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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF EARLY BUDDHISM

BY

KALUKOTTEGE KUMAR PIYASIRI

THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

OCTOBER 1977

without the loving kindness of these two friends, who always

took the time to care, to listen and to be concerned. They

have looked after me very carefully and their affection has

been a constant moral encouragement to me. I wish to express

my sincere thanks to D.T. Rajapatirana ,, Dr. H. H. E. Loafs,

Dr. J.T.F. Jordens, Professor Q.B. Gibson and to my friends,

Mr. John Pflugradt and Mrs. B. Johnstone for many acts of

kindness and for valuable and constructive suggestions at

every stage of the writing of this thesis. They have always

enthusiasti9ally encouraged and willingly helped me in many

ways. I wish to thank the Australian National University

for allowing me to carry out this research project and I am

especially grateful to Mr. C.W. Plowman and Mr. G. Dicker,

of the Australian National University administration for

their assistance and support, not least in the final stage

of preparing this thesis. I must also take this opportunity

to express my sincere thanks to Professor M.B. Ariyapala for

his help and co-operation on a number of difficult issues I

had with the University of Sri Lanka.

Finally, I wish to express my deep gratitude to my wife

Chandra, to whom I owe an enormous debt and from whom I never

cease to learn.

''Knowledge" as ~rya§~ra says in the J;takam;l; "is the special

cause for receiving presents from persons of high rank". I

have been a most fortunate recipient of favours while engaging

in the pursuit of it. If the results of the search set out in

this thesis give any satisfaction to the learned world, then

the purpose of my quest will have been fulfilled.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................ · ·

Subsections (Numbers here denote paragraphs)

1.1.1 - 1.1.3: Introductory observations. 1.2.1 - 1.2.2: Early Buddhism was a product of social change in ancient India. 1.3.1 -1.3.6: Criticism of the view that early. Buddhism does not concern itself with social, political and legal ideas. 1.4.1 -1.4.4: Some views suggesting that the Buddha based his system on the teaching of the Vedas. 1.5.1 -1.5.2: Impression created in connect­ion with early Buddhist social and political ideas and the neglect of such ideas in the context of Indian social and political thGught. 1.6.1 -1.6.5: Previous works on the subject. 1.7.1- 1.7.6: The purpose of the present work, impression created by some modern scholars concerning Buddhist social and political thought and its modern interp­retations. 1.8.1-1.8.6: Source materials used and the treatment of the subject. 1.9.1 - 1.9.2: Main topics discussed and the usefulness of the present work.

CHAPTER II: POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION

Subsections. 2.1.1: Introductory observations. 2.2.1 -2.2.5: Classification of ideas of political obligation and authority in Indian tradition. 2.3.1. -2.3.7: Examination of the theological theory of the Vedic tradition. The first version -monistic view. 2.4.1-2.4.2: A second version -divine invention. 2.5.1-2 .5.6: The third version-magico-religious view. 2.6.1- 2.6.6: Final version of the theological theory - idea of an agreement. 2.7.1 -2.7.2: Summary of the theological theory. 2.8.1-2.8.6: Comments on the Vedic and post-Vedic ideas of the origin of kingship. 2.9.1: The early Buddhist approach to the subject. 2.10.1 -2.10.18: The arguments against a personal creator God. 2.11.1 -2.11.12: The notion of social contract. 2.12.1 -2.12.3: The other versions-different schools of Buddhism and the summary. 2.13.1 -2.13.6: Examination of the meaning of Mahasammata - its narrow explanation. 2.14.1-2.14.5: Its wider explanation, its meaning and its socio­political implications. 2.15.1-2.15.3: Important features of the notion of social contract. 2.16.1: Conclusion.

Page

1- 16

17- 69

CHAPTER III: THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA

Subsections. 3.1.1: Introductory observations. 3.2.1-3.2.5: Dhamma as a word of importance in Indian religious traditions. Its derivations - develop­ments from the days of the Vedas. The words rta, dharman and dharma. 3.3.1-3 .3.8: ·some observation about the assumption that the both concepts, the Vedic dharma and Buddhist dharma, are of the same nature. The Brahma~ic and Upanisadic conception of dharma. Its interpretations - the sources - the various uses in different contexts. 3.4.1-3. 4.9: What is dhamma of early Buddhism in contrast to the Vedic and post-Vedic systems? Some of the fundamental differences between Vedic dharma and Buddhist dhamma. 3.5.1- 3.5.7: Relation of dhamma to the social contract theory of early Buddhism. 3.6.1 - 3.6.4: The authority of dhamma in the sphere of social and political life, and its explanations. 3.7.1- 3.7.13: Principles enunciated to rule in accordance with dhamma. 3.8.1 -3.8.12: The concept of world-ruler. The spiritual and material welfare of the subjects. 3.9.1-3.9.4: Duties of the subjects. 3.10.1-3.10.7: Connection of the early Buddhist account of the world-ruler with the reign of Asoka. Difference of opinion as to whether the idea of the world-ruler in the early Buddhist account is in some way linked with Asoka. 3.11.1 - 3.11.8: Asoka's policy of dhamma and its relationship with the dhamma of early Buddhism. 3.12.1 -3.12.5: Asoka's internal and foreign policy. 3.13.1-3.13.10: The early Buddhist attitude to war. 3.14.1: Conclusion.

Page

70-133

CHAPTER IV: ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY .................. 134-185

Subsections. 4.1.1: Introductory observations. 4.2.1- 4.2.3: Ancient Indian social order and its origins. The conflict between the Aryans and the Dasas and Dasyus. 4.3.1 -4.3.9: The origin of the four-fold division gf society (varna). The authority of the Brahmanas and the"reasons for their claim to supe~iority. 4.4.1 - 4.4.5: Preliminary observations on the idea of equality in early Buddhism. 4.5.1 -4.5.4: Man's duty in his human existence. 4.6.1 -4.6.6: The classification of the arguments used by the early Buddhists in

support of their attitude to equality. The first argument-Biological. 4.7.1 -4.7.8: The second argument - Anthropological. 4.8.1 -4.8.10: The third argument-Sociol­ogical. 4.9.1-4.9.3: The fourth argument­Legal. 4.10.1- 4.10.17: The fifth argument -Moral. 4.11.1-4.11.8: The sixth argument-Religious. 4.12.1 -4.12.3: Examination of some misconception regarding the spirit of egalitarianism of early Buddhism. 4.13.1: Conclusion.

CHAPTER V: ATTITUDE TO LAW ..................... .

Subsections. 5.1.1 -5.1.2: Introductory observations. 5.2.1 -5.2.4: Preliminary observations to disprove the view that there is no Buddhist law. 5.3.1-5.3.8: The Buddhists views on the nature of justice, of law, and. of punishment with a comparison of post~ Vedic notions .1 1: General observations on tne Vinaya laws and their place in a context of "law" 5.5.1-5.5.10: The formation of the

Saflgha and its prime motive. The purpose of enacting rules and regulations and of legislation. 5.6.1-5.6.5: The codified laws of the Sangha. §orne interpretations of the word patimokkha. An outline of the seven categories of patimokkha. 5.7.1-5.7.7: The jurisdiction of the Sangha. 5.8.1-5.8.11: The juridicial procedure of the Sangha. Discussion about some methods of conducting trials and settling legal disputes. 5.9.1-5.9.6: The democratic foundation of the Sangha. The conception of a welfare state. 5.10.1-5.10.2. Final observations.

CONCLUSION ...................................... .

ABBREVIATIONS ................................... .

NOTES ........................................... .

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................... .

Page

186-221

222-224

225-227

228-258

259-271

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1.1. It has been observed that most social and

political ideas properly began with the Greeks, more

importantly, from the days of Plato and Aristotle, and that

all succeeding social and political

1 thought

thought is a footnote

and a commentary on Greek But there is also

definite and significant thought on social and political

ideas in the Indian context2 .

1.1.2. The foundation of social and political ideas of

the Indian tradition were first laid in the oldest

literature of the Vedic period (the Vedic Samhitas and the

Brahmanas) . These ideas were later developed through

varied channels such as the literature of Brahmanical law-

books (Smrtis), Epics and Puranas, Kautilya's Arthasastra, ------ . . unorthodox canonical works of the Buddhists and Jainas, the

classical Sanskrit and Tamil literature and the literature

of historical records of the later periods 3

1.1.3. The present work forms a study of the social and

political ideas contained in the large body of early

Buddhist literature, especially that composed in the Pali

language.

1.2.1. In a very real sense, early Buddhism is in part

a product of social change in ancient Indian society, and

this change is indirectly reflected in its early literature.

It reflects the rise to importance in the social order of

.5' *< • /

2

classes connected with the production and exchange of goods,

whose members seem to have been some of the most enthusiastic

supporters of the new religion4

1.2.2. If we agree that early Buddhism was in part a

product of social change in ancient India, it is also clear

that it responded to the needs of the people at a time when

material culture was expanding rapidly. Its appeal to the

laity was founded partly on the notion of social concern,

which encouraged frugality and what in modern economic terms

would be called reinvestment, arid partly on the notion of

the perfectibility of the individual5 .

1.3.1. Though such was the case, according to all our

evidence, dissentient opinions, to the effect that early

Buddhism is incompatible with social, political and legal

ideas are often to be found in the writings of earlier

scholars of Buddhism. The reasons for this are many. For

one thing, it has been commonly assumed hitherto that early

Buddhism was almost entirely concerned with individual

ethics. Thus, various scholars have maintained that the

spiritual uplift of the individual was the chief aim of

early Buddhism. Furthermore, they maintained that there is

in early Buddhism no place for a genuine social and political

theory, because of i·ts doctrine concerning the ultimate end

of human striving, for which is prescribed a course of action

designed to lead to the Summum bonum of dukhanirodha or

Nibbana (Sabbadhammanam uttamatthena varam) .

3

1.3.2. Many views have been expressed to the effect

that with such a doctrine early Buddhism was not concerned

with social and political problems. In some earlier studies

by the Western scholars one may find the view expressed that

Buddhism is so lofty and sublime a system that it cannot be

practised by ordinary men, because its teaching is directed

towards detachment from the worldly affairs, that is, that

it is super-mundane (lokottara) 6 .

1.3.3. Along with this, there is an impression created

in the Western mind that Buddhism is a mere system of self-

discipline for monks with no significant message for the

ordinary man except that he also should renounce the world,

take a yellow robe, and try to attain nibbana. This

impression may be summed up in the following statements:

"It is in fact surprising that such"a

body of doctrine as the Buddhist, with

its profoundly other-worldly and even

anti-social emphasis ... can have become

even as 'popular' as it is in the modern

environment" 7 , "one of the features

of the study of Buddhism most frustrating

to the Western mind is the effort

necessary to discover a social philosophy

within it. The question suggests itself:

8 Is there any?" The same author

proceeds to suggest the answer: "To

tell the truth the Buddha had little,

either of concern for society

1.3.4.

4

as such or of firm conviction of its

possible improvability" 9 , "Buddhism

generally stands aloof from the affairs

10 of the world" •

There are others who believe that Buddhist

teaching is non-political in nature and is a "non-political

and anti-political" religion. Among them, Max Weber writes:

1.3.5.

"Buddhism is a specifically unpolitical

and anti-political status religion,

more precisely, a religious 'technology'

of wandering and of intellectually

schooled mendicant monks ... and it is

a 'salvation' religion" 11

Sangarakshita, a Mahayana Buddhist monk,

following the same line, writes:

"As a teaching aiming at the experience of

Enlightenment, Buddhism has no direct

concern with the collective life of man

on the social and political level. It

does not tell its followers how many

wives they may have or what form of

government they should support. At the

same time, as the existence of the

monastic order indicates, external

conditions are not altogether irrelevant

to the development of the wholesome

mental attitudes on which the experience

1.3.6.

5

of enlightenment depends. A minimum of

social and political teaching is, there-

fore, scattered here and there through

the Tripitaka. That, notwithstanding

the example of Asoka, they were never

taken up and systematically developed

in India is perhaps due to the

predominantly philosophical and other­

worldly tendency of the Indian Buddhist

. d"l2 m~n .

With regard to Buddhist legal ideas, another

scholar writes:

1.4.1.

"In the strict sense of the word, there

is no Buddhist law; there is an

influence exercised by Buddhist ethics

or changes that have taken place in

custom. No Buddhist authority, whether

local or central, whether lay or clerical,

has ever created or promulgated any law.

Such law as has been administered in

countries ruled over by monarchs nominally

Buddhist has been custom rather than law,

and the custom has been in the main pre-

Buddhistic, fixed and established before

the people became Buddhist" 13 .

Among other scholars, including some contemporary

ones, there is an attempt to review the teaching of the

6

Buddha or early Buddhism in the light of the Vedic

(Brahmanic and Upanisadic) system. They maintain that the

Buddha restated what was already current among the brahmi.ns

and based his system on the teaching of the Upanisads. Thus

Radhakrishnan writes:

1.4.2.

1.4.3.

"The Buddha did not feel that he was

announcing a new religion. He was born,

grew up, and died a Hindu. He was

restating with a new emphasis the ancient

ideals of Indo-Aryan civilization"14 .

Similarly, Coomaraswamy writes:

"The more superficially one studies

Buddhism, the more it seems to differ

from the Brahmanism in which it

originated, the more profound our study,

the more difficult it becomes to

distinguish Buddhism from Brahmanism;

or to say in what respects, if any,

Buddhism is really unorthodox" 15 .

Rhys Davids is of the same opinion:

"Gautama was born and brought up and lived

and died a Hindu .,16 "Such originality

as Gautama possessed lay in the way in

which he adopted, enlarged, ennobled, and

systematized that which had already been

well said by others" 17 . "Buddhism grew

and flourished within the field of

orthodox belief" 18 .

7

1.4.4. According to this common view, some scholars

think that, though early Buddhist literature may contain

some social and political ideas, these are not original,

but borrowed from Vedic thought or the general political

ideas of times19

. For example, Ghoshal writes:

1.5 .1.

"The Buddhist canonists deal incidentally

with a few chosen topics of the state,

but they share with the authors of the

Dharmasutras and the Arthasas·tra the

credit of being the makers of Hindu

political theory20

Much has been written about ancient Indian

social and political ideas and their development may be

traced fairly clearly, but most authors, both Hindu and

Western, tend to ignore to a great extent early Buddhist

teachings in the context of Indian social and political

thought. However, a few writers have been impressed by

early Buddhist political thought, for instance, Ghoshal,

who writes:

1.5.2.

"The most important contribution of the

early Buddhist canonists to the store of

our ancient political thought consists in

their 'total' application of the principle

of righteousness to the branches of the

king' s internal and foreign administration"21

However, even by such writers as Ghoshal, early

Buddhist social and political ideas are treated very

8

cursorily in lengthy books which are replete with reference

to Kautilya's Arthasastra and the twelfth book of the

Mahabharata; they tend to think of Kautilya's Arthasastra

as a treatise on political science free from religious

ideology, though this is a matter for debate. We cannot

discuss this problem in detail since it does not directly

concern us.

1.6.1. The early Buddhists' teachings on ethico-

• religious matters and metaphysical problems are fairly well-

known, but their teachings on social and political matters

are little known to the West, largely because of the

negative views mentioned above. More positive views,

however, of the social and political ideas of early Buddhism

are not lacking, though they are rare.

1.6.2. Jayatilleke has examined the early Buddhist

principles of law, including international law, and has

presented arguments against the view that there are no

Buddhist social, political and legal ideas, and presented a

brief account of them based on material in early Buddhist

texts and in earlier studies on the subject22

. Unfortunately,

he died before he was able to make a detailed study of these

topics.

1.6.3. He has shown that the early Buddhists had views

about the duties of the state, the rights of the people and

of individuals, the principles on which civil and criminal

law should be founded, the just social order, inter-state

relations and world government.

9

1.6.4. One of his concluding remarks was that early

Buddhism for the most part respected utilitarian and

pragmatic principles. In his own words:

1.6.5.

"There emerged with Buddhism the concept

of a common good, embracing the whole

world and conceived as both material and

spiritual welfare. Going along with this

idea there was the concept of common

humanity transcending national and racial

barriers The social contract theory

of the origin of society, the state and

law made it obligatory for the state to

serve the best interests of the people

and of mankind. Sovereignty was vested

in the people and was limited by the

requirement of righteousness or dhamma.

The conception of the welfare state was

conceived for the first time" 23 .

Apart from Jayatilleke's very valuable study, we

can find only a few monographs on such topics as the

jurisprudence and internal polity of the Buddhist Order24

,

as well as one or

few articles and

two chapters

26 pamphlets

in lengthy textbooks25

, and a

Two recent studies in the

form of doctoral theses of Lancaster University should also

be mentioned 27 . These works do not advance our knowledge

and understanding greatly beyond what is already known.

There are still various gaps in our knowledge in this field.

Therefore, in this thesis, an attempt is made to complete

10

the task which Jayatilleke could not finish in detail.

1.7.1. In considering the purpose of this thesis, it

must not be forgotten that the main features of early

Buddhism are ethico-religious in character and this limits

the range of early Buddhist teachings on other aspects of

life. In fact, varying ethico-religious systems produce

varying patterns of social and political thought and, despite

the "ultimate end" which is prescribed by early Buddhism,

there is no logical reason why it should not have had a

genuine social and political system.

1.7.2. Basham, following the same line as those scholars

who maintain that early Buddhism has no social and political

doctrines, says:

"It is at first sight surprising that this

other-worldly movement, with its rather

pessimistic attitude towards life, and its

emphasis on detachment and the renunciation

of most of the material pleasures of life,

should have made an appeal to the mercantile

class at a time when trade was expanding

rapidly" 28

However, he points out that there are other cases of

merchants adhering in large numbers to new religious

movements of a rather pessimistic kind, which tend to

promote frugality, and gives examples such as early

h . t. . 1 d 1 . . 29 c rls lanlty, Is am an Ca vlnlsm . Reynolds is of the

same opinion:

1.7.3.

11

"Religions at various levels of human history

have expressed a concern both for the

attainment of personal salvation and for

the establishment and maintenance of proper

order in the world" 30 .

In the light of these interpretations, we wish

to emphasise the fact that, apart from the main determinants

of early Buddhism, a number of questions relating to social,

political and legal ideas are dealt with in early Buddhist

literature and have affected social and political life in

lands influenced by Buddhism. These ideas may be gleaned

from various texts of the Pali canon, and from other early

Buddhist literature, and show parallels with those of the

West and of other Asian systems 31

1.7.4. Interest has been more closely focussed on the

study of Buddhist social and political ideas since the

Buddhist nations of Asia regained their political independ­

ence after the Second World War. In the long history of

those nations, Buddhism has had an increasing effect upon

their entire social and political life, and since they

achieved political independence it has resumed its previous

role in shaping their social and political ideas, now also

influenced very strongly by the thought of the West.

1.7.5. It is necessary to mention Gard's observation

in this point. He says:

"Since its inception in the sixth century

B.C., Buddhism has exerted profound and

1.7.6.

12

varied influences upon Asian political

thought and institutions. For example:

in India, for centuries until its decline,

Buddhism preserved principles of

republican government and legislative

procedure, public welfare and national

security, conventional law, and elective

kingship of headship. In Ceylon (Sri Lanka),

Burma, Thailand, Indochina and Indonesia,

Buddhism has generally avoided direct

interference in politics but at the same

time has been a pacifying and civilizing

factor in the administration of political

authority. In Tibet, Buddhism became the

state in both theory and administration

(sic). In China, Buddhist monasticism

alternately accepted and rejected political

jurisprudence. In Japan, Buddhism

characteristically sanctioned and

administered state authoritarianism or

opposed it by becoming a rival political

and economic power" 32

Much has already been written on the role played

by Buddhism in the contemporary social and political

development of the Buddhist nations of Asia. But, while

there is an abundance of literature dealing with modern

Buddhist social and political ideas, there are only a few

studies on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism

13

(~.supra.l.6.2- 1.6.6).

1.8.1. The aim of this thesis, however, is not to

produce an exhaustive treatment of the whole theme, but to

examine some of the socio-political foundations of the Indian

Buddhist tradition. Our inquiry is basically conceptual and

therefore should be considered as falling within the scope

of the history of ideas rather than of events and systems.

A sense of history is a useful possession for a philosopher,

but a study of what people in previous generations, more

particularly about two thousand five hundred years ago in a

different social and political climate from the contemporary

world, actually intended by certain expressions does not

itself constitute a philosophical examination. we do not

intend to establish a form of "Buddhist Modernism", since

there are a number of studies on modern Buddhist social and

political ideas. Our interest is only in the history of

views and therefore the present work is intended to throw

light on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism.

1.8.2. Our findings about early Buddhist social and

political ideas are primarily based on the source material

afforded by the Pali canon. This is studied historically

and philosophically in the light of earlier and later

literary source material and the findings of other scholars.

1.8.3. It has been observed by many scholars that the

Pali canon provides many descriptions and a variety of ideas

on the subject. Gard, for example, writes in the following

words:

1.8.4.

14

"The Mahavagga and Cullavagga are first

class documents of institutional literature

in the field of public life and social

polity. Political science can derive much

data from these Vinaya texts both from the

viewpoint of institutions as well as from

that of theories. The theories of the

Sakyan monks in regard to the problem of

authority, justice, liberty, individual,

democracy and so forth may be gleaned by

a careful student of political philosophy

out of many passages in this literature" 33 .

We also consider many passages of importance to

be found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, though these in

most cases represent a later stage of Buddhist thought, not

so close to the idea of the Founder as the doctrines of the

Pali canon. There are many Buddhist Mahayanist scholars who

argue against the above proposition because so much of the

Pali canon was obviously composed several generations after

the Buddha. This is not the place to trace the arguments

by which such scholars have become convinced that Mahayana

more closely reflects the doctrine of the Founder of

Buddhism than Theravada, but it should be noted that the

different treatment of the career of the Buddha by the two

schools illustrates in a preliminary way the close relations

and the differences between them. We may refer here to the

opinions of Basham and Thouless, who say:

"The Theravada school more closely reflects

15

the doctrine of the Founder of Buddhism

than does any other sect, and ... the

Theravada canon contains more authentic

reminiscences of the historical Buddha and

his times than do the Buddhist Sanskrit

sources" 34 , "It seems more likely that

Hinay~na was Buddhism as originally taught

and the Mahayana was a product of . . ,35

development and conventionallsatlon

l. 8. 5 However this may be, according to our prime

interest it is not essential that the movement as a whole be

brought into focus. And yet, since many modern scholars

believe that little or nothing can be confidently ascribed

to the Buddha himself, ou·r interest does not lie so much in

terms of what the Buddha himself taught, but of what early

Buddhists taught.

l. 8. 6 Vedic and Sanskrit literature is used to throw

light on the historical background and for comparative

purposes.

l. 9.1 The question of political authority and

obligation has always been a fundamental problem of political

philosophy. The second chapter of the present work will

discuss the nature, grounds and justification of political

authority and obligation as criticized and accepted by the

Buddhism of the Pali canon. The social and political ideas

16

of early Buddhism are closely tied up with dhamma or the law

of righteousness. We have seen, as Ghoshal and Jayatilleke

observe (~.supra. 1.5.1 and 1.6.4), the importance of dhamma

in its socio-political context. A detailed study of the

concept of dhamma will be made in chapter three, covering

its social, political and legal senses. In the fourth

chapter, "Attitude to Equality", an attempt is made to give

the early Buddhists' views on such topical issues as racism,

human rights and freedom. The fifth chapter, "Attitude to

Law " makes, on the one hand, a study of the Buddhist

monastic laws, and on the other, gives a picture of the

organization of the Sangha and its internal polity.

l. 9. 2 Those who still maintain that early Buddhism is

incompatible with social, political and legal ideas may find

this work a challenge to their opinions. The social and

political ideas of early Buddhism are becoming an increas­

ingly fruitful field for research, and this is reflected in

the material used in this work. We hope that our work may

also be of interest to scholars of ancient and mediaeval

Western thought, because they may find in this study some

developments parallel to those in their own fields, as well

as differing ones. We also hope that our work may rectify

some misconceptions about Buddhism, particularly in the area

of its social and political ideas.

17

CHAP'l'ER TWO

POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION

2.1.1. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate

the views of early Buddhism on the nature, grounds and

justification of political obligation and authority

(~.supra.l.9.1), as they appear in the Pali canon and the

non-canonical literature of early Buddhism. We shall also

be concerned with what thinkers of the pre-Buddhistic era,

particularly those of the Vedic and later Vedic (Brahmanic

and Upani~adic) period, and post-Vedic thinkers, assumed or

accepted in regard to political obligation and authority, in

order to obtain a clearer perspective on early Buddhist

ideas. This will be followed by a consideration of passages

in which political obligation and authority are discussed in

the Vedic and Buddhist texts.

2.2.1. Ideas of political obligation and authority,

since men attained a certain maturity in the formulation of

a variety of expressions of them, can of course be classified

in many ways and looked at from a number of points of view.

If we confine ourselves to the Indian tradition, we can find

a number of ideas of political obligation and authority which

were accepted as valid by Indian thinkers.

2.2.2. These ideas have been classified in many ways

and looked at under different names by modern scholars

writing on Indian social and political ideas. For example,

some scholars, like Basham and Ghoshal, have mentioned three

18

different views. According to Basham, they are: (i) the

Buddhist theory of social contract, tii) theory of quasi­

divinity and (iii) theory of divine right 1 . Ghoshal's

division is different. He distinguishes: (i) the divine

right theory, (ii) the ethico-religious theory and (iii) the

quasi-contractual theory 2 . According to him the Buddhist

social contract comes under the last head. An account and

discussion of Ghoshal's interpretation will follow in

sections 2,.8.3 - 2.8.4. There are also other classifications

of the Vedic and Buddhist ideas by many scholars 3 .

2.2.3. From a careful study of different ideas on the

problem, however, it is possible to classify them into two

groups which may be called the theological theory and the

theory of social contract.

2.2.4. The theological theory was accepted by Vedic and

post-Vedic thinkers of the orthodox schools. In contrast,

the theory of social contract was accepted by early Buddhist

thinkers.

2.2.5. It is necessary to point out two things. First,

the word "theory" is used here in a rather loose sense: the

ideas referred to are mostly put forward in a dogmatic manner

and are usually not supported by rational argument. Secondly,

the application of the phrase "theological", rather than

"divine" in the present context is appropriate, because the

Indian doctrine is somewhat different from the Western idea

of "divine right"~A

19

2.3.1. Before embarking upon the theory of social

contract of early Buddhism, let us examine the theological

theory, which was widely accepted by orthodox thinkers. we

can distinguish four different versions of this.

2.3.2. The first version of the theological theory is

the monistic view. It holds that the authority of the ruler

is derived from the sacrifice of the cosmic person, and the

subjects are obliged to obey the ruler because he promotes

their salvation in accordance with the omnipotent cosmic or

divine will of the cosmic person. More particularly, this

3B view is implied by the divine creation of the social order

in four classes with distinctive functions.

2.3.3. According to the earliest account of this view,

the Primeval Person (PurusaJ , the highest God, who existed

before the foundation of the universe, was sacrificed by the

gods, who apparently were his sons. From the body of the

divine victim the universe was produced. The "Hymn of the

Primeval Person" in the Rg-Veda, in which this first cosmic •

sacrifice is described, tells how the four classes were

created by the divine victim when he was sacrificed by the

gods. It says:

"When the gods divided Purusa, into how many

portions did they div1de him? What was his

mouth, what were his arms, what were his

thighs and his feet called? The Brahmana

was his mouth, of both his arms was the

Rajanya made, his thighs became the Vaisya, ,_ 4

of his feet the Sudra was produced"

20

2.3.4. This Vedic dogma of divine creation of society

in four classes were accepted as valid by later thinkers of

the orthodox schools and it was developed with slight changes

in many texts of the later period5 In all, the ideas that

were accepted can be summarised as follows. Society is a

divine institution, owing its origin not to human, but to

divine agency. Each class had its own set of duties and

obligations (sva-dharma) exactly prescribed by the Creator.

The seconcr class (rajanya) was the ruling one. The ruling

or warrior class was inferior to the Brahmana, but was

superior to the Vaisya and the Sudra. The Cosmic Person

commanded it to protect the people 6 . The protection of the

people is the divine purpose of the creation of the ruler,

because his authority is based on divine ordination7 .

2.3.5. More importantly, from the tradition of the

cosmic sacrifice, a new attitude to the sacrifice developed,

leading to new and complex rituals such as the king's

inauguration sacrifice (rajasuya) , the horse sacrifice

(asvamedha) the drink of strength sacrifice (vajapeya) , and

a number of other elaborate sacrifices and rituals. These

rites had become a supernatural mystery and had many

bearings upon the authority of the ruler8 . With the

development of the sacrificial cult the position of the

priestly class (Brahmanas) was consolidated and their social

status rose far above those of the other classes. They were

considered to be gods in human form, and even rulers were

expected to place themselves at their service. They were

looked on as supreme social servants because they imagined

21

that they derived their power from the cosmic sacrifice. We

shall discuss the significance of these ceremonies and the

supreme role played by the priestly class elsewhere in this

chapter (~.infra. 2.5.4 - 2.5.5) and in chapter four.

2. 3. 6 The implication of the monistic view and its

later elaborations is that the derivation of the authority

of the ruler is ascribed to a personal divine being, but

there seems to be contradictory views in many passages as

to who is that personal divine being. During the Rg-Vedic

period, Varuna or Indra were generally credited with the

f . . 9 task o creatLng the unLverse By the period of the

Brahmanas and Upanisads, however, Prajapati "the Lord of

Beings", is thought of as a Primeval Person from whom the

universe was produced10 . This god was often identified with

Brahma, the masculine form of the neuter Brahman (Prajapatyo

- 11 - - - 12 -Brahma , Prajapatyo vai Brahma ) . In the Brahmanas and

in the Upanisads, Brahma is represented as the creator as

well as the first teacher of the Vedas, who in the beginning

of the world was identified by himself "I am Brahma" 13

(v.infra. 2.10.4).

2.3.7. In whatever way the monistic views were

developed, they involved a strong belief that the authority of

the ruler was derived from an omnipotent, omniscient Personal

Being. The implication is that the subjects ought to obey the

laws of the state because they represent the creator's law.

2.4.1. A second version of the theological theory,

that of divine invention, also appears in many forms and

22

aspects14

, one of which is found in the Mahabharata. It

tells that in the original state of nature everything was

perfect, and men lived together in peace and happiness,

having all things in common. Then, at a certa1n stage of

the decline of the golden age, men began to commit violence

against each other. When this happened everything which was

good and righteous was lost; the Vedas were forgotten, the

religious rituals were no longer performed, unrighteousness

prevailed .. Everything became sinful. The gods, rather than

men, were overcome with fear, and the gods, not the men,

approached Brahma, the highest God, and asked for help to

put things right. Brahma composed the archetypal treatise

on polity. After this was composed, the gods went to Visnu,

the ruler of heaven, and asked him to ordain a king. Visnu

created the first king out of his own mind, a miraculous

and supernatural being, to rule over men, and to ensure that

they fulfil their religious duties 15 .

2.4.2. Passages such as this, wh1ch can be paralleled

by many other extracts, adapt the idea of divine creation of

the ruler so as to invest him with divine attributes or even

with divinity itself. What is emphasized in this legend and

in other passages fou~d in the Vedic Samhitas and Brahmanas

is that the authority of the ruler was not a matter of human

will, nor was obligation to obey him of human choosing. The

ruler is entirely a divine creation and is endowed by the

Highest God, and thus his will is finally binding upon men.

The authority of the ruler,according to the story,is essentially

an emanation of,and a delegation by,divine authority,and there is

no obligation on the part of the ruler towards his subjects,

except to coerce them into maintaining religious norms.

,,

23

.~ ... e.-.- ,!;~ 'c-,1;- '-'!"':'~A <.:~~-"" ~-

"-- , All his rights are divine, his obligation

must ultimately be to the Highest God, and the ruler is the

servant of God, rather than the servant of men. Furthermore,

this story seemec to embody the most extreme form of royal

divinity and shows a certain priestly sophistication not

found in the other stories of the origin of rulership.

2.5.1. The third version of the theological theory is

the magico-religious view, which has in one form or another

played an important role in the history of Hindu political

ideas. It expresses the idea that the authority and

obligation of the ruler is derived from the Most High and it

is based on the mutual relationship between the spiritual

authority and the temporal power. Two of the best-known

expressions of this view are to be found in the early Vedic

literature. They are: (i) the authority and obligation of

the ruler is primarily based on the cosmic sacrifice and

secondarily on his connection with the royal and imperial

sacrifice (~.supra. 2.3.5), and (ii) the authority and

obligation of the ruler is based on his personal unity and

identification with the gods (~.infra. 2.7.2). The same

tendency is found in the Brahmanas, which are text-books

intended to guide the priests, and it is in the Brahmanas

that we find developed ideas of what became for orthodoxy

the supreme source of power - the spiritual authority

(v.infra. 2.5.4). As we shall see more precisely later, the

Brahmanas developed the idea of the two powers in order to

gain supremacy over the ruling class.

24

2.5.2. The supremacy of the Brahmanas over the

class is expressed in many passages of the Brahmana

ruling

16 texts .

At the same time, we can find some other passages which

in fact the Brahma~as were often point to the conclusion that

treated as inferiors by the ruling 17

class. Ghoshal's statement on

this issue is quite correct, where he says that the mutual

relations of the two powers and the superiority of the

Brahmanas over the ruling class are expressed in diverse and

even contr~dictory terms 18 . Even with such references, the

magico-religious view has occupied the greatest attention of

the Brahmanic thinkers through the ages, and they maintained

that the priest had a claim to be the dominant class over the

ruling class for a number of reasons (~.supra. 2.3.5).

2.5.3. The most illuminating expression of the magico-

religious view with regard to polltical obligation and

authority is to be found in the words of the marriage ritual:

"I am That, thou art This, I am Sky, thou art Earth"19 This

expression was taken out of its context in Brahmanic sources

and used to justify the claims of the Brahmanas to supremacy.

It is interesting to note coomaraswamy's interpretation of

this expression. He says that ''the whole of Indian political

theory is implied and subsumed in the words of the marriage

formula: I am that ..... 20 . In his statement, the words

"the whole of Indian political theory" lmply that this was

the case also with early Buddhism. But early Buddhism did

not believe or teach any such idea. The Buddha was always

critical of the supremacy of the Brahrnanas (see Ch. 4).

Therefore, in relation to early Buddhism or other heterodox

25

schools Coomaraswamy's observation is hardly justified.

2.5.4. However, the important fact of the above

expression, which we should note is this. It is said that

the ruler has to play the "feminine" role in the "marriage"

of the spiritual authority (brahma) and the temporal power

(ksatra). In short, what it tries to justify is the . .

dominating influence of the Brahmana priesthood over the

ruling class. For even in the earlier Vedic texts

references are to be found indicating the predominance of

the priestly class over the ruling class (~.supra. 2.3.5).

Throughout the Vedic literature it is evident that the

authority of the ruler is theoretically dependent upon the

spiritual authority which has been given to the Brahmana

priest, the Purohita. Simultaneously with these ideas the

priests, while gaining supremacy in social and religious

matters, formulated more elaborate rituals and sacrificial

ceremonies. These rituals and sacrifices rose to

preeminence and came to be regarded as the only means of 20A

attaining desired objects and ends. Martin Haug sums up the

theory of sacrifice promulgated in the Brahmanas thus:

"The sacrifice is regarded as the means for

obtaining power over this and the other

world, over visible as well as invisible,

. 11 . . ,21 anlmate as we as lnanlmate creatures .

2.5.5. As the sacrifice rose in importance, the power

of sacrifice became one of the cardinal doctrines of

Brahmanism. All were said to be subject to the influence of

26

the .sacrifice. Even the ruler is subject to it, and the

Brahmanas, who claimed to be able to understand and correctly

perform the sacrifices, emphasize the fact that the authority

of the ruler was based upon these sacrifices. Ghoshal sums

up the bearing of these ceremonies upon tne authority of the

ruler as follows:

2.5.6.

"The king derives his authority, including

his immunity from punishment, from the

sacrifice. Further, he acquires his

divinity (to the point of identity with

the highest deity of the pantheon) by

virtue of his participation in the same

22 ceremony"

As already pointed out, temporal authority is

guaranteed through the personal relationship in which it

gives preeminence over itself to spiritual authority

incarnated in the )?urohita. This relationship between

temporal power and spiritual authority, even at the time of

the Rg-Veda, is explicit in the words of Agni (representing

the Purohita) addressed to Indra (representing the ruler);

"I go in person before you, 0 Indra ... and if you

my share, then through me you shall perform heroic

give me

23 deeds" .

The implications of the etymology of the word purohita

(derived from purah "in front" and dha "to place" - "one put ---. in front", "one who takes precedence") are clear in the above

expression. It is said that without the guidance of a

spiritual adviser the ruler cannot rule 24 . With such

guidance he rules by divine right. The Purohita represents

27

the divine authority originated from the highest sources,

namely the eternal Vedas, which were regarded as divine

revelation. The Vedas contain a body of rules which is

binding upon the ruler in all his actions, and the Pur~hita,

who is the custodian of the eternal Vedas, finds religious

reasons for obedience to the divine will, rather than to the

human will, and these reasons are valid for both the ruler

and his subjects 25 . As we shall see later in this chapter

(v.infra. ·2.10.10 - 2.10.18), early Buddhism criticised and

rejected the authority of the Vedas and the power of

sacrifice.

2.6.1. The final version of the theological theory is

the idea of an agreement between the ruler and his subjects,

with divine approval. The stories of this agreement are

repeated in many texts, but they differ in detail 26 and can

be interpreted as indicative of ideas of both divine

selection and contractual agreement. The most significant

passages illustrating the idea of an agreement are to be

found in the Aitareya Brahmana and in the Mah~harata.

2.6.2. The former tells how the gods and the demons

(asuras) were in battle, and the gods were suffering badly

at the hands of their enemies. The gods met together and

said: "through our lack of a king our enemies conquer us.

Let us make a king". They consented and appointed Soma as

their king, with whom the gods reconquered all that they had

1 t 2 7 h . t. 7 -h . th. t os . T e Talt 1r1ya Bra mana, whlch repeats lS s ory

in a significantly altered form, says that the ruler was

28

appointed by the Highest God. It says that Prajapati

created gods and demons, and when the gods were suffering

badly at the hands of their enemies, they did not select a

ruler, but sacrificed to the high God Prajapati, who sent

his son Indra to become their king, under whose leadership

the gods overcame the demons 28 .

2.6.3 In many versions of this legend, Indra was

identified as the ruler of the gods 29 . Historically

considered, Indra was the most prominent divinity in the

Rg-Veda and in the Brahmanas and it seems that Soma,in the . . Aitareya Brahmana's version of the legend, was an early

29A priestly emendation of Indra. It should also be noted that

in the Brahmanas, Varuna is also identified as the ruler of . . the gods. He was appointed by the Highest God 30 . It seems

that at different periods and in different circles Varuna,

Indra and Soma were looked on as the supreme ruler of

heaven.

2.6.4. The stories of the divine selection of a ruler

suggest that rulership originated through the external

insecurity of the gods and military necessity. The ruler

appointed by the will and consent of the gods was a war

leader, and his first duty was to lead his subjects in

battle. The Aitareya Brahmana further says in connection

with the great coronation ceremony of Indra that the ruler

was appointed by the gods on the grounds of his superior

merits. He was the most powerful and the strongest among

the gods, who could lead in battle and establish external

29

security31 All these references show that the above factors

furnished the occasion for the popular selection of the

ruler. Moreover, the stories of this repeatedly emphasize

the vital role played by the Highest God, Prajapati.

2.6.5. Another story reflecting the idea of a contract

between the ruler and his subjects is found in the

Mahabharata. It tells how at one stage chaos was rife in

society and there was a great fear of anarchy because of the

passionate and covetous nature of men. This conforms with

the idea of matsyanyaya32 - the analogy of the big fish

eating up the little fish. As in this analogy, society at

that stage was lacking in values and rules, and it was like

a "devil's workshop". Without laws and a king to rule

(arajaka) , matsyanyaya operated, and the strong dominated

and ruthlessly exploited the weak. When people were over-

powered by anarchy, they met together and made an agreement

to keep the peace and to expel evildoers. Through the evil

passions of men, however, the agreement was not kept and

conditions became worse than before. Then mankind in a body

went to Brahma, the Highest God, and asked for help. Brahma

ordained Manu, son of the sun, as the first king. Manu first

refused to become king because he assumed that men are by

nature deceitful and cruel and he would himself incur sin by

administering punishment. The people, however, persuaded

him to be king by promising to give him shares of their crops,

a fiftieth part of their animals and precious metals, and

the most beautiful of their maidens, to fulfil religious

rituals and the like. Manu then accepted their fixed

appointed

30

promises and confirmed that he would maintain the security

and the welfare of the people33

2.6.6. From the above, it is clear that these

contractual ideas, while agreeing on the fundamental

principle of the divine origin of kingship, differ only in

one aspect. The ruler here is a divinely apointed figure,

but is appointed by the will of the people and at their

request in order to put an end to a state of anarchy and •

degeneration, and the people are obliged to obey the ruler

because they have promised to do so.

2.7.1. These are the four different forms of the

theological theory widely believed by the orthodox schools.

The four versions, while agreeing fundamentally upon the

divine creation and endowment of kingship, differ greatly in

details. All versions of the theological theory sought to

explain the authority of the ruler and the limits of that

authority, the obedience of his subjects towards him and

his obligation towards his subjects by reference to the

highest authority, which is attained by virtue of the ruler's

connection with the Highest Deity.

2.7.2. Since the derivation of the ruler's authority is

from the Most High, all Brahmanical legal literature takes

this kind of attitude with varying intensity. For example,

at one place it is said:

''The ruler (rajanya) is the visible

representative of Prajapati, hence while

being one he rules over many• 34

31

Elsewhere we read:

"The ruler is a great deity (mahati-devata)

in human form; imposed from the Most High

without any intervention on the part of

mankind themselves" 35 .

The masses on the whole, therefore, were led to believe in

the divinity of the ruler36 .

2.8.1. It is clear that there is here no consistent or

single principle of the nature and grounds of political

obligation and authority, because the four versions of the

theological theory, which we have discussed above)are

mutually contradictory, and if one is true the other three

m~st be false. They are not products of rational or

empirical reasoning, but they are mere beliefs, and were

never backed by logical arguments. Moreover, none of the

four versions provides a genuine notion of a social contract,

although occasionally some reference is made to agreements

between subjects and rulers. The election of Soma or Indra

in the Brahmana legend involves no explicit mutual

relationship which could be called a contract, but merely

the popular choice of the ruler. In the secomMahabharata

story <:::.supra. 2.6.5) the first king isappointed:by the

High God, and not by men, as the divine means of meeting

human need. The subjects agree to pay taxes to the king in

return for his services, but this does not amount to a social

contract, because the king's position does not depend on the

contract, but OJl divine appointment.

32

2.8.2. Before we leave this topic, it is necessary to

note a few comments of earlier writers on Hindu ideas of the

origin of kingship. This would enable us to see how early

Buddhist ideas differ from those of early Hinduism.

'} (1 ,:_ 11! '-'

(•\ 0

•

0\T~l \JOJ~(S~

"'' "V~.J ., ,_, s -c ;.~' c

s r; ::::.::1

st: ~

,s L:_~_:_L}C' _.\_ ¢

"At this point the paths of the Brahmanas

and the Buddhist thinkers diverge completely.

For the former, instead of tracing like the

latter the subsequent creation of kingship

to a governmental compact between the people

and a select individual in their midst,

derive it from the will of the creator" 37 . ~h~hd - -~ further points out that, according to the first Mahabharata ~

story, the original ruler, who was not yet a king, derived

his title to rule from the gods. His creation was due to

the initiative of the gods themselves, undertaken rather in

their own interests than in the interests of the afflicted

people. He was created by the will of God the Preserver,

supplementing the creation of the science of polity by God

the Creator. He was moreover a mind-begotten son of the

Preserver 38 . Elsewhere, Ghoshal suggests that the ideas of

the king's origin in the Mahabharata and Manusaffihita exhibit

a complex blending of ideas formulated deliberately with the

object of counteracting the individualistic and anti-

monarchical tendencies of the Buddhist theory of contract39

.

33

Moreover, he does not agree with some scholars, like Altekar

and Sengupta, who hold that the idea of the king's divinity

or divine personality was unknown in the Vedic period40

Apart from a few exceptional passages, the idea of king's

divinity is a well-established fact in the Vedic texts.

2.8.4. While we agree with Ghoshal's criticism of the

Vedic ideas of kingship, we do not agree with some of his

remarks on the early Buddhist idea of its ori0in. For

example he says:

"The early Buddhist theory , contract

tended to strengthen a not on of social

contract which was familiar to Hindu

political theory, namely, that the king

was an official paid by his subjects for

the service of protection" 41

It is true that, according to the Buddhist tradition, the

first king Mahasammata was an official paid by his subjects,

but his position was not created in the same manner as that

of the first king according to Hindu tradition (~.infra

2.11.11). In his examination of kingship in ancient India,

Dumont points out that the Buddhist idea of the origin of

kingship has an entirely different character and based on a

contract binding on all future subjects and future kings,

but in the corresponding Hindu versions the divine or quasi­

divine quality of the king was not excluded42 .

2.8.5. Some Hindu scholars firmly believe that the

contractual ideas of the orthodox schools (~.supra. 2.6.1 -

2.6.6) can be classified under a social contract theory. As

34

we observed earlier, the legend of Manu differs considerably

from a tacit or implied contract because it involves divine

intervention, and also implies that the kings were treated

as gods so long as they obeyed the Creator's law. Spellman

is much more specific at this point, when he deals with the

contractual ideas of the Hindus. In his own words:

"What elements of the contractual theory do

we find in this story (the legend of Manu

in the Mahabharata)? There appears to be

a type of anarchy in which men are living

and they are not satisfied with this.

Apparently they possess the power to

contract. There is an offer to Manu by

the people and although we are not told

expressly that he accepts it, his actions

pursuant to the offer imply that he does.

But would Manu have had the power to act

independently of this offer? Did he

derive his power from the people? What

did they surrender to him? In the usual

sense of the social contract, the leader

derives not only his right, but his

power as well, from the people. It is

not clear that this was the case with

Manu" 43 .

Further he says that divine appointment is the prevailing

Hindu idea of the origin of kingship and, despite some

elements of social contract in the notion of an exchange of

35

taxation and protection, royal power was not derived from an

. h h 1 . . d d' . 44 agreement Wlt t e peop e accordlng to Hln u tra ltlons •

Moreover, he points out that the most complete Indian version

of a social contract theory appears in Buddhist literature45 .

2.8.6. It is not the author's main intention to examine

the theological theory in detail, but only to show, in short,

what orthodox thinkers generally accepted on the issue of

political obligation and authority in order to gain a clearer

' understanding of the early Buddhist ideas.

2.9.1. Let us now turn our attention to the early

Buddhist ideas in regard to political obligation and

authority. While rejecting most of the religious and

metaphysical ideas of the Vedic thinkers, the Buddha or

early Buddhism advocated a critical rationalism in the realm

of politics. There were two main bases from which the

question of the grounds and justification of political

obligation and authority were approached by the early

Buddhists. The first was the argument against a Personal

Creator God (Issara). Secondly, while rejecting such a God,

early Buddhism recognized the authority of dhamma (see Ch.3)

and in one of its senses it put forward a social contract of

the origin of kingship in contradistinction to the

theological theory.

2 .10 .1. Before we proceed to examine the notion of social

contract in early Buddhism, let us first consider the

Buddhist argument against the creator God. As we sa~ (2.3.6),

from the period of the early Upanisads, Brahma was considered

~'

36

to be the creator, eternal, primordial, omniscient, powerful " if not almighty, and supreme. The appellations of Brahma in

i\

the Pali texts are the same as those of rsvara in the. early theis·

schools. The concept Issara (Vedic Isvara, from Is, to have

power) means lord, ruler, master chief46 ; and it also means

. ' h - 47 1 Creat~ve De~ty, Bra ma . The concept of a Persona creator

God and the attributes which are given to him are criticized

directly in the early Buddhist texts.

2.10.2. On this issue the main Buddhist criticism was

that the thinkers of the Vedic tradition had no special

insight or direct understanding about the nature of Brahma.

They believe that God (Brahma) in heaven is the mighty God

(Maha-brahma), the omnipotent (abhibhu anabhibhuto)' the >

omniscient (annadatthu-daso), the controller (vasavatti),

the lord (issaro), maker (!:catta) ,the creator(nimmata) , the

perfect or the most high (set tho) , the chief of all (sa'l'ij ita) ,

the almighty father of beings that are and are to be

( - - - - • 48 vasi pita bhuta-bhavyanam) .

2.10.3. The early Buddhist reaction to the conception of

a personal creator God was a determined attempt to deny every

one of those attributes. In the Buddhist view, those

attributes are erroneous, for Brahma is not an eternal being

as the ignorant believe him to be. For example, when the

monk Kevaddha asks him where the four elements of earth,

water, fire and air finally cease without leaving a trace,

he has to admit, after a long hesitation, that he does not

know49 . This clearly indicates that Brahma is not

omniscient. This fact has been recently analysed very

~ ~

'9-; 3 7

lucidly by Dharmasiri. He says that a concept of a personal

creator God is delineated in terms of its attributes, and he

gives five main reasons how the concept of God is meaningless

. f . "b 50 ln terms o lts attrl utes .

2.10.4. Early Budchist texts expressly assert that the

belief in Brahma is an opinion not based on empirical

b t . . . . d d "11 . 51 o serva lon, lt lS lnaccurate, an a angerous l uslon

In the Patika sutta, the Buddha exposes the falsity of the --.-;-

traditional doctrine that the origin of things comes about

through the work of Brahma. The text reads as follows:

"There are some recluses and brahmins who

declare as a doctrine received from their

teachers that the beginning of all things

was the work of the god Brahma. I (i.e.

the Buddha) have gone and asked them

whether it was true that they maintained

such a doctrine, and they replied that it

was; but when I asked them to explain,

they have not been able to answer, and

have returned the question to me. Then I

have explained it to them thus: There

comes a time, sooner or later, ... when

the world is dissolved and beings are

mostly reborn in the world of Radiance52 .

There they dwell, made of the stuff of

mind, feeding on joy, shining in their own

light, flying through middle space, firm

in their bliss for a long, long time.

2.10.5.

38

Now there comes a time when this world begins

to evolve, and then the world of Brahma

appears, but it is empty. And some being,

whether because his alloted span is past or

because his merit is exhausted, quits his

body in the world of Radiance and is born in

the empty world of Brahma, where he dwells

for a long, long time. Now because he has

been so long alone he begins to feel lone-

liness, dissatisfaction and longing, and

wishes that other beings might come and

live with him. And indeed soon other beings

... appear in the world of Brahma as compan-

ions to him; and in all respects, they lead

a life like his. Then the being who was

first born thinks: 'I am Brahma, the mighty

Brahma, the conqueror, the unconquered, the

all-seeing, the lord, the maker, the creator ,

the supreme chief, the disposer, the father

of all that is or is to be. I have created

all these beings, for I merely wished that

they might be and they have come here'. And

the other beings ... think the same, because

he was born first and they later. That is

how your traditional doctrine comes about

that the beginning of things was the work

- 53 of the god Brahma"

Finally, the Buddha tells us that one of the

39

beings in the world of Brahma, by reason of his poor stock of

merit, was born on earth. He recalls his former dwelling-

place, but does not remember what went before and says:

"Brahma, the great Brahma ... he by whom we

were created, lives in the Brahma world.

He is permanent, constant, eternal,

unchanging, and he will remain so for ever

and ever. But we who were created by that

Brahma are all impermanent, transient

unstable, short lived, destined to pass

away" 54

In reply to Kevaddha's question Brahma says: "I am Brahma

" But Kevaddha replies "I did not want to know all about

who you are, I asked you where the four elements cease without

leaving a trace". Brahma, unable to answer, and in order to

save his face, and not to display his ignorance before all his

retinue, says to Kevaddha: "I did not wish to say this in

front of them. They think I know everything, but I do not

know the answer. You should not come to me with a question

like that. You should ask the Buddha" 55 .

2.10.6. It is clear, therefore, from the above accounts

that the Buddha strongly disagreed with the view that the

beginning of things was the work of Brahma. According to

the early Buddhist point of view the world is impermanent.

Its central thesis emphasizes that everything is subject to

an unceasing flow of change (viparinama-dhamma) . One of his

disciples once questioned the Buddha:

" 'The wo:r·ld! The world! ' is the saying, lord.

40

How far, lord, does this saying go?"56

The Buddha answered:

"It crumbles away, monk. Therefore, it is

called 'the world'. What crumbles away?

The eye ... objects ... eye-consciousness

tongue .•. body ... mind ... It crumbles

away, monk. Therefore, it is called 'the

world' ,S?.

To the Buddha the world is not a "thing" but only a vast

series of evanescent changes. The law of causation as

affecting the physical and mental realms is regarded as

fully sufficient-to explain this cosmic series of changes58

2.10.7. Contradicting thus the conception of Brahma as

eternal and as creator, the early Buddhist texts represent it

as an illusion on a par with many other illusions which it is

S·-l ~-

C :~"' Cf:~

\!C'

s e:·:_)_s c of ,

0

'· t cor.:ce c o:~_ct1

cs , ~

CJ.l. C. S ·~ !_':lC£~]."

1-1~ strongly maintainS. that "one should not overstep the limits 1\

of conventional usage" and sayS that by confusing the usages y

of "is, was and will be" one can be led into intricate

philosophical muddles59 Moreover, the Buddha says that the

people who talk about God (Brahma) and talk about ways of

attaining union with him are making meaningless statementl,

because no one can make the concept of a creator God meaningful

in any way, no one can give any criteria for discriminating

God from other entities. To understand a concept one must

have delineating criteria for making that concept meaningful.

41

These criteria can be derived either from knowledge by

acquaintance or from knowledge by description60

2.10.8. The Buddha says that those who believe in Brahma

and talk about ways of attaining "union with" or "becoming one

with" him do not furnish any of the above criteria. For example

"Then you say, Vasettha, that none of the

brahmanas, or of their teachers, or of their

pupils, even up to the seventh generation,

has ever seen Brahma face to face. And that

even the sages of old, the authors and

utterers of the verses, of the ancient form

of words which the brahmanas of to-day so

carefully intone and recite precisely as

they have been handed down - even they did

not pretend to know or to have seen where or

whence or whither God is. So that the

brahmanas versed in the three Vedas have

forsooth said thus: 'What we know not, what

we have not seen, to a state of union with

that we can show the way, and can say: this

is the straight path, this is the direct way

which makes for salvation, and leads him,

who acts according to it, into a state of

union with God'. Does it not follow, this

being so, that the talk of the brahmanas

turns out to be foolish talk? ... Verily,

Vasettha, that brahmanas versed in the three

Vedas should be able to show the way to a

2.10.9.

42

state of union with that which they do not

know, neither have seen - such a condition

of things can in no wise be! Just as when

a string of blind men are clinging one to the

other, neither can the foremost see, nor can

the middle one see, nor can the hindmost see

just even so, the talk of the brahmanas

versed in the three Vedas is but blind talk;

the first sees not ... The talk then of these

brahmanas turns out to be ridiculous, mere

words, a vain and empty thing" 61

Further, the Buddha points out how the path to

God becomes meaningless because meaning cannot be attached

to the concept of God.

"Just as, if a man should make a staircase in

the place where four roads cross, to mount up

into a mansion. And people should say to him:

'Well, good friend, this mansion, to mount up

into which you are making this staircase, do

you know whether it is in the east, or in

the south, or west, or ... north? Whether

it is high or low or of medium size?'. And

when so asked, he would answer: 'No' . And

people would say to him: 'But then, you are

making a staircase to mount up into some-

thing - taking it for a mansion - which, all

the while, you know not, neither have seen'.

And when so asked, he would answer: 'Yes'.

Even so, the talk of that man was foolish

2.10.10.

43

talk, and in the same way the brahmanas

are not able to point out the way to union

with that which they have seen ... n 62 .

As already pointed out (~.supra. 2.3.5), one of

the cardinal doctrines of Brahmanism was the power of

sacrifice. One's whole life is regarded as a sacrifice.

There were a number of elaborate and complicated sacrifices

such as the Asvamedha, Rajasuya and Vajapeya, which were

performed by kings and nobles, and besides these there were

numerous lesser sacrifices. The Buddha condemned these

elaborate sacrifices, since they involved waste of effort

and valuable resources as well as injury to life. In the

Kutadanta Sutt~ the Buddha points out what the ideal

sacrifice should be. He describes the sacrifices held in

the days of yore, wherein no living things was injured; all

labour was voluntary and the sacrifice was offered, not only

on behalf of the king, but on behalf of all. He explains

other forms of sacrifice more potent than the gift of

t . 1 h" 63 rna er1.a t 1.ngs

2.10.11. Moreover, in the early Buddhist texts, the

argument against a personal creator God is based on the

transitoriness (aniccata) of each being. Kamma operates

even on Brahma, and he is fallible and imperfect. The

Brahmanas believe that pleasure and pain, weal or woe or

neutral feelings may be due to creation by God64

.

"There are certain recluses and brahmanas

who teach thus, who hold this view: 'What

2.10.12.

44

so ever weal or woe or neutral feeling is

experienced, all that is due to the

creation of a supreme god'. I (i.e. the

Buddha) approached them and asked: 'Is it

true, that the venerable sirs hold the view

and teach that whatsoever weal ... is

experienced, all this is due to the

creation of a supreme god?'. Thus questioned

by me, they replied 'Yes, we do'. Then I

said to them: 'So then, owing to the

creation of a supreme god, men will become

murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars,

slanderers, covetous, malicious and

heretical. Those who rely on the creation

of a supreme god, those lack the desire,

and the energy, to do what is to be done

and to refrain from doing what is not to

be done. So then, the necessity for action

or inaction not being found to exist in

them, the term 'recluse' cannot reasonably

be applied to yourselves since you live in

a state of bewilderment without heed or

restraint'"65

.

The fact of the world's suffering is another

argument against the belief that everything is the creation

of a supreme god. Two arguments are adduced from this

standpoint. The first is the puppet argument. The Buddha

argues that if God creates and designs the world with his

45

foreknowledge, he has to bear the ultimate responsibility

for every action done by his creatures. The puppet argument

is stated as follows:

"If God designs the life of the entire

world- the glory and the misery, the good

and the evil acts, man is but an instrument

of his will (niddesa-k~ri) and God (alone)

is responsible" 66

The secona argument is the argument from evil. Given the

existence of evil in the world, how can there be a God who

is benevolent, omnipotent and omniscient? The Buddha

criticized the existence God precisely on this ground. His

main argument is that if God is all-knowing, all-powerful

and perfectly loving he should have made the world otherwise

than it is. The argument from evil has several variants,

but it can be summed up as follows:

"If God (Brahma) is Lord of the whole world

and creator of the multitude of beings,

then why (i) has he ordained misfortune in

the world without making the whole world

happy or (ii) for what purpose has he made

the world full of injustice, deceit,

falsehood and conceit, or (iii) the Lord

of beings is evil in that he ordained

injustice when there could have been

justice" 67

2.10.13. It is said, "the world is without refuge and

without a God" - 68 (attano loko anabhissaro) . Buddhaghosa

46

uses the argument against a personal creator God in his

analysis of the paticca-samuppada. He takes the denial of

God's existence as the logical implication of "doerlessness",

the world is without a "doer", a "soul", a "person". The

wheel of becoming is without known beginning, lacking both

Maker (karako) such as Brahma and percipient (vedako) ; for

each consequent proceeds by reason of its anticedent, and

not through the intervention of an almighty deity69

2.10.14. All these arguments and more against a personal

creator God are also found in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts.

Asvaghosa, using the puppet argument, says:

''So others say that creation proceeds from

Isvara. What is the need in that case for

action by men" 70

In the Mahabodhi Jataka of the Jatakamala several variants

of the above two arguments are given, and there is also

another argument, which concerns the question of the creation

of dharma.

"Further, the sovereignty of the Lord must

rest either on the lawful order of things

(dharma) or on something else. If on the

former, then the Lord cannot have existed

before the dharma. If effected by some

external cause, it should rather be called

'bondage', for if a state of depending

should not bear that name, what state may

not be called 'sovereignty'?"71

47

2.10.15. It is necessary to add, however, that although

early Buddhism rejects a personal creator God, it does not

reject the existence of supernatural beings, or even of

Brahma himself. From the point of view of Patika Sutta, a

very powerful supernatural beings known as Brahma really

exists, but he did not create the universe, though he

imagines that he did (~.supr~. 2.10.4). According to the

early Buddhist point of view, the word "Brahma" is used to

denote a member of a species of deities inhabiting one of

the sixteen high heavens of the Rupa world of the Buddhist

cosmography. He is in heaven, a morally perfect being, wise

and powerful, chief of all, but he is also subject to the

ignorance, delusion and misunderstanding which affect all

beings who have not attained supreme wisdom. Therefore, he

. t . . t . t t 72 1s no omn1sc1en or omn1po en

2.10.16. In the early Buddhist texts more than one Brahma

is described, such as Maha-Brahma, Sahampati-Brahma, Baka­

Brahma and Brahma-sanankumara. According to the early

Buddhist ideas, however, although Brahma is nominally the

highest being within the cosmos, he is lower in spiritual

status than a Buddha or an Arahant in that he has not

attained the transcendent wisdom. The Buddha shows that man

can attain fellowship with such a being not by prayer or by

calling on his name, or by sacrificing animals but by being

"free from anger and malice, being pure in heart and gaining

self mastery" 73

2.10.17. In the light of what is said above, it is fully

48

justifiable to claim that early Buddhism rejected the

creator-role of Brahma, but the existence of Brahma appears

to have been explicitly accepted, though early Buddhists

modified the word of Brahma on the lines of their own

thought. Rhys Davids, for example, points out that the

neuter Brahman of the Upanisads is entirely unknown in the

Pali literature, and that the Buddha's idea of Brahma in the

masculine differs widely from that of the Brahma of the

U . d 74 panJ.sa s ..

2.10.18. There is also evidence in the early Buddhist

texts that, in addition to the divine authority in ethical,

social and political life, orthodox thinkers claimed

authority in the sphere of knowledge as having been inspired

by Brahma. He was

Vedas. The Buddha

believed to be the first teacher of the human or divine

rejects all recourse to authority as

" worthless 75 . According to the Buddha, any statement

claiming to be authoritative should be accepted or rejected

only after one has discovered its truth or falisty after

personally verifying it. This is so even with regard to

the statements of the Buddha himself 76 .

2.11.1. Rejecting the uncritical religious and

metaphysical ideas of the Vedic thinkers and recognizing

the authority of dhamma, early Buddhism put forward a social

contract theory of the origin of kingship. This notion had

much influence on the political life of those days and after,

perhaps more than any Vedic or post-Vedic doctrine of the

origin of kingship. Ghoshal is quite justified when he says:

49

"The most original contribution of the early

Buddhist canonists to the store of our

ancient social and political ideas consists

in their formulation of a remarkable theory

of the origin of man and of his social and

political institutions" 77

Moreover, this is one of the world's earliest versions of the

widespread contractual theory of the state. The seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries were the heyday of the social

contract in Western thought, which is especially connected

with the names of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 78 .

2.11.2. The early Buddhist theory of social contract

begins with an account of man in the state of nature - that

is of man outside of or apart from civil society. The

original state of nature is variously described by Vedic,

early Buddhist and Jaina thinkers. We have seen earlier

(~.supra. 2.6.5) the traditionalists' account of the

original state of nature, its decline because of man's sin,

and the formation of political institutions and of social

order by divine ordination. Jainism, while rejecting the

doctrine that the universe is created or guided by a divine

will or divine mind, postulated a mythical age of perfectly

virtuous beings living in complete happiness, free from the

whole paraphernalia necessitated by man's dependence upon a

nature which was growing progressively less bountiful. With

life becoming increasingly difficult owing to the cosmic

decline, some form of social organization became necessary,

and the people were persuaded to accept the family and social

50

order by their Patriarchs. Man's increasingly sinful actions

were only a symptom of cosmic decline. The necessity to

labour for food and clothes was another factor that brought

about the social order according to Jainism. The formation

of a state of society was created by a succession of

Patriarchs blessed with superhuman attributes, in order to

adjust the people to their changing environment. According

to the Jaina account, the state was not instituted by any

definite cbntract, but it was virtually protective and

paternal. It was instituted by the last patriarch, Rsabha,

who, realizing the need of a coercive system to maintain

society, persuaded the people to accept his son Bharata as

th . f. k. 79 eJ.r J.rst J.ng

2.11.3. Early Buddhism also taught the existence of the

golden age, and the process of the gradual decline of

humanity on account of their sinful actions. But the

description of the state of nature and the way in which men

formed their social order and their state differs widely

from the Vedic and Jaina ideas on the subject80

2 .11. 4. According to the early Buddhist tradition, in

the early days of the cosmic cycle mankind lived on an

immaterial plane, dancing on air in a sort of fairy-land,

where there was no need of food or clothing, no laws, no

king and no private property, family etc. Then gradually

the process of cosmic decay began its work, and mankind

became earth-bound, and felt the need of food and shelter.

As men continued in this way, feeding on the earth, they

51

became more solid; different characteristics appeared in

them, and in consequence insecurity and conflict appeared

81 among them .

2 .11. 5. In such conditions .men were placed in the more

difficult and uncertain position of the state of nature,

because some of them, attracted by the beauty, smell and

taste of the earth, gradually acquired gross bodies, due to

the gradual increase of their greed, conceit and lust

coupled with the growing scarcity of the edible earth.

"Then a certain being, greedy from a former

birth, said: 'What can this be?' and tasted

the sweet earth with his finger. He was

delighted with the flavor and craving

overcame him. Then others followed his

example ..• and as they did so their

radiance faded; and as it faded the moon

and sun appeared, with the constellations

and the forms of stars, nights and days,

phases of the moon and months, seasons and

,82 years ••.

"Beings continued thus, feeding on the sweet

earth, •.. and the more they ate the more

solid their bodies became, some beautiful

and some ugly. And the beautiful scorned

the ugly, boasting of their greater beauty.

And as they became vain and conceited

because of their beauty the sweet earth

disappeared. Then growths appeared on the

2.11.6.

52

soil, coming up like mushrooms, with

colour, scent and flavour like those of

the sweet earth ... Then creeping plants

arose, growing like rattans; and beings

lived on them until the creepers too

disappeared ... Then rice appeared, already

ripe in the uncultivated soil, without dust

or husk, fragrant and clean-grained. And

those beings continued to live on the

rice •.. ,and their bodies became more

and more solid, and their differences in

beauty even more pronounced, and the

characteristic of the female appeared in

women, and of the male in man. The women

looked at the men too intently, and the

men at the women, and so passion arose,

and a raging fire entered their bodies.

In consequence they took to intercourse

together. When people saw them doing so

some threw dust at them; others ashes,

others cowdung, and shouted, 'Perish,

you foul one! Perish you foul one!!

How could one person treat another like

that?'" 83 .

The text continues that what was considered immoral

in those days is now considered moral. In those days those

who had sexual intercourse were not allowed to enter a

village or a town for months, and they incurred so much blame

53

for their immorality that they started building huts in

d 1 . 84 or er to concea ~t . Thus the gradual decline of humanity

began, on account of man's physiological differences and

psychological impulses. With the progressive decline of the

cosmos, there developed human families and households, on

account of passion, desire (kama) and greed (gedha).

Agriculture was necessitated by the steady diminution of

the fertility of the wild rice which formerly grew in

abundance .• In such a state the distinction between dhamma

and adhamma was blurred.

2.11.7. In the whole account, there is no involvement

of gods or demons, Vedas or sacrifice, or doctrines like

matsyanyaya, but we are simply told that man's nature

brought about the growth of bad customs.

2.11.8. With the growth of immoral customs, man's

psychological impulses dominated him, and there was a change

in attitudes and beliefs, desires and purposes. It was at

this stage that men entered into a social contract.

"Then someone of a lazy disposition thought

to himself 'Why do I go to the trouble of

fetching rice night and morning? I will

fetch enough for supper and breakfast in

one journey'. Then another man saw him

and said 'Come on, my friend, let us go

and fetch our rice'. 'I have got enough',

the first man replied. So the second man

followed the first man's example and thus

2.11.9.

54

gradually others too. And from the time

that people took to feeding on stored

rice the grain became covered with dust,

and husks enveloped it, and reaped stems

did not grow again, and there were pauses

in its growth, when the stubble stood in

clumps. Then the people gathered together

and lamented, saying: 'Evil customs have

appeared among us. Once we were made of

the stuff of mind ... and were firm in our

bliss for a long, long time ... But since

evil and immoral customs became rife among

us, we have degenerated until our grain has

become covered with dust ... and the stubble

stands in clumps. Come now, let us divide

the rice fields, and set up the boundary

marks•• 85 .

It is implicit in this account that the

transition of man from a state of nature to a state of

society is a gradual decline, on account of man's selfish

disposition. After the households came into existence food

began to be stored, land came to be divided among

individual owners and boundaries had to be set up, thus

giving rise to rights of property. In the above extract,

the thought and action of the man who first stored grain and

introduced private property in land were considered evil.

One might argue that such actions were in no way evil. They

were considered evil because they were inspired by greed and

55

selfishness, and because of those actions ''the grain has

become covered with dust and the stubble stands in

clumps", that is to say, the fertility of the soil

diminished. The chief basis of the economy of the people

was in disorder, and lack of co-operation led to difficult

circumstances. Early Buddhism in this passage condemns

hoarding up food and wealth 86 , since it leads to avarice

and wickedness 87 . An individual may righteously (dhammena)

earn wealtn and use it righteously, sharing it with others 88 .

The first man's action arose from a selfish disposition, and

since then injustice has entered into human life. To put an

end to disorder, man realized the importance of mutual

co-operation and assistance in order to preserve individual

rights. So the fundamental laws of social relations were

established by substituting justice for psychological

impulses as the rule of man's conduct, and moral values

were associated with man's actions. People then entered

into an agreement among themselves and set up the first

social institutions.

2.11.10. When men formed themselves into a state of

society, there was a remarkable variety of natural

dispositions among them. These different dispositions

resulted in lack of co-operation and breaches of their first

agreement. The strength, the power, and the different

passions of the many individuals forming the first society

could not be fully harmonized, and in consequence weakness,

fear and selfish desires again struck at the very root of

their being. According to the early Buddhist point of view,

56

greedy dispositions among men are never ending and have

increasingly grave consequences. By repeated and

progressively worse and more sinful actions man will

ultimately reduce his life span from hundreds of thousands

of years in the earlier age to ten years or less in times

to come, when the world-cycle is nearing (samvatta) its

89 close .

2.11.11. With the gradual decline of humanity, on account

of its own greed, the people again entered into an agreement

to maintain justice and the like. This was the stage at

which men formed their second contract with the

responsibility of law and order, which may be called a

contract of government.

"Then someone of_ a greedy disposition, while

watching his own plot, appropriated another

plot that had not been given to him, and

made use of it. The people seized him and

said: 'You have done an evil deed in

taking and using a plot which was not

given to you. Do not let it happen again'.

'Very well', he replied. But he did the

same thing again and yet a third time.

Once more the people seized him and

admonished him in the same words, but this

time some of them struck him with their

hands, some with clods, and some with

sticks. From such beginnings arose theft,

blame, false speech, and punishment. Then

2.11.12.

57

the people gathered together and lamented,

saying: 'Evil ways are rife among the

people - theft, blame, false speech, and

punishment have appeared among us. Let

us choose one man from among us, to

dispense wrath, blame, and banishment when

they are right and proper, and give him a

share of our rice in return'. So they

chose the most handsome ... and capable

among them and invited him to dispense

anger, blame, and banishment. He consented

and did so, and they gave him a share of

their rice" 90 .

Describing the etymology of words connected with

kingship, the text continues:

"Mahasammata means approved (sammata) by the

people (mahajana) , and hence Mahasammata

was the first name to be given to a ruler.

He was lord of the fields (khettanam) and

hence khattiya (Sanskrit ksatriya) was his . .

second name. He pleases (ranjeti) others

by his righteousness (dhamma) - hence his

third name, raja 91 (king) . This was the

origin of the class of ksatriyas, according

to the tale of long ago. They originated

from those same folk and no others, people

like themselves, in no way different; and

their origin was quite natural and not

58

otherwise" 92 .

The text continues to explain the origin of the other three

classes, Brahmana, Vaisya, and Sudra (see Ch. 4).

2 .12 .1. The account of the origin of man and his gradual

decline from the state of nature to the origin of kingship

is found in all schools of Buddhism with minor and sometimes

local variations, and is widely known. In the Visuddhimagga,

the comme-ntator Buddhaghosa gives an account parallel to the

Agganna Sutta, and differs only in identifying Mahasammata

as the future Buddha (bodhisatta) 93• The Buddhist Sanskrit

accounts are to be found in the Mahavastu, in the Vinaya

section (the Qulva) of the Tibetan canon, in the

Lokaprajnapti, and in Vasubhandhu's Abhidharma-kosa94 •

2.12.2. If we take, for example, two accounts found in

the Mahavastu and in the Vinaya section (the Dulva) of the

Tibetan canon, we find slight changes, but they are only in

the words and phrases and not in the substance of the account

in the Agganna Sutta. For instance, the Agganna Sutta at

one place says:

"The characteristic of the female appeared

in women, and of the male in man ... In

consequence they took to intercourse

together, when others saw them doing so

some threw dust at them ... What was

considered immoral (adhamma-sammatam) in

those days is now considered moral ... "

ly.supra. 2.11.5 - 2.11.6).

59

The Mahavastu says:

"The distinguishing characteristics of

female and male appeared among them

Becoming inflamed with passion they

violated one another. And those who

witnessed them violating one another,

threw sticks at them, and clods of earth

and mud ... Then, indeed, this was

considered immoral, irreligious and

irregular, but now it is considered moral,

religious and regular" 95

The Vinaya section (the ~ulva) of the Tibetan canon says:

"From eating rice their different organs

were developed; some had those of males

and others those of females. Then they

saw each other, and conceived love for

each other, and, burning with lust, they

came to commit fornication. Others saw

what they were doing, so they threw at

them stones, gravel, pebbles, and

potsherds, and exclaimed: 'Why do you

thus insult us ... And thus it was that

what was formerly considered unlawful has

become lawful ... ,what was not tolerated

in former days has become tolerated ... ,

what was looked down on ... has become

praiseworthy nowadays" 96

60

2.12.3. Such are the accounts to be found in the

literature of Buddhism about the origin of the world, of man,

and of his social and political institutions. The Agganna

Sutta gives a quasi-historical account of the origin of

government, describing the development of man from the

original state of nature to a fully evolved society, when the

first king was approved by the people and was hence called

Mahasammata. He was also called khattiya because he was the

overlord (adhipati) of the fields (khetta) ' and raja because

he pleased the people with dhamma. Dhamma, thus, is finally

introduced as a basic constituent of the state (see Ch. 3).

Thirdly, it also tells us explicitly that man's social and

political institutions have no divine sanction but that they

are only measures of human expediency. There was a necessity

among human beings to restrict their immoral ways, and their

freedom to do immoral acts. For this reason mutual consent

was required to set up a king, that is to place one man among

them in highest authority. The relationship between the king

and his subjects is a contractual obligation in which one

commands and the other obeys. The contract is symbolized by

the institution of taxation, which is a payment for specific

work on the part of the king. In this sense the story

explains the grounds and limits of political obligation and

authority of the ruler, which are based upon the consent of

the people.

2.13.1. Let us now examine what is meant by "Mahasammata".

This is the central concept in the social and political ideas

of early Buddhism. However, there is no direct inquiry about

61

the implications of the title Mahasammata, in the social and

political sense, in the early Buddhist texts or in later

writings of the different schools of Buddhism. But the value

placed on Mahasammata is so great that some observations

about him are inevitable.

2.13.2. Let us first consider the narrower explanations

of the word. Most of the later Buddhist commentators

attempted to explain Mahasammata in terms of a mythical idea

of the origin of kingship. According to the Pali chronicles

of Sri Lanka, Mahasammata is the proper name of a king who

lived in the beginning of this present age, and who was the

original ancestor of the Sakyan family, to which the Buddha

belonged. The text gives a list of the dynasties from his

day up to the time of the Buddha, to prove that the line was

"unbroken• 97 .

2.13.3. Moreover, Mahasamrnata is said to have belonged to

the Solar Dynasty and was identified as the Bodhisatta (the

future Buddha) , who was born among men after a sojourn in the

Brahma worlds. The commentator Buddhaghosa says:

"In this cycle, among the beings who had made

this resolution (to select a king), the

Blessed one, the future Buddha, was then

more beautiful ... They approached him,

asked his permission, and chose him

That wondrous event in the world, the

future Buddha, was first man"98

.

An examination of the original Pali version will show that

62

Buddhaghosa's identification is wrong. There are references

to Mahasammata in the canonical Jataka, but he does not

occur as the future Buddha. For example, the Mandhatu

Jataka gives a list of the dynasties from Mahasammata to

Mandhata, and there identifies Mandhata as the future

Buddha99

. The fact to be noted, however, is that both the

Pali texts and their Commentaries agree that Mahasammata was

chosen by the people to put an end to disorder.

2.13.4. On the other hand, the Vimanavatthu Commentary

explains that Mahasammata is the name given in the Buddhist

sacred books (sasane) to Manu100 • The interesting point

about this late commentarial reference is that it tries to

assimilate the early Buddhist legend of Mahasammata to one

of the Hindu myths. The form of the legend given in the

Vimanavatthu Commentary does have some similarity with the

legend of Manu. This would suggest that they are connected

in some way and did not arise wholly independently. It

would then appropriate to pose, (i) was Mahasammata adapted

by the Buddhist from Manu?, (ii) Was Manu adapted by the

Hindus from the Buddhist Mahasammata?, (iii) Were both

adapted from a common original? Whatever the answer, it can

be pointed out explicitly that the Pali version of the

Mahasammata story is the first reference in ancient Indian

political thought to a social contract in the proper sense.

2.13.5. Moreover, in the Mahayana texts, there are

references to the doctrine of divine right (and duty) of

kings. The suvarnaprabhasottama Sutra, for example, speaks

63

f d . . . k. d l d. . . 10 l o 1v1ne appo1ntment of 1ngs an even roya 1v1n1ty

This shows clearly that non-Buddhist political ideologies,

including the well-known Hindu doctrine of the divine

creation of Manu and his Dharmasastra (i.e. Hindu law),

exercised deep influence upon later thinkers of different

schools of Buddhism102 .

2.13.6. The above explanations of Mahasammata do not

develop the social and political implications of the story,

but are rather concerned with harmonizing it with the

prevalent Hindu doctrine of royal divinity. Jayatilleke

comments that it would be a mistake to associate the idea of

Mahasammata with divinity, for anyone can become a bodhisatta

and such a being has to•act with selfless devotion for the

good of others103 . Rhys Davids comments, in spite of its

good-humoured irony and its fanciful etymologies, the

Agganna Sutta reveals a sound and healthy insight and is

- 104 much nearer to the actual facts than the Brahmana legends

Varma comments that the account of Mahasammata is of

considerable sociological significance, but it did not

initiate any larger amount of further sociological and

political investigation in the writing of later Buddhist

th . k 105 1n ers .

2.14.1. What is meant by Mahasammata is not explicitly

stated in the Buddhist texts. But we can gather a number of

implications in the social and political sense from them.

The Pali version states that Mahasammata means approved by

the people as a whole (sannipatitva samaggajatehi mahajanehi

64

. - - 106 . sammanltha kato mahasammata) . However, thls word has

been translated variously as "The Great Elect", "The Great

One Chosen by the Multitudes", "The Great Selected One",

"The Great Chosen One" 107 . The point to consider is that,

in contrasting "chosen one" with "elect", some. writers make

d . . . 'th d'ff 108 a lStlnctlon Wl out l erence . The two are synonymous.

However, there is no clear indication that the ruler was

elected by a formal process, and it seems more accurate to

use the words "The Great Approved One".

2.14.2. We have a similar account of Mahasammata in the

- 109 - . . Jataka . In one of the Jataka storles the followlng

account is given:

"The people who lived in the first cycle of

the world gathered together, and selected

the most handsome, attractive and capable

among them as their king. The quadrupeds

also gathered together and selected a lion

as their king; and the fish in the ocean

selected a fish as their king called

Ananda ... Then all the birds in the

Himalayan region assembled together,

crying: 'Among men, among beasts, and

among the fish too there is a king, but

amongst us no king. We should not live

in anarchy (appatissavaso) ; and we must

also select a king'. They selected an owl.

And a bird made a proclamation that it was

necessary to show consent on this matter by

2.14.3.

65

saying three times 'We are all agreed'

(ath'eko sakuno sabbesa~ ajjhasayagahanattha~

tikkhatum savisi). A crow made a protest.

In the end the birds selected a golden goose

h . k' ,110 as t e1.r 1.ng

Let us now try to find out what is exactly meant

by "mahasammata" in the light of the accounts given above.

Maha means great. Sammata means approved, authorized,

111 selected or agreed upon Thus Mahasammata means "the

great approved one", and it is evident that the king is

said to be. the "great approved one" because his kingship was

approved "by the people" or "approved by the great body of

the people" or "by general consent of the great body of

people". On the whole we are of the opinion that the

explanation as "chosen by the whole people" is a forced one;

and was probably not in the minds of those who first used

the word.

2.14.4. According to the tradition, as time went on,

the "contract of society" proved inadequate for ensuring

property rights (v.supra. 2.11.8). To put an end to

disorder and to have greater security than before, the

people who had gathered together voluntarily agreed to

subject themselves to an authority as the opposing force

(pratibala) 112 . By their mutual consent they decided to

give the authority to a person among themselves who could

administer the law justly and punish the guilty, and in

return they promised to give him a share of their harvests

66

in order to enable him to perform his duties. And thus all

men, by consenting with others, bound themselves to an

authority which had been established by mutual agreement

among those who had gathered together.

2.14.5. Consent imposes an obligation. Therefore, it is

not necessary to explain how both parties, the king and his

subjects, have bound themselves by restricting their freedom

to perform duties imposed with their own consent. This is

why the Buddhist texts demonstrate that the king is merely

primus inter E_ares, a being "like unto themselves and not

unlike", because of the equality of man, despite the fact

that the king selected has a handsome and commanding

personality. Therefore, the king is of the people, is to

act in the interest of and for the people, and for this task

has been approved by mutual consent. It is said in one

Chatu~~ataka of Aryadeva. that the king should not feel any

pride because after he has consented to rule he is "the

servant of the people" (gana-dasa), and for his services the

1 . . t . h f h . . d 113 peop e glve ln axes one-slxt o t elr pro uce

2. 15 . 1. The important facts that may be noted in the

early Buddhist theory of the origin of kingship are the

following. First, the theory implies a democratic

conception of the state and the law. Secondly, early

Buddhism conceived of the king as a human being and did not

believe in his divinity. Thirdly, it implies that the king

has no authority, legislative, judicial or executive, except

by virtue of the fact that he has the people's consent as

67

long as he fulfils his contract, which means that

sovereignty in the sense of the supreme legislative power is

vested in the people and was limited by the requirement to

conform to the law of righteousness or dhamma (see Ch.3).

In the Pali Scriptures it is said that the king becomes the

. rob 1 ( --- ) f . 114 h. h . Slgn or sy o pannanam o soverelgnty , w lC lS

vested in the people and is ultimately derived from dhamma

(v.infra. 2.16.1. Also see Ch.3). He should not be moved

by hatred or desire from material gain. While it is the

king's first duty to maintain law and order, he has other

responsibilities as well, including that of positively

encouraging and contribution to the economic and spiritual

welfare of the people. His service to the people must be

based on the law of righteousness (dhamma). In this sense,

the Sutta gives a clear idea of the nature and limits of the

duty of allegiance owed by the subjects of the king, and of

the rights and duty of the king to maintain law and order

(see Ch. 3) .

2.15.2. In this connection, another point that may be

noted is that if the king fails to fulfil the promise or

contract, which is presumed to exist, and instead of

providing good government betrays the trust that the people

have placed on him, the people have a moral right to depose

the king. In one of the Jatakas the Bodhisatta addresses

crowd of citizens who are suffering the tyranny of a wicked

king and his Purohita in the following terms:

"Let town and country people assembled all

give ear. The water is on fire. From

68

safety comes fear. The plundered realm may

well complain of king and priest. Hence­

forth protect yourselves. Your refuge

proves your bane" 115

This passage is evidently intended to show that every

individual has the moral right and even duty to engage in

rebellion against the king who betrays the contract. The

statement "it is up to you to protect yourselves (attagutta

viharatha)'is made to the general public (mahajana), who are

told that the king is defrauding the people when he ought to

protect them and work for their welfare. When the people

heard this advice, they thought, "Now we are without

protection", so they arose up with sticks and clubs in their

hands, and then beat the wicked king and the priest till

they died116 .

2.15.3. Thus the story of Mahasammata gives clear

answers to the problem of political authority and obligation.

In every respect it implies a novel idea which was not

current in any political context before the time of the

Buddha. The king's authority is that of human will, and the

king holds office by virtue of the general consent of his

subjects, to perform his duties and bring happiness to the

people by means of dhamma. We shall discuss the king's

duties and his other responsibilities in chapter three.

2.16 .1. As we have seen, there was a necessity to

appoint a person from among the people and to put him under

an obligation. How then was the person appointed put under

69

such an obligation? The people have accepted a lawgiving

authority on the understanding that the lawgiving authority

should act in a certain way. The appointed ruler has

consented to act in just such a way by assuming the power

granted to him by the people; obviously then the obligatory

force of the general consent comes into effect. But how the

law can come into effect, if there is no rule which stands

above the ruler? The obligatory force of the general consent

cannot stem from the will of the parties alone. Therefore,

there must be a rule making the agreement binding on the two

parties. According to early Buddhism that rule is dhamma,

which we shall discuss in the next chapter (Ch. 3).

70

CHAPTER THREE

THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA

3.1.1. The social contract theory of early Buddhism,

which we discussed in chapter two, is closely related to the

idea of dhamma. In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine

this concept as the law of righteousness, since it reveals

the basis of allegiance in relationships between the ruler

and his subjects. We shall then consider its relevance to

law and administration of the state, as it appears in the

early BJlddhist texts. we shall a.lso distinguish, where it

is appropriate, the different uses of the early Buddhist

conception of dhamma from the Vedic (Brahmanic and

Upanisadic ) e>nd the Hindu conception of dharma, so that

we can see the significance of the early Buddhist ideas in

clearer focus.

3.2.1. The word "dhamma" in Pali, and the corresponding

word "dharma" in Sanskrit, is perhaps the most distinctive

and indispensable word in the entire history of Indian

thought. Indeed, it may be the best established word in

the Indian religious vocabulary. It has several meanings or

shades of meaning which have to be understood according to

their context, since variations in the interpretation of

dhamma are many. Therefore it has been noted that dhamma

is a most difficult word to define and is untranstable into

any other language. Rhys Davids, for example, writes:

"The word 'dhamma' has given, and will

always give, great trouble to the trans-

3.2.2.

7l

lators. It connotes, or involves, so

much" 1 .

The word ''dhamma" or "dharma" is derived from

the root dhr, which means "to support", "to sustain", "to --. hold together"; thus, according to its derivation, it could

mean "that which supports", "that which sustains", "that

which holds together".

3.2.3. In the Rg-Veda, there is a conception of rta2, -.-

which can safely be translated as the regular course of

things. Explanations of this concept are given by assuming

the existence of wills behind natural phenomena. The term

rta comes closest to the idea of a natural physical order, -.-that is, the cosmic order by which the universe, the gods

and men are governed3 , and it was considered to be the law

of Varuna, who is the administrator of the cosmic order or

4 law .

3.2.4. At a later stage of the Rg-Vedic period, rta ~

acquired a moral and religious connotation, and was

identified with truth (~atya). . -which is essentially a lack of harmony with natural and moral

law5

. Rta was also associated with sacrifice or rite (yajna) ~- ---

The chief duty of man is to engage in yajna because the

very manifestation of the world as well as its maintenance

is the effect of yajna. As Macdonell points out, rta is ~

"order in the moral world as truth and right, and in the

religious world as sacrifice or rite"6

.

72

3 . 2 . 5 . However, during the Brahmanic and Upanisadic

period, :ta gradually became less important, and subsequently

the cosmic and moral law was denoted by dharman 7 (an early

form of dharma declined as a consonantal noun) , which has

connotations similar to rta. It occurs in conjunction with -.--the word ~rata 8 , which denotes in this context the command

or law of a deity9

. Later the word dharma was developed in

its masculine form, and became a key word in the Indian

religious vocabulary.

3.3.1. The word "dhamma" is used in early Buddhism

with an emphasis rather different from its uses in other

Indian religious traditions. But it has been frequently

assumed that the two conceptions, early Buddhist dhamma and

Vedic dharma, are of the same nature, or that early Buddhism

as a protestant movement merely cleared up certain confusions

and corruptions that had crept into the Vedicc notion of

d h . 10 harma at t e t1me . For example, B.G. Gokhale, in an

examination of dhamma as a political concept, writes that

the early Buddhist concept of dhamma is related to the Vedic

concept of rta {v.supra. 3.2.3 - 3.2.4). He defines rta as -.-- - -.--"the regular order", and in other terms he thinks ;ta is

"the physical order of the universe, the due order of the

sacrifice, and the moral law in the world", which appears in

the Vedas as an independent authority as well as the

possession of some gods, especially Varuna. Gokhale further

points out that the early Buddhists were doubtless acquainted

with these notions and borrowed parts of the Vedic concept

of rta which they interpreted in their own way; and more -.--

73

especially they applied it to their own political ideas11 .

3.3.2. We entirely disagree with Gokhale's observ-

ations. For one thing, we never meet in Buddhist literature

the Pali word corresponding to :ta. The word rta must have

lost much of its currency in India before the time of the

rise of early Buddhism, and it has never been traced in

either early Buddhist or Jaina literature. Moreover, dhamma

is never associated with sacrifice or rite, or linked with

divine prototypes. In many cases, the early Buddhist dhamma

has different connotations, or altogether different meanings

in different contexts from the Vedic and Hindu conception of

dharma. However, this does not mean, as Jayatilleke points

out, that early Buddhism did not accept any notions at all

from the Vedic system. Early Buddhism appears to have

followed the general principles of the moral tradition of

the past by taking what was considered to be sound and good

and developing it, while leaving out what seemed unsound or

'112 evJ. .

3.3.3. Let us examine some of these contexts. The

Brahmanic and Upanisadic conception of dharma is closely

associated with the omnipotent cosmic or divine will of the

cosmic person (purusa) . This interpretation of dharma is ---.-

dealt with in the account of the divine creation of social

order in four varnas (v.supra. 2.3.3). After the creation of: . -the four varnas, the Highest God created dharma in order to

preserve his entire creation and give it stability. It is

said:

74

"He was not strong enough. He created still

further the most excellent dharma. This

is the power (ksatra) of the ruling class

(ksatra), viz., dharma. Therefore, there . ------

is nothing higher than dharma. So a weak

man controls a strong man by dharma, just

as if by a king. Verily that which is

dharma is truth. Therefore, they say of

a man who is speaking the truth 'He speaks

the dharma', or of a man who is speaking

dharma, 'He speaks the truth'. Verily

both these are the same" 13 .

From the above it is evident that the law (dharma) is a

divine law, because it is ascribed to the will of God. God

alone has the power of creating it for the sa.ke of individual

and collective security; and it is binding upon the members

of society by virtue of its divine origin.

' 3.3.4. The eternal Vedas (Sruti) are said to be the

primary source of dharma, Sacred tradition (Smriti) and

good custom or usage or convention (sadacara, sistacara,

- - -- 14 acara, sila, samaya) . They are all divinely created, and

thus secondary. They consist of a body of rules and

regulations for each member of society.

3.3.5. Let us consider briefly the significance of

dharma in a socio-political context. Together with the idea

of the divine creation of the four varnas and dharma, the

Brahmanical law-books stressed inequalities, laying heavier

75

burdens on Sudras and granting special privileges to the

Brahmanas (see Ch.4). For the Sudras there was a divine

barrier to social relationships with the higher orders.

This was considered final, permanent and pre-ordained.

Dharma was believed by the Brahmanas to be a creation of God;

but from t.he early Buddhist point of view the Brahmanical

class system did not serve the best interests of society as

a whole, because it did not prescribe that all human beings

should be treated alike (see Ch.4).

3.3.6. Along with the above ideas, dharma, the

supreme law of the social order, sets forth concretely the

distinctive status and functions of the four varnas in

accordance with the divine will. Accordingly, there are

various types of dharma, both general and special. Among

them, there is a special dharma of varna duties and ----.-positions in an unalterable religious and social scheme

(varna-dharma) • There is a dharma for the rules of life

for a particular period in one's life (asrama-dharma). At

the same time, each individual member of society had his

own set of duties and obligations exactly prescribed by

the divine will (sva-dharma). Moreover, there is a general

dharma applicable to all men and women, despite differences

in age or social status (sadharana-dharma or samanya-dharma)'

and there is a dharma for the regulation of communities

(samaja-dharma).

3.3.7. In a political sense, there is a particular

dharma for the king (raja-dharma) , which applies to the

76

regulation of his kingdom. The ruler was conceived to be

powerful only so far as he wielded dharma. He should

protect dharma, both general and special and its protection

is the divine purpose of the Ksatriya varna. The king's ----.-ruling power (ksatra) was believed to be derived from the

Most High , but the brahman priesthood claimed to represent

the divine authority, and to exert a dominating influence

upon the king in all his actions. The Purohita instructs

the king on dharma and guides him in the protection of

dharma, since he is the custodian of dharma (~.supra. 2.5.6).

On such instruction and guidance, the king's duty, among

many other things, is to preserve and promote dharma in all

its aspects, while punishing those who reject their dharma,

thus fulfilling his own.

3.3.8. we do not propose to scrutinize the various

types of dharma, as it would divert us from our present

discussion. But, on the whole, it is clear from an exam-

ination of Vedic and Hindu dharma, in all its aspects, both

general and special, that it is generally believed to be

based on divine will. Dharma is used both in Brahmanism and

Hinduism to denote sacred law and duty, justice and

religious merit, based upon the sacred canon, the eternal

Vedas, and usage,. custom or convention. They were all

considered to be divine in character because they were

derived from God himself, according to the Vedic and Hindu

literature. Moreover, dharma refers to the rules of conduct

of the divinely ordained social order, and is often

designated as the eternal dharma (sanatana-dharma).

77

3.4.1. In many aspects the early Buddhist dhamma

differed completely from the Vedic conception of dharma. By

refuting and criticizing several uses of the term dharma,

early Buddhism enunciated a new philosophy of dhamma. The

differences between the early Buddhist dhamma and that of

Vedic and Hindu dharma, mainly in a socio-political context,

will be explained in this study.

3.4.2. Here we may briefly indicate some of the

' differences between these two concepts. The first and

obvious observation is that early Buddhism does not subscribe

to a theistic origin of dhamma. As we have seen above

(~.supra. 2.10.1 - 2.10.18), the notion of a personal

creator God had no place in early Buddhism. According to

early Buddhism, dhamma is not God-given as was earlier

believed. Since there is no act of creation, dhamma cannot

be ascribed to the will of God. It is supposed to have

always existed. It is timeless and universal, hence it is

the law of nature. Even Brahma, who was considered to be an

almighty creator God by the Brahmanas, is subject not only

to the judgement of dhamma, but also to the universal laws

of impermanence, suffering and absence of any permanent

entity, according to early Buddhism. Therefore a personal

God cannot have created dhamma, since it is superior and

anterior to any God.

3.4.3. Moreover, early Buddhism paid no special

allegiance to the Vedas. In fact, early Buddhism criticized,

both directly and indirectly, the Brahmanas' claim that the

78

eternal Vedas, which were considered to be the highest source

of dharma, were divine revelation and the final authority.

In addition to the Vedas, there were a number of other

sources of dharma (~.supra. 3.3.4). On the whole, early

Buddhism rejected and criticized all doctrines that dharma

has any particular source not only as worthless, but even as

wholly irrelevant15 . The early Buddhist dhanuna, therefore,

is not based on any theistic assumptions.

' 3.4.4. There is, however, a further point, which is

very important. For the early Buddhists dhamma is the law

of nature, which regulates and governs the totality of

existence. It is also the law of nature of man's inward

being or, in other words, it is a governing principle of

human activity. The Buddha is represented as a discoverer

of dhamma in both these aspects. It was his realization

and proclamation of dhanuna which enabled him to attract and

maintain the loyality of a large number of very influential

members of the mercantile class. Therefore the early

Buddhist dh~ to a great extent determined by the Buddha's

discovery at the point of his enlightenment - the discovery

which became for him a unique feature of his teaching.

3.4.5. According to the tradition, when the Buddha

gained enlightenment after six years of experimentation, he

was reluctant to teach to the world the dhamma, which he had

found with such difficulty. He thought to himself:

"This dhamma is not readily comprehensible

to those who are given to craving and hate.

79

It goes against the current. It is subtle,

profound and difficult to comprehend for

those who are enveloped in darkness would

not find it easy to see its truth" 16 .

Brahma then descended from his heaven and invited the Buddha

to teach dhamma to the world, which would otherwise be

destroyed saying:

"There was a dhamma in the past among the

Magadhan peoples, which was not perfect

and which was conceived by imperfect seers.

Open now the doors to immortality. So

that people may listen to dhamma, which

has been fully comprehended by the Buddha

Teach dhamma. Those who learn your

dhamma will become perfect" 17

This statement of Brahma recognizes the fact that the Vedic

teaching of dharma was not worthwhile, as it was not

conducive to the happiness of mankind as a whole (~.supra.

3.3.5).

3.4.6. The Buddha's teaching of dharma, as he found

it, is usually described as "the setting in motion of the

supreme wheel of the law" (dhamma-cakka) 18 . The term

dhamma-cakka, here translated as "the Wheel of the Law" can

be more accurately rendered as "the law of righteousness"

since the cakka or the "wheel" is the emblem of authority

of the sovereign. It also has the connotation of the

kingdom of righteousness since the term Brahma-cakka has

been used synonymously with it19 . But the term Brahma here

80

means the "highest" or "most sublime", and has no theistic

connotations.

3.4.7. The Buddha gave his teaching to the world as a

way of life, telling men and women how they should employ

this existence in order to achieve supreme happiness. The

Buddha's dhamma, therefore, appears as a message proclaimed

"for the welfare and happiness of the many" 20 , since he

himself is said to have been "born in the world of men for

welfare and happiness" (manussa-loke hita sukhataya jatol21

,

where the "welfare" is primarily the spiritual and second-

arily the material welfare of humanity.

3.4.8. There is in early Buddhism a concept of a world-

ruler or world-state,sman(cakkavattiraja), who is likewise

said to "be born for the welfare and happiness of mankind"22

.

It is said:

"There are those two persons, who in being

born in the world are so born for the good

and happiness of mankind, for the wealth,

good and happiness of gods and men. Which

two? The worthy and perfect Enlightened

23 One and the World-ruler" .

It is stated that the world-ruler sets up a just social order

embracing the whole earth, working primarily for the material

and secondarily for the spiritual welfare of humanity on the

basis of righteousness (dhamma). We.shall examine the

concept of the cakkavattiraja in a later part of this

chapter.

Bl

3.4.9. We have so far seen a few fundamental differ-

ences between Vedic dharma and early Buddhist dhamma. It is

clear that early Buddhist dhamma is based partly on the

notion of the perfectibility of the individual and partly on

that of social consciousness. As well as this, there are

many other differences between these two concepts, as is

apparent in the early Buddhist attitudes towards social

ethics, politics and law. We shall consider them, while

discussing,the es.sential features of dhamma as a political

concept.

3.5.1. we have now reached a point where we can

discuss in detail the nature of dhamma as a socio-political

concept. The word dhamma has varied connotations, most of

them are of an ethical nature. Several efforts have been

made to find suitable English translations of it, for

instance, "Normn, "Lawn, "Virtue", 11 Piety", 11 Justice",

"The Doctrine", and "Righteousness"; in our discussion it is

translated "the law of righteousness" in most cm;~texts.

3.5.2. Let us first consider the importance of dhamma

in relation to the social contract theory of early Buddhism,

to which reference has been made in chapter two. According

to this, it was necessary to appoint a person from among the

people to preserve the social order; he was called

Mahasammata, and was put under an obligation to do so. At

the end of chapter two (~.supra. 2.16.1), the principal

questions that we have posed in relation to the obligatory

82

force of the general consent are the following. Is there a

law that regulates the relationships between the ruler and

his subjects? What is the rule making the agreement binding

on the two parties? On what is the authority of the ruler

grounded? The answer to all these questions, according to

the early Buddhist point of view, is dhamma or the law of

righteousness~

3.5.3. ~rhis conception of "law of righteousness" has

a number of implications for the early Buddhist conception

of law. It means that the ultimate source of law in the state

should reside not in any ruler, human or divine, nor in any

body governing the state, nor in the state itself, but in

dhanuna or the law of righteousness. This is not to be inter-

preted to mean that ;:Ihamma is some sort of mysterious entity,

but that it is only to the extent to which the state conforms

with dharruna in its .internal and foreign policy that man can ----achieve his legitimate aspirations for peace, prosperity and

happiness. Since man is free to choose and the right to

govern is vested in the people, according to the early Buddhist

social contract theory, it would be the responsibility of man

to set up such a state.

3.5.4 According to early Buddhism, the state of

nature in the blissful golden age was governed by dhamma.

When the gradual decline of humanity occurred, on account

of its own greed and passion, some men infringed dhamma ----

with unhappy results. Finally, when there ;vas strife and

injustice in society, the people needed an impartial

'

83

authority to lay down and enforce minimum good standards,

and bind them to dhamma. This is well-illustrated in the

Vinaya section (the Dulva) of the Tibetan canon which states

that, before the first appointment of Mahasammata, a person

who stole another's rice was arrested and charged with theft.

But the thief made a counter-charge, saying: "I have been

badly treated in that I have been laid hold of by these

people on account of some rice and brought into this

assembly".• Then the people in turn warned those who had

arrested him, saying: "In bringing him here into our midst

you people have done him wrong", since they had no authority

to do so. The people let him off, warning him "do not it

again"24

. It was then that, in the interests of fairer and

more efficient justice, among other reasons, the people

selected a king and delegated their functions to him.

3 • 5 • 5 • The appointed person or individual is said to

have been under an obligation because he had consented to be

the authority and to guide the people in accordance with

dhamma. It is said:

" he pleases others by dhamma, hence he

is the king ... (dhammena pare ranjeti kho

-.- )"25 raJa . . • .

The force of dhammena is augmented and emphasized by the

explanatory clause "righteously indeed, not unrighteously"

(dhammen'eva no adhammena)26

. The Sanskrit version found in

the Mahavastu says:

"So originated the idea of Mahasammata

He is the king, which means one who is

84

a perfect guardian and protector ... he

who achieves security for his people by

means of dharma"27

.

The Vinaya section (the ~ulva) of the Tibetan canon says:

"Mahasammata ... was a righteous man and

wise, and one who brought happiness to

mankind with the law (dhamma), he was

. - - 28 called 'k1ng' or 'raja'''

• 3.5.6. The above extracts indicate in the first place

the relationship of dhamma to kingship. It is also said that

dhamma is the essence of kingship as well as the king's best

policy, since power is vested in him by virtue of his being

the protector of dhamma29 . The duty of the king is to

maintain law and order for the welfare and happiness of the

people as a whole, and this should be in harmony with dhamma 30

The king obtained the right from the people to interpret

dhamma in many ways, according to their needs. The ideal

king of earlier times was said to obtain the consent of all

sections of people in carrying out the affairs of state31 .

3.5.7. The right of owning property justly acquired,

for example, is in accordance with dhamma. This is also the

case with just punishment. Part of what is meant here by

dhamma is the administration of justice, which involved the

punishment of those deserving punishment and the compensation

of those deserving compensation. Dhamma, therefore, gives

wide scope to the duty of the king. In the first place, it

gives the king the authority to rule and calls upon the

85

subjects to obey him so long as he rules in accordance with

dhamma. The king should positively encourage and contribute

to the economic and spiritual welfare of his subjects. When

he ceases to do so, the basis of allegiance is destroyed and

h "11 . 32 anarc y Wl relgn supreme Therefore, it may appear,

according to early Buddhism, that obedience is a moral

principle assumed through a promise, and the authority of

the ruler is derived from the will and consent of the people

in whose interests he should govern, but his power is subject

to the law of righteousness (dhamma) since the "wheel of

power turns in dependence on the wheel of righteousness"

' - 33 (bala-cakram hi nisraya dharma-cakram pravartate) .

3.6.1. Thus early Buddhism recognises the authority

of dhamma in the sphere of social and political life. The

social and political dhamma, therefore, needs to be explained

here. In the Anguttara Nikaya, the question is asked as to

who is the king of a righteous king (dhammikassa dhammaranno

raja), the Buddha's reply is that it is dhamma.

"It is dhamma, monk. Herein, monk, the

king, the wheel roller, a dhamma man, a

dhamma raja, relies just on dhamma,

honours dhamma, reveres dhamma esteems

dhamma; with dhamma as his mandate, he

sets a dhamma watch and bar and ward for

folk within his realm ... He set a dhamma

watch ... for warrior and camp follower,

for brahmans and for householder, for

town and country folk, for recluse and

3.6.2.

86

godly man, for beast and bird alike.

Thus indeed, monk, that raja ... setting

a dhamma watch ... within his realm, rolls

on the wheel by dhamma; and that wheel

may not be rolled back by the hands of

h '1 34 any ostJ. e creature" .

This passage, which can be paralleled with

many other passages in the early Buddhist texts, especially

in the Jataka stories, indicates in the first place that

dhamma is the "ruler of rulers" or the "highest in the world".

In the second place it recognises that the ultimate criterion

of the rightness, justice, legality, propriety etc. of any

government policy is dhamma. It should be emphasized,

however, that this dhamma differs from the pre-Buddhistic

conception of dh~. Although the latter emphasized

righteousness, it was placed within an explicitly

religious context and expressed in characteristically

theological terms (~.supra. 3.3.3 - 3.3.8). Therefore, there

is a great different between Vedic dharma and early Buddhist

dhamma.

3.6.3. According to early Buddhism, it is dhamma in

conformity with which a reigning king should shape his

conduct and guide the course of administration in internal

and foreign policy. This is explained in many discourses,

especially in the Jataka stories. We may illustrate this

with an example. In one of the Jataka stories, a king was

advised to practise dhamma towards friends and courtiers,

87

brahmans and ascetics, beast and birds, and in war and travel,

in town and village, in every land and realm35 . On this

basis, Ghoshal writes:

"The most important contribution of the

early Buddhist canonists to the store of

our ancient political thought consists of

their 'total' application of the principle

of righteousness to the branches of the

king's internal and foreign administration"36

•

It was indeed this principle of dhamma, as we shall see, that

Asoka sought to embody in so many of his policies. Moreover,

the ancient history of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) recorded in the

Mahavamsa and Culavamsa shows how this dhamma affected the

king's policies.

3.6.4. Therefore, it appears that dhamma is not a

mysterious entity, as is often stated37 , but something

comparable to Western natural law doctrine. It is only to

the extent to which the king conforms with dhamma in his

policies that he can achieve his legitimate aspirations for

peace, prosperity and happiness. If the king does not fulfil

his primary task of maintaining law and order in society by

means of dhamma, and is given to vice (adhamma), the people

have a moral right to depose the king (~.supra. 2.15.2).

3.7.1. Accordingly, early Buddhism recommends that

the king, as the acknowledged head and leader, the refuge

and security of the people 38 , should rule in accordance with

dhamma in order to gain their goodwi11 39 The actions of

88

the king should be conducive to the happiness and welfare of

the people as well as his own40 . The king, therefore, should

avoid the four wrong courses of life (agatigamana), namely,

desire (chanda), malice (dosa), delusion (moha) and fear

(bhaya) 41

. Moreover, he should refrain· from all evil and

cultivate good behaviour, observing the early Buddhist

ethical principles of the ten virtues (dasa-kusala-kammapatha­

dhamma)42. These ten virtues are applicable, not only to the

king but to all humanity.

3.7.2. In the Majjhima Nikaya, we find these ten

virtues classified according to their expression through the

body, through speech and in the mind. They are:

"1. He refrains from killing (panatipata)

and abides full mercy to all beings.

2. He refrains from stealing (adinnadana)

and is honest and pure of heart.

3. He refrains from sexual misconduct

(kamesu-micchacara) and does not

transgress the social mores (caritta)

with regard to sex.

4. He refrains from lying (musavada) and

is devoted to truth. On being summoned

as a witness before an assembly or a

court of law, he claims to know what

he knows, he does not claim to know

what he does not know, he claims to

have seen what he saw and does not

claim to have seen what he did not

89

see; he does not utter a conscious

lie for the sake of himself or for

the sake of others for some trifling

gain.

5. He refrains from slander (pisuna-vacaya)

and holds himself aloof from calumny.

What he hears here, he repeats not

there in order to cause factions among

people. He is a peace maker, who brings

together those who are divided, delights

in social harmony and makes statements

which promotes harmony.

6. He refrains from harsh speech (pharusa­

vacaya) and uses language that is civil

and pleasant to hear.

7. He refrains from idle gossip

(samphappalapa) and speaks at the

right time in accordance with facts,

what is meaningful, righteous and in

accordance with law (vinaya-vadi)

8. He refrains from covetousness

(abhij jhaya) , does not covet another's

property, and is generous in heart.

9. He refrains from ill-will (byapada)

and is benovelent.

10. He refrains from holding false view

(micchaditthiya) and holds the right

philosophy of life, believing in the

3.7.3.

90

reality of this world and the next, in

moral recompense, moral obligations

and values and in religious teachers

who have led good lives and have

proclaimed by their superior insight,

the nature of this world and the

next•• 41 .

These ten virtues formed the basis of

legislation in some Buddhist countries. For example, the

first great king of Tibet, Sron-b-tsan'-sgam-po is said to

have "promulgated laws to harmonize with the ten virtues

prescribed by early Buddhism" 44 in the seventh Century A.D.

It should be emphasized, however, that these ten virtues,

unlike the commands of the Decalogue, are not to be

interpreted as commandments or laws. They are recommended

on the grounds of higher self-interest and expediency. A

person can voluntarily decide whether he should take upon

himself these ten virtues. If he sincerely and consistently

does so, he can root out greed, hatred and ignorance and act

out of selfless service, love and understanding towards his

fellow beings, according to early Buddhism.

3.7.4. From the standpoint of politics, the pursuit

of ten virtues is considered a necessary prerequisite of

social stability, international understanding and peace. In

addition to the above ten virtues, early Buddhism recommends

that the king and his officials should act out of selflessness,

rectitude, mercy and the power of wisdom. These characterist­

ics are mentioned in the list of ten qualities of the king

91

(dasa-raja-dhamma). They are~

l. Liberality, generosity and charity

(dana) .

2. High moral character (sila).

3. Selflessness (Eariccaga).

4. Honesty and integrity (ajjava)

5. Kindness and gentleness (maddava)

6. Austerity in habits (tapa).

7. Freedom from hatred, ill-will and

enmity (akkodha).

8. Non-violence (avihimsa).

9. Forbearance and tolerance (khanti).

10. Non-opposition and non-obstruction

(avirodha) 45 .

Another list of the same name <:::.supra. 3.6.3) mentions the

several duti.es of kings towards different classes of persons

and beings, including citizens in the town and country,

religious teachers and even birds and beasts 46 .

3.7.5. The king with such virtues and qualities will

ward off pain and suffering from other beings, whether human

or non-human and promote their well-being and happiness.

Moreover, when the king follows righteous ways his people

will be righteous and peace will reign in his realm47

. In

the Anguttara Nikaya, we find the Buddha explains thus:

"Monks, when rajas are righteous, their

ministers are aJso righteous. When they

are righteous, brahmins and householders,

the town folk and villagers are righteous.

92

This being so, moon and sun go right in

their courses ... constellations and stars

do likewise; days and nights, months and

fortnights, seasons and years go on their

courses regularly; winds blow regularly

and in due seasons. Thus the devas are

not annoyed and the sky-deva bestows

sufficient rain. Rains falling seasonably,

the crops ripen in due season, men who

live on those crops are long-lived, well­

favoured, strong and free from sickness"48

Further the Buddha explains that if the king, who is reckoned

best among men, lives righteously, the whole realm dwells in

happiness and the people follow him as a herd of cattle follow

49 the. bull .

3.7.6. Early Buddhism openly condemns the king who

selfishly sits on the throne, indulges in the pleasures of

the sense, and is drunk with the intoxication of authority50

Such a king brings about his own woe as well as that of his

subjects. When the king is unrighteous evil consequences,

the reverse of those mentioned above (~.supra. 3.7.5.) will

follow51 . One of the Jataka stories explain thus:

"At the time of unjust kings, oil, honey,

molasses and the like, as well as wild

roots and fruits, lose their sweetness

and strength, and not only these but the

whole realm loses its vigour"52

93

3.7.7. Accordingly, early Buddhism recommends that

the king should refrain from evil and cultivate good towards

his subjects with loving kindness as a father loves his

children53

. The Buddhist virtue of metta is also said t.o be

analogous to a mother's love for her only child: "Just as

a mother, as long as she lives, cares for her only child, so

should a man feel all-embracing love to all living beings

(mata yatha niyam puttam ayusa ekaputtam anurakkhe, evam pi

- - - - 54 sabbabhute~u manasam bhavaye aparimanam) . In early

Buddhism, the importance of love (metta) is greatly stressed.

This may be gathered from the following remark of the Buddha:

"None of the good works employed to acquire

religious merit is worth a fraction of the

value of loving-kindness"55

The Pali word metta is an abstract noun meaning "love, amity,

sympathy, friendliness, active interest in others" derived

from the Sanskrit word "mitra" meaning "friend" 56 . The

practice of the "highest life" or the "divine life" in this

very world is said to consist in the cultivation of the four

cardinal virtues, love (metta), sympathy (karuna), sympathetic

joy (mudita) and impartiality (upekka), towards all beings57

The person who has successfully developed these qualities·

is said to be "one who is cleansed with an internal bathing"

after bathing "in the waters of love and compassion for

one's fellow beings" 58 Inspired by the Buddhist ideals,

Asoka frequently stressed the importance of love in the

form of father-child relationship.

"All men are my children, and just as I

3.7.8.

94

desire for my children that they should

obtain welfare and happiness in this

world and the next, so do I desire (the

same) for all men" 59 .

The nature of a kingdom is said to founded on

the "strength of friendliness" (maitri-bala) 60 . Therefore,

the king and his officials should perform their duties on

the four bases of kindliness (sangahavatthuni) in order to

win the hearts of the people. They are: (i) charitable­

mindness (dana), (ii) affability (priyavacana), (iii) work

for the welfare of society (atthacariya)and (iv) sense of

- - 61 -equal respect for all (samanattha) . One of the Jataka

stories states that the king should distribute every morning

and evening by public proclamation food and drink, garlands

and ointments 1 clothes, umbrellas and shoes to the needy.

Moreover, he should not make aged men and outworn domestic

animals labour. He should pay due honour to them, because

they gave him service when they were strong62

3.7.9. Such a king is said to be a successful one, in

keeping his people positively happy through his encouragement

of and his contribution to their welfare. In the Dlgha Nikaya,

Seniya Bimbisara, king of Magadha, is referred as "righteous

and ruling righteously, benign to priest and laymen, to town

and country folk (dhammiko dhammaraja hito brahamana-

- - ~ - - 63 gahapatikanam negamanan c'eva janapadananca) and likewise

the text gives a list of eight characteristics of a good

king, among which we find the following:

3.7.10.

95

"He is a believer (in dhamma), generous

benefactor (dayako danapati), keeps open

house to all, a welling spring (opana) for

the satisfaction of all religious people,

the poor and wayfarers, beggars and

petitioners. He is a doer of good deeds

(pu~~ani) , is intelligent, learned, wise

and capable of thinking out matters

relating to the past, present and future" 64 .

In addition to the above matters·, the king

should also base his daily life upon the principle of

vigilance (appamada) . The essence of this principle is

summed up in the Dhammapada: "Vigilance is the source of

immortality and negligence is that of death" (appamado

- 65 amatapadam, pamado maccuno padam) . It has been suggested •

that this principle of vigilance had much effect on Asoka66 .

The Buddha said by way of admonition to the king of Kosala:

3.7.11.

"If you lead a vigilant life, your court

ladies will say: 'the king lives in

vigilance. Let us live likewise'. And

your court nobles, and your subjects in

town and country will say the same. And

you living thus in vigilance, yourself

will be guarded and preserved, the house

of your women, your treasury and store­

houses will be guarded and preserved too"67

The Jataka stories frequently refer to this

96

principle of vigilance. The most important statement on not

being negligent, but being earnest and ruling in righteousness

occurs in the Tesakuna Jataka. In this story, three wise . birds give instructions to a king, who adopts them as his

children, in ruling his kingdom in righteousness. The king,

in the midst of the crowd of people, questioned the first

bird on the duty of a king. Without answering the question

directly, the bird reproved the king for his negligence,

and then sa.id:

"To rule a kingdom righteously, the king

should avoid falsehood, anger and levity;

he should learn not to do again whatever

he has done in the past under the

influence of passion and sin; a king who

become negligent in his rule loses all

his wealth; good luck and fortune delight

in a man who is energetic and free from

jealousy; ill-luck delights in men of

ill-deeds who are afflicted with jealousy

and hard-hearted; the king should be a

friend and protector to all: he should

perform his duties without making mistakes

and without coming under the influence of

self-will and other passions; he should

be earnest in efforts for good; no

sluggard can attain happiness"68

The second bird, replying to the same question, first declares

that the duty of a king consists of the acquisition of wealth

not acquired and the conservation of what is acquired, and adds:

97

"The king should select ministers who are

wise and learned, and free from vices

such as gambling and drinking; he

should select other officials who would

guard him and his treasure; he should

steer the kingdom's common weal as a

charioteer guides his chariot; he should

keep his subjects well in hand; he should

himself examine the income and expenditure

and should not trust another for a loan or

deposit; he should punish those deserving

punishment and favour those deserving

favour; he should see that nothing is

done by himself or by others with overmuch

speed; he should never mislead his

subjects and he himself should decide his

subjects' affairs; he should never give

way to wrath; he should not allow

unrighteous officials to ruin his

substance and his kingdom; he should

practise virtuous conduct, for vices

lead to a state full of suffering and

woe" 69 .

The third bird in reply to the king's specific question of

"What is the highest of all powers?" said that there are five

powers which are in ascending order of importance. They are:

(i) the power of limbs, (ii) the power of wealth, (iii) the

power of officials, (iv) the power of high birth and (v) the

f . d 70 power o w1s om

98

Illustrating the power of wisdom in two

examples, he says that if a fool attain a rich and prosperous

kingdom, another will by violence seize it in his despite.

Even so, if a high born but unwise prince were to attain a

kingdom, he would not be able to rule with his whole

71 resources

3.7.12. The Mahayana texts also repeat and develop the

same ideas of dhamma as the basic source of kingship. For

example, in the Mahavastu, we find the parallel version of

the story of the three wise birds and their instructions on

the duties of king 72 . Moreover, in the works of Asvaghosa •

and Aryasura, we find the same ideas repeated and developed,

. . . 73 - -- . . - - -somet1mes Wlth sl1ght changes . Aryasura, 1n hls Jatakamala,

enumerates the good characteristics of a king:

"He was behaving like the embodied

righteousness and discipline, and was

intent on promoting the welfare of his

subjects like a father ... For his

administration of justice followed the

path of righteousness, and made no

difference between kinsmen and the rest

of his subjects. It obstructed for his

people the road of wickedness

Perceiving the welfare of the creatures

to be the effect of righteousness, he

knew no other purpose than this"74

.

3.7.13. It should be emphasized, however, that in

Mahayana Buddhism ideas of a different kind developed, more

99

especially the mythical attitude towards dhamma75 . Accord-

ingly, there is an interpretation of dhamma in terms of the

Vedic ideas of the divine right (and duty) of the king

(~.supra. 2.13.5), which lays down the principle that the

king is the divinely ordained instrument for the fulfilment

76 of dhamma .

3.8.1. One of the most important contributions of

early Buddhism to the history of Indian political thought, if

not to the political thought of the whole world, is that of

the concept of the world-ruler or world-statesman (cakkavatti­

raja). He is depicted as a person like the Buddha, who comes

at a time when conditions are ripe, and, just as the Buddha

works primarily for the spiritual welfare of mankind, the

world-ruler works primarily for their material welfare

(~.supra. 3.4.8).

3.8.2. The spiritual and material welfare of mankind

is conceived symbolically as the rolling onwards of a wheel

(cakka) • The world-ruler sets rolling this wheel of material

welfare of mankind, under the superior power of dhamma, just

as the Buddha sets rolling the supreme wheel of "the law of

righteousness" (dhamma-cakka) for spiritual endeavour. In

this sense, the "wheel" appears in two forms, one of which

belonged to the Buddha (dhamma-cakka), and the other to the

- 77 world-ruler (ana-cakka) .

3.8.3. The world-ruler, according to early Buddhism,

sets up an international social and political order on the

basis of dhamma, with a "political philosophy and constitution

100

based on the law of righteousness" 78 , just as the Buddha

sets up an international order (sangha) based on dhamma and

the constitution and codes of law (vinaya) . Therefore the

most important force for the material and spiritual welfare

of mankind is that of dhamma, or in other words dhamma is

the common and ultimate basis of all social relationships

presided over by the Buddha and the world-ruler.

3.8.4. The world-ruler, who works according to the

"law of righteousness", is able to extend his authority

"over the whole earth girded by the oceans, not by the rod

or sword but by the victory of dhamma" (imam pathavim

sagarapariyantam adandena asatthena dhammena abhivijjiya) 79 . . . And again, as the Buddha says, the world-ruler sets up "a

kingless authority" (so pi nama arajakan cakkan vatteti) 80 .

To the question as to who is the world-ruler above the king

(ko pana ... ranno cakkavattissa raja), the Buddha replied

that it is dhamma:

"'Monks, a king who is a world-ruler, a

just and righteous ruler, even he is not

without a king' . 'At these words a

certain monk said to the Buddha: who

then is the ruler over a world-ruler?'.

'Dhamma, monk', replied the Buddha"81

"Monk, a king who is a world-ruler, a just

and righteous ruler, in dependence on

dhamma, honouring dhamma, respectful and

deferential to dhamma, with dhamma as

his banner ... as his standard ... as

101

his overlord, keeps constant watch and

ward for the folk. Then again, a world-

ruler ... keeps constant watch. and ward

for the warriors, for brahmins, for town

and country folk, for beasts and birds

alike. He ... who keeps constant watch

.•. rolls the wheel of sovereignty

according to dhamma. That wheel of

sovereignty is not to be upset by any

human being whatsoever, or by any foe

that lives. Just so, the Buddha is

dependent on dhamma, honouring dhamma,

respectful and deferential to dhamma,

with dhamma as his banner ... standard

as his overlord, keeps constant watch

and ward over actions of his body

actions of speech and thought ... and

keeps rolling the supreme wheel of dhamma

·and that supreme wheel of dhamma is not to

be turned back by any recluses or brahmins,

- - 82 by any god or Mara or Brahma" .

3.8.5. Like Mahasammata, the world-ruler's function

is to maintain law and order in accordance with dhamma. The

- - 83 --Cakkavatt:is:ihanada Sutta , which complements the Agganna

Sutta, sets out in detail the origin of crime on account of

poverty and other economic factors. According to the

Aggan;:;a Sutta, it was economic factors such as growing

demand, which made it necessary to institute private property;

102

and eventually, in order to safeguard the rights to such

property, the people select a king from among themselves.

We must assume that the kings who followed Mahasarnrnata were

believed to be so efficient and righteous that they kept

crime at a minimum. It only reappeared after the ancient

principles of government were forgotten.

3.8.6. The Cakkavattislhanada Sutta claims to give

the ancient principles of government and to foretell the '

future of society. It tells, in the form of a myth, how a

world-ruler of the past provided protection to his subjects

but later failed to provide economic security to the needy

for their subsistence and maintenance. Hence crime appeared,

morality declined, and in consequence the standard of life

weakened, owing to the short-comings of a king in his

administration of the law by means of dharnrna and his failure

to give righteous instructions to the people. The story

further tells that this decline will reach its nadir in a

catastrophic war in which the greater part of humanity will

be destroyed. The remnant who manage to survive, learn the

ancient principles of government and proceed to rebuild the

just society on firm moral and economic foundations.

" ... Thus from goods not accruing to those

devoid of goods, poverty becomes rampant.

From poverty being rampant, stealing

becomes rampant ... the violence ...

killing ... lying ... slander ... sexual

midconduct ... abusive and idle talk ...

covetousness and ill-will ... false views

103

of life ... wanton greed and perverted

lust ... till finally filial and religious

piety and lack of regard for authority ...

Among such humans it is to them who lack

filial and religious piety and show no

respect for authority that homage and

praise will be given. The world will fall

into promiscuity ... keen enmity will

become the rule, keen ill-will, keen

animosity, passionate thoughts even of

killing ..• in a father towards his child

and a child towards his father Among

such humans there will arise a war of

seven days, during which they will look

on each other as wild beasts. Dangerous

weapons will come into their hands and

they, regarding each other as beasts,

will deprive each other of life ... But

to those to whom it would have occured,

'let us not slay each other' - they

would betake themselves to dens of grass

of dens in the jungle, or holes in trees,

or river fastnesses, or mountain clefts,

and subsist on roots and fruits of the

jungle. And they will do so for those

seven days. And at the end of those

seven days, coming forth from dens and

fastness and mountain clefts, they will

] 0 4

embrace each other, and be of one accord

comforting one another and saying: How

good it is, my friend, to see you still

alive! Then it. will occur to these

beings that it was only because they had

gotten into evil ways that they had this

heavy loss of kin. They will then decide,

'Let us, therefore, now do good' ... So

they will practise virtues ... and they

will increase in length of life, in

comeliness and prosperity ... Among such

humans, this India ~iz. the world) will

be mighty and prosperous, populous and

with plenty of food and having numerous

villages, towns and cities ..... 84 .

3.8.7. The above passage clearly indicates the impact

of man's economic environment on his life and on society.

According to the above passage, economic insecurity was the

immediate cause of tension and instability in human society

and loss of values and beliefs. Man, whose inner nature is

essentially good, eventually comes to regard his fellow

b . b t b f . . 1" . 85 e1ngs as eas s ecause o econom1c 1nequa 1t1es.

Therefore, the economic factor is considered as of primary

importance for a just social order. In the Cakkavattisihanada

~utta, it is said: "Whoever is poor in your kingdom, to them

let wealth be given" (ye ca tata vijite adhana assu tesanca

dhanam anuppadajjeyyasi) 86 , for subsistence is essential for

social stability.

10 5

3.8.8. The king's duty is, therefore, to maximize

the national economy. This should be guided by righteousness

a.nd imp<>.rtiality (samena) . In doing so, the king ensures a

strong 2nd prosperous kingdom. Concerning economic welfare,

for example, we find the following passage in one of the

texts:

3.8.9.

"The world rests on two foundations - the

acquisition of wealth not acquired and

the conservation of what is acquired.

Therefore Require wealth and conserve

what you have gained, make firm efforts

within the bounds of righteousness. The

realm of that king who rules unrighteously

becomes weakened and rent on all sides,

but. the realm of the king who rules

righteously is strong, prosperous,

flourishing and populous" 87

Moreover, according to early Buddhism,

prosperity and the elimination of crime are possible only by

ensuring full employment and thereby developing the economy.

In contrast, the brahmins often advised the king to perform

sacrifices to secure such welfare (~.supra. 2.5.5). The

Buddha's advice was tt.at such measures were a waste of time

and resources. This, for example, is the advice of the

Buddha on such issues as levying taxes, assistance to

business and agrict•lture and wages.

"The king's country, Sirs, is harassed

and harried. There are dacoits abroad

•

10 6

who pillage the villages and townships,

and who make the roads unsafe. were the

king, so long as that is so, to levy a

fresh tax, verily his majesty will be

acting wrongly. But, perchance, his

majesty might think: 'I will soon put a

stop to thE·se scoundrels' game by

degradation and banishment, and fines and

bonds on death! ' But their license

cannot be satisfactorily put a stop to

so. The remnant left unpunished would

still go on t.a:rassing the realm. Now

there is one method to adopt to put a

thorough end to this disorder. Whosoever

there be in the king's realm who devote

themselves to keeping cattle and the farm,

to them let his majesty tte king give

food and seed-corn. Whosoever there be

... who devote themselves to trade, to

them ... give capital. Whosoever ...

devote themselves to government service,

to them ... give wages and food. Then

those men, foJlowing each his own business,

will no longer harass the realm; the

country will be quiet and at peace; and

the populace, pleased with one another

and happy, dancing their children in

t.heir arms, will dwell with open cloors"88

107

3.8.10. The above passage clearly states that the

planning of economic we].fare is the most important function

of the king. A~cording to the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta, a

king provided the care and protection of the land, but

neglected the economy, that is to say, he did not provide

wealth to those devoid of wealth (dhammikam rakkhavara -

naguttim samvidhahi, no ca kho ac1hananam dhanam anuppadasi) 89

,. . . and so poverty became widespread. Then the king gave wealth

to his indigent subjects without punishing thosE: who were

guilty of theft. The result was that the people began more

and mere to commit theft in order to gain wealth from the

king. Finally, the king was forced to establish capital

punishment for theft. The only result of punishment was the

appe:arance of more serious crimes such as banditry and

looting. The passage suggests that the suppression of crime

through punishment is futile, but the planning of economic

~telfare leads to a happy and peaceful society.

3. 8 .11. Thus giving vrealth to the needy is considered

<m important function of the righteous king90 . ThereforE,

the kinq sho«ld base hJ..s policy on the four bases of kindness

(v.supra. 3.7.8), work for social utility, and help those in

d . t 91 A k' 7 ' ' d . h k' 1R ress . 1ng Ser1 1s ment1one as B r1g teous 1ng,

who redressed the poverty of the poorest in his kin~dor.• and

had fresh taxes levied and wealth distributed among the needy92

3.8.12. While encouraginq material progress, earJy

Buddhism always lays great etress on the development of the

n:oral and spiritual welfare of the people. The Buddha, who

108

is the spiritual counterpart of the world-ruler, works

primarily for moral and spiritual welfare, while his

temporal counterpart works for material welfare. But at

t:he same time the world-ruler should work for spiritual

welfare, following the ethical principles such as the ten

virtues and other qualities, which we mentioned earlier

(~.supra. 3.7.1. - 3.7.12). The king with such virtues and

qualities will provide righteous care and protection to all

his subjeohs, inolu.ding birds and beasts, ensure that there

is no crime and no unemployment or poverty among the

citizens, and work for the good of the people with selfless-

ness, love and understanding, dispensing impartial justice

<md promoting both material and spiritt'al welfare on the

principles of right.eousness and equality.

3.9.1. While the king has duties to his subjects,

the duties of his subjects to each other are summed up in

the Sigalovada sutta 9 3 This Sutta is chiefly concerned

with the cultivation of virtue in the layman's life, his

family and his social relationships. The reciprocal duties

of parents cmd children, husbands and wives, teachers and

pupils, employers and employees are enumerated. It is said

that servants are to be assigned work according to their

capacity and ability, supplying them with food <md wages,

tending them in sickness, sharing with them unusual

delicacies, and gr<mting regular leave. Employees, in their

turn, should be diligent and not lazy, honest and obedient

c1 • h . k 9 4 an . earnest 1n t e1r wor .

109

3.9.2. Moreover, early Buddhism speaks of the

happiness of the average man as depending en economic security

or sufficient wealth acquired by just and righteous means

(atthi-sukha), the enjoyment of one's wealth by himself, his

family, his friends and relatives, while rerforming

meritorious deeds (bhoga-sukha), freedom from debt (anana­

sukha), and blameless moral and spiritual life (anavajja-

95 sukha) . It should be noted that three of these sources of

happiness are economic. Therefore, welfare is conceived in

terms both spiritual and material, which is an idea of

importance in connection with dhamma.

3.9.3. Furthermore, a layman should be skilled,

efficient, earnest and energetjc in whatever profession he

is engaged. He should know :it well (utthana-sampada), and

should protect his income, which vas earned by just means

and by the sweat of his brow, (arakkha-sampada) and from

which he derives feelings of economic security. He should

have good friends (kalyana-mitta) who are faithfnl, learned,

virtuous, liberal and intelligent, who will help him along

t.he right: path away from evil. He should spend reasonably,

in proportion to his income, neither too much nor too little,

without hoarding "lo!ealth avariciously or being extravagant,

and should live wj_thin his means (samajlvikata). At the

same time, a layman should cultivate his spiritual welfare

by faith and confidence in moral, intellectual and

spiritual values (saddha), abstaining from destroying life,

lying, stealing, sexual misconduct, falsehood and intoxicatinq

drinks (panca-sila) , practising charity, generosity, withm:.t

110

attachment and craving for his wealth (caga), and developing

wisdom which leads to the elimination of suffering, and to

the realization of ultimatE: happiness ~~ - 96

(panna-sampada) .

3.9.4. The eight-fold path to happiness and

realization requires that one adopts a "right mode of

livelihood" (samma-ajiva) . The "wrong mode of livelihood"

(miccha-ajiva) is described <ts that of acquiring wealth with

the idea of adding gain to gain by resorting to trickery, '

fraud and hypocritical talk97 • It is suggested that a good

Buddhist should not undertake trade in armaments, slaves,

t . . . 98

mea , 1ntox1cants and po1sons Therefore, earning

righteously one should accumulate wealth and spend "one

portion for enjoyment, two portions for business and the

fourth portion should be deposited for the use in times of . 99

need n ..

3 .10. 1. Let us now consider some aspects of Asoka's

policy of government. His importance for us lies in the fact

that he popularized the idea of ruling by righteousness

(dhamma). Therefore, his policy of government is frequently

called a policy of dhamma.

3.10.2. Asoka is described as a world-ruler, who was

a dhammika dhamma raja, a ruler who ruled in accordance with

dhamma100 • Therefore, it is with l:.im t-.hat v;·e find the

special significance of the early B"ddhist account of the

world-ruler (cakkavatti-raja) , to which reference has been

made above.(v.supra.3.8.1-3.8.12)

111

3.10 0 3. There is, however, difference of opinion among

historians as to whether the cakkavatti idea] was adopted by

Asoka from the early Buddhists or the early Buddhists who

finally edited the Pali canon a few generations after Asoka

adopted it from him. According to Buddhist sources, which

give the main body of Asoka's legends, such as the Mahavamsa,

Dipavamsa and Divyavadana, Asoka>as a pious Buddhist,ruled

his empire in accordance with the Buddha's dhamma, and tried

to strengthen and propagate Buddhism in and out of his

empire. In the Dipavamsa, there is an attempt to connect

the idea of cakkavatti with Asoka. It says" ... the wheel

of his power rolled through the great empire of Jambudvipa

"101 However, there are a number of discrepancies

between the legends and the edicts of Asoka. The legends

give a different picture of Asoka in contrast to his own

d . t 102 . e 1c s . .

3.10.4. Since there are discrepancies in these two

sources, historians have expressed doubts whether the idea

of the cakkavatti in the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta (:::_.supra.

3.8.5) is in some way linked with Asoka. Basham, when

speaking of this word, says that the interpretation of the

data is open to question, but the oldest occurrence of this

word appears in the Digha Nikaya. This text either inspired

Asoka or was inspired by him. However, the very late

character of the cakkavattisihanada sutta of the Digha

Nikaya suggests th latterl03 His observation about the

very late character of the above sutta is correct, because

it records the prophecy of the future Buddha called Metteyya,

112

a late myth particularly popular in Mahayana Buddhism.

3.10.5. Romila Thapar is also of the opinion that

it is unlikely that the cakravartin idea was a fully

developed political concept in the pre-Mauryan period, or

that most of Asoka's ideas were inspired by his ambition to

be a cakravartin. Had this been the case he would surely

have mentioned it somewhere in his edicts, particularly as

he does give expression to many of his ambitions in these

104 • sources .

3.10.6. On the other hand, S. Dutt suggests that it

was after his accession to the throne as a cakkavatti that

Asoka became a convert to Buddhism, and, after his

conversion, he aspired to fill the role of a dhamma-raja ·as

described in the Anguttara Nikaya (~.supra. 3.8.4). He

gives evidence, following Kosambi and Lanman, that the text

named Aliya-vasani, recommended for the study to the monks

in the Calcutta-Bairat Edict, corresponds to the fourth

nipata of the Anguttara Nikaya and in the same Eoict occurs

a phrase borrowed from the text. If Asoka was acquainted

with this part of the texts, we may presume his knowledge of

a sutta that occurs in it, describing the relationship of a

cakkavatti dhammika dhamma raja to dhamma. Therefore Dutt

is of the opinion that it was from the text that Asoka

picked up the cue for the use of the term dhamma in this

way, and its frequent use in various contexts in his edicts

suggests that he meant it as a sort of emblem, to betoken the

overall character of his rule, that is the rule of a

113

- -105 cakkavattin who was a dhamma raja

3.10.7. However, with all these differences of

opinion, we submit that the question forms a historical

problem, which is still open to debate. No final answer is

possible. But there are two sides to every question, and

some common features between the early Buddhist account of

the idea of cakkavatti and the character of Asoka's rule,

as Dutt suggests, are clear enough . •

3.11.1. What in fact is important for us is to

examine Asoka's dhamma and its relationship with the dhamma

of early Buddhism. Asoka, in his edicts, repeatedly

emphasizes the importance of dhamma and makes use of it as a

moral and social force upon society, since he himself

professes to follow dhamma and wishes to employ it in all

his actions and measures, and has the intention of promoting

it.

3.11.2. There is a difference of opinion among

scholars as to the exact nature of his policy of dhamma.

Some are of the opinion that Asoka's policy of dhamma

conforms to the early Buddhist principles and policies of

government and betokens the overall character of the rule of

cakkavattin, who was a dhammika dhamma-raja106 There are

others who take the opposite view. Among them, Romila

Thapar is of the opinion that Asoka's policy of dhamma was

h . . . 107 ~s own ~nvent~on . Therefore, it did not necessarily

conform to any of the religions.

3 .11. 3.

114

"Had the dharruna conformed to any of the

religions, more particularly Buddhism,

the institution of the dhamma-mahamattas

would have been superfluous. Each

religion had either its group of devoted

believers or its order of monks who could

have ben organized into active

propagandists with greater efficiency as

they would already have been ardent

believers" 10 8 .

It is in fact true that Asoka himself

introduced new ideas, and some of them were not distinctively

Buddhist. But Asoka's inscriptions and edicts, taken

collectively and broadly interpreted, show that there is

much Buddhist influence in his policy of dhamma. We shall

illustrate this with examples.

3 .11. 4. In the fourth Bhabru (or Bairat) rock

inscription the following texts are recommended by Asoka.

Scholars have identified these texts with parts of the Pali

109 . d' d b 1 canon , as 1.n 1.cate e ow:

1. Vinaya samukase (samukkamsika dhamma-

desana: 8.5.420 ff.) the Buddha's

principal sermon concerning the Four

Noble Truths.

2. Aliyavasani (dasa ariyavamsa: A.5.29)

the ten rules of the noble life.

3. Anagatabhayani (A.3.100 ff.): the five

]15

future dangers to be feared.

4. Munigatha (Muni sutta: sn. 207-221).

5. Moneyasute (Moneyyani: A.l.273): On

moral perfection in body, speech and

mind.

6. Upatisapasine (Sariputta Sutta or

Therapanha Sutta: sn.955-975):

Question of Sariputta answered by the

Buddha.

7. Laghulovade (Maha-Rahulovada sutta:

M.l.421 ff.). Exhortation in regard

to lying110

3.11.5. In his assimilation, Asoka was frankly

selective. After greeting the Sangha, he says:

"You know, sirs, how deep is my respect

for and faith in the Buddha, the Dhamma

and Sangha ... Whatever the Buddha has

said is of course well said. Allow me

to tell you what I believe contributes

to the long survival of the Buddha's

teaching"lll

This in fact shows how deeply he was influenced by Buddhism.

Moreover, Asoka mentions in several other places his faith

in Buddhism and his high regard for the Buddha and his

teaching. Elsewhere he says:

"For two and a half years I have been an

open follower of the Buddha, though at

first I did not make much progress. But

3.11.6.

116

for more than a year now I have drawn

closer to the (Buddhist) Order, and have

made much progress. rn India the gods

who formerly did not mix with men now do

so. This is the result of effort, and

may be obtained not only by the great,

but even by the small, through effort -

thus they may even easily win heaven,

Father and mother should be obeyed,

teachers should be obeyed; pity ...

should be felt for all creatures. These

virtues of dhamma should be practised

This is an ancient rule, conducive to

long life" 112 .

Asoka himself made public pronouncements about

his faith in Buddhism, and evidence of Buddhist influences

is not wanting in his Major Edicts. The reasons for this are

many. For one thing, he was ruling a country where there

existed a great diversity of faiths and sects. For another,

as it is evident from his Rock Edict 13, he had a constant

source of danger from the wild uncivilized tribesmen of the

hills and jungles. S. Dutt is much more specific, when

speaking of this problem he says:

" ... ruling over a country of people of

diverse faiths as an impartial sovereign,

even handed in his dealings and policies,

he could not exalt one faith over another

by his sovereign authority, though the

117

fact that the emperor himself was

Buddhist must have given a certain

. ht . h 1 113 we~g age w~t peop e"

3.11.7. Ruling over a country where a great diversity

of faiths and sects existed would have been impossible if he

did not apply an equal and impartial attitude. He regarded

himself as the protector of the people rather than their

ruler. The doctrine of loving kindness had a great effect

on Asoka (~.supra. 3.7.7). From this it seems that he did

not lay great store by his sovereign authority, and saw the

practical advantage of applying dhamma to his policies. He

interpreted dhamma in the designation of dhammika dhamma raja

in a sublimated sense, not as a concrete form of faith, but

an abstract ethical ideal that should set and regulate men's

pattern of life and conduct114.

3.11.8. Asoka in applying the spirit of tolerance and

understanding towards other religions was following the early

Buddhist principle. The Buddha very often showed great

respect to the leaders and followers of other religions and

strongly recommended his followers to respect other faiths115

.

This precept in fact is what Asoka was following. He

declared:

"The Beloved of the gods ... honours

members of all sects, whether ascetics or

householders, by gifts and various honours.

But he does not consider gifts and honours

as important as the furtherance of the

118

essential message of all sects. This

essential message varies from sect to

sect, but it has one common basis, that

one should so control one's tongue as

not to honour one's own set or disparage

another's on the wrong occasions; for

on certain occasions one should do so

only mildly, and indeed on other

occasions one should honour other men's

sects. By doing this one strengthens

one's own sect and helps the others,

while by doing otherwise one harms one's

own sect and does a disservice to the

others. Whoever honours his own sect and

disparages another man's, whether from

blind loyalty or with the intention of

showing his own sect in a favourable

light, does his own sect the greatest

possible harm. Concord is best, with

each hearing and respecting the other's

teachings. It is the wish of the Beloved

of the gods that members of all sects

should be learned and should teach virtue

•.. Many officials are busied in this

matter ... and the result is the progress

of my own sect and the illumination of

dh .,116 amma .

119

3.12.1. Let us examine some of the viewpoints that

Asoka adopted from early Buddhism. First, the effect that

early Buddhism had on the internal and foreign policy and the

abandonment of aggressive war is clearly seen from his

statement in one of his Rock Edicts. In Asoka's own words:

"When the king, Beloved of the gods and

Gracious Mien, had been consecrated eight

years. Kalinga was conquered, 150,000

people were deported, 100,000 were killed,

and many times that number died. But after

the conquest of Kalinga, the B.eloved of

the gods began to follow dhamma, to love

dhamma, and to give instruction in dhamma.

Now the Beloved •.. regrets the conquest

of Kalinga, for when an independent

country is conquered people are killed,

they die, or are deported, and that the

Beloved ... finds very painful and

grievous. And this he finds even more

grievous - that all the inhabitants -

brahmans, ascetics, and other sectarians,

and householders who are obedient to

superiors, parents, and elders, who treat

friends, acquaintances, companions,

relatives, slaves, and servants with

respect, and are firm in their faith -

all suffer violence, murder, and

separation from their loved ones. Even

120

those who are fortunate enough not to

have lost those near and dear to th.em are

afflicted at the misfortunes of friends

The participation of all men in

common suffering is grievous to the

Beloved ... There is no land, except

that of the Greeks, where groups of

brahmans and ascetics are not found, or

where men are not members of one sect or

another. So now, even if the members of

those killed and captured in the conquest

of Kalinga had been a hundred or a

thousand times less, it would be grievous

to the Beloved ... He will forgive as far

as he can, and he even conciliates the

forest tribes of his dominions; but he

warns them that there is power even in the

remorse of the Beloved ... , and he tells

them to reform, lest they be killed. For

all beings the Beloved ... desires

security, self control, calm of mind, and

gentleness. He considers that the

greatest victory is the victory of dhamma;

and this he has won here (in India) and

even five hundred leagues beyond his

frontiers in the realm of the Greek king

Antiochus, and beyond Antiochus among the

four kings, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas and

3.12.2.

121

A1exander. Even where the envoys of the

Beloved ... have not been sent men hear

of the way in which he follows and teaches

dhamma, and they too follow it and will

follow it. Thus he achieves a universal

conquest, and conquest always gives a

feeling of pleasure; yet it is but a

slight pleasure, for the Beloved ... only

looks on that which concerns the next

life as of great importance. The Beloved

... had this inscription of dhamma

engraved that all his sons and grandsons

may not seek to gain new victories, that

in whatever victories they may gain they

may prefer forgiveness and light punishment,

that they may consider the only (valid)

victory the victory of dhamma, which of

value both in this world and the next, and

that all their pleasure may be in dhamma

.117

This alone shows the impact of the early

Buddhist attitude to war (v.infra. 3.13.1 - 3.13.9) on the - -----

language as well as on the policy of Asoka. It appears from

the above passage that Asoka was trying to emulate the

example of the righteous world-ruler as described in the early

Buddhist texts. It seems that he won many victories by the

method of "conquest by righteousness" (dhamma-vijaya), not

by the sword. It has been held that the concept of dharma-

122

vijaya is found in the Arthasastra118 , but as we shall see

more precisely later {~.infra. 3.13.4), the Brahmanical

dharma-vijaya was a conquest by the sword. Barua has shown

that Asoka rightly characterized dharma-vijaya as a milder

mebhod of conquest, where forebearance and light punishment

were to be practised and preferred. The Buddhistic dhamma­

vijaya was to be achieved "without the employemtn of the

119 sword or armed force ... " . It also seems that Asoka

sent envoys to the five Hellenic kings, whose names are

1 1 d . . d b . . . 120 . oose y 1sgu1se y Ind1an1zat1on , urg1ng them to accept

his policy and his moral leadership. This means that he did

not give up his imperial ambitions, but attempted to further

h . b 1 . . d . h 121 t em 1n a enevo ent sp1r1t an w1t out recourse to arms .

3.12.3. It was in early Buddhism that there emerged

for the first time in Indian history the idea of a universal

good embracing. the whole world. This idea is explicit in t.he

edicts of Asoka. Their contents reveal the fact that his

main consideration was to set up a just social order and

work for the welfare of the whole world. The following

reforms mentioned in his edicts throw light on social

welfare.

1. Forbidding slaughter of animals.

Sacredness of all life. {1st Major

Rock Edict, 5th Pillar Edict).

2. Establishments for the dispensing of

medicine for men and animals, and

works of social utility and help

extended to those in distress {2nd

123

Major Rock Edict, 7th Pillar Edict) .

3. Appointment of rural administrators

and heads of the districts in order to

instruct people in dhamma as well as

for other purposes (3rd Major Rock

Edict) .

4. Appointments of Ministers of dhamma to

work for the welfare and happiness of

the people without any discrimination

whatsoever throughout the empire (5th

Major Rock Edict) .

5. Prompt dispatch of business of the

kingdom (6th Major Rock Edict).

6. Change in the nature of the king's

pleasure trips and the practice of

tours connected with dhamma (8th Major

Rock Edict) .

7. Recommendation that various ceremonies

of dhamma which include regard for

slaves and servants, respect for

teachers, restrained behaviour towards

living beings, and donations to

religious people are recommended as of

great value (9th Major Rock Edict) .

8. Instruction to the officers and city

magistrates to practise impartiality

(1st Separate Edict - Dhauli and

Jangada) .

124

9. Instruction to the officers to win the

confidence of the frontier people, and

to work for their welfare and happiness

(2nd Separate Edict).

3.12.4. All in all, we can see the application of

Buddhist principles to the policy of Asoka's government.

They can be compared with many passages of the early Buddhist

texts to which reference has been made above.

3.12.5. With all deference to some historians, such

~s Basham and Thapor, who say that the dhamma officially

propagated by Asoka was not Buddhism122 , we wish to submit

that Asoka's, as a temporal counterpart of the Buddha

(cakkavatti-raja), attempted to rule his kingdom in both his

internal and foreign policy in accordance with the

humanitarian principles of early Buddhism as he understood

them.

3.13.1. It now remains for us to deal with the early

Buddhist attitude to war, since this had a striking impact

on Asoka. According to early B.uddhism, wars and disputes

have their origins in the minds of men. The preoccupation

with thoughts of destruction and ill-will, and the subtle

defilements consisting of racial feelinqs, national feelings

and egotism or personal or national pride are the main causes

of wars and disputes. The Buddha said that "it is possible

to rule a country in accordance with dhamma without smiting

or letting others slay, without conquering or making others

sorrow" 123 . One should practise selfless service and

125

and friendliness for the sake of social harmony. This is

well illustrated in the Mahavastu:

3.13.2.

"0 king, do not foster hostility towards

neighbouring kings. Whosoever hates will

be repaid with hatred by his foe.

cultivate ties of friendship with

neighbouring kings, ... for other peoples

honour kings who stedfast in friendship" 124

Thus, non-aggression and co-operation are

recommended as the best policy for achieving peace, love and

understanding. According to early Buddhism, wars result in

further wars. The following are sentiments about war and

enmity expressed in the Dhammapada:

"'He abused me, beat me, overcame me,

robbed me' - in those who harbour such

thoughts hatred does not cease.

'He abused me ... ' -in those who do not

harbour such thoughts hatred ceases.

Hatred never ceases by hatred in this

world. Hatred ceases by love - this is

the ancient law.

Other do not know that 'we come to an end

here'. But those who know this, have

their quarrels calmed thereby.

The noblest conqueror is he who would

conquer himself ratrer than defeat a

hundred thousand men in battle.

Self-conquest is, indeed, better than the

3.13.3.

126

conquest of all others.

Happily do we live without anger among

those who are angry. Let us live without

anger amongst angry folk.

Victory breeds hatred; the vanquished

live in sorrow.

The peaceful ones live in harmony giving

up both victory and defeat.

Conquer enmity with amity, evil with

good; conquer miserliness with charity

and falsehood with truth.

Whoso desires his own happiness by

inflicting suffering on others is not

released from hatred, being himself

entangled in the bonds of hatred" 125 .

The early Buddhist attitude to war differs

from that of Hinduism. Even in Vedic times there existed a

political materialism among some recluses and brahmins, who

according to early Buddhist texts taught khatta-vijja or the

"scienC'e of power" 126 . Buddhaghosa explains this term in a

sense similar to that of khatta-dhamma "the law of ruling or

1 . t. 1 . " . h - k 12 7 "" . th 128 h. h po 1 1ca sc1ence 1n t e Jata as as n1t1sat a , w 1c

means both "political science and law". This term is

mentioned in the Chandogya Upanisad as ksatra-vidya and

Sa~kara has interpreted this to mean "military science"

(dhanur-veda) 129 . This "science of power" included both

military and political science as well as the study of law,

considered as an instrument for the retention and advancement

127

of power. Here the principle of expediency based on one's

material interests was to be the guiding principles behind

military s.trategy, political power and law. This philosophy

inculcates Machiavellian tricks. A Jataka story refers to

this philosophy as follows:

"Fools thinking themselves learned say that

there is the "rule of might" (khatta-vijja)

in the world; one may kill his parents,

elder brother, children and wife if one's

material interests demand it (attho ca

tadiso siya) 130 . ~I'\

3.13.4. Following this philosophy, the later classical

texts of Hinduism such as the Dharmasastras, the Arthasastra,

the Santiparvan of the Mahabharata and the Bhagavad-gita

illustrate the ideal of imperial domination by conquest.

For example, the entire Tenth and TWelfth Books of the

Arthasastra deal with the ideals of conquest. In it there is

a formula of Sadgunya which sums up the military strength of

any "circle of states" (mandala) as consisting of the six

policies. They are: making a treaty containing conditions

or terms, that is, the policy cf peace (samdhi), the policy

of hostility (vigraha), the policy of remaining quiet (and

not planning to march on an expedition) - (asana), marching

on an expedition (yana) , seeking shelter with another king

or in a fort (_~amsrayal ' the double policy of samdhi with

one king and vigraha with another at the same time

( 'dh' h- )131 dval 1b ava . The general principle is that when one

is weaker than the enemy, the policy of peace should be

128

followed, if stronger than he, the policy of hostility should

be followed. If both are equal in power, neutrality is the

right policy, but if one is very strong, one should march

on an expedition. When one is very weak, seeking shelter

with another king or in a fort is necessary, while the last

is the policy recommended when with help from another source

one can fight one's enemf 32

3.13.5. It is clear from this sixfold policy that

peace is only a temporary expedient for a kingdom that feels

that it is not strong enough to defeat another kingdom.

Moreover, it is not a policy of maintaining a balance of

133 power to keep peace All in all, the Hindu texts preach

the doctrine that conquering in battle is one of the duties

f k . 134 d . . . . o a lng , an engaglng ln a war of aggresslon lS a

meritorious deed, It is said:

"The kings who perform great sacrifices,

who are possessed of a knowledge of the

Vedas, and who gain victories in battle,

become foremost of those that acquire

many blessed regions hereafter by their

merit. Therefore, a king who desires to

acquire religious merit should engage in

battle" 135 .

"For without battle, he cannot extend his

kingdom and acquire wealth to give away

'f' .,136 and meet the expenses of sacrl lees

"A king whose power has been consolidated

and who is confident of his own strength

3.13.6.

129

should assail a neighbour who is weaker

than himself but never one who is

stronger" 137

"Consider your own class duty, then too

you have no cause to quail; for nothing

is better for a man of the princely class

than a fight prescribed by law" 138 .

"Cast all your works on Me, your thoughts

(withdrawn) in what appertains to self;

have neither hope nor thought that 'This

is mine': cast off this fever! Fight!"139

"Hold pleasure and pain, profit and loss,

victory and defeat to be the same: then

brace yourself for the fight. So you will

bring no evil on yourself"140

"Play not the eunuch, for this ill beseems

you: give up this vile faint-heartedness.

Stand up, chastiser of your foes!" 141 .

Those are some of the sayings about war in the

Mahabharata and the Bhagavad-gita. It seems quite clear that

they are the antithesis of the sentiments expressed in the

early Buddhist texts (~.supra. 3.13.2). This may be further

illustrated from the advice of the Buddha. He was placed in

a similar situation to that of Krsna on the eve of a war ... between his own people, the Sakyas and their blood brothers,

the Koliyas. A dispute arose between these two tribes about

the right to the use of the waters of the river Rohini, which

flowed between their territories. When the dispute ran high,

130

with words of abuse, the soldiers on each side were

assembled (as the Kurus and Pandavas had assembled) for the

fight. The Buddha intervened and asked them what the war

was about. The answer was that it was over the water. He

settled the dispute by peaceful means and said:

"Why, on account of some water of little

worth, would you destroy the invaluable

lives of these soldiers•• 142 .

Commenting•on a war between two kings on another occasion the

Buddha says:

3.13.7.

"Victory arouses enmity and the defeated

live in sorrow; the victor obtains himself

. h ,.143 a vanqu1s er

On the other hand, the Hindus believe that

"one who fights with selfless motive incurs no sin, whereas

if one fights with selfish motive he would still st2.nd to

profit either by gain and honour on earth or by glory in

heaven"l44. ' "the warrior who falls in the battleground while

f . h . . h ,.145 1g t1ng atta1ns eaven The early Buddhists maintain

the opposite ,·iew. For example, the Buddha answers the

question of a warrior-chief in connection with the above

beliefs thus:

"In the case of a warrior who in battle

exerts himself, puts forth effort, he

must previously have had this low, mean

perverse idea: 'Let those beings be

tortured, be destroyed, be exterminated,

so that they may be thought never to

~

131

have existed'. Then, so exerting himself,

so putting forth effort, other men torture

him and make an end of him. When his body

breaks up, after death he is reborn in a

hapless condition•• 146

A It is in this sense that early Buddhism condemned the

manufacture and sale of weapons of war as a wrong mode of

1 . l"h dl47 1ve 1 oo .

• 3.13.8. However, the question as to how a king should

meet aggression is also dealt with. There is a mention of

two policies, each of which has been pursued by two kings,

who "rule their kingdom in accordance with righteousness"

( . . - ) 148 dhammena raJ]am karento . These principles are enunciated

in a Jataka story. It tells that two kings met in a place

where the carriage-road was deeply sunk between two' banks,

and there was no room for one carriage to pass another. The

question of precedence was raised, since it was necessary for

one to give way. Since it was discovered that the extent of

their kingdom, their military strength, economic resources,

prestige and the nobility of birth and age of the kings were

the same, there was a discussion about their policies. At

this stage the policy one is summed up as follows:

"He meets force with force, mildness with

mildness; he wins over the good with

good and conquers the evil with evil"149

.

The poli.cy of the other is summed up as follows:

"He conquers with kindness, evil with

good, greed with charity and falsehood

132

with truth"lSO

3.13.9. This latter policy was acknowledged as the

best and the former voluntarily gave way. The former is the

policy of meeting aggression with military force in a war of

self-defence without indulging in aggression oneself. It

should be noted that early Buddhism did not talk about a

Utopian state and did not recommend a policy of disbanding

the army151 . Asoka also continued to govern his kingdom

without disbanding the army, since many of his subjects

faced a constant source of danger from the wild tribesmen in

his kingdom. Despite the peace, security and prosperity of

the kingdom, the king must keep his army satisfied and in a

state of military preparedness and good humour, according to

Buddhism. It is said in the Jatakamala:

"A prince who, having no reason to complain

of his army, fails to honour it and

disregards his military men who have shown

their valour on the battle field and are

renowned for their skill in the science of

arms, surely such a king will be deserted

b . . b 152 · y v1ctory 1n attle" .

The army is necessary to meet aggression, but it is said that

a king who rules his kingdom on the basis of friendliness is

unlikely to be attacked:

"On friendliness does his strength rest,

not on his motley-bannered army, which he

keeps only to comply with custom. He

knows no anger, nor does he speak harsh

133

words, protects his land in the proper

manner. Righteousness is the rule of

his actions, not political wisdom, that

b . '153 ase sc~ence' .

3.13.10. Despite the fact that a wise king may counter

aggression with military force, passive resistance is held

. 154 - - -up as the better ~deal . The Mahasilava Jataka illustrates

the fact that passive resistance would be eventually triumph-•

ant if tried. It tells how the king of Kosala appeared

outside the city of Benares and sent a message to the king

of Benares bidding him either yield up the kingdom or give

battle. However, the king of Benares had a thousand gallant

warriors, who would face the charge even of a rut elephant,

but his reply was: "I fight not, let him seize my kingdom".

Finally after a series of events when the king was in a

position to overpower his foe but did not do so, it is said

that "the usurper's heart was moved within him" and the king

. d h' k' d 155 rega~ne ~s ~ng om

3.14.1. Thus it is clear that the political authority

is subject to dhamma or the law of righteousness. The king

rules in accordance with dhamma and has an obligation of two

kinds. First, he should promote the material and spiritual

welfare of his subjects in internal policy. Secondly, in

foreign policy the king should not commit aggression and

co-operate with other kingdoms for the common good of mankind.

The keynote of early Buddhism is to reform humanity.

134

CHAPTER FOUR

ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY

4.1.1. We have seen in chapter three that there

emerged with early Buddhism the conception of a common good,

embracing the whole world and conceived as material and

spiritual welfare. Of similar importance is the conception

of a common humanity or unity of mankind. This view is most

closely connected with the idea of equality. In this

chapter, therefore, we shall examine the idea of equality,

as it appears in the early Buddhist texts.

4.2.1. In order to understand the early Buddhist

attitude to equality, it is necessary to have a description,

however brief, of the ancient Indian social order and its

origins. The earliest evidence we have of the Indian social

order is to be found in the Vedic literature, the work of the

Aryans1 , who entered India in the Second millennium B.C.

Our knowledge of their earliest phase is based primarily on

the Rg-Veda. It gives a fairly clear picture of the first

-settlement of the early Aryans in ancient India. When the

Aryans first entered India, they fought with native peoples,

called Dasa and Dasyus2

, probably originally two prominent

indigenous tribes. The main motive of the Aryans was to

subjugate and suppress these peoples. Moreover, the Aryans

developed a consciousness of belonging to a superior race

from the beginning of their conflicts in India.

4.2.2. A number of ways were devised by the Aryans

135

to develop a consciousness of belonging to a superior race,

because there was an acute disjunction between the Aryans

and the indigenous peoples in several respects. In physical

appearance, the Aryans had certain inheritable physical

characteristics in common. They were tall men, proud of their

fairer skin and disdainful of others whose skin was darker.

On the other hand, the Dasas and Dasyus were "dark skinned,

noseless and bull lipped" 3 There was also a difference in

religion. •The Aryans had a common religion. The darker

people did not worship their gods. They were considered to

be phallus-worshippers, lawless and lacking devotion4

Moreover, the language and manners of the two racial groups

were different5

.

4.2.3. The Rg-Veda gives many accounts of the

emotions the Aryans felt towards one another and towards the

darker people. For example, at one place, it is said:

"We are surrounded on all sides by Dasa

tribes. They do not believe in anything.

They are not men. 0 destroyer of foes!

Kill them. - 6

Destroy the Dasa race" •

The implication of this hymn is that there was intense racial

prejudice among the Aryans. The Aryans treated the darker

people as an "out group" and looked on them as scarcely

human 7 . This extreme prejudice can also be illustrated by

another example, the recurring theme of the Aryans praying

to Indra for the elimination of the darker people 8 . The

~g-Veda describes how Indra killed the darker people and

protected the white colour9 , and how he trampled down in the

136

10 caves the darker colour .

4.3.1. There was at first continuous fighting between

the Aryans and the darker people. From these fights, the

Aryans gained complete victory and settled down in Panjab as

the dominant people. When they were fairly well settled,

they developed a tendency towards a gradation of society.

Among the Aryans themselves birth (jati) in the families

(~ulas) of priests, warriors and farmers was beginning to .

intensify gradations in their society which may have existed

l . ll ear J.er . In the early stage, the Aryans were divided into

three groups among themselves - priestly, warrior and

commoner, a division in which the three groups were expected

to promote spiritual progress, military pre-eminence and

cattle prosperity respectively12

4.3.2. In later times, there was a process of mixing

with the darker people in several aspects. Therefore, the

notion of social differentiation was recognized, and

differences were sanctioned which placed individuals higher

or lower in the social scale. In course of time, the system

of the four-fold division of society into Brahmanas, Ksatriyas,

Vaisyas and Sudras was fully recognized. This division was

accepted as fundamental, primeval, and divinely ordained.

The four-fold division of society finally developed within

the Aryan race, the suppressed Dasas and Dasyus, or persons

partially descended from them, receiving a humble place in

. -- . l3 the socJ.al order as Sudras, who formed a kJ.nd of helot class .

4.3.3. Each of these groups is referred to as Varna.

137

The word varna (Sanskrit, vanna in Pali) is often confused ----.- . with caste (jati, jat - literally meaning "birth"), since

many writers have translated it thus. The word signifies in

its basic and general sense "appearance" or "colour", but as

shown by Trautmann, in its technical sense it comes closest

to the medieval western conception of "order" or "estates" 14 .

Trautmann writes that the most acceptable translation for

varna so far put forward is "class", but this term often has

an economi~ connotation. In Indian thought varnas are not

essentially economic but sacred. Therefore, to translate

varna as "class" is to choose a term much too objective, ---.--. t'f' d d 15 sc1en 1 lC an mo ern .

4.3.4. The origin of the caste system cannot be

clearly traced historically. There are various hypotheses

about the origin of caste, but as shown by Basham, they have

no scientific validity. He writes that varnas should never

be referred to as castes, since they are not and never have

been castes, and traditional view that castes are a result

of the fragmentation and miscegenation of the varnas is ----.--'t 'th d . 16 qu1 e Wl out foun at1on .

4.3.5. Whatever the origin of caste, it is clearly

evident from the Pali texts and the Brahmanical literature

that caste and the system of the four orders of society did

exist, the latter at least in theory. Basham adds that the

most outstanding feature of traditional Indian society was

caste rather than varna. Usually a brahmana is conscious of

being a brahmana, and so is a ksatriya, but the average

138

member of the two lower orders, which constitute the great

bulk of the population, is much more aware of his caste (jati)

than of his order (varna). It is his caste, not the orders

of society to which he belongs, which gives him a sense of

community, of being a member of something greater than

h . 1 17 1-mse f .

4.3.6. The system of varnas was probably an

innovation of the Br~manas themselves. Later this was given

a divine sanction by being considered as a creation of the

Cosmic Person. As we have seen earlier (~.supra.2.3.3.),

the "Hymn of the Primeval Person" in the Rg-Veda describes

how the four varnas were created by the divine victim. We

were also told that horses, cows, goats, sheep and other

animals were created from the same victim18 .

4.3.7. Later, it was believed that, in order to

maintain the prosperity of the world, the Cosmic Person

declared in due order the sacred laws to each of the four

varnas, laying down their specific aptitudes and functions19

.

However, it is not made explicit in this religious context,

why all four varnas were not treated equally, as they had a . . common origin from the body of the Cosmic Person

20; but it

is assumed that the various parts of the body of the Cosmic

Person were considered nobler according to their height

above the ground. As we have seen, later Buddhist authors

attacked this myth, claiming that if it is true then the

Cosmic Person is full of injustice and prejudice. If he is

the Lord of the world why did he not give the sacred laws

139

without making any discrimination, opening the doors for

everybody? This implies that the Lord's creation is evil

and unjust (~.supra. 2.10.2; infra. 4.6.9).

4.3.8. In the social context the four-fold division

involved a fragmentation of the race21 The four varnas

were looked on as essentially different species 22 . The

Sudras were mainly distinguished from the others by race.

The practical outcome was that, in the social order,

subordinate and superior status, prestige and power, tended

to perpetuate themselves from one generation to another.

Duties, obligations and roles were recognized and respected.

The Sudras originally had no right to social status and they

were completely an "out group". The only function that "the

Lord" prescribed to them was to serve others 23 . The above

four-fold division of society received greater priestly

authority in the time of the Brahmanas and Upanisads. The . . concept of dharma was interpreted as being ultimately

connected with the divine creation of the social order in

four varnas (v.supra. 3.3.3). Within this social order, the . -Brahmanas claimed very high social privileges and supremacy

(~.supra. 2.3.5., 2.5.4. - 2.5.5., 3.3.5 - 3.3. 7).

4.3.9. The Brahmanas had a number of reasons for

claiming their hierarchy of prestige and power over the

others. We have seen some of the claims of Brahmanas

regarding their supreme social status (~.supra. 2.3.5., 2.5.2.

- 2.5.6). The main reasons for this are many. The first and

foremost was psychological and social. The Brahmanas had a

140

great fear of losing their social status and they largely

regulated social behaviour through their influence over

kings and people. Their most important psychological need

was to remain in the superior social position. Moreover,

they had a fear of pollution from social contact, and this

led to rigid regulations in many fields of human activity.

Social intercourse was restricted on the grounds that the

four-fold division of society was genetically determined and

fixed; ana inter-marriage was condemned as both biologically

and socially undesirable24 . The lowest varna was denied

1 . . f 25 . . d . 26 . re ~g~ous reedom , pol~t~cal an soc~al freedom , econom~c

freedom27

, and equality before law28 . All these beliefs,

attitudes and practices were associated with the Brahmanas

social and psychological need to preserve their own

innovation of social order and to maintain important functions

such as their trusteeship for the gods, and to remove their

fear of losing their distinguished positions. From the

economic point of view the Sudras formed a supply of cheap

labour, and thus the institution was important even beyond

the ritual and social sphere.

4.4.1. It has been widely recognized that early

Buddhism denounced all claims of the Brahmanas to superiority

and opened the doors for the welfare of a11 29 . The reasons

adduced for this emergence of egalitarian thought are many.

For one thing, in ancient India at the time of the rise of

Buddhism, there was a rapid change in the structure of life

and society. It was evidently a period of expanding material

culture with far wider commercial activities and economic

141

. 30 progress However, the commercial classes rapidly gaining

8conomic importance, were socially inferior and they were in

practice generally treated contemptuously by the Brahmanas,

who claimed every social privileges and supremacy. The Buddha

or early Buddhism strongly objected to such social

discrimination. Romila Thapar, for example, writes that the

social equality preached by Buddhism made a strong appeal to

those who were considered socially inferior 31 .

4.4.2. Throughout the Pali literature, no other

social problem is referred to so often as the supremacy of

the Brahmanas. This was another reason, among many more, why

the Pali texts discuss the idea of equality. In this sense

most scholars have treated Buddhism as unique among Indian

religions because of the central place it gives to the idea . 31A

of equality. However, there seems to be some misconception

in this proposition.

4.4.3. According to one view the Buddha restated

what was already current among the Vedic thinkers.

Radhakrishnan and Rhys Davids, for example, have stated that

the Buddha was born and brought up and lived and died a Hindu

or a typical Indian (~.supra. 1.4.1, 1.4.3). Rhys Davids

writes:

"Such originality as Gautama possessed lay

in the way in which he adopted, enlarged,

ennobled, and systematized that which had

already been well said by others; in the

way in which he carried to their logical

142

conclusion, principles of equity and

justice already acknowledged by some of

the most prominent earlier thinkers" 32 .

Elsewhere, Rhys Davids writes:

"Some writers on Buddhism do not hesitate

to ascribe to the Buddha the role of a

successful political reformer, by

representing him as having fought for the

poor and despised against the rich and

privileged classes, and as having gone

far to abolish caste. Other writers gird

at the Buddha because most of the leaders

of his Order were drawn from the ranks of

the respectable and well-to-do with an

education in keeping with their social

position, and disparage him for neglecting

the humble and wretched, for not using his

influence to abolish, or to mitigate, the

33 harshness of caste rules'' .

Giving these two alternatives, Rhys Davids adds that both are

equally unhistorica134 .

4.4.4. While there are two sides to every question,

we shall try to follow the trend of argument. The Brahmanas

view of social organization, as we have seen above, was based

on the system of four varnas, a system which was divinely

ordered. In the thought of early Buddhism, as we have seen

in chapter three, the notions of justice, concord, friendship,

loving kindness and equal respect for all were seen as

143

essential for the preservation of just social and political

order. These notions offered something approaching a true

conception of equality. At a time when material culture was

developing so rapidly, equal religious, social, political

and judicial rights were considered as most desirable to

curb the power and prestige of any one class and to allot

social responsibilities, not according to any class system

but solely on merit. The new emphasis on equality as an

ideal is perhaps best seen in the words of the Buddha:

"The facts being what they are, the people

of all four varnas are absolutely equal

and I do not see any difference at all

among them .,35

The criteria of equality are:

4.4.5.

"Not by birth does one become a brahman a,

by his action alone one becomes a brahmana,

a farmer, an artisan, a trader, a servant,

a thief, a soldier and a king"36

The assumption here is that men can be judged

only by the good and bad actions they do and not by the

stations of life in which they were placed by virtue of their

birth. It is according to kammic 37 factors that men can be

divided into high or low orders. In the Culakammavibhanga

Sutta38 , the Buddha is asked the question:

"What is the reason and the cause for the

inequality among human beings, despite

their being human?".

The Buddha's reply is:

144

"Beings inherit their karnma and kamma

divides beings in respect of their

(various) high and low states" 39 .

Although early Buddhism recognizes this variation, it does

not assert that everything is due to kamma. The recognition

of known inequalities among human beings does not mean that

early Buddhism accepted the status quo of a static conception

of society or denied the doctrine of equality of mankind. The

ethical teachings of early Buddhism revolves round the

conception of the destruction or elimination of the evil

effects of ka~ by effecting a change in the basis of human

motivation from that of greed, hate and ignorance to

selflessness, compassion and understanding. In the sphere of

moral life, early Buddhism recognises the authority of dharnma.

This is clearly stated in the Ambalatthika-Rahulovada Sutta40

,

where it is said that the behaviour of man should be such

that it does not lead to the harm of oneself, of others, or

of both. It should be morally good (kusala), yielding

happiness (sukhudraya) and resulting in happiness (sukhavipaka)41

.

This is the path leading to the destruction of karnmic effects.

Hence, here too, dhamma is recognized as the authority,

depending on which society is graded42

4.5.1. It is necessary to point out, before taking

it up for actual discussion, the early Buddhist view of man's

duty in his human existence, since it has some relevance to

the idea of equality. Early Buddhism holds that the world

goes through periods of evolution and dissolution (samvatta

. ) 43 and Vlvatta · . The early Buddhist texts state that the

145

world is gradually declining, on account of man's greed and

evil ways, and this decline will reach its nadir in a

catastrophic war (~.supra. 3.8.6). It seems from this

account, that the function of the Buddha and a world-ruler

is to restore the standards of human life, if temporarily.

It is with this possibility in mind that the Buddha is said

to have "been born for the good and happiness of mankind"

(~.supra. 3.4.7), and likewise a world-ruler is said to

"be born for the welfare and happiness of mankind" (~.supra.

3.4.8). On a basis such as this, it is clear that both a

Buddha and a world-ruler are believed to stand for the

oneness of humanity, the idea of human equality and the

spiritual unity of mankind.

4.5.2. Moreover, there are accounts of the origin

and extent of the universe and man's place in it. According

to the early Buddhist conception of the universe, there are

innumerable world systems44

. In the vastness of the cosmos,

the human worlds form a very small part. All beings within

the human worlds, however low their state of evolution may

be45 '

are said to have the capacity to evolve up to the very

highest state; and however high their states may be they are

said to be subject to death so long as they remain within

46 the human worlds . The human worlds are always represented

as standing midway in the hierarchy of the worlds. Life in

these human worlds is a mixture of the pleasant and unpleasant,

good and evil, while the pleasant and good traits are

intensified in the higher worlds and the unpleasant and evil

. h 1 47 ln t e ower .

146

4.5.3. The span of life of human beings is

insignificantly small in comparison with cosmic time and

may be compared in its duration to a line drawn on the

th 48 . . . . b f . ear . However ~ns~gn~f~cant man may e rom a cosm~c

perspective, it is pointed out in the early Buddhist texts

that human birth is very valuable in the cosmic scheme. It

is said that "birth as a human being is a rare event" 49 .

In the course of our samsaric evolution human beings have

been born, •it is believed, hundreds of times as animals,

and it is rarely that we emerge into a human existence 50 .

It is said that it is a difficult thing for a man who has

gone down the scale of existence to a subhuman condition to

emerge as a man again. The reason given for this is that

among the lower animals there prevails no practice of

righteousness or equitable living but just cannibalism, the

stronger preying on the weaker creature" 51 .

4.5.4. At this rare human level, all human beings

have something in common by virtue of the fact that they

belong to a common humanity. This being the case, the

people of the four varnas and people of "diverse races"

- - 52 (nanajacca) are said to be equal . Man belonged to one

species. Owing to this oneness, of which he is ignorant,

egotism or personal and national pride, racial feelings and

. 1 f 1" . d d. . k . 53 nat~ona ee ~ngs are cons~ ere as m~sta en not~ons .

Also, at this human level, whatever individual differences

there may be, man has within himself the capacity of gaining

the highest knowledge for his salvation. Thus, everyone has

a duty to help his fellow beings in their development and no

147

one has any right or valid grounds to despise another. Man

has within himself the ability of gaining moral, intellectual

and spriritual worthiness by developing and extending mutual

help to others 54 . This is the point of departure in early

Buddhism for the idea of human equality, looking at the value

of human life, which is a rare thing in the cosmos.

4.6.1. The new emphasis on equality as an ideal is

best seen in the arguments of the early Buddhists. There are

a number of arguments scattered through the Pali texts, but

if we take them together and analyse them, we can find six

main arguments. However, some writers like Rhys Davids and

B.C. Law classified them under three heads. According to

Rhys Davids, they are: biological, historical and ethica155 .

Law also mentions three arguments. They are: biological,

occupational and cultura1 56 On the other hand, Malalasekera

and Jayatilleke classified them under three heads -

biological, sociological and ethico-religious57 , but

Jayatilleke in his later work adds four more. According to

him there are seven arguments: biological, anthropological,

sociological, legal, moral, ethical and religious or

. . 158 spJ.rJ.tua Following Jayatilleke's classification

approximately, we submit six main arguments used by the early

Buddhists in support of their attitude to equality.

4.6.2. Among these six arguments, the first is

biological. It is said that in the case of animals and

plants, specific and generic differences are perceptible;

but mankind is one species. The distinction is drawn clearly

148

- 59 - -in the Vasettha Sutta . Two young brahmanas, Vasettha and . . .

Bharadraja, were discussing what makes a true brahmana. The

latter maintained that it was pure descent from seven

generations of ancestors, with neither break nor blemish in

the lineage. The former maintained that virtue and moral

behaviour made a true brahmana. As neither could convince

the other, they referred the matter to the Buddha, who is

said to have replied in verse as follows:

"I will explain to you step by step and

accurately the division of living things

into species, for species are separated

one from another. You should know that

grass and trees have no reasoning power,

yet they possess the characteristics of

their species, for species are separated

one from another. Moreover, beetles,

moths and ants also have the

characteristics of their species, for

species are separated one from another.

And so it is with four-footed creatures,

great and small ... reptiles, snakes,

long-backed animals, fish and creatures

living in water, birds and winged

creatures, they ail have the character-

istics of their species, for species are

separated one from another. In all these

species the specific characteristics are

evident, but this is not the case with

4.6.3.

149

men .•. Not in the hair, head, ears,

mouth, nose, lips, brows, throat, hips,

belly, back, behind, sex .organs· or

breast ... , is there any specific

characteristics (to divide one class of

man from another) as there is in other

species. There is no distinction in the

bodies of men (of different classes) .

The difference in men is conventional".

Continuing, the Buddha says: "I do not

call one a brahmana on account of his

birth or his origin from a particular

mother" 60 .

The dialogue goes on to show that the apparent

divisions between men are not due to basic biological factors

but are "conventional classificaton" (samanna), on ·-· -~-~=-==

occupational or economical grounds (~.infra. 4.8.2.). The

distinctions made in respect of the differences in skin

colour, hair, the shape of the head and so forth, are not

absolute categories. Therefore men cannot be taken to

h . 61 represent more t an one spec1es Malalasekera and

Jayatilleke writes:

"It would appear that early Buddhism is in

accord with the findings of the modern

biologists who exploded the doctrines of

racism and would urge the biological unity

of mankind in support of the concept of a

common humanity. So when early Buddhism

4.6.4.

150

asks us to treat all men, irrespective of

race or caste, as our fathers, mothers,

brothers and sisters or as one family,

there seems to be a deeper truth in this

statement than that of a mere ethical

. .62 recommendat1on •

There is also reference to the biological

argument in the Divyavadana. Here it is said that on the

application of the biological test, there is seen to be one

species among men and all of them possess common character-

istics. The Brahmanas, the Ksatriyas, the Vaisyas and the . . Sudras are all names arbitrarily fixed63 . One example is

given as follows:

"If four sons are born in a family and

their father chooses to call them by

names Nandaka (gladdner), Jivaka (the

living), A~oka (sorrowless), and Sataya

(the long-lived), the names fixed have

no special connotation of their own and

have no proof that their bearers will

enjoy the blessings mentioned. There are

certain qualities, moral, intellectual or

occupational, which children should acquire

as they grow up; but these qualities

cannot be predicated of persons because

of their birth to certain parents• 64

4.6.5. The most impressive and sustained Buddhist

151

attack on class distinction and the pretensions of the

Brahmanas in particular is given by Asvaghosa in his

Vajrasuci. There is a similar text of the same name among

the minor Upanisads, which deals with the system of four

varnas. Both texts begin with the following questions:

"Who is Brahmana? Is a man Brahmana by

his birth or is he Brahmana by his

knowledge? Is he Brahmana by following

the traditional usages, or by his

profession or by his mastery over the

Vedas?" 65 . ancient Indian

The strength of"- , racial prejudice is clear enough in the

Upanisad, where it says:

"Brahmana is of the white complexion

(sveta-varna), Ksatriya is of the red . . .

complexion (rakta-varna), Vaisya •..

tawny complexion (pita-varna) and Sudra

... dark complexion (krsna-varna)"66

. . . . It is apparent from the Vajrasuci that Asvaghosa's criticisms

were chiefly directed against this racial attitude of the

Brahmanas which the Hindu text(exceptional in this respect) • J

also criticizes.

4.6.6. A number of arguments against class distinction

found in the early Buddhist texts are expanded by Asvaghosa.

There is reference to the biological argument. Asvaghosa

says that the fatherhood of God in which Brahmanas believe

should imply the brotherhood of mankind. If all men proceeded ....

from God, how then can there be four-fold'. insuperable diversity

" among men? Here is a man called Devadatta who gives birth to

152

four sons from one wife, the four sons, having one father

and mother, must be all essentially alike. Distinctions of

species among beings are broadly marked by differences of

conformations and organizations. In this world, we find

distinction in the footprints of cattle, elephant, horse,

and so of the rest; but we have never heard or seen that

the footprint of a Sudra is different from that of a

Brahmana. In this world, we find distinction in the male

and female 6rgans, in colour, complexion, and form, in

stools and in urine, in smell and in voice, of cattle,

buffalo, horse, and so of the rest. Those furnish further

diagnostics whereby to separate these various animals, but

in all those respects the Brahmanas resemble the Ksatriyas, . . Vaisyas and Sudras. Again we find distinction in form, in

colour, in furs and in breaks, of the goose, pigeon, parrot,

cuckoo, peacock, but there is no such distinction found

among the four classes. We find distinction in different

kinds of trees, in their stem, leaves, flowers, fruits,

barks, wood, seeds, juice and smell; we do not find this to

be so in the case of the four classes, neither in limbs, nor

in skin, blood, flesh, bones, semen, stools, nor in form and

complexion, nor in their issues. Again, as there is

similarity in joy and sorrow, in life, in intellect, in

functions, in conduct or in behaviour, in birth and death,

in sexual enjoyments and in fear, there is indeed no

distinction in Brahmana and others. Moreover that there is

no distinction of classes among the fruits produced from the

same tree. For example, take the fruits of the fig and

153

jack trees. Among the fruits of these two trees, some grow

from the stem, or trunk, others from the branches, and some

others just above the root. They have no such distinction

as, this is the Brahmana fruit, that is the Ksatriya fruit, . . this is the Vaisya fruit and that is the Sudra fruit; as

they are produced from the same tree. There is no such

distinction among human beings too as they are also born

from the same person according to the brahmanical

tradition. ' There is another defect. If the Brahmana is

born from the mouth, whence is the Brahmana woman born.

Certainly also from the mouth. Then she is the brahmana's

sister. so the brahmanas disregard the convention of licit

and illicit intercourse. But this is extremely repugnant

to the people of this world. so the social dogmas of the

brahmanas are uncertain .. All men are formed alike and

are clearly of one species67

4.7.1. The second argument against class distinction

is the anthropological one. The Agganna Sutta, to which

reference has been made above (~.supra. 2.11.4 - 2.11.12)

shows that the claim of the brahmanas to be the legitimate

heirs of God is meaningless by giving an account of the

evolution of the world, of men and of society. The brahmanas

claimed that "only a brahmana is of the best social grade,

other grades are low. Only a brahmana is of clear complexion,

other complexions are swarthy. Only they are of pure breed,

not they that are not of the brahmanas. They are genuine

- - 68 children of Brahma, heirs of Brahma" .

154

4.7.2. The early Buddhist answer to such claims is

that the brahmanas make them in ignorance of the past and

they have no basis in fact. Originally all human beings

were alike and what later became class distinctions were due

to a division of specific occupations but they were not

necessarily absolute and were not created by God from the

very beginning of time. The early Buddhist condemnation of

the brahmanical ideas is further seen where it is said that

the class of ascetics was formed by people from all the four

occupational classes "despising (the

- 69 garahamano) .

concept of) their own

duty" (sakam dhammam

4.7.3. Two themes run through the whole account of

the Agganna Sutta. we have seen earlier one theme which

describes the origin of the world, of society, and of

government. The second theme describes the origin of class

from divisions of labour and occupational distinctions which

arose with settled society "among beings who were like unto

themselves and not unlike" (neva sattanam anannesam sadisanam . . ~ - 70 neva no asadisanam) .

4.7.4. Since we have seen the origin of the ksatriya

class (~.supra. 2.11.12), let us see the explanation of the

origin of the other three classes, brahmana, vaisya and sudra.

4.7.5. The class of brahmanas originated likewise:

"Then it happened that some men thought,

'Evil ways are rife among men. Let us

give up such evil and unwholesome ways'.

And they put away from them such evil ways.

155

The word brahmana implies that they put

away such evil ways, and so brahmana

became their earliest name ('Eapaka

akusale dhamme bahentiti' ... brahmana,

brahmana tv eva pathamam akkharam

upanibbattam) 71 . . .

They went to the forest and lived in

huts of leaves, and there they sat and

meditated. They had no more use for

charcoal or the smoke of cooking, or for

the pestle and mortar, but they went to

vilJages, towns, or cities, seeking their

food, in the evening their supper, in

the morning their breakfast. When they

had enough to eat they came back and

meditated in their huts, and so they were

given the second name of mystics because

they meditated ( 'jhayantiti' kho ... jhayaka, jhayaka tv eva dutiyam akkharam

upanibbattam) . Now some of them grew

tired of meditating in the forest, and

they went away, settled down in villages

and towns, and started compiling texts,

which they repeated to others. When men

saw this, they said: 'These good folk

cannot meditate', and so they were called

teachers, and this became their third

name ('na dan'ime jhayantiti' kho ...

4.7.6.

4.7.7.

156

~jhayaka, ajjhayaka te eva tatiya~

akkharam upanibbattam) 72 • At that time . . these teachers were looked on as the

lowest or inferior brahmanas, but now

they are considered the best. This was

the origin of the class of brahmanas ..•

'I'hey originated quite naturally and not

otherwise" 73 .

The class of Vaisya originated likewise:

"There were some other people who married

and took to all kinds of crafts and trades

(visutta-kammante) ; and because they took

to various kinds of business they were

called Vessa (Skt. Vaisya) ('visutta-

kammante payojentiti' kho ... vessa,

vessa tv eva akkharam upanibbattam) . This

was the origin of this class Vaishyas

They originated quite naturally and not

otherwise" 74 .

The class of Sudra originated likewise:

"Those who remained were hunters. Those

who live by hunting have a mean trade,

and thus they were called Suddha -

(Skt. sudral . < 'luddha-cara khuddacara

·ti O kh0 • 0 o SUdda I SUdda tV eve akkharam

upanibbttam) . This was the origin of

this class of Shudras ... They originated

157

quite naturally and not otherwise" 75 .

4.7.8. It is in this text especially, describing the

origin of the world, of society, of government and of the

class system, that early Buddhism proclaimed the equality of

men on anthropological grounds. This tells us explicitly

that neither the state nor the class system has any divine

sanction but that they are only measures of human expediency.

The text further explains that since such social and

functional differences arose among human beings in the

collective interest of society, socio-moral ideas were

developed, giving rise to a social ethics, which comes to

be known as dhamma , in opposition to what is detrimental to

the well-being of the community, that is to say, adhamma76 .

Rhys Davids comments:

4.8.1. :I,

"We may not accept the historical accuracy

of this legend. Indeed a continual note

of good-humoured irony runs through the

whole story, with its fanciful etymologies

of the names of the four vanna ... But

it reveals a sound and healthy insight,

and is much nearer to the actual facts

than the Brahmin legend it was intended

77 to replace"

The third argument against class distinction

is sociological. This appears in many aspects. First, early

Buddhism points out that there are certain peoples among whom

there are no rigid divisions of society. Therefore, the

four-fold class system has no universal acceptibility. In

158

- 78 79 . the Assalayana Sutta , Yona and Kamboja are mentioned

as places in which there were only two classes of people,

namely lords and serfs, and this division too was not rigid

since lords sometimes became serfs and serfs lords:

4.8.2.

"'What do you think about this, Assalayana?

Have you ever heard that in the lands of

Yona and Kamboja and other adjacent

districts there are only two classes,

lords and serfs, and a lord can become a

serf and vice versa?'

'Yes I have heard this Sir. In Yona and

... having been a serf one becomes a lord'.

'And what strength or support does that

fact give to the brahmanas' claim?'" 80 .

Secondly, early Buddhism asks how far livelihood

is identical with social differentiation, and on what grounds

the class sytem could be justified:

"The man who earns his livelihood, by

minding cows and fields, he is a farmer,

not a brahmana. He who works at diverse

craft is an artisan ... He who plies a

trade for livelihood, he is a trader ...

He who toils in service for another man,

he is a servant He who lives by

archery, he is a soldier He who lives

by priestly craft, he is a celebrant

He who own the village, country side, he

. k' ,81 J.S a J.ng •.•

159

4.8.3. It is clear from the above passage that class

names are merely conventional designations signifying

occupational differences and, since men are free to change

their occupations, these differences had no hereditary or

genetical basis. It is said:

"What the world holds as 'name' and

'lineage' is indeed nominal. Terms risen

here and there by popular opinion" 82

Asvaghosa says that the system of four classes was established

according to the distinction of profession and functions 83 .

In contrast, the brahmanical theory held that each class had

its own set of duties and obligations (sva-dharma) exactly

prescribed and, for the sake of the solidarity and progress

of society as a whole, each class was expected to act up to

the following teaching of the Bhagavad-Gita:

"Better one's own duty (to perform),

though void of merit, than to do another's

well: better to die within (the sphere

of) one's own duty: periolous is the

duty of other men" 84 .

It was accepted that there are specific hereditary occupations

suitable for members of each class and they were not free to

choose his occupation. All Brahmanical legal literature lay

down the specific occupations suitable for members of each

class in an unalterable religious context. For example, a

son of Sudra's parents must always do a menial job. The

Buddhist condemnation of this idea is seen where it is said

that one's occupation gives a "class" name (kammana khattiyo

160

vasalo ... hoti) 85 , but it is merely a conventional

designation (samanna eva lokasmim) denoting one's occupation

and is of no genetical significance, since one does not

follow a vocation or have an aptitude for it merely because

one is born of parents who followed the same 86

4.8.4. In the Madhura Sutta87 , it is pointed out that

the brahmanas' claim to superiority is a mere propagandist

cry (~hosa) 88 . It gives four reasons for this. Among them,

one is that superiority often depends not on one's high birth

but on wealth that one possesses, and illustrates this point.

A wealthy member of any of the four classes would find

members of each of the other three classes to wait upon him

h . 89 and serve 1m . The Jataka stories give frequent reference

to people who were born in outcastes becoming as wealthy and

even kings90

. This shows the fallacy of the brahmanas' view

that members of the four-fold order are obliged to perform

'f' d t' . h 91 spec:t :tc u :tes ass:tgned to t em .

4.8.5. Thirdly, early Buddhism exposed the myth of

the purity of the brahmanas. They claimed that all of them

are descendants in one line of a particular person through a

determinate number of generations since they have an unbroken

lineage, they conceived the view that they are the highest

class of men. This view has been condemned as baseless in

many passages of the early Buddhist texts.

4.8.6. 92 In the Ambattha Sutta , the Buddha exposes

the myth of the purity of class, of which the brahmanas were

so conscious. Ambattha was a young brahmana who was very

161

aware of his lineage. He was once involved in a discussion

with the Buddha about the purity of the Brahmanas' lineage.

To the statement of Ambattha that among the four classes the .. brahmanas are of the highest born, and the other three classes

are of their attendants, the Buddha points out that the

so-called purity of ancestry was a myth by tracing Ambattha's .. lineage to an offspring of one of the slave girls of a

Sakyan.

4.8.7.

"If one were to follow up your ancient

name and lineage, on the father's and on

the mother's side, it would appear that

the Sakyas were once your masters, and

that you are the offspring of one of

their slave girls" 93

The concept of purity of birth is dismissed in

this ~utta on the grounds that most people are not aware of

their true facts of their ancestry, and they cannot be certain

that intermarriage strictly within the different groups alone

or outside of it, was observed by their parents and grand-

parents even up to seven generations 94 This is again well

illustrated in the story of Asita Devala detailed in the

Assalayana Sutta. Asita Devala,a well-known brahmana priest,

was scorned because of his dark complexion by seven other

priests. He examined, and cross-questioned these and pressed

for an answer concerning their claim to pure lineage:

"I have heard this: 'Only brahmanas are

of the highest class, all others are low;

only brahmanas are of white complexion,

•

162

o.ll others are of dark complexion; only

brahmanas are pure, alJ others are impure; . only brahmanas are legitimate sons of

Brahma, born of his mouth •.. heirs to

Brahma'.

'Is that true?'

'Yes, Sir' ..

'But do you know whether your mothers

consorted with brahmanas, not with others?'

'No' ..

'And do you know whether your mother's

mothers even up to seven generations

consorted only with brahmanas, not with

others?'

'No'·

'And do you know whether your father

father's fathers even up to seven

generations consorted only with brahmana

women, not with others?'

'No'·

'But do you know how there is & descent

into a womb? •

'Yes, we do know. When there is a coitus

of the parents, and when it is mother's

season, and when a gandhabba95 is present.

It is on the conjunction of these three

factors that there is a descent into a

womb'.

'But do you know whether that being to be

4.8.8.

16 3

born is a brahmana, or a ksatriya or a

vaisya or a sudra?'

'We do not know'.

'This being the case, we do not know who

we are?'"96 .

Moreover, to the statement of Assalayana that

only brahmanas are sons of Brahma ... heirs to Brahma, the

Buddha answers: •

"But Assalayana, brahmana wives of

brahmanas are known to have their seasons

e>nd to conceive and to give birth and to

give suck, just like any other women.

Yet these brahmanas, born of woman like

everyone else, speak thus: 'Only brahmanas

are the highest class ... • 97 .

The Commentary explains, with reference to the countries where

there are only two classes of people (~.supra. 4.8.1), thus:

"If a brahmana and his wife go to trading

in adjacent districts he may die there

leaving no son. The wife in course of

time may have sexual intercourse with a

slave or workman. Any son born is a

slave, although. 'pure' on his mother's

side. If this son goes to trade in the

Middle country and marries a brahmana

girl, any son born will be 'pure' only on

his mother's side• 98 •

164

4.8.9. The arguments against purity of birth are

well brought out by Asvaghosa.

•

4.8.10.

"'Does a man become a brahmana by birth?'

'Well, now, if you say that when the

mother is not a brahmana, and the father

is a brahmana, the child should be a

brahmana'. ·· I object to thfs because those

who are born from maidservanLs, fathered

by a brahmana, will also be entitled to

be a brahrnana. But t.his is not a.greeable . to the brahmanas. How can this be. In

these days to find out a father of a

brahmana is very doubtful. The reason is

this. From the olden days, since the

time of the first brahmana in the lineage,

it js noticed the wives of the brahmanas

had and still have illicit connection

with men of all classes, even with the

sudras. So to claim a man is a brahrnana

by birth is absurd" 99 •

By such criticisms, the brahmanas' claim to

superiority was gradually being weakened. This process was

expedited by the ra tionc.l argumen Ls put forward by the Buddha.

All in all, the Buddha points out that the pretentions of the

brahmar:as are baseless, and that virtt:,e, which alone leads to

purity, can be cultivated by any of the four classes.

"For whosoever are in the bondage to the

notions of birth or of lineage, or to the

165

pride of social position, or of

connection by marriage, they are far

from the best wisdom and righteousness.

It is only by having got rid of all such

bondage that one can realise for himself

that supreme perfection in wisdom and in

conduct" 100 •

4.9.1. The fourth argument against class distinction

is legal. A special emphasis is placed in early Buddhism on

equality before the law. Early Buddhism regards the law as

an instrument for achieving certain ends, which are held to

be socially desirable 101 Men are judged by the good and

evil they do, and not by the stations of life in which they

are placed by virtue of their birth (2.supra. 4.4.5). ·

4.9.2. In the brahmanical legal system, there was a

denial of equality before the law. In fact the effect of the

class system is to be seen very clearly in the administration

of justice. For example, Manu says:

"Knowing what is expedient or inexpedient,

what is pure justice or injustice, let

the king examine the causes of suitors

according to the order of varna" 102 •

Moreover, the most prominent feature of the brahmanical law-

code is its class legislation. All brahmanical law-books

prescribe different punishments for different classes for

the same crime and offence103 . The brahmanas claimed great

privileges in law, and in every respect they demanded

166

precendence, honour and worship. They were regarded with

such veneration that they were considered not liable to

capital punishment even if they committed the gravest of

crimes104 Even though there was some moderation of their

privileges in the later law-books, the brahmanas still

suffered lighter punishments than the other three classes105 •

All brahma~ical law-books prescribe unequal treatment to the

sudras in both criminal and civil law, and the punishments

laid down for them were in general much more severe. The

sudras had few privileges and rights, and little value was

set on their life in law. A brahmana killing a sudra

performed the same penance as for killing a cat or dog106

4.9.3. On the other hand, early Buddhism emphasized

the fact that there should be no legal discrimination between

the different classes. We shall discuss the importance of

this attitude in chapter five. In the Madhura Sutta it is

said that a criminal, whatever his class, would be equally

subject to punishment for his crime:

"If a noble, or a brahmana, or a merchant,

or a worker, were to break into a house,

or carry off loot, or commit a robbery,

or make an ambush, or commit adultery, and

if the men who had captured him were to

show him to you, and say: 'This, your

majesty, is the thief who is doing evil

to you, decree what punishment you like

for him?' -what would you do to him?"

"We would kill him or ruin him or banish

167

him or deal with him as we liked. What

is the cause of this? The designation

of 'noble' or 'brahmana' or 'merchant'

or 'worker' that once he had now

disappeared for him, and he is reckoned

simply as 'thief'. Indeed this being so,

107 the four classes are exactly the same" · .

4.10.1. The fifth argument against class distinction

is moral. There are two main aspects of this argument.

First, early Buddhism maintains that all men are equally liable

to kammic consequences, irrespective of their status.

4.10.2. According to early Buddhism, the world in

space-time is said to be a causal system, in which there

operate physical laws (utu-niyama) , biological laws (bija­

niyama), psychological laws (citta-niyama), kammic laws

(kamma-niyama) pertaining to the order of acts and their

consequences and laws pertaining to spiritual phenomena

(dhamma-niyama) 108 . These causal laws are said to be neither

d . . . ( . . ) . d . . . ( dh . )1 0 9 etermlnlstlc nlyatl or ln etermlnlStlc a lcca-samuppanna .

The operations of kamma are deemed to be of the same sort and

occur in the realm of volitional acts and their consequences

to the individual.

4.10.3. In these kammic consequences, as described in

the early Buddhist texts, morally good actions (kusala-

kamma) tend to be followed by pleasant consequences or good

effects to the individual. On the other hand, morally bad

actions (akusala-kamma) tend to be followed by unpleasant

16 8

consequences or bad effects, and actions which partake of

both good and bad (vokinna - a "mixed" nature) by a mixture

of pleasant and unpleasant consequences or good or bad

llO effects .

4,10.4. Since kammic correlations are not deterministic,

kamma is only one of many factors conditioning the nature of -----. 111 h'l k . . . h bl d exper1ence , w 1 e past amma 1s ext1ngu1s a e an

modifiable in the context of one's present actions. Kamma

is the law of cause and effect, of action and reaction. This

is not different in principle from a law in the natural

sciences. Therefore, kamma is not so-called "moral law" or

"reward and punishment" because it does not constitute a

divine command, a categorical imperative or a norm. Since

every volitional action produces its effects or results,

the individual is responsible for his good or bad actions

(~.supra. 4.4.5). In this sense, early Buddhism recognizes

that man's conscience is generally aware of right and wrong

even though it is admitted to be sometimes fallible; but

this does not come about through a supreme Being, who

decides what is right and wrong. It is said:

4.10.5.

"Your conscience is aware whether it is

truth or falsehood Therefore be

guided by one's conscience (attadhipateyya)

as well as by public opinion

(lokadhipateyya) and the dhamma or

righteousness (dhammadhipateyya) 112.

Accordingly, early Buddhism maintains that

169

human law must have a universally acceptable moral basis.

Every individual is morally responsible for his private or

official actions. This responsibility is personal and one

is not obliged to perform unrighteous or iniquitous acts

either for the sake of the king or for the sake of one's

parents or children113 .

4.10.6. Thus in the operation of kammic laws, there

is no distinction of classes. The Madhura Sutta and the

Assalayana Sutta point out that a noble, a priest, a

merchant or a worker are subject to kammic recompense

equally, irrespective of their status:

4.10.7.

"'If a man is a murderer, a thief, or an

adulterer, or commits other evil actions,

when his body breaks up on death does he

pass on to the Downfall Niraya Hell if he

is a ksatriya, . ' or sudra, but not va~sya,

if he is a brahmana? •

'No, Sir. In such a case the same kamma

is in store for all men, whatever their

class. '

'And if he avoids evil actions, will he

go to heaven if he is a brahmana, but not

if he is a man of the lower classes?'

'No, Sir. In such a case the same kamma

effect awaits all men, whatever their

class. '·~ 114 .

In the second aspect of the moral argument,

170

early Buddhism maintains that all are equally capable of

moral development and individual differences in good or

evil have little relationship with the classes. Men e.re

inherently good and they should be educated in right and

wrong so that they may transform t.hemselves from what they

are to what they ought to be. Early Buddhism insists on the

application of a universal standard of ethics applicabJ.e to

all men and women, irrespective of any class privileges.

4.10.8. As already pointed out in chapter two and

t.hree, the brahmanas established a rigid morality by

insistence on the universality of ritual and sacrificial

acts. With the development of the sacrificial cult the

brahmanas fulfil their own aims and strive to establish their

supremacy. Morality was evaluated on the amount of sacrifice

involved and the motive behind it. Moreover, the institution

of the four class system and the four stages in life helped

to maintain and raise the stc.ndard of ethics. The highly

educated brahmanas thus fulfilling their own desires claimed

to be the mediators between man and his gods. They alone

were capable of attaining the moral heights required for

. . h us unlon Wlt God .

4.10.9. Early Buddhist ethics is based on the notion

of the perfectibility of man. The Noble Eight-fold Path and

the Four Cardinal Virtues of early Buddhism, for example, are

intended to transform man, to bring out his inherent goodness.

The essence of early Buddhist ethical teaching is summed up

in the words of Dhammapada:

"To refrain from all evil, to cultivate the

171

good and to cleanse the mind" 116 .

According to this ethical context, a wrong act or an unskilful

(akusala) act is defined as what tends to hinder the self­

development of oneself (atta-vyabadhaya samvattati) as well as

of othen: (pc>.ra-vyabadhaya). It is said:

"A wise person does not think of hindering

his own self-development, or another's or

both his own and another's self-

development, but he will always think of

the welfare of himself, of ethers, of

both himself and others; and in fact of

the welfare of the whole world (sabba­

loka-hitameva) "117 .

Furthermore, if one promotes or help others in a spirit of

service and loving kindness, one produces happiness both in

this world and in the next118 . The importance of loving

kindness towards all beings is well illustrated in the

Metta Sutta:

"May every living being, weak or strong,

large or small, seen or unseen, near or

far, born or yet unborn- may every

living thing be full of joy. May none

deceive anothE,r, or think ill of him in

anyway whatever, or in anger or ill-will

desire evil for another. Just as a

mother, as long as she lives, cares for

her only child, so should a man feel all-

embracing love to all li vi.ng beings. He

should feel boundless love for all the

4.10.10.

172

world, above below and across,

unrestrained, without enmity. Standing,

walking, sitting or lying down .•. he

should be firm in the mindfulness of

love. For this is what men call the

Sublime Mood" 119 .

In contrast to the principle of love and

understanding towards all beings, the brahmanical morality,

as we said earlier, was based on ritualistic duty. Apart

from this, the brahmanas promulgated numerous other rites and

rituals. Some of these rites were called samskaras or

purificatory rites. They were performed in order to purify

oneself, to absolve oneself of sins accrued by evil actions.

Among such purificatory rites are bathing at holy places,

and springkling oneself with sacred water120 .

4 .10 .ll. Early Buddhism condemned such purificatory

rites which the brahmanas considered capable of washing away

evil actions. The sarcastic remarks of Punna theri, show

the early Buddhist attitude to such purificatory rites:

"What ignorant person has told you ...

that (ritual) ablution in water can free

you from evil actions. In such a case

all creatures living in water would go

straight to heaven (on death). Those who

produce evil actions such as butchers " • • I

hunters • ,. - I thieves and murderers have

only to splash themselves with water and

4.10.2.

173

they are set free from evil actions.

And if the stream carries away your

evil ... , it should also take your merit,

leaving you naked of both ..... 121 .

Moreover, there is a magical concept of

purity and pollution associated with the class system. This

is exposed in the Assalayanasutta:

•

4.10.13.

"'What do you think about this Assalayana?

Is it only a brahmana who, taking a back-

scratcher and bath-powder and going to a

river, is capable of cleansing himself of

dust and mud? And not a noble, a merchant,

a worker?'

'That is not so ..• a noble, a merchant,

a worker who ... is capable of cleansing

himself of dust and mud.'

'With reference to this then ,. • ,. I on what

strength and support do brahmanas say that

122 they are from the best class .•. '" .

What matters is not even external cleanliness

but the purity of heart or the absence of pollution within:

"Not flesh of fisb, nor fasting, nakedness,

The shaven head, the mat·ted hair, nor sweat,

Nor rough-skin garb, nor solemn celebration

Of sacrificial fire, nor signal penance

Of those who here seek immortality:

Not hymns, ablutions, rites, feasts of the

season

174

Will cleanse a man with doubt not overcome.

With guarded senses, governed faculties,

Fareth the poised in Dhamma finding joy,

Mild, upright, bondless, rid of every ill:

Things seen or heard soil not the rouser

t "12 3 rap •..

4 • 10 • .4. A person who practises the "highest life" is

said to be "one who is cleansed with an internal bathing"

"after bathing in the water of love and compassion for one's

fellow beings" 124 • Moral development is not a prerogative

of people who are specially favoured by their birth, but is

open to all and is within the reach of a11 125 . Since all

are capable of good and evil, none is to be treated as a

means to an end "like beasts in a sacrifice" 126 . A virtuous

man, whatever his class, is a gift of grea~ value:

"As in a herd of cattle, white or black,

red, tawny, dappled, uniform dove-hued,-

Whatever the hue, - when a tamed bull is

found,

A beast of burden, mighty, fair and swift,

Heedless of hue men yoke him to a load:

So among men, wherever he be born,

Noble or brahmana, merchant, serf, or

castless, -

Just a mean scavenger, -

Whatever he be,

He who is tamed, devout, just, virtuous,

Truth-speaking, shamefaced, done with birth

175

and death,

One perfect in the good life, load-free,

Detached from worldly ties, whose task is

done,

Taintless, one gone beyond all states, not

clinging

To anything, one utterly released, -

To such a one, a dustless, lustless field,

Abundant, fertile offering becomes ... n 127 .

4.10.15. In the Sonadanda Sutta128 , the Buddha deals . .. with the question of what are the: essent.ial characteristics

which makes a man br~mana. According to the brahma~as, the

essential characteristics of a brahmana, as stated in the

above sutta are:

"A brahmana is well born on both sides ... , of pure descent; h~ is a preacher of the

sacred words, knowing the mystic verses

by heart, one who has mastered the three

Vedas, with indices, the rituals, the

phonology, the exegesis and the legends,

learned in phrases and grammar, versed in

Lokayata sophistry, and in the signs on

the body of a great man; he is handsome,

pleasant to look upon, inspiring trust,

gifted with great beauty of complexion,

fair in colour, fine in presence and

stately to behold; he is virtuous,

increases in virtue; he is learned and

176

wise, the first or it may be the second,

129 among those who hold out the ladle" .

While rejecting the brahmanical conceptions, the Buddha lays

down that virtue, wisdom and intelligence as the most

. t h . . b -h 130 h lrnpor .ant c aracter1st1cs of a true ra mana . T ese

characteristics are detailed in the Brahmajala sutta131 ,

Samannaphala Sutta132 , Ambattha Sutta133 , Lohicca Sutt.a134 0 - • q

d . h h 135 an 1n t e D ammapada

.. 4.10.16. Asvaghosa, dealing with the question of

what makes a true brahmana, says:

4.10.17.

"All are mortals and born from the same

place (i.e. produced from the womb). All

have (wi thi.n them, dirty things, such as)

stools and urine. All have got the same

senses and the same objects of senses.

So, it is only by good conduct and merit

that men become brahmanas. If a sudra

possesses good conduct and merit, he

becomes a brahmana and if a brahmRna is . without good actions, he is inferior to a

sudra ,136 ...

The word "brahmana" is used in early Buddhism

to denote a pereon leading a pnre c>.nd virtuous life. Thi.s

is different from the definition of the term by the brahmanas.

The racial sense of superiority associated wj. th the word

"brahmana" is completely eclipsed in early Buddhism by the

moral and spiritual sense of superiority. In early Buddhism,

177

the word "brahmana" is often synonymous with the word

"arahant". This word also is not purely Buddhistic in

origin. Before Buddhism, it was used to describe a person

of high standing, not necessarily on moral or spiritual

grounds. In its usage in Buddhism, it denotes a person who

had achieved Nibbana and who has gained insight into the

137 -true nature of things . The use of the words "brahmana''

and "arahant" in the sense of "virtuous", "perfect" is an

eloquent te'stimony to how early Buddhism ignored class

claims and distinctions.

4.11.1. The sixth argument against class distinction

is religious. Early Buddhism maintains that all are capable

of attaining salvation or spiritual development and

individual differences in capacities have little relationship

to the classes into which men and women happen to be born.

Man's basic needs are fundamentally the same, though there

are individual variations in their nature, owing to

differences in the impact of his environment and his samsaric

evolution. Whatever the differences may be, according to

early Buddhism, men should realize their common lot and their

common humanity. All are subject to disease, decay and death,

but man's quest for security and lasting happiness never

ceases. This is never satisfied by pandering to his desires,

and yet he is capable of discovering the ultimate good and

happiness. It is in this sense that early Buddhism proclaimed

h ' . 1 ' f k' d 138 t e sp~r~tua un~ty o man ~n .

4.11.2. In contrast, the brahmanas claimed special

178

prerogatives not only in day to day affairs but also in

religious affairs. They maintain a monopoly of religion

merely because of their lust for power139 . They denied the

sudras admission into their religious orders, and even the

possibility of spiritual and moral development, on the

grounds that the sudras were born to serve and their nature

was untruth itself140 . The sudras had no rights in religious

affairs. The ears of a sudra who hears the Veda are to be

filled with,, mol ten lead and lac. His tongue is to be split

if he recites it; his body is to be cut through if he

't . h' 141 preserves ~ ~n ~s memory God himself has assigned the

exclusive right of teaching to the brahmanas142 . They were

considered to be gods in human form. Manu states that by

his birth alone a brahmana is a deity even for the gods, and

his teaching is authoritative for men because the Veda is its

foundation; a brahmana, whether he is ignorant or learned,

is a great divinity, just as the fire, whether carried forth

. d f h . d. . . 142 or not carr~e ort , ~s a great ~v~n~ty Therefore, it

was considered to be a danger to the social order if they

taught women', or any males not twice-born, or any twice-born

males who did not share their views as to the ethics of

teaching, and as to the privileges and prerogatives of the

. h 144 pr~est as teac er .

4.11.3. The Buddha directed his attack on such

religious exclusiveness and maintained that every one should

be allowed to learn; that every one, having certain

abilities, should be allowed to teach; and that, if he did

teach, he should teach all and to all, keeping nothing back,

179

shutting no one out. But no man should take upon himself to

teach others unless he had first been taught himself, and

had also acquired the faculty of importing to others the

truth he has gained himself145 Moreover, the dogma of the

efficacy of sacrifice by which the brahmanas gained their

superior power was also criticised by the Buddha. (see Ch.2)

4.11.4. In contrast to the brahmanas, who were making

a monopoly of religion, early Buddhism advocates a society ,

in which all men irrespective of their social status are free

to join religious orders and receive equal recognition as men

of religion. Buddhist monks and nuns ignored class distinction

both within the Sangha and in their relationship with the lay

people and openly preached and practised the doctrine of

equality of man146

4.11.6. A man, whatever his class, after becoming a

bhikkhu and joining to an order, received equal respect and

honour from the people. This is well illustrated in the

Madhura Sutta:

"'What do you think about this, Sir? If

a noble, a brahmana, a merchant, a worker,

having cut off his hair and beard, having

dressed in saffron robes, should have. gone

forth from home into homelessness, and is

one that refrains from onslaught on

creatures, from taking what has not been

given, from lying speech, is a one-meal

man, a brahma-farer, virtuous, of lovely

180

character- what would you do to him?'

'Good Kaccana, we should salute him or

rise up before him or offer him a seat

or give him robe material, almsfood,

lodgings and medicines, or we should

have proper watch and ward and guard

provided for him'. 'What is the cause

of this?' 'Good Kaccana, the designation

of 'noble', 'brahmana', 'merchant',

'worker' that he once had has now

disappeared for him, and he is reckoned

simply as 'recluse'

'This being so, are these four classes

exactly the same or not? Or how does

this seem to you?' 'Indeed, good Kaccana,

this being so, these four classes are

exactly the same; I do not see any

difference between them in this respect' "14 7

.

This is further illustrated by the simile of the rivers:

"Just as the great rivers: the Ganga, the

Yamuna, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu and the

Mahi entering the mighty ocean, lose their

former names and identities and are termed

simply ocean; even so these four classes:

ksatriyas, brahmanas, vaisyas and sudras, . . going forth from home to homelessness,

into the discipline of dhamma proclaimed

by the Buddha, lose their former names and

181

lineages and are reckoned simply

'recluses' .. 148

4.11.6. 149 In the Kannakatthala Sutta , the B.uddha says

that all men have the capacity to attain spiritual heights,

irrespective of the class to which they belong, and it is

this search for ultimate happiness which constitutes the

religious quest of man. The King of Kosala once questioned

the Buddha on this subject: •

"These are the four classes: nobles,

brahmanas, merchants and workers, and if . they made the proper efforts to achieve

the spiritual heights, would there be

between them any distinction or any

difference?"

The Buddha replies:

"I, Sire, here speak of no difference at

all. It is as though a man, bringing dry

sticks from a teak tree were to produce

a fire and heat were to result. Then

another man, bringing dry s.ticks from a

sal tree .•. ,another man from a mango

tree and another man from a fig tree were

to produce a fire and heat were to result.

'What do you think about this? Because of

the different woods used for the fires,

would there be any difference in what is

produced, in flame as against flame, in

hue as aginst hue, in brilliance as against

4.11.7.

182

brilliance? • 'No sir'. 'Even so it is,

with heat created energy, produced by

striving. I do not recall of any

difference whatsoever herein in regard

to their salvation•• 150 .

Therefore, it is said that in the supreme

perfection in wisdom and righteousness, there is no reference

to the question of either of birth, or of lineage, or of '

pride. It is only by getting rid of all such bondage that

one can realise for himself the supreme perfection151 . It

is said that if a man is proud of his birth, of clan, of

his wealth, and of

he will definitely

his family and despises

152 come to a downfall .

his relatives,

4.11.8. In all these passages, early Buddhism proclaims

the oneness of mankind and maintains that pride of birth in

a particular class as an obstacle to spiritual progress.

Man should have within him capacities to develop his material

and spiritual welfare without any barriers from fixed social

rules153 . Women are also considered to have similar

potentialities to those men. They are also equally capable

f . . 'bb- 154 o atta:Ln:Lng. N:L ana .

4 .12 .1. It is in these arguments that early Buddhism

proclaims the equality of man as a member of society.

However, the spirit of egalitarianism in early Buddhism is

open to some misconceptions. However, we may mention one

misconception which has been held by some writers, who say

that these arguments are chiefly directed against the

183

pretensions of the brahmanas in particular rather than

against the class system in general. The early Buddhists,

while fully accepting the brahmanical four-fold class

system, made a change of placing the ksatriyas, the class to

which the Buddha belongs, before the brahmanas in the class

h . h 155 :terarc y

4.12.2. If we consider these arguments carefully we

see that they do not merely represent a trend of ksatriya

opposition to the brahmanas' claim to superiority, but to

establish the fact that all men, regardless of their

individual differences, are on an equal footing (samasama).

To uphold the fact that man belongs to a single species, the

early Buddhists directed their attack towards the brahmanas

because the foundation of social inequality was laid down

by the brahmanas, who were formulating the required sanctions

for perpetuating the system, by the methods of theological

persuasion and examples. Therefore, the early Buddhists

attack on them is quite justifiable. The Buddha equally

denounced the ksatriya claims to superiority. He emphatic-

ally pointed out the fact that it is not one's birth, but

one's actions and good conduct that make one a brahmana or a

sudra.

4.12.3. Though it is constantly pointed out in the

Pali texts that all men are born equal, there is one statement

by the Buddha which has been taken seriously and misinterpreted

by some writers to mean that the Buddha championed the l55A

superiority of the ksatriyas over the brahmanas. It occurs

in the Ambattha Sutta: ••

184

"The ksatriya is the best of those among . .

those folk who put his trust in lineage.

But he who is perfect in wisdom and

righteousness, he is the best among gods

and men" 156 •

If the statement is carefully studied in its context, it will

be seen that in this discourse the Buddha employs a

dialectical method of argument. He takes up some of the

criteria wJ:rich Ambattha accepts as proof of class superiority .. and shows that when they are actually applied to the context

of society they establish the superiority of the ksatriyas

and not the brahmanas- thus proving that the brahmanas'

claim to superiority in respect of these criteria is baseless.

Lineage is of little or no account, but if it is taken as the

criterion then it is the ksatriyas who should claim

. . t 157 super~or~ y We have seen earlier (~.supra. 2.5.2) that

even in the Vedic texts there are many passages which

illustrate the de facto inferiority of the brahmanas to the

ruling class. Such references lend enough historical support

to this deduction. However, the important fact that we should

note in that statement is that he who is supreme above all is

one "who is perfect in wisdom and righteousness", a supremacy

not based on the claims of birth. Therefore, it can be

clearly seen that the Buddha or early Buddhism did not

champion the cause of the superiority of the ksatriyas over

the brahmanas.

4.13.1. Thus we see that early Buddhism stands for a

common humanity or unity of mankind. Early Buddhism accepts

185

that there are individual variations in the nature of man,

owing to the differences in the impact of his environment

and kammic factors. Nevertheless, there is a basic similarity

in the nature of man. He therefore needs to be treated

equally and afforded an equal opportunity for developing his

potentialities and serving the human race which he belongs

to. Therefore, the early Buddhist conception of equality of

man allows for no chosen class or caste, chosen race, chosen

creed or c~osen individual.

186

CHAPTER FIVE

ATTITUDE TO LAW

5.1.1. In this final chapter, we shall examine the

early Buddhist attitude to law and the internal polity of

the Sangha, as they appear in the early Buddhist texts.

5.1.2. The organization of the Sangha interests us

because of the importance attached to the value of the

individual ·within the Sangha and the role of law in

furthering the aims and objectives and the life of the Sangha.

The Sangha was modelled on democratic principles, and the

concept of the international Sangha forms an analogy for the

early Buddhist conception of the international political

order.

5.2.1. We should point out, before taking the matter

up for actual discussion, that some writers have expressed

the view that there is no Buddhist law. For example, Rhys

Davids writes that in the strict sense of the word, there is

no Buddhist law. There is only an influence exercised by

Buddhist ethics or changes that have taken place in customs.

No Buddhist authority, whether local or central, whether lay

or clerical, has ever created or promulgated any law (~.supra.

1.4.5.).

5.2.2. It is difficult to agree with this view. The

reasons for this are many. If we ask the question "What is

law?", it is difficult to find a precise answer, and there

are a variety of answers to the question. The word "law" is

187

used in many different ways and many different senses.

Therefore, it is often associated with unclear meanings.

The best way to see what this word means is to examine how

people in fact have used it in various ways and contexts.

5.2.3. The early Buddhist texts distinguish between

law and what is morally right, using the words niti, nyaya

or ~inaya for the former and dhamma for the latter. This

distinction is to be found in English, which distinguishes

law from right, though in most European languages the terms

for law and right coincide1 It is not possible, however,

to draw any significant conclusions from linguistic facts,

since we cannot say that those who did make or failed to

make the distinction in language have had more just laws than

2 the others .

5.2.4. As we have already shown in chapter three,

secular legal texts were composed by Buddhist monks in

countries where Buddhism flourished, and these laws were

adopted by the state. They were based on Hindu legal texts,

whose content and character were altered in the light of

Buddhist doctrines. Kings of various Buddhist countries

enacted codes of secular law and formulated constitutions on

the basis of Buddhist moral principles. Criminal and civil

laws were to some extent transformed in conformity with such

principles. The attitude to war and the conduct of war was

affected by Buddhism. There is also a developed philosophy

of the state and law in Buddhist texts and a statement of

the principles that should govern inter-state relations.

188

According to the theory of social contract in early Buddhism,

which we discussed in chapter two, human law is the will of

the human soveriegn. The capacity of the sovereign to lay

down laws for his subjects derives from the social contract,

which is binding by virtue of dhamma. Dhamma is the ultimate

foundation of human law. The sovereign has no legitimate

power but that which was conferred on him by dhamma and the

social contract (see ch.2).

5.3.1. General views on problems of law and punishment

are to be found in several Buddhist texts, especially in

Jataka stories. In one of the Jataka stories it is said that

the king should judge a case fairly and justly, without making

mistakes and without coming under the influence of self-will3 .

It is also said that there are four ways of falling into

injustice or untruth. They are prejudice, hatred, ignorance

and fear4

. It was felt that in the administration of justice

the judge should administer law without fear, favour, folly

or antagonism. A king who acts in favour of a false complaint

made by his priest is advised in the Rathalatthi Jataka:

"It is wrong for one who is the fountain

of justice to act without trying the

case. You should always act after

hearing everything" 5

The following advice testifies to the high standard of justice

recognized by early Buddhism.

"A king should punish an offence. He should

hear no plea at all without thoroughly

investigating it himself in all points.

5.3.2.

189

A king who punishes an offence before he

tries it is like a man born blind, who

eats his food with all bones and flies.

A king who punishes the non-offenders

and let free the offenders is like one

blind upon a rugged highway He who

examines all well in things and administers

justice fairly and rightly is (truly)

worthy of sitting in judgement ... "6

The Mahavastu gives the following advice to a

king who is hearing a lawsuit:

5.3.3.

"A king should not fall into the power of

wrath. Rather let him curb his anger,

forlO king, neither the interests nor the

duty of a man thrive when he is angry.

But when a king is not subject to wrath,

his interests, his duty and his wisdom

always thrive. Hence he should restrain

his anger. When a dispute arises, he

should pay equal attention to both parties

to it, and hear the arguments of each side

and actaccording to what is right. He

should not act out of favouritism, hatred,

fear or folly. He should hear the

arguments of each side and act according

to what is right" 7

Inspired by the Buddhist principles of

190

righteousness and equality, Asoka instructed his officials

to employ impartial justice in their judicial dealings.

5.3.4.

" ... Just as one entrusts his child to an

experienced nurse, and is confident that

she is able to care for the child

satisfactorily, so my rural officers

have been appointed for the welfare and

happiness of the country people. In

order that they may fulfil their functions

fearlessly, confidently, and cheerfully,

I have given them independent authority

in judgement and punishment. But it is

desirable that there should be uniformity

(samata) in judicial procedure and

punishment. This is my instruction from

now on: 'Men who are imprisoned or

sentenced to death are to be given three

days respite. Thus their relations may

plead for their lives, or, if there is no

one to plead for them, they may make

donations or undertake a fast for a

better rebirth in the next life ... •8

.

The brahmanical tradition stressed the

importance of sanctions in law based on the deterrent and

retributive theories of punishment9 It upheld the theory

that law is force incarnate. For example, Manu says:

"For the (king's) sake the Lord formerly

created his own son, Punishment, the

191

protector of all creatures, (an incarnation

- 10 of) dharma, formed of brahmana's glory" . ------ . The study of law was itself called the "science of punishment"

(da~~a-niti) 11 . The only way that the whole world might be

kept pure and righteous was by the fear of punishment12

example, the Mahabharata says:

For

"Force or the fear of punishment rules all

beings, force alone protects them, when

people are asleep it is force that keeps

awake, the wise recognize the law (dh~)

to be force" 13 .

Ultimately all law and order depends on force or the fear of

punishment. It is said that wicked people do not commit

crimes for four reasons, fear of punishment by the king, fear

of divine vengeance, fear of the other world and fear of

society14

5.3.5. In contrast, early Buddhism holds that although

punishment has a place in law, the law itself is based on

consent resulting from understanding, friendliness and mutual

interest. As stated earlier in chapter three, it was on the

unsatisfactory nature of private punishment and in the

interest of fairer and more efficient justice that the people

delegated their functions to a king (~.supra. 3.5.4).

Another fact that we have noted in chapter three is that the

suppression of crime merely through punishment was considered

to be a futile thing, but that the planning of economic

welfare would lead to a happy and peaceful society (~.supra.

3.8.10). Moreover, the punishments mentioned are humane and

•

192

confined to reproving, warning and banishment, with no

mention of corporal punishment. One of the Jataka stories

explains that the kings who followed Mahasammata were so

efficient that they kept crime at a minimum. There was no

greater punishment than that of beating, warning and

banishment (talana-garahana-pabbajana). There was, indeed, •

no cutting off of hands and feet and execution (hattha­

pada-cchedana-ghatana) . These things came into existence

after the ancient principles of government were forgotten

during the times of cruel kings 15

5.3.6. Early Buddhism believed in the inherent

goodness of man. In this respect the mind of a man is

compared to a piece of gold ore, which is said to have the

defilements of dust and sand, gravel and grit, but when it

is purified it shines with its natural lustre, as he attains

the transcendent mind16 . These defilements are classified

as gross, medium and subtle. The gross defilements are

misconduct with regard to body, speech and mind; the medium

defilements are lustful and covetous thought, thoughts of

destruction and ill-will and the subtle defilements are

racial and national feelings, and personal or egoistic

pride17

5.3.7. The belief in the inherent goodness of man

led to the view that if man is educated in right and wrong,

he is likely to be law-abiding. The belief in the

possibility of transforming human nature, the need

with criminals with mercy and understanding18

, and

to deal

the

19 3

doctrine that officials are morally responsible for the acts

they do even in their official capacities (ra;no rajakaraniyam

hetu) 19 resulted in the abolition of capital punishment. It

is said that the king must follow a middle course between

extreme severity and laxity in punitive measures, for

punishment was regarded as a necessary evil of kingship20

However, it is also said that if punishments are necessary,

they should be awarded with careful measures (nissamma),

proportionate to the nature and degree of the offence

committed21 , but without harsh punishment22

5.3.8. It follows from this that the wrong-doer

should be punished primarily with a view to reform and

secondarily for

. d. . 1 23 v~n ~ct~ve y

deterrent reasons but never retributively or

In the Ratnavali 24 , which is a "discourse

to a king" (raja-parikatha) , Nagarjuna expresses his attitude

to criminals:

"You should punish them out of compassion

and from a desire to turn them into worthy

persons as you do as regards worthy sons;

and you should not be moved by hatred or

by desire for material gain"25

He further adds that as a consequence of compassion, mercy

should be shown to those who are punished, imprisoned or

beaten in accordance with law; prisoners should be well

looked after, no one should be imprisoned for life, and there

should be no mutilation or execution of criminals, though

b . h . . d26 an~s ment ~s perm~tte

194

5.4.1. A careful perusal of the juridical system of

early Buddhism as recorded in the Vinaya texts shows that

the Vinaya rules are not merely metaphorical or figurative.

There are certain rules, which consist of positive moral

instructions, but these also are to be called laws in a

proper sense. Divine laws, in the strict sense of the term,

have no place in early Buddhism (~.supra. 5.2.4). The laws

which are promulgated by the Buddha, as the founder and head

of the Order, consist of enforceable rules of conduct,

precisely stated and codified. There are also instructions

on juridical procedures laid down in the Vinaya texts for

trial and conviction in case of infringement. The Vinaya

laws were promulgated to promote the health and longevity

of the Sangha. Even to-day the Theravada Sangha abides by a

common doctrine known as the Dhamma and a common constitution

and code of laws called Vinaya. Moreover, the various

Mahayana and Tantric sects, though several of them have much

modified the rules of monastic conduct in practice, still

respect their own versons of the Vinaya Pitaka. This Vinaya

is considered as binding on all Sanghas, present or future.

5.5.1. In order to have a better understanding of

the Buddhist Vinaya laws, we must begin with the formation

of the Sangha. At first the Sangha was formed with five

monks 27 , and, soon after its establishment, it received

considerable support from the mercantile class. The Sangha

was established primarily to give the individual a training

in the higher morality, the higher thought and higher wisdom28

At first, admission to the Sangha, like the higher ordination,

195

was given by the Buddha himself and no legislation was

enacted, since, according to the tradition, the Sangha

consisted entirely of monks who had attained Arahantship29 ,

and thus would have no need of rules and regulations.

5.5.2. At this stage, there were sixty monks. The

Buddha addressed to them thus:

"Walk, monks, on tour for the welfare and

happiness of mankind, out of compassion

for the world, for the weal, welfare and

happiness of gods and men. Let not two

of you go in the same direction" 30 .

The monks who went on tour to teach Dhamma brought to the

Buddha persons from various districts and from different

states for admission and ordination. As this procedure was

cumbersome for all concerned, the Buddha allowed the monks

to admit and ordain new-comers by the repetition of the

. 31 formula of refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha

Apparently this was the second stage in devising regulations

for admitting persons to the Order, the first being

represented by the formula spoken by the Buddha, "Come, monk".

5.5.3. With the gradual growth of the number of monks

in the Sangha, these methods of admitting and ordaining did

not last very long. We can see from the statement of the

Buddha himself the need for and the purpose of rules and

regulations and of legislation. When one of his disciples

wanted to know why the religion of some enlightened teachers

lasted long while that of others did not do so, his reply was

196

that a religious dispensation lasted long because its founder

had given a detailed exposition of his teachings and also

"enacted a code of rules or precepts" (pa;:i;:iattam sikkhapadam)

and "enforce legislation binding on them" (anuddittha~

patimokkham)32

. Whereupon the disciple requested the Buddha

to enact rules and enforce legislation. The reply given was

that the Buddha does not make known rules or precepts or

enforce legislation until conditions leading to misdemeanours

appear in the Order, and that the time was not yet ripe for

such things. It was only when the Order had attained long

standing, that misdemeanours would arise. When this happened

the Buddha would make known the rules or precepts and also

enforce legislation in order to curb the conditions arising

f . d 33 rom m~s emeanours . It is said that at a later stage in

the history of the Sa~gha, towards the end of the Buddha's

life, the number of monks who had attained Arahantship was

porportionally less, but the code of monastic law had

d d . . 34 expan e ~n s~ze

5.5.4. Commenting on the Buddha's reply that the time

was not yet ripe for legislation, but that it would eventually

come, Jayatilleke writes:

"We notice here that legislation is

considered unnecessary or superfluous,

where conformity can be ensured without

it but that legislation makes for the

perpetuity of an institution and the aims

and aspirations for which it stands. At

the same time there is a constant reminder

'

5.5.5.

197

that legislation alone is of no avail.

Legislation itself contributes to a

legalistic frame of mind. People tend to

conform to the letter of the law forgetting

the spirit in which the laws wereenacted.

Others find ways and means (as happened

in the Sangha during the time of the

Buddha himself, contributing to the

growth of the law) of evading the law by

conforming to the letter of the law and

violating the spirit. The moral that is

generally drawn is that law-abiding

behaviour must result eventually from

charity, love and understanding and not

from a fear of the sanctions of the law•35

•

The earliest Vinaya rule, according to the

tradition, was laid down when a certain monk, who had

received initiation and was ordained, had sexual intercourse

. h h" f "f 36 w~t ~s ormer w~ e • Since the establishment of the

Sangha, it had hitherto fulfilled its aims and aspirations

under the instructions of the Buddha. The way in which

breaches of Dhamma steadily increased, demanding further

legislation on the part of the Buddha, might be interpreted

as a parallel to the beginnings and gradual increase of evil

customs with the decline of the world, according to the

tradition of the Agga~na Sutta, which we have discussed in

chapter two. As more and more monks infringed the guidelines,

it became necessary to lay down rules in order to regulate

198

the outward conduct of the Sangha. The term dhamma-vinaya,

used constantly in the Vinaya texts to indicate the two

factors which govern the Sangha. The word denotes "doctrine-

cum-discipline" or "philosophy-cum-law". The word Vinaya

in the general sense means "discipline" and in the special

sense, "the law and constitution of the Sangha" 37

5.5.6. It was only after the misbehaviour of the

uxorious monk, whose example was soon followed by others,

some of whom had found less worthy objects of sexual desire,

that a situation arose making it necessary to lay down laws

of moral conduct. These were in the form of "rules of

training or precepts" (sikkapada) voluntarily accepted as

binding by the monks. There were ten main rules of morality

or precepts (dasasikkhapada) to be adopted by one who is

entering the Sangha, and an increasing number of lesser

regulations, making a final total of 150 in the texts38

.

The Buddha gives the following reasons for enacting such a

code:

"I am enacting rules of training for the

monks, for the well-being of the community,

for the convenience of .the Community, in

order to curb miscreants, for the ease of

well-behaved monks, in order to restrain

misbehaviour in the present, in order to

check future misbehaviour, in order that

those who have no faith (in this religion)

may acquire faith, in order that those

who have faith may be further strengthened

5.5.7.

199

in their faith, in order that the good

doctrine (dharnma) may last long, and for

the promotion of discipline" 39

The laws of morality are meant to serve the

interests of the Buddhist Community as a whole, making things

easy for those whose behaviour is good and serving as a

deterrent to others. They are also intended to promote the

discipline of the Order, which is considered a good in itself • •

They are also laid down in order to seek and promote public

confidence. The Sangha was dependent on the laity for its

material needs and in .turn it had to perform the duty of

educating the public and giving them moral and spiritual

guidance. Thus we see a utilitarian and pragmatic motive

behind the legislation, as well as an attempt to maintain the

high standards of conduct required for spiritual progress 40

5.5.8. Miss Horner makes the following observation,

summarising, as it were, the true relationship that obtained

between the Sangha and lay supporters:

"For the believing laity, though naturally

not to the forefront in the Vinaya, are

in a remarkable way never absent, never

far distant. They perpetually enter into

the life of the Order as supporters,

critics, donors, intensely interested

It seems that they were deeply anxious for

its success. Thus the Vinaya does not

merely lay down sets of rules whose

5.5.9.

200

province was confined to an internal

conventual life. This was led in such

a way as to allow and even to encourage

a certain degree of inter-communication

with the lay supporters and followers, no

less than with those lay-people who were

not adherents of the faith. What was

important, was that the monks should

neither abuse their dependence on the

former, nor alienate the latter, but

should regulate their lives so as to give

no cause for complaint. With these aims

in view, conduct that was not thought

seemly for them to indulge in had to be

carefully defined, and it became drafted

in rules and precepts• 41

Later, when the rules or monastic laws were

codified, the set of legally binding rules (patimokkha) was

formally recited every fortnight at a formal meeting of each

Sangha. The rules were codified and enforced binding on

monks since the central issue of authority and obligation of

the Sangha was raised under the question of obedience and

coercion, in answer to such question as: "Why should a monk

obey the Order?" and "If he disobeys may he be coerced?".

The going for refuge to the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha was

abolished from the normal procedure of ordination, but it

was retained as a formula to be repeated when novices and

former members of the other sects were accepted on probation

201

as candidates for ordination42 • By abolishing the old

formula, admission and ordination took a more formal

character. This can be seen from the statement of the Buddha

himself:

"From this day forth, monks, I abolish that

ordination by going to the three refuges

which I allowed. I allow you, monks, to

ordain by a formal act consisting of a

motion and a resolution put three times" 43 .

According to this statement, it is evident that the Order

along has the authority, the power and the legal right to

d . 44 or a~n .

5.5.10. In addition, the candidate for ordination now

has to have a preceptor. After a brief period of probation

and experienced and capable monk, who is well-versed in

Dhamma and Vinaya, of a particular monastery would propose

at a formal meeting of the Sangha that such and such a person

be ordained by such and such a preceptor. The matter was

placed before the assembly as a formal motion, which was read

thrice, and if none dissented it was deemed to have unanimously

passed. The formalism of this procedure can be illustrated

as follows:

"The Order should be informed by an

experienced, competent monk, saying:

'Honoured Sirs, let the Order hear me.

This (person) so and so wishes for

ordination from the Venerable so and so.

So and so asks the Order for ordination

202

through the preceptor so and so. This

is the motion. Honoured Sirs, let the

Order hear me ... If the ordination of

so and so through the preceptor so and

so is pleasing to the venerable ones, let

them be silent; he to whom it is not

pleasing should speak. And a second time

I speak forth this matter ... And a third

time ..• It is pleasing to the Order,

therefore they are silent .,45

This same formula is repeated to this day as a preliminary to

the ordination of a Buddhist monk; it vividly illustrated

the legalistic aspect of the life of the Buddhist Sangh.a, a

feature which appeared very early in its history.

5.6.1. It is evident from the Vinaya texts that the

legally binding rules (patimokkha) were enforced because the

Order was growing and that, in order to meet this expansion,

it had to be carefully controlled46 . With the expansion of

the Order, corrupt monks appeared. These monks caused

disputes, contentions and even brawls. There were also an

unspecified number of people seeking for admission to the

Order, but there were no proper rules as to .who was eligible

for it. Therefore the inner life of the Order had to be

safeguarded with planned and carefully arranged rules and

regulations. At the same time, they were necessary in order

to maintain ties with the secular society47

5.6.2. The word patimokkha has been translated variously,

203

and many interpretations have been put forward. Let us take

some of them. According to Oldenberg, it means freedom

"from sins" 48 . He further adds that the list of those

offences which deserved punishment or some kind of expiation

was, at a very early period, drawn up for use at confessional.

meetings. This list was read out to the assembled monks, and

each one was asked whether he knew himself to be free from

the sins there named. This list is called the patimokkha49

Miss Hornercriticises Oldenberg's interpretation and points

out that the monks were not asked, as Oldenberg states,

whether they were "free from the sins there named". The

word for "free" or "freed" would have been vimutta. What

they were asked was whether they were parisuddha, pure in

the matter of having kept the rules, therefore outwardly

pure. Moreover, she points out that the word "sin" is not a

Buddhist conception50

5.6.2. The word patimokkha is defined in the Mahavagga

as the "face, head of all good states"51 , but, as Winternitz

points out, this derivation "is quite impossible" 52 . He

himself is inclined to explain patimokkha as "that which is

to be redeemed" 53 . Rhys Davids and Oldenberg say that

according to the derivation of the word pa~i (Skt. prati)

~~ it means "to free one-self, to get rid of"; and it is

precisely through the patimokkha recitation and answering the

questions that the members of the Sangha were set free from

the offences they had incurred. Therefore, patimokkha means

"disburdening, getting free" 54 . But Miss Horner points out

that it was not the getting free that was of such importance

204

as the being bound, and that the assumption is that the

rules, as binding, should be followed and obeyed, and that

a monk should be "bound by the restraint of the patimokkha"

- 55 (patimokkhasanvarasanvutu) .

5.6.3. S. Dutt, taking the etymological interpretation

of the word prati as "against" and moksa as "scattering" sees

it as "bond". He says that it is an external bond of union

d . d h . 1" . d 56 ev1se to convert t e sect 1nto a re 1g1ous Or er Rhys

Davids and Stede say that the word has the "sense of binding,

obligatory, obligation", and literally it means "that which

should be made binding" 57 Miss Horner, in her translation

of the Vinaya texts, left the word untranslated, but says

that it means "bond" and refers as "binding legislation"58

5.6.4. The P.atimokkha consists of two parts, the

Bhikku-patimokkha and Bhikkuni-patimokkha, for monks and

nuns respectively. In the first of these, which is the most

important, and upon which the second is based, 227 offences

that may be committed by monks are classified under seven

categories in a descending order. They are: (i) parajika,

(ii) sanghadisesa, (iii) aniyata, (iv) nissaggiya-pacittiya,

(v) pacittiya, (vi) ~~idesaniya and (vii) sekhiya59 . There

are also a number of other kinds of offences like thullacciya,

dukkata and dubbhasita, which were later additions60 .

5.6.5. The worst category of offences grouped under

these seven headings is parajika and the lightest one is

sekhiya. The parajika offences are: (i) sexual intercourse,

(ii) theft, (iii) murder or abetting of murder and (iv) pretence

205

f . . . 1 f . 61 o possess1ng sp1r1tua per ect1ons According to the

Vinaya, any monk who violates. these basic commands of

monastic discipline is automatically excluded from the

Order62 . Sanghadisesa is a class of offence whose punishment

must be meted out by some formal administration on the part

of the Order63 . Aniyata is an offence the guilt of which

uncertain, and which requires the investigation of evidence.

Where the evidence is not clear offences of the other

. b . 64 categor1es • ecome an1yata Nissagiya - pacittiya is a

c.lass of offence which involves the infringement of the rule

that the monk should abandon all, or almost all, his personal

possessions except those few permitted by the Buddha65

Pacittiya offences require expiation66 . Patidesaniya offences

ought to be confessed and are normally pardoned by the Order

. h . h 67 Wlt a warnlng not to repeat t em Sekhiya is a rule of

good breeding. It gives instruction to be observed by a monk

in his daily life. Breaches of sekhiya rules are not treated

as offences and no punishment is therefore prescribed for

them68 . We do not propose to scrutinize the various types of

offences which are categorized under these seven headings,

as this would divert us from the present discussion.

5.7.1. The jurisdiction of each Sangha extended only

as far as its geographical boundaries or ''territorial limits"

(sima), which were strictly defined, and this was another

innovation of the Buddha69 . These Sanghas extended beyond

the limits of political units and there was constant inter­

course between them. The singular word Sangha was used to

denote all the Buddhist communities collectively and was

206

designated "the Sangha of the four quarters, of the present

- - - - . 70 and the future" (agatanagatassa catuddisassa sanghassa) .

They all abode by the same Dhamma andthe same Vinaya,

except for the fact that those rules which were proposed and

adopted by one Sangha and had only a local relevance were not

binding on another Sangha unless that Sangha decided to

adopt them71 .

5.7.2. Executive, legislative and judicial powers

were vested in the Sangha72 , and the decision of the Sa~gha,

if necessary, were enforced by the secular state73 , which

did not in any way interfere with the authority or

jurisdiction of the Sangha over its members 74 . s. Dutt, for

example, writes that the Sangha as it developed became

virtually one of the constituent communities of the body

politic. It possessed, above all, a well-developed and

well-organized body of laws, which enjoyed state recognition,

and to that extent it was a part of the civil law 75 .

5.7.3. Authorities on ancient Indian plity,,like

Kautilya, specially advise kings to respect and enforce the

rules made by corporations, religions or secular, for the

discipline of their members, and laid down that infringements

of the laws of such bodies were punishable by the secular

state76 . Moreover, there have been many instances where the

secular state came to be involved with the Sangha over legal

matters. For instance, we are told how the royal officers

accepted the verdict of the Sangha in a case of alleged

77 theft by some monks .

207

5.7.4. At the same time, the Buddha advises the

monks to conform their behaviour to the royal wishes

(anujanami bhikkhave rajunam anuvattitum) 78 . Moreover, the

rules regarding admission to the Order were so based as to

avoid all inconvenience to the secular state, in that

soldiers and slaves were excluded. For example, we are told

that the monks once ordained "some soldiers. But this resulted

in a complaint against the monks, and the Buddha thereupon

prohibited•the admission of officers of state to 79 the Order .

This is a clear proof that the monks had to adapt themselves

to certain given situations.

5.7.5. We are thus assured that the laws of Vinaya

are legally valid, since they received the state's

recognition. They did not apply, moreover, to a narrow

private body, but to an international institution, the sa~gha

80 of the present and future . Four formal sources of law

(cattaro mahapadesa) are mentioned, namely the claim that a

rule was (i) promulgated by the Buddha, (ii) by a unitary

Sangha, (iii) by a body of learned

(iv) by a single learned expert of

experts of the law and

the law81 , but it is said

that the authority of all four claims should be investigated

and confirmed, and the laws adopted only if they are in

conformity with the spirit of the existing Dhamma and Vinaya82

.

5.7.6. The Sangha is deemed a juridical person having

a legal personality of its own, and it has the right of owning

property, which is vested in the monastic community. The

Sa~gha is a system in which property is held in common.

208

B.K. Mukerjee writes in the following words:

5.7.7.

"The Buddhist Sangha was undoubtedly a

juristic person and was capable of

holding property in the same way as a

private person could ... the ordinary

formalities of gifts were observed by the

donor when he wanted to dedicate any

property to the Buddhist congregation,

and the gift was accepted on behalf of

the Sangha by its head or representative.

The property did not become the private

property of the ostensible donee, nor

could it be said to belong jointly to all

the monks who were members of the

congregation at that particular time. It

was the property of the congregation

itself which could not but be deemed to

be a separate entity for this purpose and

which continued to exist even if all its

members died out or were replaced by

83 other people"

That all property was vested in the universal

Sangha and lent to the individual for use is clear from

several passages in the Vinaya texts. For example:

"Monks, the Sangha is the owners of the

bowl and robes of a monk who has passed

away. But truly those who tend the sick

are of great service. I approve of your

5.8.1.

209

giving through the Sangha the three robes

and bowl to those who tended the sick and

also of your distributing through the

(resident) Sangha in their presence the

light goods and the light requisites that

are there; but whatever heavy goods and

heavy requisites that are there, these

belong to the Sangha of the four quarters

of the present and future - they are--not

to be disposed of and not to be divided

up"84

Chapter nine of the Mahavagga contains a

thorough discussion about the validity and invalidity of the

formal acts that the Order can carry out. To sum up, the

following would be the essential conditions of a valid act.

(i) The Order must be complete.

(ii) Those who are unable to attend due

to illness or some other reason

should ask leave to be absent, and

those who are present should not

protest against the proceedings of

the assembly.

(iii) The proposal of the motion.

(iv) The proclamation of the resolution

once or thrice.

(v) Consent to the proposal given by

silence. When there is a division

of opinion, it becomes a case of

5.8.2.

210

dispute. But when the matter is

decided by a valid act, it becomes

fit to stand, and protests against

its validity will be of no avai1 85 .

Formal acts of the Sangha may be either

disciplinary of non-disciplinary86 These acts are deemed

invalid if the constitutional procedure laid down is violated.

This would eventually lead to a dispute. The Vinaya texts •

discuss the methods of conducting trials and settling various

disputes (adhikarana-samatha). It is said that there are

four kinds of dispute. They are:

(il Vivadadhikarana - the disputes which ~

may arise on the interpretation given

to certain specified matters such as

Dharnrna, Vinaya, the teachings,

practices, or ordinances of the

Buddha, and the nature of

ecclesiastical punishments.

(ii) Anuvadadhikarana - the disputes

which may arise regarding the state

of a monk's opinion, morals,

character, conduct, or manner of

life.

(iii l Apattadhikarar;a - the disputes

which may arise on the offences

mentioned in section 5.6.4.

(iv) Kiccadhikarana - disputes which

may arise regarding the procedure

211

of a formal act and the decision

given by the Order, or the duties

and obligation of the sangha87

Chapter four of the Cullavagga discusses thoroughly the

different methods of settling these disputes 88

5.8.3. The general method of settling disputes is

confrontation (sammukhavinaya). It involves four conditions.

First, the trial should be held in the presence of the

accused monk. It is said:

"Monks, a formal act of censure or guidance

or banishment or reconciliation or

suspension should not be carried out

against monks who are not present.

Whoever should carry one out, there is

an offence of wrong-doing" 89

Secondly, the trial should be held in the presence of the

full assembly authorized to conduct it. Thirdly, the accused

should be charged according to the letter and the spirit of

the law (i.e. Dhamma and Vinaya) under which he is charged

and an account of the procedure for settlement as laid down

by the Buddha should be recited, and finally, he should be

tried in the presence of the complainant90 This four-fold

confrontation is necessary for the settlement of all disputes.

If, for any reason, a local Sangha is unable to settle a

dispute by means of confrontation, the case is referred to

another Sangha and it is settled there if the latter agrees91

5.8.4. Another method of settling disputes is

212

sativinaya, which is a disciplinary proceeding under appeal

to the accused monk's own conscience. If a monk is wrong-

fully accused and is found innocent, the Order must

repudiate the charges and must take action against the monk

who brought the false accusation92 . If a monk committed an

offence while insane, acquittal on the ground of insanity is

granted. This is granted under one of three conditions:

(i) the accused confesses the offence committed when reminded

of it, (ii)• the accused cannot remember it owing to lapse

of memory, (iii) the accused continues in an insane state of

mind93 .

5.8.5. An attempt should be made to secure a

confession by reminding the person of the circumstances in

which the offence was committed, as far as the assembly was

aware. This method is called pati~natakarana. This is . . followed by the formal charge, after which the trial preceeds,

giving a full opportunity for the accused to present his

case and point of view94

5.8.6. If in the course of the proceedings the Order

feels that it is difficult to come to a decision, it may

appoint a committee (ubbahika) to settle the matter.

"Honoured Sirs, let the Order listen to

me. While we are investigating this

legal question both endless disputations

arose and of not one speech was the

meaning clear. If it seems right to the

Order, the Order may agree to appoint a

5.8.7.

213

committee to settle this legal question.

This is the motion ... If the Order is

pleasing to appoint a committee, the

Order should be silent and if any one

is not pleased let him speak ..... 95

If this committee finds it impossible to

decide the matter delegated to it, it should report back to

the Order, who may then settle it by the decision of the

. . 96 ma]or~ty This is carried out by members who are fully

ordained after their periods of probation and who have one

vote each. Voting is always on a resolution formally moved

once or thrice according to the importance of the matter

under discussion. Voting is by means of marked voting

tickets with different signs (salaka), which are distributed

and subsequently counted and the majority opinion ascertained97 .

5.8.8. Moreover, voting is carried out by a secret

method (gulhaka), open method (vivataka), or by the . . whispering method (sakanna-jappaka). A special officer called .. the "arbitrator" (salaka-gahapaka - literally meaning "vote-

taker"), noted for his impartiality, knowledge of the law and

voting procedure is unanimously elected by a formal resolution

of the assembly to take charge of voting. The arbitrator,

having marked the voting tickets with different signs,

proceeds to take votes in either of three methods. He may

either call upon each monk and speak to him: "This ticket

is for one of such a view, this ticket is for one of such a

view. Take whichever you like"; when he has taken it, he

214

should be told: "Do not tell anyone about it", or he may

call upon each monk and whisper the same thing into his ear.

After voting has finished and has been counted either by

secret or whispering methods, if the arbitrator finds that

the majority profess what is not Dhamma and thinks that

voting was wrongly taken, the result should be rejected.

On the other hand, if he finds that the majority profess

Dhamma and thinks voting was rightly taken, the result

should be announced. If the arbitrator finds that those

who profess Dh~ are in a majority, because of his very

confidence he should take voting openly98

5.8.9. The arbitrator, who enjoys the confidence of

the whole Order, has the privileges of deciding how the

voting should be conducted, the right of rejecting the

decision, and also the right to advise members on matters

legal and moral, if he fears a breach of justice. From the

powers given to him we can see that it is not merely the

consent of the majority that mattered but the conformity of

the decision with the spirit and the letter of law, that is,

. h h d . 99 Wlt D aroma an Vlnaya

5.8.10. These are some of the methods which have to be

followed in conducting trials and settling disputes in the

Buddhist Order. These proceedings display a healthy and

sound democratic attitude. The opinions and rights of the

individual are respected and every accused person is given a

chance to express his views. All in all, these proceedings

show that the principles of justice of early Buddhism, which

215

we discussed earlier (5.3.1- 5.3.7), were scrupulously

observed.

5.8.11. Miss Horner, who translated the entire Vinaya

texts, points out that the discipline, at the beginning of

the training, "is a teaching of commands (anadesana), being

taught by the Buddha in respect of a multitude of commands

for those meriting commands" 100 She further says:

"Practically every conceivable thing

affecting monastic life for monks and

nuns, practically every conceivable

relation with other human beings, whether

fellow monks or nuns or the laity, are

brought under review and legislated for

in minutest detail It is a very

complete system, a very precise

organization, marked throughout by the

humaneness and reasonableness of Gotama,

the codifier to whom but few exception

1 . . 'b d"lOl every ru lng lS ascrl e .

5.9.1. The Sangha was a "system of government formed

by the Bhikkhus, Bhikkunis, Upasakas and upasikas", and it

was a republican democratic institution set up by the Buddha

for the good of its members as well as of mankind in general.

He intended it to continue to function on the same democratic

basis after his death102 . The question was raised, during

the last days of the Buddha's life, as to how in the absence

of the Teacher, there could be unity in the Sangha, since he

216

had not appointed a personal successor or head of the Order

to function in his place after his death. The Buddha

replied:

"So behave that you make yourselves your

own island (dipa) 103 , your own refuge;

and that you seek no other refuge. So

behave that you rely upon the Dhamma as

your own refuge and that you seek no

104 other refuge"

The assurance given is that the system in itself is capable

of taking the place of the Master in his absence. Such an

idea was a novel one and was unknown to the political or

1 . . . . . ddh. 105 re lglous organlzatlon contemporary or prlor to Bu lsm .

5.9.2. Early Buddhism was acquainted with both

monarchy and republican democracy, but favoured the latter.

We use this term in the same sense as it is applied to

ancient Greek institutions, implying a system wherein a large

number of citizens had some say in the determination of policy.

There is no need to press the point that such tribal republics

existed in early India. That Buddhism favours democracy can

be seen from the account of Agga~a Sutta, which conceives of

the state as democratic. In such a democracy, what is

important, according to early Buddhism, is not merely the

rule of the majority but rule in conformity with the law of

righteousness. Although early Buddhism favours democracy, it

considers that any form of government is good to the extent

to which it follows the law of righteousness.

217

5.9.3. The Sangha was set up on democratic

foundation, and the concept of the Sangha appears to have

been derived from that of a democratic political state. The

early Buddhist texts mention as an example worthy of

emulation the republic of the Vajjians, contemporary with

the Buddha. The Buddha speaks very appreciatively of the

Vajjian tribe:

"As long as they meet in concord, conclude

their meetings in concord, and carry out

their policies in concord; as long as

they make no laws not already promulgated,

and set aside nothing enacted in the past,

acting in accordance with the ancient

institutions of the Vajjis established in

olden days; ... as long as they respect,

esteem, reverence, and support the elders

of the Vajjis, and look on it as a duty

to heed their words; ... as long as no

women or girl of their tribes are held by

force or abducted; as long as they

respect, esteem, reverence, and support the

shrines of the Vajjis, whether in town or

country, and do not neglect the proper

offerings and rites laid down and practised

in the past; ... as long as they give due

protection, deference, and support to the

perfected beings (arahants) among them so

that such perfected beings may come to the

5.9.4.

218

land from afar and live comfortably among

them, so long may they be expected not to

decline, but to flourish• 106 .

This is followed by a longer passage in which

the Buddha is purported to have adapted the seven conditions

of the welfare state to the circumstances of the Buddhist

Order. In this passage 41 conditions of the welfare of the

Sangha are listed. The nature of this long list, mostly '

referring to moral qualities, suggests that it is not

authentically the Buddha's words, but nevertheless it reflects

the ideals of early Buddhism. Virtues of harmony, affection

(metta) are stressed and strict discipline is commended.

5.9.5. The reference to the Vajjis is interesting

because of the comment made by Buddhaghosa.

"As for the 'ancient Vajjian constitution'

it is said when a thief was brought before

the rulers, they handed him over to the

judicial officers (viniccaya-mahamatta) .

They investigated the facts and if they

thought that he was not a thief they

released him but if they suspected that

he was a thief, they handed him over to

the magistrates (voharika) without making

any statement themselves. They in turn

investigated the matters and if they

thought he was not a thief they released

him but if they suspected that he was a

5.9.6.

219

thief they handed him over to the

justices (sutta-dhara) they in turn

to a panel of eight judges (attha-kulika)

.•. they in turn to the president, who

investigated the case and if he thought

that he was not a thief, released him but

if he was convinced that he was a thief

called for the book of precedents (paveni­

potthaka) . There it is written down that

such and such was the punishment for such

and such offence. The president, there­

upon, compared his offence with those and

ordered the appropriate punishment. Thus

the people who abode by the "ancient

Vajjian constitution" had no disgruntlement

(against the state) because justice was

done in accordance with the ancient

tradition and they felt that if anyone was

at fault it was themselves and not the

officials (of the state). And as a result

they performed their task with a sense of

responsibility. In this way the state

prospered'' 107

This passage, from a commentary composed almost

a thousand years after the Buddha's death does not certainly

record historical fact, and the Vajjian legal system seems

almost too cumbersome to be possible in a small state. Never­

theless, the passage may depend on an early tradition,

220

exa99erated in transmission, and at least it reflects the

value placed by Theravada Buddhism on a system of justice

which gives every consideration to the accused, and is

firmly based on precedent.

5.10.1. The Buddha set up the Sangha, the oldest

international society in history, which was to function after

his death in accordance with its constitution (vinaya), drawn

up for the furtherance of the law of righteousness and the

teachings of the Buddha108 . This can be seen from the

statement of the Buddha himself. Just before his death he

tells Ananda that it was possible that they might think that

after his death they would be without a teacher and adds:

"You should not look at things in this

light. The Dhamma that has been taught

and the Vinaya that has been laid down by

me should serve as the Teacher after I

109 pass away"

Further, it is said:

5.10.2.

"If the Sangha so desires, it may abolish

the minor rules of the Community after my

death" 110 .

According to the tradition as handed down by

the Theravadins, when the First Buddhist Council was held

soon after the death of the Buddha, there it was questioned

as to which sections of the Buddha's doctrines were to be

rehearsed first. And, it is recorded, the monks declared that

the Vinaya should be rehearsed first, for "the Vinaya, indeed,

221

is the lifeblood (ayu - "vitalizing factor") of the Buddha

Sasana. so long as the Vinaya lasts, the Sasana would last"

( ... Vinayo nama Buddha-sasanassa ayu; vinaye thite sasanam

thitam hoti. - . - - - 111 Tasma pathamam vinayam sangayama'ti ... ) . ~·

Thus they maintained that the very survival of the Sasana

would depend entirely on the Vinaya. It is said in the

Mahavagga that "the teaching persists while Vinaya is not

destroyed" (vinaye avinatthamhi puna titthati sasanam) 112 .

These statements indicate the position held by the Vinaya in

Buddhism. The life of the Sasana, it was unequivocally

acknowledged by the Theravadin, is in the hands of the Order,

whose survival and p~rity, in turn, depended entirely on the

Vinaya. Therefore, it is indispensable for the existence of

the Sasana. The Vinaya, as promulgated, is itself an

authority. It consists of the commands and prohibitions of

the Buddha. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that

there is no Buddhist law.

222

CONCLUSION

6.1.1. In the introductory chapter of this thesis,

we stated that we would examine the view that early Buddhism

is incompatible with social and political ideas. We believe

that we have produced enough evidence to disprove this view.

Though, for obvious reasons, the bulk of the Pali canon deals

with metaphysical, epistemological, psychological and ethical

questions, there is sufficient material in it to show that

the early Buddhists had definite ideas and ideals concerning

social and political life. In order to show this many

passages have been quoted in extenso.

6.1.2. These ideas were comparatively rational and

equalitarian. The early Buddhists rejected the idea of

divine authority and the divine origin of kingship and based

their political thought on a doctrine involving a social

contract, apparently the first doctrine of social contract in

the history of thought. They strongly maintained that the

fundamental ethical principles which governed all life in

the cosmos - Dhamrna - were valid in social and political as

well as in individual life, and rejected the rather

Machiavelli<'l.n view of the state which is reflected in the

Arthasastra of Kautilya.

6.1.3. They seem to have set themselves against the

growing tendencies to autocracy, which culminated in the

Mauryan Empire, and, if we are to believe the "seven

conditions for the welfare of the Vajjis" contained in the

Mahaparinibbana Sutta, they tended to idealize the republican,

223

more democratic tribal states which were already declining

in power and influence when the Buddha taught .. They strongly

maintained that the ideal state works for the material and

spiritual welfare of the people, guaranteeing religious,

social, political and individual freedom, as well as economic

security with full employment. This is the first time in

Indian history that the idea of a "general good" or "a common

good", not only affecting the common man but also pertaining

to the peoples of the world, is envisaged.

6.1.4. Moreover, the early Buddhists strongly

maintained the idea of a common humanity transcending national

and racial barriers. In respect of law they maintained that

it must have a universally acceptable moral basis; they

favoured speedy justice and equality of punishment, and were

not inclined to give advantages to litigants or criminals of

high birth. All in all, they were concerned with the

reformation of society as well as the perfectibility of the

individual and maintained as an ideal the concept of the

world becoming a single international political order, under

the Cakkavatti.

6.1.5. Thus we may justly say that the early Buddhists,

though they may not have been rationalists, humanists, or

democrats in the modern sense, did anticipate, in an earlier

more rudimentary form, many of the ideals of modern liberal

democracy. Their influence on Indian civilization as a whole

was not strong enough to directly affect its political

institutions, but the more humanitarian and paternalistic

224

aspects of Hindu kingship may well owe something to the

influence of early Buddhism, perhaps chiefly mediated by

Asoka. Several of the social and political ideas reflected

in the Pali canon may be found, in very modified form, in

much later Hindu literature of a didactic nature, such as

the interpolated portions of the Epics and the Dharmasastras.

6.1.6. Thus we conclude that early Buddhism played a

part in the moulding of Indian political ideas which was by

no means insignificant. In the social thought of India its

influence was less, since in early medieval times we meet

kings, for instance the Palas of Bengal, who declare themselves

to be Buddhists and at the same time are proud of the fact

that they are upholders of the "rules of class and stages of

life" (varnasrama-dharma) . In this respect the persistent

class-consciousness of India was too strong for its early

Buddhists critics. Although early Buddhism had little

permanent influence in the social thought of India, it had an

increasing effect upon the Buddhist nations of Asia in their

social and political life.

6.1.7. We cannot claim that we have said the last

word on the social and political ideas of early Buddhism.

Nevertheless we may have produced enough evidence to show

that it is not as "frustrating" as some earlier writers have

claimed C::;:. supra. 1. 3. 3) to discover the basic elements of a

social and political philosophy in the texts of early Buddhism.

There are still numerous gaps in our knowledge., and we trust

that later students may find in our study the stimulus to try

to fill them.

A.

AA.

AB.

-AD.

AU.

BD.

B.Disp.

BG.

BU.

Cornm.

cu.

D.

DA.

Dhp.

Dial.

DPPN.

Dpv.

EB

ERE.

GD.

It.

J.

JB.

KA.

M.

225

ABBREVIATIONS

Anguttara Nikaya

Anguttara Nikaya Atthakatha (Manorathapurani)

Aitareya Briihmana

- -Apastamba Dharmasutra

Aitareya Upanisad

Baudhayana Dharmasutra

Book of the Discipline (Translation of the Vinaya Pitaka)

•

Bhagavad-Gita

Brhadaranyaka Upanisad

Commentary

Chandogya Upanisad

nigha Nikaya

Digha Nikaya Atthakatha (Sumangalavilasinil

Dhammapada

Dialogues of the Buddha (Translation of the Digha Nikaya)

Malalasekera, G.P., Dictionary of Pali Proper Names

Dipavamsa

Malalasekara, G.P. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Buddhism

Hastings, J. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics

Gautama Dharmasutra

Itivuttaka

Jataka

Jaiminiya Brahmana

Kautiliya Arthasastra

Majjhima Nikaya

MA.

Manu.

Mbh.

Mhv.

Mhvu.

Miln.

MT.

o.u.P.

PB.

PED.

PTS.

PU.

RV.

s.

SB.

SBB.

SBE.

SBH.

SED.

Sn.

SnA.

TB.

TS.

TU.

v.

VA.

VD.

Vi sm.

226

Majjhima Nikaya Atthakatha (Papancasudani)

Manu Smrti or Manavadharmasastra

Mahabharata

Mahavaffisa

Mahavastu

Milindapanha

Mahavaffisa Tika

Oxford University Press

... ......, _,. -Pancavimsa Brahmana

Rhys Davids, T.W. and Stede, w. (eds.), Pali English Dictionary

Pali Text society

Radhakrishnan, S., The Principal of Upanisads

Rg-Veda

samyutta Nikaya Atthakatha (saratthappakasini) . . . Satapatha Brahmana

Sacred Books of the Buddhists

Sacred Books of the East

Sacred Books of the Hindus

Monier-Williams, M., Sanskrit English Dictionary

sutta Nipata

sutta Nipata Atthakatha (Paramatthajotika)

Taittiriya Brahmana

Taittiriya saffihita

Taittiriya Upanisad

Vinaya Pitaka

vinaya Pitaka Atthakatha (Samantapasadika)

Vasistha Dharmasutra

Visuddhimagga

,~~ms EA~TEhE~~~x

pBS,UEdD ~~,O~SE~~BA

>~~ms nus>A

L'G'G

·sx

'DA

'SA

228

*"'·

NOTES

Except where stated in the notes some of the translations

are taken from the PTS and other series, editors and

translators of which are mentioned in the bibliography.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

No. Page

1 Curtis, M., ed. The Great Political Theories, 'voi. 1, ( 1961) , p. 23.

2 Basham, A.L., The Wonder That was India, (1954, Rep.l971), p.80.

Ghoshal, U.N., A History of Indian Political

1

!deas, (1959), p.3. 1

3. Ghoshal, Ibid., p.529.

4. Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p.l41.

Basham, A.L., "The Rise of Buddhism in its Historical Context", (1966), p.399.

1

2

5. 0.3.180-93. 2

6. For example see: Goddard, D., ed. A Buddhist Bible, (1970), p.645 ff. 3

7. Coomaraswamy, A.K., Hinduism and Buddhism, (n.d.), p.48. 3

8. King, W.L., In the Hope of Nibbana, An Essay on Theravada Buddhist Ethics, (1964), p.l76. 3

9. Ibid., p.l77. 4

10. Life Magazine, Issue on "Buddhism", (7th March, 1955). 4

11. Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie, (1921), p.220 ff. trs. Gerth, H.H. and Martindale, D., (1958), pp.206, 226. 4

12. "Buddhism" in A Cultural History of India, (ed. Basham, A.L., 1975), p.97. 5

229

No. Page

13. Rhys Davids, T.W., Buddhist India, (1903), p .132.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

ERE, vol. 7, s.v.Law (Buddhist)

Indian Philosophy, vol.l, (1948), p.360. This v1ew is again presented in a preface written by him in 1956 to 2500 Years of of Buddhism, (ed. Bapat, P.V., 1956), p.ix.

Op.cit., p.45.

Buddhism, (1899), p.83.

Ibid., 84.

Ibid., p. 85.

For example see: Law, N.N., Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity, (1921), p.90 ff.

A History of Hindu Political Theories

Op.cit., (1959), p.69.

"The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine", (1967).

Ibid., p.534 (94).

24. For examples: Bhagvat, D.N., Early Buddhist Jurisprudence, (1939). Chan Toon, Principles of Buddhist Law, (1902), Dutt, S., Early Buddh1st Monarchism, (1960). De,Gokuldas, Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha, (1955).

25. Probably all modern works dealing with ancient Indian polity have a chapter or two or a few sections on early Buddhist social and political ideas. The subject of ancient Indian polity has been treated by many writers both Indians and foreign. Early Buddhist social and political ideas are to be found discussed, for example, in the following works. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), Chs. 4, 14 and 19. Warder, A.K., Indian Buddhism, (1970), Ch.6. Ling, T., The Buddha, (1973), Chs. 6-8 of part 3. Basham, A.L., "Theravada Buddhism" in Sources of Indian Tradition, (ed. De Bary, Wm.T., 1958), Ch.6, Section 3. Rahula,

5

6

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

8

9

W., What the Buddha Taught, (1959), Ch.8. 9

26. For examples: Malalasekera, G.P. and Jayatilleke, K.N., Buddhism and the Race Question, (1958). Jayatilleke, K.N. ''Buddhism

No.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32 •.

33.

34.

35.

230

and Peace", (1962); ''Aspects of Buddhist Social Philosophy'', (1970). Wijesekera, O.H.de A., "Buddhism and Society", (n.d.). Gokhale, B. G., "The Early Buddhist View of the State", ( 19 69) ; "The Early Buddhist Kingship", (1966); "Dhamma as a Political Concept in Early Buddhism", (1968). Malalasekera, G.P., ''Buddhist Socialism", (1972). Reynolds, F., "The Two Wheels of Dhamma", (1972).

Anuruddha, K., Studies in Buddhist Social Thought as Documented ln the Pall Traditlon, Unpubllshed PhD thesls, Lancaster Unlverslty, (1972). Warnasuriya, K.S. Buddhist Social Philosophy, Unpublished PhD thesis, Lancaster University, (1974).

Op.cit., (1966), p.403.

Ibid., p.404.

Op.cit., (1972), p.6.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.532 (92).

Gard, R.A., Buddhist Influences on the Political Thought of India and Japan, (1949), p.l; ''Buddhist Polltical Thought", (1952), p.viii.

Ibid., (1952), p.24.

Op.cit., (1966), p.395.

"Christianity and Buddhism", (1962), p.3.

Page

9

9

10

10

ll

ll

12

14

15

15

231

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND AUTHORITY

No. Page

1.

2.

3.

39. .a,r:

5.

6.

7.

8.

Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture, (1966), p.l6.

A History of Indian Political Ideas, (1959), p.SO.

For examples: Spellman, J.W., Political Theory of Ancient India, (1964), pp.l-24. Sharma, R.S., Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions 1n Anc1ent Ind1a, (1959), pp.64-76.

~1\•Sho.ll., Ojo·C~t.., c IH""')' I>. 3(, "\'\.• ...

k><L·. ~. • 1'1 - ;t:). V.l0.90.

AV.l9.6.6, BD.l.l0.18.2-6, TS.7.1.1.4-6, PB.6.1.6-ll, Manu.l.88-9l.

RV.l0.173-174, SB.ll.l.6.24, AV.3.3-5, BU.l.4.ll-l5, Manu.l.89, KA.l.3.6.

Manu. 7. 2 . 3 .:

Ghoshal, Op. cit. , ( 19 59) , p. 2 4. A.L., The Wonder That was India, p.243.

Basham, (1954)'

18

18

18 18 l'l 19

20

20

20

20

9. RV.l.32. 21

10. TS.8.l.l.4-6, TB.2.3.10.l, PB.6.1.6-ll, BU.5.2.l. 21

11. TU.3.3.8.3. 21

12. Gopatha Uttarabhaga.3.18. cf. Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963) 1 p.l78. 21

13. BU.l.4.10 1 D.3.28 21

14. TB.2.2.7.2; 2.2.10.4, PB.l5.3.30, JB.3.152, SB.2.6.3.8, AB.7.17; 8.13, Manu.7.3-l3. 22

15. Mbh.l2.12.59. 22

16. TS.2.6.2.5; 5.10.10.3, AB.8.1.4.2, PB.ll.l.2, Manu.l.93. 24

17. SB.5.3.3.12; 8.4.15, AB.9.9, TS.2.5.10.l. 24

18. Op.cit.,(l959),p.32. 24

19. AB.8.27. 24

\

No.

20.

2olj. 21.

22.

23.

24.

232

"Spiritual Authority and the Temporal Power in"''rndian Theory of Government",

" (1942), p.l. Bo..s""""'' Cp· ~-~-·, C I'IS4-) , I>· '::l..lf:?. Aitareya Brahmana,. (1863), p. 73 ff.

Op.cit., (1959), p.25.

RV. 8.10 .1.

RV.7.18, AV.3.19, AB.8.24-27, SB.4.1.4.6, Mbh.l2.74.1.12, Manu.7.78, VD.l9.3-5, YS.312-13, BD.l.l6.18.7.

25. SB.5.3.3.11-13. For a fuller account of this, see: Coomaraswamy, A.K., Op.cit., (1942), p.l ff. Dumont, L., "The Conception of Kingship in Ancient India", (1970), p.62 ff. Cf. Vedic Index, vol.2,

Page

24 :l_{i

25

26

26

26

pp.5-8, EB. vol.2, s.v. Authority. 27

26.

27.

28.

29. 2'/A. 30.

Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.27-28.

AB.l.l4.

TB.l.5; 2.2.7.2; 2.10.4

TS.2.4.2.1, AB.8.12-14, TB.l.5; 2.2.7.2. Bees'-"-""• op.c.;.t.., c. 1'\S'+4.) p. @.::<. PB.l5.3.30, JB.3.152.

27

27

28

28 la.S 28

31. AB.8.12-14. 29

32. SB.ll.l.6.24, Manu.7.3.14-20, KA.l.l3.5-7. 29

33. Mbh.l2.12.67. 30

34. SB.5.1.5.14. 30

35. Manu.7.8. 31

36. Gonda, J., Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View, (1966), p.l ff. 31

37. Op.cit., (1959), p.l96. 32

38. Ibid., p.l97. 32

39. A History of Hindu Political Theories, (1923), pp.vli-vlll, 267. 32

40.

41.

Op.cit., (1959), p.36 n.3.

Op. cit. , ( 19 2 3) , p. 172 .

33

33

<!

233

No. Page_

42. Op.cit., (1970), p. 71. 33

43. Op.cit., (1964), p.21. 34

44. Ibid., p.24. 35

45. Ibid., p.2l. 35

46. A.4.90, Sn.552, J.l.l89; 1.283. 36

47. 0.3.28, M.2.222, A.l.273, Vism.598. 36

48. D.l.8; 1.222; 3.28-30, M.l.l; 1.327, A.4.88; 2.24; 3.201, It.l5. 36

' 49. 0.1.221. 36

50. A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God, (1974), p.215. 37

51. 0.1.1.13; 3.28. 37

52. This, the Abhassara-devaloka, ranked in the cosmogony adapted (or put forth) by Buddhism, as the third celestial stage above that of the Great Brahma devaloka. Cf. Dial.part 3, p.26 n.2, PED.DPPN.EB.vol. 1, s.v. Abhassara deva-loka. 37

53. 0.3.28-30. (tr. Basham in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol.l, 1958), pp.l27-28. We slightly amend Basham's trans­lation in places, for the sake of easier

54.

55.

56.

57.

58. SSil. 59.

60.

61.

6 2.

6 3.

understanding in the context. 38

0.3.30. 39

Ibid., 1. 221. 39

8.4.52. 40

Ibid., (tr. Dharmasiri, Op.cit., 1974), p.33. 40

Ibid., 2.24. Cf. Qhar!llaSif:'i, Ibiq,, pp.33-34. 40 M. 1.6'oc:> -.3.23o. t-s. ~:a., vot:·,:~, Li. fi!....-.i..k..,..._:. s.;a -11 ItO Ibid., 3. 70-73. Cf. Dharmasiri, Ibid., p.224. 40

Dharmasiri, Ibid., p.227. 41

0.1.241. (tr. Dharmasiri, Ibid.,), p.227-28. 42

Ibid., 243. (tr. Dharmasiri, Ibid.,), p.228-30.

Ibid., 129 ff.

43

43

No.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69 .

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79 .

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

234

M.2.222, A.l.273.

A.l.l74.

J.5.238. (tr. Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,) (196~p.411. Also The Message of the Buddha, (1975), p.l08.

J.6.208. (tr. Jayatilleke, Ibid.,) (1963), p.411 and (1975), p.llO.

M.2.68.

Vism.598. Cf. EB. vol.3, s.v.Brahma.

See Johnston, E.H., The Buddhacarita, part 2, (1930), p.XXX1 ff.

The Jatakamala, 23.38-39.

M.2.127-28.

0.1.50.

Oial.pait 1, p.298.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1963), pp.l68-205. Cf. EB.s.v., vol.2, Authority.

A.l.l88, M.l.475; 2.44. Cf. Jayatilleke, Ibid., pp.l69-204, 369-402, 427.

Op.cit., (1959), p.62.

For a fuller account of the social contract theory in Western thought, see Gough, J., The Social Contract, (1936).

Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.457-59. Prasad, B., Theory of Government in Ancient India, (1928), pp.221-25.

Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), p.64, 538.

0.3.81-89.

Ibid., 85-86. (tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), p.l29.

Ibid., 86-89. (tr.Basham, Ibid.), p.l30.

Ibid.

Page

43

44

45

45

45

46

46

46

47

47

48

48

48

49

49

50

50

51

51

52

53

No.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

235

Ibid., 89-92. (tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), pp.l30-3l.

Ibid., 90. Also. A.l.87.

Ibid., 289.

5.4.336, A.2.66.68.

0.3.61-67.

Ibid., 92-93. (tr.Basham, Op.cit. ,) , p.l31.

91. Raja the common Indian word for king is cognate with Latin Rex and other Indo­European words connected with ruling. The false etymology from the root ranj "to gladden", "to please" is also sometimes found in non-Buddhist sources and is significant of some of the ideas surrounding kingship. The imagined connection of khattiya with khetta "field" is also false, as ~re the e!ymologies of the brahma~a, vaisya, and sudra in the text. According to the Buddhist point of view the ksatriya is regularly mentioned before the brahma~a and belongs to the highest social order. (see Ch. 4) .

Cf. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), p.l31, Dial.

Page

54

55

55

55

56

57

part 3, p.89 n.2, PED. s.v. Khattiya. 57

92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

97.

98.

99.

D.3.93. (tr.Basham, Op.cit., 1958), p.l31.

The Path of Purity, (1923), pp.484-86.

Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.258-60, 337-38, Prasad, Op.cit., (1968), pp.202-20, Lingat, R., "The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of Hindu Law in Hinayanist Indo-China", (1949), pp.284-87.

Mhvu. 1. 342.

Rockhill, W.W., tr. The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of His Order, (1907), p.4.

Mhv.2.1 ff., Dpv.3.1 ff., MT.l22 ff.

Vism.l3.419, DA.3.870, MT.l21.

J.2.311; 454.

58

58

58

59

59

61

61

62

No.

100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107 0

108 0

109.

llO.

lll.

ll2 0

ll3 0

ll4 0

ll5.

ll6 0

236

p. 19 0

Nobel, J., ed. (1937), pp.l32 ff. Cf. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), pp.l82-85.

Lingat, Op.cit., (1949), p.284.

"The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine", (1967), p.513 (73).

Dial. Part 1, p.l07.

Studies in Hindu Political Thought, (1954), p.l84.

D.3.92.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.512 (72). Ghoshal, Op.cit., .(1959), p.63. Spellman, Op. cit . , ( 19 6 4) , p. 2 2 . Sharma, J. P . , Republics in Ancient India, (1968), p.25.

Spellman, Op.cit., (1964), p.22.

J.2.352 ff.; 5.462; 1.207.

J.2.353.

V.l.lll; 3.150. Cf.PED.s.v.Sammata.

chatuhsataka of Aryadeva. 4.77.

Ibid.

S.l.41. Cf.Jayatilleke, Op.cit.,(l967), pp.512-14 (72-74) 0

J.3.513-14. Cf.Jayatilleke, Ibid., p.528(88).

Ibid.

Page

62

63

63

63

63

63

64

64

64

64

65

65

65

66

6 7'

68

68

237

CHAPTER 3: THE LAW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - DHAMMA

No. Page

l. Buddhist India, (1903), p.l32. 71

2. RV.4.23.8-9. 71

3. Ibid.,l.2.8, 1.65.2, 1.68.2, 1.108.2, 1.124.3, 4.23.8; 51.7-8. 71

4. Ibid., 5.85. 71

5. For a detailed discussion of rta, see: Keith, A.B., Religion and PhilOSophy of the Veda and Upan19ads, Vol.l, ( 19 2 5, Repn.nt, 1970) 1 pp.248 ff. 71

6. Vedic Mythology, (1897), p.ll. 71

7. Vedic Index, s.v.Dharman; SED.s.v.Dharman. 72

8. RV.5.83.5; 10.65.11. 72

9. Keith, Op.cit., p.249. 72

10. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, vol.l, (1923) 1 pp.360-6l.

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Buddhism, (n.d.), p.32 ff.

Rhys Davids, T.W., Op.cit., (1903) 1 p.l32.

ERE. vol.7, s.v. Law (Buddhist).

"Dhamma as a Political Concept in Early Buddhism", (1968), p.259.

"The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine'', (1967), p.488 (48).

BU.l.4.l4.

GD.l.l-2, BD.l.l.l.l, VD.l.4-5; 6.17 1

AD.l.l.l.l-2, Manu.2.6, YS.l.7.

Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963) 1 pp.l69-204. Cf. EB.vol.2, s.v.Authority.

V.l.4, M.l.l67.

Ibid. ,1.4-5.

Ibid. ,1.11.

M.l.69, A.2.9; 24.

72

73

73

74

74

78

79

79

79

79

No.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29 .

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

238

V.l.21.

Sn.683.

A.l.76.

Ibid.

Rockhill, W.W., tr. The Life of the Buddha and the Early History of Hls Order, (1907), p.4.

D.3.93.

Ibid. Cf. Barua, B.M., Asoka and His Inscriptions, (1968), pp.227-28.

Mhvu.l.348.

Rockhill, Op.cit., (1907), p.4.

VA.l.lO.

D.3.232, M.l.34l-42.

D.l.l36-37, J.5.ll2.

A.2.74-76.

Mhvu.l.227. Cf. Jones, J.J., tr. The Mahavastu, vol.l, (1949), p.230 n.~ Jayat1lleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.472 (32).

A. 3.148-49.

J.4.423. Cf. J.5.223; 6.94; 224.

36. Ghoshal, U.N., A History of Indian Political

Page

80

80

80

80

83

83

83

84

84

84

84

84

85

85

86

87

Ideas, (1959), p.69. 87

37. Gokhale, Op.cit., (1968), p.257, Reynolds, F., "The Two Wheels of Dhamma: A Study of Early Buddhism", (1972), p.l9. 87

38. J.5.102-l06; 3.ll0. 87

39. Ibid., 3.262, 470; 4.110, 176; 5.352. 87

40. D.3.232, M.l.34l-42. 88

41. Ibid., 3.228, J.4.402: 5.98, 510. 88

42. DA.3.849. 88

No.

43.

44.

45.

46.

4 7.

48.

49.

so.

51.

239

M.3.47-52, (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967), pp. 502-503 (62-63).

Bapat, P.V., ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism, (1956), pp.73-74.

J.260, 282, 399; 2.111, 118, 274, 320, 352, 470; 4.119, 153, 378, 462.

Ibid., 6.94.

Ibid. , 3 .lll.

A.2.75. Cf. J.3.111; 5.222, 242.

Ibid.

S.l.lOl.

A.2.74. Cf. J.3.456.

Page

90

90

91

91

91

92

92

92

92

52. J.3.111. 92

53. D.2.178. 93

54. Sn.149. 93

55. It.20. 93

56. PED.s.v. Metta. 93

57. Sn.149-5l. 93

58. M.1.39. 93

59. 1st Separate Edict, (tr. Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p.147. 94

60. The Jatakama1a.8.14. 94

61. D.3.152, 192. J.5.331, 352. A.2.32, 248. Cf. PED.s.v. Sangha. 94

62. J.6.251. 94

63. D.2.202. 94

64. Ibid., 1.137. 95

65. Dhp.21. 95

66. Mhv.3.68, Norman, H.C., "Buddhist Legends of Asoka and His Times", Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, (1910), p.63. 95

240

No.

67. s.l.88.

68. J. 5 .112-114.

69. Ibid., 116-119.

70. Ibid., 120.

71. Ibid., 121-22.

72. Mhvu.l.274-82.

73. Asvaghosa, Buddhacarita, Saundarananda, Catul)sataka, Aryasura, JatakamaHi. Cf.

Page

95

96

97

98

98

98

Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp.337 ff. 98

74. The Jatakama1a.13.1-3. 98

75. Basham, A.L., in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol.1, (1958), p.179. 99

76. suvarnaprabhasa-sutra.132. Cf. Basham, Ibid.,

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89 .

pp.l82-85, Ghosha1, Op.cit., (1959), p.264. 99

VA.l.10. Cf. Ghokha1e, Op.cit., (1968), p.257.

Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 539 (99).

0.3.59.

A.l.l09.

Ibid.

Ibid.

D.3.58 ff.

Ibid., 70-75, (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967)' p. 536 (96).

Ibid., 61. Cf. Jayati11eke, Ibid., p.537 ( 9 7) •

Ibid.

Mhvu.l.277. (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967)' p. 456 (16).

D.l.135.

Ibid . , 3 . 6 5 .

99

100

100

100

100

101

101

104

104

104

105

106

107

241

No.

90. Ibid., 61, 145, J.5.331, $.1.43.

91. 5.1.33.

92. Ibid., 58. SA.l.90.

93. D.3.180 ff.

94. Ibid., 191.

95. A.2.66-68.

96. Ibid., 4.281 ff. AA.2.778.

97. H.3.75.

9 8. Ibid.

99. D.3.191.

100. Dpv.6.1.2. Cf. EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka.

101. Ibid., 6.2.

102. For a comparison and contrast between legends and the edicts see: EB.vol.2, Asoka.

the s.v.

103. The Wonder That was India, (1954), p.84.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

Op.cit., (1961), p.l46.

EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka.

Ibid. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), pp.554-55(114-15). "Buddhism and Peace", (1962), p.S. Ghoshal, Op.cit., (1959), pp. 2 9 2-9 4 . Ling, T. , The Buddha, ( 19 7 3) , p.l52 ff.

Op.cit., (1961), p.l49.

Ibid., p.l57.

EB.vol.2, s.v. Asoka.

Ibid.

Minor Rock Inscription-Bhaba Inscription, Cf. Thapar, Ibid., p.261.

Minor Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 1958), p.l44.

Page

107

107

107

108

108

109

110

110

110

110

110

111

111

111

112

113

113

113

114

114

115

115

116

242

No. Page

113. EB. vol. 2, s. v. Asoka. 117

114. Ibid. 117

115. See for example the Upali Sutta in M.l.372 ff. 117

116. 12 Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 19 58) ' p.l48. 118

117. 13 Rock Edict, (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 19 58) , pp.l43-44. 121

118. Dikshitar, V.R.R., Mauryan Polity, (1932), pp.l28~30. 122

119. Barua, B.M., Op.cit.,(l968), p.285. 122

120. The Greek kings mentioned in Asoka's 13 Rock Edict may be identified as follows:

Antiyoka - Antiochus II Theos of Syria and Palestine. Turamaya - Ptolemy II Philadephus of Egypt. Antikini - Antigonus Gonatus of Macedonia. Maka - Magas of Cyrene. Alikasundara - Alexander of Corinth or Alexander of Epirus.

Cf. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1962), p.32. Basham, Op.cit., (1958), p.l44 n.3. 122

121. Basham, Ibid. 122

122.

123.

124.

Op.cit., (1954), p.56. Op.cit., (1961), pp.l80-81.

s .1.115-16.

Mhvu.l.276.

124

124

125

~~============================~====~===~ 126. D.l.l9. 126

127. J.5.489-90. 126

128. DA.l.93. 126

129. CU.7.1.2. 126

130. J.5.240, (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967), pp.469-70 (29-30). 127

131. KA.7.1.6.-12. Cf. Kangle, R.P., The Kautiliya Arthasastra, part 3, (1965), p.251. · 127

No.

132.

133.

134.

135.

136.

137.

138.

139.

140.

141.

142.

143.

144.

145.

146.

147.

148.

149.

150.

151.

152.

153.

154.

155.

243

Kang1e, Ibid.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p.551(111).

Roy, P.C., tr. The Mahabharata, vo1. 8, part 1, (n.d.), p.210.

Ibid., p.135.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.214.

BG.2.31-32.

Ibid., 3.30.

Ibid., 2.38.

Ibid. I 2. 3.

J.5.412-15.

S.1.83-85.

BG.2.37.

Mbh. Udyogaparvan.32.65.

s.4.308-09.

A.3.208.

J.2.1 ff.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 4.

Jayatil1eke, Op.cit., (1967) 1 p.550 (110).

The Jatakama1a.23.68.

Ibid. I 8.14.

Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), pp.550-51 (110-11).

J.l.263 ff.

Page

128

128

128

128

128

129

129

129

129

129

130

130

130

130

131

131

131

131

132

132

132

133

133

133

244

CHAPTER 4: ATTITUDE TO EQUALITY

No. Page

1. The word Arya in Sanskrit and Ariya, Ayira, Ayya in Pali may be derived from an old Indo­European root but its exact etymology has not yet so far been made clear. The first appear­ance of this word in an Indian context is in the Rg-Veda where aborigines are referred to as Dasa and Dasyu to distinguish them from the Aryans who had conquered the North Western part of the Indian sub-continent. In the Indian context the word Arya was originally the name of a group of kindred peoples. In those days the word was more or less racial in connotation. Later it came to mean a person who was accepted as a better-class follower of the dhamma of class and asrama. In scholarly circles the word is now generally used to imply a linguistic and cultural group, rather than a race.

In Pali the word has three meanings: (i) racial (of white complexion), (ii) social (noble, distinguished, of high birth) and (iii) ethical (following the customs and ideas of one's clan). The word is most frequently found in the Buddhist texts not in the first sense, but in the second and third. It was natural that this attitude of equality should have caused the word Ariya to lose its original sense, in refer­ence to a group of people. But the meaning of nobleness and truth in the word was retained and adopted in Buddhism and these meanings were further enriched by giving them a Buddhist interpretation. The most noteworthy uses of the word Ariya appears in connection with the Buddh1st doctrine known as the cattari ariya-saccari (Four Noble Truths) and ariya-atthangika magga (The Noble Eight-fold Path) . The reason why these Truths and the Path are called Ariya is that they considered the noblest and most righteous of all truths.

PED.s.v. Ariya. EB.vol.2, s.v. Arya. Basham, A.L., Studies in Indian History and Culture, (1964), p.20. Malalasekera, G.P. and Jayatilleke, K.N., Buddhism and The Race Question, (1958), pp.37-38. 134

2. Most writers have treated Dasa and Dasyus as synonymous. But R.S. Sharma has shown that Dasa and Dasyus are different groups of the indigenous peoples (Sudras in Ancient India,

245

No. Page

3.

4.

5.

6.

7 .

8.

9 •

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

1958, p.l3 ff.). However, in Vedic times they were both non-Aryan people. The Dasas are referred to having a distinctive colour of the skin, varna. (RV.3.34.9). In Pali the word Dasa is sometimes used to refer to uncivilized people, or in the same way that Greeks use the term "Barbarians" . It is defined by Buddhaghosa (DA.l.300) as antojato (base born). In classical Sanskrit dasa regularly means "a slave", while dasyus comes to mean "a robber". Basham, The Wonder That was India, (1954), p.32 ff. 134

Sharma, Op.cit., (1958), pp.l2-13.

Ibid., pp.9-ll.

Ibid., p.l3.

RV.l0.22.8.

Ma1a1asekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p.30. Sharma, Op.cit., (1958), pp.l2-13.

RV.l.32, 5.34.6.

Ibid., 3.34.9.

Ibid. , 2. 12. 4.

Ibid., 4.42.1.

Ibid., 8.35.16-18.

Ma1a1asekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958)' p.30.

"On the Translation of the Term Varna", (1964)' p.l96 ff.

Ibid., p.198.

"Indian Society and the Legacy of the Past", (1966), p.l32, n.3.

Ibid., p.134.

RV.5.10.

Manu.l.87-91. BG.4.13.

Basham, Op.cit., (1966), p.l33.

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

136

136

136

136

137

137

137

138

138

138

138

246

No. Page

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p.31.

Basham, Op.cit., (1966), p.l33.

Manu.l.91.

Ibid., 3.12.13-17.

Ibid., 4.81, 10.4; lll; 183.

Ibid., 3.156, 4.99, 10.128.

Ibid., 8.413-14 . . Ibid., 8. 20 ff.

29. For examples: Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op. cit., (1958), p.48 ff. Jayatilleke, "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine" (1967), pp.515-518(75-78). Bapat, P.V., ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism,

139

139

139

140

140

140

140

140

(1956)' pp.2-4. 140

30. Basham, "The Rise of Buddhism in its Historical Context'', (1966), p.399. 141

31. Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p.l4l. 141

31~. l"o-r '""~r.to.~ r. ....... No\:.4 :t'l tJ+I 32. Buddhism, (1899), pp.83-84. 142

33. Dial. part l, p.96.

34. Ibid.

35. M.2.86.

36. Sn.650-652.

37. The word karma in Sanskrit and kamma in Pali (derived from the root kr - to do) literally means action, deed; both subjective and objective. The law of karma holds that actions produce their good or bad effect and result in this life or in a future one. However, some Indian thinkers like Purana, Makkhali, and Pakudha appears to have disagreed with this view, while Ajitha the materialist evidently denied the existence of karma altogether. Even among those who accepted it, we can find differing views. In the earlier Brahma~ical literature, the word karma is used mainly in the sense of either religious

142

142

143

143.

No.

247

rituals or the social functions and duties of man. In the latter sense, it came to be accepted that there are specific hereditary social and occupational functions suitable for people born into different social grades, and since they needed special aptitudes (guDas) it was the specific duty and obligation of the members of these social grades to perform their assigned duties and occupations and no other (BG.4.13). Early Buddhism accepted the prevailing ideas of karma, though it had an original explanation of the process whereby kamma operated. In the Buddhist theory of kamma it has a specific meaning: it means only "volitional action", not all action. Any kind of volitional action whether mental, verbal, or physical is regarded as kamma. The law according to which a good or bad volition (kusala-akusala cetana) must have its fruition is the law of kamma, but in order to have a consequence the action must be produced by an effect of the volition "volition alone is kamma" (cetanahm bhikkhave kammam vadami - A.3.415). In the the1st1c rel1gions, every living being exists by virtue of the manifestation in him of a universal force, as a transcedent, an Absolute called God. According to Buddhism, every living being exists by virtue of an individual force. This is kamma. This is not the law regulating the relat1ons of individual human beings but it is the law controlling the relations between the state of ignorance (which is inevitably attached to individual human existence and behaviour) and the way of deliverance from it. These kammic laws are non-deterministic in the sense that initial volitional acts are conditioned but not determined and are therefore "free" within limits, while the consequences of these acts may be inhibited, prevented or promoted by background conditions such as time, place, opportunity and the potentialities of later and present volitional acts. Early Buddhism clearly discounted the fatalistic notion that all the experiences of a man in the present life are totally determined by his previous kamma alone, or that they are immutably fixed by some divine scheme, nor did it subscribe to the view that they are simply fortuitous and happen without any previous cause.

Page

248

No.

37. PED.s.v. Kamma. 8ED.s.v. Karma. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, (1963), pp. 376, 404, 440-41, 460; The Message of the Buddha, (1975), pp. 139 ff; Op.cit., (1967), pp. 481-84 (41-44)' 506-508 (66-68). Rahula, W., What the Buddha Taught, (1959),

Page

p. 32. 143

38. M.3.202 ff. 143

39. Ibid., 203. Cf. Miln. 65. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1963), p. 404; Op.cit., (1975), pp. 141-42. . 144

40. M.l. 414 ff. 144

41. Ibid., 417. 144

42. EB. vol. 2, s.v. Authority. 144

43. 8.2.121. A.4.176. 144

44. A.l.227-28. 145

45. Ibid., 3-35, 4.39-40. 145

4 6 . Ibid. , 4 . 13 8. 14 5

47. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p. 33. 145

48. A.4. 138-39. 146

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

Ibid., 1.35. Dhp. 182. 8.1.1o1. Therigatha. vv.500.

8.2.188.

Ibid., 5.455. M.3.169.

Ibid., 1. 85-89.

A.l.254. Cf. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 534 (94).

Ibid. , 1. 61.

Dial. part 1, p. 104.

Concepts of Buddhism, (1937), p. 11 ff.

Op.cit., (1958), p. 35 ff.

Op.cit., (1967), pp. 516-17 (76-77).

M.2.196 ff. 8n.594 ff.

146

146

146

146

146

147

147

147

147

147

148

249

No.

60. Sn. 600-611.

Page

149

61. Ibid., 608-10. 149

62. Op.cit., (1958), p. 37. 150

63. 625. 150

64. Ibid., 629-30. 150

65. The vajrasuci of Asvaghosa, (tr. Mukhopadhyaya, S., 1960); p. 14 ff. VU v PU. pp. 935 ff. - 151

66. vu. 8. 151

67. Mukhopadhyaya, (tr.) Op.cit., (1960), pp. 19-20. We slightly emend Mukhopadhyaya's translation in places, for the sake of easier understanding in the context. 153

68. 0.3.82. 153

69. Ibid., 96. 154

70. Ibid., 93. 154

71. The word brahmana is derived in tte Agganna Sutta from the verb "keep off" (baheti) . Some people kept off or excluded bad, evil customs, to keep away from sin. This etymology is pure fancy. The word derived from brahman, which in the Rg-Veda generally means super­natural power: In the Buddhist terminology brahmana is also used for a man leading a pure, sinless and ascetic life, and many passages show that Buddhists were encouraged to treat worthy brahma~as with respect. 155

72. The text referred to are the Vedic canon. Ajjhayaka, another name given to the brahmanas, is here interpreted as "non-meditators". This also seems to be a false etymology. It means simply "teacher". 156

73. D.3. 94-95. (tr. Basham, in The Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De Barry, vol. 1, 1958), pp. 131-32. We slightly emend Basham's translation in places, for the sake of easier understanding in the context. 156

74. Ibid., 95. (tr. Ibid.). 156

75. Ibid. (tr. Ibid.). 157

76. Ibid. 157

No.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

250

Dial. part 1, p. 107.

M.2.147 ff.

Yona means Ionian or Greek. If this text is authentically the words of the Buddha he must have heard something of the Greeks, some of whom were living in the Persian Empire. Kamboja is the mountains region south of Kabul river, along the present border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. For further details see: DPPN.s.v. Yona and Kamboja.

M.2.149.

Sn-612-619.

Ibid., 648.

Mukhopadhyaya, (tr.), Op.cit., (1960), p.5.

Page

157

158

158

158

158

159

159

84. BG.3.35. 159

85. Sn.650. 160

86. .Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), p. 43. 160

87. M.2.84 ff. 160

88. Ibid., 89. 160

89. Ibid., 85. 160

90. J.l.ll4; 326, 2.264; 413, 3.312, 4.38. 160

91. M.2. 151-52. 160

92. D.l. 88 ff. 160

93. Ibid., 92-93. 161

94. Ibid., 97-99. 161

95. This is explained as the being who is coming into the womb ... the being about to enter

96.

the womb ... about to come into that situation, being driven on by the mechanism of kamma (MA.2.310). It also means a "sal!lsaric being in the intermediate stage" (between death and birth). See: Wijesekera, O.H·de.A., "Vedic Gandharva and P~li Gandhabba", (1945)' pp. 73-107. 162

M.2. 15.6-58. 163

No.

9 7.

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

119.

251

Page

Ibid., 148. 163

MA.3.409. 163

Mukhopadhayaya, (tr.), Op.cit., (1960), pp. 14-15. 164

D.l. 99-100. 165

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 447 (7). 165

Manu. 8.24. 165

Ibid., 8.70; 88:99; 279, 11.130-31; 151. BD.l.l0.19.1. AD.l.9.24. Cf. Basham, Op:cit., (1954), p. 121. 165

GD.8.13. KA.4.222. BD.l.l0.18. 166

KA.3.9, 4.9. 166

Manu. 11.132. 166

M.2.88. 167

Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 459 (19); Op.cit., (1975), p. 146. 167

Ibid., pp. 459-60 (19-20), 482-83 (42-43). 167

M.3.203 ff. 168

A.2.87. 168

Ibid., 1.149-50. M.l.97. 168

M.2.187-88. 169

Ibid., 149-50 169

EB. vol. 3, s.v. Brahmana, Brahmanism. 170 . Dhp.l83. According to the Dhp. the teaching of all the Buddhas are ethical in character and centre round avoiding all evil, cultivat­ing the good, purification of the mind, speaking no ill, not doing any harm, and restrained in respect of the fundamental precepts. (185). 171

A.2.69. (tr.Jayatilleke, Op.cit., 1967), p. 495 (55). 171

Dhp.l8. 171

Sn.l43-152. (tr. Basham, Op.cit., 1954), p. 286. 172

No.

120.

121.

122.

123.

124.

125.

126.

127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

133.

134.

135.

136.

137.

138.

139.

140.

141.

142.

143.

144.

145.

252

EB. vol. 3, s.v. Brahmanism.

- - -Therigatha. vv. 239-243.

M.2.151.

Sn. 249-50.

M.l. 39.

Malalasekere and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958)' p. 50.

- - -Jatakamala, 23-21.

A.l.l62.

D.l.lll ff.

Ibid., 120.

Ibid. , 224 ff.

Ibid., 4 ff.

Ibid., 47 ff.

Ibid., 100 ff.

Ibid. , 224 ff.

Page

172

173

173

174

174

174

174

175

175

176

176

176

176

176

176

Dhp. 383 ff. 176

Mukhopadhyaya, (tr.), Op.cit., (1960), p.22. 176

PED.s.v. Brahmana, Arahant. 177

Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), pp. 49-51. 177

Sn.315. 178

AB.7.29. 178

Comm.on the Vedanta Sutra, 1.3.38. Cf. Dial. part 1, p. 285. 178

Manu. 1.88. 178

Ibid., 9.317-19. 178

Dial. part 1, p. 285. 178

D.l.227 ££. Cf. Ibid., p. 287. 179

146. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1958), pp. 48,55 ££. 179

No.

14 7.

148.

149.

150.

151.

152.

153.

154.

155. 155'11. 156.

253

M.2.89.

A.4.202. Mi1n. 70.

M.2.125 ff.

Ibid., 129-30.

D.l.99 ff.

Sn.102.

Ibid., 782.

S.1.33; 42; 125. A.1. 23-26 V.2.253.

Basham, Op.cit., (1966), p. 136. I!ri..L.)'·I:!>b j '"-~r~ ...... R., Ai.ol< ...... ..,ol 'lv..)<di..,. c$+~ D.1.99. "'......,.,.'a"',(•~biJ,)>.IJ+t.

157. Ma1a1asekera and Jayati1leka, Op.cit., (1958),

Page

180

181

181

182

182

182

182

182

183 IS3. 184

pp. 59-60. 184

254

CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDE TO LAW

No. Page

l.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Vinogradoff, P., Common Sense in Law, (1914)' p. 23.

J.ayatilleke, K.N., "The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine", (1967)' p. 487 (17).

J.2.2.

Ibid., 4.402, 5.98; 510. A.2.18. D.3.228.

Ibid., 3.105.

Ibid., 4.192.

Mhvu.l.275.

4th Pillar Edict. (tr. Thapar, R., Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas, (1961), p. 263.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 451 (17).

Manu. 7.14.

Mbh. 12.59.78.

Manu. 7. 2 2.

Mbh.l2.15.2.

Ibid., 12.15. 5-6.

J.4.192.

A.l.253.

Ibid., 254.

Ibid., 5. 79-81. Cf. D. 3. 236-37.

M.2. 186-88

8.1.116. D.3.64 ff.

J.3.105; 154, 4.451.

D.l.89. A.4.89.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 507 (67).

Tucci, G., "The Ratnavali of Nagarjuna", (1936)' pp. 237-252, 423-435.

187

187

188

188

188

189

189

190

190

191

191

191

191

191

192

192

192

192

193

193

193

193

193

193

255

No. Page

25. Ibid.,p. 426 v.36. 193

26. Ibid., v.32,33,37. 193

27. V.l.l3. 194

28. Ibid., 3.23-24. 194

29. Ibid. I l. 20. 195

30. Ibid. I 21. 195

31. Ibid., 21-22. 195

32. Ibid. I 3.8 196

33. Ibid., 9-10. Cf. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 450 (10). 196

34. S.2. 223-24. 196

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

Op.cit., (1967), pp. 450-51 (10-11).

V.3.17.

Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 448 (8).

A.l.230.

V.3.20. (tr. Jayati11eke, Op.cit., 1967), p.451 (11).

Jayati11eke, Ibid.

B. Disp. part 1, pp. xvi-xvii.

Ibid., part 4, p.xii.

V.l.55.

B. Disp. part 4, p.x.

V.l.56.

Ibid., 350 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 4, p.xviii.

B. Disp. Ibid., pp.x.xi.

V.1.p.xv(Introduction).

Ibid.

B.Disp. part 1, p. xii.

V.l.103.

197

197

198

198

199

199

200

201

201

201

202

202

202

203

203

203

203

No.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

256

History of Indian Literature, vol. 2, (1927-33), p. 22, n.2.

Ibid.

Vinaya Texts,· (tr.) vol. 13, part 1, p. xxvii.

B. Disp. part 1, p.xxvii.

Early Buddhist Monachism, (1960), p. 73.

PED. s.v. Patimokkha.

B. Disp. part 1, pp. xiii-xviii.

Ibid., p. xxiv. Bhagvat, D., Early Buddhist Jurisprudence, (1939), pp. 19-20.

Bhagvat, Ibid.

V.3.21, 44, 70, 89. Cf. B. Disp. part 1, p. xxvi ff. PED. s.v. Parajika.

Ibid.

V.2.38, 3.112; 186, 4.110;225. Cf.B. Disp. part 1, p. XXX ff.

Ibid., 1.112, 2.287. Cf. Ibid., p.xxii.

Ibid., 1.196; 254, 3.195. Cf. Ibid., part 2, p. vii ff.

Page

203

203

203

204

204

204

204

204

204

205

205

205

205

205

66. Ibid., 1.172; 176, 2.242. Cf. Ibid., p.xxv ff. 205

67.

6 8.

69.

70.

71.

72.

7 3.

74.

75.

76.

Ibid. Cf. Ibid., part 3, pp. v, XXX ff.

Ibid., 4.185. Cf. Ibid., p. xxvii ff.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 521 (81).

V.l. 305, 2.147. D.l.l45. J.l.93.

Jay<ttilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 521 (81).

Ibid. Dutt, Op.cit., (1960), p. 143.

Dutt, Ibid., pp. 143-45.

Bhagvat, Op.cit., (1939), p.v.

Op.cit. I (1960) I pp. 143-45.

KA. 3.7.40; 10.45.

205

205

205

206

206

206

206

206

206

206

No.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

257

V.3.60.

Ibid., 1.101; 138.

Ibid., 73.

Bhagvat, Op.cit., (1939), p. vi.

D.2.123-24.

Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 522 (82).

The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, (1952), p. 24.

V.l.303-04. (tr. Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967)' p. 490 (50).

Ibid., 312 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 4, p.xviii-xix. Dutt, Op.cit., (1960), p. 124-25.

Dutt, Ibid.

V.3.163 ff.

88. Ibid., 2.73 ff. Cf. B. Disp. part 5, pp. vii -viii.

89.

90.

91.

92.

93.

9 4.

95.

9 6.

97.

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

Ibid.

Ibid. , 93-94, 4.207.

Ibid. , 94.

Ibid., 79

Ibid. , 1.325, 2.81; 99, 4.207; 351.

Ibid., 2.83; 102.

Ibid. , 9 5.

Ibid., 96

Dutt, Op.cit., (1960), p. 131.

V.2.97-98.

Jayati11eke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 524 (84).

B. Disp. part 5, p. XX.

Ibid., p. xx-xxi.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), pp. 519-20 (79-80). Gokuldas De, Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha, (1955), p.xv.

Page

206

207

207

207

207

207

208

209

210

210

211

211

211

211

211

212

212

212

213

213

213

214

214

215

215

215

No.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

llO.

lll.

ll2.

258

The word dipa has two meanings: (i) lamp and (ii) island. In this context, it means "island".

0.2.101.

Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), p. 520 (80). Cf. Dutt, Op. cit., (1960), p. 116.

0.2. 74-76. (tr. Basham, in Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. De. Barry, vol. 1, 1958)' pp. 139-140.

DA.2.519. (tr.Jayatilleke, Op.cit., (1967), pp. 525-26 (85-86).

Jayati11eke, Ibid., pp. 451-52 (11-12).

0.2.154. (tr. Jayatilleke, Ibid.).

Ibid. (tr. Ibid.).

VA. 1.13.

V.l.98.

Page

216

216

216

218

219

220

220

220

221

221

259

BIBLIOGRAPHY

l. ORIGINAL SOURCES

A. Pali Texts and Translations.

Anguttara Nikaya, eds. Morris, R. and Hardy, E., 6 vols. and 1ndex, (PTS, London, 1885-1910). trs. Woodward, F.L. and Hare, E.M., The Book of the Gradual Sayings, 5 vols., (PTS,London, 1932-36).

Culavama, ed. Geiger, W., 2 vols., (PTS, London, 1926-1927). tr. Geiger, W., Culavamsa; or Minor Chronicle of Ceylon, 2 vols., (PTS, London, 1929-30, Reprint, 1973).

Dhammapada, ed. Sumangala Thera, s., (PTS, London, 1914). tr. Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Minor Anthologies, part 1, SBB, vol.7, (PTS, London, 1931), tr. Max MUller, F., The Dhammapada, SBE, vol.lO, (Clarendon Press Oxford-;-18 81)

Dhammapadatthakatha, comm. to Dhammapada, eds. Norman, H.C. and Tailing, P.L.S., (PTS, London, 1906-15), tr. Burlingame, E.W., Buddhist Legends, 3 vols., (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, 1921, Reprint, PTS, London, 19 69) .

Digha Nikaya, eds. Rhys Davids, T.W. and Carpenter, J.E., 3 vols., (PTS, London, 1890-1911), trs. Rhys Davids, T.W. and Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Dialogues of the Buddha, SBB, vols. 2,3 and 4, (O.U.P., London, 1899-1921).

Dipava~sa, ed. and tr. Oldenberg, H., (Williams and Norgate, London, 1879).

Itivuttaka, ed. Windisch, E., (PTS, London, 1889), tr. Moore, J.H., Sayings of the Buddha, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1908), tr. Woodward, F.L., Minor Anthologies, part 2, (PTS, London, 1935). ---

Jataka, ed. Fausbi:ill, V., 6 vols. and index, (london,, 1887-97, Reprint, PTS, London, 1962-64), trs. By various hands under the Editorship of Cowell, E.B., 6 vols. and index, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1895-1913, Reprint in 3 vols., PTS, London, 1957).

Mahavamsa, ed. Geiger, w., (PTS, London, 1908), tr. Geiger, W., Mahavamsa; or Great Chronicle of Ceylon, (PTS, London, 1912, Reprint, 1964).

Majjhima Nikaya, eds. Trenckner, v., Chalmers, R. and Rhys Davids, C.A.F., 4 vols., (PTS, London, 1888-1925), tr. Horner, I.B., Middle Length Sayings, 3 vols., (PTS, London, 1954-59), tr. Chalmers, R., Further Dialogues of the Buddha, 2 vols., (PTS, London, 1926-27).

260

Manorathapurani, comm. to Anguttara Nikaya, ed. Walleser, M. and Kopp, H., 5 vols., (PTS, London, 1924-57).

Milindapanha, ed. Trenckner, v., (Williams and Norgate, London, 1880), tr. Rhys Daivds, T.W., The Questions of King Milinda, 2 vols., SBE, vol.35-36, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1890-94), tr. Horner, I.B., Milinda's Questions, 2 vols., (PTS, London, 1963-64).

Papancasudani, comm. to Majjhima Nikaya, eds. Woods, J.H., Kosambi, D. and Horner, I.B., 5 vols. (PTS, London, 1922-38) .

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