US ARMY LONG-RANGE PATROL SCOUT IN VIETNAM … · early 1960s they were called long-range...

GORDON L ROTTMAN ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK

US ARMY LONG-RANGEPATROL SCOUT INVIETNAM 1965–71

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

WARRIOR • 132

US ARMY LONG-RANGEPATROL SCOUT INVIETNAM 1965–71

GORDON L ROTTMAN ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK


CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 4LRP units

CHRONOLOGY 8

RECRUITMENT 10

TRAINING 12Jump school

APPEARANCE 18

EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS 22Radios Weapons

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE 32

BELIEF AND BELONGING 37

ON CAMPAIGN 39Deployment to LRP units Living conditions on base Planning and types of missions

EXPERIENCE IN BATTLE 46Mission preparation Insertion Contact

AFTERMATH OF BATTLE 60

COLLECTIONS, MUSEUMS, AND RE-ENACTMENT 62

BIBLIOGRAPHY 63

INDEX 64

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INTRODUCTION

When US Army conventional infantry units began to arrive in the Republicof Vietnam (RVN, or South Vietnam) in May 1965 they found a country of rugged mountains and hills, open plains, dense forests, and vast deltamarshes and swamps. The climate was hot, humid, and dry – or hot, humid,and wet. Yet the terrain and unpleasant climate were not the only difficultiesthat awaited the units. The local Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and the NorthVietnamese Army (NVA) regulars opposing them were highly mobile,traveled light and fast, and were not burdened with a significant logisticstail as the Americans were. Indeed, the enemy was elusive, blended into thepopulation, and could chose when and where to strike. The US-allied forcesreacted. They reacted with massed artillery, fighter-bombers, helicoptergunships, and infantry transported in by helicopters. But the enemy oftenmanaged to fade into the countryside. Their own logistics bases were acrossthe border in Cambodia and Laos, close but essentially unreachable due todiplomatic considerations.

It became increasingly obvious that this was a war for which the US Armywas not prepared. The Army was organized, trained, and equipped to fighta conventional war in Europe or Korea. It was prepared for high-tempomobile operations involving massed armor and artillery; nuclear, chemical,and biological warfare; electronic warfare; and massive use of airpoweragainst a larger enemy force with similar capabilities. Army doctrine focusedon seizing and retaining terrain. An operation order directed a unit to occupya hill. If the enemy was on the hill or was encountered en route, he wasdestroyed. If the hill was unoccupied by the enemy, the unit secured it andprepared to fight off attackers or to continue their mission.

Vietnam proved to be an entirely different kind of war. Seizing and holdingterrain seldom accomplished much: the enemy had no need to seize and holdterrain. It wanted to seize and control the population. To destroy the enemy,the enemy had to be found – found while he was moving to attack US-alliedforces, exploiting the civilian population, or withdrawing after doing so. Theenemy’s scattered base areas, weapons caches, infiltration trails, and troopconcentrations also had to be found to keep him off balance. Once the enemywas located he could then be engaged with overwhelming firepower, and airmobility ensured that troops could be rapidly deployed at any time and fromunexpected directions. But first the enemy had to be found.

US ARMY LONG-RANGE PATROLSCOUT IN VIETNAM 1965-72

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This proved to be a much more difficult task than imagined. Traditionalreconnaissance and surveillance assets, including fixed and rotary-wingaircraft, satellite surveillance, radio intercept and direction finding, groundsurveillance radar, armored cavalry units, and other conventional means wereof only limited value. The Army soon began reverting to less conventionalmeans to locate the enemy. Acoustic motion sensors were dropped fromaircraft and monitored, scout and tracker dog teams were utilized, defectingenemy soldiers were employed as scouts and guides, and a “people-sniffer”was even developed to detect human scents from helicopters.

In dense terrain where the enemy could easily hide, scouts could also moveabout comparatively undetected. It was found that “putting eyes on the

A Long Range Patrol (LRP) team

of the 173rd Airborne Brigade

stands by to load aboard a

Huey for insertion, early 1967.

Different styles of wear of their

boonie hats is apparent. (Photo

by Co Rentmeester/Time Life

Pictures/Getty Images)

Helicopters were used

extensively to insert LRP units

into the field. Here troopers

prepare an 80ft aluminium

rung extraction ladder to rig it

into a Huey. The rope woven

through the center of the rungs

is used to pull the ladder back

up. (US Army)

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ground” in the form of small reconnaissance teams, using extreme caution toavoid detection, sometimes achieved success in locating the enemy. US GeneralWestmoreland realized the need for Long Range Patrol (LRP) units soon aftertaking over Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in June 1964,although their formation was not officially approved for another two years.

The concept of and the doctrine for such units already existed, but it wasintended for operations behind enemy lines on a conventional European linear-front battlefield. However, units were not available for deployment toVietnam, and instead they had to be created. The situation in Vietnam calledfor dedicated specialized infantry units that were organized, trained, andequipped to conduct intelligence collection and surveillance in small teamswithin enemy-controlled territory.

LRP unitsFirst, an understanding of the designation of these units is necessary. From theearly 1960s they were called long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) units.In the mid-1960s they were commonly known as long-range patrol (LRP).“Reconnaissance” was dropped because the units were sometimes assignedother missions and, according to some, as a way of simplifying thedesignation. Through the 1960s the terms LRP and LRRP were usedinterchangeably, and both were even used in the same official reports. Bothterms are pronounced “Lurp.” It is incorrect, however, to use the word“Lurp” in text to identify these units (even though it is written that way insome books). Officially, they were identified as an Infantry AirborneCompany (Long-Range Patrol). On January 1, 1969, they were redesignatedan Infantry Airborne Company (Ranger), but their mission did not change.No Ranger units had existed since 1951, and the redesignation as Rangerwas simply to restore a traditional title. In World War II and the Korean War,Ranger units were primarily raider or strike units. LRP units, while theymight undertake occasional small-scale direct-action missions, were chieflypassive reconnaissance units and not “commandos.”

The earliest US Army unit that could be considered LRP was the AlamoScouts, who served in the Southwest Pacific in World War II.1 They mainlyconducted passive reconnaissance missions, operated in six-man teams, andused a peer evaluation system in training that was later adopted by theRanger Course. In 1961 two provisional LRP companies were formed in WestGermany to support V and VII US Corps. These units were formalized in1965, being assigned a table of organization and equipment (TO&E).

US military histories seldom mention that US LRP doctrine is an offspringof the LRP concept developed by NATO in 1960. Largely based on BritishSpecial Air Service concepts of deploying small patrols behind enemy lines, unitsreported enemy movements and rear area targets via long-range radios. Thepatrols would be inserted by foot, helicopter, or parachute, or left as stay-behindelements as the Soviets advanced into Germany. They also provided targeting forair and missile strikes on Soviet follow-on echelons. Each NATO countryformed LRP units of one or more companies, and battalions in some cases. Theoperational concept of most of these units was to dig completely concealed hidesoverlooking main avenues of approach. They reported intelligence using single-sideband radios transmitting in Morse code to rear area base stations. For themost part these units were under corps control, as were the early US units.

OPPOSITE

A patrol crosses a monsoon-

swollen stream. M60 machine

guns were often carried by

combat and ambush patrols.

A faster-flowing stream would

require air mattresses to be

used or poncho rafts made of

bundled brush wrapped in a

poncho. Not normally carried

by LRPs, they were taken when

stream-crossings were

expected. (Photo by Hulton

Archive/Getty Images) 1 See Osprey BTO 12, US Special Warfare Units in the Pacific Theater 1941–45.

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However, the Americans never fully embraced the hide concept and preferredmore active patrolling – perhaps because the US military tends not to have thenecessary patience for such techniques and prefers to be more proactive.

The existence of the two-corps LRP companies and a couple of provisionalplatoon-sized units within the US Army prior to Vietnam was not widely known.They trained hard, participating in major exercises, exchanged lessons learnedwith NATO LRPs, and pioneered operational techniques. The volunteers forthese early LRP units were paratroopers with service in the 82nd and 101stAirborne Divisions. Some had served in Special Forces (SF) and would return tothe Green Berets while others later volunteered for SF. These LRPs oftenundertook the Ranger Course or the Pathfinder Course, as well as training withNATO LRRP units. Many of these soldiers wound up in LRP units in Vietnamand were invaluable, passing on their skills to the new units being raised tooperate in the jungles and rice paddies of Southeast Asia.

This book is confined to the experience of soldiers within LRP units,specifically airborne LRP units. The experiences of nonairborne LRPs were identical except that they did not attend jump school. The specifics of Vietnam-era recruiting, basic and infantry training, pay, barracks life, and other aspects of nonairborne troops can be found in Osprey Warrior98, US Army Infantryman in Vietnam 1965–73.

CHRONOLOGY

1945July 21 Vietnam divided at the 17th Parallel as the French forces are

withdrawn from Indo-China.

1955March First US military advisors arrive in Vietnam.

Many LRPs and Rangers

volunteered to escape from

line companies with their

more regimented way of life.

(US Army)


1959January North Vietnam issues resolution that changes its “political

struggle” in South Vietnam to an “armed struggle.”

June North Vietnam begins developing the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the official name of South Vietnam.

1960December National Liberation Front (Viet Cong, or VC) is formed.

1961July 15 First two US LRP companies are formed in Germany.

1964August 2–4 Destroyers USS Maddox and C. Turner Joy allegedly attacked

by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin.

August 7 US Congress passes Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to counter North Vietnamese aggression.

1965February 7 VC attack US installations in Pleiku. President Johnson

authorizes air attacks on North Vietnam, which commence on February 24.

March 8 First US Marine ground combat troops arrive in the RVN.

April 6 US ground troops authorized to conduct offensive operations.

May 7 First US Army conventional ground combat troops arrive in the RVN.

December First provisional LRRP unit formed in Vietnam (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div LRRP Platoon).

1966July 8 General Westmoreland issues directive authorizing provisional

LRP units.

August Projects OMEGA and SIGMA established by Special Forces(SF) to provide LRP support to Army commands.

September 15 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) RecondoSchool established to train LRPs and other US-alliedreconnaissance troops.

1967November 1 Projects OMEGA and SIGMA absorbed into MACV-SOG.

December 20 All provisional LRP units become approved units and areassigned formal unit designations.

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1968January 30 VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) initiate Tet Offensive,

which ends on February 26, 1968.

March 31 US government announces deescalation of its war effort andhalts bombing of North Vietnam.

May 12 Peace talks begin in Paris.

1969February 1 All LRP units reflagged as Ranger companies of the

75th Infantry.

1970December 19 MACV Recondo School closed.

1972July 16 Last LRP mission conducted in Vietnam (Team 72, H-75).

August 15 Last Ranger company (H-75) in Vietnam stands down.

1973January 15 US government announces the cessation of all offensive ground

action.

January 27 Cease-fire agreement is signed in Paris; US conscription ceases.

March 29 Final US troops withdrawn from RVN; MACV is disbanded.

RECRUITMENTThere was no central controlling headquarters or organization managingLRP/Ranger units and their personnel. Each was an independent unit underthe direct control of its parent command. The recruiting and training ofpersonnel, as well as standards, varied between units.

Most men volunteering as LRPs were three-year volunteers. They wereregular army enlisted men with any number of reasons for signing up duringan unpopular war: a desire for adventure, patriotism, idealism, an interest in amilitary career, a need for a job, or to leave a bad home situation. Drafteesserving for two years also volunteered. Many African-Americans and Hispanicsvolunteered for the airborne, either because it was more of a challenge, with theopportunity to prove themselves, or simply for the extra money to send homethanks to the jump pay. However, smaller numbers of minorities served inLRPs, although the reasons are not entirely clear.

While LRP/Ranger units were considered “airborne,” in many cases theywere nonairborne-qualified. The troops were originally recruited from infantrybattalions within their parent division/brigades. Even in airborne divisions andbrigades some assigned troops were nonairborne. While airborne qualificationwas desirable, mainly because of the inherent esprit de corps, self-confidence,and physical fitness that were a result of airborne training, it was not essential.Indeed, no LRP team was ever inserted by parachute. Only the companies

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assigned to the 173nd Airborne Brigade (75th Det/N-75), 101st AirborneDivision (F-58/L-75), and the two fields forces (E-20/C-75, F-51/D-75, D-151)were maintained close to fully airborne-qualified.

Overall, recruiting was an ongoing struggle. LRPs demanded highlyqualified soldiers, and infantry battalions were reluctant to relinquish theirbest men. A divisional LRP company required some 100 potential fire teamand squad leaders at a time when infantry battalions already suffered from alack of qualified leaders. Some men in line units volunteered for a change: toget out of a unit they did not like, for the challenge, to be part of an elite unit,or to serve with professionals rather than alongside possibly less enthusiasticline company troops. All volunteers had to convince their commanders to letthem transfer. LRP NCOs did recruit from the division/brigade replacementtraining center, but such individuals had only four months of basic andinfantry training; their lack of in-country experience was a deficit. Men withseveral months’ experience in line units were preferred, but such volunteersmay have had only six months remaining in their tour, and they still had to be trained and gain further experience on patrols. Line company volunteerswere sought to attend the MACV Recondo School, but in all probability those showing promise would be assigned to the LRP unit upon completion.LRP officers were more experienced, having already served as rifle platooncommanders and were often Ranger-qualified, while company commanderswere usually on their second tour.

The criteria sought for a LRP varied between units, but generallyincluded someone between the ages of 20 and 21 (as they were more matureand had greater stamina than 18–19-year-olds), a high school education ora 100 GT score,2 a clean police record, and a high degree of physical fitness.Other desirable traits might include rural, hunting, or outdoor experience,or an athletic background. LRPs also required less tangible qualities such as patience, self-control, self-confidence, psychological stability, and thewillingness to work as a member of a close-knit team.

Volunteers were interviewed by the company commander or a panel ofofficers and NCOs in an effort to appraise their suitability. Just as important,they were told what was in store for them, the danger of their missions, andthe high standards expected of them. As a result, volunteers were fully awarethat they would be required to infiltrate enemy-controlled areas in four- toeight-man teams, avoiding contact and with extraction a dangerously longtime coming.

In order to attract qualified personnel and recognize their efforts, unitsimplemented different benefits and privileges that included:

• Distinctive insignia such as company scrolls or pocket patches• Distinctive headgear such as berets or authorization to wear boonie

hats in base camp• Priority consideration for promotion when eligible• Special attention to awards• A minimum of a 36-hour standdown between missions• Additional out-of-country (seven-day) or in-country (three-day)

R&R (normally only one of each granted)• Frequent articles on the unit in division/brigade newsletters

2 General Technical skill test, a type of IQ test. An infantryman required at least a 70, SpecialForces 100, and Officer Candidate School 110.

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TRAININGThere was no formal LRP training course. The optimistic prewar trainingscheme for a LRP company required eight months of intensive unit andindividual training. It unrealistically included all leaders and recon teampersonnel attending the eight-week Ranger Course as well as the three-weekPathfinder Course. However, training slots for those courses were simply notavailable. Most units were raised in-country from men with previous LRPexperience, sometimes transferred from existing units in Vietnam – SpecialForces and Ranger-qualified NCOs, and inexperienced volunteers. Only threecompanies (E-50, F-58, D-151) were trained first in the States.

LRPs were for the most part infantrymen; specifically, light weaponsinfantrymen with Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) 11B.3 This meant theyhad eight weeks of Basic Combat Training (BCT) and eight weeks of LightWeapons Infantryman Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Many, but notall, infantry volunteering for parachute training upon enlistment undertookAIT at Fort Gordon, GA, the Army’s only “airborne-oriented” infantrytraining center. It was little different from AIT at any of the other six infantrytraining centers. But trainees were armed with M16 rifles while other trainingcenters still had M14s, they sang a lot of airborne Jody calls during runs, andtheir physical training was more oriented to passing the Airborne physicalfitness test. Besides 11Bs, other infantrymen who served as LRPs includedmortar men (11C), antitank gunners (11H), and cavalry scouts (11D).

Regardless of the degree of training and experience of a LRP volunteer,few had previously served in LRP units. Ranger training, while focusing onpatrolling and leadership skills, did not provide the very specialized trainingnecessary for LRPs. Each LRP unit had its own methods of operation and specific types of missions, and operated on different terrain against avariable enemy.

Units were responsible fortraining their own replacements. Attimes the personnel loss rate was sohigh with men rotating home thatunits had to stand down to recruitand train. LRP unit courses lastedfrom one to two weeks, workingeight to twelve hours a day, with thecourse run by experienced patrolmembers. No two courses were alike,even within the same unit, as theywere constantly modified withlessons learned. Training wasnormally a brief lecture anddemonstration followed by hands-onexercises. The range of subjects wasbroad and included physicalconditioning, marksmanship, enemy

Airborne students wait their

turn on training apparatuses

while they observe other

students to learn from their

mistakes. Here a Black Hat has

just ordered, “Hit it!” and the

students immediately jump up,

assume the exit position and

count to six thousand. It was a

ploy to keep students on their

toes and from dozing off.

The Black Hat wears a black

windbreaker adorned with

Ranger and Airborne tabs over

the Infantry School patch.

(US Army)

3 A complete MOS code included a skill level (1 = PVT, PFC; 2 = SP4; 4 = SGT, SSG, SFC, MSG, 1SG; 5 = SGM). “3” was fornoninfantry SP4s with more technical skills. A special skill identifier was appended (P = Parachutist, G = Ranger, 0 = nospecial skill). A parachute-qualified SP4 would be an 11B2P while a Ranger-qualified SSG would be an 11B4G (“P” wouldnot be included even if he was parachute qualified).

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weapons familiarization, load packing,camouflage, noise and light discipline, movementtechniques, immediate action drills (IAD),helicopter loading and off-loading, landnavigation, hand signals, radio procedures, callingfor artillery and medical evacuation (medevac),directing helicopter gunships, emergencytreatment of wounds, patrolling techniques,helicopter rappelling, and extraction techniques.Units conducting direct-action missions wouldinclude demolitions, machine gun familiarization,and ambush training.

Most courses were concluded by the conductof at least an overnight security patrol or anambush patrol outside the base camp. No morethan two “newbies” were assigned to a team,and their training and evaluation continuedunder the supervision of experienced LRPs. It could require up to three months of frequentpatrols for a man to become fully qualified.

Jump schoolAirborne qualification proved a soldier was highly motivated, physically fit,and could control his apprehension. Predeployment combat training, no matterhow realistic, is still moderated by safety constraints. Participants know that itis training, and while accidents happen, they are comparatively rare. Battlefieldsights and sounds can be partly replicated, as can stress and exhaustion throughconstant action, demanding tasks, sleep and food deprivation, and poorweather. Yet it is still training, and the fear and stress of combat cannot bereplicated to anywhere near the intensity of the real thing.

It is a different matter for one to strap on a heavy load of equipment andboard a hot or freezing aircraft for a bouncing, noisy ride with airsick fellowpassengers and feel the tension build as it roars toward the drop zone (DZ).The paratroopers hurl themselves from an aircraft with complete trust thatthe parachute will open, knowing they face any number of landing hazardsand the possibility of injury. The tension felt by paratroopers about to exitduring a training jump is little different from that experienced when inboundto a hot landing zone (LZ). The difference is that the paratroopers havelearned to manage their fear and deal with stress.

The Airborne Course was three weeks of highly focused, physicallydemanding instruction. The appeal for volunteers was the esprit de corps,assignment to a quality unit, the paratrooper’s trappings, and the additionof jump pay. Many LRPs had undertaken airborne training. It was a criticalassessment of whether a soldier was suitable for specialist training. Even ifLRPs were never inserted by air, their airborne training was a hugelyimportant part of their predeployment training.

Airborne volunteers were assigned to the 4th Student Battalion, The StudentBrigade, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. The battalion’s 41st–49thCompanies typically numbered 300–500 students, of which 15–30 were officers.At the time, regular army combat arms officers were also required to attendeither jump school or the Ranger Course. There might be a few men from otherservices attending the course alongside these potential LRP Scouts.

A student vigorously exits the

34ft tower. He will fall only a

few feet before sliding down

the cables to the mound. The

sensation is not unlike, in some

aspects, jumping from an

aircraft in flight. (US Army)

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Flying into Atlanta, GA, or bussed from AIT centers, the aspirantparatroopers reported in and were assigned to a training company. Twocompanies, for example the 45th and 49th, were paired for a class with 600–900 students including recycles from the previous class. Within acompany, students were assigned in alphabetical order and given a “chalknumber,” which was stenciled on their helmet. Companies were then dividedinto three platoons of four “sticks.”

The class assembled during Zero Week and was given the airborne PT test. The class was required to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test for the17–21 age group (one-mile run, sit-ups, push-ups, chin-ups, horizontal ladder,grenade throw, low-crawl, and a run, dodge and jump). They also met theirplatoon’s TAC NCO (Tactical Advisor and Counselor – pronounced “tac”).The TACs were not instructors, but they were responsible for the men in thecompany area and for getting them to and from the training area.

At 0500hrs on a Monday morning the students were roused for reveilleto start on their road to becoming a paratrooper. Their uniform was simplyfatigues, combat boots, and a steel helmet. The uniforms had to be starchedand boots spit-shined. Breakfast was rushed: food was aplenty, but only sixminutes were allotted to eating it. The companies double-timed to the trainingarea to begin Ground Week. Filing into bleachers they were greeted byColonel “Bill” Welch, the Airborne Department’s director though much of thewar. Welch told the aspirants they had one goal: to learn how to safelyparachute from an aircraft. Standing in the background were the Black Hats,the instructors identifiable by their black baseball caps.

The Black Hats ran the trainees through inspection, dropping students forpush-ups for each infraction. Black Hats were referred to as “Sergeant,” andstudent officers were given normal courtesies, but there was no requirementto salute them on the training grounds. The Black Hats addressed officers as“Sir” but treated them no differently than other students, dropping them forpush-ups just as readily as a private – “Give me ten, Sir.” If wearing aparachute harness, ten squat jumps were given. On the training grounds, ifa student took more than one step he ran. If he took only one step hehopped. When still, he stood at parade rest. There was a ten-minute breakevery hour, but the students ran to and from the break area, and the transittime was included in the “break.” After inspection, platoons hit the graveltrack for a two-mile run, singing airborne Jody calls – ritualistic chantsdisparaging the useless “legs,” or nonjumpers, and the valor and esteem ofparatroopers. This was done in formation and in step, making for a gruelingrun compared to running at one’s own pace. If a student fell out he had tokeep moving and still finish the run. To stop was to quit. The sticks double-timed to their training stations, rotating hourly in a modified “country fair”system. That is, the Black Hat led each stick to the next station and taughtthe class himself rather than using a dedicated instructor. Instruction beganwith a lecture and demonstration. Everything else was performance-oriented:doing it repeatedly until it became automatic. During Ground Week thetrainees learned the nine jump commands, door exit procedures, and whatthey had to do during Jumpmaster inspection, as well as mastering theparachute landing fall (PLF). This was done without equipment, and thenwith a harness and dummy reserve. Sticks were taught to roll with thedirection of the wind drift, distributing the impact of the fall along the “fivepoints of contact” with the feet and knees together, arms up protecting thehead, fists balled, and elbows tucked in: 1) balls of the feet, 2) calf, 3) thigh,

Jump pay

Known officially as Hazardous

Duty Pay, enlisted men

received $55 a month and

officers $110. This was a

substantial sum for a PFC with

less than two years’ service

drawing $137.70 before taxes,

and jump pay was

nontaxable. To draw jump

pay a paratrooper had to be

assigned on orders to an

airborne unit and required to

conduct parachute jumps

from an aircraft in flight.

Being parachute-qualified didnot grant one jump pay; onehad to be on “jump status”and had to jump at least onceevery three months. InVietnam it was seldom thatparachutes, aircraft, and timewere available for proficiencyjumps, so authorization wasgranted for jump pay to becontinued whetherindividuals jumped or not.Most paratroopers did notregard it as true “hazardousduty” pay, and some of theirmoney went to maintaininguniforms to a high standard,purchasing jump boots, and,as they so eloquently put it,“putting up with the extrachickenshit.”

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4) buttocks,4 and 5) side of the back. This was repeated over andover off a 2ft platform into a sawdust pit until the PLF becamesecond nature. The Black Hats constantly corrected, guided, andgave hints to performing better techniques. They had the students’best interest at heart and inspired them through their dedicatedprofessionalism and attention to details. Internal contusions,scrapes, strains, and pulled muscles were common, with studentsloading themselves down with aspirin, elastic bandages, andmuscle ointments from the PX rather than reporting for sick calland risk missing so much training that they had to be recycled.

A couple of days into training all eyes were on the first stick to climb the 34ft (10.4m) tower. This tower replicated C-130transport troop doors. On each side of the compartment were fourcables running at a downward angle 150ft (45m) to a 10ft (3m)earth berm, called “the mound.” The cables were anchored to polesbehind the mound. Cables stretched between the poles stopped thejumper before he reached them. On each cable was a trolley wheelto which were attached 8ft (2.4m) straps with shock absorbers.Outfitted in a parachute harness with a dummy reserve, the stickdouble-timed up the four flights of stairs after being Jumpmaster-checked. Two Black Hats inside fastened the harness’ web risers tothe trolley straps. Abbreviated jump commands were given, andthe student assumed the exit position. On the command “GO!”the trainee performed a hard exit as it was essential that the jumpercompletely clear the aircraft. Pushing hard with his arms andspringing with his legs, the jumper hurled out the door, legs stiff,elbows tucked hard against his sides, hands gripping the reserve, and chindown, while counting out loud from one thousand to six thousand. (During anactual jump, if the paratrooper did not feel the opening shock by that time, hepulled his reserve.) As his short fall came to the end of the trolley straps, he feltthe jerk that simulated his canopy opening, and he slid down the cable to themound. There, students below each of the cables – called “mound men” –waited to grab the jumper and unhook him. The jumper then double-timedback to the tower, and the Black Hat critiqued him from the door. Anotherstudent, on the ground below the mound – the “rope man” – snapped a ropeto the trolley straps and ran back to the tower where the Black Hat grabbed thestraps and unclipped the rope. Students awaiting their turn sat in bleacherswatching each jumper and listening to critiques. The 34ft tower was the greatseparator. Anyone refusing to jump or unable to master the procedures wasgone. During the week a student made over a dozen 34ft-tower jumps. WithGround Week completed, the weekend offered no rest, but rather long days onKP, polishing boots, and getting uniforms ready for Tower Week.

The second week proved to be even more demanding, physically andtechnically. Two-mile runs and PT began each morning. There were more PLFsand 34ft-tower jumps with four men rapidly exiting each door, simulating a“mass jump.” Being dragged by a parachute in high winds was serious, andrecovery methods were taught using wind machines to drag students behind aninflated canopy. In lower winds they were taught to roll onto their feet andoutrun the canopy, turning into the wind and collapsing the canopy. In higherwinds when it was impossible to regain one’s feet, the canopy quick-releases

A student jumper makes a

parachute landing fall (PLF) on

Lee Drop Zone, Alabama. His

feet should be together. Feet

spread apart could result in one

foot taking more impact than

the other, possibly causing a

sprain if not a break. (US Army)

4 Leading to the phrase, “He has his head up his fourth point of contact.”

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(“Capewells”) on the harness were released and the canopy collapsed. The leastpopular training device was the “suspended harness.” The “nutcracker,” or“suspended agony,” saw the student strapped into a harness alongside aplatform. He practiced slips and turns by pulling on the risers to “steer” thecanopy. Not much more popular was the “swing landing trainer” described in Plate A. Trainees learned in-aircraft procedures and more about the 35ft(10.7m) diameter T-10 parachute. They also learned emergency actions iflanding in trees, water, or electrical power lines; the procedures necessary for different types of parachute malfunctions; how to deploy a 24ft (7.3m)diameter reserve parachute; and what to do if the static line failed to separateand they were towed by the aircraft. Tower Week drew its name from the three250ft (76.2m) towers; usually only one or two drops were made from them. Inthese jumps, the student was harnessed, and a special canopy was attached toa large ring that was hoisted up and released. He immediately hauled down onhis risers to slip away from the tower with the wind, but he had to quickly turnsideways into the wind. The Black Hat shouted bullhorn instructions until thetrainee PLFed into the sawdust. After hundreds of push-ups and squat jumps,miles of running, being twisted and turned every which way, and sufferingcountless aches and pains, the first two weeks were behind the trainees.

Weather and aircraft cooperating, Jump Week was only three days long,with one jump on Monday and two on each of the following two days. The firsttwo jumps would be individual tap-outs. The last three were mass jumps withall jumpers exiting in a pass. The first four jumps were “Hollywood jumps” –without equipment. The last jump was with equipment: a sandbag-filled kitbag simulating a pack under the reserve and a weapons container with a boardinside attached to the left side.

On Monday morning refresher classes were presented on in-flightemergencies, malfunctions, and emergency landing procedures. Colonel Welchpresented the malfunctions class and gave a pep talk assuring the students theywere well trained, their equipment reliable, and that they would perform better

The student’s view from the

34ft-tower door, looking

toward the mound with detail

students standing ready to

receive “trolley troopers”

sliding down the cables. Four

sets of cables run from each

side of the tower to the

anchoring poles. (US Army)

16


than they expected. After lunch they bussed to Lawson Army Airfield. In ahangar they were issued parachutes and “chuted-up” after a briefing on allaspects of the jump. The Jumpmasters gave them a detailed inspection and ledthem to the transports.5 The Jumpmasters exuded confidence, although thejumpers were in too much of a daze to hesitate.

After takeoff they flew toward Lee Drop Zone in Alabama. At the ten-minute warning, with the red light beside the door blinking on, the Jumpmastersopened the doors. It was actually pretty easy. The Jumpmasters ran through thejump commands, and the students responded to the actions as they hadpracticed: “Get ready. Outboard personnel stand up. Inboard personnel standup. Hook up. Check static lines. Check equipment. Sound off for equipmentcheck. Stand in the door.” With that command, the number one man on each side pivoted into the door, passing the static line to the Jumpmaster andgripping the inside of the door frame. As the aircraft roared over the DZ at1,250ft (381m), the Jumpmaster shouted “GO!” in the jumper’s ear and slappedhim on the back of the thigh.

When tapped out he pushed hard with his arms and legs rotating towardthe aircraft’s rear. The falling sensation was brief, only so long as the aircraft’sside was in his peripheral vision. As he streaked down shouting, “One thousand!Two thousand!” the 15ft (4.5m) static line stretched behind him, pulling thedeployment bag out of his backpack. The 30ft (9.1m) long “S”-foldedsuspension lines ripped out of their pack tray retaining bands, stretched full-length along with the 3ft (0.9m) web risers connecting them to the harness, andthen the 18ft (5.5m) length of folded canopy was pulled from the “D-bag.”Everything stretched out to 80ft (24.4m), and the jumper was still attached tothe anchor line while the following jumpers were already going out the door. Thecanopy inflated and the break cord connecting the canopy apex (top) to thestatic line snapped, releasing his bond to the aircraft. The opening shock, witha properly fitted harness, was surprisingly mild and was absorbed bodywide.This all occurred in four to five seconds. The immediate need was to check forcanopy damage and complete opening, and then check for nearby jumpers.Collisions and mutual entanglements were something to be avoided. If a jumperwas seen below, the higher man slipped away as the lower canopy robbed air.

One’s sensations were overwhelmed with that first experience; the brieffall, the gush of wind and screaming turboprops, bellowing the count andfeeling the suspension lines unraveling off one’s back, the not uncomfortablebodywide opening tug, the sudden silence, a floating sensation, the horizon-to-horizon vista, the pure exhilaration, and, if one was so fortunate to haveturned back toward the rapidly dwindling aircraft, the thrill of seeing bodieshurtling out both doors followed by blossoming canopies.

Regardless of the Black Hats admonishing them to refrain from shouting,there were yells of “Airborne all the way!” Black Hats on the ground shoutedinstructions to specific jumpers to turn into the wind or to start looking aroundto avoid another jumper or to prepare to land. The ride was over in less thanone minute. The ground rush was coming up fast; a slip to turn sideways, toesdown, knees bent, elbows into the sides, and head up looking at the canopyskirt to prevent one from “reaching for the ground” – a reaction that couldcause a stiff-legged injury. A thump, bump, and a roll just as he had practiced,and it was over. Then there were heavy tugs on the suspension lines and a quick

5 These may have been Fairchild C-119F Packets (“Flying Boxcar”), Fairchild C-123KProviders, or Lockheed C-130H Hercules (“Herc”).

17


scramble to his feet to run around behind the reinflating canopy. The harnesswas shed and placed into the kit bag. The canopy and suspension lines werefigure-eight rolled and stuffed in. Black Hats shouted through bullhorns todouble-time off the DZ to the chute turn-in point. As they trotted through theweeds the new paratroopers would meet up and greet one another with shoutsof “Airborne!” and “They’re paying us for this?”

The next day reality struck. Most paratroopers will confess the hardestjumps they ever made were their second or third, a sort of “What am I doinghere?” realization. Nonetheless, the five jumps were completed. After theirgraduation jump the new paratroopers did not bother to double-time off tothe DZ. The students fell into a rather loose formation. Officers worked theirway down the ranks shaking each man’s hand, handed him his silver wings,and said, “Congratulations, paratrooper.” Within a day or two they were ontheir way to their assignments.

APPEARANCE Owing to the heat and humidity, as well as a Spartan diet and strenuousexercise, LRPs for the most part were lean and trim. Looking at periodphotos of LRPs, one can see a thinner general appearance than a young manof the same age today raised on fast food. Hair styles varied from longish ontop, usually cut short on the sides, to very short all around, as it was easierto keep clean and was much cooler. Mustaches were permitted in some unitsbut generally frowned on in the army. “Lifer” NCOs told troops they couldgrow a mustache if their ID card photo showed them wearing one.

Once assigned to an airborne unit, a paratrooper was authorized to wearhis jump wings on a unit-colored oval background on the left breast pocket(over the pocket on field uniforms); the red, white and blue “glider patch”(which also depicted a parachute) on the left front of his garrison cap (officerswore it on the right side – paratroopers did not wear “flying saucer” or “busdriver” service caps); and privately purchased Corcoran jump boots withtrousers bloused. The Airborne tab over shoulder patches was worn by all unitpersonnel including “legs,” identifying the unit and not individuals as airborne.

Technically LRP companies were to wear the parent command, division,or brigade patch with an airborne tab. Most LRP/Ranger units wore someform of unofficial scroll on the left shoulder over the parent unit’s patch,often influenced by the World War II Ranger battalion scrolls.

A AIRBORNE TRAINEE, FORT BENNING

Jump school was strictly regimented, with every effort made to keep students focused

solely on how to safely parachute from an aircraft. Here a Black Hat instructor critiques a

student executing a parachute landing fall from the swing landing trainer. Under a shed

were 10ft platforms on which the harnessed student stood. He swung off and, oscillating

back and forth, other students gradually lowered him with a pulley system until the Black

Hat signaled his release a few feet above the sawdust. He might unexpectedly fall forward,

rearward, or to the side, and instantly had to assume the correct PLF. Training continued

regardless of temperature, hot or cold, and through rain or snow. Here the students wear

the M1965 field jacket while the instructor wears the wool shirt. In the summer students

wore white undershirts and instructors black. Fort Benning summers were so hot that

students were hosed down at hourly intervals.

18

The shirts and trousers of tiger

stripes seldom matched in color,

pattern, and fabric. Here a

distinctive black unit scarf is

worn. In the background are

helicopter revetments and large

aluminum-frame helicopter

maintenance shelters without

their canvas covers. (John

Burford collection)


19


The Korean War Ranger companies unofficially wore black berets in1950–51, the first use of this headgear by Ranger units. In 1967 some of theLRP companies began wearing black berets on an unofficial basis. Othercompanies locally purchased tiger-stripe berets, mainly for wearing on baseas they were poor field headgear. With the redesignation as Ranger companiesand the assignment of the 75th Infantry lineage, the black beret was adoptedby most companies, but some did not begin wearing it until 1971.

On base, LRPs wore standard olive green (OG) jungle fatigues, OGundershirt and shorts, jungle boots, and prescribed headgear. More commonlythey wore only the trousers and undershirt or went bare-chested and bare-headed. Most men did not wear undershirts or shorts, especially in the field, asthey retained moisture and caused chafing and rashes.

Mission uniforms were a different matter. While there was a degree oflatitude in what LRPs wore, it was usually standardized in the unit or at leastin accord with team SOPs (standard operating procedures). Rather thanallowing too much individual variation, many units realized it was wiser for allteam members to wear the same uniform, especially headgear. This allowedindividuals’ silhouettes to be more readily identified.

The most commonly worn uniform was three-color tiger stripes, whichbecame a symbol of LRPs. These were not official issue but either locallypurchased or obtained by special requests through supply channels. Tigerstripes originated in the early 1960s, being introduced by SF advisors to theCivilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and Vietnamese Marine Corps. Theywere produced in Okinawa, South Korea, and Thailand by many contractors.This resulted in a variety of patterns, colorations, and fabric weights. Whileidentified with elite units and widely popular, there were numerous complaintsabout the uniform. Being less durable than American uniforms, the fabric andstitching easily ripped, dyes faded, thin plastic buttons were easily pulled looseand broken, and the pockets were too small for necessary items. The sizingwas also poor, and it was especially difficult to find American sizes. It waseven common for shirts and trousers to be mismatched in color and pattern.Troops would have local tailors cannibalize uniforms to sew in panels to createlarger sizes, to sew on US jungle fatigue buttons, to reinforce seams, and toreplace pockets with larger ones. No insignia were worn.

After a great deal of study and indecision the Army finally adopted acamouflage uniform for special units in early 1967. Developed by the EngineerResearch and Development Laboratory in 1948, the four-color woodlands

Examples of LRP/Ranger berets.

Left to right: black beret worn

by F-58 Infantry displaying

the 101st Airborne Division’s

black-and-white Recondo

patch; black beret of a

Ranger company displaying

the 75th Infantry flash;

tiger-stripe beret. There was

no standardization between

units as to beret insignia.

A tiger-stripe beret was worn

by some early LRP units − not

very practical as field wear.

(Trey Moore collection)

20


Rangers of Company D,

151st Infantry of the Indiana

Army National Guard, the only

National Guard infantry unit

deployed to Vietnam. They

wear woodlands camouflage

uniforms and olive green

boonie hats or sweat bands.

Note the CIB on the nearest

man’s turned-up hat brim.

(US Army)

pattern was applied to jungle fatigues. They did not see wide issue until theend of 1967 and into summer 1968. Known as “camies” they proved to bepopular in both color/pattern and wearability, gradually replacing tiger stripes.

However, neither pattern was adequate for the many variations ofvegetation throughout Vietnam. There were instances where normal OGjungle fatigues were better. Splotches or bands of black paint were sometimessprayed on “jungles.” While sometimes done by SF recon teams, LRPs veryrarely donned black uniforms in an effort to appear as VC from a distance.

Headgear was usually a “boonie hat” or “jungle hat,” officially a hotweather or tropical hat, a full-brimmed hat with a flat-topped crown. Issuehats came in various styles but were colored OG and later woodlandscamouflage. Tiger-stripe boonie hats were locally purchased and were found in a wide variety of styles, colors, and patterns. Boonie hats were oftenpersonalized in indelible ink with names, slogans, and symbols. There was oftena great sense of attachment to boonie hats. Headscarves and headbands, usuallymade from triangular bandages or undershirt cloth, were also sometimes worn.They were discouraged as they presented a piratelike image, but they kept sweatout of the eyes and were not knocked off by vegetation.

Clothing was loose to allow air circulation, but if too loose it would snag onvegetation. Sleeves were worn down for camouflage, and trousers were usuallybloused into boots. It was not uncommon to tie “550 cord” (olive drab, or OD,parachute suspension line) or boot laces around the calves to reduce snaggingand leech infiltration. Besides issue trouser belts, many men wore a shortenedA7A cargo strap (“rigger belt”) or a doubled length of 5/8-in. nylon rope tiedwith a square knot. Sweat cloths or “drive-on rags,” were very popular. This could bean OD triangular bandage (36x36x56in.),an issue OG terry cloth towel, or an issueOG tropical combat neckerchief (24x36in.)draped or loosely tied around the neck. Theywere used to mop sweat and dirt from theface, neck, and hands; to clean weapons andammunition; to wrap around the handguardof hot weapons; to secure prisoners; and asan emergency tourniquet. In some instancesgloves were worn as an aid for bustingthrough brush, especially in areas withthorny plants and vines. These were blackleather glove shells without the knit woolinserts and with the finger tips cut off at thefirst joint – “recon gloves” – to allow easyuse of weapons and equipment, and for aircirculation. Cream-colored heavy leatherwork gloves were used for rappelling. In thecentral highlands and mountains, troopswere issued the lightweight knitted shirtmade of OG acetate, the “sleeping shirt.”The fast-drying, pullover sweater was wornunder camies, especially at night. Patroluniforms were not washed, and some troopseven smoked them so that the smell mergedwith the environment.

21


Overall, however, LRPs maintained a more military appearance andbearing than many other troops. They had their rebellious streaks, and therewere exceptions of course, but LRPs were volunteers in select units. Too muchdeviation was discouraged. Most units did not tolerate the display of peacesymbols and other signs of protest.

Camouflage sticks were OD metal tubes with a cap on each end and apush-out solid paint stick with loam (very dark green) and light green oneither end. Loam was applied to the shiny, high areas of the face (forehead,cheekbones, nose, chin, jawline, ears) and light green was applied to otherareas including the neck, while the backs of hands were done in loam. ManyLRPs had favored patterns they applied. Camouflage paint was reapplied(“re-camied”) in the morning and as necessary. The “men with green faces”became a trademark of LRPs as conventional infantry seldom “camied up.”

ID tags were kept quiet by “dog tag silencers,” a thin plastic tube thatsheathed the beaded chain and clear plastic covers for the tags. There werealso stretchable rubber rims that fitted around the edges of tags, or they couldbe taped together or simply carried separately: one around the neck and theother in a pocket.

EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS LRPs used the same equipment as was carried by conventional infantrymen,although the gear was tailored for LRP missions according to duration,mission requirements, and terrain. A factor differentiating LRP equipmentrequirements from conventional infantrymen was that every man had to beself-sufficient in case he was separated from his team. Not all conventionalinfantrymen carried a map, compass, air-ground marking gear, and smokegrenades, for example. A good deal of ordnance was carried by each man,usually more than their conventional counterparts.

B INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

This early LRP (1) wears the signature tiger stripes without insignia, M1956 web gear,

and an indigenous rucksack as used by the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG).

At the time no comparable US frameless rucksack existed. He is generously equipped with

M18 “colored smokes” and M26 “frags.” He has a double 5/8in rope around his waist and

wears a headband and neckcloth made from triangular bandages. He has taped a second

20-round magazine to his M16A1 rifle’s magazine for quick reload.

The insert items are typical of what a LRP would carry in his ruck, on his web gear, and on

his person. 2: M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mine with 100ft electrical firing wire and

M57 “clacker” firing device. 3: M16A1 rifle cleaning kit. 4: XM166 white, XM167 green,

XM168 red, and XM169 yellow mini smoke grenades. 5: “Pop-up” ground signal flare

(removed from its gray packing container and available in white, green, red, and amber

parachute flares and star clusters; here M127A1 white star parachute). 6: Pocket-size

fluorescent orange/pink marker panels were cut from 20x72in. VS-17 air-ground marker

panels. Some men sewed a panel section into the inside of their hat crown and “flashed” it

at aircraft as a signal. 7: Halazone water purification tablets, 50 to a bottle, one per quart.

8: Insect repellent, “bug juice.” 9: Foot powder. 10: Poncho liner. 11: Sleeping shirt.

12: Cushion sole boot socks. 13: Acetate-covered AO map. 14: Issue notepad and pencil.

15: Lensatic compass. Carried in a pocket or a first aid pouch and secured to

the person by a “dummy cord.” 16: Camouflage stick. 17: Snap link (aka carabineer).

Anything that could be damaged by water was wrapped in plastic.

22

This M16A1 rifle-armed LRP has

an AN/PRC-25 radio strapped

to his aluminum-frame

rucksack. An Air Force survival

knife is carried on his pistol

belt, and M26 frags are

attached to his ammo pouches.

(US Army)


23

2

17 7 8 16

10

11

9

14

13

12

1

5

15

6

4

3


“Web gear,” collectively called “load-bearing equipment” (LBE) or “load-carrying equipment” (LCE), included pistol belts, suspenders, magazinepouches, canteen carriers, first aid pouches, and various special purpose items.Early in the war these were the M1956 made of cotton canvas and webbing.Constant wetting and drying coupled with hard use rapidly wore it out.Cotton gear absorbed up to 40 percent its weight in water, an encumbranceduring the monsoon season and when crossing streams. The M1967-modernized LCE began to be issued in 1968, although some units received testversions earlier. This gear was made of nylon, with aluminum and plasticfittings replacing steel and brass hardware. It was lighter, more durable, andabsorbed only 8 percent its weight in water. When new it was somewhat shinyand stiff, making a rustling noise in vegetation. It was of basically the samedesign as the M1956, and it was not uncommon for both types of items to bemixed by individuals. Items such as the small combat packs (“butt pack”),mess kits, entrenching tools, machetes, and bayonets were seldom carried.

A good deal of ammunition was carried, with SOPs typically specifying aminimum of 18–20 20-round M16 magazines (the 30-round was notavailable). Some men carried more or may have carried a seven-pocketbandolier – with two ten-round stripper clips in each pocket – stowed in therucksack. One never discarded magazines. Four to six magazine pouches might

be carried, with each holding four 20-round magazines. The universalpouches (originally holding two M14 magazines) were too deep forM16 magazines, but troops placed a field dressing in the bottomto raise the magazines. Both shorter M1956-type and M1967

pouches were made for M16 magazines. Magazine poucheswere bulky and heavy, and so many men carried two seven-pocket M3 bandoliers with a magazine in each pocket. Thesecheap cotton bandoliers rapidly wore out, but replacements

came in every ammunition can. There were sometimesshortages of magazine pouches, so magazines were loaded incanteen carriers or in an M9 Claymore mine bag.

A major deficiency was the lack of an adequate rucksack.Field gear had been designed for conventional environmentswith the idea that a soldier would have to carry only oneto three C-ration meals at a time. Resupply would be

RIGHT

The M1951 mountain rucksack

saw some use in the early days

of the war. Being made of

untreated canvas, it soaked up

water and was slow to dry. This

rucksack, like all later models,

had three external pockets.


FAR RIGHT

The nylon rucksack with an

aluminum frame was widely

used by LRPs, but the frame

rode low on the back and

prevented equipment from

being carried on the back

and side of the pistol belt.


The nylon tropical rucksack was

introduced in late 1968. While

it allowed equipment to be

carried on the belt, its capacity

was too small for LRPs, but it

was used regardless. (Trey

Moore collection)

24


continuous. In Vietnam conventionalinfantry had to be able to carry atleast three days of rations and LRPsoften more. The little combat buttpack was totally inadequate. Early on,some units managed to acquire M1951mountain rucksacks. More commonlyused was the lightweight rucksack. Thiswas a nylon combat pack with three externalpockets attached to a tubular aluminum frame,usually the bottom portion. A radio could bestrapped to the upper frame. The problem withframe rucksacks was that they rode low on the back,preventing items from being attached to pistol belts.Some men wore no web gear, carrying everythingattached to the ruck and their magazines in bandoliers.Later a nylon tropical rucksack with three external pockets was issued.

Conventional infantrymen usually shared an inflatable air mattress, poncho,and poncho liner with a buddy. These items increased weight and bulk, butmore importantly, they made noise. Air mattresses required a lot of huffing andpuffing to inflate and made crinkling noises, as did ponchos. LRPs simply didnot use them. Ponchos were sometimes carried in the monsoon season, and in1967 the lightweight poncho was issued, being less bulky and quieter but alsoless waterproof. Most teams carried at least one poncho to make a hasty litter.In some areas of Vietnam and during some seasons, comparatively cool nightswere experienced. Poncho liners proved invaluable. Though a bit bulky, theywere very light and comfortable. They consisted of a thin layer of polyesterbatting sewn between outer camouflage nylon and parachute cloth. They readilyabsorbed water but were much lighter than a wet wool blanket, and they driedmore quickly.

Most men carried a knife, not so much as a weapon as a tool. One ofthe most common was the Air Force survival knife with a sharpeningstone provided in a pocket on its leather sheath. Privately purchasedfighting knifes were also popular, aswere pocket knives.

Numerous items of air-groundmarking gear were carried.From the air a small teamwas extremely difficult tolocate when looking downon a vast, rugged jungle. Theteam had only a short range ofvision and could identify fewlandmarks readily visiblefrom the air. These aidsincluded colored smokegrenades, signal mirrors,handheld signal panels, andat night, handheld colored“pop-up” flares, strobe lights, penflares, and flashlights with coloredlens. Marking one’s position on the

LEFT

“Pop-ups” were used for

signaling. Issued in a gray tube

opened by a key and strip, the

packing tube was discarded

and the signal carried in the

rucksack with the cap over the

muzzle (left end). To fire it, the

cap was slid onto the other end

up to the red line, and then the

cap slapped with the palm with

the tube in a vertical position.

A rocket propelled the signal

to about 200m. The white

star parachute provided

good self-illumination.


BOTTOM LEFT

The larger type “pen flare gun,”

the A/P255-5A personal

distress signal kit, could

penetrate foliage better than

the smaller M186 pen flare. This

kit was provided with only red

flares. (Trey Moore collection)

LRPs often carried a sheath

knife. Typical models were

(left to right): Gerber Mk II

fighting knife, Randall Model 16

fighting knife, and Air Force

survival knife (with a 5-in.

blade, for length comparison).

All have sharpening stones

in their sheath pockets.


25


ground to friendly aircraft was essential, especially when attack helicoptersand fighter-bombers were delivering ordnance at “danger close.”6 It was alsonecessary to mark helicopter pickup zones for extraction.

The actual gear carried by a LRP depended on his duties, team mission,terrain, weather, personal preferences, and unit SOP. How and where the gearwas carried was sometimes specified by SOP, but more often according toindividual preferences. Often, critical items to be carried were specified, so that

Individual gear

Weapons

5.56mm M16A1 rifle or XM177E2 submachine gun 1

Fragmentation grenades 4–6

M34 WP grenade and/or M7A2 CS grenade 1

M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mine 1

Cleaning gear 1 set

Communications/air-ground signaling

M18 colored and/or minismoke grenades 1–4

“Pop-up” ground signal flares 1–2

Marker panel 1

Extra radio battery 1

Existence

LRP rations 2 per day of anticipated mission duration

1- and 2-qt water canteens 2–6

Canteen cup 1

Water purification tablets 1 bottle

Insect repellent 1 bottle

Foot powder 1 can

Poncho 1 or none

Poncho liner 1

Mosquito net (some areas/seasons) 1

Sleeping sweater (some areas/seasons) 1

Spare socks 1–2 pairs

Mission

Acetate-covered map of area of operation (AO) 1

Notepad and pencil 1

Lensatic compass (sometimes a spare button compass) 1

M49A1 trip flares 1–2

Camouflage stick 1

Rappelling seat rope (12–14ft) 1

Snap links 1–2

M1950 leather gloves 1 pair

Flotation vest (only in the Mekong Delta) 1

Medical items (varied greatly)

The rigging arrangement for rappelling ropes, secured to floor

cargo rings aboard a Huey, two per side. The log reduces rope

chaffing. (US Army)

Typical items carried by a LRP, (left to right): Lensatic compass attached to

the person by a dummy cord; wrist compass on an olive drab web band

carried as a backup; SDU-5E strobe light; Mk 3 signal mirror (backside).


The flexible plastic 2-qt canteen proved to be more practical than the

bladder type. The one to the left has a waterproofed case, and the one

on the right has a nylon case. The carrying strap was usually removed,

and it secured to the rucksack by slide hooks on the carrier’s back.


26


if the man became a casualty the equipment could be recovered quickly. Whiledetails varied, a LRP would typically carry the items listed in the box below.

Team equipment included radios, surveillance gear, air-ground signalingitems, and special items needed to accomplish specific missions. These itemswere distributed as equally as possible among team members. Loads wereinvariably unequal with the radio operators especially burdened. In someteams each man carried one of the air-ground signaling items, but more oftentoo few men were available. Two radios were carried as this was the LRPs’means of reporting timely information and was their lifeline for fire supportand extraction. A backup was essential. Often one man was designated theteam medic, although he had received only cursory training from companymedics. He carried a medical kit with dressings, bandages, medications, anddrugs. Other team members would carry additional dressings, morphinesyrettes, and serum albumin cans.

Radios The radio was the team’s lifeline. The Korean War-era 26lb (11.8kg) AN/PRC-10, using vacuum tubes and having a three- to five-mile (5–8km) range, was

Team equipment

Team equipment was distributed between all members, and the number of items carried varied, depending on the mission. These are typical examples:

AN/PRC-25 or -77 radios 2

Survival radios 1–2

Olympus Pen EE 35mm camera 1

7x50 M17A1 binoculars 1–2

20x M49 observation telescope (occasionally) 1

AN/PVS-1 or -2 starlight scope (occasionally) 1

Mk III signal mirrors 2–4

SDU-5/E strobe lights 2–3

M186 pen flare projectors 2–3

MX-99/U or -991/U flashlights or penlights 2–3

Demolition materials (mission dependent)

Extra ammunition for M79, M60, etc. for ambush missions

ABOVE LEFT

The Army generously issued

many items that made jungle

life a little more comfortable.

Left to right: top row: 2oz insect

repellent bottle, chap stick,

anti-malaria tablets, 2oz foot

powder can. Middle row: Snake

bite kit lid, camouflage stick.

Bottom row: Snake bite kit,

sunburn preventive paste. (Trey

Moore collection)

ABOVE RIGHT

Some LRPs managed to obtain

an individual survival kit, which

was issued in two plastic boxes

carried in nylon cases: the

operational packet for daily use

and the reserve packet for

evasion use. The two packets

contained 42 survival and first-

aid items. (Trey Moore

collection)

27

An AN/PVS-1 “starlight scope” that

could be mounted on an M14 or

M16A1 rifle. These first-generation

night vision weapons sights were

heavy and of marginal effectiveness.

(US Army)


used until 1967/68 when it was replaced by the solid-state AN/PRC-25. These24.7lb (11.2kg) transistorized FM radios had only a five-mile range with the3ft antenna. Using 10ft (3m) long whip antennas or jury-rigged “jungleantennas” and transmitting from high ground, they might reach 15 miles(24km). The similar AN/PRC-77 allowed the attachment of an AN/KY-57secure voice device (cryptographic scrambler), but these were not used in thefield to prevent their capture.

LRP base stations usually used AN/VRC-46, -47, and -48 radios, able totransmit on one frequency and receive on one, two, and three respectively.The RC-292 antenna (“Two-niner-two”) was used by base stations. This wasa sectionalized, up to 30ft (9m) tall, mast antenna supported by guy wires,and taller antenna towers were often erected.

LRPs used pocket-sized, handheld survivalradios normally carried in aviators’ survivalvests. These served for short-range emergencycontact with extraction helicopters and wereespecially valuable as they could be retainedeven if backpack radios were discarded orinoperational. These included the ACR/RT-10,AN/URC-64, and AN/PRC-90.

Weapons LRPs required light, reliable weapons capableof laying down a good deal of firepower. Evenon passive reconnaissance missions a teamhad to possess enough firepower to fight its

RIGHT

An AN/PRC-25 radio, with the

smaller AN/GRA-39 remote

control group attached,

is prepared to be hoisted

by a tethered balloon.

The AN/GRA-39 retransmitted

the radio traffic to a ground

telephone via wire. (US Army

Communications-Electronics

Museum)

FAR RIGHT

An AT-292 antenna used by

base radio stations, here being

guarded by the company

mascot, a monkey. (John

Burford collection)

An AN/PRC-25 radio carried on

an aluminum rucksack frame

with 2qt canteens and M18

colored smoke grenades. The

headset included a boom

microphone and replaced the

normal handset, allowing

hands-free use of the radio.

(John Burford collection)

28

6 “Danger close;” the safe distance from friendlyforces depends on the type of ordnance: helicoptermachine guns – 100m; helicopter rockets – 200m,aerial bombs – 300m, mortars and artillery – 600m,naval guns 5in. and smaller – 750m, naval gunslarger than 5in. – 1,000m. The ordnance may beadjusted in closer after the initial delivery.


way out of a tight spot. Combat missions of course required more firepower,especially for a small team, but weaponry still had to be light. This wasusually compensated for by increasing the size of teams. One school ofthought held that teams should be armed with only personal defenseweapons. Providing them with more firepower, such as M79 grenadelaunchers, would only lead teams to take aggressive action and compromisetheir mission. However, six men in enemy-controlled territory relying onslow-to-arrive helicopter extraction tend not to look for trouble regardless ofhow well they are armed.

The original TO&E called for 7.62mm M14 rifles, but they were heavyand only a limited amount of ammunition could be carried in their bulky 20-round magazines. Airborne and airmobile units arrived in Vietnam withthe 5.56mm XM16E1 or M16A1 rifle and this became the standard rifle ofLRP units. The selective-fire (650–750rpm) M16A1 weighed 6.3lb (2.8kg).From about 1968 some units obtained 5.56mm XM177E1 or XM177E2submachine guns, short-barreled versions of the M16A1 with telescopingstocks and weighing 5.38lb (2.4kg).

The 40mm M79 shoulder-fired, single-shot grenade launcher weighed only5.95lb (2.7kg) and allowed high-explosive rounds to be fired 493ft (150m) atpoint targets and 1,230ft (375m) for area fire. There was also a canister(buckshot) round with a 115ft (35m) range. Various pyrotechnic rounds(colored smoke and flares) were also available. LRP patrols were originally notauthorized a so-called “thumper,” although by 1969 it was standard issue.Some teams modified the M79, cutting down the barrel by 3in. (7.6cm),removing the rear sight, and sawing the butt stock off, leaving a pistol grip. It was carried on a cord or in a canvas holster. This provided a short-rangeemergency weapon for breaking contact. A man armed with a “blooper”would also carry a rifle. In 1967 a few units obtained XM148 grenadelaunchers and in 1968 they received the XM203 mounted under the M16A1barrel. A 40mm grenade launcher gave a team an edge as they were effectiveat keeping the enemy down and disorganizing him. A rapid rate of high-explosive (HE) rounds confused the enemy and made him believe he hadengaged a larger force, which was extremely valuable for ambushes.

The 5.56mm XM177E2

submachine gun was issued to

many recon teams. Its compact

design was ideal for use by

LRPs. This is a 20-round

magazine. Curved 30-round

magazines were extremely rare.

(US Army)

Nonstandard weapons

A wide range of specialpurpose, nonstandard“exotic” weapons were used,but these generally saw onlylimited use. Units had theirown rationale for using theseweapons. They were acquiredthrough trading with otherUS, Allied, and ARVN units,and some were requestedunder special allocations.

.30cal M2 selective-fire

carbine.45cal M3A1 submachine gun

(“grease gun”).45cal M1A1 submachine gun

(Thompson)7.62mm M14 rifle

7.62mm M21 sniper rifle9mm Mk IIS silenced

submachine gun (BritishSten gun)

9mm m/45b submachine gun(“Swedish K”) with or

without silencer

.22cal HD pistol (Hi-Standard)with silencer

12-gauge pump shotguns*

*Typical models were the

Remington Model 870, Ithaca

Model 37, Savage Model 69E,

and Stevens Model 77E with

20in. barrels.

29


Some teams carried one or two 5.2lb (2.4kg) single-shot M72 or M72A1light antitank weapons (LAW): a 66mm HEAT rocket. These were used forambushes and to break contact, especially against vehicles or sampans.

The M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mine was a 3.5lb (1.6kg) directionalmine in a rectangular, slightly curved fiberglass box with 1.5lb (0.7kg) of C4backing 704 7/32in. (6mm) ball bearings, making them devastating to assaultingtroops and those caught in ambush kill zones. It was electrically detonated bycommand, or it could be rigged with a tripwire to be activated by an intruder.When detonated the ball bearings were blasted out in a 60-degree fan with anoptimum range of 164ft (50m), but dangerous out to 820ft (250m). Blast andsecondary fragmentation were dangerous within 328ft (100m).

Hand grenades were important tools for self-defense and for breakingcontact. The earlier “lemon grenades” included the M26, M26A1, M26A2,7

M57, and M61, and they remained in use throughout the war. In 1967 the“baseball grenades” made their appearance; the M33, M59, M67, and M68.The M57, M61, M67, and M68 were identical to the M26A2, M26A1, M33,and M59, respectively, with the addition of safety clips. The wire clip wasrotated to allow the arming lever to fly off once the arming pin was pulledand the grenade thrown. It helped prevent accidents if the grenade wasinadvertently dropped.

M34 white phosphorous (WP) grenades were excellent break-contactweapons if they could be thrown far enough in vegetation. Besides creating an

C PATROL EQUIPMENT

In 1968 the woodlands pattern camouflage jungle uniform began replacing tiger-

stripes to provide a more functional, better-fitting uniform (1). Modernized nylon web

gear also began to be issued. The nylon tropical rucksack, while an improvement over

earlier options, was not large enough for the necessary amount of rations and gear.

Every team member had to carry his share of team equipment, which was tailored to

the mission and terrain. (2) Olympus Pen EE 35mm half-frame fixed focus camera. (3)

7x50 M17A1 binoculars with M44 leather case. “Binos” were often wrapped in cloth to

prevent reflections. (4) 20x M49 observation telescope; seldom used as there were few

opportunities for long-range observation. (5) AN/PVS-1 night vision sight introduced

1965. (6) AN/PVS-2 night vision sight, introduced 1967. “Starlight scopes” were in wider

use by 1969. These were passive sights, which intensified moon and starlight rather

than using infrared. Heavy and bulky (8lb and 6lb respectively), they saw limited use

mounted on M14 or M16A1 rifles. (7) Mk III signal mirror for ground-air signaling. (8)

SDU-5/E strobe light with a FG1C plastic flash guard to prevent it from being seen from

the ground. The strobe could also flashed up an M79 grenade launcher barrel to shield

it. (9) M186 pen flare projector with red, green, and white flares. They were not

launched toward helicopters to prevent their being mistaken for tracers. (10) MX-991/U

flashlight; the MX-99/U lacked the protective ears at the switch. Lens filters, stowed in

an end cap, were available in green, amber, red, blackout, and diffusion. (11) XM28

lightweight protective mask was used in areas where tear gas had been spread. It was

only effective for CS and not casualty-producing chemical agents. (12) BA-4386 battery

for AN/PRC-25 and -77 radios. A spare was carried by each man. (13) ACR/RT-10 radio.

(14) AN/URC-64 radio. (15) AN/PRC-90 radio; with flexible antenna folded and

earphone case attached. One or two “survival radios” were carried by a team for

emergency contact with extraction helicopters.

7 The M26A2, M57, M59, and M68 were impact-fuzed grenades, which had the standard four-to five-second delay but would detonate before upon impact with the ground. Most troopsrefused to use them because they detonated if dropped or struck vegetation when thrown.

Sometimes .30cal M2 selective-

fire carbines with 30-round

magazines had the barrel

cut down and the butt stock

sawed off leaving a pistol grip,

to use as a “spray and pray”

break-contact weapon.

(Author’s collection)

30


31

2 4

11

13

12

14

15

1

7

8

10

9

3

6

5


instantaneous smoke cloud they showered gobs and particles of burning WPup to 35m (115ft), making them dangerous to incautious throwers.

M7A2 and M7A3 riot control grenades were burning-type tear gas (CS)grenades, producing a cloud in 15–35 seconds. The AN-M8 white smokegrenade was also a burning type, creating a dense grayish-white cloud toscreen movements and mark targets.

There were occasional attempts to shorten M14 rifles, M60 machine guns,and M2 carbines to reduce their weight and bulk, making them handier inclose terrain. These shortened weapons were notoriously inaccurate andcreated a great deal of muzzle blast, noise, and recoil. They were strictly“spray and pray” weapons of marginal effectiveness.

Occasionally some teams were fully armed, or at least the pointman wasarmed with weapons employed by the VC/NVA. This was so that the firingsignature would not alert the enemy to the team’s presence, and it allowedcaptured ammunition to be used. These weapons included the 7.62mm AK-47,AKM and AKMS assault rifles; SKS carbine; and Czechoslovak vz.58 assaultrifle. Use of such weapons was hampered by the lack of repair parts, insufficientmagazines, and reliable ammunition.8

Some LRPs obtained .45cal M1911A1 Colt pistols and .38 Special Smith& Wesson Model 10 revolvers (issued to aviators). Privately owned 9mmand .45cal pistols, and .38 Special and .357 Magnum revolvers were popular.These unauthorized handguns were passed on or sold to buddies when theowners returned home.

Two LRPs wearing XM29 tear

gas protection masks. They

have sewn skirt pockets from

their woodlands pattern jungle

fatigues on the shoulders. They

use 1qt canteen carriers for

their XM177E2 submachine

gun magazines, which could

hold five magazines. (US Army)

8 Unknown to LRPs and their higher headquarters, MACV-SOG teams were “salting” VC/NVAammunition dumps with exploding cartridges, which could make their way into Allied handsif captured. MACV directives discouraged the use of captured weapons for this reason.

9 The designations and assignments of LRP/Ranger units are discussed in Osprey Elite 13,US Army Rangers and LRRP Units 1942–87.

10 The two field force LRP companies were commanded by majors; not because they were a littlelarger than others but to allow the CO to more effectively work with senior staff officers.

32


CONDITIONS OF SERVICEVolunteers assigned to a LRP company or detachment found a unit verydifferent from the infantry rifle company, known colloquially as a “linecompany.” A line company possessed a ten-man headquarters, three 41-manrifle platoons with three rifle squads and a weapons squad, and a weaponsplatoon (the latter usually deleted in Vietnam).

A LRP company was organized along very different lines.9 They were moreself-contained, although they were normally attached to another unit foradministrative, mess, and military justice support. They were often attachedto the divisional armored or air cavalry squadron or a brigade armored cavalrytroop. The division/brigade retained operational control. An advantage ofattaching LRPs to cavalry squadrons was that they had organic helicoptersupport for insertion and extraction, easing coordination. Additionally, thesquadron’s aero rifle platoon could be used as a reaction force.

The company HQ varied in size. The HQ section contained a captaincompany CO,10 a first lieutenant executive officer (XO), a first sergeant, asupply sergeant, an armorer, a clerk or two, a couple of drivers, and perhapsa medic or two. A mess team with a mess sergeant and two to four cooks mayor may not have been assigned, depending on the messing arrangements ofthe unit they were attached to. The operations and intelligence (O&I) sectionwas assigned a captain or lieutenant operations officer, a lieutenant intelligenceofficer, operations and intelligence sergeants, an assistant operations sergeant,and a few enlisted operations assistants, intelligence analysts, and order ofbattle specialists. The transportation and maintenance section provided driversand mechanics. Most units lacked this element, relying on their parent unit fortheir minimal transportation needs. Most companies possessed two to four¼-ton M151A1 utility trucks (“jeeps”), perhaps a ¾-ton M37B1 cargo truckand one or two 2½-ton M35A1 cargo trucks. Brigade detachments/companieslikely had only one to three vehicles.

BELOW LEFT

The commanding general of

the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne

Division talks to the troops in

1966. In the background in

tiger stripes are members of

the brigade’s LRRP platoon,

raised in December 1965 as the

first true LRRP unit in Vietnam.

The brigade had reorganized its

three battalion reconnaissance

platoons after arriving in

Vietnam in mid-1965 to

operate similarly to LRRPs. Each

platoon received a nickname:

Tiger Force (1-327th Infantry),

Hawks (2-327th Infantry), and

Recondos (2-502nd Infantry).

(US Army via John Burford)

BELOW

The 9th Infantry Division’s LRP

Company (E-50) at Bear Cat

used a helium balloon to send a

radio and a retransmitter aloft

to communicate with recon

teams at a much greater range

than ground antennas. The

balloon was marked Chiêu Hôi

(Open Arms − a program

allowing VC/NVA to defect) as a

deception effort to lead the

enemy to believe it was just a

propaganda “signboard.”

(US Army Communications-

Electronics Museum)

33


Ideally a LRP company had a communications platoon with a large HQmanning the message center and containing radio repairmen, plus three baseradio stations. These were intended to operate widely scattered stations, withall three monitoring all teams’ frequencies. Very high frequency (VHF)amplitude-modulated (AM) radios were used that transmitted by skippingradio waves off the ionosphere. One or all stations might receive team messagesdepending on atmospheric conditions. The messages were transmitted by high-speed data burst and recorded by the base stations, which slowed down therecordings, transcribed them, and transmitted them to the company messagecenter by radio teletype. The message center decrypted the messages and passedthem to the O&I section. Intelligence information was then passed to the LRPcompany’s division/brigade G2/S2 section where the information was analyzed,processed, and disseminated.

However, in Vietnam this advanced communications system was not used.The equipment was not available, and there was no time for the lengthytraining of Morse code radio operators. For the most part, only line-of-sight frequency-modulated (FM) voice radios were used, although their range wasgreatly limited. This resulted in companies having only an eight- to twelve-man communications section to transmit and receive voice traffic to and fromteams and to operate the message center.

The number of patrol platoons varied. The 61-man brigade LRP detachments(called companies from 1969) had one platoon. The 118-man divisionalcompanies had two platoons while the 1st Cavalry Division’s 198-man companyhad three. The two corps-level 230-man field force companies had four platoons.

The platoon HQ typically possessed only a lieutenant, a platoon sergeant,and an enlisted man described as a radio-telephone operator/driver, althoughhe usually did neither; he was simply an assistant. The standard called for eightfive-man patrols or teams per platoon. In reality there could be five to ninepatrols/teams, with six to eight being common. The number of teams variedover time in any given unit owing to available personnel and reductions forcedby casualties, illness, rotations, and personnel attending training or on leave.

A team, sometimes called a “recon team” (RT), was officially a “patrol.” It was actually a squad echelon unit, but it would have been misleading to call itsuch because of its small size. “Squad” denoted an offensive maneuver unit. Theterm “patrol” had its origins with the British Special Air Service and was adoptedby NATO LRPs including those of the United States. “Team” was a morefamiliar term to Americans, implying a small, close-knit group cooperating withone another. Officially a patrol was comprised of five men: patrol leader (staff

D THE RECON TEAM

The final inspection was conducted just prior to boarding the helicopter to ensure all

weapons and equipment were ready and present, that gear was properly secured and

silenced, and that camouflage was applied. The TL (2) will also ask questions of his men

to assess their state of readiness. The pointman (1), here with a Winchester Model 1200

trench gun along with his slung M16A1, is the most experienced man, but the assistant

TL might serve as a pointman, with a scout as the “tail gunner.” The radio operator (3)

carries an AN/PRC-10 in his rucksack, as does the TL. It was common for the TL or the

assistant to carry a radio in teams of five men and smaller. The second scout (4) doubles

as the team medic, carrying additional medical gear in his ruck. He is also armed with a

cut-down M79 grenade launcher. The assistant TL (5) here serves as the “tail gunner”

bringing up the team’s rear. Part of mission preparation was to learn who carried what

team equipment and where it was carried, so that it could be recovered if necessary.

34


35

5

4

1

2

3


sergeant), assistant patrol leader (sergeant), senior scout/observer (specialist 4),senior radio operator (specialist 4), and scout/observer (private first class). Morecommonly in Vietnam a sixth man was added, either another radio operator ora scout/observer (private first class). Patrol leaders were commonly called teamleaders (TL). Six men gave the team another weapon, another pair of eyes, anda body to share watch. The Ranger Course concept of always having two menwork as “Ranger buddies” was a strong inducement for even-number-strengthteams. They were to watch out for one another and share the burdens. While five-or six-man teams were common, three- and four-man teams were sometimesemployed. For ambushes, prisoner snatches, recovery, and other offensiveoperations, teams as large as 12 men might be employed as a “heavy team.” Thismight be achieved by combining two “light teams” under the senior or mostcapable leader, or pulling selected individuals with specific expertise from otherteams. On occasion a platoon leader or sergeant might lead a heavy team. The9th Infantry Division’s LRP company, operating in the canal-crisscrossed MekongDelta, used eight-man teams with four going into each of its two 16ft (4.9m)plastic assault boats. Teams were usually designated by two-digit numbers, thefirst identifying the platoon and the second identifying the team within theplatoon (11 = 1st Platoon, Patrol 1; 36 = 3rd Platoon, Patrol 6). Other numberingsystems were used, and some were designated by state or other names.

In 1966–67 the 4th Infantry Division employed three brigade LRRPdetachments of eight five-man Recondo teams and three Hawkeye teams.11 Thelatter were composed of two Americans and two Montagnards who hadundergone a ten-day training program. Recondo teams performed as normalLRPs while the Hawkeyes intercepted enemy couriers and hampered enemyscouting and surveillance efforts. A division Recondo Detachment of the sameorganization was assigned to the cavalry squadron. Other divisions sometimesattached their company’s platoons directly to brigades.

Ideally, patrols developed into tight-knit teams that developed a deep trustin one another, anticipated their teammates’ actions, knew their capabilitiesand limitations, and shared a hooch and off-duty hours. They could recognizeone another’s silhouettes in the dim jungle and even the gait of their walkfrom a distance. Assembling new teams after suffering casualties or theturnover of personnel was a slow process. New members had to be trainedand accepted. Sometimes a man did not fit into a team; each team had itsown personality, and was tried out by others.

It is worth noting that the early provisional LRP units were much smallerand possessed the bare minimum of support personnel. Often they were ofplatoon size with three to nine patrols. Provisional units were formed fromassets drawn from other units of the parent command. That means everyman, weapon, vehicle, radio, typewriter, and rucksack was given up by

11 “Recondo” was coined by General Westmoreland when commanding the 101st AirborneDivision in 1959 and is a contraction of “Reconnaissance” and “commando.” Two- tothree-week Recondo courses were conducted by some divisions as “mini-Ranger” courses.“Hawkeye” is an old frontier scout and hunting term for a sharp-eyed person.

12 The 75th Infantry carried the consolidated lineages of the 5307th Composite Unit(Provisional) – Merrill’s Marauders – and the 475th Infantry Regiment (Special), whichhad continued the Marauders’ long-range penetration mission in Burma. In 1974 the newRanger battalions were assigned the 75th Infantry lineage and those of Vietnam Rangercompanies. The 75th did not then carry the lineages of the World War II Ranger battalionsand Korean War Ranger companies, which had been assigned to Special Forces in 1960. In1986 those unit’s lineages were withdrawn from the 1st Special Forces lineage andconsolidated with the 75th Infantry.

36


another unit. The provisional unit commander may have had commandauthority, but the troops’ accountability, ration allocation, military justice,and pay were the responsibility of the individual’s original assigned unit.

The first small provisional LRP units bore names such as 173nd AirborneBrigade LRRP Platoon and Detachment A (LRP) (Provisional), 196thInfantry Brigade. MACV authorized the formation of such units on July 8,1966. On December 20, 1967, the Army authorized the establishment ofpermanent LRP field force and divisional companies and brigade detachmentswith assigned lineages. This is when the units were provided formal TO&Esand given the lineages of infantry units. On February 1, 1969, thesecompanies and detachments were redesignated as Ranger companies andassigned the lineage of the 75th Infantry.12

BELIEF AND BELONGING“Highly motivated” are the words that best sum up the most desirable traitof a LRP. But no one trait can truly describe a LRP. Militarily proficient,technically competent, dependable, patient, courageous, physically fit, self-starter, and other terms can describe the necessary qualities of a LRP. But toachieve any of these and prevail under demanding circumstances required ahighly motivated individual.

No aptitude tests, interviews, or observation during training effectivelyassessed how a man would actually perform in combat, although airbornetraining was a good indication of a soldier’s ability to deal with stress as wellas acquiring new skills. The demands made on individuals to pull their weightand perform effectively and reliably as part of the team were just as criticalto a mission’s success, even if no contact with the enemy was made, as howthey performed under the stress of combat.

There are many intangibles that affect and strengthen a soldier’s qualities.Such qualities may be found in the “ideal” soldier, if there is any such thing, butthey are also found in the less-than-ideal soldier. There have always beensoldiers who rebel against authority, show disrespect or at least disregard forsome superiors, possess a “rebel” streak, and display a degree of wildness orat least less-than-model behavior. With the right leadership, both by exampleand direction, such individuals performed effectively. The downside was thatthe image they created led outsiders to assume them to be typical of LRPs. Theunits sometimes gained an undeserved reputation owing to the actions of a fewindividuals coming across as overly cocky, arrogant, or just plain crazy.

An intangible enhancing of a soldier’s qualities is the benefit of a good espritde corps. Simply belonging to a LRP or other special unit is not enough; a unitis not “elite” simply because someone says it is. That distinction had to beearned, not only by its present actions or reputation, but reinforced by its ties to the past. While most LRPs were not parachute-qualified, theairborne mystique contributed a great deal to unit spirit. Airborne training wasthe only course in the Army in which enlisted men and officers went throughexactly the same training together. (The same can be said of Ranger training,but it was rare for enlisted men at the time to attend.) Airborne units effectivelyused their history, traditions, and image to enhance their esprit de corps. Theybore a proud record from World War II and were considered elite in their ownright, although the view was held begrudgingly by “legs.” Airborne units inVietnam boasted a none-too-shabby reputation themselves. Their jump wings,

37


jump boots, and other trappings were jealously protected and flaunted, andthey were enthusiastically vocal in letting others know who they were. Raucousairborne songs, Jody chants, and even their greetings constantly remindedeveryone within earshot they were paratroopers. When an airborne soldiergreeted and saluted an officer, airborne or otherwise, he would shout,“Airborne, Sir!” An airborne officer would reply, “All the way!” while a legofficer might simply mutter, “Good morning, soldier” or “As you were.”

When the companies were redesignated Ranger in 1969, whether airborne-qualified or not, the units now could claim a common Ranger linkage thatdated back to colonial America. Their greeting now was “Rangers lead theway!” They had a common lineage through the 75th Infantry that includedMerrill’s Marauders and, even though they had no direct lineage with theWorld War II and Korean War Rangers, they shared their traditions. Fewactually attended the Ranger Course, but they embraced the Rangers’ image ofexcellence, the black beret, and other trappings.

And yet there was another factor in play for these men. They believed in theLRP concept and that their sacrifices were worth the effort to find the enemy.This belief did not always extend to other branches of the forces. Somequestioned the value of LRP intelligence collection efforts (unless they wereprocessing, analyzing, and receiving that intelligence), felt they siphoned offtoo many scarce manpower resources, and begrudged them their notoriety andapparent self-aggrandizing. LRPs were especially disliked by line companyofficers who thought they received too much credit when their own companieswere risking life and limb daily. At times, these were the companies that had tobreak brush and disregard movement security when ordered to make all hastecross-country to rescue an engaged LRP team.

There is little doubt that LRPs were boastful, highly strung, and quicklyrose to any challenge to their image in base clubs. But most of all, they canbe characterized by their admirable loyalty to their team. These were the menthat a LRP knew he could count on. LRPs put up with some commanderswho disbelieved their intelligence reports (often owing to their own

LRP and Ranger units

attracted a more independent

and adventurous soldier, but

he had to be a part of the

small, close-knit team.


Combat Infantryman’sBadge

The CIB, instituted in 1943, is

considered among the most

prestigious decorations a

soldier can be presented. It

was authored in Vietnam on

March 1, 1961, at a time when

only advisors were in-country.

A soldier was required to

possess an infantry MOS andbe assigned directly to aninfantry unit, must haveserved at least 30 consecutivedays in the combat zone,have engaged in offensivecombat operations, and hadto have been personallypresent and under fire. USARVregulations went so far as torequire documentation of thetype and intensity of enemyfire encountered by thesoldier. LRPs of course did notnormally conduct offensiveactions, but an exception was made owing to thetremendous odds they faced in their engagements.Worn above all otherdecorations, the badge had a robin’s egg blue (“infantryblue”) bar and a burnishedsilver musket and wreath.

38


preferences or preconceived notions of the LRPs), “friendly” helicoptersattacking them, inaccurate or late fire support, delayed extraction helicopters,and the “chickenshit” they had to deal with in base. Yet none of that reallymattered so long as they could rely on their team.

ON CAMPAIGN Deployment to LRP units Future LRPs deployed to Vietnam in the same way as any other infantryman.They were processed at one of two replacement battalions, underwent thedivision’s/brigade’s orientation course to become acclimatized, and were assignedto an infantry battalion. Records were screened, and those with Ranger trainingor who had previous LRP or Special Forces experience were asked to volunteerfor LRPs. At some point, infantrymen with the desire volunteered for the LRPs.Upon acceptance, they underwent the unit’s training program regardless ofprevious experience. Every unit had its own techniques of operations, and thetraining program was an opportunity for unit leaders to assess the individual.

Some individuals were selected to attend the MACV Recondo School. Thisthree-week course was conducted by Project Delta, a 5th Special Forces Groupspecial reconnaissance project at Nha Trang. It was established in September1966 to train its own personnel, but General Westmoreland directed the schoolto provide training for US and allied LRP units. The demanding course provided288 hours of classroom and field instruction. On average about 20 members ofa 60-student class washed out. LRP units might send individuals or a completeteam for training to fill their quotas. However, units were fortunate if one outof five members was able to attend the course. Students reported with theirweapon, web gear, and a basic load of ammunition and grenades. They wereprovided a 30lb (13.6kg) sandbag, which they carried in their rucksack at alltimes along with other gear and four full canteens. Morning calisthenics wereconducted, along with marches starting at two miles (3.2km) and increasing to seven miles (11.3km) in 90 minutes. Five-man teams were formed, led by instructors. The first week was classroom instruction in the compound. The second week was mostly conducted in nearby training areas and ranges,

BELOW LEFT

A MACV Recondo School

instructor (the Recondo patch

can be seen on his right breast

pocket) explains to LRP

students how to rig rappelling

ropes in a helicopter. (John

Burford collection)

BELOW

A soldier practices rappelling

from a 40ft tower prior to doing

it from a hovering helicopter.

Helmets were worn during

training, but LRPs rappelled

bareheaded during actual

insertions. (US Army)

39


Two Special Forces instructors

at the MACV Recondo School

display the STABO harness. The

man to the left has the leg

straps fastened while the man

to the left has them secured by

tape to the back straps, as

would be worn when

patrolling. (US Army)

where practical exercises and techniques were covered. The third week was aninstructor-led patrol mission in a relatively secure area. Some 3,000 US personnelwere trained by the MACV Recondo School. Its impact was broad, in thatgraduates passed on their skills to their own units and based their own trainingon the Recondo’s.

Living conditions on base LRP units were located at division or brigade base camps, which werecomparatively secure, enduring only an occasional rocket or mortar attack.Units usually lived in one- or two-story temporary wooden barracks with bunksand mattresses, or at least folding cots with a nylon bed and an air mattress,and a mosquito net. A camouflaged poncho liner served as bed linen andblanket. Division/brigade bases sometimes relocated, and the troops would liveunder canvas. The bases were notoriously dusty in the dry season, and the dust

Recondo School program of instruction

Subject Time(hours:minutes)

Administration 15:00

Physical fitness 14:20

Medical 3:30

Communications 8:30

Intelligence 4:40

Patrol exercises 62:40

Weapons instruction 15:10

Air operations 18:30

Land navigation 15:30

Examinations, critiques 6:30

Commander’s time 13:00

Practical patrol mission 112:40

Three LRPs are lifted out during

training in McGuire rigs. Normally

their rucksacks would be snap-

linked to D-rings on the straps.

At the MACV Recondo School, two students demonstrate

lifting off in McGuire rigs by a helicopter. It was a less-than-

comfortable ride. All have removed their headgear to avoid it

being blown off by the hovering helicopter. (US Army)

40


permeated everything. During the monsoon season the dust was replaced byglutinous mud. Local “hooch maids” performed menial duties such as cleaningthe quarters and laundering uniforms. Officially they were hands-off sexually,but this did not keep some girls from freelancing. Latrines, showers, andwashrooms were separate buildings. The mess halls served rations littledifferent from those served in Stateside messes. The bases boasted clubs,outdoor movie theaters, Armed Forces Television Network showing old TVshows, United States Organization (USO) shows, recreational activities, andmedical and dental clinics. LRPs typically kept to themselves and did notsocialize with the the support personnel – so-called rear echelon mother***kers(REMFs) – or even other infantry units.

Divisional brigade bases were sometimes more temporary, and patrolplatoons or recon teams might operate from these and battalion firebases asforward operating bases (FOB), placing them closer to their AO. Teams wouldbe rotated to these Spartan FOBs.

Meals consisted of B-rations: canned, dehydrated,and preserved foods, mostly in #10 (1-gallon) cans.Some A-rations – fresh and frozen foods (mostlysteaks, pork chops, chicken, and fish) were served,and bread was baked in base bakeries. Iced tea, fruitjuice, reconstituted milk, “bug juice” (questionablefruit punch), and coffee were also served. Eggs weremostly powdered. Some fresh vegetables and cannedfruits were available.

Planning and types of missions The company headquarters consisted of an orderlyroom, operations and communication bunkers, anda supply room. The ops bunker, or TOC, was wheremissions were planned and monitored, and wherecommitted teams were briefed and debriefed upon

Base camp living conditions

were often Spartan, as seen

here at the H/75th Infantry with

sandbag-protected tents and

bunkers in which shelter was

taken during rocket and mortar

attacks. (John Burford

collection)

A crude field shower facility.

The 3-gallon canvas shower

bag was tuned on and off by

turning the large shower head,

which surprisingly built up

more than adequate water

pressure. A good shower could

be had with just 4-5 gallons.


41


their return. The comms center held banks of radios that monitored eachteam’s frequency, recorded every message and passed the information to theTOC, and forwarded intelligence to the division/brigade G2/S2.

The patrol platoons were responsible for the training, readiness, andadministration of recon teams. They did not operate as platoons; rather theteams were committed on independent missions under company control.Platoon commanders and sergeants assisted teams in planning missions,developed preplotted artillery and mission overlays, participated in premissionbriefings, undertook reconnaissance overflights with team leaders, and flew

ERECONDO SCHOOL, NHA TRANG, RVN

There were three systems available to extract recon teams when helicopters were unable

to land on the PZ. The McGuire rig was developed by SF Sergeant Major Charles T.

McGuire of Project Delta. This was a system of three 120ft 5/8in nylon ropes suspended

from one side of a Huey. The ropes were stowed in a paratrooper’s weapons container

with the harness and a sandbag. They were dropped out of the chopper and three LRPs

attached their rucksacks, stepped into the loop (8ft A7A nylon strap), adjusted it, slipped

their left hand into a wrist loop, and the chopper lifted off. They could not be hoisted into

the chopper, but were flown back to base dangling below the bird, unless a secure

clearing was found to land and take them aboard. The harness was extremely

uncomfortable on a long flight and there was danger of a wounded man falling. The

STABO harness was developed by SF Major Robert L. Stevens, Captain John. D.H. Knabb,

and Sgt 1st Class Clifford L. Roberts, all of Project Delta. The harness was designed to be

worn with web gear. Its leg straps were rolled up and secured by tape or rubber bands

until needed. Ropes were dropped in the same manner as the McGuire, but had two

snap-hooks on the ends that clipped into D-rings on the harness shoulders. The STABO

was available to LRPs in late 1970. Another system was an 80ft ladder with tubular

aluminum rungs on thin steel cables. Soldiers could climb into a hovering helicopter and

be lifted out clinging to it. Here a MACV Recondo School instructor describes the STABO

harness and McGuire rig to LRP students. The MACV Recondo School insignia was

awarded to graduates for wear as a pocket patch.

The base camp of Company F

(LRP), 58th Infantry of the

101st Airborne Division, 1968.

This unit was redesignated

Company L (Ranger), 75th

Infantry at the beginning of

1969. (John Burford collection)

42


43


A main mission of LRPs was to

locate and explore VC trails,

which as can be seen, were

virtually undetectable from

the air and only found on the

ground by running across one

underfoot. (US Army)

aboard insertion and extraction helicopters or in C&C (commandand control) birds aiding the location of the LZ/PZ (pickup zone).They seldom if ever accompanied patrols. When they did it was asa sixth member rather than leading it. They might do so to accessterrain and operating conditions in a new AO, assess the team, orsimply to earn a CIB.

The company commander and operations officer oversawmission planning, maintained liaison with controllingheadquarters, issued orders for team insertion and extraction,and flew in the C&C bird during insertions and extractions, aswell as responding to team contacts arriving on-station withgunships, closely monitoring missions, and approving/rejectingchanges to missions, requests for extraction, and coordinatingfire support.

While it can be said that the primary mission of LRPs wasintelligence collection, with combat patrols being a secondarymission, a great variety of missions were conducted. The variouskinds of missions are detailed below.

Reconnaissance missionsCovert reconnaissance of specified points, areas, and routesSurveillance of enemy infiltration routes and base areasTerrain analysis and map correctionsCanal and river reconnaissanceLocating and plotting trail systemsConfirming sightings of enemy forces reported by aerialreconnaissance

Reconnaissance of potential LZs for larger forcesProlonged surveillance of planned LZ for larger forcesLuring enemy forces to a particular point followed by extraction

and replacement by larger forcesConducting bomb damage assessment of areas struck by B-52sSearching for enemy rocket-launching sites outside basesRecovering dead, weapons, radios, etc. from downed aircraftEmplacing unattended ground movement sensorsOperating radio relay sites for other teams

Combat missionsReaction teams for downed helicoptersRapid reinforcement of outpostsLocal ambush patrols for base securityCountering enemy patrols near US basesConducting prisoner snatchesExecuting small-scale raids on enemy sitesScreening the flanks and rear of larger moving units to counter

enemy patrolsDirect air and artillery strikes on discovered enemy forces/facilitiesSecurity for sniper teamsSecurity for underwater demolition and explosive ordnance disposal

teamsEmplacing antipersonnel or antivehicle mines on roads and trails

44


Often LRP teams were

delivered to a remote

temporary firebase and then

would depart on foot at dusk

or before dawn. To the left a

LRP can be seen with a serum

albumin can taped to the

back shoulder yoke of his

suspenders. This was a blood

volume expander that saved

many lives. (US Army)

It must be emphasized that specific LRP units conducted different types of missions at different times. This was affected by the nature of the enemy,the civilian population, terrain, and the preferences of commanders. Somecommanders used their LRPs solely for covert reconnaissance while othersfocused on small-scale combat and reaction force missions. This focus changedas commanders changed. However, it was realized that to ensure success ateam was assigned either a reconnaissance or a combat mission, not both.

If at all possible teams were allowed at least a 36-hour standdown betweenmissions. Continuous back-to-back missions with inadequate rest wore downa team and led to mistakes and inefficiency. Occasionally, operational tempodid not allow this luxury, but during lulls in missions, teams undertookindividual and team training, reinforcing or learning new skills.

A LRP team loads into a Huey

for mission insertion. A

helicopter crew chief (wearing

a baseball cap) assists with the

on-load. (John Burford

collection)

45


EXPERIENCE IN BATTLE No two missions were the same: units operated differently, and the terrain,weather, and enemy and civilian situations caused even more variation. The preinfiltration phase was extremely important. Effective planning andpreparation went a long way to achieving mission success. LRPs’ primarymission was to collect and report battlefield intelligence information. Themost successful LRP missions were those on which not a single shot was fired.They searched for, located, and reported the enemy. They might directartillery or air strikes on him, move into the target area, conduct a battledamage assessment, and report the results. Thus, a six-man patrol had thepotential to kill more of the enemy than a rifle company could.

Missions were assigned by the division/brigade G2/S2 specifying the AO,purpose, and dates. Many other details were required, including insertion time,means of delivery, enemy and friendly forces in the area, fire support, weather

LRP rats

The “food packet, long range patrol” – “LRP rations” – wereintroduced in 1965 for small teams. They were designed to be light, compact, nourishing, and filling. These were the first freeze-dried rations issued by the Army and thepredecessor of the modern army-issue meal, ready-to-eat(MRE). Early-issue packets were packaged in olive drab foil-lined waterproofed cotton. Later issues were in heavy,olive drab plastic bags. Freeze-drying removed 100 percentof the moisture (a meal contained 70–90 percent water)resulting in about an 11-ounce (4,812 gram) packetaveraging 1,100 calories. Troops could subsist on them for up to ten days. The main course was a precooked, freeze-dried block of food contained in a clear plastic bagwith a white square cardboard stiffener on the bottom. This packet was sealed in a dark brown foil bag. A fewounces of cold or hot water were added, the bag foldedshut, and the food kneaded to completely mix the water. Itcould be eaten dry on the move, precluding cooking odors.A chocolate, coconut, or vanilla wafer (“John Wayne bar”);

orange-flavored cereal; or fruitcake bar was included alongwith two packets of bitter instant coffee, clumpy powderednondairy creamer, and sugar. Also provided were a whiteplastic spoon, a small roll of toilet paper, matchbook, and asoft wooden toothpick for cleaning teeth, all held in a darkbrown foil accessory packet. No cigarettes were provided as they were in C-rations – smoking was not permitted onpatrol for obvious reasons. Forty meals were packed in acase. Opinions differed, but menus Nos. 3, 5, and 8 weregenerally popular with Nos. 1 and 6 being the least popular.No. 2 was good, but one had to be cautious of the straybean failing to absorb water that could break a tooth. The packets included:

No. 1 Beef hash No. 5 Chicken stewNo. 2 Chili con carne No. 6 Escalloped potatoes No. 3 Spaghetti with with ham

meat sauce No. 7 Beef stewNo. 4 Beef with rice No. 8 Chicken with rice

An early-issue LRP ration (left to right): sealed ration, main course packet,

cocoa powder packet, coconut bar, instant coffee, dry cream product,

and sugar packets. (US Army)

A “food packet, long range patrol,” or “LRP ration.” To the left is the later

brown plastic bag and to the upper right is the earlier foil-backed cloth

bag. The smaller brown bag to the lower right is the main course meal.


46


forecast, exactly what information was to be collected, extractiondate/time/means, and more. Many details had to be worked out during theplanning process involving the O&I section, division/brigade G2/S2 andG2/S3, LRP communications element, supporting aviation13 and artillery units,and the team itself. Missions were from one to six days and AOs might be 1.5square miles (4 square kilometers) or smaller. AOs were designated “No fire,no fly zones” where no artillery could be fired and no helicopters allowed tooverfly unless supporting the mission. Teams were not resupplied to extendmissions as this would compromise their location. If it was necessary to keepa team in the AO, the current team was extracted and a fresh one inserted atthe same time – “direct exchange” (DX) – either there or elsewhere in the AO.

Mission preparation The LRP team received a warning order 24–48 hours prior to insertion. Teamshad well-developed SOPs and preparations were fairly routine. When alertedthe team would not bathe or use scented soap, shampoo, or aftershave lotion.Such alien scents were easily detected by the VC/NVA. The TL and sometimeshis assistant or even the entire team were briefed either by representatives of the division/brigade G2/S2 and G2/S3 section or the LRP operations andintelligence officers. Weapons were cleaned and test-fired, then cleaned withoutdisassembly. Ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnics, rations, radio batteries,expendable supplies (medical items, water purification tablets, insect repellent),and any special items of equipment were drawn. The radio operators did acommo check and received call signs and frequencies (primary, alternate,aviation, artillery). Everything was carefully checked and packed. Coordinationwas continuous as the plan developed and the inevitable changes were made.

Much attention was given to the insertion plan. LRPs did not conductlocal patrols, as infantry units could handle that. LRPs operated in remote,denied areas. It was not a matter of merely walking out of a firebase, althoughthat sometimes occurred if a remote base was situated in the right area. Stay-behind insertions were also conducted. The team might accompany a riflecompany that was air-assaulted into an LZ. The team could break off andmove in another direction or the company would be extracted from a PZafter just hours on the ground, to be reinserted elsewhere, and the team wouldremain. The same was done during airmobile artillery raids. A howitzerbattery was inserted on a hilltop, fired on preplotted targets, and departed,leaving the team behind. A team might also ride into an area aboard amechanized unit’s armored personnel carriers or on riverine craft in the Delta,and be dropped off as the unit moved on.

Helicopter was by far the most common means of insertion. A primary LZand one or two alternates were selected. This was difficult in some areas dueto the scarcity of viable LZs. A danger in such areas was that the enemy couldeasily place surveillance, often just a village boy who would alert the local VC.When LZs were unavailable or could be under surveillance, a team mightrappel in through sparse tree growth, using ropes from as high as 100ft (30m).More commonly the team would disembark from a landed or hoveringhelicopter a few feet off the ground, carefully avoiding flooding and rocks,stumps, and logs hidden in vegetation.

Once briefed, team preparations continued, which included practicingmovement formations, immediate action drills, and disembarking the helicopter,

13 See Osprey Elite 154, Vietnam Airmobile Warfare Tactics.

47


Rather than large multiple

helicopter landings zones, LRPs

preferred small discreet LZs

such as this bomb-blasted

clearing. (US Army)

especially if rappelling. Even if they had just completed a mission, suchrehearsals served to put LRPs in the necessary frame of mind. The team studiedthe AO map and aerial photographs, identified LZs and PZs, plotted artillerytarget reference points, and their route and objectives. If at all possible the TLand a unit officer conducted a reconnaissance overflight of the AO, identifyingthe LZs and route. Such flights did not orbit or hover over points of interest, butmerely overflew the area. Their findings might result in further changes.

The team would then present a briefback of all aspects of their mission tothe company commander and operations officer. Questions were asked toensure the team was fully prepared to accomplish the mission and deal withunforeseen situations. The TL would conduct a final inspection ensuring allweapons and equipment were on hand and ready, that equipment wasproperly secured and silenced, and that all camouflage measures taken.

Noise discipline was critical, and all gear with the potential of makingnoise was taped or padded – “taping up” – especially buckles and snaps. Riflesling swivels were removed along with the unnecessary sling. No metal-on-metal contact was permitted when packing equipment. Small items might bepadded by placing them in a sock. Rations were “broken down:” the mealcomponents were removed from the outer packaging and undesired itemsdiscarded to reduce weight and bulk. LRP rations were not always available,and C-rations were often substituted. These canned rations were heavier,made more noise when opening, and caused stronger food odors, plus thecans had to be disposed of. Usually only the meat and fruit cans were retainedand packed in socks, while the B units (cookies, “John Wayne crackers,”cocoa power) were discarded.

It was also essential to waterproof items from rain, sweat, and wadingstreams. Plastic sandwich bags had been introduced in 1957 but were scarcein Vietnam and the ziplock bag, introduced in 1968, was even rarer. Soldiersmade do with the plastic, foil, or cellophane bags from rations and batteries.The only documentation they carried, if any, was their ID and GenevaConvention cards. A small notebook was carried for recording information

48


with a pencil, as pen ink became illegible if the paper got wet. A SignalOperating Instruction (SOI) extract was carried. This included radio call signs,frequencies, and encryption codes. Radio handsets were plastic-bagged toprotect from water and dust; a spare handset was sometimes carried. Mapswere covered with “combat acetate” or “sticky acetate” on both sides. Thiswas a thinner, more flexible plastic than the heavier, nonsticking acetate usedas map overlays in command posts. It had adhesive on one side, allowing it tobe applied to a map sheet. This was more to protect the map from water thanfor grease pencil marking. No mission data was marked on maps, to deny theenemy information if captured. Yet maps might be annotated with updated

information discovered by the team along with enemy information. Eachman carried a map in the event he became separated from the

rest of the team.Each round of ammunition was cleaned andcarefully loaded, with 18 per magazine to prevent

straining the spring. The third round from thebottom might be tracer to alert the firer that

he was almost empty. Some mencarried a magazine or two of all

tracers (this does not harmthe weapon as some

claim)

FAR LEFT

LRPs often removed the issue

sling from their weapons.

Here a length of cord replaces

the sling on an XM177E2.

This radio operator carried

the AN/PRC-25 handset tucked

into his shirt, with the 3ft tape

antenna bent down over his

shoulder. prior to boarding

a helicopter. Note the snap

link and M67 frag grenade

on his suspenders.

LEFT

Radio handsets were more

likely to fail than the radio

itself. It was common practice

to protect the handset from

water and dust with a plastic

bag as shown here. A spare

handset was sometimes

carried. (US Army)

BELOW

Ammunition used in common

LRP weapons (left to right):

7.62mm NATO (M14 rifle,

M60 machine gun), 5.56mm

(M16A1 rifle, XM177-series

submachine guns), .30cal

carbine (M2 carbine), .45cal Colt

(M1911A1 pistol), 9mm

Parabellum (various unofficial

pistols and submachine guns),

and 7.62mm Soviet short

(AK assault rifles.

No Soviet 7.62mm

rounds were

interchangeable

with the 7.62mm

NATO as was

rumored).

(Author’s

collection)

49


or every other round a tracer. This was carried by the pointman and used tobreak contact, making it appear to the enemy they were under heavier fire.Magazines were inserted in pouches mouth down and bullets pointing awayfrom the body, with a tape tab affixed to the magazines’ bottoms to aidextraction from the pouch. A second magazine was often taped to the magazinein the weapon for quick change. Grenade levers were taped prior to theintroduction of safety clips, or arming rings were taped to prevent them from snagging on vegetation. Trip flares and “pop-ups” were removed frompackaging, and Claymores were rigged with short delay fuzes and packed in thetops of rucksacks for quick access to leave on the backtrail.

The team loaded aboard the Huey with the TL on the side they plannedto disembark from. They would sit down on the LZ close to a wood line forthem to rush into. Normal rules were for weapons to be empty, but a LRPteam went in locked and loaded with weapons on “safe.” With the seatsremoved they sat on the floor without seatbelts, with muzzles down and hatsin pockets to prevent them from being blown away. Ideally the team ridingin the insertion chopper was accompanied by a rescue chopper in the eventtheir ship went down. A second team might be carried in the other bird withthe two teams to be inserted in different AOs. One or two gunships wouldescort them and provide fire support if the team ran into trouble uponinsertion. A C&C bird with a company officer controlled the insertion, madecertain the team was inserted on the correct LZ, and coordinated fire support.The team’s radios were tuned to the C&C chopper’s frequency. Radioantennas were bent down to prevent rotor strikes.

Small, inconspicuous LZs were selected far enough from suspected enemyareas so as not to attract attention, preferably with a terrain feature, such asa ridge, hill mass, or belt of forest, separating the LZ from the enemy area.Often this could not be done, and LZs might be in close proximity to theenemy. As a deception, the insertion and rescue choppers made multiplelandings on scattered LZs, dropping the team on one. Another method wasfor several choppers to fly in a trail, or column, at treetop level, and theinsertion chopper landed, dropped the team, and rejoined the rear of the trailas the other choppers continued on.

A LRP team rapidly off-loads

from a UH-1H Huey without it

fully touching down. The team

could be out of the slick and it

would be on its way in less than

five seconds. Note the team

members have removed their

boonie hats to prevent them

from being blown away.


50


Insertion Insertion was the most intense moment of any mission. Each man was lost in histhoughts, but this was where discipline and training paid off. Troops had tofocus and be prepared for any eventuality. The crew chief alerted them a fewminutes out from the LZ. The TL leaned out the door, straining to confirm itwas the right LZ. Landing on the wrong LZ, even a few hundred yards away,would make it extremely difficult to determine the team’s actual location in thedense forest with scarce identifiable landmarks. The team’s survival and abilityto report accurate locations demanded it know its location precisely at all times,and unfortunately it was all too common for pilots to insert on the wrong LZ.

The chopper came in fast, flared, and went into ground effect a few feet offthe red dirt. The team might all go out the same side and rush into the treeswithout slowing. Alternatively, they could also go out both doors, hit the ground,and move out once the chopper departed. This took only seconds. If they werefired upon they knew not to fire from within the helicopter for danger of hittingthe chopper, a crewman, or their own men. If only one man was out the door andfire was received they all exited. It was a dash to the nearest concealment, andthey halted after 330–1,000ft (100–300m) in a tight circle, kneeling, alert, andweapons ready. After the chopper departed it was startlingly quiet, and the teamlistened for sounds of movement and signal shots, and accustomed themselves tothe natural sounds. The TL had the radio handset to his ear. Once assured theywere safe he gave an all-clear to the C&C bird and a commo check was madewith the other radio. The C&C and gunshipswould orbit nearby on standby. Noses werecounted and equipment checked to ensurenothing was dropped. Satisfied, the TLreported his direction of movement and thenmoved out in a file formation.

The most experienced scout was thepointman with his weapon set on fullautomatic. The TL followed with the radiooperators behind him, then a scout. Theassistant patrol leader brought up the rear asthe “tail gunner.” A wedge or diamondformation might be used in sparse vegetation,but the file was faster (when necessary),quieter, easier to control, and less tiring indense vegetation as only one trail was busted.It created a less detectable trail than anextended formation, which made a widerpath. The interval depended on vegetation,but it was typically close. Each man wasassigned a sector of observation and hecarried his weapon ready, moving with hiseyes. Troops were alert for any unnaturalsounds or disruption of normal sounds, theleast flicker of movement, and anything thatappeared out of place or man-made.

Their pace was deliberate andpainstakingly slow. Each toe-heel step wasmade with caution, the toe feeling for twigs,crackling dead leaves, and loose rocks before

BELOW

A LRP team is inserted by a

Huey using flexible aluminum

ladders. These ladders have

only 12in-wide rungs as

opposed to the more common

36in rungs. The latter ladder

had a propensity of whipping

around in the rotor-wash. (US

Army)

BELOW BOTTOM

LRPs cling to the extraction

ladder at a couple of thousand

feet above ground level. They

have clipped themselves on

with snap links. The ladder

could also be used to insert a

team from a hovering chopper.

There were instances when

troops were dragged through

treetops as choppers avoided

fire. (US Army)

51


firmly planting the heel. Movement was painfully slow, sometimes with only acouple of hundred yards covered per hour. They followed the terrain contour,keeping to the most densely vegetated areas and zigzagging through the AO.Map corrections, water points, LZs, and trails were marked. Arm and handsignals were used to relay actions and warnings. When it was necessary to speak,the message was whispered into an ear and relayed man to man.

F RAPPELLING

Rappelling from a UH-1D Huey was used to insert teams when LZs were unavailable,

or to simply avoid using the few LZs in an area as they might be under surveillance.

It was a less-than-desirable means of insertion as it required special rigging of the

helicopter, preparatory training for the team, and exposed the helicopter in a hover

at between 50ft and over 100ft for several minutes. Only four rappelling ropes could

be rigged. With four heavily loaded LRPs, a rappelmaster, and the four-man crew, it

would require a second chopper to insert the rest of the team. Rappelling is relatively

safe although the rucksack and weapons made it cumbersome. Web gear could not

be worn and had to be secured to the rucksack. The only equipment needed by the

individual was a 12ft sling rope to form a rappel seat, heavy duty work gloves, and a

snap link. The 120ft 5/8in diameter nylon ropes were dropped either coiled around a

log, 16-24in long and 2-3in in diameter, or a sandbag to carry the rope to the ground.

The rappelmaster ordered the men to hook up, checked for proper attachment,

assisted them out the door as they stood on the skips, and gave the order to rappel.

If a rope tangled in vegetation the rappelmaster would cut it. The ropes were

designed to stretch and a log book was kept on each. Once they had stretched

to 140ft or showed excessive wear they were replaced.

A LRP team moves through

shoulder-high elephant grass.

This was the typical height, but

it could reach as high as 8ft,

restricting a man’s field of

observation to arm’s length.


52


53


A 2qt bladder-type canteen,

one of several models. Note the

Velcro-closed water purification

tablet bottle pocket on the

case. Depending on the season

and area, water shortages

could be a serious problem for

LRPs. (Trey Moore collection)

Extra precautions were used to cross danger areas. Efforts were taken toprevent scuffing the sides of stream banks and gullies, while roads and trailsmight be crossed in single file with each man stepping in the footprints of theothers to minimize tracks and to prevent the team’s strength from beingdetermined. Another technique was for the team to position themselves alongthe trail and to all cross at once, minimizing their exposure and preventingthe team from being split if engaged. The first individuals crossing a gully orother rough terrain learned to slow their pace to allow the following mentime to get across and not become separated. Unless a reconnaissanceobjective, villages and cultivated areas were avoided and bypassed downwind.Crossing a stream meant a short halt to fill canteens, with halazonepurification tablets added at the next break.

It was difficult for many commanders to comprehend the slow movementrate necessary for LRPs to remain undetected. They could not alwaysunderstand the limitations of the team’s visibility at ground level in the jungleor that from atop a jungle-covered hill they could see nothing but trees.

Radios were normally turned off to conserve batteries. Batteries burned upquickly and only a limited number of 4.12lb (1.9kg) “bats” could be carried.Radios were only turned on if it appeared enemy contact was imminent.Required contacts were made at specified times three or four times a day toreport the team’s location, movement direction, and status. In AOs out of radiorange a helicopter would overfly the area several times a day to make contact.When reporting enemy activity a SALUTE report was made (see sidebar).

Grid coordinates were transmitted by a “shackle code.” This was a simplelow-level code for encrypting grid coordinates. It consisted of a predeterminedten-letter word with no two letters the same; BLACKNIGHT for example. Itwas a simple substitution code with the letters assigned 1–0. When transmittinga six-digit coordinate the radio operator would say, “I shackle, Charlie,November, Kilo, Bravo, Alpha, Lima. How copy? Over.” Using BLACKNIGHTas the code word, the base station would repeat the phonetic letters; in this casestanding for “465132.” Another means was a “KAC code,” a pocket-sized“wiz-wheel” for converting numbers to letters.

Many missions were a so-called “dry hole” with nothing found. This wasof value as it was important to know where the enemy were not located orwhether they had moved out of an area. Patrols might also find indicationsof the size of the force that had occupied a base camp and in what directionit departed. It was common for a team to be extracted from such an AO in aday or so or even hours; sometimes to be reinserted in a nearby AO.

A team would move until dusk, with just enough light remaining to see by.The leader would select a “remain overnight” (RON) position, discretely pointit out, and continue past. The team hooked back to the designated RON andimmediately took up position covering their backtrail in case they were beingfollowed. A RON was often compared to a miniskirt: it offered minimal coverand concealment, all-around security, and can be defended for a short time.LRPs might move a short distance after darkness fell to further deceive theenemy. The RON was within dense vegetation well away from trails, streams,lines of drift, and easily traversed terrain. Claymores were emplaced on avenuesof approach. The team might assume a “wagon-wheel” formation in the prone,facing outward with their feet in the center. This allowed them to alert oneanother by tapping boots. An alternative was to sit back-to-back in a tightcircle resting on their rucksacks. At rest, weapons and equipment were checkedand cleaned without disassembly, and a radio report was made. Troops slept

SALUTE report

The SALUTE report formatwas used to ensure thefollowing information wasaccurate and complete:

Size of enemy forceActivities of the enemy force,

including general directionof movements

Location given by six- oreight-digit coordinates

Unit identification of enemy

including markings,symbols, and uniforms

Time and date of sighting

using 24-hour military timesystem; equipment carried

by the enemy includingweapons, web gear,

and vehicles

54


in that position without a bedroll. If the enemy was about, even whenit rained, LRPs did not use ponchos as they made noise and glistened.To further minimize the chances of discovery insect repellent was reliedupon rather than mosquito nets. Everything was kept packed andready to move out with only necessary items removed from the ruck.Troops did not shave or brush their teeth, and they removed one bootat a time when checking their feet.

Seldom was a situation such that meals could be heated. Issue heattablets or burning balls of C4 and food odors were too conspicuous.LRP or C-rations were usually eaten cold, and in the case of LRPs, dry.On longer missions, especially in the rains, hot meals were preparedwell away from possible enemy areas, while tepid drinking water wasflavored with presweetened Kool-Aid® sent from home.

Night movement was avoided. It made too much noise, was tooslow, and there was too much of a chance of running into an enemycamp or ambush. There were no night vision goggles at the time – andthere is nothing darker than a jungle floor at night. Moving on trailswas suicide.

Contact The following describes a typical example of what would happenwhen an LRP team encountered the enemy.

The team is awake and alert as dawn approaches. They quicklyeat, and when it is light enough, they move out, recovering theClaymores. They soon find a yard-wide trail one-third of the way upa ridge with recent footprints leaving telltale tire tread marks. Theyparallel the trail, moving a few paces at a time: halting, listening,moving, but never setting foot on the trail itself. The team discoversa site where a fallen tree branch has recently been cut to clear thetrail. At another point where streamlets trickle out of the ridge side,new bamboo mats have been laid over the muddy trail. The teamplots the trail’s coordinates and continue on.

A chance contact, the accidental meeting with an enemy patrolor even individuals on routine duties in a base area, were the most common contacts. Once a team was discovered it was“compromised.” With the enemy aware of its presence, the LRP teamcould no longer accomplish its mission. The enemy quickly learnedhow dangerous a LRP team was with their ability to call in artillery,air strikes, and gunships, let alone report his activities. Every effort would bemade to destroy a LRP team, with even rear service troops turning out tosweep the area. It did not require highly trained troops to keep the LRPs on the run, and if discovering them, to fix them so that they could bedestroyed. For the LRPs, keen alertness was essential, not just to avoidambushes, but to ensure it was they who detected the enemy first. Thisguaranteed a distinct advantage in a close-range firefight.

The trail leads downward and crosses the stream at the bottom of theridge and then climbs up the opposite ridge. The team backs off andcautiously crosses further downstream. Angling up the side of the jungle-covered ridge now above the trail, the pointman sees a flicker of movementand signals “hasty ambush left.” The men ease into prone positions. Most arenot certain from exactly which angle the threat approaches due to the groundvegetation blocking their view of each other just a couple of yards away.

ABOVE TOPAn XM177E2 submachine gun-armed LRP team leader, carryinghis own radio, signals his men toquickly cross a rice paddy.Sometimes such exposure couldnot be avoided owing to the sizeof the paddies. (US Army)

ABOVEAn AN/PRC-25 radio carried on amakeshift shoulder sling. Thiswas sometimes used whenoccupying an observation postwhen keeping a trail undersurveillance, and the rucksackwas left in a patrol base to therear. (US Army)

55


The TL is forced to make a quick decision. If it appears the enemy, whom heestimates at at least eight if not more, will pass them, his troops will merelyhide. But it will be a different matter if the enemy moves directly toward the team. The LRP hears voices above them. The VC patrol is less than 100ft(30m) away higher up the ridge, heading down toward the team, perhaps tothe stream. The VC looking down the slope can see only vegetation, but theteam can see brush moving, and then it sees canvas-booted feet.

With signaling impossible, the team is prepared to do whatever the TLinitiates. He removes a grenade, rotates the safety clip, and lays it on theground. He aims his XM177E2 above a pair of boots, partly exhales, andsqueezes the trigger shouting, “Fire!” in case his weapon fails. The team’sresponse is immediate, and all weapons blast away with rapid semiautomaticshots.14 The TL chucks his grenade and reloads. More grenades detonate withcrashing bangs. Answering fire is erratic and high, snapping over the brush, anadvantage of being positioned downslope. Rattling AK bursts clatter from theright and higher up. High-pitched shouts, bodies thrusting through brush,scrambling feet; a grenade detonates behind the TL, and twigs and leavesshower down. Shrieks emit from the cloud as other team members throw frags.

“Peal to six o’clock,” shouts the TL, ordering a disengagement in thedirection they had traveled from. The pointman empties his weapon on full-auto, and crouching low, darts past the TL who throws a grenade, emptieshis magazine, and runs to the rear. Each man sequentially chucks a frag andempties his weapon in a “banana peel,” the means of breaking contact whilekeeping up a continuous barrage of fire and grenades. Finally the assistant TLlobs a CS grenade followed by a frag, and as he departs he drops a whitesmoke. AK bursts crackle behind them amid shouts. They leave “Charlie” inconfusion, but the VC might soon be on their trail. The team closes up, andthe assistant TL sends up the count, tapping on the man in front, saying,“One.” That man taps the man ahead of him. “Two.” When the count comesto the TL, the number five, he knows the pointman is ahead; all men areaccounted for. The TL signals a halt, and the men coil into a tight circle toassess casualties. One scout took a deep graze in his side, and it is quicklydressed. A team member shoulders the injured man’s ruck. One of the radiooperators has two grenade fragments in his thigh and one in the hand, but

G CONTACT

An extraction under pressure, that is, engaged by a closely pursuing enemy force, was

among the most dangerous actions LRPs encountered. All manner of techniques were

used to break contract with a pursuing enemy force: minimizing tracks, laying

deceptive trails, ambushing the back-trail, deploying trip-wired grenades and

Claymores, tear gas and smoke grenades, calling artillery fire on the back-trail, wading

down streams, and crossing rocky ground. A combination of these techniques were

used, with the goal of giving the enemy an excuse to quit the pursuit. The team being

pursued had much more to lose and could use extraordinary measures to outrun the

enemy. Attack helicopters were invaluable in suppressing pursuers. Their 7.62mm

machine gun and 40mm grenade launcher fire could be brought in extremely close. It

was a different matter with their less-accurate 2.75in rockets. Essential to a successful

extraction under pressure was for the team to be able to accurately mark its position,

so that gunships and extraction choppers could locate them and have a reference

point from which to engage the unseen enemy.

14 Full automatic fire wastes ammunition and is inaccurate, even at short ranges.

56


57


B/W

neither injury is very serious. As they start moving, both radios are turned on,and the TL sends in the contact report that includes location, time, whoinitiated contact, range, friendly and enemy casualties, and present situation.He requests immediate extraction, sends the codeword for the nearest PZ, andgives his estimated time of arrival (ETA). Having engaged roughly 12 VC, the

team is on the run from a superior force. There is a contingency PZ,Tango Six, down the ridge, but this is two “klicks,” or

two kilometers (1.2 miles) away. A CS grenade ispopped behind them so its cloud will hang aroundthe trees. The team works its way up the ridgestaying below the crest, where a shallow gully

angles upward.


ABOVE

Two LRP are lifted out of a PZ

using McGuire rigs. No more

than three men could be

extracted at a time using this

system, and it would require

two choppers to take out a five-

or six-man team. (John Burford

collection)

OPPOSITE PAGE

Among reeds a LRP guides a

Huey onto a sandbar for

extraction. River-bend sandbars

served as PZs when other

clearings were unavailable.

Note the taped M16A1 muzzle

protecting it from water and

dust. The tape could be shot

through without removing it.

(US Army)

They file into it, intentionally leaving scuff marks. Halfwayup, they rig a trip-wired Claymore across the gully as a“mousetrap.” Two men move up to the head of the gullyand set up a trip-wired frag with a CS grenade taped onand arm it after the team passes. At the same time they heara shot from behind and then an answering signal shot fromthe opposite ridge. The enemy is now closing in from two directions.

The TL calls for artillery fire giving a six-digitcoordinate on the opposite ridge. After ten minutes, “Shot.Out.” comes over the radio followed shortly by “Splash.Out.” Seconds later, six plumes of black smoke blossomon the ridge, followed by dull thumps. “Up two hundred,right one hundred. Over.” Six more rounds impact in aneffort to slow anyone attempting to cut them off. As theypress on there are more enemy signal shots from theopposite ridge. More artillery, or “arty,” is called for, androunds slam into the ridge until a “check fire” is called.The C&C bird and a gunship are inbound as the sharpcrack of a Claymore echoes behind them, causing someamusement among team members.

A scout crouches at the edge of the brush flashing amarker panel as the two choppers come into view. TheC&C bird acknowledges them and reports the PZ is 650ft(200m) ahead. The TL requests rockets halfway up theirridge, and the accompanying Cobra gunship starts its runbetween the ridgetops. White lances of smoke slant intothe trees with dirty gray explosions. But the VC are stillclosing in.

The distinctive whack of Huey blades is heard; the extraction and rescuebirds are black dots barreling toward the team below the height of the ridge.The gunship makes another rocket run on the other side of the ridge,preserving a few vital rockets to cover the extraction.

Halting short of the PZ, the scouts move forward to check it out as the TLnotifies the C&C they have arrived. As a rule, all choppers monitor theconversation during extractions, but only the C&C talks directly to the TL toprevent confusion. A quick exchange follows. C&C: “Mark your location.”TL: “Roger, popping smoke.” The TL signals a scout, who tosses a yellowsmoke on the PZ’s edge. TL: “Identify smoke.” C&C: “Lemon.” TL: “Roger,lemon.” The ground element never told the airborne element what color theywere popping as the enemy could monitor the frequency and would attempt toconfuse the choppers by popping the same color elsewhere.

A grenade detonates behind them and rifles crackle as two green-cladfigures dart over the crest with AKs blazing. The assistant TL throws his lastgrenade, and all hands fire as the scouts rush back to add their firepower.Warning that the PZ is hot, the TL pops a mini red smoke to mark theirprecise location, the red indicating danger. The gunship rolls over the crestwith a solid stream of red tracers lashing the trees. The TL orders a peelbackto the PZ as the assistant TL empties his weapon. Few grenades remain as theextraction bird comes in at full throttle. The assistant and a scout half-dragthe wounded radio operator to the bird as it flares and sets down. Theremaining frags and white smokes are thrown as inaccurate VC shots

59


continue to crackle out of the smoke. Men dive into the bird with the TL thelast to fling himself in, after taking a moment to ensure all are aboard. The gunship makes another pass as the bird lifts off with the door gunnerhammering rounds into the trees. As it drops down the ridge and flies up thevalley, the gunship makes a last pass, expending its rockets.

The blast of cool air gushes through the doors over the gasping men.Grinning in relief, they give each other the thumbs up. As they wing to base,two team members change the radio operator’s sodden dressing and the pilotrelays the team’s condition to the C&C.

As the chopper settles on the pad, uncommitted teams greet the returnees,who soon make their way to the O&I section for debriefing. All aspects of the mission are discussed: insertion to extraction; terrain conditions; mapcorrections; route; communications problems; fire support; enemy sightings andfacilities; enemy uniforms, weapons, equipment, tactics, and activities; and allother aspects of the mission – essentially, what went right and what went wrong.

Debriefing includes the entire team, although individual sessions are alsoconducted. For critical missions a representative from the headquartersrequesting the mission might be present. Debriefing forms are completed andsigned by the TL. After a day or two off, they begin planning the next mission.

HAWARD CEREMONY

LRP/Ranger units were among the most highly decorated units in Vietnam. It required a

great deal of skill and valor just to conduct “routine” operations with such a small

number of men, deep within enemy territory. The most common decorations for valor

were the Silver Star, Bronze Star, and Army Commendation Medal. The latter two were

also awarded for service, but when presented for valor, a small bronze “V” device was

affixed to the ribbon. The Purple Heart was presented to those wounded in action. These

Rangers of Company H, 75th Infantry, attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, wear the

traditional black Ranger beret with the 75th Infantry flash, and their unit scroll on the left

shoulder in the traditional Ranger colors of red, white, and black. The staff sergeant to the

left is Ranger- and airborne-qualified, as is the company commander presenting the

decorations, who had served with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in a previous tour, signified

by wearing his former combat unit’s patch on the right shoulder.

60

RIGHT

LRP team leader John Burford

upon returning from a mission.

Burford is the author of two

books on LRPs. On his belt are

magazine pouches, a canteen

in the front for easy access,

and other canteen carriers

holding 20-round magazines.

On his right suspender are a

strobe light and a serum

albumin can and on the left

is an M18 smoke grenade.


BELOW

Many medical evacuation

(“medevac” or “dust-off”)

helicopters were fitted with a

power hoist and a jungle

penetrator. Its yellow bullet-like

shape and weight allowed it to

be lowered through trees by its

steel cable. On the ground one

of three seats was pulled down,

and there was a securing strap

for the man to be hoisted.

Only one man could be

hoisted at a time.

(Lone Star Flight

Museum)


61


A LRP team returns from a

mission. The man in the center

carries a 12-gauge pump

shotgun, popular with point

men, and a Chinese 7.62mm

Type 56 (AK-47) assault rifle.

It may have been captured

or carried by the point man.

(US Army)

AFTERMATH OF BATTLEFor their frequent actions in which six men opposed twice that number or werepursued by a force potentially in the hundreds, for the casualties they caused bycalling in fire, and for the damage they indirectly inflicted on the enemy by theirintelligence collection, LRPs were generously presented with many decorationsfor valor. Three LRP/Rangers received the Medal of Honor, and hundreds ofother awards for valor were also bestowed upon them. Between the LRP/Rangercompanies/detachments a total of one Presidential Unit Citation, nine ValorousUnit Awards, four Meritorious Unit Commendations, 30 Vietnamese Cross ofGallantry Unit Citations, and 16 Vietnamese Civil Action Medal Unit Citationswere granted. About 340 LRPs and Rangers were lost in combat, excluding afew in the early provisional units, for which separate records were not kept.Nine are carried as missing in action.

Regardless of the dangers, stress, and physical strain, a surprising numberof LRPs extended their tours up to six months. Some preferred breakingbrush as a LRP in Vietnam to monotonous Stateside duty. Many LRPs, aftercompleting their two or three years, simply left the Army. Others reenlistedand went on to serve in the 82nd Airborne Division or the Special Forces, orjoined the new Ranger battalions raised in 1974. Only three active Rangercompanies remained after 1972; the two Stateside companies (A-75, B-75)were committed to Germany, and one to Alaska (O-75) from 1970 to 1972.They were accompanied by four National Guard companies, reduced to twoby 1977. The two companies destined for Germany were deactivated in 1974to provide manning spaces for the two Ranger battalions. It was not until1985 that Active Army units, now called long-range surveillance (LRS), beganto be activated again.

The LRPs had their detractors,who felt they drew off too muchtalented manpower, that their missionswere often of too short a duration, thatthey required too much support whenextracted, too frequently requiredother units to rescue them, or who didnot like the elitist attitude displayed bysome. Regardless, the LRPs more thanadequately proved their value.

While no fewer than 18 memoirsand novels have been publishedabout LRPs, only two movies havetouched on the subject. 84 CharlieMoPic15 (1989) depicts a cameramanaccompanying a LRP team to recordlessons learned. The Odd Angry Shot (1979) is actually about theAustralian SAS conducting LRPmissions in Vietnam, but it providesa view of the experiences of a LRP unit.

15 84C was the MOS of a motion picturecameraman.

62


COLLECTIONS, MUSEUMS, AND RE-ENACTMENT There is no single museum that highlights the LRPs and Rangers in Vietnam.Examples of uniforms, insignia, and equipment can be found in the Airborneand Special Operations Museum at Fort Bragg, NC, and in the NationalInfantry Museum at Fort Benning, GA. Items will also be found in theremaining divisional museums of units that served in Vietnam as well as invarious private Vietnam War museums. The most extensive collections ofLRP/Ranger items are found among private collectors. Collectors are urgedto use extreme caution when purchasing items that are reputed to beauthentic LRP/Ranger. There are a few LRP/Ranger reenactment groupshonoring the memory of these unique units.

For a site detailing individual equipment see: http://www.vietnamgear.com/.

The 75th Ranger Regiment Association: http://www.75thrra.com/.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Burford, John, LRRPs in Action, Squadron/Signal Publications, Carrolton, TX (1985)—— LRRP Team Leader, Ballantine Books, NY (1994)Camper, Frank, L.R.R.P.: The Professional, Dell Publishing, NY (1988)Chambers, Larry, Death in the A Shau Valley: L Company LRRPs in Vietnam, 1969–

1970, Ivy Books, NY (1998)Ebert, James R., A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam 1965–1972,

Ballantine Books, NY (1993)Field, Ron, Ranger: Behind the Lines in Vietnam, Publishing News, London (2000)Gebhardt, James F., Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and

Surveillance Units, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS (2005).Online at: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gebhardt_LRRP.pdf.

Jorgenson, Kregg P. J., LRRP Company Command: The Cav’s LRP/Rangers inVietnam, 1968–1969, Ballantine Books, NY (2000)

—— The Ghosts of the Highlands: The 1st Cav LRRPs in Vietnam, 1966–67, IvyBooks, NY (1999)

Lanning, Michael Lee, Inside the LRRPs: Rangers in Vietnam, Ivy Books, NY (1988)Linderer, Gary A., Eyes Behind the Lines: L Company Rangers in Vietnam, 1969,

Presidio Press, Novato, CA (1991)—— Phantom Warriors: LRRPs, LRPs, and Rangers in Vietnam, Ballantine Books,

NY (2001)—— Six Silent Men: 101st LRP/Rangers, Ballantine Books, NY (1996)—— The Eyes of the Eagle: F Company LRPs in Vietnam, 1968, Ballantine Books,

NY (1991)Lyles, Kevin., Vietnam: US Uniforms in Colour Photographs, Europa Militaria Special

No. 3, Windrow & Greene, London (1992)Miraldi, Paul W., Uniforms and Equipment of US Army LRRPs and Rangers in

Vietnam 1965–1971, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA (1999)Shanahan, Bill, and John P. Brackin., Stealth Patrol: The Making of a Vietnam Ranger,

Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA (2003)Stanton, Shelby L., Rangers in Vietnam: Combat Recon in Vietnam, Orion Books, NY

(1992)——US Army Uniforms in the Vietnam War, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA (1992)US Army, Infantry Long-Range Patrol Company, FM 31–18, January 1965.——Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company, FM 31–18, August 1968.

63


64

INDEX

Figures in bold refer to illustrations

acoustic motion sensors 5Advanced Individual Training (AIT) 12aftermath of battle 62Airborne and Special Operations Museum, Fort

Bragg, NC 63Airborne Course 12, 13, 13–18, 15, 16, 19 (18)AK-47 rifles 56, 62Alamo Scouts 6antipersonnel mines 23 (22), 30, 50, 59appearance see uniformArea of Operation (AO) 46–47, 48, 54arms see weaponsArmy Physical Fitness Test 14award ceremony 61 (60)

badge 38base camps 40–41, 41, 42Basic Combat Training (BCT) 12battle experience 46–60, 55, 57 (56), 59, 60benefits, Long-Range Patrol Scouts 11berets 20, 20, 61 (60)bibliography 63Black Hat instructors 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

(18)boonie hats 5, 21, 21briefings 47Burford, John 60

C. Turner Joy, USS 9camouflage 20–21, 21, 22chronology 8–10Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG) 20collections 63combat missions 44communications 33, 34, 42

Morse Code 6radios 27–28, 28, 31 (30), 35 (34), 49, 49,

54, 55company HQ 33conditions of service 33–37contact with the enemy 55–60, 57 (56)

debriefing 60decorations 61 (60), 62deployment to units 39–40“Direct Exchange” (DX) 47“dog tag silencers” 22dogs, as trackers 5Drop Zones (DZs) 13, 17, 18“dry hole” missions 54

84 Charlie MoPic (film) 62equipment 22–28, 23 (22), 24, 25, 26, 27, 31 (30),

32esprit de corps 37–39

food see rationsForward Operating Bases (FOBs) 41

General Technical (GT) skill test 11gloves 21grenade launchers 29, 35 (34)grenades see hand grenadesGulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) 9

hand grenades 22, 23 (22), 30–32, 50, 56, 58, 60hand guns 32Hazardous Duty Pay 14HEAT rockets 30helicopters 5, 43 (42), 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 51,

53 (52), 59, 60Ho Chi Minh Trail 9

insertion 51, 51–55, 53 (52)plans for 47

insignia 11, 43 (42)

Johnson, President Lyndon B. 9jump pay 14jump school 12, 13, 13–18, 15, 16, 19 (18)

Knabb, Captain John D. H. 43 (42)knives 25, 25Korean War (1950–51) 20

Landing Zones (LZs) 13, 47, 48, 48, 50, 51Light Antitank Weapons (LAW) 30Load-bearing Equipment (LBE) 24, 24–27, 31 (30)Long-Range Patrol (LRP) units

aftermath of battle 62camouflage 20–21, 21, 22chronology 8–10communications 6, 27–28, 28, 31 (30), 33, 34,

35 (34), 42, 49, 49, 54, 55conditions of service 33–37decorations 61 (60), 62deployment to units 39–40equipment 22–28, 23 (22), 24, 25, 26, 27, 31

(30), 32esprit de corps 37–39experience in battle 46–60, 55, 57 (56), 59, 60insignia 11, 43 (42)living conditions on base 40–41, 41, 42missions, planning and types of 41–45recruitment 10–11signaling equipment 25, 25–26, 31 (30), 49training 8, 12, 12–18, 13, 15, 16, 19 (18), 39,

39–40, 40, 43 (42)uniform 5, 14, 18, 18–22, 19 (18), 20, 21, 31

(30), 38, 61 (60)weapons 7 (6), 12, 22, 23 (22), 28–32, 29, 35

(34), 49, 49–50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 59, 60LZs see Landing Zones

M14 rifles 12, 29, 32M16 rifles 12, 22, 23 (22), 29, 35 (34), 59M60 machine guns 7 (6), 32M72 Light Antitank Weapons (LAW) 30M79 grenade launchers 29, 35 (34)Maddox, USS 9McGuire rigs 43 (42), 59medals 61 (60), 62medical evacuations 60Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)

6, 9, 37Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) codes 12mines 23 (22), 30, 50, 59missions

planning and types of 41–45preparation 47–50

Morse Code 6motion sensors 5motivation 37–39movement 52–54museums 63

National Liberation Front see Viet Cong (VC)noise discipline 48North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 6, 34North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 4, 10

Odd Angry Shot (film) 62OMEGA Project 9Operations and Intelligence (O&I) 33, 34, 60

Parachute Landing Fall (PLF) 14–15parachute training see Airborne CoursePathfinder Course 8, 12patrol equipment 31 (30)Pick-up Zones (PZs) 47, 48, 58pistols 32preparation, missions 47–50privileges, Long-Range Patrol Scouts 11Project Delta 43 (42)PZs see Pick-up Zones (PZs)

radios 27–28, 28, 31 (30), 34, 35 (34), 49, 49,54, 55

Ranger Course 8, 12, 13, 36rapelling 48, 53 (52)rations 41, 46, 46, 48, 55re-enactments 63“recon teams” 34, 35 (34)Recondo School 39, 39–40, 40, 43 (42)reconnaissance missions 44recreation 41recruitment 10–11“Remain Overnight” (RON) positions 54–55rifles

AK-47 rifles 56, 62M14 rifles 12, 29, 32M16 rifles 12, 22, 23 (22), 29, 35 (34), 59

Roberts, Sergeant 1st Class Clifford L. 43 (42)rucksacks 24, 24–25, 31 (30)

SALUTE reports 54SAS see Special Air Service (SAS)SIGMA Project 9Signal Operating Instruction (SOI) extracts 49signaling equipment 25, 25–26, 31 (30), 49smoke grenades 25, 28, 30–32, 58, 60Special Air Service (SAS) 34STABO harness 43 (42)Stevens, Major Robert L. 43 (42)submachine guns 29, 29, 55, 56surveillance 5survival kits 27

Tactical Advisor and Counselor (TAC) 14team equipment 27Team Leaders (TL) 35 (34), 36, 47, 48, 51, 56,

59, 60towers, parachute 15, 15, 16tracker dogs 5training 8, 12–18

jump school 12, 13, 13–18, 15, 16,19 (18)

Recondo School 39, 39–40, 40, 43 (42)transport 33

uniforms 18, 18–22, 19 (18), 20, 21, 31 (30),61 (60)badges 38berets 20, 20, 61 (60)boonie hats 5, 21, 21gloves 21when training 14

vehicles, motor 33Viet Cong (VC) 4, 56

formation of 9Tet Offensive (1968) 10

weapons 23 (22), 28–32, 49, 49–50antipersonnel mines 23 (22), 30, 50, 59grenade launchers 29, 35 (34)hand grenades 22, 23 (22), 30–32, 50, 56,

58, 60hand guns 32HEAT rockets 30M14 rifles 12, 29, 32M16 rifles 12, 22, 23 (22), 29, 35 (34), 59M60 machine guns 7 (6), 32M72 Light Antitank Weapons (LAW) 30M79 grenade launchers 35 (34)XM148 grenade launchers 29XM177E2 submachine guns 29, 55, 56XM203 grenade launchers 29

Welch, Colonel “Bill” 14, 16Westmoreland, General 6, 9, 39

XM148 grenade launchers 29XM177E2 submachine guns 29, 55, 56XM203 grenade launchers 29


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OSPREYPUBL I SH ING


First published in Great Britain in 2008 by Osprey Publishing,Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford, OX2 0PH, UK443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USAE-mail: [email protected]

© 2008 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of privatestudy, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any formor by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical,photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permissionof the copyright owner. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

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ARTIST’S NOTEReaders may care to note that the original paintings from which thecolor plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale.The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever.All inquiries should be addressed to:

Scipio Gallery, PO Box 475, Hailsham, East Sussex BN27 2SL, UK

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe author is indebted to Shelby Stanton, Stéphane Moutin-Luyet, TreyMoore of Moore Militaria, Mindy Rosewitz of the US Army Communications-Electronics Museum, and Steve Sherman of RADIX Press for their assistance.

ABBREVIATIONSAIT Advanced Individual Training

AO Area of Operations

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

BCT Basic Combat Training

C&C Command and Control

CO Commanding Officer

IAD Immediate Action Drills

LRP Long-Range Patrol

LRRP Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol

LZ Landing Zone

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MOS Military Occupation Specialty

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NVA North Vietnamese Army

O&I Operations & Intelligence

PZ Pick-up Zone

RON Remain Overnight

SAS Special Air Service

SF Special Forces

SOI Signal Operating Instructions

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

TAOR Tactical Area of Responsibility

TL Team Leader

TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment

USARV US Army, Vietnam

VC Viet Cong

WP White Phosphorous (“Willie Pete”)

XO Executive Officer (second-in-command)

War 132 lnners.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/12 14:19 Page 2

US ARMY LONG-RANGE PATROL SCOUT IN VIETNAM … · early 1960s they were called long-range...

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