1

WARTBURG COLLEGE

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN INDONESIA FROM 1945-1966 AND ITS ROLE IN INDONESIAN

MASSACRE IN 1965-1966

SUBMITTED TO DR. TERRENCE J. LINDELL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE COURSE

H1/PS 306 HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS,

BY

RUT S. NASTITI

WAVERLY, IA

04/09/2014

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Background

In September 30th 1965, six army generals were killed in East Jakarta, Indonesia. At the same

period of time until 1966, a great number of civilians who were suspected to uphold communism

ideology were murdered and killed. As an Indonesian, our history books taught us that the six generals

were killed by the member of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Most Indonesians students were

aware that the killings of communist-suspected civilians must have been done by someone with a great

military power. Many suspected that Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Suharto is beyond the

killing of the civilians. There are no written evidences that came up on surfaces to claim who supposed

to be responsible for the genocide. Even though there were, nobody was taunt to go against the military

power in Indonesia.

As I grew up and read more outside sources and critically question the event – studies, articles

and documents reveal that the United States backed up the Indonesian army to execute the coup under

General Suharto, who later became the second president of the country. However, our history system

never mentioned the involvement of the United States Government by its own government or through

the Central Intelligence Agent (CIA).

This claim started to make more sense to me by studying and understanding United States

Foreign Policy especially after the period of World War II when the United States were trying to limit

the movement of communism. With regard to CIA, many argue that the U.S. has supported more coups

against democracies that it perceived as communist, becoming communist, or pro-communist1.

Communism was believed to be a bad ideology and was being combated especially by the Western

allies. Additionally, Sukarno, the founding father and first president of Indonesia, formed a non-aligned

1 Many argue that non-transparent United States government agencies worked in secret sometimes mislead or do not fully implement the decisions of elected civil ian leaders and that this has been an important component of many such

operations (Spencer R Weart. Never at War. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 221–224, 314

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movement during the cold war. History told us that country needed to pick a side during the Cold War.

However, this movement shows that Sukarno did not want to be in both either side. He was also

suspected leaning against western democracy in 1963. These two facts serve as great assumptions to

explore the role of the United States in the mass murder in Indonesia. Some argue that the United States

provide means for Indonesian military to combat members of the communist party (PKI). In the other

hand, many also argue that the United States have been involved years and months before the incident

since 1945. According to Bradley Simpson, the U.S. was involved by covert operations to provoke an

armed clash between the Indonesian army and the communist movement in the month leading up to the

events of Sep.30, 1965, hoping it would eliminate the PKI2. Therefore, this paper is going to discuss,

explore and show supports of U.S. involvement in the killings, directly or indirectly, in a periodic and

chronological order. In order to understand better the role of U.S. in the killings, some terms such as

covert operations, coup d’état, will also be explored and included briefly in this paper. The paper will be

focusing on U.S-Indonesia relations prior to the event from 1956 to 1968, and the event of the killings

from 1965-1966, however events and informations prior to that period of time that might lead to the

event will also be included in the paper to solidify and reach the purpose of the paper.

Introduction

On the morning of October 1, 1965, Lyndon Johnson’s White House received a terse situation

report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the telegram said “A power move which may have

far reaching implications is underway in Jakarta3. The night before, six generals from the Indonesian

army high command, including commander Lt. General Achad Yani, were kidnapped from their homes

2 Bradley Simpson, who heads a project at the National Security Archive that declassified key US government documents concerning Indonesia and East Timor during the reign of General Suharto (‘Act of Kil l ing’ Director Hopes US Will Admit Role in 1965 Kil l ings, Inter Press Service on 10:08 am Mar 03, 2014) 3 Memo for Johnson, October 1, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964 -1968, v.26, 300-301

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in Jakarta, killed, and dumped in a well on the outskirts of Halim Air Force Base by self-prescribed

participants of the September 30th Movement who claimed they were acting to forestall a coup by right

wing “Council of Generals”4. According to Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, the Indonesian

Killings of 1965-66 occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War, extreme political tension and

economic hardship5. The killings were part of a massive bloodletting that took an estimated 250,000

lives that started in Central Java and spread around other islands in Indonesia6.

From 1957 to 1965, Sukarno was believed to play a delicate balancing act by supporting both

anticommunist army and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI). According

to World Socialist Website, the bloody coup in Indonesia was the outcome of the drive by US

imperialism to gain unchallenged control of the immense natural wealth and strategic resources of the

archipelago, often referred to as the “Jewel of Asia”7. This importance was emphasized by U.S.

President Eisenhower in 1953 in a statement that it was imperative for the US to finance the French

colonial war in Vietnam as the "cheapest way" to keep control of Indonesia. The central Intelligence

Agency’s (CIA) active involvement in the Administration’s very personalized campaign against

Sukarno began towards the end of 1956. These information have given an understanding how the

killings is relevant to the context of Cold War and U.S. foreign policy.

4 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Gun; authoritarian development and U.S. – Indoenesia relations, 1960-1968

(Stanford: Standford University Press, 2008) p.1 5 He claimed that since the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch (1945-49), the system of parliamentary democracy had

failed. Sukarno proposed an alternative in which the president would play a greater role. In addition he called for a ‘return

to the rails of the revolution’ and began to focus increasingly on implementing the next stage of the revolution, a form of

socialist populism (Dr Katharine E. McGregor, The Indonesian Kil lings of 1965-1966 , Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence,

[online], published on 4 August 2009, accessed 7 April 2014, URL : http://www.massviolence.org/The-Indonesian-Kill ings-

of-1965-1966, ISSN 1961-9898) 6 Kathy Kadane, Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians, Washington Post, May 21, 1990, Retrieved from http://www.namebase.org/kadane.html 7 Lessons of the 1965 Indonesian Coup “Chapter One: The historical background” Retrieved from:

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/05/ind1-m16.html

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Content

Indirect Role of U.S. Involvement: U.S Foreign Policy in Indonesia from 1948-1955

Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands and Japan in 1945 when the United

States were under Truman administration. Truman administration initially acquiesced to Dutch effort to

reestablish control over their former colonial empire, expressing the same ambivalence about the fitness

of Indonesian for self-government that it did for Vietnam8. For three years (1945-1948), the U.S.

publically professed neutrality in Indonesia’s independence struggle while The Hague used lend-lease

equipment and funds freed up by U.S. Marshall Plain aid to repress Indonesia’s republican sources.

However, the situation quickly changed when Washington decisively back Indonesian independence by

threatening to withhold military and economic aid after the Netherlands unilaterally violated a U.S.-

brokered settlement9. At the same time, the young republican government shows an anti-communism

bona fides to the Truman administration by bloodily crushing a PKI uprising in September 1948 in the

East Java city of Madiun10. Couple agreements were also broken by the Dutch who intended to install a

pliant government in Indonesia to act as a front for the final destruction of the Republic. This situation

quickly changed U.S attitude towards Indonesia independence. However, the United States was playing

its role as a nation who supports Indonesian statehood, however the Administration ensured its support

for the Dutch. At this time, the possibility of Indonesia to become a battleground with the communist

had not been a dominant theme in Washington, despite of Washington’s appropriation of Indonesian

independence as a Cold War propaganda weapon11. Washington was soon found that the nationalists

8 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Gun, p.14 9 Ibid 10 Katherine McGregor, “A Reassessment of the Significance of the 1948 Madiun Uprising to the Cold War in Indonesia ,”

Kajian Malaysia,(2009) p. 27 See: http://myais.fsktm.um.edu.my/9850/1/KM_SE-_XXVI_NO _1_%26_2_ART_4_%2885-119%29.pdf 11 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, (New York: Palgrave

Macmillan), p. 75

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were more than capable to deal with the communists, as suppression of the Madiun revolt showed12.

The Administration’s realization that the Republican leadership was anti-communist quickly

transformed its appreciation of the nationalists. The Truman Administration concluded that only a

properly managed transition to independence offered the prospect of peace and economic rehabilitation

in Indonesia13. Therefore the U.S. policy was essentially defensive since it was not directed against

communist aggression but in support of American and Western interest which in the NEI, at the same

time were bound up maintaining Dutch rule.

U.S Policy towards Indonesia were dramatically altered at the first months in 1950, especially

after the approval of NSC 6814 which was a fundamental change on Washington’s policy on the Cold

War in developing countries such as Indonesia. This change in attitude was led by USSR’s acquisition

of atomic weapons and the success of the Communist Chinese in 194915. Relationship between the U.S.

and Indonesia was also seasoned by the status of West Irian. However, Administration believed that it

had interests in common with Indonesia.

By early 1951, pressure was mounting on the Administration to end its ‘hands-off’ policy and to

deploy its ‘strength and proven techniques of technical and economic aid’ so government in Indonesia

would be better able to overcome domestic criticism16. In this period basis US policies towards

Indonesia were made. The administrator’s first priority was to ‘firmly align’ Indonesia with the West by

means of ‘friendly’ assistance or, at minimum, to preserve its non-communist orientation. This policy

12 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, p. 75 13 Ibid, p.76 14 NSC 68 was important for US policy in the Third World because it was based on assessments of Soviet capabilities rather

than intensions. It predicted that communist would launch proxy wars in the periphery. This also noted Administration’s

decision to move away from economic to military containment of communism (Roadnight, p . 81). 15 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, p. 80 16 Loc; Papers of Philip C. Jessup (Jessup Papers), Box. 1 170; Philip Jessup – UN General Correspondence 1944-1952;

‘Memorandum on Issues of International Security Policy Affecting ECA Operations’, by Harlan Cleveland and H . Van B. Cleveland, Jan 1951. (Roadnight, p. 85)

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was later helpful to understand as one of the cause that triggered U.S decision to support Indonesian

army to topple Sukarno, since Sukarno later decided to form a non-align movement or famously known

as non-block. At the end of Truman Administration transitioning to President Dwight Eisenhower,

America’s relationship with Indonesia has reached its lowest point since independence.

From 1953 to 1955, Eisenhower Administration created a ‘New Look’ policy towards Indonesia

and Third World countries in Asia. The aim of the new policy is to reduce the cost of defense by

concentration on, and extending, the superiority in air power and atomic weaponry that the US enjoyed

over USSR. Included in the plan, the new policy promised massive retaliation against Soviet aggression

and noticing that it would fight Soviet expansionism by developing an ‘intelligence system’ capable of

detecting communist subversion in any area of the world17. Another policy that is specifically designed

for Indonesia was written in NSC 171/1 noting that Indonesia was ‘strategically important to the United

States’. Most importantly, the document highlights that objective of the new policy was to ‘prevent

Indonesia from passing into the Communist orbit. More specifically the notes includes that Indonesian

Government’s request to supply ample-anticommunist legislation, preliminary discussions of a state visit

for President Sukarno, and increased training for Indonesian army officers in U.S. military service

schools18.

This agreement was not officially reached until November 1953 when Vice President Richard

Nixon came to Jakarta to show seriousness that Indonesia is in dangers. However, Nixon said that the

U.S will find it difficult to help Indonesia until it gave an open and active proof staht is anti-communist

alignment. At that time, many people in State Department thought that Indonesia was becoming a Cold

17 Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy Toward Indonesia in Truman and Eisenhower years, p. 103 18 National Security Council Operations Coordinating Board, Progress Report on NSC 171/1 United States Objective and Courses of Action with Respect to Indonesia,(July 1954), p. 1-3 Retrived from:

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/fi les/document_conversions/5829/CIA-RDP80R01731R003000160006-0.pdf

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War battleground which theorized that it would be the next major area of conflict in Asia19. Supporters

of domino theory believed that communist success in Indochina would lead to the progressive collapse

of the rest of South East Asia. The dilemma at this period also continued when Indonesia under Sukarno

held a Bandung Conference or known AS Asian-African Conference in 1955 which gathered Minsters

of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. The conference’s aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic

and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism and imperialism. This conference was an important

step stone of the Non-Aligned movement that consisted of group of countries that did not necessarily

supported one block or another.

Indonesia’s Internal Affairs and Higher Level of U.S. Involvement: Sukarno’s Guided Democracy

in 1956 to 1958

From the previous period, it was clear that United States was trying to prevent Indonesia from

falling to communism. Indonesia was seen as possibly having a quality and impact that was necessary

for the U.S. government to assert its stance in Indonesia. However during the period of 1956to 1965,

Sukarno was suspected to give more space to PKI in the parliament and also received aid from USSR.

An article by New York Times described ‘Soviet Point IV’ plan amounting to $100 million which

Indonesia would share with India20. Francis Underhill, the Vice Consul in Jakarta citing Soviet

references considered the plan as ‘mutually beneficial economic relations’ rather than ‘aid’ or

‘assistance’. From U.S. perspective, this attitude was seen as a rejection of Western liberal value, while

for Sukarno he believed that as a nation, Indonesia can choose its own path of being ‘neutral’. Indonesia

want to be seen as an equal partner rather than being preached to. Regardless of the tension, in the early

19 Roadnight, p. 121 20 The New York Times, 7 Nov. 1954 (See Roadnight p. 191, reference)

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months of 1956, Indonesia’s neutralism might be more acceptable to Washington. Sukarno even toured

to the U.S. in May and June 1956. With his approachable style, made a great impression in America’s

public opinion and feted in the newspaper. He was a quiet warm and phenomenal politicians. In his

speech, Sukarno also told America that they had nothing to fear from Asian nationalism and praised

congressional support. However, U.S. Secretary of State denounced it by telling Sukarno that he had to

choose sides in the Cold War21. At the end of October 1955, Sukarno decided to reorganized parliament

that changed Western model democracy into ‘Guided Democracy’ due to the fact that many parties in

Indonesia at that time only caused complications in the society as they were given enough freedom. As

the matter of fact, Indonesia had 40 parties at that time. Sukarno saw this as inefficient. Sukarno also

believed that the situation will lead to divergence and fragmentation. Cumming also reported that

Sukarno’s desire came from disaffection amongst the army and youth as from the lesson he had drawn

from his trips to USSR and PRC22.

This quick change in Indonesia’s invited a stronger military uptake by the U.S23. The Central

Intelligence (CIA) involvement started at this period of time, at the end of 1956. CIA created a very

personalized campaign against Sukarno. In November 1956, Frank Wisner, the CIA Deputy Director

Plans, signaled the beginning of eighteen months of undercover operations against Sukarno when he told

Al Ulmer, the chief of CIA’s for Easter Office that, ‘it’s time we held Sukarno’s feet to the fire’24. At

the end of 1956, Secretary of State Dulles and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, were convinced

that Indonesia’s government and military were falling under the influence of PKI25. Joseph Smith, the

21 The New York Times, 22 Apr, 1957 (Roadnight, 195) 22 NA; RG 59; DF 2955-1959, Box 3439; 756D.00/10-356; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 30 Oct. and 2 Nov. 1956

(Roadnight, p. 223) 23 By March 1956, planners had concluded that to be successful, any military intervention before communist ta keover

‘would require a substantial and successful conditioning by psychological, political and economic means’ (Roadnight, p . 141) 24 Roadnight, p. 142 25 Bradley Simpsons, Economists with gun. P. 1957

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CIA Agent responsible for Indonesia, attributed Wisner’s remark to secret decision taken by the Dulles

brothers to pressurize Sukarno into changing his policy26. Washington, under the Dulles brothers, also

provided military assistance for rebels against PKI noted in ‘Eyes Only’ memorandum27. Many

believed these provoke by the U.S. only encouraged separatism and pushing Indonesia towards

separatism28. By early 1957, U.S policy objective to Indonesia was no longer friendly by encouraging

Indonesia towards the West but was highly interventionist. Its intention was still to stop Indonesian from

falling to communist camp. The policy has not changed a lot under the Truman and Eisenhower

Administration was believed as a failure to make Indonesia as its friends. At the end of 1957,

Washington had little prospect to influence its policy in Indonesia. In the face of PKI, the

administration’s attitude towards Sukarno was seen as a sense of powerlessness. Most importantly, the

covert intervention in 1957 and 1958 was seen as misunderstanding of the dispute between the regions

and Jakarta. The Washington was also blamed for not understanding the dynamics in Indonesia’s

political life.

U.S. entered Indonesia’s Confrontation: Kennedy Administration

The U.S. entered the new era of Indonesia’s political instability when the country decided to

confront Malaysia’s formation, while Kennedy Administration picked up the pieces from the failure its

precedents did to Indonesia. Kennedy convinced the Congress to provide aid for Indonesia, however

Congress was very skeptical of it. An important note under Kennedy administration was written on NSC

602 3 “all feasible means, including the use of U.S. armed force if necessary and appropriate,29”

26 Joseph Smith, Portrait of a Cold War Warrior. (New York: Putnam, 1976), 197-9 27 Roadnight. P.154 28 Ibid. p.155 29 NSC 602 3, “US Policy on Indonesia,” 27. Retrieved from

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/fi les/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000606461.pdf

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Kennedy administration was also perplexed by risking alienating some oil companies out of Indonesia

while the country was trying to stabilize its economy and cooperated with IMF30. Kennedy was famous

of having strong policy of aiding Indonesia. He also planned to visit Indonesia as the seal of one of the

negotiations with Sukarno. However, his long term economic and technical assistance for Indonesia was

never came to realization because he was assassinated.

The Peak of U.S. Covert Operations: Johnson Administration in 1963-1966

Lyndon Johnson’s Administration continued the Konfrontasi strategy however filled with

regional conflicts and more of CIA Covert actions. The U.S has shown interest of building its relations

with Malaysia. Sukarno who disliked Malaysia for its non-permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council

thought that the U.S. has favored Malaysia. The peak of their deteriorated relationship is when Sukarno

told the U.S. ‘to hell with your aid!31’. Since then, Sukarno’s leftward drift has led the U.S. to a closer

tie with the army. This is an important connection when United States expected the country to be run by

its military32. Johnson administration was seen important to initiate more coverts of CIA and its aim to

overthrow Sukarno administration. CIA’s covert aimed at ‘building up strength among non-communist

and anti-communist groups and or organizations and ‘encouraging direct action against the PKI as a

party’33, however CIA’s proposal has been trying to avoid the term ‘coup’.

During Johnson Administration, Indonesia faced turmoil and the United States was seen as the

chief threat to Indonesia’s interest. Some argue that the U.S. was a bystander to control events in

Indonesia, but for Washington to stand by helplessly while the world fifth largest country went

30 Simpson, Economists with Gun, p.105 31 Sarasota Herald Tribune, Sukarno Tells U.S. To Go to Hell with Foreign Aid. (Feb.1, 1965), p. 2 Retrieved from http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1774&dat=19650201&id=Q9geAAAAIBAJ&sjid=xmUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5351,12732 32 Simpson, Economists with Gun, p. 132 33 Ibid , p, 140

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Communism would be the greatest anomalies of the Cold War34. By no means, U.S. policy in Indonesia

was no anomaly. Officials in Washington and Jakarta reduced the overt U.S. presence, however sought

an expanded program of covert action to exploit political polarization and clash between the army and

PKI or a military coup against Sukarno35. The situation in Indonesia was really dangerous as clashes

between different parties, PKI, and army continued. Anti-Americanism was raised.

The summer 1965 noted the peak of Indonesian instability when Indonesia did not allow foreign

investment and replace all foreign managers with Indonesian managers. Washington was in deep

pessimism. PKI demanded a “fifth force” which is an entity of armed peasants and workers. Sukarno

realized how destabilized Indonesia was and tried to restore the balance of power. Regardless of what

happened, Indonesian army was unwilling to act against Sukarno and they assured U.S. that PKI would

never be allowed to take power. CIA also analyzed that PKI had no weapons for a revolt since its

members were loyal peasants. The situation was worsen when new ambassador of the U.S. for Indonesia

did not receive a warm welcome and the embassy was being protested by PKI. Sukarno’s health was

worsen. In the late August PKI warned all its branches of an impending coup by the army’s Council of

Generals and another warning in September36. On the night of 30th, rumor was swirled that Generals

Yani, Parman and Suprapto met. The morning of October 1, 1965, six army generals were murdered

and dumped into well. Since November 1965 until the end 1966, civilians who were members of PKI or

favor the ideology were slaughtered in different regions in Indonesia.

34 Simpson, Economists with Gun, p. 146 35 Ibid 36 Ibid. p. 170

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Evidences and Correlation of U.S.’s Support Indonesian Army

After the incident, the Washington and U.S. officials were in confusion on deciding who was

behind the coup. There was ‘no active role of Sukarno in the coup and the 30 September group claims

that the alleged Generals' plot was American inspired’, and its immediate purpose appears to be the

‘elimination of any political role by anti-communist Army elements and a change in Army leadership’37.

This memorandum can be interpreted that the coup was inspired by the U.S. in some way. With regards

to a change in Army leadership, as mentioned before, during political instability under Johnson

administration, there can be a correlation. There is a strong indication that the army is behind the coup

since the Army

‘has banned the PKI newspaper but has made no move against PKI headquarters. General

Suharto38, who seems to have firm control of the military situation in and around Djakarta, went

on the radio today with a strong speech denouncing the Air Force for its role in the plot and went

to great lengths to build up public support for the Army by describing the brutal slaying of its top

generals. This is the first indication we have that the Army may be willing to take issue with

Sukarno's policy of trying to gloss over the events of the last few days.39’

This fact is quite surprising considering the fact that the Army at first did not want to go against Sukarno

at the same time assuring that Indonesia will not fall into the hand of communism.

37 Memorandum for President Johnson, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65–11/65. Secret. Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d142 38 Indonesia Army, Commander of the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) until October 16, 1965,

Chief of Staff of the Indonesia Army and Chairman of Presidium and First Mini ster of Defense and Security Sector; after March 12, 1967 Acting President of Indonesia. Office of Historian, Person.Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines 39 146 Memorandum From the Director of the Far East Region (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs (McNaughton)1 .

14

The U.S. involvement can’t easily be interpreted directly for the slaughters of 1965 since the

incident happened so fast. The two published notes with regard to the incident showed a surprise and

confusion within Washington and U.S. officials in Jakarta. It did not indicated any involvement by the

U.S., however the U.S. indicated understanding that the military was somewhat responsible or have

power over the slaughter. These two notes only serves as assumption whether U.S. is involved or not

involved.

Additionally, there is no tangible NSC documents that stated about U.S. aided on weaponry,

assistance or any of its kind that supported the claim. However, the claims are supported by statements

from ex-CIA agents and American journalists who did a further investigation on the mass killing. Ex-

agents CIA, Robert J. Martens, stated that he provided a list of names of PKI leaders and senior cadre

system40. Between December 17, 1965 and August 10, 1966, the Embassy sent the Department three

airgrams listing PKI members41. The most evidence was shown on A-74 from U.S. Ambassador to

Indonesia, Marshall Green, and listed 4 senior PKI officials were reported dead and 20 imprisoned. The

airgram also indicated that “A sanitized [embassy attribution removed] version of the lists in A-398 has

been made available to the Indonesian Government last December 1965 and is apparently being used by

Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest over information on PKI leadership

at the time (…)’42. Additionally after the coup, the US administration immediately rushed to express

political support for the Suharto regime. It provided covert monetary assistance to the Indonesian armed

forces, while the CIA organized arms from Thailand. The US government also provided

40 “It is true that I passed names of PKI leaders (…), the real point however is the name I gave were based entirely – I repeat

entirely – on Indonesia Communist press and where available for everyone – a few thousand at most out of the 3.5 mill ion claimed party members.” Retrieved from: Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1964, Volume XXVI http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/exhibit2.pdf 41 Ibid 42 Ibid

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communications equipment, medicine and a range of other items, including shoes and uniforms43. The

United States seemed to be involved at providing facilities for the mass killings after the coup. From

these evidences, the active U.S. involvement to the mass killing was by providing a list of PKI leaders

and members and possible equipment.

Conclusion, Discussions and Evaluation

U.S. Foreign Policy in Indonesia to prevent Indonesia falling to communism has started since

1945 under Truman Administration, however its objective was not achieved until the U.S. finally

supported a list of names and equipment to support the Army to banish communism under PKI as noted

in Document NSC 171/1. A thorough understanding of Truman and Eisenhower Administration is very

important to see U.S. policy aims in Indonesia and to understand what motives triggered U.S.

involvement in the mass killing during 1965-1966. As it was discussed, Truman and Eisenhower

Administration outlined Indonesia as a communist battle ground, therefore the U.S. involvement in the

killing has been very much perpetuated since 1945. Under Kennedy Administration, the U.S. gained a

little of Indonesia’s favored, however the failure left by the two administrations did not help to better

U.S. objective since Kennedy was assassinated. Johnson Administration was the highlight of a more

involved United States in combatting communism in Indonesia. During Johnson Administration, the

situation in Indonesia enabled the U.S. to have a stronger link to the military, in which becomes the

main entity of Indonesian killing from 1965-66.

43 See John Bardock, Historian says US backed “efficacious terror” in 1965 Indonesian massacre, Global Research Canada, www.globalresearch.ca, see http://www.globalresearch.ca/historian-says-us-backed-efficacious-terror-in-1965-indonesian-

massacre/14254 (Accessed 4/9/2014)

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