URBAN DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATIONS

RONAN PHILIPPOT (ERASMUS)

TRANSFORMING CITIES

DECEMBER 2013

Urban Development Corporations Introduction This essay will provide a critical evaluation of a flagship government urban regeneration policy;

the Urban Development Corporations (UCDs). The essay is based on Part 2 of the module, the

evolution of national urban policy and on some key readings. Firstly, we will present the political

and philosophical context of the 1980s behind the UCDs and a succinct summary of the policy.

Secondly, we will draw up a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the UCDs using city case

study examples. To conclude we will resume the key messages and state the lessons learnt for

future regenerations and urban policies.

Establishment of the UCDs: political and philosophical context and

succinct summary of the policy

The great recession of the 1970s and 1980s was bound to change the nature of the basic

perceived problem with which planning had to deal, and thus to threaten its very legitimacy. It

hit British economy with especial force, exposing deep structural weaknesses: a large part of the countrys manufacturing base disappeared, bringing a loss of two million factory jobs between 1971 and 1981.1 Especially in over wide areas of the country, like Liverpool, London and

Birmingham.

Therefore, during the 1980s, conventional planning, the use of plans and regulations to guide the

use of land, seemed more and more discredited. Instead, planning turned from regulating urban

growth, to encourage it by any and every possible means. Cities, the new message rang loud and

clear, were machines for wealth creation; the first and chief aim of planning must be to oil the

machinery. The guidance and control of growth, traditional concern of the British statutory

planning system since 1947, had quite suddenly been replaced by an obsession with

encouraging growth at any cost.

The 1980s were also characterised by an entrepreneurial approach to urban policy. It is a

perspective on urban development that views the city as a product that needs to be marketed.

This marketing approach and emphasis on restructuring the city to appeal to global business,

assign pre-eminence to economic interests in the decision-making process of urban planning.2

Consequently, cities competed for investment, jobs, skilled workers, visitors and affluent

residents. Those cities were focused on competitiveness, marketing and image management. The

1980s were the beginning of public-private partnership, based on US experience in the 1970s.

That partnership consists in a shift from public to private sector in regeneration and in co-

operation between government and private sector.

In this context, the UDCs were created by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act

and became the most significant element of urban policy in England and Wales. UDCs

1 Hall, 2002; Massey and Meegan 1982.

2 Pacione, 2009; Transforming Cities.

represented also the flagship, the jewel in the crown, of Conservative government urban policy.

Their remit was originally outlined by Michael Heseltine, then Secretary of State for the

Department of the Environment, in 1979. He saw the UDCs as both a political and economic

mechanism for unlocking the development potential of the inner cities. The UDCs were

forerunners in reorienting urban policy towards new economic imperatives in urban

regeneration with the objective of pump-priming inner city land values through infrastructure

projects, creating, and enabling, the new spaces of production and consumption, and utilizing

private sector capital as a mechanism for revitalizing the cities. The essential notion was

American: leverage. Public investment, kick-starting the process, plus the new powers, would

create the right conditions to bring in a much bigger volume of private funds.

UDCs were government agencies, or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization

(quangos), implanted directly upon designated areas and were responsible for the regeneration

of these areas. They were run by appointed boards consisting largely of representatives from the

local business community and typically exhibited little representation from the local resident

community. They aimed encourage the private sector back to run-down inner-city areas through

a market-oriented and property-led approach. In order to achieve this area regeneration

objective, UDCs were given substantial powers to acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of

land and other property; carry out building and other operations; enhance the environment.

They also were given powers to ensure the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewerage and

other services; provide a transport infrastructure; carry out business or undertaking for the

purposes of the objective of urban regeneration; and provide financial incentives for the private

sector.3

The UDCs were also born at a time of great upheaval for local government, where local

authorities were being questioned. In particular, government concern was premised on an

ideological distaste of public sector intervention, and, in the early years, the Thatcher

administration were particularly zealous in seeking to privatize public policy and reduce the role of what was being presented as the interfering state.4 Heseltine was quite specific about bypassing the local planners:

we took their powers away from them because they were making such a mess of it. They are the people who have got it all wrong. They had advisory committees, planning committees, inter-

relating committees and even discussion committees but nothing happened UDCs do things. More to the point hey can be seen to do things and they are free from the inevitable delays of the

democratic process.5 UDC policy, like that of the Enterprise Zones, was focused on the local as opposed to the regional

scale and especially at those cities, scattered across the UK, where there were particularly local

urban problems of severe de-industrialization, economic restructuring, environmental

degradation, but also of economic potential. The phase one UDCs, comprising the flagship,

London Docklands, and Merseyside Development Corporation, were set up in 1981. Five more

followed at the beginning of 1987, comprising Teesside, Tyne and Wear, Trafford Park, the Black

Country, and Cardiff Bay. These were followed in 1988 with the announcement of the so-called

3 Imrie and Thomas, 1999 ; Tallon, 2013.

4 Imrie and Thomas, 1999.

5 Hall, 2002; Thornley, 1991.

mini-UDCs for Central Manchester, Bristol, Sheffield and Leeds. In , two further UDCs was announced, one in Birmingham, the other in Plymouth.6

Figure 1: The UDCs at designation

In our critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the UDCs we will particularly take the example of

the London Docklands, Cardiff Bay and Bristol to illustrate our words.

Critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the UDCs

Controversy of the UDCs

As we are going to see, UDCs had a relatively highly controversial history. The most important

controversy was the London Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC).

Indeed, the transformation of London Docklands during the 1980s emerged as Londons greatest development opportunity since the Great Fire of 1666. It also represented the biggest piece of

urban revitalization in Europe, if not the world. Form some, it was a shining example of how to

do it; for others, of how not to. It was accused of favoring elitist luxury developments rather than

affordable housing, and it was unpopular with the local communities, who felt that their needs

were not being addressed. Nonetheless, the LDDC was central to a remarkable transformation in

the area, although how far it was in control of events is debatable.

6 Imrie and Thomas, 1999.

Figure 2: London Docklands. Source: Jason Enright

Some surveys conclude that as an exercise in regeneration, the London Dockland has to be

judged a modest success. Between 1981 and 1990 Docklands lost 20,532 old jobs but gained

41,421 new ones: 24,862 by transfers from other places and 16,862 new jobs. But the lost jobs

were very different from the new ones: port jobs disappeared, manufacturing stayed almost

static, while the big gains were in advanced services, above all banking insurance and finance;

service employment rose from 32 to 60 percent of the total. And very few jobs no more than a quarter, probably far fewer went to local people. Furthermore, in 1991 unemployment across Docklands was nearly two and half times the London average. One good explanation for the low

take-up of new jobs by residents is that educational achievements in Docklands were often very

low.

Susan Fainstein, a Senior Research Fellow in the Harvard Graduate School of Design, consider

that;

the failure indicates the limits on turning to the private sector for achieving public ends. The whole Docklands experience exposes the fatal weakness of relying heavily on property development to

stimulate regeneration government-supplied incentives to the development industry inevitably beget oversupply if not accompanied by other measures to restrict production. However, the LDDC succeed in some points. The Docklands historically had poor transport

connections. This was addressed by the LDDC with the construction of the Docklands Light

Railway (DLR), which connected the Docklands with the City. It was a remarkably inexpensive

development, costing only 77 m in its first phase, as it relied on reusing disused railway

infrastructure and derelict land for much of its length. LDDC also built Limehouse Link tunnel, a

cut and cover road tunnel linking the Isle of Dogs to The Highway (the A13 road) at a cost of over

150 million per kilometre, one of the most expensive stretches of road ever built. The LDDC

also contributed to the development of London City Airport, opened in October 1987 on the

spine of the Royal Docks.

Furthermore, over the past 30 years, the population of the Docklands has more than doubled

and the area has become both a major business centre and an increasingly desirable area to live.

Transport links have improved significantly and Canary Wharf has become one of Europe's

biggest clusters of skyscrapers and a direct challenge to the financial dominance of the City.

Although most of the old Dockland wharfs and warehouses have been demolished, some have

been restored and converted into flats. Most of the docks themselves have survived and are now

used as marinas or watersports centres (the major exception being the Surrey Commercial

Docks, now largely filled in). Although large ships can - and occasionally still do - visit the old

docks, all of the commercial traffic has moved down-river. Besides, the revival of the Docklands

has had major effects in run-down surrounding areas. Greenwich and Deptford are undergoing

large-scale redevelopment, chiefly as a result of the improved transport links making them more

attractive to commuters.

The Docklands' redevelopment has, however, had some less beneficial aspects. The massive

property boom and consequent rise in house prices has led to friction between the new arrivals

and the old Docklands communities, who have complained of being squeezed out. It has also

made for some of the most striking disparities to be seen anywhere in Britain: luxury executive

flats constructed alongside run-down public housing estates.

To conclude on the benefits effects, the Docklands environment has been transformed, the population has grown, there are new jobs, road and rail construction continue at a frenetic pace.

London Docklands has become almost a symbol of a certain style of development, culture, and

politics in the 1980s and 1990s.

Positive results of UDCs

Overall, some UDCs had positive results on regeneration of their designated areas. For example,

the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation which was set up by the United Kingdom Government

in 1987 to redevelop of one sixth of the area of Cardiff to create Cardiff Bay. The Secretary of

State for Wales, Nicholas Edwards set out the CBDC's mission statement as:

To put Cardiff on the international map as a superlative maritime city which will stand comparison with any such city in the world, thereby enhancing the image and economic well-being

of Cardiff and Wales as a whole. The five main aims and objectives were to: promote development and provide a superb

environment in which people will want to live, work and play; re-unite the City of Cardiff with its

waterfront; bring forward a mix of development which would create a wide range of job

opportunities and would reflect the hopes and aspirations of local community; achieve the

highest standard of design and quality in all types of development and investment; and establish

the area as a recognized centre of excellence and innovation in the field of urban regeneration.

Overlooking these objectives, over a period of 15 to 20 years, the UDC aimed to act as the

catalyst for the transformation of 2,700 acres of land into 6,000 new homes, 4 million square

feet of commerce, 5 million square feet of industry, providing 30,000 new jobs. Cardiff Bay

continues to develop and by the early 2010s housed buildings including the Senedd housing the

National Assembly for Wales and the Wales Millennium Centre.

Figure 3: Cardiff Bay. Source: Ronan Philippot

As a result, an evaluation of the regeneration of Cardiff Bay published in 2004 concluded that the

project had "reinforced the competitive position of Cardiff" and "contributed to a massive

improvement in the quality of the built environment".

Other example, in greater Manchester, next to the Trafford Development Corporation and

Enterprise Zone, the City of Salford itself successfully turned its docks around, culminating in

2000-2001 with a spectacular arts and museum complex incorporating a new gallery for the citys most famous artist, L. S. Lowry, and a northern branch of the Imperial War Museum designed by Daniel Libeskind.

Figure 4: Imperial War Museum. Source:

Looking at the above examples, a number of positive results can be drawn from the UDCs. There

is little doubt that a single-purpose body concentrating on a narrowly defined area,

unencumbered by the diverse range of local authority responsibilities, and negating local

democratic accountability, can achieve things very quickly. UDC areas benefited from investment

from central government and levered in European as well as private sector fund, resulting in

new employment and environmental improvements. Such schemes helped in changing public

attitudes and perceptions of UDC areas which have been largely positive. It is argued by their

proponents that urban regeneration stimulates further private investment in the areas, which

arguably would not otherwise have been attracted to the area.

Negative results of UDCs

As we have seen with the regeneration of London Docklands, UDCs have been subject to

widespread and deep criticism. As a case in point, the designation of the Bristol UDC drew

immediate criticism from the local authority, which was concerned about five issues: outside

intrusion into the key areas of planning and development; the use of public funding to subsidise

private development; the lack of the UDCs local accountability; potential clashes with existing local government policies of urban regeneration; and the definition of regeneration within the

designated area the local authority felt that the UDC was more concerned with the regeneration of the local property market than with the social needs of the areas.

Figure 5: Bristol Temple Mead. Source: Transforming Cities

Many sites remained derelict, and the process had become bogged down in a number of costly

and lengthy public inquiries. The recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s particularly

affected the property market, demonstrating the limitations of relying on market forces and

private capital to regenerate local economies. The lack of alternatives strategies precluded any

effective response to the prevailing negative economic conditions.7 So Bristols UDC is regarded as one of the least successful, one that disappeared without managing to agree a development

plan for his flagship city centre site, Quay Point, let alone attract investors and occupiers to the

area.

A single-purpose and single-minded organization might also limit urban regeneration. In accordance with the governments philosophy that wealth creation was the goal and trickle-down would distribute that wealth to those in need, most UDC policies, certainly in their earlier

7 Oatley and May, 1999.

years, concentrated purely on property-led physical regeneration with little regard to human

social provision or the development or to the development of human capital, including low-

income housing, community facilities and education and retraining programmes. Despite

massive expenditure, very few new jobs were actually generated. Most economic activity was

centred on property speculation, and inward investment attracted was small compared with the

public money invested in the UDCs. Significant amounts of money were also lost in land deals.

Perhaps most controversially, UDCs were appointed and not democratically elected bodies. In a

number of cases such as in London Docklands, Liverpool and Bristol, there were serious

breakdowns in communication between the UDCs and local authorities.8

Conclusion

To conclude, UCDs were influenced by an entrepreneurial approach to urban policy driven by

the philosophies of the New Right which characterized the period from 1979 to 1991. Looking at

that, the urban regeneration policy was distinctive from that which had been characteristic of

the period 1945 to 1979; the focus shifted from social welfare projects to private sector and

property-led approaches. The problems at the beginning of the Thatcher years in government

were seen as too much state intervention and public spending, individual and group dependency

on the state and restriction of the free market. In response to the problems as interpreted by Thatchers government, s urban regeneration focused on profit, property and market-led regeneration, public-private partnerships, an emphasis on better and corporate management,

and a marginalization of local government and local community in the regeneration process.

The flagship policy was the Urban Development Corporations, which were essentially property-

led regeneration projects, which offered fiscal and regulatory incentives to businesses. The goal

of urban policy was to roll back the state and to free market forces, core wider philosophies of

Thatcherism at that time. The approach to countering the urban problem combined social

pathology and structural economic approaches.

Problems with urban policy, identified at the end of the period, centred on the scale of the

response to urban problems, the lack of a co-ordinated policy approach, the lack of long-term

strategy, the growing dissatisfaction with property-led-regeneration, the lack of benefits for

local communities and problems of urban governance. In response, 1990s urban policy sought to

ensure that excluded communities benefited from urban regeneration projects, to address the

incoherence of area-based initiatives and levels of governance, and to achieve sustainable urban regeneration.9

8 Hall, 2002; Tallon, 2013.

9 Tallon, 2013 ; Transforming Cities.

References

Peter Hall (2002). Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the

Twentieth Century, 3rd Edition.

Rob Imrie and Huw Thomas (1999). British Urban Policy: An Evaluation of the Urban

Development Corporations, 2nd Edition.

Andrew Tallon (2013). Urban Regeneration in the UK, 2nd Edition. Routledge.

Coulson (1990). Flagships and flaws assessing the UDC decade. Town and Country Planning. Walton (1990). Cardiff Bay development. The Planner.