two basic assumptions poses different

problems for psychological research. The possibility that someone may not be

willing to honestly answer self-report measures is generally acknowledged to

pose a validity problem for the measurement of psychological constructs

although the importance of the problem is subject of ongoing debate

(Holtgraves 2004; Alliger & Dwight, 2000). Indirect or implicit measures

circumvent this problem since the subject simply does not know what is being

assessed so that the impact of social desirability greatly diminishes. The idea

that individuals actually may not be able to have full introspective access to

themselves can already be found in the works of 18th and 19th century

influential philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but has

only been substantiated by empirical evidence conducted in the last few

decades (for reviews see for example Dijksterhuis, & Bargh, 2001; Epley,

Savitsky & Kachelski, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Lewicki, Hill &

Czyzewska, 1992; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Because traditional self-report

measures cannot capture someone’s introspectively inaccessible parts, our

understanding of psychological functioning benefits from indirect or implicit

measures that do try the grasp these attitudes and feelings. Hence, besides

circumventing validity problems in self-report measures, the development of

indirect or implicit measures may first and foremost be useful in exploring the

role that both nonconscious content and processes play in our psychological

Summary

119

functioning.

In this dissertation I examine function and form of implicit self-esteem,

which reflects the relatively less accessible part of self-esteem. Specifically,

this dissertation is about the additional value implicit self-esteem has in

understanding self-esteem. I will argue that in order to place the concept of

implicit self-esteem within the realms on current research on self-esteem,

understanding of both the measurement of implicit self-esteem and its relation

with explicit self-esteem is necessary.

In Chapter 1 an overview of the existing literature on implicit and

explicit self-esteem is integrated with the findings from the research presented

in the chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation. First, a discussion on the

emergence of the concept of implicit self-esteem is presented, followed by an

analysis and overview of several instruments that measure implicit self-

esteem. The relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem, which, like

any other implicit-explicit relation, is subject to ongoing debate, will then be

discussed and connected to other psychological constructs. Specifically,

results will be presented showing that implicit self-esteem relates over and

above explicit self-esteem to important affect-related personality traits and

furthermore serves as a useful predictor of affect-regulation. I will attest that

these empirical results form the core in the theoretical development of

understanding function and form of implicit self-esteem, and conclude that

although the current measures of implicit self-esteem are still in their infancy,

they already serve as important empirical tools in diminishing the distance

between our real self and the self we believe or say we are.

In Chapter 2, I will focus on optimizing one of the most widely used

implicit self-esteem measures, the name letter test (Kitayama & Karasawa,

1997). The name letter test consists of judging the different letters of the

alphabet on their attractiveness. A name letter effect is then traditionally

calculated as the rated attractiveness of someone’s initials or name letters

minus the average attractiveness of those same letters rated by people not

having those initial or name letters. This name letter effect is subsequently

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120

used as a measure of implicit self-esteem based on the assumption that by

assessing someone’s evaluation of well established attributes of the self (such

as someone’s initials) in an unobtrusive way (e.g., under the guise of simply

evaluating all alphabet letters), someone’s implicit evaluation of the self is

measured. It is argued that the traditional calculation method results in a name

letter score that is confounded, because this method cannot adequately

distinguish the evaluation of name letters from not-name letters, and may

therefore mistake response bias or general letter liking for implicit self-

esteem. This is why an alternative scoring algorithm for the name letter score

is proposed that is without confounds and assesses the unique contribution of

name letter evaluation by simultaneously controlling for the influence of not-

name letter liking and general liking of the specific letters. In three

experiments it is shown that the confound of overall letter liking is indeed

problematic in empirical findings on implicit self-esteem when using the

traditional name letter score while the alternative scoring algorithm remedies

this issue and as such results in a more valid measure for implicit self-esteem.

In Chapter 3, I will discuss function and form of implicit self-esteem in

relation to affect-regulation processes. Using the new scoring algorithm for

the name letter test presented in Chapter 2 it is first empirically demonstrated

that implicit self-esteem relates over and above explicit self-esteem and across

time to the personality dimensions Emotional Stability and Neuroticism, the

two personality dimensions that are most strongly related to affect regulation.

In a second and third experiment I will further show that implicit self-esteem

can differentiate between the kind of affect regulation required: It is of special

importance in regulating affect when the self is threatened. On the other hand,

the explicit measures of self-esteem did not relate to this kind of self-

regulation but rather seemed to predict a more general state of affect. These

results suggest that measuring implicit self-esteem has additional value in our

understanding of both function and form of self-esteem

In Chapter 4, I will, in search for “the real self”, further dig into the

relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Based on both theoretical

Summary

121

and empirical evidence it is proposed, that though measures of implicit self-

esteem may not be without problems, in essence implicit self-esteem is closer

to our core self-esteem than explicit self-esteem. First of all evidence is

provided that the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem is

enhanced by factors that reduce (the need for) an active construction process

of responding to the explicit self-esteem measures. Secondly, empirical

evidence is presented demonstrating that high scores on traditional measures

of explicit self-esteem could be either the result of actually having high self-

esteem or the result of other, less desirable self-presentational strategies.

Conversely, measures of implicit self-esteem are unrelated to these

psychological processes. Because measures of explicit self-esteem do not

have the inherent capacity to distinguish between these possibilities, this

provides further support for the proposition that explicit self-esteem is a less

pure measure that is more dissociated from core self-esteem than implicit self-

esteem. In an additional experiment this proposition is further substantiated

by showing that explicit self-esteem more resembles implicit self-esteem

when an automatic goal to be honest is activated.

123

Summary in Dutch

(Nederlandse Samenvatting)

Het is lastig iemand te vinden die geen diepgeworteld gevoel heeft een zelf te

zijn. Een zelf dat zich duidelijk onderscheidt van zijn omgeving en andere

personen die, op hun beurt, zichzelf op dezelfde wijze onderscheiden.

Bovendien lijken al deze ‘zelven’ een existentiële betekenis te verbinden aan

de toestand waarin zij zich bevinden, waardoor je goed voelen over jezelf

vaak een levensdoel op zich is. Dat deze observatie niet zomaar uit de lucht

gegrepen is wordt duidelijk wanneer we kijken naar het overweldigende

aanbod op het gebied van zelfhulp. De Engelse vertaling van zelfhulp (i.e.,

Self-help) geeft bijna 1 miljard hits op het internet, waarmee het veel bredere

Engelstalige begrip ‘health’ (i.e., gezondheid) in aantal benaderd wordt en de

Engelse vertalingen van begrippen zoals god, geloof, oorlog, vrede, succes,

geneeskunde, geld en voedsel zelfs overstegen worden.

De grote behoefte om ons goed over onszelf te voelen komt ook sterk

naar voren in wetenschappelijk psychologisch onderzoek, waarbij

zelfwaardering één van de meest onderzochte onderwerpen is. Net zoals bij

andere psychologische constructen werd ook zelfwaardering in de twintigste

Double You?

124

eeuw vooral als een expliciet en bewust construct benaderd. Bij het meten van

zelfwaardering betekende dit dat iemand de mate van instemming diende aan

te geven op beweringen zoals “Ik heb een positieve houding naar mijzelf”. De

mate waarin die persoon vervolgens instemde met verschillende gerelateerde

beweringen werd vervolgens als maat genomen voor iemands zelfwaardering.

Hoewel deze expliciete manier van meten ook nog tegenwoordig de gangbare

methode is om psychologische constructen te meten, is het wel zo dat de

laatste decennia steeds meer aandacht is gekomen voor het ontwikkelen van

meer impliciete of indirecte meetmethodes. Dit komt vooral omdat de

aannames, die ten grondslag liggen aan de expliciete meetmethodes en ervan

uitgaan dat personen zowel in staat als bereid zijn aan te geven wat zij over

zichzelf denken en voelen, steeds vaker in twijfel worden getrokken (Fazio &

Olson, 2003).

De falsificatie van deze twee basisaannames zorgen elk voor hun eigen

problemen binnen psychologisch onderzoek. De mogelijkheid dat iemand niet

bereid is eerlijk zijn wordt in het algemeen gezien als een probleem bij het

meten van het betreffende psychologische construct (Holtgraves 2004; Alliger

& Dwight, 2000). Indirecte of impliciete meetmethodes kunnen dit probleem

omzeilen omdat de ondervraagde persoon zich niet bewust is van datgene dat

gemeten wordt zodat de impact van sociaal wenselijk gedrag sterk wordt

verminderd. De mogelijkheid dat iemand niet in staat is om volledige

introspectieve toegang te hebben tot zichzelf wordt al benoemd in het

gedachtegoed van invloedrijke filosofen zoals Leibniz, Schopenhauer en

Nietzsche, maar wordt pas de laatste paar decennia ondersteund door

empirisch bewijs (voor een overzicht zie bijvoorbeeld Dijksterhuis, & Bargh,

2001; Epley, Savitsky & Kachelski, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;

Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1992; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Omdat de

traditionele zelfrapportage methodes niet in staat zijn de ontoegankelijke

aspecten van onze psyche bloot te leggen kan ons begrip over ons

psychologisch functioneren en de rol die onbewuste processen hier in spelen

dus baat hebben bij indirecte of impliciete meetmethodes die erop gericht zijn

Summary in Dutch

125

dat wel te doen.

In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik vooral de impliciete zelfwaardering,

die betrekking heeft op het relatief minder toegankelijke deel van onze

zelfwaardering. De nadruk zal hierbij liggen op de toegevoegde waarde die

deze impliciete benadering heeft voor het beter begrijpen van de functie en

vorm van zelfwaardering.

In Hoofdstuk1 wordt de bestaande literatuur over impliciete en

expliciete zelfwaardering geïntegreerd met de bevindingen van het onderzoek

dat gepresenteerd wordt in de hoofdstukken 2, 3, en 4 van dit proefschrift.

Allereerst wordt de opkomst van het concept impliciete zelfwaardering

besproken, gevolgd door een overzicht en analyse van de verschillende

methoden om impliciete zelfwaardering te meten. De relatie tussen impliciete

en expliciete zelfwaardering zal dan onder de loep genomen worden en

vervolgens worden gerelateerd aan andere psychologische constructen.

Specifiek zal empirisch aangetoond worden dat impliciete zelfwaardering

vooral gerelateerd is aan persoonlijkheidstrekken die een sterke affectieve

component bezitten en verder kan fungeren als een bruikbare voorspeller voor

affectregulatie. Ik zal verder aangeven dat deze empirische bevindingen de

kern vormen in de theoretische ontwikkeling en het begrip van de functie en

vorm van impliciete zelfwaardering en concluderen dat ondanks dat de

huidige meetmethodes voor impliciete zelfwaardering nog in hun

kinderschoenen staan, ze zelfs nu al fungeren als belangrijk empirisch

gereedschap om de afstand te verkleinen tussen ons echte zelf en het zelf dat

we denken of zeggen te zijn.

In Hoofdstuk 2 zal de nadruk liggen op het op het optimaliseren van de

naamletter test (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997), één van de meest gebruikte

methodes om impliciete zelfwaardering te meten. De test is gebaseerd op de

aantrekkelijkheid die iemand toedicht aan de verschillende letters van het

alfabet. De traditionele rekenmethode om hier vervolgens een naamletter

effect voor te berekenen bestaat uit de aantrekkelijkheid die iemand dan blijkt

te geven aan zijn initialen of naamletters te verminderen met de gemiddelde

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126

aantrekkelijkheid die andere personen, die de betreffende initialen of

naamletters niet in hun eigen naam hebben, aan die letters geven. Dit

naamletter effect wordt vervolgens gebruikt als maat voor de impliciete

zelfwaardering gebaseerd op de aanname dat door het op onopvallende wijze

vaststellen van iemands waardering voor kenmerken die sterk geassocieerd

zijn met het zelf (zoals onder het mom van het simpelweg waarderen van alle

letters van het alfabet daarmee onopvallend de waardering bepalen die iemand

geeft aan zijn initialen), de impliciete waardering die een persoon over

zichzelf heeft gemeten kan worden. Er zal zowel theoretisch als empirisch

worden aangetoond worden dat de traditionele rekenmethode niet in staat is

een onderscheid te maken in de waardering van iemands naamletters en de

overige letters van het alfabet, zodat het geen goede methode is om iemands

impliciete zelfwaardering vast te stellen. Om deze reden zal er een nieuw

algoritme worden voorgesteld dat wel in staat is dit onderscheid te maken en

resulteert in een betere methode om impliciete zelfwaardering mee vast te

stellen.

In Hoofdstuk 3 zal ik de functie en vorm van impliciete zelfwaardering

in relatie tot affectregulatie bespreken. Met gebruik van het nieuwe algoritme

voor het naamletter effect, besproken in Hoofdstuk 2, zal er eerst empirisch

worden aangetoond dat impliciete zelfwaardering bovenop expliciete

zelfwaardering gerelateerd is aan de persoonlijkheidseigenschappen

Emotionele Stabiliteit en Neuroticisme, de twee persoonlijkheidsdimensies

die het sterkst gerelateerd zijn aan affectregulatie. In een tweede en derde

experiment zal verder aangetoond worden dat impliciete zelfwaardering

vooral een belangrijke rol speelt bij affectregulatie wanneer het zelf bedreigd

wordt, terwijl de expliciete zelfwaardering niet gerelateerd lijkt te zijn aan

deze vorm van zelfregulatie maar eerder indicatief is voor de algemene

gemoedstoestand van een persoon. Deze resultaten duiden op de toegevoegde

waarde die het meten van impliciete zelfwaardering heeft in ons begrip van

zowel functie als vorm van zelfwaardering.

In Hoofdstuk 4 zal ik in de zoektocht naar het ‘werkelijke’ zelf verder

Summary in Dutch

127

ingaan op de relatie tussen impliciete en expliciete zelfwaardering, waarbij

zowel op grond van theoretisch als empirisch bewijs geconcludeerd wordt dat

in essentie de impliciete zelfwaardering dichter bij onze werkelijke

zelfwaardering ligt dan de expliciete zelfwaardering. Allereerst zal er bewijs

gegeven worden dat laat zien dat de relatie tussen impliciete en expliciete

zelfwaardering versterkt wordt door factoren die de (behoefte tot) actieve

constructie verminderen bij het meten van iemands expliciete zelfwaardering.

Daarnaast wordt er empirisch bewijs gepresenteerd dat laat zien dat hoge

scores bij het meten van expliciete zelfwaardering zowel het gevolg kunnen

zijn van een werkelijke hoge zelfwaardering maar ook het gevolg van een

minder wenselijke zelfpresentatiestrategieën die een eigenlijk lage expliciete

zelfwaardering maskeren, terwijl het meten van impliciete zelfwaardering niet

beïnvloed wordt door deze strategieën. Dit geeft verdere ondersteuning aan de

het idee dat expliciete zelfwaardering een minder zuivere maat is die verder

verwijderd is van onze werkelijke zelfwaardering dan impliciete

zelfwaardering. In een extra experiment wordt dit idee verder ondersteund

door te laten zien dat expliciete zelfwaardering meer op impliciete

zelfwaardering gaat lijken wanneer een onbewust doel om eerlijk te zijn

wordt geactiveerd.

129

Acknowledgements

(Dankwoord)

Zelfs een mars van duizend mijl begint met de eerste stap. Nu het einde van

mijn proefschriftmars in zicht is wil ik deze woorden van Lao Tse graag

aangrijpen om iedereen die deel is geweest van mijn reis met heel mijn hart te

bedanken.

Ik ben deze reis ooit begonnen met de eerste stap, eigenlijk zonder doel

of verwachting over de afloop. Promoveren was ondergeschikt aan

onderzoeken. Ondergeschikt aan de uitdagingen die de wetenschap mij te

bieden had. Dat beviel uitstekend, maar veranderde toen na een paar jaar

duidelijk werd dat mijn omzwervingen mij niet wezenlijk dichter bij het

promoveren zelf hadden gebracht. Het doel om te promoveren werd steeds

saillanter en drukte mijn onderzoekspassie soms naar de tweede plaats. Een

op intelligentie geënte bergbeklimming werd daardoor steeds meer een proeve

van doorzettingsvermogen. Hoewel mij dat niet altijd even goed beviel, bleek

ik over meer doorzettingsvermogen te beschikken dan ik aanvankelijk had

gedacht. Een soort van onbewuste vastberadenheid die nieuw voor mij was.

Alleen bleek die wel een beetje te botsen met mijn eigenwijze neiging het op

mijn eigen voorwaarden te doen. Iets te perfectionistisch. Iets te idealistisch.

Iets te moralistisch. En die voorwaarden bleken soms moeilijk de kop in te

drukken. Daarmee heb ik mijzelf vaak door te krappe kloven proberen te

Acknowledgements

130

duwen en mezelf op wel erg kronkelende paadjes en te steile hellingen doen

belanden. En dus kwam ik wel eens vast te zitten, verloor ik perspectief of

gleed ik uit. Maar evenzo vaak hebben jullie mij weer vlot getrokken, het

juiste pad gewezen, mij verzorgd en rechtop gezet. Zelfs wanneer ik tijdens

het uitglijden jullie wel eens heb laten uitglijden. Ik kan niet vaak genoeg

zeggen hoeveel mij dat waard is.

Ap en Mark, bedankt voor jullie vriendschap, ondersteuning, geduld en

wetenschappelijk inzicht. Ik heb er veel van geleerd en veel aan jullie gehad.

Dit geldt ook voor alle andere collega’s van de verschillende vakgroepen

Sociale Psychologie, de vakgroep Arbeids- en Organisatie Psychologie aan de

UvA en mijn tijd bij het Social Skills Lab. Door jullie heb ik veel mooie

onuitwisbare herinneringen. Met weemoed denk ik vaak aan die tijd terug,

niet in het minst door Yael, Catherina, Helma, Maaike, Kirsten, Sjoerd,

Maaike, Karin, Clemens, Daphne, Job, Michael, Sjoerd, Gerben, Sanne, Titia,

Petra, Tessa, Carlijn, Marielle, Pam, Lotte, Lotte, Anja, Karin en Ho Jung.

Wat een mooie tijd met mooie mensen was het.

En dan mijn leven buiten de UvA. Al mijn vrienden, bedankt voor jullie

warmte en levenswijsheden en dan zeker Stefan, Edo, Mike, Chris, Petra,

Maria, Janneke, Jeroen, Jeroen, Lobke, Daphne, Carlijn, Sjoerd, Sumit en

Yann. Marije, Roos en Julie, dank voor de mooie momenten die ik met jullie

heb mogen delen.

Sjoerd dank je voor je ongekunsteldheid, je vriendschap en Etta James.

Waar zouden we zijn zonder muziek.

Sumit, dank voor je steun en de gepassioneerde discussies over het leven

in het algemeen en de wetenschap in het bijzonder. We hebben veel gemeen.

Yann, merci de votre amitié et chanter le Blues du Lac de St.Croix avec

moi.

Chris, dank voor je recht-voor-z’n-raap-zijn, onuitputbare energie en

hernieuwde vriendschap. Ik zal oefenen om je wat beter bij te kunnen houden.

Lobke, dank voor je ondersteuning, eigenzinnigheid en goede

gesprekken. Het doet me goed.

Dankwoord

131

Edo, dank voor je grote humor en behulpzaamheid. Je bent een mooi

mens.

Carlijn, dank voor je mensenkennis, je interesse en oprechtheid. Ik leer

er veel van.

Marjolein, dank voor je lieve warmte en dat je me naar Cambodja

stuurde. Het was zo nodig en zo’n goed idee.

Stefan, dank voor jouw empathisch vermogen en diepgaand inzicht in

mijn menselijk zijn. Het is mij veel waard.

Jeroen dank voor je vriendschap, je levenshouding, goede gesprekken en

backgammon. Daarbij bestaat er geen betere zwager voor mijn zus.

Daphne, dank voor al je vriendschap, humor in mooie tijden en grote

steun op moeilijke dagen. Ik prijs me heel gelukkig dat ik je ken.

Jeroen, kerel. Dank voor al meer dan zeventien jaar magie.

Onbetaalbaar. Onvoorwaardelijk. Ongelooflijk.

Janneke, Janneke, Janneke. Wat een fantastische zus en wat een

ontzettend mooi mens ben jij. Wat zou ik zonder je moeten.

Liefste Pap en Mam. Jullie stonden, staan en zullen altijd aan mijn basis

staan. Zonder enig voorbehoud was jullie liefde er en zal die er altijd zijn.

Jullie zijn wie ik hoop te zijn.

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The “Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series” started in 1997. Since 2008 the following dissertations have been published: 2008-1: Marijke van Putten: Dealing with missed opportunities. The causes and boundary conditions of inaction inertia 2008-2: Marjolein Maas: Experiential Social Justice Judgment Processes 2008-3: Lonneke de Meijer: Ethnicity effects in police officer selection: Applicant, assessor, and selection-method factors 2008-4: Frederike Zwenk: Voice by Representation 2008-5: Margreet Reitsma: The Impact of Linguistically Biased Messages on Involved Receivers 2008-6: Marcus Maringer: Feeling one thing, seeing another: Emotion comparison effects in person judgments 2008-7: Hanneke Heinsman: The competency concept revealed: Its nature, relevance, and practice 2008-8: Joris Lammers: Toward a more social social psychology of power 2008-9: Daniël Fockenberg: Between Good and Evil: Affective Priming in Dynamic Context 2008-10: Arne van den Bos: Why we stereotype influences how we stereotype: self- enhancement and comprehension effects on social perception 2008-11: Lidewij Niezink: Considering Others in Need: On Altruism, Empathy and Perspective Taking 2008-12: Aad Oosterhof: Better together: Antecedents and consequences of perceived expertise dissimilarity and perceived expertise complementarity in teams 2008-13: Femke ten Velden: Negotiation in dyads and groups: The effects of social and epistemic motives 2008-14: Maike Wehrens: How did YOU do? Social comparison in secondary education 2008-15: Kyra Luijters: Making Diversity Bloom: Coping Effectively with Cultural Differences at Work 2008-16: Ilona de Hooge: Moral emotions in decision making: Towards a better understanding of shame and guilt 2008-17: Lindred L. Greer: Team Composition and Conflict: The Role of Individual Differences 2008-18: Sezgin Cihangir: The Dark Side of Subtle Discrimination: How targets respond to different forms of discrimination 2008-19: Giel Dik: On the contagiousness of others’ goals: The role of perceiving effort 2008-20: Lotte van Dillen: Dealing with negative feelings: The role of working memory in emotion regulation 2008-21: Marijn Poortvliet: Information exchange examined: An interpersonal account of achievement goals 2008-22: Sjoerd Pennekamp: Dynamics of disadvantage: Uncovering the role of group- based anger 2008-23: Chris Reinders Folmer: Cooperation and communication: Plastic goals and social roles 2009-1: Marijke Leliveld: Ethics in Economic Decision-Making 2009-2: Monique Pollmann: Accuracy and Bias in Person Perception 2009-3: Krispijn Faddegon: Regulatory Focus in Group Contexts

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2009-4: Lieven Brebels: Mirror, mirror on the wall… Procedural fairness as an evaluative and regulatory looking-glass self 2009-5: Daphne Wiersema: Taking it personally: Self-esteem and the protection of self-related attitudes 2009-6: Judith D.M. Grob: Dial E for Emotion: Context and Consequences of Emotion Regulation 2009-7: Katherine Stroebe: Is this about me? Responding to subtle discrimination – beyond an individual versus group perspective 2009-8: Menno Vos: Identity patterns in diverse work groups: Improving social integration outcomes through relational identities 2009-9: Lennart Renkema: Facing Death Together: Understanding The Consequences of Mortality Threats 2009-10: Michael Vliek: Group-based social comparison processes: An intragroup level of analysis 2009-11: Karlijn Massar: Unconscious rivals: The automatic evaluation of rivals in jealousy-evoking situations 2009-12: Bart Terwel: Origins and consequences of public trust: Towards an understanding of public acceptance of carbon dioxide capture and storage 2009-13: Emma ter Mors: Dealing with information about complex issues: The role of source perceptions 2009-14: Martijn Veltkamp: On the Instigation of Implicit Motivation: How Deprivation and Positive Affect Cause Motivated Behavior 2009-15: Marret K. Noordewier: Consistency and the unexpected 2009-16: Sytske van der Velde: Imitation of Emotion: How meaning affects the link between imitation and liking 2009-17: Jacomijn Hofstra: Attaching Cultures: The role of attachment styles in explaining majority members' acculturation attitudes 2009-18: Jacqueline Tanghe: Affect in Groups: Convergence, Conditions and Consequences 2009-19: Anne Marike Lokhorst: Using Commitment to Improve Environmental Quality 2009-20: Jonathan van ‘t Riet: Framing Health Communication Messages 2009-21: Suzanne Pietersma: Persuasive Health Communication: A Self-Perspective 2009-22: Remco Wijn: A functional perspective on the justice judgment process and its consequences 2009-23: Niels van de Ven: The bright side of a deadly sin: The psychology of envy 2009-24: Anthon Klapwijk: The Power of Interpersonal Generosity 2010-1: Maarten Wubben: Social Functions of Emotions in Social Dilemmas 2010-2: Joyce Rupert: Diversity faultiness and team learning 2010-3: Daniel Lakens: Abstract Concepts in Grounded Cognition 2010-4: Luuk Albers: Double You? Function and Form of Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem

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