Untitled Document 2011/08/10 12:33 PM MAILED FIST ... · PDF fileArmour and the attack...

2011/08/10 12:33 PMUntitled Document

of 33file:///Users/mbadenhorst/Documents/websites/iss/pubs/Monographs/No2/Mono2.html

MAILED FIST

Developments in modern armouredited by Jakkie Cilliers and Bill Sass

Monograph No 2

February 1996

Notes on the authors

List of abbreviations

Armour in the SANDF: a strategic and practical perspectiveMaj-Gen W G Lombard

Latest international developments in armour Christoper Foss

Armour and the attack helicopter in AfricaMaj-Gen W H Thackwray

The present and future of armourProf Richard M Ogorkiewicz

The Gulf War: British interpretations of the armoured lessons learnt Maj-Gen Patrick Cordingley

Armour in the African environment Maj-Gen J M Dippenaar

This publication is sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation

NOTES ON AUTHORS

Maj-Gen W G Lombard is Chief of Army Staff Intelligence of the South African Army. Hepreviously commanded Northern Transvaal Command, Army Battle School and 81 ArmouredBrigade. He has held numerous staff and training posts, and also held numerous operationalposts during the former South West Africa/Namibia campaign.

Christopher F Foss wrote his first book Armoured Fighting Vehicles of the World in 1970,and since then has written more than 30 books on armoured vehicles and artillery. He ispresently military editor of Jane's Defence Weekly, editor of Jane's Armour and Artillery, and



is closely associated with all the other Jane's publications.

Maj-Gen W Thackwray advises the Chief of the South African Air Force on operationalrequirements. He previously served as Chief of Air Staff Operations and Director of Operationsof the SAAF, and commanded its Western Air Command during the South West Africacampaign. He has been closely involved in developing the Rooivalk attack helicopter.

Prof Richard Ogorkiewicz is an internationally recognised expert on the design anddevelopment of armoured vehicles, and has advised the British Ministry of Defence and variousinternational companies on this subject. After lecturing at various universities and colleges onvehicle engineering and design, he has since 1988 been a professor at the Royal MilitaryCollege of Science.

Maj-Gen P A J Cordingley, DSO, is General Officer Commanding 2nd Division/Eastern Districtof the British Army. He commanded 7th Armoured Brigade (the Desert Rats) during the GulfWar, and previously commanded his regiment, the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards. Hehas held numerous training posts, including one at the Staff College Camberley.

Maj-Gen J M Dippenaar is Chief of Army Staff Personnel of the South African Army. Hepreviously commanded the Army Battle School, and the renowned 61 Mechanised Battle Groupduring the South West Africa/Namibia campaign. He has also held numerous staff and trainingposts, and has served as a military attaché.

Brig W P (Bill) Sass (ret) is the deputy director of the IDP.

Dr Jakkie Cilliers is the executive director of the IDP.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFV Armoured fighting vehicle

AH Attack helicopter

APC Armoured personnel carrier

APFSDS Armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot

APFSD Armour-piercing fin-stabilised dart

AT Anti-tank

CAS Close air support

CATTB Component advanced technology test bed

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe

CVR Combat vehicle reconnaisance



DEXA Defence Exhibition of South Africa

DSO Distinguished Service Order

ERA Explosive reactive armour

FIFV Future infantry fighting vehicle

FMC Ford Motor Corporation

FN Fabrique Nationale

GOCO Government-owned, contractor-operated

GPS Global Positioning System

IFV Infantry fighting vehicle

IVIS Inter-vehicular information system

LIO Low-intensity operation

MBT Main battle tanks

MK1 Mark 1

MRL Multiple rocket launcher

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBC Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical

R&D Research and development

RO Royal ordnance

RPG Rocket-propelled grenade

RSA Republic of South Africa

SAAF South African Air Force

SANDF South African National Defence Force

SWA South West Africa

TAMS Tank anti-missile system

TOGS Thermal observation gunsight

TTD Tank technology demonstrator



US SLID United States small low-cost intercepting device

VERDI Vehicle electronics research defence initiative

ARMOUR IN THE SANDF: A STRATEGIC AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVEMaj-Gen W G Lombard, Chief of Army Staff Intelligence

INTRODUCTION

The notion of armour, as I believe in it, is encapsulated in the following statement which is oftenquoted in armour magazines: "Armour is a concept it is not a tank or a specific weapons systembut rather a state of mind, an approach to combat that stresses firepower, mobility and shockeffect."

I believe one could also add `versatility' to this definition, even if this were to supplant thetraditional shock effect; our experience in deploying armoured cars has reinforced our belief intheir practicality and versatility.

I believe in Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the continuation of state policies by other means".Among other things, this places the armed forces of a nation safely in the hands of thepoliticians! If the political view or perception of the threat changes, so will the relative role andstature of the military. The army is part and parcel of the military, and the armoured corps is partof the army. We must be under no illusion that to be employed or not employed is above all elsea political decision and that the defence budget in a democracy in peacetime is nearly alwaysunder pressure.

We now find ourselves in what is commonly described as a `post-Cold-War phase', and thisaffects the RSA as well. For the first time this century there is a marked absence of `isms'nobody will admit to imperialism, nazism and fascism, and communism is dead or dying. Talksabound about the new world order "the world yells peace, but there is no peace"; the new worldorder appears to be the new world disorder.

The `peace dividend', as it is called, translates into cuts in defence budgets on a worldwidescale, all clad in new phrases such as `downsizing', `right-sizing' and `resizing'. Armamentproduction has been affected; development has been affected. If one reads overseasmagazines, one gains the impression that some armed forces are seeking new enemies or newroles, or are at least taking a serious new look at their priorities.

The main shift in this post-Cold-War phase is away from the bipolar confrontation towardsoperations called `peacekeeping', `wider peacekeeping' and `peace enforcing', to help keep thelid on the new world disorder. Whatever it is called, it remains military intervention but this typeof intervention appears to be more acceptable at the international level.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

On a lower level, the RSA was also involved in the bipolar confrontation during our years ofdeployment in Namibia/Angola. In Angola we viewed the Cubans as Soviet surrogates. TheUSSR saw them as their allies, their brothers in the revolutionary struggle. Our perception was



that we were resisting communist aggression; their perception was that we were supporting therebels and counter-revolutionaries. The bottom line was that we were drawn into the globalconfrontation, but at the lower end of the scale. It was typical military intervention a limited warwith limited objectives but we had a fairly clear idea of what we wanted to achieve.

Our conflict in Namibia/Angola was a protracted one, a typical African bush war, interspersedwith more intense conventional battles. Flowing from our experiences, we adapted ourweaponry and weapon systems as best as we could. Because of our isolation and sanctions, wehad to develop our own armaments industry which had to cater for both protracted low-intensityconflict and the higher-intensity mobile conventional operations. These experiences haveingrained not only the belief in the value of certain weaponry, but also the belief in certaindoctrines. We still believe in:

the value of taking the offensive;

the value of carrying the battle over the `cutline' the border into enemy territory;

the value of mobile, balanced and hard-hitting battle groups and combat teams;

the need to maintain mobility over long distances; and

flexibility the same battle groups that carried out conventional attacks also went over into`area operations' (counterterrorist/guerrilla patrolling and area sweeps).

We had to adopt a practical approach, and had to be flexible we could not be dogmatic. On theother hand, we did realise the value of a high/low mix. As regards armour, wheels could do thejob in 90 percent of cases, but the real hard cases called for tanks. This was especially trueduring the latter phases of operations Hooper, Modular and Packer (1988/9) in southern Angola.

1994 AND BEYOND

The year 1994 will be remembered not only for the advent of democracy; in the case of the SAArmy, it also meant the end of national service, the start of the integration process and ourreturn to the international arena, with all its ramifications and implications. We had to take a newlook at our strategy, and decided on a threat-independent approach. What came to the fore wasthe concept of a `core force', a `war force' and an `affordable force'.

There is no conventional threat on the horizon, but we are a regional power and there are noindications that we will step down from this position. The implication, from a military point ofview, is an increasing possibility of being drawn into military intervention operations, especiallyin sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the primary function of the army is still to defend theRSA against foreign aggression to safeguard the borders against a military threat.Peacekeeping operations are seen as part of the army's collateral value, a collateral capability itmust have to move towards. This will become a reality. The question is how this will affect thearmy and the armoured corps.

Broadly speaking, it will require specialist and dedicated forces. These forces must be easilytransportable by air or sea, and once deployed they must be very mobile. Besides beingmaintainable, they must have sufficient weapons and weaponry to make an impact, or to force alocal decision if necessary. Besides the command structure, this will require specialist advisers,an engineering capability, and medical and other types of support, from the political to the



practical one cannot see, from a South African perspective, the employment of heavy armour.

Operations in a Rwanda-type situation call not only for sufficient infantry and other specialists,but also for deployable light armoured forces. A suitable armoured personnel carrier (APC) forthe infantry is important. Inter alia, one can expect that a force in this situation will have to dealwith:

a bad transport and road network;

a decaying infrastructure, or one that has virtually ceased to exist; and

guerrilla-type opposition, but one that is still able to sabotage what is left of the usablemilitary infrastructure, plant mines, lay ambushes and fire at you with anything from rifles toRPGs, mortars, mobile rocket launchers and the odd lumbering T55. This can andprobably will take place while 80 percent of the peace force's attention is directed towardshumanitarian and political/diplomatic efforts.

A force thus employed must be a true rapid deployment force, a force in being especially theinitial contingents. I believe it must be designed and built around what can be airlifted in a C130aircraft; if larger aircraft (non-SAAF) were made available, this would be no more than a bonus.Equipment-wise, on the armour side it will be appropriate to take a new look at the Elandespecially the Springbok variation. These cars will be backed by Mamba-borne infantry, or willback the Mamba-borne infantry. Additional firepower could be added to this force in the form ofportable anti-tank missiles, mortars or MRLs.

I would say the main indication now is in the direction of light deployable and maintainableforces, including light deployable armour. I also believe it would be senseless, given our timeand financial restrictions, to develop vehicles right from the beginning. Use what is availablenow, and develop (or adapt) from the existing baseline of vehicles. Although I stressed thedeployability and maintainability of forces employed in Africa, one cannot rule out furtherreinforcement by heavier weaponry, should this become necessary. In the immediate region ofthe RSA's borders this should not pose a problem one would simply move the Rooikats/Ratelsby road.

THE ARMY'S PRIMARY FUNCTION

International peacekeeping is not the SA Army's primary function even if this becomes a regularand prominent pattern of operations in the future, the army's primary function will still be tocounter any landward threat against the RSA. The factors that were considered when the army(and armour) was redesigned in the 1960s and 1970s still hold true.

These factors are, inter alia:

a large space-to-troop ratio;

the near-impossibility of holding fixed lines of defence;

the terrain, which is suitable for (mechanised) manoeuvre; and

the possibility of having to fight while outnumbered.

The answer to these constants was to invest in firepower and mobility, and I cannot see that



these tenets will change in the foreseeable future. One can perhaps argue about beingstrategically on the defensive, but being allowed tactically to go on the offensive if the threatjustifies it and the government allows it.

I believe this is still the best option, and that the means to carry it out will and must rest squarelyon the shoulders of the mobile formations. It was with these concepts in mind that the Rooikatwas designed and developed. If the constant factors stay the same, the need stays the same.We will still need a vehicle that can deliver superior operational mobility for the manoeuvringphase of the war (be it offensive or defensive), while at the same time providing adequate togood tactical mobility and still carrying an adequate main weapon.

The Rooikat, with its 76mm gun, was never meant to be a tank destroyer its purpose is to exploitthe indirect approach, to use the open flank, to get to the rear areas and to use space tomanoeuvre effectively. Seeing that the topography of South and southern Africa is not going tochange, we will need the Rooikat type of armoured vehicle.

Mobile operations are not always a matter of quick and decisive operational and tacticalmanoeuvring. On the future battlefield one will still find reinforced positions, covered by heavydirect and indirect fires. These positions will call for a deliberate assault the traditional tankattack, supported by mechanised infantry and concentrated artillery fire.

The capacity to attack reinforced positions or to stage a decisive destruction battle is necessaryif one believes in having a balanced army and, in the regional context, adding to the concept ofa credible deterrent. The tank is still needed; a proper main battle tank (MBT) that can do atank's job when the going gets tough.

Seeing that there is no immediate threat on the horizon, one could argue that perhaps moreeffort should be directed towards the tank technology demonstrator (TTD) either to develop itfurther (even into another concept), or to go into limited production with the present concept sothat troop trials can be carried out.

If this option is accepted, it will imply that the Olifant Mk1a will form the mainstay of the tankfleet until the decision is taken to start producing the new-generation tank. To me it is not aquestion of Rooikat versus tank rather, it is the question of the right mix. There is a need forboth.

It is beyond the scope of this presentation to delve deeply into aspects such as local productionand research and development. A local industry gives the RSA the capacity, when needed, notonly to supply but to upgrade, modify and maintain. It provides the capacity to stay in tune withthe rest of the world. Despite the cutbacks we are still, and must remain, active in research anddevelopment.

The Deputy Minister of Defence stated a short while ago that we must never allow a post-World-War-1 and a pre- and post-World-War-2 situation to develop again we must maintain a credibleforce. And local industry as well as R&D are part and parcel of that.

LATEST INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMOURChristoper Foss, Military editor, Jane's Defence Weekly



INTRODUCTION

Most armed forces around the world, except those in the Middle East and in some countries inthe Far East, are going through a period of very painful adjustment owing to changes in theworld situation. For more than 45 years NATO trained to fight the numerically stronger WarsawPact. The latter has now ceased to exist; there are no longer any Russian troops in any of thesatellite countries, and Russia is beset by numerous internal problems. For many countriesthere is now no clearly perceived threat to help justify the large defence expenditures of thepast; for this reason, some western countries are now emphasising `out of area' operations fortheir armed forces, with the thrust on lighter forces that can be quickly transported by tacticalaircraft to where they are required.

The end of the Cold War has not only impacted dramatically on the actual armed forcesthemselves, but also on the large industrial base that supported them. In the past many westerndefence equipment manufacturers, especially those in the US, were used to very highproduction runs on a multi-year basis. For example, the former FMC Corporation's GroundSystems Division produced 600 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) a year, while GeneralDynamics Land Systems Division manufactured almost 800 M1 series main battle tanks (MBTs)a year. For the US manufacturers, those days are over for the time being, and may well be goneforever.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US DEFENCE INDUSTRY

In the US a restructuring of the whole defence industry has been under way for several years,with some companies pulling out of the defence business altogether and others merging inorder to survive.

In January 1994 the FMC Corporation and the Harsco Corporation (which owns BMY CombatSystems) announced that they had completed plans, first announced in December 1992, tocombine FMC's Defence Systems Group and BMY's Combat Systems Division. This newpartnership began on 1 January 1994; FMC holds 60 percent of the joint venture and Harsco 40percent, with the former acting as manager.

General Dynamics has already sold its Fort Worth company, which makes the F16, toLockheed, but still retains its Land Systems Division, which makes the M1A2 Abrams MBT forexport only.At the lighter end of the market, Cadillac Gage Textron has moved its combat vehicle productionoperations from Coco, Florida, and integrated them with its marine division in New Orleans toform Textron Marine & Land Systems.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

In Europe, the rush to merge key land systems manufacturers has still to start in earnest,although there have been moves in some countries, especially France and the UK. GiatIndustries of France has taken over a number of companies, including FN and PRB of Belgiumand Mecanique Creusot-Loire, Luchaire, Manurhin and Cime Bocuze of France, and is now thelargest land systems manufacturer in France. But Giat is still state-owned, which in the eyes ofsome European defence equipment manufacturers does not make for real competition.

In the UK there are still five major land systems manufacturers, with little duplication of effort:Vickers Defence Systems (MBTs), Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited (artillery), Alvis



Vehicles (light tracked and wheeled vehicles), GKN Defence (wheeled and tracked vehicles) andRoyal Ordnance (artillery and ammunition).

The Royal Ordnance Division of British Aerospace Defence Limited has also been in acquisitionmode and has purchased the British Manufacture and Research Company, Heckler & Koch ofGermany, and Muiden Chemie International of the Netherlands. Royal Ordnance was originallyowned by the British government, but was privatised some years ago and is now owned byBritish Aerospace. Its sites have been rationalised; it is now much more competitive thanpreviously, and is well placed to compete in the international marketplace.

GKN Defence has acquired the small company of Glover Webb in southern England, which hasenabled it to offer a complete family of tracked and wheeled vehicles ranging from three to 30tonnes. GKN Defence is well suited to larger production runs, while Glover Webb is more suitedto smaller production runs and customised vehicles.

While the rationalisation of the western defence industries is set to continue, for the customer itcan lead to less competition and therefore to higher prices, especially in the area of ammunition.For example, in the US there are just two manufacturers of 120mm tank ammunition forM1A1/M1A2 MBTs: Alliant Techsystems, and Olin. In the UK, there were two suppliers of 30mmammunition: the British Manufacture and Research Company, and Royal Ordnance; now thereis just one, Royal Ordnance. In most major industrialised countries there is insufficient volume tokeep two ammunition manufacturers in business.

While competition does drive prices down, the government must provide some financialincentive to industry in order to keep the production base alive. In the US, for example, many ofthe ammunition production facilities are Gocos (government-owned, contractor-operated), soeven if the contractors change the actual production facility remains in existence.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND BRAZIL

While the end of the Cold War has had a dramatic effect on western defence equipmentmanufacturers, its impact on those in the East, especially the former Soviet Union, has beencatastrophic. Many facilities have either stopped working or are running at very low levels, andin some cases production is for export only. Production of the T-80 and T-72 MBTs continues,as does production of the BMP-3 infantry combat vehicle, which has been bought by Kuwait andthe United Arab Emirates.

Some of the Brazilian defence equipment manufacturers have also had a very hard time inrecent years, and one of the largest manufacturers of wheeled armoured vehicles in the world,Engesa, has ceased to exist.

In the past, many manufacturers invested large amounts of their own capital in developing newarmour systems, primarily meant for export. These projects include the Engesa Osorio MBT, theFrench Creusot Loire Mars 15 family of light tracked vehicles, the Royal Ordnance RO 2000family, the Alvis Storm light tank, the Vickers Defence Systems Mk 7 MBT, and numerousteaming arrangements with Norinco of China, all of which came to nothing. While exports canand do make a major difference to many defence equipment manufacturers, a strong homemarket is essential, as it builds a firm base for the future of the company.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT



Today, defence equipment manufacturers have to keep two key parts of their business alive:first, research and development, and second, production capability; the two are intertwined andcannot be separated. In some western countries, research and development is often carried outby the government as well as defence equipment manufacturers. In the age of substantialdefence cutbacks, government and industry most co-operate far more closely on research anddevelopment, so that scarce resources are not wasted.

A good example of co-operation between government-backed research and developmentorganisations and private industry is that in the UK in respect of the VERDI-2 (VehicleElectronics Research Defence Initiative-2) and the Advanced Composite Armoured VehiclePlatform.

In the past, research and development in the west was driven by the perceived threat from theeast, and this has led to development programmed for new armours and larger-calibre guns forexample, the 140mm smooth-bore gun now under development by France, Germany, the UKand the US.

Industrial teaming is becoming much more common. For example, Mowag of Switzerland hasteamed up with Giat Industries on the Mowag 10x10 armoured combat vehicle, while GiatIndustries has teamed up with Hagglunds Vehicles on the CV 90105 TML. Both these vehiclesfeature the private venture Giat Industries 105 TML modular turret system, armed with a 105mmrifled tank gun. In some respects European armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) manufacturers arebetter placed than their US counterparts, as in some cases they have a broader product rangeand are better suited to lower production runs. For the future, it is likely that there will be morecollaborative AFV programmes, although past experience in Europe has shown this to be full ofproblems.

REARMING NATO

In NATO, downsizing has meant that some countries, for example Denmark, Greece, Portugal,Spain and Turkey, have taken delivery of surplus modern AFVs at virtually no cost, as othercountries rationalise their forces, especially large numbers of M60A1/M60A3 MBTs from the USand Leopard 1 MBTs from Germany and the Netherlands. While this free transfer of vehicles hasbenefited the countries concerned, it hardly helps the manufacturers of complete new vehicles.but it will mean much work for the subcontractors supplying new engines, transmissions, firecontrol systems and, in some cases, armour systems.

In recent years the established western manufacturers have also had to contend with newcountries entering the international marketplace from a much lower cost base. The customer isalso becoming more demanding, and today the contractor must accept more responsibility.Reliability is written into the contract which is often a fixed-price one and a complete package isrequired that not only covers the vehicle but also spare parts and training. The contractor mustalso be more flexible in providing what the customer wants.

CONCLUSION

In the future there are likely to be more upgrade programmes than new starts, and industry willtry to take over some of the functions often carried out by the armies themselves, such as baseoverhauls. Above all, systems must become more reliable. Research and development, not onlyof technical but also of operating aspects, must have real meaning. In the past, many countriespaid little attention to this.



ARMOUR AND THE ATTACK HELICOPTER IN AFRICAMaj-Gen W H Thackwray, senior advisor operational requirements, South African Air Force

There is no other weapons system, save perhaps for the fully equipped infantryman, that hasthe potential of the attack helicopter to contribute across the complete spectrum of conflict, frompeacekeeping operations to general war, in such a predominant manner." General Sir CharlesGuthrie, KCB LVO OBE, Chief of the British General Staff

INTRODUCTION

The armed helicopter and even the full-blown attack helicopter (AH) are no strangers to Africa.Indeed, it was during their colonial war in Algeria that the French became the first nation tomount armaments on helicopters. In so doing, they took the first tentative step towards a newweapons system in modern warfare; one that is rapidly proving to be as revolutionary as themachine gun.

This revolution also made itself felt in southern Africa, during the conflict that raged in this regionuntil recently. The relentless progression in Africa from the armed Alouette through the armedMi-8 to the fully fledged Mi-24 Hind AH convinced the SA Air Force that it should launch its ownAH programme. From this programme, which included the XH-1 concept demonstrator, XH-2weapons-proving platform and the combat experience that had been built up during the 1970sand 1980s, the third-generation AH Atlas Rooivalk evolved.

The tank is also no stranger to Africa; some of the biggest tank battles ever witnessed tookplace on African soil. Since those days, smaller tank battles of greater technologicalsophistication have taken place. The demise of the tank, so often forecast by its opponents andthe prophets of doom, has not yet occurred. We dare wonder, however, whether this might notcome to pass in our children's lifetimes. We need be in no doubt that a very real challenge to itscontinued existence lies in the rapid evolution of the high-technology AH. The aim of this paper,then, is to examine the role of the AH in operations in Africa, against an armour background.

THE POTENTIAL FOR ARMED CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Ever since communism fell in 1990, Africa has experienced a revolution of peace. Long-standing political conflicts have been or are being settled, particularly in the southern Africanregion. Concessions have even been made in territorial disputes, as was witnessed by thereturn of the Walvis Bay enclave and offshore islands a potential flashpoint to Namibia. It shouldbe abundantly clear, therefore, that South Africa does not harbour territorial ambitions in ourregion. But is this enough to exempt us from possible involvement in hostilities on the Africancontinent?

Despite the joyous predictions of peace in our time, most of us know that peace is a highlyfragile state that needs to be guarded carefully. Regrettably, Africa has a dismal track record inrespect of stability. Instability has manifested itself in many ways from the agony of repressivedictatorships, through warlords and starvation on a national scale, to `mad dog' scenarios andtotal, devastating, civil war. Cross-border disputes and full-scale war between nations have alsobeen part of this scenario.

Experts in world conflict believe we are living in a highly dangerous decade, with a myriad of



small conflicts against a background of problematic control over proliferation; the potential forconflict in our region is ever present, and the dictum "if you want peace, be prepared for war" isnot as silly as many naive people would like South Africans to believe. South Africa, as theregional power, cannot afford to find itself in such a weak position that it cannot deter war in ourregion, or intervene to stop it.

THE RULES FOR FUTURE WARS

Bearing all this in mind, what sort of a war can we expect to encounter in Africa in the future?

In the dying decades of this century, it has become abundantly clear that drawn-out wars aregoing out of fashion. The great loss of life and property associated with this type of conflict veryrapidly causes an international outcry. Unless a conflict is settled quickly, the outcome is often anegotiated solution of dubious value. The `new morality' of warfare, by which we should abide ifwe are not to be damned as warlords, thugs or the bully of the continent, restrains acts of warconsiderably.

Collateral damage must be avoided the civilian population and assets of an opposing countrymust be viewed as untouchable. Superb intelligence and accurate weapon systems are a must.

Occupation of another country's territory for long periods must be avoided. Occupation leads toescalation. Surface-bound logistical lines that necessitate occupation and defence thereofshould be avoided.

A `host' country's military assets should be avoided, thereby avoiding a fight with a third party.The time frame should preclude counteraction by such a country's defence force.

Escalation and extension of operations must be totally avoided: keep it short.

Own damage (potential) must be actual, and counteraction must take place shortly thereafter:an adequate military capability should be ready to react quickly.

THE DESIGN OF A FUTURE FORCE

The characteristics of the force that will be needed for future conflict can easily be deduced fromthe following rules:

It must provide flexible capabilities.

It must be combat-ready at short notice: therefore, it must be a dedicated full-time force.

It must be easy to insert and extract without en route delays, exhaustion, or the risk ofbeing pinned down.

It must be capable of rapid action in order to achieve surprise and deception.

It must be capable of accurate discriminatory action; therefore, it must be able to accessaccurate and timely intelligence.

It must be capable of handling rapidly changing local circumstances. It must be capable oftimely tactical adjustments: command and control and mobility must allow such changes.



The force must be balanced and flexible.

It must be capable of rapid escalation or variation, without sacrificing accuracy ordiscrimination.

Preferably, it should be capable of operating without support from ground-borne logisticallines for the duration of the operation. The ground force should be logistically independent,or depend on maintainable sea and air supply capabilities.

THE NATURE OF FUTURE OPERATIONS

While these requirements for a future force may be clear, the likely nature of future operations isless clear than at any time during the past 40 years. What is understood, and this view is prettyunanimous, is that the AH will provide various critically important capabilities.

These relate not only to the full spectrum of conflict, in any geographical setting, but also themanagement of crises, where the mere presence of attack helicopters may have a strongdeterrent effect.

Unlike many other weapon systems, the attack helicopter provide a uniquely adaptablecapability, and will be useful in virtually any military operation.

This is not to say that there is no role for armour. Light, mobile and agile armour in particularsuch as that which dominates the South African force design today fits in well with the designcriteria that have just been spelled out. It is, however, a simple matter to visualise the role of theAH in exactly this kind of scenario.

THE TANK IN MODERN WARFARE

The mechanisers of the 20th century saw freedom of movement off prepared surfaces as one ofthe major assets of the `caterpillar track'. They envisaged entire mechanised forces, completewith logistical backing, rolling freely in tactical formation over the countryside. However, eventhe best cross-country vehicles move far more slowly off roads and other prepared surfacesthan it does on them. In so doing, they also use far more fuel and suffer more wear and tearthan they do on roads. A cross-country supply echelon, for instance, can become self-consuming. There are many routes in many parts of Africa over which only the lightest forcescan be supplied by land. Cost does not allow the cross-country resupply of anything but thehighest priority ordnance, such as tank ammunition. This, in an African scenario, cansignificantly limit mechanised forces.

That the modern tank itself mounts a very capable anti-tank weapon cannot be denied. Anti-tank guided weapons mounted on AHs depend on chemical energy attack, including top attack.At this stage, however, modern armours are proving resistant to chemical energy attack, and inthat particular area the pendulum today swings towards modern armours. On the other hand,the tank, with its known disadvantages ground-sensitive, slow, cumbersome does mount akinetic energy weapon, and kinetic energy is proving increasingly effective against modernarmour, particularly over the past five years; in this case, the pendulum swings to the tank'sweapon rather than its armour.

While considering the role of the tank, it would also be wrong to ignore the limitations of AHs. Incommon with other weapon systems, AHs are not invulnerable, and the nature of specific



threats will require appropriate tactical procedures to counter them. This emphasises therequirement of a high standard of fieldcraft, tactics and operational practices and procedures,closely co-ordinated with other manoeuvre arms, if mission aims are to be achieved throughwell-defended enemy formations.

AHs are limited in their ability to hold ground (long a hackneyed argument offered by armyofficers when attempting to discredit the contribution of air power to modern warfare), and tocarry out sustained actions against the enemy's main manoeuvre force. Here one must bear inmind that the intensity of indirect fire is already making the holding of ground with infantry athigh density a thing of the past. Both high-density defenders and those who concentrate undulyto attack them will be pulverised. So one is already thinking of controlling ground by establishing`anvils of fire' shaped by troops, as opposed to being filled by them on key ground, and bypractising fire and movement elsewhere.

In this event the AH will be just as capable of conducting a fire-based hammer-and-anvil battle.More generally, one could expect its ability to control ground by surveillance, fire andmanoeuvre to be similar to that of a light armoured division. An important point here is that thehelicopter's ability to `pop up' greatly increases useful intervisibility distances, providing area-to-area intervisibility as opposed to `crest to crest'. It is not too hard to gain an idea of how a rotarywing force might control ground by extrapolating from German defensive techniques, employinglow-level fire and movement by mechanised forces.

THE ATTACK HELICOPTER

What, then, can we expect from this new predator of the battlefield? South African experience inAngola, as well as the lessons learnt from other people's wars, such as the Gulf War, hashelped to develop the AH doctrine in the SANDF. This doctrine is still evolving, but the requiredoperational capability of an AH is clearly understood, namely:

It must defeat enemy armour and mechanised forces. The destruction of these forces is ofprime importance.

Attacks on other ground forces is a secondary role.

It must counter opposing helicopters.

To achieve all these aims, the AH itself must survive. The reported magnitude of Americanhelicopter losses in Vietnam is doubtlessly accurate, but the whole approach to the survival ofthe helicopter on the modern battlefield has changed since then. Particularly, the AH exploitsthe three-dimensional battlefield by operating, when in the proximity of the enemy, in the heightband between ground level and 100 feet. Its survivability centres on the following concepts:

Do not be seen. Minimise detectability.

If seen, do not be hit. Maximise agility.

If hit, do not crash. Maximise damage tolerance.

Minimising detectability is further enhanced by providing the AH with good stand-off capabilityfirstly, the ability to itself detect the enemy at great range by means of a target detection andtelescopic sighting unit; secondly, by making use of low-light television cameras so thatrecordings can be made during a pop-up manoeuvre, allowing the crews to select and designate



targets for the weapon system from the relative safety of a re-masked position; and thirdly, themodern helicopter-launched anti-tank guided missile, which has a very high first shot killprobability, coupled to a short time of flight.

In trials conducted at Ansbach in Germany, somewhere around 1980, the capability of the AH tosurvive in an anti-armour scenario was amply demonstrated. Laser-activated smoke generatorsmounted on both the helicopters and the opposing armoured forces told the story in anincontestable fashion. If my memory serves me correctly, the tradeoff, when using sound tacticsbased on Nap-of-the-Earth manoeuvre, was in the order of one AH loss for the destruction of33 tanks. The kill capability of the AH has advanced considerably since those days, and it cangenerally outreach threat systems, both in sensor capability and weapon range. In summary,the AH can be said to possess the following capabilities:

firepower

selective targeting

shock action

flexibility

stealth

responsiveness

mobility

deployability

survivability

So with good planning, highly capable stand-off weapons, good tactics and clever helicopterdesign, the third-generation AH can not only survive but triumph on the modern battlefield. Thecrucial question on the operational level is, of course, how best to use this revolutionary weaponsystem in both high-intensity and low-intensity or crisis operations.

THE AH IN HIGH-INTENSITY OPERATIONS

Although history is moving towards favouring the AH as a primary army weapons platform, it isnot yet in a position to replace the tank. Until that point is reached, there is great advantage intheir operating together in concert. The expected range and speed of response of the AH willallow it to be manoeuvred with considerable freedom anywhere within a divisional area. AHs canalso be delegated to brigade level for specific operations, to support brigade-size or evensmaller deployments.

Incorporating AHs in corps-level plans would be equally feasible. Primary control at divisionallevel provides the optimum position for all options. The divisional commander must be able toplan for operations with the confidence that his full aviation support will be available to him, justas he counts on his infantry and armoured divisional resource. The big advantage of the AH isits flexibility, which allows it to be switched rapidly through brigade, divisional and corps areas itneed not be tied rigidly to a specific level of command.



A similar degree of flexibility is possible with its employment. The AH has an obvious role in thecontact battle, because of the range advantage that can be achieved by its anti-armour weaponsystem over those of ground-based systems. This means that the aviation component and otherground forces (including air defence assets) will have to be carefully co-ordinated if the risks ofmutual fratricide are to be minimised. To this end, reliable and secure communications areessential.

The AH can complement medium reconnaissance, and furthermore has the firepower, selectivityand responsiveness to play a major part in the engagement of depth battle targets. The USused its AHs boldly during Operation Desert Storm, and suffered few casualties. Part of itssuccess can be attributed to the early achievement of air supremacy, which the AH helped tosecure.

The indeterminate nature of the threat, the vast size of the battlefields in Africa and theprosecution of bold offensive operations, as required by the rules and expected nature of futurewars, is certain to result in a rapid increase in the size of the area in which combat support unitsare deployed. These units will become increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

In addition, the uncertainties about our freedom to manoeuvre ground forces, and the need toconcentrate combat power at the `sharp end' of the attack, all combine to create a need for apowerful and responsive multi-role capability that can readily move over long distances and candisrupt, delay or destroy an enemy operation. The AH would be uniquely suited to such a task.

A point of major interest, in debating the AH's future operational level of employment, is that theBritish Army envisages an AH-equipped army aviation as a manoeuvre arm in its own right (asis armour and infantry), as opposed to purely providing combat support. The formationcommander will, of course, decide on the appropriate role for aviation, depending on theprevailing circumstances.

The AH could, early on in hostilities, assist armour and other ground elements by providing ascreen while they deploy to their allotted positions. It could thereafter attack enemy forces justbeyond the brigade area of influence, in what one could call a brigade-deep operation.

Once the ground elements have halted or fixed the enemy's initial thrusts, major deep AHmanoeuvres can be conducted against the follow-on forces, to destroy their main effort andprevent them from reinforcing the other battles.

Alternatively, the AHs could be used to fix an enemy thrust while the ground units manoeuvre toattack and complete the destruction. The flanks of the manoeuvring armour will almost certainlybe protected by other aviation units, if available. Enemy forces in a static posture could also befixed by the AH, while armour is used to complete their destruction.

THE AH IN LOW-INTENSITY AND CRISIS OPERATION

Low Intensity Operations (LIOs) are seen as encompassing actions against less capable forces,including irregular or ad hoc forces, but also as operations in support of forces deployed topromote stability or maintain peace. These operations will probably lead to actions dispersedmore thinly over large areas. The AH's strategic mobility would prove to be an important factorin its employment in LIO. It could be deployed early on in a crisis, and it is likely to need lessinfrastructure than an equivalent fixed-wing aircraft fleet. Furthermore, the very presence of sucha potent and flexible asset within a crisis area could well make a major contribution to deterring



escalation.

Although the type of forces likely to be encountered is classified as light, this does not precludethe presence of armour or high-technology weapons, even if both are limited in quantity. Armouris unlikely to be massed, and may well be positioned in areas containing significant numbers ofcivilians, thereby precluding the use of area systems. The ability to deliver a relatively limitednumber of anti-armour weapons with precision would therefore be necessary. Armour that mightbe encountered, while in relatively small packets, may be widely scattered, and engagementsacross a dispersed area of operations may be necessary.

Again, the mobility of AH and its integral ability would provide an effective means of counteringthe threat without the deployment of our own armour, and might well decrease the number ofground troops required in the overall force mix. It is also worth noting that the AH's anti-armourweapon system would be very effective against all all point targets (eg specific points within abuilding or complex), which could be identified and engaged at long range, with great accuracyand minimum collateral damage. This was the case during the American operation in Somalia.

The light nature of enemy forces and their dispersion are also likely to make target acquisitionmore difficult, producing a serious threat to an unprotected helicopter. The protection integral toan AH would greatly reduce its vulnerability against such a threat. Furthermore, on a relativelyunsophisticated battlefield, short-range on- and off-axis systems are likely to have considerableutility, and in certain circumstances could be used in lieu of close air support (CAS) or evenartillery support. The `lighter' the nature of the task, the less likely it is that a comprehensiverange of reconnaissance equipment will be deployed. The capabilities likely to be offered by theAH sensors, coupled with its C3 systems, would prove invaluable, as would its ability to moverapidly in response to the identification of a specific threat.

CONCLUSION

In seeking to define the role of the AH, we face a challenge not dissimilar to that between thetwo world wars when the role of the tank had to be defined. The protagonists who viewed tanksas being no more than a means of supporting infantry (in the contact battle) were proved aswrong as those who advocated their independent use. It is not necessary or appropriate to tiethe AH to a specific role, a specific level of intensity or a specific level of subordination. Itscharacteristics allow it to be easily and rapidly switched between roles, to be used at almost anylevel of conflict, and to be re-subordinated in the light of the tactical situation. It does notnecessarily compete with armoured manoeuvre forces or fixed-wing aircraft; it can becomplementary to both. However, its introduction to the future battlefield could allow the groundcommander greater freedom of manoeuvre within the contact battle, and allow him to dominatethe depth battle; both of these aspects were vividly demonstrated by US forces in the Gulf War.

THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF ARMOURProf Richard M Ogorkiewicz, Royal Military College of Science

INTRODUCTION

We live in times of major political and strategic changes, and these have impacted as much onarmoured forces as on anything else. If we take a global view, armour has been most affected bythe end of the Cold War and the attendant military confrontation in Central Europe. Prior to this,



Warsaw Pact countries, led by the Soviet Union, boasted of having as many as 59 470 battletanks, 41 580 of which belonged to the Soviet army. To counter these, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO) had a total of 25 091 tanks; both alliances attached great importance totheir armoured forces.

However, as the two sides began to negotiate with each other, they agreed to reduce thenumbers of battle tanks substantially. This was done under the Conventional Forces in Europe(or CFE) treaty, which allowed the Warsaw Pact armies to retain 20 000 tanks. As a result, thesize of their armoured forces were reduced very considerabhly, and thousands of tanks werescrapped. The cutbacks became even more severe with the subsequent demise of the WarsawPact and the break-up of the Soviet Union, which left its eight successor states entitled to retain13 150 tanks; of this, only 6 400 were to be held by the Russian Army.

Under the CFE treaty, NATO forces were also entitled to retain 20 000 tanks. This required themto scrap far fewer tanks, but individual members of NATO have cut back their tank fleets furtherthan required. For example, the British Army is entitled to 1 015 tanks, but its tank regiments areto be re-equipped with only 386 of the new Challenger 2 tanks. Similarly, the French Army isentitled to 1 306 battle tanks, but according to its latest statements it intends to have no morethan 800 and only 310 of them are to be the new AMX Leclerc tanks, the rest being made up ofthe obsolete AMX 30 B2.

Some countries, such as Greece and Turkey, may retain larger numbers of tanks, even as manyas they are entitled to, as a result of receiving surplus equipment from the US and Germanyunder the NATO `cascading' programme. However, the tanks being transferred to these are allof the older type, and if or when they acquire more modern and costly tanks, the numbers willundoubtedly go down.

Similar conditions are emerging elsewhere. India, for instance, has a fleet of 3 400 tanks, butmost of them are of the older type and it has only ordered 126 of the new Arjun tanks. Much thesame applies to Japan, which has 873 of the second-generation Type 74 tanks but has onlyordered 108 of the new third-generation Type 90 tanks. All this indicates that there will be farfewer tanks in future than there have been in recent years.

However, tanks and the armoured forces based on them continue to be regarded as anessential component of ground forces, and in particular as an important deterrent to any majoraggression on land.

To fulfil their role in the much smaller size to which they are being reduced, armoured forces willhave to rely on their quality and the effectiveness of their equipment rather than on theirnumbers. But the end of the confrontation between the major powers has removed much of themotivation to develop new and more powerful equipment. As a result, the development of newtanks is slowing down.

In these circumstances, tanks can only be made more effective by further improving existingmodels, which will have to remain in service for longer periods. One of the most immediate waysof doing this is by retrofitting them with more advanced fire control and battlefield managementsystems.

FIREPOWER

In fact, the retrofitting of progressively more effective fire control systems has been going on for



some time. An important recent facet of this has been the adoption of thermal imaging sights,encouraged after their efficacy was demonstrated during the Gulf War. Another has been theprovision of stabilised panoramic sights for tank commanders, enabling them to acquire targetsindependently of the gunners and increase the speed or rate of engagement as a result.

Further developments are likely to include the addition of millimetre wave radar, to ensuresurveillance and target acquisition under all weather conditions. Other developments will includeautomatic target tracking, which is already incorporated in the fire control system of theJapanese Type 90 tank, and automatic target detection and recognition, which will enhance theperformance of tank crews.

Battlefield management systems are still relatively new. In essence, they amount to theprovision of computerised information and communication systems. These include digital mapswith coloured flat panel displays, which immediately show the tank commander his position onthe basis of the vehicle's inertial or global positioning system (GPS), as well as those of all othertanks in the same unit. All this greatly increases commanders' tactical awareness, reducing therisk of fratricidal fire and enabling them to react more quickly.

Battlefield management systems have been already been introduced to some extent in the US,where the latest MIA2 version of the Abrams tank has been fitted with the Inter-VehicularInformation System (IVIS). They are also being introduced in Germany, where the latest versionof the Leopard 2 tank (adopted this year by the Swedish Army) is being fitted with a tankcommand and control system called IFIS. A battlefield management system has also beendeveloped in France for the AMX Leclerc tank.

Battlefield management systems will undoubtedly increase the efficacy of tanks and tank units,and will therefore be a `force multiplier'. But it will not improve the ability of tanks to defeat thearmour of opposing tanks. This can only be done with more effective main armament. The latesttanks are already well armed with guns of 120mm or 125mm, which are capable of defeatingheavy armour, and their performance can be stretched further. However, there are indicationsthat, even at their best, these guns will not be able to defeat the kinds of armour that are beingdeveloped for future tanks. In that situation, it is necessary to resort to guns of larger calibre, andseveral countries have been working for some time on 140mm guns that fire APFSDSprojectiles with twice the muzzle energy of those fired by the current 120mm tank guns. As partof this development, the German firm of Rheinmetall has mounted its 140mm gun in a Leopard 2tank. The Swiss Federal Construction Works has also mounted its 140mm gun in a Leopard 2.

These experiments indicate that the retrofitting of 140mm guns in the existing tanks is possible.But it presents a number of major problems. In particular, 140mm rounds are large and heavy,which makes them difficult, if not impossible, to manhandle. As a result they require automaticloading systems, and this implies major changes to tank turrets and a reduction in the size oftank crews from four to three men.

The only type of automatic loading system which may readily be installed in existing tanks is oneinstalled in the turret bustle. In consequence, the configuration of tanks rearmed with 140mmguns should resemble that already adopted for the Japanese Type 90 and the French AMXLeclerc. In fact, this configuration has actually been adopted for CATTB, the ComponentAdvanced Technology Test Bed built recently in the US to explore the future form of tanks. ThusCATTB has a three-man crew and a bustle auto loader for its XM-291 gun, which can be fittedwith either a 120mm or a 140mm barrel.



Because of the problems they pose and the absence of a threat which would urge theiradoption, the development of 140mm tank guns is proceeding slowly. The problems theypose are also encouraging people to consider potential alternatives to conventional140mm guns. One of them is liquid-propellant guns, which were seriously considered fortanks 10 years ago. However, there is no sign of their being adopted for tanks, despite thefact that liquid propellant guns continue to be developed in the US for the artillery.

The second potential alternative is electromagnetic guns. Their main attraction is that theycan launch projectiles at more than 3 000m/s, or twice the muzzle velocity of APFSDprojectiles fired by current tank guns. The size, weight and other problems associated withelectromagnetic guns do not make them a practical proposition for tanks. Nevertheless,there is a belief in the defence ministries of the US and the UK that, given furtherdevelopment, electromagnetic guns might become the main armament of tanks by theyear 2015 or so.

The third alternative is hybrid electrothermal-chemical guns. They have been considered amore immediate proposition for tanks than electromagnetic guns because they onlyrequire part of the projectile propulsion energy to come from the electrical equipment,which can therefore be smaller. In fact, electrothermal-chemical guns were beingproposed in the US five years ago as the main armament of the next version of the MlAbrams tank. However, they are now seen to require much further development beforethey can be seriously considered for tanks.

ENGINE POWER

In view of all this, tanks will have to continue relying on solid propellant guns for their mainarmament. If or when the development of future tanks advances beyond the installation of newguns and turrets, and allows major changes to their chassis, it will be possible to take advantageof the considerable reductions in the size of power packs achieved in recent years. Thus thereare now power packs with a volume of 5m2 which deliver the same amount of power as theexisting ones with a volume of 8m2.

The benefits of using such much more compact power packs are demonstrated by the FrenchAMX Leclerc, which has been able to take advantage of them already. As a result it is 1,5mshorter than the British Challenger, for instance, which makes it considerably lighter for a givenlevel of protection.

The new, more compact power packs have been based equally well on diesel engines as on gasturbines, but diesels are generally preferred because of their lower fuel consumption and lowerproduction cost. Exceptions to the general trend are represented by the US Ml and Russian T-80 tanks, both of which are powered by gas turbines. In consequence they both suffer from highfuel consumption, which poses logistical problems. In view of this it is not surprising that thelatest Russian tanks are again powered by diesel engines, like all the earlier Soviet battle tanks.So far the US Army has not made such a U-turn, but it has been developing a new dieselengine as well as a new gas turbine for its future tanks.

Whatever the type of engine, there have been no demands recently for increasing the power-to-weight ratio of tanks above the level already reached, of 20 to 30 horsepower per ton. Not somany years ago it was argued that more than 30 horsepower per ton would make tanks somuch more agile that they would be much more difficult to hit, and therefore would be moresurvivable. However, such arguments are no longer regarded as tenable.



PROTECTION

The survivability of tanks continues to rely primarily on their armour. In its most sophisticatedform this reaches the equivalent of 600mm of rolled homogeneous steel armour against kineticenergy projectiles, and of 1 300mm against shaped-charge warheads. Apart from increasing theamount of armour, to which there is a weight limit, the survivability of tank crews can beincreased by departing from the traditional configuration and locating all the crewmen in the hull.

This has already been done in an experimental vehicle called the Tank Test Bed, built in the USby General Dynamics Land Systems, the producers of the US M1 tanks. In this vehicle, all threecrewmen were located in the front of the hull, and the main armament, consisting of a 120mmgun, was mounted in an unmanned turret operated by remote control. Development of the TankTest Bed was abandoned some time ago, but most future tank studies I have seen recentlyhave followed very similar lines.

The survivability of tanks will probably be further improved by active protection systems, whichwill automatically detect threats and activate appropriate countermeasures. Laser threat warningsystems is the first small step in this direction. Another is the infra-red jammers deployed onFrench armoured vehicles during the Gulf War, and on Russian tanks, under the name ofShtora. The jammers disrupt the optical guidance on which most current anti-tank guidedmissiles depend, and achieve `soft kills' by causing them to disengage.

Other active defence systems capable of achieving `hard kills' disrupting or destroying missilesbefore they strike their targets are still in the early stages of development. One example is theTank Anti-Missile System (TAMS), which was being developed in Britain. This consisted of amini turret containing surveillance and tracking radars and two 7,62mm machine guns, whichcould be mounted on the bustle of a tank turret. An even earlier system is the Russian Drozd,which consisted of a combination of millimetre wave radar with eight small rockets withfragmentation warheads.

The most recent example of an active defence system is provided by the US Small Low-CostInterceptor Device (SLID), which uses homing mini-missiles to defeat the incoming threats at arange of about 100m from the defended vehicle.

INFANTRY

Active defence systems is regarded as offering a revolutionary improvement in the survivabilityof tanks, and it would also greatly benefit other armoured vehicles, which form an indispensablecomponent of the armoured forces and most of which cannot carry the same amount of heavyarmour as tanks do. These vehicles include armoured infantry vehicles, which continue to be anessential complement to tanks. Those intended for the infantry units that are expected to co-operate closely with tanks are generally tracked, but the French Army now proposes to equipthe infantry of its armoured formations with wheeled armoured vehicles.

The latest tracked infantry vehicles are as mobile as battle tanks and are generally armed with25mm or 30mm automatic cannons, as shown by the US M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicleand the ASCOD, developed jointly by Austria and Spain and adopted recently by the SpanishArmy as the Pizarro. However, the new Japanese Type 89 infantry vehicle is already armed witha 35mm cannon, and the CV-90 being produced for the Swedish Army has an even largercalibre 40mm cannon. Moreover, the French Army is developing a 45mm cannon for its futureinfantry vehicles, and the German Army intended to arm its future Marder 2 infantry vehicle with



a 50mm cannon.

There has been some progress in improving the protection of tracked infantry vehicles, whichthey need much more than larger calibre cannons. For example, the armour protection of theUS M2 Bradley IFV has been increased from being effective against 14,5mm heavy machineguns to the level of 30mm cannons, although at a considerable increase in weight. The BritishWarrior infantry vehicle has also been better protected by adding `special armour' modules. Thiswas done originally for the Gulf War, but the additional armour has been retained for operationsin Bosnia, where Warriors are exposed to attack by RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers. TheGerman Marder 2, which was to weigh 42 tons, and the US Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle(FIFV), which was to have been based on the chassis of the future US battle tank, would havebeen far better protected. However, these vehicles are no longer being developed, partlybecause of cuts in defence budgets and partly because such vehicles are not immediatelyneeded on the changing world scene.

In contrast, there is continuing development and production of wheeled armoured carriers, whichare seen to be more economical to operate and more suited to a variety of roles in the newpolitical and strategic environment, including that of United Nations operations. The mostnumerous of them outside the former Soviet Union is the four-wheeled Renault VAB, 4 000 ofwhich have been produced for the French army and another 1 000 for others. Its productionrecord is now being approached by that of the eight-wheeled Mowag Piranha, developed inSwitzerland and produced not only there but also under licence in Canada, Chile and the UK.

LIGHT ARMOURED VEHICLES

Closely related to the wheeled carriers are the light armoured vehicles intended primarily forreconnaissance and security roles. The leading example of them is the VBL, produced byPanhard for the French Army. Similar vehicles still being developed include the DAF Multi-Purpose Carrier, which might be adopted not only by the Netherlands but also the GermanArmy, and the Iveco-Fiat Puma, designed for the Italian Army.

These light armoured vehicles represent but one extreme of a wide spectrum of vehicles usedby armoured reconnaissance and other light armoured units. The other extreme is representedby vehicles armed with 105mm tank guns which can act as tank destroyers. The prime exampleof them is the eight-wheeled Centauro, which is being produced for the Italian Army. Another isthe improved version of the six-wheeled AMX 10 RC, which the French Army hopes to have.The latest example is the 10-wheeled Piranha built in Switzerland by Mowag. Similar commentsregarding its capabilities apply to the tracked counterparts of these vehicles, represented by theXM8 Armoured Gun System which is being developed in the US for the airborne and lightarmoured units.

In all their different forms, light armoured vehicles are attracting increasing attention because ofthe recent changes in the world situation, which call for their employment rather than that ofbattle tanks. An inevitable consequence of this is an argument that a greater proportion of thearmoured forces of most armies should consist of light armoured units. Such a change in thecomposition of the armoured forces should enable them to perform a wider range of roles andthereby make them, overall, an even more effective component of the ground forces.

THE GULF WAR: BRITISH INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ARMOURED LESSONS LEARNT



Maj-Gen Patrick Cordingley, DSOGeneral Officer Commanding 2nd Division/Eastern District of the British Army

TRAINING ON ARRIVAL

On arrival in Saudi Arabia, the 7th Armoured Brigade (12 000 men and 150 Challenger tanks)were faced with a number of unusual problems, of which the media was probably the mostcomplex. The second was how to set about becoming an effective part of a coalition army. Thesolution to these problems, and many others, lay in getting into the desert as quickly as possibleto start the business of finally preparing for war.

The desert, which should have been the ultimate armoured training area, presented its owncomplications. The Americans had arrived before us, and space was at a premium. The localBedouins needed to be moved before you could fire, and the area that we were allocatedoffered extremely good camel grazing; each day before we started, these animals had to bemoved. There were also other interesting obstacles to mobility, such as oil pipelines, some ofthem as much as two metres in height and pumping oil at a greater rate than normal. But thegreatest concern was how we should set about training, with the US Marines, for breaking intoKuwait through the massive Iraqi border defences.

We were extremely fortunate to have trained as a brigade at Suffield in Canada during thesummer of 1990. This huge area of rolling prairie was as near perfect a rehearsal for the desertas we could have hoped for. Although its maximum capacity, at any one time, is for one battlegroup of two squadrons of tanks and two companies of armoured infantry, it allowed us to fireand manoeuvre in a way that is not possible in western Europe. Even given this superb training,only half the problem was solved. Becoming fully integrated into an unusual formation requiredmuch discussion and practice. Procedures common to Nato did not necessarily apply to the USMarines and their special roles. Close air support and naval gunfire support required particularattention. But the will to achieve perfection and full integration as quickly as possible was alwaysthere, and I felt confident that after three weeks' training we could successfully attack intoKuwait or Iraq.

RANGE SAFETY

Preparing to go to war and making certain that all one's equipment is working properly and theguns firing correctly gave us our next unusual problem. Once we had set up a large range wherewe could manoeuvre up to battle group level, firing all the equipment, including artillery andsupport infantry weapons, we realised that for the first time since probably World War 2 we wereabout to embark on major night-time live fire training without safety staff. Under suchcircumstances mistakes would almost certainly be made, and in the worst instances we wouldkill people. My commander in Riyadh fully understood that the type of training I was embarkingon was necessary, and gave me his support. My main concern, however, was the effect the lossof life in such circumstances could have on the media, our coalition partners, and indeed thegeneral public at home.

The morale of my own troops was also cause for concern. What would happen if a tankexploded if it was hit? Our propellants are as benign as any in the world. But they are stillvolatile, and as we were to bring down artillery to within 100 metres of the tanks at night, therewas clearly a considerable risk. The point was not only one of losing the crew, but also theeffect on the entire force, should they know of or see a tank detonating. Ammunition mustalways be stored as safely as possible, and the propellant as docile as it can be. I feel sorry for



those soldiers still manning T-72s; they must be very concerned after seeing pictures ofdetonating Iraqi tanks during the Gulf War.

TACTICAL COMMAND

My next topic is command. While carrying out our work-up training, it became very clear that wehad an unfortunate command and control mindset. For years we had been used to going out onexercise in West Germany to put into practice our General Defence Plan. We knew exactly howwe were to be deployed, and where to withdraw to. All the commander had to do was to set inmotion a series of control measures.

Much more would be required in a war of manoeuvre. The commander would have to give clearorders; it would then be the responsibility of the staff, who did not necessarily have to be withhim, to work out the control measures necessary to make it possible for the mission to beaccomplished. Clearly, when the initial orders were being prepared I would have to be with mystaff, to direct and advise, but after that I would need to move quickly around the battlefield. I feltcomfortable commanding my brigade from a tank. I could communicate forward to my owntroops and backwards to my staff, sending them the various orders so they could set in chain aseries of control measures. If there was a crisis and I needed to go there myself, I was in themost protected piece of equipment on the battlefield. So one concludes that in future we mustgive the commander every possible aid in his tank to help him in his decision-making process.We have to take away the problems of reading maps, and other equipment that require unusualattention, so that he can concentrate on making decisions and issuing the necessary orders.

THE 24-HOUR BATTLE

Once our initial desert training was complete, we set about building 'The Devil Dog DragoonRange'; this we did with the US Marines. When this was done, we could manoeuvre at brigadelevel and fire all our weapon systems, but most importantly, we could fire and manoeuvre atnight something which is almost impossible in peacetime, because of safety restrictions. Wecould demonstrate to ourselves and to the media that we had this tremendous advantage overthe Iraqi forces because of thermal imagery.

But we asked ourselves how long we could sustain that pressure. Advancing in time for amoment, and looking at the consequences of fighting through each night of the four days of theland battle, I can assure you that after two days we became very tired and started to makemistakes. It was at that stage that I gave the order for all messages to be written down andchecked before they were sent over the radio. After three days we started shooting at eachother, and at the end of the fourth day we were very tired indeed. For those designers who arelooking at the two-man tank, they should be very conscious of battle fatigue. The more menthere are in a crew, the greater the chance of somebody getting some useful rest.

On a related subject: we had, by mid-December, fitted all our tanks with satellite navigationsystems (GPS). This, coupled with the thermal observation sight, TOGS, was a battle-winner.Not only for the first time in history in the British Army did we know where we were, but we werealso capable of fighting for 24 hours a day.

TRAINING AT DIVISIONAL LEVEL

Returning to the chronology of events: by early January we had been taken away from the USMarines and put under the command of the 7th US Corps. Leaving the Marines was very sad,



but operationally it would be easier to work alongside a corps that we had been next to inWestern Europe and Nato; we shared common procedures. After arriving at the Wadi Al Batin,some 250 miles to the west, we were given the new plan. We were to be part of the main pointof effort; the manoeuvring of the 7th US Corps to attack and destroy the Republican Guard.

The 1st British Armoured Division's part was to put out a flank guard on the right of the 7th USCorps as it moved north, and then east. It was planned to launch the Corps on the second dayof the ground offensive, and that had implications which I will return to later. But we now had amission, and we could set in motion the necessary training to make it possible. Because weknew that our first manoeuvre was to pass through the 1st US Infantry Division (Mechanised) inthe minefield breach, that became our training priority. It took us collectively some two weeks toplan, and we exercised it no less than three times. The manoeuvring of a division is acomplicated affair. To manoeuvre it through another division increases the difficulty, and if ithappens that you are not working with a division that has the same procedures, thecomplications abound. In the years to come we must not forget that there are areas ofmanoeuvre warfare that will be almost impossible to replicate by simulation, and that onlypractice on the ground will prepare one for war.

The divisional plan was to pass through the minefield breach and then attack sequentially withthe two brigades. Our objectives were given metallic code names. Once we had reached `Lead'we were to create a stop-line to restrict the Republican Guard's movement further south. Beforethe attack, the 7th US Corps and the British artillery put in a week-long barrage on the front-lineIraqi positions. This was calculated as the equivalent of firing 75 000 Scud missiles.

My brigade was given the privilege of leading the attack into Iraq, and I planned to advance withthe Queen's Royal Irish Hussars battle group leading, consisting only of tanks. Once clear of thebreach we were to push the medium reconnaissance out in front of us. They would trigger closeair support, attack helicopters and medium artillery when needed. This was only partiallysuccessful; I will return to this theme in my summary. Close reconnaissance was unnecessaryon the very flat terrain, and tanks were better suited for that particular role. I quite expected tofight for information, and with tanks leading I had all the advantages, particularly at night; interms of penetration I knew that I outranged his tanks by at least 1 500m.

THE CHEMICAL THREAT

On 25 February, at 15h00, we passed through the minefield breach and were ready to attack. Itwas cold, wet and overcast, and we were dressed in our NBC suits because we quite expectedthe enemy to use chemical weapons against us. The point is that we had spent a considerableamount of time not only training for chemical and biological warfare, but also making certain thatour soldiers were inoculated against any known threat, for their protection and confidence.

But what is interesting is that under stressful circumstances, confidence-building measures canhave an adverse affect. Some of the inoculations, for instance, make one feel extremely ill, andthe knowledge that more were to come was not good for the soldiers' morale. And then, whenthe air war started, we decided to take precautionary measures and various pills. Rumours gotaround very quickly that these pills contained bromide, and you can imagine how thrilled thesoldiers were with that knowledge. There was no doubt that the threat was very real, and theeffects on morale were interesting. What we must ensure is that our chemical and biologicalprotection within our tanks is as foolproof as it can possibly be.

THE CONTACT BATTLE



I gave the order to advance at 15h15; I was leading one of the four columns. Ridiculously, wewanted to put in our first attack during daylight, despite the fact that we knew the advantageswere going to be with us at night-time. But darkness fell before our first contact, and when itcame it was at an unexpected position; a company with tanks dug in around a command post. Itwas pitch-black by the time my southern battle group came across it.

I include a very short extract from an account of that attack, to give you a feel for the type ofbattle we were involved in during the first two days of the land war. I am not going to pretend toyou that our battle was violent; it was for the Iraqis, because we outreached them and hadcomplete air superiority.

"As night fell, the columns of tanks closed up. Only the red turret lights betrayed the presence ofa mass of moving armour. Suddenly, reports of the enemy came in from a squadron on theright. It was not a pre-planned attack, but we knew that there was a divisional headquarters inthe area. As we advanced into the mine-belt, the tanks began to pick up the objectives in theirthermal sights. As well as seeing the mast, they reported bunkers and other positions around it,and they were clearly occupied. It was a particularly unpleasant night; it was raining heavily, andvisibility with the naked eye was down to 15m before you could see anything the size of a tank;it was pitch black. Thirty seconds before we went in, the tanks opened up, and when thevehicles they hit started to burn, the infantry had a reference point to aim for."

While this was in progress, I was faced with an interesting problem. With a third of my brigadeinvolved elsewhere, I had to tackle our first expected objective, an Iraqi brigade. The tacticalinformation I had was not good. But in support I had five regiments of British artillery, and acomplete US artillery brigade. If I needed it, I had more artillery, in terms of high explosives thatcould be put on the ground, than General Montgomery had at the battle of El Alamein. With thatsupport available to me, I did not need to be Rommel to work out precisely what to do. Twothirds of my brigade put in the attack, moving west to east, taking the enemy in the flank.

As dawn broke the following day, it was dark and miserable, and we were already seeing theeffects of the burning oil wells. The debris around us was considerable; it was clear at that stagethat the Iraqis had attempted to respond to our attack. But what was interesting, as far as thetank crews were concerned, was that it was difficult when using thermal sights to know whetheryou were being fired at or not, unless your tank was actually hit. That is something that shouldbe studied further in future.

LETHALITY

The next two days were characterised by fast manoeuvring. We destroyed some 300 tanks andarmoured personnel carriers (APCs), and we took some 8 000 Iraqi prisoners. We wereimmensely impressed by the lethality of the main armament of our tanks. We could hit enemytanks at ranges greater than 3 000m, but we learnt a lesson that we should have been aware offrom reading accounts of recent battles in the Middle East. This is that a kinetic energy rounddoes not necessarily cause a tank to detonate. As a result, we found that our high explosiverounds were exceptionally useful. After the first day, the first round loaded was high explosive. Iwould have been upset not to have had such a round in our inventory.

SUMMARY

I would like to end by making a few general observations about lessons we learnt from the GulfWar. Firstly, we cannot afford to lag behind in armour/anti-armour technology. While maintaining



the overall aim of outgunning the enemy and remaining well protected, we must be prepared toadjust our requirements to different threats and concepts. The point behind this somewhatgeneral statement is that the Gulf blew away many of our equipment assumptions. No tanks canbe universally well-protected, and while this used to matter less in defensive operations in theclose terrain of Europe, we feel it is necessary to redistribute the armour priorities for offensiveoperations in the open desert of the Gulf. For this reason, additional armour was added to thesides and front glaces of the tank, and given the added danger of nose-up berm crossing,Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) was added to the toe-plate. This additional armour addedseveral tons to the weight of Challenger 1, and placed its profile outside the European railgauge envelope.

The lesson here is that modular armour holds many attractions for the future, as it might enableprotection to be tailored to specific threats and terrains. It can also help overcome the strategicand operational mobility restrictions on the size and weight of armoured fighting vehicles(AFVs).

Another assumption that has been swept aside is that less well-trained countries will notpossess modern tanks or armour technology. You will be aware of the capabilities of variousmodels of T-72, of the appearance of rudimentary, but locally produced, complex armours, andof the near certainty that the Middle East will profit from arms cascading down from Nato andthe former Soviet Union. It is absolutely essential that our armour triumphs when it representsthe final trump card; although we were not faced with the potential problem of matching M-60against T-72, we did take measures to ensure our ability to overcome all aspects of thereasonably well-protected tanks of the Republican Guard.

Secondly, our army must be equipped with a single and reliable tank fleet. The Gulf did bringinto question previous assumptions about the necessity of co-operating with some of our allies.On the whole, it was seen to be important that we should have a single fleet, rather than a splitfleet with some co-operation-type elements. In the Gulf we had Challenger 1, but the supportfleet, mainly engineer, were based on the Chieftain chassis. In Germany and England we had amixed tank fleet of Challenger 1 and Chieftain. We were also keenly aware of how much ourhigh tank availability figures were dependent on unusually fast logistic support, and of course onsecure lines of communication. As a result we have selected Challenger 2 as our full fleetreplacement; this exciting new tank is as good as the best in the world.

Medium reconnaissance is required to prevent gaps arising in tactical intelligence, and thereforenew equipment and concepts are required. Currently, our medium reconnaissance is equippedwith CVR Scimitar. It could not keep pace with Challenger 1 in the Gulf, was vulnerable in theabsence of cover, and could not see as far as Challenger at night. In the light of theseshortcomings, medium reconnaissance was rarely used in its proper role of acquiring timely andaccurate combat information, with the result that gaps arose in the tactical intelligence picture; itwas our experience that despite the undoubted value of satellite intelligence and JSTARS,these systems were incapable of acquiring or quickly disseminating intelligence that wasdetailed, accurate and up-to-date enough for the purposes of tactical commanders on theground.

The Gulf has given us a great deal to think about in terms of reconnaissance concepts. Mostnations would agree on a concept of reconnaissance by stealth; however, stealth can beextremely difficult to achieve over some terrains. In our view, some critical questions must beaddressed, such as protection, air-portability, amphibious capability, and the place of fire power,both with the stealth concept and as an alternative to it when stealth fails. The Gulf proved the



dominance of the tank in land warfare, and Chaim Herzog's words remain true: "Contrary to thehasty conclusions published throughout the world after the Yom Kippur War, the tank stillremains a dominant factor on the field of battle, provided that it is part of a well-planned battleteam which is capable of answering the problems of modern warfare." Another, more succinctview was given by a totally impartial witness, a US Marine Corps pilot, who said; "The war ain'tover until you've parked your tank on his lawn."

But we must be cautious about the lessons we learnt, and remember that we enjoyed airsuperiority which developed into air supremacy, had a near-monopoly of intelligence, andoperated in a benign electronic warfare environment. Nevertheless, as a result of this campaignwe now have a new tank and a new generation of soldiers who have experienced war.

ARMOUR IN THE AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTMaj-Gen J M Dippenaar, Chief of Army Staff Personne

INTRODUCTION

The use of armour on the battlefield has been well-documented and studied. There is excellentreading material about armour in the deserts of North Africa or the Middle East. Many accountsof armoured action in the mountainous areas of Italy, the Golan Heights in Israel, and othertypes of terrain, including urban areas such as Beirut, are available for analysis. This researchhas led to adjustments in focus that have preserved armour as a dynamic force on thebattlefield.

To assess armour in the African environment, and more specifically its role on the Africanbattlefield, we will discuss its primary characteristics, namely firepower, mobility, protection, andshock effect, in this context. To give a complete picture of armour in the African environment, Iwill discuss:

the African combat theatre;

the application of armour, judged by its characteristics;

equipment adjustments;

training; and

A future vision.

THE AFRICAN COMBAT THEATRE

We know that terrain and meteorology play an important role in any armour operation. Duringthe early training years, before the conflict in South West Africa (Namibia) started, armouredpersonnel were fond of talking about ideal armour terrain ie rolling terrain, open countryside withgood manoeuvrability, few obstacles and abundant fire positions, with good observation, andfavourable arcs of fire. This was the picture all armoured crews desired, until our armour wasfirst deployed in the NamibianAngolan border area in the early 1970s.

Over the next two decades, the SA Armoured Corps was used intensively over the mostextreme terrain, and under the most extreme weather conditions. In the early 1970s, armour



personnel faced the bush for the first time the thick trees and dense undergrowth of the EasternCaprivi. Later, by the mid-1970s, forces deployed in Operation Savannah encountered open,undulating terrain with a good measure of densely bushed areas, with weather conditionsvarying from hot to very hot, and dry to very wet. Most of the operations during the 1980s werefought in the bush of northern Namibia and southern Angola. Although armoured cars were themain weapons used throughout those years, the Olifant Mk1 tank played a crucial role in thebush war of the late 1980s.

During the 1990s the South African internal urban milieu was the next challenge for armouredoperations. Although urban operations are common to armour in certain parts of the world, itwas quite new to the South African armoured soldier the more so when it is borne in mind thatthe peace-keeping role of armour was introduced without an announcement. Again, urbanterrain with a restriction on the use of weapons, increased vulnerability, limited firing positionsand difficult manoeuvrability created its own lessons.

Since the Army Battle School was opened 16 years ago, the Lohathla exercise area (lohathla isa Tswana word for monotonous, open, flat terrain) represented another part of the Africanmilieu. In many respects this training area is representative of the African environment. Theground surface changes from sandy or rocky to salt bush trunks. Weather differs from the oneextreme to the other. As a matter of interest, the Army Battle School is one of only three similarinstitutions in the world which aims at integrating the activities of all the different corps.

To summarise, the African environment can be described as a vast geography, which meansstrategic and long tactical moves. The terrain is more often rugged, densely vegetated and flat,the soil mostly sandy, studded with tree trunks and/or rocks, and the weather extremely hot, withcold winters.

FIREPOWER

The ideal firing positions taught during training ie the turret- or hull-down positions are seldom tobe found on the African scene. Clear and defined arcs of fire are also very limited in closeterrain. Main armament traverse is restricted, and concentration of fire is rarely possible, due tolow visibility and aiming interference. Armoured fighting vehicles can move as close as 20mapart, and the combat range for engaging targets is 200m and on occasion as close as 20m. Allthese limiting factors on the main armament require armour crews to ensure first-shot hits. Thismeans good reaction times and slick fire orders and drills, which are only possible with superiortraining the latter being the reason why our armoured crews survived the armoured battles andgained the edge over their Angolan and Cuban counterparts.

In defence, where terrain can be selected and dugouts prepared for better firing positions,concentration of fire by sub-units and units will be more likely. In this setting, anti-tank (AT)missiles are a potent weapon, especially in favourably selected positions and in a tank huntingrole. In densely vegetated terrain, the enemy uses trees to observe the activities of our forces.In this instance, secondary weapons such as the machine gun, used for speculative fire, proveto be effective, provided longer bursts are fired. Since the enemy must be located and engagedin rapid sequence on the ground and in tree tops, it requires good teamwork by turret crews withquick reactions.

Fire power is as important now as at any stage in the past. The limits the African environmentimposes on the use of armament compel armoured crews to elevate firepower to the mostcrucial discipline, if they are to perform well.



MOBILITY

The notion of mobility changes entirely on close terrain. Speed of tactical movement isdecreased considerably: tanks travel at 35km/h in densely vegetated terrain and under sandyconditions, and at a maximum of 15km/h on dirt roads. Speed decreases because of poorvisibility, and it is difficult to keep sight of individual vehicles; control over forces and navigationbecome the focus of movement. Combat formations must have visual contact between vehicles,and are therefore more rigid and set-piece; individual vehicles may not break away, and combattroops must stick together. The principles of fire and movement are more applicable than thoseof fire and manoeuvre.

Navigation is extremely difficult, even when a sub-unit is equipped with navigation equipment.Maintaining the axis of advance, or attacking with hatches `buttoned down', takes some doing.The navigation plan must be rehearsed and accurately executed by commanders at all levels,including individual AFVs the kilometre tripmaster on each AFV, together with combatformations, must be used to help the navigation plan. Navigation in urban operations has provedto be just as challenging. The use of sketch and command and control maps is essential.

The demands of the African environment became clear in the early years of armouredoperations. Experience showed that the combat range and speed of the Eland armoured carand Centurion tank were poor; South African industry reacted quickly to improve and satisfyarmour's needs. The Rooikat, with its impressive power and combat range, will fulfil therequirement. Its fire control system makes the Rooikat a formidable weapon. The upgrading ofthe Olifant MBT will help to overcome the limitations experienced previously.

General wear and tear on AFVs increase drastically in African conditions, requiring maintenanceat more regular intervals. The life span of tank tracks is also considerably shorter under sandyconditions especially, such as in south-east Angola, one can plan on about 1 500km only. Airfilters and air intakes also need special attention, as these are easily clogged by leaves. Whenusing tanks in densely vegetated areas, and specifically where logistic lines are unrealisticallylong, one really starts to appreciate one of their limitations, namely their dependence onlogistical support. Moving logistical and combat support vehicles over difficult terrain is moredifficult than moving AFVs. Logistical vehicles struggle to keep up with the fighting force, andfurthermore the vehicles and their cargooes are severely damaged by the vegetation.

In the African environment, operations should never be conducted with sparingly deployedlogistics, far from depots or third-line support. Movement over long distances takes time. It istherefore important to have A Echelons close to F Echelon, with a guaranteed back-up that iswell-protected.

Mines have become an important feature of the African milieu. It would be foolish to ignore avehicle mine threat; the safest way to eliminate this threat is not to move on any roads, and tobe extremely careful when going through defiles. This means challenges to movement, aspreviously mentioned.

Steady development over the past two decades has ensured that the SA Armoured Corpsmeets the operational demands of the African environment in terms of mobility and firepower,and has made it one of the leading armoured corps in the world.

PROTECTION



Armoured vehicles are more vulnerable in close and densely vegetated terrain than in the open;for that reason, accurate and timeous intelligence has become a very important operationalfunction during armoured operations. This not only improves precautionary measures, butensures that the armoured effort is directed productively, since it is easy to miss or by-pass theenemy at short range in close terrain.

The dense African bush favours infantry anti-tank weapons; the introduction of compositearmour has given the Olifant MBT a new lease on life. The African experience was remarkablywell addressed in the development of the Rooikat, which embodies a fine balance between theweight of armour against speed.

Experience forced the SA Army to undertake proper integrated force training. Infantry supporthelps to protect armour. Doctrine and procedures aimed at ensuring the integration of devicessuch as remotely piloted aircraft, electronic warfare, observation and surveillance teams are partof the training. The screening of forces by armoured cars or the use of flank guards to providereconnaisance services to tanks or other forces are still important roles. Immediate protectionwas improved with the ability to make smoke by spraying fuel on warm parts of the engine, andthe use of smoke grenade launchers. The use of these facilities, in conjunction with the denseundergrowth of the African bush, greatly improved the survival of the AFV.

Ideally, the AFV commander should have his head outside the vehicle, but this is not alwayspossible. Various arrangements have been made to provide commanders with some means ofvisibility from within AFVs, such as viewing slits protected by bullet-proof glass. Quality sightswith a day and night capability are fitted, but restrictions imposed upon these by the terrain andbush encountered on the African battlefield forced AFV commanders on numerous occasions tofight with their head outside their vehicles. The importance of good visibility while closed downemphasised the need to ensure proper control and effective target acquisition.

The bush war taught us that AFVs need to be extensively armoured, not only against enemyprojectiles but also against the damage caused by vegetation. Vehicles must have smooth andhardened exteriors, with no protruding objects and no exposed components (especially underthe chassis). Essential protrusions such as antennae, lights, etc must be specially protected.Crew ergonomics proved to be another crucial factor. Adequete climate control (ventilation/airconditioning) and availability of water for closed-down tank crews is essential to preventdehydration and heat fatigue.

Dense bush provides cover against artillery observation and air observation, thus decreasingthe effectiveness of artillery and the air weapon. Smoke and pyrotechnics as navigation controlaids must be used cautiously, and reserved for the most crucial stage of the operation.

SHOCK EFFECT

To concentrate armour in force at the right place and the right time remains a strongcharacteristic. The fact that an armoured force can reach targets by day or night despite thedensity of terrain will always surprise the enemy. The psychological effect of armour (especiallytanks) is increased because they can often be heard long before they are seen. To benefit fromthe presence of tanks on the battlefield, it is important that no less than squadron strength isdeployed at any one time.

During operations as well as force preparation it has become clear that commanders tend tolose focus on the depth of objectives. The full potential of armoured forces is lost after the initial



contact. The timeous concentration of fire on the enemy's strong points needs to be addressed.To ensure that the impetus of the offensive is kept, much more will have to be done about closereconnaissance for tanks and wide reconnaissance in general. The Rooikat armoured car withits advanced fire control system and better mobility is a top contributor to shock effect in thecombat reconnaissance role. The armoured car can not only perform the role of eyes and ears,but can also, in the case of the Rooikat, fight for information. As has already been discussed,the information collection system will have to be better integrated into the command and controlof armoured forces.

The SA Armoured Corps has good equipment. And the human potential of the SA soldier isremarkable: During the past years of operational deployment, leaders have proven time andtime again that they posses the fibre and initiative to keep up with the changing situation, andkeep the doctrine dynamic. The principle of the commander being placed far forward has beenconfirmed. Good radio discipline with accurate, short and essential commands by commandershave proved to be the correct drill. To ensure that the full potential of the combat soldier isutilised, the combat leader should always be cool and calm over the radio. Battle talk, sufficientto ensure the necessary aggressiveness and spirit needed to maintain the momentum of anoperation, must be practised.

The role of the armoured car in the internal and urban milieu has also brought some importantlessons to the fore. There is no doubt that the mere presence of armoured cars in urbanoperational theatres has a psychological effect. The required result must be determined inadvance, and the armour deployed accordingly: it is clear that in many cases the mere proximityof armoured cars to a big concentration of people tends to make them more aggressive. On theother hand, experience has shown that the presence of armoured cars at a distance and/or inthe background tends to bring calm to the area. Again, the armoured cars' characteristics ofmobility and flexibility with guaranteed communications have not yet been exploited to the full. Inthe African theatre the scope and potential of the shock effect of armoured forces must beexploited further.

TRAINING

Flowing from the above assessment of armour in the African milieu, it is clear that our trainingdoctrines and techniques have to be adjusted. Probably one of the strongest characteristics ofthe SA soldier is his adaptability. The way the soldier in southern Africa is busy adjusting to thenew environment, the new defence policy and the recently formed SA National Defence Force isproof of that.

Shortcomings in armoured soldiers' combat posture were picked up in debriefings after eachoperation. The lessons learnt were immediately implemented, and used to adjust ongoingtraining. Battle drills and procedures were adapted to fit the circumstances, and immediatelyevaluated during operations. Experience and strong combat leadership helped to bringarmoured doctrine and training techniques in line with operational requirements. The continuingoperational commitment, with its accompanying adjustments of drills and procedures, meant thattraining manuals became outdated. In recent years, much has been done to update all trainingmanuals and techniques.

At present, the focus of the SA Army is on force preparation. Much time is spent on technicaltraining (ie handling of equipment, slick crew drills, rapid reaction times on weapon systems,and good radio discipline). Simulated combat scenarios at tank, armoured car and squadronlevels are rehearsed to perfection. During the last four years I have evaluated all the corps of



the army during combat situations, and I can assure you that you can be proud of the calibre ofour armoured soldiers. At the same time, I want to caution everyone responsible to ensure that acombat-effective armoured corps does not put a time limit on training, but rather has battle drillor skill as the priority objective.

Since we can no longer practise armoured operations in real combat, a high priority should alsobe placed on developing combat leadership. There are many techniques one can apply in thecourse of this process; suffice it to say that the development of initiative, and innovative andquick thinking, with an understanding of the situation and the ability to adjust accordingly, is ofthe essence.

FUTURE OPERATIONS

Predicting war is difficult, if not impossible. Yet it must be done in order to focus training,research and development, force structure, operational craft and tactical techniques. Failure todo so is to prepare for the previous war. The political progression and preferences of a nationare almost impossible to predict. The state of the US armoured force at the start of World War 2is a good example of being unprepared. More recently, the deployment of the US Army inSomalia and Rwanda came as a surprise to many of the soldiers.

My vision (and this is not an official view) of a future theatre of war is one of high-tempo, high-intensity joint operations encompassing vast areas. High-technology weapon systems, includingarmour, will be used. On the tactical level, information will be paramount. To ensure thefurnishing of accurate intelligence, high-tech collection systems and good command and controlwill be a prerequisite. As regards the technical aspects of armour, basic AFV drills andprocedures such as fire and movement will be needed, directed by strong leadership. Theabsence of an external threat in the short term must by no means signify that the army may lieidle. The Armoured Corps, especially the tanks, have to be prepared at all times to execute themandate of the SANDF.

In the meantime the Armoured Corps, especially the armoured cars, may occasionally beengaged in curbing internal conflict, to ensure peace and democracy for all. The role of stoppingand discouraging aggression can become its focus. The SANDF now has the historicopportunity to assist and lead Africa. Although the internal situation will have to be addressedfirst, the SANDF will sooner or later have to take up its position in peace-keeping and peaceenforcement. Policy-makers must determine what types of actions are appropriate: armouredcars have the characteristics to command and ensure a safe situation.

Above all else, the SANDF and the Armoured Corps must always be ready, willing and able, nomatter what demands are made of them.

Untitled Document 2011/08/10 12:33 PM MAILED FIST ... · PDF fileArmour and the attack...

Documents

Transcript of Untitled Document 2011/08/10 12:33 PM MAILED FIST ... · PDF fileArmour and the attack...