National Security of Pakistan Economic, Water, Energy and Food Security By Arshad M. Abbasi.
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Leadership, Energy, and Execution 1UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
USAR Energy and Water Security
08 November 2017
Dr. Mark Kodack, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability
Marcus De La Rosa, Pacific Northwest National LaboratoryDave Judi, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 2UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Learning Objectives
• Why do energy and water security planning?
• What is my role with the energy and water security planning?
• What is a vulnerability assessment?
• What is the Army Reserve's plan for implementing an Energy and Water Security Strategy?
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Why water security?
Marc Kodack
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Potential Crises to 2030Arctic
Territorial Disputes
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
North Korea -South Korea
Crisis
South China Sea Tensions
SE AsiaTensions
Russia-Georgia Tensions
Yemen Instability
Armenia-Azerbaijan
Crisis
SyriaCivil War
Terrorist Challenges
Terrorist Challenge
Somalia Conflict
Sudan Conflict
Terrorist Challenge
Sub-Saharan AfricaWidespread Potential Humanitarian Crises,
Governance Crises
Piracy
TCOs Destabilizing Governance
Libya Internal Tensions
Egypt Internal Tensions
Cuba -Instability
Haiti Crisis
PakistanInternal Tensions
Columbia Insurgency
VenezuelaInstability
Central AsiaInterstate
Friction
Peru Insurgency
Terrorist Challenge
BalkansInstability
AfghanistanContinuing Insurgency
Terrorist Challenge
Israeli-Palestinian
Tensions
Peacekeeping India/Pakistan
IranRegional
Antagonisms
North KoreaRegime Collapse
China-Taiwan Crisis
Range of Threat Actors
Near-Peer State
Regional State
Failing State
Transnational Group
Insurgent/Guerrilla/Militia
Proxies
Terrorists
Criminal Groups
Future Operating Environment Will be Complex and Change is Likely to Accelerate
TCO Violence
Cyber Attack on Critical U.S.
InfrastructureTerrorist WMD
Attack
Colors Indicate Regional Groupings with Shared Factors
Global Conditions
Proliferation of Arms, WMD
Uneven Economic Recovery
Humanitarian/Natural Disaster,
Demographics, Technology, Resource
Scarcity, Energy, Environment
EU Integration
Frictions
Motivations• Wealth• Resources• Political authority• Influence• Sovereignty• Identity• Legitimacy
Desertification
Deserti
fication
Desertification
Desertification
Large Majority of Crises Stem from
Weak Governance
Relationship to U.S. & Allies’ Vital
National Interests May Not Be Apparent
Deforestation
Deforestation
Deforestation
Deforestation
Water Scarcity
Water Scarcity
Water
Scarcity
Fishery
Depletion
Fishery
Depletion
Fishery
Depletion
Sea Level
Rise
Sea Level
RiseSea Level
Rise
Sea Level Rise
Sea Level
Rise
Sea Level
Rise
Sea Level
Rise
Sea Level
Rise
Environmental changes will drive weak governance, which will drive crisis
4
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Mission Assurance
Minor
Moderate
Major
Extreme
Highly Unlikely
Improbable Probable Very LikelyProbability
Co
nse
qu
ence
5
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
• Changes in storm frequency, duration, and intensity
• Water rights
• Sea level rise
• Wild fires
• Drought
Water Risks
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Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Recent• Drought can result in water restrictions
that include Army installations• Training restrictions – wildfire risk• Community relations
Future• Water increasingly scarce• Increased conflict between
installations and local communities for water
• More frequent training restrictions due to limited water supply
• Supply chain disruptions• Heat index
Drought
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Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Energy Security and Sustainability
Strategy
Army-wide applicability
Shared Goals1. Inform Decisions2. Optimize Use3. Assure Access4. Build Resilience5. Drive Innovation
Installation-wide applicability of Key Business Driver #2, Energy and Sustainability
ASA(IE&E) Strategy 2025
Energy Security and Sustainability Strategy
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Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Army Net Zero
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A net zero installation: Applies an integrated approach to management of
energy, water, and waste to capture and commercialize the resource value
and/or enhance the ecological productivity of land, water, and air.
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy & Environment)
Why water security?
Marc Kodack
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 12UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
USAR Energy & Water Security
• BLUF: To confirm the path forward for Energy and Water Security planning and implementation at USAR facilities and installations
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 13UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Agenda
• Background
• Definitions
• Installation Energy and Water Plan (IEWP)
• Installation Status Report – Mission Capacity (ISR-MC)
• Army Reserve Critical Asset List (ARCAL)
• Concurrent Tasks
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 14UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Background
Facts:
Energy & Water Security planning is required
Defense managers and commanders will: (1) conduct energy vulnerability
analyses and review for currency annually; (2) establish energy emergency
preparedness and operation plans; and (3) develop and execute remedial action
plans to remove unacceptable energy security risks. (DEPPM 92-1)
DoD Components shall plan and have the capability to ensure available, reliable,
and quality power to continuously accomplish DoD missions from military
installations and facilities. (DoDI 4170.11 change 1, March 2016)
The Army will reduce risk to critical missions by being capable of providing
necessary energy and water for a minimum of 14 days. (Army Directive 2017-07)
Problem Statement
The complex, geographically dispersed nature of the Army Reserve presents
unique challenges to the development and implementation of energy and water
security (E&WS) planning, required by the Army for all facilities.
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 15UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
• Energy Security – 10 USC 2924 “(3)(A) The term “energy security” means having assured access to reliable
supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission essential requirements.
(B) In selecting facility energy projects that will use renewable energy sources, pursuit of energy security means the installation will give favorable consideration to projects that provide power directly to a military facility or into the installation electrical distribution network. In such cases, projects should be prioritized to provide power for assets critical to mission essential requirements on the installation in the event of a disruption in the commercial grid.”
• Energy Resilience – DoDI 4170.11 “The ability to prepare for and recover from energy disruptions that impact
mission assurance on military installations.”
Definitions
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 16UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Concurrent Tasks
Installation Energy and Water Plan
(IEWP)
ISR – MCMetrics for
Readiness Divisions
Vulnerability Assessments
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 17UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
IEWP
• March 2016 OSD memo requires
installation energy plan to:
− Assure future energy, water demand
− Achieve requirements (Congress, White
House, DoD)
− Lower costs
− Facilitate stakeholder cooperation
• OSD target is signed plans for top 75%
Army energy users by March 2019
• The Army will take this opportunity to
develop a comprehensive IEWP
requirement:
− Leverage current installation-level plans
− Meet OSD requirements
− Address additional Army energy and water
security planning objectives
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 18UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Concurrent Tasks
Installation Energy and Water Plan
(IEWP)
Draft Outline
ISR – MCMetrics for
Readiness Divisions
Vulnerability Assessments
Completed Plans MAR 2019
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 19UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
ISR-MC2016 Results
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 20UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Strategic Readiness Platforms (SRP)
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 21UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Strategic Direction
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 22UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Concurrent Tasks
Installation Energy and Water Plan
(IEWP)
Draft Outline
ISR – MCMetrics for
Readiness Divisions
Preliminary Analysis
Vulnerability Assessments
Completed Plans MAR 2019
First Draft DEC 2017
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 23UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
ARCAL List
Leadership, Energy, and Execution 24UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
ARCAL List
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ARCAL List
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Leadership, Energy, and Execution 26UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 08 NOV 2017 Mr. Marcus De La Rosa/703-806-6721
Completed Plans MAR 2019
First Draft DEC 2017
VAs Complete DEC 2019
Draft Outline Preliminary AnalysisMethodology
Validation
Concurrent Tasks
Installation Energy and Water Plan
(IEWP)
ISR – MCMetrics for
Readiness Divisions
Vulnerability Assessments
Comprehensive Energy and Water Security Planning
Infrastructure Resilience
Overview
DAVID JUDI, ALAN BERSCHEID
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
December 6, 2017 27
Infrastructure Analytics
2
8
Improve the understanding of mission functional dependencies on infrastructure
service and evaluate the impacts of potential disruptive events in those systems
• System reliability studies
used to evaluate
infrastructure asset
criticality
• System response studies to
assess the ability of system
operators to mitigate
impacts
• Restoration and recovery
studies to evaluate duration
of impacts and system
outages
Infrastructure Sectors and Modeling
and Simulation Capabilities
Energy
Dams
Water\Wastewater
Information Technology
Transportation
Public Health & Healthcare
Emergency Services
Agriculture & Food
Financial Services
Commercial Facilities
Critical Manufacturing
Telecommunications
Chemical
Nuclear Reactors, Materials & Waste
Government Facilities
Defense Industrial Base
System Impacts Under Complex Threat
Scenarios
CBRNE
Physical Assault
Cyber
Accident
Weather Hurricane\Cyclone
Ice Storm
Tsunami
Drought
Earthquake
Flood
Climate
Pandemic
Wildfire
Analytic Process – hard, but not
intractable
December 6, 2017 31
• Data acquisition
• On-site mission
essential functions
• On-site physical
infrastructure systems
• Off-site supporting
infrastructure systems
• Control Systems
• Model based analyses
• Contingency analyses
• Scenario driven case
studies for events of
interest
• Fragility analyses
• Cascading analyses
Systems are heterogeneous across facilities
Infrastructure Analytic Process
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Use modeling and simulation to
understand impact of external stressors on
system performance
Infrastructure Security Analytic Process
Network-based modeling and simulation
N-1, N-2 contingencies for critical assets
Definition of disruption as threshold (e.g.,
pressure/demand unmet over simulation
period)
Process objectively quantifies:
Component criticality
System redundancy
Quantification of inherent system
redundancy
Characterization and quantification of
emergency backup systems
Infrastructure analytic process is “Threat
Agnostic”
An
alyt
ic P
roce
ss Co
nti
nge
ncy
Syst
em P
erfo
rman
ce
% of normal pressure pr
D(pr) – total economic damages to business
Max_Impact
100%
0%
0% 100%
(4)
(5)
(6)
Interdependency and Consequences
Service Area Tools
Algorithms based on
magnitude of demand at
delivery points
Interdependencies identified
through the geospatial link
Consequences
Identification of dependency
magnitude
Physically based
Simulation of other
infrastructure models
33
Water Service Areas
Electric Power Service Areas
Infrastructure Analysis Levels/Data Needs
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GOLD SILVER BRONZE
Network models
– Georeferenced
data
System schematics
Operational Plans
Stakeholder
engagement
Geospatial system
data
System component
capacities
System subject
matter expertise
Geospatial demand
allocation
Stakeholder
engagement
Higher-level analysis
Publicly available
information (e.g.,
utility websites)
Subject matter
expertise (SME)
SME assumptions on
system functionality
Service area
estimation
– Geospatial location
– Population
distribution
Value Proposition
December 6, 2017 35
• Insight to decision makers on internal and external infrastructure
dependencies for response planning
• Access to key study findings for collaborating utilities
• Potential planning tool and support for capital improvement funding
proposals across the region
• Definition of cascading consequences of system operation including public
health and economic value
• Identification of mitigation strategies for specific contingencies
• Evaluation of impacts on future system operational constraints
• Characterization of importance of interconnections to regional system
stability
Example
December 6, 2017 36
Naval Station Norfolk
Infrastructure dependencies inside/outside installation boundaries
Electric Power
Water\Wastewater
Telecommunications
Transportation
Workforce Challenges